Xiao Ma

South Korean Migrants in China

An Ethnography of Education, Desire, and Temporariness

South Korean Migrants in China

South Korean Migrants in China

An Ethnography of Education, Desire, and Temporariness

Xiao Ma

Amsterdam
University
Press

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

Abstract

This chapter frames the central questions and key concepts that this book aims to examine. First and foremost, migrant education is regarded as a lens through which to assess South Korean migrants' socio-political positionality in China. I adopt 'in-between' as an analytical framework to elaborate on the subjective and structural aspects of this positionality. Furthermore, 'educational desire' among Korean migrants illustrates how they respond to the temporariness generated by the education-migration regimes of both China and Korea. Viewing Koreans as a new wave of foreigners in China, I also examine their identities and practices in the unique context of Chinese internationalisation. Meanwhile, these migrants are also observed to be a novel form of Korean diaspora, and one that has become globalized.

Keywords: In-between, educational desire, internationalisation, globalisation

One chilly morning in October in 2014, I attended a tour of an international school in Beijing with Hyemin – a South Korean (hereafter Korean) diplomat's wife and mother of a fifteen-year-old girl. As with many other Korean women in Beijing, Hyemin had moved to Beijing with her husband, who had been given an overseas posting, and their daughter. Although she had had a job in Korea, in Beijing she became a housewife and took care of the daily life of her family, while her husband played the role of breadwinner. Their daughter was enrolled in Year 9 at a British school in Beijing, and 70% of the tuition fees were covered by the father's employer as part of the subsidies granted to expatriate employees. In an earlier conversation, Hyemin told me that her family would only reside in China for three years before returning to their home country, as her husband's appointment was for a fixed term. Hyemin added that, at the end of the three years,

she would return to continue her career as a Korean language teacher at a public middle school. However, some time after our first meeting, Hyemin confessed that she had totally changed her mind about this, for reasons that will be explored later.

The school tour was arranged by me, a PhD candidate keen to learn about every aspect of the education of Korean migrant children in China. Many Korean parents had told me how 'good' they believed the international schools were for their children, and many either intended to, or had already enrolled their children in such an institution. I became curious to see how good these schools really were. Hyemin was very pleased to join the school tour with me because she was dissatisfied with the schooling her daughter was receiving and planned to transfer her to another school with a more intensive academic programme. The entire tour was private and attended by three people: an admissions officer called Anna – a Chinese woman who had completed her master's programme in an English-speaking country – Hyemin, and myself.

The first part of the tour took place in the meeting room of the admissions office, where Anna gave us a brief and informative introduction to the school in fluent English. We were provided with a package of brochures and printouts to look through. The second part was much more interesting, as Anna guided us around the main building and showed us the school's facilities, which included art rooms, music rooms, classrooms, a science laboratory, a library, a theatre, and a canteen. The well-equipped, brightly coloured and nearly spotless environment stood in sharp contrast to many Chinese public schools. In the corridor, almost every wall was fully decorated with the students' art works, photos of school events and some exquisite sketches. Located behind the main building was a dome-shaped stadium, which was as big as two basketball courts. It was equipped with an advanced air purifying system to protect students from the harmful Beijing smog during PE (Physical Education) lessons. Other sporting facilities included a swimming pool, several tennis courts, a rugby pitch, and an ice skating rink.

At the end of the tour, in the meeting room, we were provided with information about admissions. This served as a perfect opportunity for me to observe Hyemin's concerns about the school, while assisting her in communicating in English. Interestingly, she spent most of the time asking questions regarding the Diploma Programme (DP for short) offered to students in the last two years of high school (Years Twelve-Thirteen). 'Why do you care about the DP so much? Didn't you plan to return to Korea

when your daughter finishes Year Eleven in China?', I asked Hyemin. To my surprise, she explained:

> I have changed my mind… I did plan to move back to Korea in three years. However, international schools here are so good that my greed (*yokshim*) comes out. You can see how good they are yourself… I think I could remain in China with T'aeŭn (her daughter), even if my husband moves back to Korea. If T'aeŭn stayed and acquired (studied) the DP here, she would be able to apply for a wide range of top universities throughout the world; of course, including the Korean ones. Do you know what it means? It means she would gain much wider choices for her life and future!
> If she moves back [to Korea in three years], it would be very difficult [for her] to catch up with other Korean kids, because kids in Korea study very hard. Now she has adapted to the English academic environment and can understand the classes well and enjoy them. I think it would be such a pity if I moved her back to the Korean environment, as she would forget English very soon.

Hyemin's daughter eventually returned to Korea and was admitted to Yonsei University – one of the top three universities in Korea. Hyemin seemed rather content with this outcome. Like many other Korean migrant children in this book, Hyemin's daughter was enrolled via the 'special case' university admissions track that was created to recruit the children of overseas Korean nationals (and foreigners) into domestic universities in Korea. In contrast to Hyemin's daughter, some Korean students elected to stay in China with the intention of being admitted into a reputable Chinese university. However, many of these students were clueless about how to prepare for the university admissions process in China. As a result, they had to rely on the services of Korean-run educational institutes to assist them in their preparation.

The school tour, and Hyemin's talk of 'greed' spurred me to further explore what she meant. How is this greed created and what makes it grow? The follow-up stories of Hyemin's daughter and other Korean young people in this book further drive me to think: what are the socio-political rationales for returning to Korea versus staying in China in pursuit of a university degree? More generally, I want to investigate the dynamic and flexible subjectivities of Korean migrants in China, particularly towards making choices, planning future trajectories and dealing with authorities in terms of education and migration. Looking into migrants' agency in depth further helps to understand the interplay of ordinary migrants and the structural leverage of education/migration regimes exercised by the host and home

state. How are these approaches of governance reflective of the rapidly changing social-political milieu in both China and South Korea?

Education as a Lens: Korean Migrants In-between Two States

In anthropological interpretations of education, the modern nation state plays a pivotal role in organising, controlling and sustaining the education system in order to achieve standardisation and centralisation (Gellner 1983, 29–38). As such, educational infrastructure provides a shared linguistic and cultural medium between strangers, who are then able to communicate efficiently as they later come to involve themselves in the division of labour required in a modern industrial society. According to Gellner (1983,37), 'The educational infrastructure is too large and costly for any organisation other than the biggest one of all, the state'. Ethnographic studies conducted in mainland China, India and Turkey, demonstrate that educational systems operate as a state apparatus that shapes individuals' performances, emotions and identities in relation to nation building (Bénéï 2008; Kaplan 2006; Hansen 1999).

Influential studies of immigrant education have been conducted in the American context. The children of immigrants encounter unintended challenges, disruption and misalignments within the state-organised educational systems that aim to develop dedicated and committed citizens (Suárez-Orozco et. al. 2011; Lukose 2007). For instance, educational anthropologist John Ogbu and his associates address the relatively poor academic performance of black American students, compared with the white majority (Ogbu 2008; Ogbu and Simons 1998; Ogbu 1995a; 1995b; Fordham and Ogbu 1986). Through under-performance at school, they essentially manifest a resistance against the social bias and unequal access to education and jobs for ethnic minorities. However, in some cases, we can observe that migrant communities excel in the host schooling system. Sociologist Alejandro Portes, Min Zhou, and their associates demonstrate the remarkable educational achievements of Asian American youth (Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese) deriving from a 'culture-structure' framework. They reference the unique cultural values shared by these migrant families in tandem with several structural factors generated by migrant communities and education institutions in the host country (Lee and Zhou 2015; Zhou 2014; 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

The aforementioned studies predominantly focus on the educational achievements of immigrant children and the extent of their integration

and assimilation into mainstream society. However, I regard Koreans in this book as 'migrants' taking up temporary residence in the destination, with a high likelihood of returning to their home country or moving on to a third country. More specifically, they have temporary working, living and schooling arrangements in China, a country which is supposedly a 'land of opportunity' for many non-natives to seek their fortune (Lehmann and Leonard 2019, 121–79). As Lukose (2007) suggests, not all migrants become immigrants who reside permanently in the receiving country and thus it is imperative to examine migrants' globally-dispensed identities and multicultural practices that go beyond a nationalist framework in the field of education. In other words, the anthropology of migrant education requires going beyond the nation-state as a dominant unit of analysis and, accordingly, beyond the analytical framework of integration and assimilation (Lukose 2007).

