






Where are we in CSCI 450?

- Now leaving: sequential, deterministic reasoning



- Entering: probabilistic reasoning and machine learning





Probability: Review of main concepts (Chapter 13)

Making decisions under uncertainty

- Let action $A_t = \text{leave for airport } t \text{ minutes before flight}$
 - Will A_t succeed, i.e., get me to the airport in time for the flight?
- Problems:
 - Partial observability (road state, other drivers' plans, etc.)
 - Noisy sensors (traffic reports)
 - Uncertainty in action outcomes (flat tire, etc.)
 - Complexity of modeling and predicting traffic
- Hence a non-probabilistic approach either
 - Risks falsehood: “ A_{25} will get me there on time,” or
 - Leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
 - A_{25} will get me there on time if there's no accident on the bridge and it doesn't rain and my tires remain intact, etc., etc.
 - A_{1440} will get me there on time but I'll have to stay overnight in the airport

Making decisions under uncertainty

- Suppose the agent believes the following:
 - $P(A_{25} \text{ gets me there on time}) = 0.04$
 - $P(A_{90} \text{ gets me there on time}) = 0.70$
 - $P(A_{120} \text{ gets me there on time}) = 0.95$
 - $P(A_{1440} \text{ gets me there on time}) = 0.9999$
- Which action should the agent choose?
 - Depends on preferences for missing flight vs. time spent waiting
 - Encapsulated by a *utility function*
- The agent should choose the action that maximizes the *expected utility*:
$$P(A_t \text{ succeeds}) * U(A_t \text{ succeeds}) + P(A_t \text{ fails}) * U(A_t \text{ fails})$$

Making decisions under uncertainty

- More generally: the expected utility of an action is defined as:

$$EU(a) = \sum_{\text{outcomes of } a} P(\text{outcome} | a) U(\text{outcome})$$

- **Utility theory** is used to represent and infer preferences
- **Decision theory** = probability theory + utility theory

Monty Hall problem

- You're a contestant on a game show. You see three closed doors, and behind one of them is a prize. You choose one door, and the host opens one of the other doors and reveals that there is no prize behind it. Then he offers you a chance to switch to the remaining door. Should you take it?



Monty Hall problem

- With probability $1/3$, you picked the correct door, and with probability $2/3$, picked the wrong door. If you picked the correct door and then you switch, you lose. If you picked the wrong door and then you switch, you win the prize.

- Expected utility of switching:

$$\text{EU}(\text{Switch}) = (1/3) * 0 + (2/3) * \text{Prize}$$

- Expected utility of not switching:

$$\text{EU}(\text{Not switch}) = (1/3) * \text{Prize} + (2/3) * 0$$

Where do probabilities come from?

- **Frequentism**

- Probabilities are relative frequencies
- For example, if we toss a coin many times, $P(\text{heads})$ is the proportion of the time the coin will come up heads
- But what if we're dealing with events that only happen once?
 - E.g., what is the probability that Team X will win the Superbowl this year?
 - “Reference class” problem

- **Subjectivism**

- Probabilities are degrees of belief
- But then, how do we assign belief values to statements?
- What would constrain agents to hold consistent beliefs?

Probabilities and rationality

- Why should a rational agent hold beliefs that are consistent with axioms of probability?
 - For example, $P(A) + P(\neg A) = 1$
- If an agent has some degree of belief in proposition A, he/she should be able to decide whether or not to accept a bet for/against A (De Finetti, 1931):
 - If the agent believes that $P(A) = 0.4$, should he/she agree to bet \$4 that A will occur against \$6 that A will not occur?
- **Theorem:** An agent who holds beliefs inconsistent with axioms of probability can be convinced to accept a combination of bets that is guaranteed to lose them money

Random variables

- We describe the (uncertain) state of the world using ***random variables***
 - Denoted by capital letters
 - **R**: *Is it raining?*
 - **W**: *What's the weather?*
 - **D**: *What is the outcome of rolling two dice?*
 - **S**: *What is the speed of my car (in MPH)?*
- Just like variables in CSPs, random variables take on values in a *domain*
 - Domain values must be *mutually exclusive* and *exhaustive*
 - **R** in {True, False}
 - **W** in {Sunny, Cloudy, Rainy, Snow}
 - **D** in {(1,1), (1,2), ... (6,6)}
 - **S** in [0, 200]

Events

- Probabilistic statements are defined over *events*, or sets of world states
 - *“It is raining”*
 - *“The weather is either cloudy or snowy”*
 - *“The sum of the two dice rolls is 11”*
 - *“My car is going between 30 and 50 miles per hour”*
- Events are described using propositions about random variables:
 - $R = \text{True}$
 - $W = \text{“Cloudy”} \vee W = \text{“Snowy”}$
 - $D \in \{(5,6), (6,5)\}$
 - $30 \leq S \leq 50$
- Notation: $P(A)$ is the probability of the set of world states in which proposition A holds

