


Demand Response Market Research: Portland General Electric, 2016 to 2035

PREPARED FOR

Portland General Electric


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Opinions expressed in this presentation, as well as any errors or omissions, are the authors' alone. The examples, facts, results, and requirements summarized in this report represent our interpretations. Nothing herein is intended to provide a legal opinion.

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I. Introduction

Interest in demand response (DR) in the Pacific Northwest has grown considerably since Portland General Electric's (PGE's) first DR potential study was conducted in 2009 and subsequently updated in 2012.¹ A need to integrate growing amounts of intermittent resources (e.g., wind and solar) into the grid, increasingly stringent constraints on the operation of regional hydro generation, growth in summer peak demand, and an expectation of a capacity shortfall in the next five years have all driven interest in DR.

As a result of this growing interest from stakeholders, several new studies have explored the potential for DR to address these issues. For instance, in 2014 the Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPCC) completed a study to assess the market for various flexible load resources.² In that same year, PacifiCorp completed a detailed DSM potential study spanning all of its jurisdictions, with considerable attention being paid to DR programs.³ That study was noted for the considerable role that demand-side resources will play in future resource planning efforts. Several demonstration projects and pilot studies are now also underway in the region, including the involvement of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and many regional utilities including PGE.

To better inform its own DR initiatives and to establish inputs to its integrated resource planning (IRP) process, PGE contracted with The Brattle Group to develop an updated DR potential study ("the 2015 study"). The purpose of this study is to estimate the maximum system peak demand reduction capability that could be realistically achieved through the deployment of specific DR programs in PGE's service territory under reasonable expectations about future market conditions. The study also assesses the likely cost-effectiveness of these programs.

The 2015 study includes several improvements over the prior studies commissioned by PGE, both in terms of the quality of the data being relied upon and the breadth of issues which it addresses. Specific improvements in the 2015 study include the following:

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- ¹ The Brattle Group and Global Energy Partners, "Assessment of Demand Response Potential for PGE," prepared for PGE, March 16, 2009. Also, Ahmad Faruqui and Ryan Hledik, "An Assessment of Portland General Electric's Demand Response Potential," prepared by The Brattle Group for Portland General Electric, November 28, 2012.
 - ² Navigant, "Assessing Demand Response Program Potential for the Seventh Power Plan: Updated Final Report," prepared for the Northwest Power and Conservation Council, January 19, 2015.
 - ³ Applied Energy Group and The Brattle Group, "PacifiCorp Demand-Side Resource Potential Assessment for 2015 – 2034," prepared for PacifiCorp, January 30, 2015.

- Market data was updated to account for changes in forecasts of the number of customers by segment, seasonal peak demand, the expected timing and cost of new capacity additions, and other key assumptions that drive estimates of DR potential and its cost-effectiveness.
- Assumptions about DR participation and impacts were updated to reflect emerging DR program experience in the Pacific Northwest. Ten regional studies conducted in the past five years in the region informed these updates.
- The findings of 24 new dynamic pricing pilots, conducted both in the U.S. and internationally, were incorporated to refine potential estimates for pricing programs. This allowed several important aspects of pricing potential to be accounted for, including seasonal impacts and differences in price response when programs are offered on an opt-in versus opt-out basis.
- A survey of market research studies and full-scale time-varying pricing deployments was utilized to improve assumptions around participation in dynamic pricing programs.
- The methodology for estimating the cost-effectiveness of the DR programs, while conceptually consistent with the prior PGE potential studies, was improved to address comments from the Oregon PUC regarding the derating of avoided costs to account for operational constraints of the DR programs. Accounting for incentive payments on the cost-side of the analysis was also refined.
- The menu of program options analyzed was significantly expanded to include several newly emerging options that have recently begun to generate interest among utilities around the country, such as smart water heating load control, behavioral DR, electric vehicle charging load control, and “bring-your-own-thermostat” programs.

A few key points should be kept in mind while reading this report:

1. The load reduction potential and cost-effectiveness of each DR option are evaluated in isolation from each of the other options; they do not account for potential overlap in participation that may occur if several DR options were simultaneously offered to a single customer segment. Therefore, the potential estimates of the individual DR options are not additive and the economics of the programs may change when the DR options are offered as part of a portfolio.
2. The analysis is based on typical program designs with illustrative yet realistic incentive payments. Rather than being the final word on the cost-effectiveness of these programs, findings should be used as a starting point for further exploring how different program designs would change the economics of the programs.