In this vein, Koreans in China tend to conduct a variety of educational practices that don't always conform to a desire for educational achievement, but to aspirations for choice-making and trajectories-planning. The ethnographic data in this book show that Korean parents are keen to cultivate multilingual children by choosing between four school tracks: international (English-medium), bilingual (English-Chinese), Korean, and Chinese (as discussed in Chapter 4). Korean students have a multitude of academic trajectories available to them. They can either return to attend a Korean university (as discussed in Chapter 5) or remain to study in a Chinese institution (as discussed in Chapter 6), in addition to a few moving on to a third place. Furthermore, Korean educational agents seek cooperation with Chinese schools and universities in order to assist their clients with university entry examination preparation (Chapter 6).

Using migrant education as a lens, this book aims to address the socio-political positionality of South Koreans in China as a rising destination appealing to international migrants. I contend that many of my research subjects are 'in-between' two states (China and South Korea). I draw on this as an analytical approach to understand their education- and migration-related practices and identities. First and foremost, the term 'in-between' denotes the multiple, unstable and malleable trajectories created by transmigrants, simultaneously structured by the migration and education regimes of the sending and receiving countries (Grillo 2007). The connotation of this use of the word 'migrants' indicates that they are more than a singular phenomenon of immigrants who settle in one country while retaining multiple ties with their homeland. Instead, migrants are 'betwixt and between', i.e., being transnationally positioned in heterogeneous ways.

They can be 'both here and there', 'neither here nor there', 'everywhere' and even 'beyond here and there' (Crawley and Jones 2021; Grillo 2007). I thus highlight that 'in-between' is a comparable and yet more flexible term than transnationality (which primarily denotes a relatively fixed positionality of immigrants, most of whom are permanent residents in the host country while retaining ties with their home).

Additionally, 'in-between' refers to a state of being liminal but not entirely in limbo. Building on Arnold van Gennep's notion of 'rites de passage', Turner utilises 'liminal persona(e)' to depict the neophytes in the initiation or puberty rites who are 'no longer classified and not yet classified' (Turner 1987, 47; 1969, 94–113). These persons are transitional beings 'betwixt and between' all the recognised fixed points in the space-time of structural classification (Turner 1987, 48). In this vein, migration scholars address 'a sense of liminality' (Huang, Yeoh, and Lam 2008, 7) among Asian transnationals and their ambiguous, open and indeterminant identities as they narrate and negotiate transnational life courses. Studies also highlight a performance of liminality (Kirk, Bal, and Janssen 2017) that illustrates the disengagement of highly-skilled migrants with their social and cultural life in both host and home country. According to Noussia and Lyons (2009), liminality is reflective of 'temporariness and transitory character of the migrants' experience', which derives from both nostalgia and instrumental strategies carried out in the host city.

I interpret liminality in this book both as a state of temporariness, and as perceptions and practices of migrants in response to an immigration-unfriendly milieu. These migrants reside temporarily in a non-traditional immigrant country where permanent residency is predictably difficult to obtain. They keep open minds as to multiple patterns of (im)mobility, such as returning, remigrating or simply staying. I suggest that liminality does not necessarily engender a state of precariousness, i.e., living in limbo (Robertson and Runganaikaloo 2014). Rather, migrants are capable of strategically adjusting their arrangements and trajectories to their state of temporariness, and even capitalising on and benefiting from it. They are not stuck but straddling 'in- between'.

In addition to a subjective positioning, 'in-between' also indicates a structural positioning that creates and reinforces the temporariness of migrants. It refers to the institutional circumstances that are paradoxically moulded by the migration-education regimes of sending and receiving countries. More specifically, this indicates a matrix of migratory/educational governance that prefers temporary migrants to permanent residents (in China), and favours overseas returnees equipped with internationally

recognised skills and knowledge (in Korea). These regulatory preferences further shape the motivations, desires, and more generally subjectivities of the migrant population (Robertson and Runganaikaloo 2014, 213; Ong 1999, 5–6).

In this book, in-betweenness is understood primarily from the transnational perspective rather than the transcultural. Korean migrants may thus be distinguished from the European expatriate youth living in Shanghai, whose cultural identities are also enmeshed between two worlds, the home country and the country of residence, as depicted in Sander's (2016) study. Korean migrants in China are also dissimilar to those who would seek permanent residency in the receiving country, for example Indian students in Australia who pursue (yet may not attain) permanent residency in that country (Baas 2010); this is primarily because China, socially and institutionally, appears reluctant to accept a large number of new permanent residents. My focus then is on how the migration-education regimes of sending and receiving countries mould the structural and subjective positioning of Korean migrants in the context of contemporary Chinese society.

Educational Desire: Agency in Temporary Migration Regimes

In this study on Korean migration and education, I focus on three groups of stakeholders: migrant parents, migrant children/students, and educational agents (people who are engaged in businesses related to education). Several years after completing my fieldwork, I still vividly recall the sparkle in Changŭn's eyes as she told me how she felt about her son attending an English-language international school in Beijing, and having the opportunity to improve his English proficiency before the family returned to Korea. I also remember Yŏngmi's anxious expression as she talked about her husband's 'early return' to Korea, which would result in their son not achieving the status of 'overseas returnee' – a privileged status that provides an easier route to a place at a reputable Korean university. I also recall Ŭnpi's excitement as she spoke of her determination to sit for the special entry exams designed for foreigners, which is a requirement of Tsinghua University in China. Similarly, I cannot forget Mr Chang's disappointment when he told me that the local government had retracted his educational agency's licence to operate because it lacked a 'legal' cooperation arrangement with a Chinese institute.

Unlike the concerns of many other Western expatriates in China (See Farrer 2019; Sander 2016), the educational aspirations of South Koreans

outlined in this book were generated in their home country and subsequently carried with them to China (Ma 2019, 75). They were driven by the socioeconomic upheaval in Korea following the Asian financial crisis (1997–1998), leading to what I refer to as an 'education exodus' (Chapter 3). The educational aspirations further drive Koreans in China to develop subjectivities and strategies to tackle transnational circumstances through the opportunities and challenges endowed by regimes of education and migration (Chapter 4, 5 and 6).

In conceptualising the above concerns on education, I adopt 'educational desire' as the core notion, central to my research. This concept is derived from *Governing Educational Desire* by Andrew Kipnis (2011), who interrogated why even the poorest people in rural China aim to provide a better life for their family and offspring through acquiring university education. Kipnis suggested viewing the creation of educational desires in China as a reflection on the process of governance. This process, according to Kipnis, is not 'a strictly top-down imagination in which a small group of state elites governs the masses' (Kipnis 2011, 5). Instead, it is carried out 'by various representatives of state agencies, by teachers and parents, by children vis-à-vis one another, and by everyone vis-à-vis him or her' (Kipnis 2011, 5). Kipnis found that educational desire in rural China is attributed to Chinese farmers and their desire to shed their 'peasant status', and to allow their descendants to become urban residents. For many years, peasants have been marginalised in the Chinese discourse on economic growth and social development, and this is partially responsible for their educational desires, according to Kipnis.