Kolmogorov's axioms of probability

- For any propositions (events) A, B
 - $0 \leq P(A) \leq 1$
 - $P(\text{True}) = 1$ and $P(\text{False}) = 0$
 - $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \wedge B)$
 - Subtraction accounts for double-counting
- Based on these axioms, what is $P(\neg A)$?
- These axioms are sufficient to completely specify probability theory for *discrete* random variables
 - For continuous variables, need *density functions*

Atomic events

- **Atomic event:** a complete specification of the state of the world, or a complete assignment of domain values to all random variables
 - Atomic events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
- E.g., if the world consists of only two Boolean variables *Cavity* and *Toothache*, then there are four distinct atomic events:

Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = false

Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = true

Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = false

Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = true

Joint probability distributions

- A **joint distribution** is an assignment of probabilities to every possible atomic event

Atomic event	P
$Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = false$	0.8
$Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = true$	0.1
$Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = false$	0.05
$Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = true$	0.05

- Why does it follow from the axioms of probability that the probabilities of all possible atomic events must sum to 1?

Joint probability distributions

- A ***joint distribution*** is an assignment of probabilities to every possible atomic event
- Suppose we have a joint distribution of n random variables with domain sizes d
 - What is the size of the probability table?
 - Impossible to write out completely for all but the smallest distributions

Notation

- $P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2, \dots, X_n = x_n)$ refers to a single entry (atomic event) in the joint probability distribution table
 - Shorthand: $P(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$
- $P(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)$ refers to the entire joint probability distribution table
- $P(A)$ can also refer to the probability of an event
 - E.g., $X_1 = x_1$ is an event

Marginal probability distributions

- From the joint distribution $P(X,Y)$ we can find the **marginal distributions** $P(X)$ and $P(Y)$

$P(\text{Cavity}, \text{Toothache})$	
$\text{Cavity} = \text{false} \wedge \text{Toothache} = \text{false}$	0.8
$\text{Cavity} = \text{false} \wedge \text{Toothache} = \text{true}$	0.1
$\text{Cavity} = \text{true} \wedge \text{Toothache} = \text{false}$	0.05
$\text{Cavity} = \text{true} \wedge \text{Toothache} = \text{true}$	0.05

$P(\text{Cavity})$	
$\text{Cavity} = \text{false}$?
$\text{Cavity} = \text{true}$?

$P(\text{Toothache})$	
$\text{Toothache} = \text{false}$?
$\text{Toothache} = \text{true}$?

Marginal probability distributions


- From the joint distribution $P(X, Y)$ we can find the **marginal distributions** $P(X)$ and $P(Y)$
- To find $P(X = x)$, sum the probabilities of all atomic events where $X = x$:

$$\begin{aligned} P(X = x) &= P((X = x \wedge Y = y_1) \vee \dots \vee (X = x \wedge Y = y_n)) \\ &= P((x, y_1) \vee \dots \vee (x, y_n)) = \sum_{i=1}^n P(x, y_i) \end{aligned}$$

- This is called **marginalization** (we are *marginalizing out* all the variables except X)

Conditional probability

- Probability of cavity given toothache:
 $P(\text{Cavity} = \text{true} \mid \text{Toothache} = \text{true})$
- For any two events A and B, $P(A \mid B) =$



Conditional probability

P(Cavity, Toothache)	
<i>Cavity = false</i> \wedge <i>Toothache = false</i>	0.8
<i>Cavity = false</i> \wedge <i>Toothache = true</i>	0.1
<i>Cavity = true</i> \wedge <i>Toothache = false</i>	0.05
<i>Cavity = true</i> \wedge <i>Toothache = true</i>	0.05

P(Cavity)	
<i>Cavity = false</i>	0.9
<i>Cavity = true</i>	0.1

P(Toothache)	
<i>Toothache = false</i>	0.85
<i>Toothache = true</i>	0.15

- What is $P(\text{Cavity} = \text{true} \mid \text{Toothache} = \text{false})$?
 $0.05 / 0.85 = 0.059$
- What is $P(\text{Cavity} = \text{false} \mid \text{Toothache} = \text{true})$?
 $0.1 / 0.15 = 0.667$

Conditional distributions

- A conditional distribution is a distribution over the values of one variable given fixed values of other variables

P(Cavity, Toothache)	
<i>Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = false</i>	0.8
<i>Cavity = false \wedge Toothache = true</i>	0.1
<i>Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = false</i>	0.05
<i>Cavity = true \wedge Toothache = true</i>	0.05

P(Cavity Toothache = true)	
<i>Cavity = false</i>	0.667
<i>Cavity = true</i>	0.333

P(Cavity Toothache = false)	
<i>Cavity = false</i>	0.941
<i>Cavity = true</i>	0.059

P(Toothache Cavity = true)	
<i>Toothache= false</i>	0.5
<i>Toothache = true</i>	0.5