3. Unless otherwise noted, peak reduction potential estimates are reported for the year 2021. This was chosen as the reporting year of interest, because it is the first year in which PGE is projected to need new capacity.
4. Any options requiring a change to the rate structure could not be offered until 2018 or 2019 due to constraints with the current billing system.
5. In all cases, the cost of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is not accounted for in the cost-effectiveness analysis as the infrastructure is already in place regardless of whether or not a decision is made to offer pricing programs.
6. As is discussed in the Methodology section of this report, the estimates of potential are not projections of what is likely to occur. Rather, they represent an estimated upper-bound on what is achievable under current expectations of future system conditions and reflect utility experience with successful DR programs around the country. Achieving this potential will require a significant customer outreach and education effort and will likely take time, given the relative lack of experience with DR in the Pacific Northwest relative to other parts of the country. Like energy efficiency, successful DR programs require active customer participation. DR in the Pacific NW is in a similar place to where energy efficiency was in the region in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The region – and PGE – has the potential to achieve a significant amount of DR, but there is an upfront investment in awareness and program design that will be required to meet this potential. Ultimately, PGE’s ability to achieve significant impacts through DR programs will depend on customer understanding and acceptance of the programs.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the various DR options that were analyzed. Section 3 summarizes highlights of the methodology for estimating potential and evaluating cost-effectiveness. Section 4 presents the key findings of the study. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of considerations for PGE’s ongoing and future DR initiatives. The report is intended to be a concise summary of the highlights of the study; the appendices contain significantly more detail on methodology and assumptions.

II. The DR Options

Thirteen different types of DR programs were analyzed in this study. Eligibility for the programs varies in part by customer segment. PGE's customer base was divided into five customer classes. Customer class definitions were determined based on both applicability of DR programs and data availability.

- Residential: All residential accounts
- Small Commercial & Industrial (C&I): Less than 30 kW of demand
- Medium C&I: 30 kW to 200 kW of demand
- Large C&I: More than 200 kW of demand
- Agricultural: All agriculture accounts

Non-metered customers, such as street lighting, were excluded from the analysis, as were customers who have chosen direct access.

Accounting for the number of DR programs offered to each customer segment, a total of 28 different options were analyzed. For organizational purposes, the DR programs can be assigned to three categories: (1) Pricing options, (2) conventional non-pricing options, and (3) newly emerging DR options.

PRICING OPTIONS

AMI-enabled rate options include prices that vary by time of day. The potential in each pricing option was modeled both with and without the adoption of enabling technology. For residential and small C&I customers, the enabling technology is assumed to be a programmable communicating thermostat (PCT), also known as a smart thermostat, which would allow the customer to automate reductions in heating or cooling load during times when the price in the retail rate is high. For medium and large C&I customers, the enabling technology is Auto-DR, which can be integrated with a building's energy management system to facilitate a range of automated load reduction strategies.

Time-of-use (TOU) rate: A TOU rate divides the day into time periods and provides a schedule of rates for each period. For example, a peak period might be defined as the period from 3 pm to 8 pm on weekdays and Saturdays, with the remaining hours being off-peak. The price would be higher during the peak period and lower during the off-peak, mirroring the average variation in the cost of supply (including marginal capacity costs). In some cases, TOU rates may have a shoulder (or mid-peak) period, or particularly in the winter season, two peak periods (such as a morning peak from 6 am to 10 am, and an afternoon peak from 3 pm to 8 pm). Additionally, the prices and period definitions might vary by season. With a TOU rate, there is certainty as to what the prices will be and when they will occur.

Critical peak pricing (CPP): Under a CPP rate, participating customers pay higher prices during the few days when wholesale prices are the highest or when the power grid is severely stressed (i.e., typically up to 15 days per year during the season(s) of the system peak). This higher peak

price reflects both energy and capacity costs. In return, the participants receive a discount on the standard tariff price during the other hours of the season or year to keep the utility's total annual revenue constant. Customers are typically notified of an upcoming "critical peak event" one day in advance.

Peak Time Rebate (PTR): Instead of charging a higher rate during critical events, participants are paid for load reductions (estimated relative to a forecast of what the customer otherwise would have consumed). If customers do not wish to participate, they simply pay the existing rate. There is no rate discount during non-event hours. Customers stay on the standard rate at all hours. The program is analogous to the pay-for-curtailement programs that have been offered to large commercial and industrial customers in restructured markets for many years. Opt-out deployments of PTR are being offered by BGE and Pepco to residential customers in Maryland. These relatively new programs will provide more information in the next few years as their impact evaluations become available.