The notion of 'educational desire' has been further adopted to understand the movement of international students in Asia. For instance, Collins et. al. (2014) found that large numbers of international students were motivated to study in Singapore due to the creation of a government scholarship programme and the desire of universities to become more internationalised. Educational desire from the perspective of the individual and the institutional were 'mutually constitutive' in the Singaporean case. Focusing on students and scholars from mainland China, Yang (2016) addresses the educational desire of these selected 'foreign talents' by the scholarship scheme of the Singaporean government. He defines educational desire as 'all manners of aspirations, longings, and interests that students experience and develop in an evolving way as they pursued and underwent education across national, cultural, linguistic and other borders and boundaries' (Yang 2016, 16). The study demonstrates that the strength of a national education programme engendered educational desires among individual

students, causing their subjectivities to grow and change. These studies show educational desire as being a formidable and viable form of subjectivity that is interwoven with citizenship status, government policy and the performance of educational institutions.

As Foucault (1978, 81) argues, desire is not repressed by power, neither is power essentially repressive, rather desire and power can be 'joined to one another' in a way that 'where there is desire, the power relation is already present…'. This theoretical viewpoint underpins that power is not an exterior force imposed upon people, but can be produced in every possible relation where desire grows and perpetuates. In addition to its connection with power, desire also has rich social implications. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 25–26) emphasise that desire is not an idealistic conception, nor is it a product of fantasy in human unconsciousness, rather 'if desire is productive, it can be productive in the real world and can produce only reality'. They point out that the immanence of desire changes social connections and relations so as to affect established orders of society (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 118). Furthermore, they believe that society can establish its order through creating 'docile subjects' who repress their desires and internalise social norms (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 118). In this sense, this book reveals how South Koreans perform their educational desire, conceive educational strategies and navigate their migration trajectories in the face of various regimes of education and migration that are representative of power. It also discusses the extent to which Korean migrants become 'docile subjects' as they deal with Chinese authorities' regulation of education.

As a theory for migration studies, desire is crucial in understanding the 'emotional generator' and 'the unpredictable dimensions' of international migration (Collins 2018). The evolution of desire tends to be an ongoing process that encompasses human emotions, aspirations and motives, instead of being located at a single point in time. In this regard, migrants' desire reveals the 'multiple temporalities of migration' (Cwerner 2001, cited in Collins, 2018) that includes 'starts and stops', 'possibilities and prospects' and 'blockages and diversions' (Collins 2018).

To this end, this study aims to further address educational desires that are engendered and evolve in the context of 'temporary migration regimes' (also TMRs) (Cook-Martín et al. 2019; Yeoh 2022). The TMRs are policy initiatives that aim to manage international population movements by creating and perpetuating 'a time delimited status' for migrants (Cook-Martín et al. 2019). Specific temporary migration programmes (e.g., contract labour arrangements) are essentially an 'imprimatur of legitimacy', granted and guaranteed by the state. In Asia, the well-documented labour migration

schemes are regarded as featuring 'enforced transience' (Yeoh 2022), 'compulsory return' (Xiang 2013b, 2) , and 'temporary arrangements' in terms of labour contracts and work permits (Baas 2018). Studies also show that temporary migration regulations exert influence on international students and scholars in several Asian countries (e.g., Singapore, Australia and China) and cause students to fall into a state of precariousness (Chacko 2021; Wang 2020; Wang and Chen 2020; Robertson and Runganaikaloo 2014; Robertson 2013).

Nonetheless, limited attention has been paid to the migrant families and entrepreneurs who live and work under such temporary migration regimes in Asia, particularly in relation to education-migration regimes. This study fills this gap by investigating their emerging and evolving subjectivities as they tackle temporariness; their coping strategies with structural constraints; and their capabilities of capturing the opportunities generated by their transnational mobility. I also intend to examine how they imagine, plan and navigate their mobile trajectories in the future. In general, my study provides insights in exploring migrant agency in the context of the temporary education-migration regimes of China and Korea within the confines of a discrete case study.

'Foreigners', 'Immigrants' and Chinese Internationalisation

From the perspective of the Chinese administration, South Koreans and other foreign nationalities are identified as 'persons with a foreign nationality' (*waiji renyuan*), simplified as 'foreigners' (*waiguoren*) (NBS 2011). The Sixth Chinese national population census in 2010, for the first time, incorporated foreigners into the scope of its investigation and reported their number as 593,832 throughout China (NBS 2011). South Koreans made up the largest group of foreigners in China (120,750), followed by Americans (71,493) and Japanese (66,159). In 2020, the total number of foreigners increased to 845,697 (NBS 2021). Foreigners, alongside the 'residents' (*jumin*) from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, constitute a statistical category of 'persons from outside the borders (of mainland China)' (*jingwai renyuan*). The latter group are considered as people 'between pure foreigners and full citizens (*gongmin*) of the PRC' who do not hold a PRC passport (Pieke 2012, 45).

The body of academic work on foreigners in China can be roughly broken down into three interrelated themes: 1) the presence of foreigners, especially Westerners, in pre-Mao and Mao eras (Gu 1925; Spence 1969; Brady 2012; Hooper 2016); 2) China's foreign policy following the Reform and Opening-up

era and newly-established immigration administration (Brady 2000; Pieke 2012; Speelman 2020); and 3) experiences and encounters with foreigners in contemporary Chinese society, including ethnic and racial encounters between foreigners and Chinese people (For instance, Kim 2010; Cheuk 2016; Lan 2017). Within the third segment we can also observe bodies of literature on expatriates' lives and communities in transnationally social context (Lehmann 2014; Farrer 2019), and the middle class migrants in the era of transnationalism and globalisation (Yoon 2020), including South Koreans, and others, from Africans to Westerners. Most studies on the third segment address migrant subjectivity in relation to social structure at national, transnational and international levels.

In 1925, Gu Weijun – a diplomat from the Republic of China – (also known as V. K. Wellington Koo) published '*Wairen Zaihua Zhi Diwei*' (The Status of Foreigners in China), which was probably the earliest work concerning foreign settlement in China. During the 'no-treaty period between 120 and 1842', Gu said that the Emperor of China showed considerable tolerance to foreign envoys, merchants, and asylum seekers, even providing privilege and protection towards missionaries. However, from the 16th century, the authorities adopted a policy of isolation and put stringent constraints on the inflows of foreigners. But, from 1842 onwards, the 'treaty period', China gave foreigners concessions and exempted them from local law. This extraterritorial privilege was granted to them in the aftermath of the Opium War (1839–1842) (Bao 1932). In brief, the early work published in Chinese in this field focuses on the legal and political status of foreigners in Chinese history, which highlights the privileges they enjoyed.

Collecting sixteen biographies of Western advisors in China between 1620 and 1960, Spence (1969, 290) found that these Westerners approached China 'from a standpoint of superiority'. Consequently, some Chinese were content to receive them, whereas others treated them with 'indifference, deception, or hostility' (Spence 1969, 292). However, focusing on foreign interaction within the Republic of China, Brady (2012) argued that it was the West's colonial impositions in China that engendered the rise of modern Chinese self-consciousness.

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949, the government pledged to eradicate all remnants of the 'imperialist existence', mainly referring to Western residents and their churches, clubs, newspapers and investments, in order to establish a new socialist country (Waldron 1988). Under Mao's regime, the Westerners (from the UK, Western Europe, North America and Australasia) were small in number and yet varied in

category (Hooper 2016).[1] They were governed by 'privileged segregation' (Hooper 2016, 5), a policy which aimed to separate and insulate them from the 'harsh realities' of Maoist China. This was done to ensure that they could not negatively influence the international community's impression of the new communist state.