P(Toothache Cavity = false)	
<i>Toothache= false</i>	0.889
<i>Toothache = true</i>	0.111

Normalization trick

- To get the whole conditional distribution $P(X | Y = y)$ at once, select all entries in the joint distribution table matching $Y = y$ and renormalize them to sum to one

P(Cavity, Toothache)	
<i>Cavity = false ∧ Toothache = false</i>	0.8
<i>Cavity = false ∧ Toothache = true</i>	0.1
<i>Cavity = true ∧ Toothache = false</i>	0.05
<i>Cavity = true ∧ Toothache = true</i>	0.05



Select

Toothache, Cavity = false	
<i>Toothache = false</i>	0.8
<i>Toothache = true</i>	0.1



Renormalize

P(Toothache Cavity = false)	
<i>Toothache = false</i>	0.889
<i>Toothache = true</i>	0.111

Normalization trick

- To get the whole conditional distribution $P(X | Y = y)$ at once, select all entries in the joint distribution table matching $Y = y$ and renormalize them to sum to one
- Why does it work?

$$\frac{P(x, y)}{\sum_{x'} P(x', y)} = \frac{P(x, y)}{P(y)} \quad \text{by marginalization}$$

Product rule

- Definition of conditional probability: $P(A | B) = \frac{P(A, B)}{P(B)}$
- Sometimes we have the conditional probability and want to obtain the joint:

$$P(A, B) = P(A | B)P(B) = P(B | A)P(A)$$

Chain rule

- Product rule:

$$P(A, B) = P(A | B)P(B) = P(B | A)P(A)$$

- Chain rule:

$$\begin{aligned} P(A_1, \dots, A_n) &= P(A_1)P(A_2 | A_1)P(A_3 | A_1, A_2) \dots P(A_n | A_1, \dots, A_{n-1}) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^n P(A_i | A_1, \dots, A_{i-1}) \end{aligned}$$

Independence

- Two events A and B are *independent* if and only if $P(A \wedge B) = P(A, B) = P(A) P(B)$
 - In other words, $P(A | B) = P(A)$ and $P(B | A) = P(B)$
 - This is an important simplifying assumption for modeling, e.g., *Toothache* and *Weather* can be assumed to be independent
- Are two *mutually exclusive* events independent?
 - No, but for mutually exclusive events we have $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B)$

Independence

- Two events A and B are *independent* if and only if
$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A, B) = P(A) P(B)$$
 - In other words, $P(A | B) = P(A)$ and $P(B | A) = P(B)$
 - This is an important simplifying assumption for modeling, e.g., *Toothache* and *Weather* can be assumed to be independent
- **Conditional independence:** A and B are *conditionally independent* given C iff
$$P(A \wedge B | C) = P(A | C) P(B | C)$$
 - Equivalently:
$$P(A | B, C) = P(A | C) \text{ or } P(B | A, C) = P(B | C)$$

Conditional independence: Example

- *Toothache*: boolean variable indicating whether the patient has a toothache
- *Cavity*: boolean variable indicating whether the patient has a cavity
- *Catch*: whether the dentist's probe catches in the cavity
- If the patient has a cavity, the probability that the probe catches in it doesn't depend on whether he/she has a toothache
$$P(\textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Toothache}, \textit{Cavity}) = P(\textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Cavity})$$
- Therefore, *Catch* is conditionally independent of *Toothache* given *Cavity*
- Likewise, *Toothache* is conditionally independent of *Catch* given *Cavity*
$$P(\textit{Toothache} \mid \textit{Catch}, \textit{Cavity}) = P(\textit{Toothache} \mid \textit{Cavity})$$
- Equivalent statement:
$$P(\textit{Toothache}, \textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Cavity}) = P(\textit{Toothache} \mid \textit{Cavity}) P(\textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Cavity})$$

Conditional independence: Example

- How many numbers do we need to represent the joint probability table $P(\textit{Toothache}, \textit{Cavity}, \textit{Catch})$?

$2^3 - 1 = 7$ independent entries

- Write out the joint distribution using chain rule:

$P(\textit{Toothache}, \textit{Catch}, \textit{Cavity})$

$= P(\textit{Cavity}) P(\textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Cavity}) P(\textit{Toothache} \mid \textit{Catch}, \textit{Cavity})$

$= P(\textit{Cavity}) P(\textit{Catch} \mid \textit{Cavity}) P(\textit{Toothache} \mid \textit{Cavity})$

- How many numbers do we need to represent these distributions?

$1 + 2 + 2 = 5$ independent numbers

- In most cases, the use of conditional independence reduces the size of the representation of the joint distribution from exponential in n to linear in n

Attribution

Slides developed by Svetlana Lazebnik
based on content from Stuart Russell and
Peter Norvig, [Artificial Intelligence: A
Modern Approach](#), 3rd edition