CONVENTIONAL NON-PRICING PROGRAMS

There is a long history of experience with conventional non-pricing programs in the U.S. These programs provide customers with incentive payments or bill credits in return for relatively dependable load reductions and do not require AMI.

Direct load control (DLC) for heating and cooling: With heating/cooling DLC the utility controls a customer's electric heating or central air-conditioning equipment on short notice. In exchange for participating, the customer receives an incentive payment or bill credit. Recent DLC programs have involved the installation of smart thermostats for customers, which allow remote adjustment of temperature settings, so the utility can remotely adjust the temperature to reduce demand from central air-conditioning (CAC) and central space heating units. After an event, load control is released, allowing the thermostat control to revert back to the customer's original settings.

Water heating DLC: Like DLC for heating and cooling, water heating DLC allows the utility to control the load of electric resistance water heaters. The water heating element is turned off during times when load reductions are needed, and turned back on before the average water temperature in the tank drops below a minimum threshold. In some applications, the water is superheated during nighttime hours to allow for longer periods of load curtailment during the day. One difference between water heating DLC and space heating/cooling DLC is that water heaters are used, on average, year-round and during all hours of the day, and can be interrupted without any detectable impact by the customer.

Curtailed tariff. This is similar to PGE’s Firm Load Reduction program (Schedule 77).⁴ Under a curtailable tariff, eligible customers agree to reduce demand by a specific amount or curtail their consumption to a pre-specified level. In return, they receive a fixed incentive payment in the form of capacity credits or reservation payments (typically expressed as \$/kW-month or \$/kW-year) and are paid to be on call even though actual load curtailments may not occur. The amount of the capacity payment varies with the load commitment level and the amount of notice required (e.g., number of hour or minutes). In addition to the fixed capacity payment, participants typically receive a payment for energy reduction. Since load reductions must be of firm resource quality, curtailment is often mandatory and penalties can be assessed for under-performance or non-performance.

Third-party C&I DLC: This is similar to PGE’s Energy Partner program. With Third Party DLC, an “aggregator” (also known as a “curtailment services provider”) works with customers to establish protocols to automate load reductions at times when they are needed from PGE. PGE purchases the aggregated load reduction from the aggregator, who shares the revenues with the customers who participate in the program. With the Third Party DLC program, customer recruitment and certain operational aspects of the program are handled by the aggregator rather than the utility.

EMERGING DR OPTIONS

Several new DR options were analyzed in this study. These are DR options with which there is relatively limited experience to-date. However, the programs have garnered significant interest from utilities around the U.S. recently and are beginning to be tested through pilot programs and some full-scale rollouts.

Bring-your-own-thermostat (BYOT): In a BYOT program, customers who already own a smart thermostat are paid to participate in a DLC program. An advantage of this program over a traditional heating/cooling DLC program are that the customer already has the necessary equipment, so there are no equipment or installation costs associated with the program. Additionally, given that the customer has made the decision to invest in a smart thermostat, it is likely that participants are already more engaged in their energy usage than the typical customer. In PGE’s service territory, the market penetration of central A/C is growing rapidly and the Energy Trust of Oregon (ETO) is promoting the adoption of smart thermostats for energy efficiency benefits, suggesting that the eligible customer base for such a program will grow considerably in the coming years. Even the low-end of the range of national studies on likely smart thermostat adoption suggests that 25 percent of households will be equipped with a smart

⁴ Whereas PGE’s Schedule 77 program has a specific design and incentive structure developed by PGE, our assessment of the Curtailable Tariff program in this study is based on average participation across a range of curtailable tariff program designs in the U.S. In this sense, our analysis is for a more generic design that is a hybrid of these programs.

thermostat by 2020.⁵ Several utilities, such as Austin Energy, Southern California Edison, ConEd, and Hydro One have recently introduced BYOT programs. PGE is currently exploring this program option through a pilot program with Nest Labs.

Behavioral DR (BDR): In a BDR program customers are informed of the need for load reductions during peak times without being provided an accompanying financial incentive. BDR can be thought of as a PTR without the rebate payment. Customers are typically informed of the need for load reductions on a day-ahead basis and events are called somewhat sparingly throughout the year. Customer response is driven by new information that they didn't previously have. BDR programs have been piloted by several utilities, including Consumers Energy, Green Mountain Power, the City of Glendale, BGE, and four Minnesota cooperatives.