In post-Mao China, the fundamental and institutional distinction between foreigners and Chinese continued. 'Treating insiders and outsiders differently' (*neiwai youbie*) is a core principle of CCP policies and activities concerning 'foreign affairs' (*waishi*) in the Reform and Opening-up era (Brady 2000, 943–947). Foreigners are '*wai*' (outer, external), while Chinese nationals are '*nei*' (inner, internal). 'Insiders are to be trusted; outsiders are to be feared' (Brady 2000, 954). Based upon this doctrine, the Chinese government has enacted contradictory yet pragmatic policies towards foreigners. On the one hand, they intend to 'utilise foreign technology and foreign investment' to propel Chinese modernisation and to help the country establish a prominent position on the world stage. On the other, they consider it imperative to 'control and manage foreigners' presence and activities' (Brady 2000, 943–946).

The above doctrines on 'foreign affairs' continue to exert influence on the emergence and transformation of the Chinese immigration regime. Before 2018, China lacked the comprehensive administrative apparatus to deal with immigration affairs; and the country's immigration regulatory framework was outdated and unsuitable to deal with increasing inflows of foreign populations (Pieke 2012; 2014). Even the term 'immigration' was scarcely used in official documents. While the awarding of permanent residence to foreigners was unavailable until 2004, the comprehensive legislation on 'exit and entry administration' was not enforced until 2013. Although 'foreign experts' enjoyed special treatment, the vast majority of ordinary foreigners were deprived of basic rights, such as access to education, healthcare and social security. Foreigners were treated as 'a special alien presence' rather than 'an integral part of Chinese society' (Pieke 2014).

In 2018, the Chinese government established the country's first national-level agency, dedicated to 'immigration affairs', the National Immigration Administration (NIA), (Speelman 2020). The NIA was established with two aims. The first is to normalise and standardise immigration administration, particularly concerning illegal migrants and refugees. The second is to provide institutional support to attract talent from throughout the world

---

1   According to Hooper, the western residents in Mao's China included six categories: "foreign comrades", Korean War "turncoats", diplomats, correspondents, "foreign experts", and students.

(NIA 2019). However, official statements concerning the integration of foreign residents have not been sufficiently discussed, and the paths to acquiring permanent residency are still unclear (Pieke et al. 2019). The launch of the NIA demonstrates the profound tensions between China's desire to open up to the world, while prioritising its 'security-oriented governance model' and thus retaining the distinctions between foreigners and Chinese (Speelman 2020). This contradiction is reflected throughout this book, particularly in Chapter 3, which concerns the internationalisation of Chinese education.

This book views foreigners as a 'new wave' of migrants in China, which has become an attractive destination for migrants globally despite contradictory and confusing migration policies (Leonard and Lehmann 2019, 2). South Koreans are similar to European and American expatriates in China to the extent that they are mostly professionals and entrepreneurs (Leonard and Lehmann 2019, 8–9). The economic and cultural capital that they possess make them appealing to the Chinese authorities, who generally permit them to stay in the country for a longer period of time compared to unskilled labour, for instance. However, Koreans do not experience the racialised 'white privilege' enjoyed by many western expatriates (Farrer 2019; Lehmann 2014; Leonard 2010), which means that they are less likely to gain opportunities and resources in China due to their skin colour. Despite this, Koreans still gain certain benefits (e.g. educational opportunities) by being foreigners in contemporary China, a country that enthusiastically welcomes international students and professional talents in its quest towards internationalisation.

My research is unique in that it explores Korean experiences and encounters in the context of Chinese internationalisation (*guojihua*). It is in this context that I investigate how Koreans respond to the policies, discourses and infrastructures enacted by the Chinese government, specifically with reference to education, migration and the aim of promoting Chinese internationlisation. More generally, I propose to examine whether the superiority, privilege and segregation that foreigners experience in building this Chinese conception of modernisation is retained, reinforced or waning in contemporary China.

Internationalisation is defined as 'the expanded flows of goods, services, and people across state boundaries', implying an increase in transnational transactions and exchanges, in tandem with a decline in the level of the state's leverage regulating these flows (Zweig 2002, 3). The process of China's internationalisation, as Zweig (2002, 17) argues, is shaped by centrally erected political and economic structures, in which the local state, communities and individuals play important roles in bringing down barriers to transnational

transactions and global exchange. However, some scholars find that the Chinese state is also capable of decentralising state-owned enterprises from administrative departments and promoting private-owned enterprises (Chin 2007; Gonzalez-Vicente 2011). This trend is called 'the internationalisation of the Chinese state' (Chin 2007; Gonzalez-Vicente 2011).

Additionally, the Chinese state plays an important role in the internationalisation of higher education in China, particularly in making policies and providing funds (F. Huang 2015). As Wang (2014, 17) argues, this internationalisation 'with Chinese characteristics' in the education sector is intrinsically 'a strategy of walking on two legs'. Walking on one of these legs refers to 'bringing in' talented international staff to enhance academic quality and attract foreign students to diversify the student base on campus. This ultimately takes place with the purpose of building world-class universities in China. Walking on the other leg is to promote Chinese culture, language and values to the world, with education serving as an important medium of communication. In this regard, internationalisation of education implies a two-way educational exchange between China and the outside world (Yang 2002).

Internationalisation as a top-down national strategy has been well discussed. However, what is still insufficiently explored is how foreign nationals in China respond to this trend. This book thereby fills a gap by exploring how Korean parents and students in China make educational choices and respond to the manifestations of internationalisation (Chapter 4). This research also shows how Korean education agents capitalise on Chinese universities' desire for international students by assisting Korean students' entry into Chinese universities (Chapter 6). Looking at what may be termed 'grassroots internationalisation' from the bottom up helps to shed light on Chinese modes of internationalisation in education from the perspective of foreign migrants.

'Temporary Residents', 'Blood-kins' and Korean Globalisation

The contemporary presence of South Korean migrants in China has been driven by an array of political, economic and social causes in the post-Cold War era. Migration to China became officially legitimated in 1992 after the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. Both sides had represented opposing and hostile ideologies during the Cold War. Following this, economic activity and social interactions between the two countries

increased. This is demonstrated by the expansion of Korean multinational corporations into China and the decision of many Korean individuals and families to seek their fortune in the world's most populous state (Song 2013; Yeo 2012; Seo 2007).

Statistics from MOFA (The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs) classify Korean overseas nationals into two major categories, 'temporary residents' (*ch'eryuja*) and 'permanent residents' (*yŏngjugwŏnja*). The first category includes two sub-groups: 'general temporary residents' and 'study abroad students' (*yuhaksaeng*) (MOFA 2015). Temporary residents, in this sense, refers to a wide range of Korean nationals who do not have permanent residency, but who hold a residence permit valid for a certain period of time. It excludes those with short-term visas, such as tourists. The statistics show that South Korean temporary residents in China (421,897) enormously outnumber permanent residents (5,572) (MOFA 2015). Notably, the vast majority of permanent residency card holders (5,508 out of 5,572) reside in Hong Kong rather than in mainland China.

The South Korean state has played a central role in mobilising and engineering emigration from South Korea over the past decades following the end of the Korean War (1950–1953). A few years after the war, only three small and specific groups of South Koreans were officially approved to move to North America: wives and children of American military officers; war orphans adopted by foreign parents; and government-sponsored students (Yoon 2012, 415). The 1962 implementation of the 'Overseas Emigration Law' marked the start of the South Korean government encouraging emigration. The government saw the initiative as a method to achieve a number of policy goals, including improving population control and reducing poverty while providing citizens with the opportunity to earn foreign currency and learn overseas (Kwon 1997, 8). Significant numbers of government-contracted workers, including miners and nurses, migrated to work in West Germany and Norway, while agricultural workers moved to farm in Brazil and Argentina; this was the case until the late 1970s (Yi 2000, 119). Skilled migrants, particularly educated professionals and entrepreneurs, accounted for the majority of migrants moving to North America and Australia from the mid-1960s onwards. This was primarily driven by the liberalisation of immigration policies in the recipient countries (DeWind et. al. 2012).

Beginning in the 1990s, emigration from Korea was regarded as a consequence of Korean capital expansion (regionally and globally) and Korean enterprises outsourcing in pursuit of lower labour costs and larger consumer markets (DeWind et. al. 2012). This was intensified by two trends, relating to globalisation, that occurred in Korea. Firstly, the policy of 'globalisation'

(*segyehwa*) as 'a state-enhancing, top-down strategic plan' to develop Korea as 'a world-class, advanced country', was initiated and promoted by the Korean authorities from the mid-1990s (Kim 2000, 2–3). In adopting globalisation as a policy, the Korean government conducted a series of political and economic reforms concerning 'deregulation, decentralisation and democratisation' with the aim of dismantling the collusion problem between the government and corporate giants (Kim 2000, 4). However, these reforms were condemned for making the national economy more vulnerable to regional fluctuations, and exacerbated the fallout experienced in Korea as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Kim 2000, 42–81). In accepting the bailout offered by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Korea agreed to open its doors to inflowing foreign capital. This, I argue, signified the second wave of globalisation in Korea.

As an integral part of the *segyehwa* policy, the Korean government actively reached out to overseas Koreans by declaring them '*tongp'o*' (blood-kin, compatriots) rather than the previously used term '*kyop'o*' (Koreans residing in foreign countries). In this way, they sought to establish and reinforce a 'de-territorialised Korean national community' (Park 1996). The Overseas Korean Act (OKA), implemented in 1999, further pledged to grant quasi-citizenship to selected groups of the diasporic population (e.g., Korean Americans) due to their potential contribution to the nation (Park and Chang 2005). From the early 2000s onwards, the MOFA regularly released official statistics on 'overseas blood-kin' (*chaeoedongp'o*), which generally incorporates two groups: 1) overseas nationals (*chaeoegungmin*), i.e., Korean citizens who reside abroad; and 2) blood-kin with a foreign nationality (*oegukkukchŏktongp'o*).[2] The focus of this book is placed on the first group.

Claiming overseas Koreans as 'blood-kin' highlights the changing role of the Korean state and its impact on overseas communities. The home is no longer a remote existence in the historical memory and cultural identity of diasporic people, as discussed in numerous diaspora studies (Tölölyan 2007; Clifford 1994; Sheffer 1986). Instead, it has been transformed into a significant political power that ambitiously attempts to incorporate its overseas nationals into the national discourse on development. As noted by Basch et. al.(1994, 269) 'by this logic, there is no longer a diaspora because wherever its people go, their state goes too'.

---

2   Since 2003, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has released "Chaeoedongp'o hyŏnhwang" (The status quo of overseas blood-kin) every two years. See more details in http://www.mofa. go.kr/www/index.do.

In this study, I intend to highlight the impact of this political discourse and policies on the overseas Korean population in China, especially with regards to making choices, planning trajectories and running businesses related to education. I also aim to investigate how Korean migrant groups develop perceptible and practical connections with the homeland in specifically educational practices such as choosing between different school tracks and preparing for university admission back home. These attempts are conducive to understanding Korean migrants in China as a novel form of diaspora, particularly with reference to the migrants' positionality in between two formidable state regimes, China and South Korea.

A Multi-Scalar Ethnography

In this project, I adopt 'a multi-scalar ethnography' as a method of planning fieldwork, organising data, analysis and writing (Xiang 2013a). Although ethnographic research was pioneered in cultural and social anthropology, it was adopted by scholars of other subjects in the social sciences, including sociology, history, and geography. Focusing on the ethnographic approach to study migration, Brettell (2003, xix) suggested varying units of analysis and comprehensively examining units of sending and receiving states (e.g., their migration policies and settlement patterns), migrant community, family (or household), and individual migrant. She underscored that it is imperative for anthropologists to 'acknowledge the significance of each of these units or levels of analysis and try to attend to all of them in their studies of migration'.

Drawing on the term 'scale makers', Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2011, 12–19) consider migrants as active agents entering into urban life in divergent ways and explore how they impacted the way a city positions itself globally, nationally or locally. They regarded migrants as scale makers because migrants 'labour, produce wealth, raise families and create and reproduce social institutions' and thus contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of their cities (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011, 12). Furthermore, Glick Schiller (2015, 2277–2278) adopted a 'multi-scalar global perspective' and called on migration scholars to acknowledge the 'multiple intersecting array of networks' apparent in the 'transnational social fields', suggesting that they trace these networks and discover the often 'unequal social relations across space and through time'.

Despite similarly framing migrants as 'scale makers', Xiang(2013a) places his analytical emphasis on the migrants (i.e., their actions and concerns)

rather than on cities and networks, as done in other works mentioned above. By defining 'scale' as 'the spatial reach of actions', he considered it imperative to trace 'people's concerns, calculations and strategies' across time and space while following their flows and connections (Xiang 2013a, 284, 296). The scales that migrants get involved in are 'not only in levels but also in kind' (Xiang 2013a, 284). They are located in the 'hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size' (e.g., the local, regional, national and global), so are they in 'the horizontal fragmentation between places' (e.g., the centre, province, prefecture, city) (Xiang 2013a, 284–288). They enable interactions with each other and materialise new levels and new kinds, i.e., 'emergent scale' (Xiang 2013a, 284–286). The multiple types and layers of scales collectively prompt or disrupt the movements of people, simultaneously constituting their divergent movements. This account makes up the core idea of Xiang's 'multi-scalar ethnography'.

As I will show in the following chapters, school choice and university entrance preparation represent two major actions that Korean migrants tactically conduct. In my case study, when a parent makes a choice concerning their child's schooling, that parent considers schools at local, national and international levels, and the decisions made by other parents. Often, they send their children to a school at a certain 'scale', later transferring them to a different one due to pragmatic considerations regarding education, financial situation and future migration plans. Similarly, the preparation for university entrance involves making decisions about universities in various destinations (China, Korea or a third destination), and that depends on their specific evaluation of migration policies and circumstances. In order to prepare for university entrance exams, migrant children also need to be engaged with a variety of educational institutions (e.g., state-sponsored, privately-run, Sino-foreign cooperative). To summarise, the multiple scales in my study encompass:

- The national discourse and regimes towards emigration and immigration for education in the home and host country;
- Schools and universities available to Korean migrant children in China (international, national, and local; foreign-invested, state-sponsored, and privately-run etc);
- Educational institutes and agencies that assist the movement of students (transnational and local; privately run and Sino-foreign cooperation); and,
- Migrants peers (transnational and local; expat and non-expat families, migrant children and international students).

Between February 2014 and February 2015, 87 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Beijing (eleven months), Seoul (one month) and Tianjin (three days). Participants were composed of South Korean parents, students, diplomats, schoolteachers, educational agents and entrepreneurs in other domains. Around 90% of these interviews were conducted in Korean, with the remainder carried out in Chinese. Participant observations occurred at various occasions such as informal gatherings of parents, parent-teacher meetings, school tours, presentation meetings with parents organised by education agents and after-class time spent with students. Informal conversations were also conducted with Chinese teachers, educators, and students to identify their perceptions about the Korean students they were involved with. In addition, documents accessed during my research included government papers, online news reports, the Beijing Journal (a Korean language newspaper published in Beijing) and additional materials supplied by informants. These documents are written in Chinese, Korean or English.

After studying the Korean language in Seoul and achieving the lower advanced level (level five – level six is the highest), I returned to Beijing to commence my fieldwork in 2014. I approached the Korean migrant sector in three ways, which I class as: official (e.g. diplomats), institutional (e.g. school teachers, educational agents) and grassroots (parents and students). Making use of my connections established in Korea, I contacted two Korean diplomats in Beijing, who provided me with general and inspiring overviews of Korean migrant society (*kyominsahoe*) in Beijing. I was surprised that they differentiated Korean migrants according to employment status and the education of their children. The children of expatriate employees usually attended international schools, while the children of local employees and the self-employed mostly attended Korean or Chinese schools. This knowledge spurred me to explore the education issues of Korean migrant children in China. Nevertheless, contact with these diplomats was confined to formal and official relations, for instance, limited meeting time and structured conversations.

Claiming an interest in the education of migrant children, I was introduced by one diplomat to the Korean international school in Beijing. This Korean government-sanctioned school provides full-time programmes to children of Korean nationals, from elementary level to high school. From March to December 2014, I visited the school several times. I conducted multiple interviews with four teachers working in both elementary and high school departments, at the *han'gŭl hakkyo* (Korean language school), and the *chinhakpu* (university admission department). In addition, with the help of a few Korean Chinese (Chaoxianzu) scholars at the

Minzu University and Tsinghua University in Beijing, I contacted several South Koreans in managerial positions in the private education sector, including *hagwŏn* (cram schools) and *yuhagwŏn* (study abroad agencies). Well-educated, intelligent, and critical, these people had considerable experience in teaching and managing Korean students and were themselves parents. These conversations clarified and sharpened my research questions, particularly by identifying what the real concerns regarding education for parents and students were. In addition, one manager agreed to 'hire' me as a Chinese language teacher for the after-school tutoring institution he operated. I duly worked for three months as a part-time tutor teaching Chinese to Korean high school students, and for one month as a full-time teacher for a Chinese language summer training programme. My employment status provided an excellent opportunity to conduct participatory observation. In total, I conducted in-depth interviews with 27 people, including diplomats, schoolteachers, and managers engaged in the private education sector. The empirical data is found in Chapter 3, 5 and 6.

Despite this access, my institutional contacts and my role in the private education sector actually restricted me from developing further contacts from below, i.e., parents and their children. This is because both schools and educational agencies have policies in place to maintain 'appropriate' and 'professional' relations between staff and parents. It was regarded as 'inappropriate' for me, as a researcher, to contact and interview the parents of enrolled students as I was considered a representative of the institution. For this reason, I had to seek more informants independently. At first, I attempted to have conversations with Korean parents waiting to pick up their children after school. This plan failed as parents were sceptical of my motivation and hence often refused my requests, claiming to have insufficient time. Fortunately, it was at this time that my friend, a PhD student in Leiden who had studied at Beijing University, asked if I would like to become a language exchange partner with a young Korean housewife in Beijing who was keen to improve her Chinese language proficiency. This experience of conversing with a Korean woman gave me the idea to start language study groups for Korean adults wanting to learn Chinese as a means to gain access to study participants. Taking research ethics into account, data collection was only conducted when participants had been clearly informed about the research objectives and were fully willing to participate.

In April 2014, I posted my first recruitment notice on '*pukyumo*', a popular Korean-language online forum used by Korean students and residents in

Beijing, with over 150,000 registered members.[3] I identified myself as a researcher interested in Korean society and stated my intention to give free weekly Chinese tutoring courses for small groups of Korean housewives (*chubu*). My language study group targeted Korean women for the following reasons. Firstly, Korean women play an integral role in the domestic sphere, including domestic chores, child rearing, and dealing with family relations (Abelmann 2003, 21). In regards to their children's education, most women act as 'primary managers', and arrange after-school education for their children, supervise their daily studies, and make choices about education where necessary (Park and Abelmann 2004, 467). The second consideration was that my informants at the Korean school and in the private education sector were predominantly male, so getting female contacts would contribute to the gender balance of my informants.

Availability of informants was the third reason. Korean households in Beijing often consist of males working full-time as breadwinners and their wives acting as housewives or working part-time. Hence, Korean women are more likely to have time available than their husbands, both to talk with me and to manage their children's education. In my fieldwork, I also attempted to converse with some of the husbands, who often claimed that they were too busy with work to give as much attention to their children's education as their wives. Generally, I failed to meet most of these 'invisible fathers', who came home from work late almost every day, or only visited their families on a weekly or even a monthly basis because they were stationed elsewhere or had considerable workloads.

Finally, a female-only study group could produce a relaxed and comfortable setting for people to study and chat. As a female Chinese researcher, I benefited from a certain gender intimacy, which made it somewhat easier to integrate. Meanwhile, my Chinese nationality helped me to gain an advantageous position as an outsider to whom Korean women could open up, having less need to be worried about private thoughts being leaked to others in the Korean community. However, the unfavourable side of my identity was that my informants could have felt the need to hide their critical views of China as a way to express courtesy. To resolve this problem, I highlighted my doctoral affiliation in a European university and remained aware of our respective identities during our conversations. Although I was able to spend time with groups of Korean women, I did not conduct group interviews considering that they preferred not to have frank conversations

3   See the link here, http://cafe306.daum.net/_c21_/home?grpid=3N8.

with their co-ethnic counterparts. All interview data in this book were collected via one-to-one interviews.

Two days after posting on '*pukyumo*', I met with my first student Hyemin, the wife of a Korean expatriate employee, who had arrived in China three weeks prior to our meeting. She became a key informant and is identified earlier in this introduction as the parent who accompanied me on a school visit. Two weeks later, I recruited two groups of female students and started two tutoring courses, at beginner and intermediate level, with four and five people in each group respectively. Their ages ranged from late 20s to early 50s. The length of time they had resided in China ranged from three weeks to over ten years. Two of the women had come to China as international students before meeting their Korean husbands and becoming engaged in self-employed businesses with their husbands. By contrast, the remainder of the women had migrated to China due to their husband's professional posting. Their husbands were engaged in various professions, including diplomacy, education and business etc. Hence, these women had different employment statuses. They all lived with their families in apartments in Wangjing, often referred to as Koreatown.

These two study groups were significant as they provided me with excellent opportunities to spend considerable time with Korean housewives and mothers. After every study group, they drank coffee or ate lunch together and I was able to listen in as they chatted about topics like their children's education, their husbands, and domestic chores. Although they were well informed about my research objectives, I did not record the content of their conversations. Instead, I made notes on my phone when some important information on children's education popped up and asked their permission to use this information in my book. Moreover, some became my key informants and agreed to numerous semi-structured interviews, while others introduced me to their friends who subsequently became informants. I became interested in Korean mothers' groups, generally called '*ŏmmamoim*' (mama's meeting), with members comprising other mothers from their husbands' companies. The groups revolved around common interests, such as church or religious interests, or their child's school. Based on the mama's meeting network, I eventually interviewed 31 Korean housewives, and a few of their husbands and children. This empirical data informed the main body of Chapter 4 and 5. Some mothers also invited me (as an interpreter) to parent-teacher meetings at their children's mainly monolingual schools. In addition to this, they invited me to accompany them to visit schools or advise on the curriculum in some Korean-run private education institutions, as they knew of my interest in their children's education.

From November 2014 onwards, I extended my contacts to Korean university students, as I sought students who had migrated to China at the pre-university stage of their education owing to their parents' movements. The major question of inquiry being: how do these students manifest and practise their 'desire' for education, e.g., going to a top university? Given that China and Korea are the two main university destinations, I spent nearly one month in Seoul (December 2014 to January 2015) and the remainder of my time in Beijing (until February 2015) conducting interviews. I explored why some students end up in Chinese universities and others do not.

With the help of Chinese and Korean informants and friends, I contacted fourteen students. Half enrolled in universities in Beijing, while the rest returned to Korea for their tertiary education. In addition, I interviewed fifteen students who had been sent by their parents, often through study abroad agencies, to China for their university education. Contact with the latter group provided a valuable comparison with the former one. The empirical data of both groups (29 students) contributed to the writing of Chapters 5 and 6.

From 2017 to 2019, I visited Wangjing every year to conduct follow-up studies, approximately one week per time. During the COVID-19 pandemic, I retained contacts with a few informants online and kept up-to-date with their news. I lost contact with many previous informants due to their departure from Beijing and instead built new connections with people. The hyper-mobility of Korean migrants in Beijing inspired me to write the following chapter on the temporary residents' community in Beijing.

Bibliography

Abelmann, Nancy. 2003. *The Melodrama of Mobility: Women, Talk, and Class in Contemporary South Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Baas, Michiel. 2010. *Imagined Mobility: Migration and Transnationalism among Indian Students in Australia*. London: Anthem Press.

Baas, Michiel. 2018. 'Temporary Labour Migration.' In *Routledge Handbook of Asian Migrations*, edited by Gracia Liu-Farrer and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, 51–63. London: Routledge.

Bao, Mingling. 1932. *Zaihua Waiqiao Zhi Diwei* (*The Status of Foreigners in China*). Unknown:Pacific Society of China Series.

Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Langhorne, PA etc: Gordon and Breach.

Bénéï, Véronique. 2008. *Schooling Passions : Nation, History, and Language in Contemporary Western India*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Brady, Anne-Marie. 2000. ''Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently': The Use and Control of Foreigners in the PRC.' *The China Quarterly* 164 (December): 943–964.

Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. *Foreigners and Foreign Institutions in Republican China*. Chinese Worlds.London: Routledge.

Brettell, Caroline B. 2003. *Anthropology and Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity*. Walnut Creek, CA etc: AltaMira Press.

Chacko, Elizabeth. 2021. 'Emerging Precarity among International Students in Singapore: Experiences, Understandings and Responses.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (20): 4741–4757.

Cheuk, Ka-Kin. 2016. 'Everyday Diplomacy among Indian Traders in a Chinese Fabric Market.' *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 34 (2): 42–58.

Chin, Gregory T. 2007. 'Between "Outside-in" and "inside-out" The Internationalization of the Chinese State.' In *China's Reforms and International Political Economy*, edited by David Zweig and Zhiming Chen. London: Routledge.

Clifford, James. 1994. 'Diasporas.' *Cultural Anthropology* 9 (3): 302–338.

Collins, Francis L. 2018. 'Desire as a Theory for Migration Studies: Temporality, Assemblage and Becoming in the Narratives of Migrants.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (6): 964–980.

Collins, Francis L., Ravinder Sidhu, Nick Lewis, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh. 2014. 'Mobility and Desire: International Students and Asian Regionalism in Aspirational Singapore.' *Discourse: Studies in The Cultural Politics Of Education* 35 (5): 661–676.

Cook-Martín, David, Filiz Garip, Shannon Gleeson, and Matthew Hall. 2019. 'Temp Nations? A Research Agenda on Migration, Temporariness, and Membership.' *The American Behavioral Scientist* (*Beverly Hills*) 63 (9): 1389–1403.

Crawley, Heaven, and Katharine Jones. 2021. 'Beyond Here and There (Re)Conceptualising Migrant Journeys and the 'in-Between.'' *Journal of Ethnic And Migration Studies* 47 (14): 3226–3242.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 1983. *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

DeWind, Josh, Eun Mee Kim, Ronald Skeldon, and In-Jin Yoon. 2012. 'Korean Development and Migration.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (3): 371–388.

Farrer, James. 2019. *International Migrants in China's Global City: The New Shanghailanders*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Fordham, Signithia, and John Ogbu. 1986. 'Black Students' School Success: Coping with the 'burden of 'Acting White.''' *The Urban Review* 18 (3): 176–206.

Foucault, Michel. 1978. *The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Glick Schiller, Nina. 2015. 'Explanatory Frameworks in Transnational Migration Studies: The Missing Multi-Scalar Global Perspective.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (13): 2275–2282.

Glick Schiller, Nina, and Ayşe Çağlar. 2011. *Locating Migration : Rescaling Cities and Migrants*. Ithaca, NY etc: Cornell University Press.

Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben. 2011. 'The Internationalization of the Chinese State.' *Political Geography* 30: 402–411.

Grillo, Ralph. 2007. 'Betwixt and Between: Trajectories and Projects of Transmigration.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (2): 199–217.

Gu, Weijun. 1925. *Wairen Zaihua Zhi Diwei* (*The Status of Foreigners in China*). Unknown: Waijiaobu Tushuchu.

Hansen, Mette Halskov. 1999. *Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Hooper, Beverley. 2016. *Foreigners Under Mao: Western Lives in China, 1949–1976*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Huang, Futao. 2015. 'Building the World-Class Research Universities: A Case Study of China.' *Higher Education: The International Journal of Higher Education Research* 70 (2): 203–215.

Huang, Shirlena, Brenda S. A. Yeoh, and Theodora Lam. 2008. 'Asian Transnational Families in Transition: The Liminality of Simultaneity.' *International Migration* 46 (4): 3–13.

Kaplan, Sam. 2006. *The Pedagogical State : Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kim, Hyejin. 2010. *International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Koreans in China*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kim, Samuel S. 2000. *Korea's Globalization*. Cambridge etc: Cambridge University Press.

Kipnis, Andrew B. 2011. *Governing Educational Desire : Culture, Politics, and Schooling in China*. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.

Kirk, Kate, Ellen Bal, and Sarah Renee Janssen. 2017. 'Migrants in Liminal Time and Space: An Exploration of the Experiences of Highly Skilled Indian Bachelors in Amsterdam.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43 (16): 2771–2787.

Kwon, Tai-hwan. 1997. 'International Migration of Koreans and the Korean Community in China.' *Korea Journal of Population and Development* 26 (1): 1–18.

Lan, Shanshan. 2017. *Mapping the New African Diaspora in China: Race and the Cultural Politics of Belonging*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Lee, Jennifer, and Min Zhou. 2015. *The Asian American Achievement Paradox*. New York, Array: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lehmann, Angela. 2014. *Transnational Lives in China : Expatriates in a Globalizing City*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lehmann, Angela, and Pauline Leonard, eds. 2019. *Destination China: Immigration to China in the Post-Reform Era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leonard, Pauline. 2010. *Expatriate Identities in Postcolonial Organizations: Working Whiteness*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Leonard, Pauline, and Angela Lehmann. 2019. 'International Migrants in China: Civility, Contradiction, and Confusion.' In *Destination China: Immigration to China in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Angela Lehmann and Pauline Leonard, 1–17. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lukose, Ritty A. 2007. 'The Difference That Diaspora Makes: Thinking through the Anthropology of Immigrant Education in the United States.' *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 38 (4): 405–418.

Ma, Xiao. 2019. 'Educational Desire and Transnationality of South Korean Middle Class Parents in Beijing.' In *Destination China: Immigration to China in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Angela Lehmann and Pauline Leonard, 67–90. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.

MOFA. 2015. '2015 Chaeoedongp'o Hyŏnhwang (The Status Quo of Overseas Korean Nationals in 2015).' Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mofa.go.kr.

NBS. 2011. '2010nian Diliuci Quanguo Renkou Pucha Jieshou Pucha Dengji de Gang'aotai Jumin He Waiji Renyuan Zhuyao Shuju' (The Main Data of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan Residents and Personel with a Foreign Nationality Who Are Registered in the 6th National Population Census in 2010).' National Bureau of Statistics of China. April 29, 2011. http://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/202302/t20230206_1901999.html.

NBS. 2021. ''Diqici Quanguo Renkou Pucha Gongbao (Diba Hao)' (The Seventh National Population Census Report: No 8).' National Bureau of Statistics of China. May 11, 2021. http://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202302/t20230203_1901088.html.

NIA. 2019. 'Chengli Guojia Yimin Guanliju: Zhongguo Qiangshi Jiaru Quanqiu Rencai Zhengduozhan (Establish NIA: China Enters Global Battle and Fight for Talents).' National Immigration Administration. May 6, 2019. https://www.nia.gov.cn/n741435/n741532/c766294/content.html.

Noussia, Antonia, and Michal Lyons. 2009. 'Inhabiting Spaces of Liminality: Migrants in Omonia, Athens.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35 (4): 601–624.

Ogbu, John. 1995a. 'Cultural Problems in Minority Education: Their Interpretations and Consequences -- Part One: Theoretical Background.' *The Urban Review* 27 (3): 189–205.

Ogbu, John. 1995b. 'Cultural Problems in Minority Education: Their Interpretations and Consequences—Part Two: Case Studies.' *The Urban Review* 27 (4): 271–97.

Ogbu, John, ed. 2008. *Minority Status, Oppositional Culture, and Schooling.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Ogbu, John, and Herbert Simons. 1998. 'Voluntary and Involuntary Minorities: A Cultural-Ecological Theory of School Performance with Some Implications for Education.' *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 29 (2): 155–188.

Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Park, Hyun Ok. 1996. 'Segyehwa: Globalization and Nationalism in Korea.' *Journal of the International Institute* 4 (1).

Park, Jung-Sun, and Paul Y. Chang. 2005. 'Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act.' *Journal of Korean Studies* 10 (1): 1–27.

Park, Sojin, and Nancy Abelmann. 2004. 'Class and Cosmopolitan Striving: Mothers' Management of English Education in South Korea.' *Anthropological Quarterly* 77 (4): 645–672.

Pieke, Frank N. 2012. 'Immigrant China.' *Modern China* 38 (1): 40–77.

Pieke, Frank N. 2014. 'Emerging Markets and Migration Policy: China.' L'Institut français des relations internationales. https://www.ifri.org.

Pieke, Frank N., Björn Ahl, Elena Barabantseva, Michaela Pelican, Tabitha Speelman, Feng Wang, and Biao Xiang. 2019. 'How Immigration Is Shaping Chinese Society.' Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Robertson, Shanthi. 2013. *Transnational Student-Migrants and the State: The Education-Migration Nexus.* Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan.

Robertson, Shanthi, and Anjena Runganaikaloo. 2014. 'Lives in Limbo: Migration Experiences in Australia's Education–Migration Nexus.' *Ethnicities* 14 (2): 208–226.

Sander, Marie. 2016. *Passing Through Shanghai: Ethnographic Insights into the Mobile Lives of Expatriate Youths.* Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing.

Seo, Jungmin. 2007. 'Interpreting Wangjing: Ordinary Foreigners in a Globalizing Town.' *Korean Observer* 38 (3): 469–500.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986. *Modern Diasporas in International Politics.* London: Croom Helm.

Song, Hunch'ŏn. 2013. *Pukkyŏngilgi* (*Twenty Years in Beijing*). Seoul: Seokyobooks.

Speelman, Tabitha. 2020. 'Establishing the National Immigration Administration: Change and Continuity in China's Immigration Reforms.' *China Perspectives*, no. 4: 7–16.

Spence, Jonathan. 1969. *To Change China: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960.* Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.

Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M., Tasha Darbes, Sandra Isabel Dias, and Matt Sutin. 2011. 'Migrations and Schooling.' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (1): 311–328.

Tölölyan, Khachig. 2007. 'The Contemporary Discourse of Diaspora Studies.' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27 (3): 647–655.

Turner, Victor W. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure.* Chicago : London: Aldine PubCo ; Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Turner, Victor W. 1987. 'Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in 'Rites de Passage.'' In *Betwixt & Between: Patterns of Masculine and Feminine Initiation*, edited by Louise Carus Mahdi, Steven Foster, and Meredith Little, 3–22. Illinois: Open Court Publishing.

Waldron, Arthur. 1988. 'China Stands Up: Ending the Western Presence, 1948-1950. (Book Review).' *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 19/20: 359–363.

Wang, Bingyu. 2020. 'Time in Migration: Temporariness, Precarity and Temporal Labour amongst Chinese Scholars Returning from the Global North to South.' *Journal of Ethnic And Migration Studies* 46 (11): 2127–2144.

Wang, Bingyu, and Jingfu Chen. 2020. 'Emotions and Migration Aspirations: Western Scholars in China and the Navigation of Aspirational Possibilities.' *Journal of Ethnic And Migration Studies* 47 (15): 3437–3454.

Wang, Li. 2014. 'Internationalization with Chinese Characteristics.' *Chinese Education & Society* 47 (1): 7–26.

Xiang, Biao. 2013a. 'Multi-Scalar Ethnography: An Approach for Critical Engagement with Migration and Social Change.' *Ethnography* 14 (3): 282–299.

Xiang, Biao. 2013b. 'Return and the Reordering of Transnational Mobility in Asia.' In *Return : Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*, edited by Biao Xiang, Brenda Yeoh, and Mika Toyota, 1–20. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Yang, Peidong. 2016. *International Mobility and Educational Desire Chinese Foreign Talent Students in Singapore.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan Springer Nature.

Yang, Rui. 2002. 'University Internationalisation: Its Meanings, Rationales and Implications.' *Intercultural Education* 13 (1): 81–95.

Yeo, Kwang-kyoon. 2012. 'A Transnational Community and Its Impact on Local Power Relations in Urban China: The Case of Beijing's 'Koreatown' in the Early 2000s.' In *Wind Over Water: Migration in an East Asian Context*, edited by David Haines, Keiko Yamanaka, and Shinji Yamashita, 78–91. New York: Berghahn Books.

Yeoh, Brenda S. A. 2022. 'Is the Temporary Migration Regime in Asia Future-Ready?' *Asian Population Studies* 18 (1): 1–5.

Yi, Kwang-gyu. 2000. *Overseas Koreans.* Seoul: Jimoondang.

Yoon, In-Jin. 2012. 'Migration and the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative Description of Five Cases.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (3): 413–435.

Yoon, Sharon J. 2020. *The Cost of Belonging: An Ethnography on Solidarity and Mobility in Beijing's Koreatown.* Oxford University Press.

Zhou, Min. 2009. 'How Neighbourhoods Matter for Immigrant Children: The Formation of Educational Resources in Chinatown, Koreatown and Pico Union, Los Angeles.' *Journal Of Ethnic And Migration Studies* 35 (7): 1153–1179.

Zhou, Min. 2014. 'Segmented Assimilation and Socio-Economic Integration of Chinese Immigrant Children in the USA.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37 (7): 1172–1183.

Zweig, David. 2002. *Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages.* Ithaca etc: Cornell University Press.