Smart water heating DLC: In contrast to the conventional water heating DLC program described above, smart water heating DLC accounts for an emerging trend toward the availability and adoption of "DR-ready" water heaters. These water heaters come pre-equipped with the communications capability necessary to participate in a DR program and have the potential to offer improved flexibility and functionality in the control of the heating element in the water heater. Rather than simply turning the element on or off, the thermostat can be modulated across a range of temperatures. Multiple load control strategies are possible, such as peak shaving, energy price arbitrage through day/night thermal storage, or the provision of ancillary services such as frequency regulation. This has the potential for facilitating the integration of intermittent sources of generation. Smart water heating DLC was modeled for electric resistance water heaters, as these represent the vast majority of electric water heaters in the Pacific Northwest and are the most attractive candidates for a range of advanced load control strategies.⁶

EV charging load control: EVs represent a potentially flexible source of nighttime load, and adoption of EVs is projected to grow in the future. This study focuses only on the potential to control home charging of personal EVs. It does not include, for example, load control at public charging stations or for commercial fleets.

⁵ Berg Insight, "Smart Homes and Home Automation," January 2015.

⁶ It may also be possible to control the load of heat pump water heaters, though there is more uncertainty around the technical and economic effectiveness of this option.

III. Methodology

This study focuses on estimating “maximum achievable potential.” This is founded in the assumption that enrollment rates in the DR programs reach the levels attained in successful DR programs being offered around the country. Therefore, while the assumed enrollment levels have been demonstrated to be achievable by other utilities, they represent an approximate upper-bound based on recent DR experience. In other words they represent some of the highest enrollment levels observed in DR programs to-date.

A few factors suggest that PGE may be able to attain levels of enrollment approaching what the very top programs have achieved nationally:

1. There has been a long history of success with energy efficiency programs in PGE’s service territory, suggesting that customers are open to participating in energy management programs.
2. PGE has an environmentally conscious customer base.
3. There has been a trend toward the rising adoption of new energy management products, such as smart thermostats, in the region.
4. Growth in summer peak demand means that DR programs that were previously not applicable to PGE’s service territory can now be productively offered to customers.

At the same time, it is important to note that it will likely take time for PGE to approach these levels of enrollment. PGE, like much of the rest of the Pacific Northwest, is starting from a point of limited experience with DR programs and low energy prices relative to utilities in other regions of the U.S., and customers will need to be educated about the benefits of the programs before having the confidence to enroll. To some extent, this appears to have been the experience thus far with the Energy Partner program. Nationally, the most successful DR programs often required years of promotion and experimentation by utilities and aggregators before achieving the high enrollment levels that are observed today.

DR potential is estimated using empirically-based assumptions about the eligible customer base, participation, and per-customer impacts. The fundamental equation for calculating the potential system impact of a given DR option is shown in Figure 1 below. Market characteristics (e.g. system peak demand forecast, customer load profiles, number of customers in each class, appliance saturations) were provided by PGE.

Figure 1: The DR Potential Estimation Framework

Potential DR Impact	=	Total Demand of Customer Base	X	% of Base Eligible to Participate	X	% of Eligible Customers Participating	X	% Reduction in demand per participant
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PARTICIPATION

Two variations of maximum achievable potential were estimated for the pricing options (TOU, CPP, PTR), based on different assumptions about the manner in which these programs would be offered to customers. Opt-in deployment assumes that customers would remain on the currently existing rate and would need to proactively make an effort to enroll in the dynamic rate. Default deployment (also known as opt-out deployment) assumes that customers are automatically enrolled in a dynamic rate with the option to revert back to the otherwise applicable tariff if they choose. Default rate offerings are typically expected to result in significantly higher enrollment than when offered on an opt-in basis. Default deployment of dynamic pricing for residential customers is currently uncommon, although TOU rates have been rolled out on an opt-out basis across the province of Ontario, Canada and throughout Italy. PTR has been offered on an opt-out basis by Southern California Edison, Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE), and Pepco Holdings in Maryland and Washington, D.C.

Participation in the pricing programs was based on a review of market research studies and full-scale deployments of time-varying rates. The market research studies used a survey-based approach to gauge customer interest in the various pricing options, while the full-scale deployments reflect actual experience in the field. Opt-in participation rates range from 13 to 28 percent, which varies by pricing option and customer segment. When offered on an opt-out basis, the participation assumptions range from 63 to 92 percent.


Participation in the conventional non-pricing programs is based on a review of DR program data collected by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).⁷ FERC surveyed U.S. utilities to gather information on the types of DR programs they offer, the number of customers enrolled, the peak demand reduction capability of the programs, and several other variables. To establish a reasonable upper-bound on participation for this study, the 75th percentile of the distribution of participation rates in each program in the FERC database was used as the basis for enrollment. The resulting participation rates generally range from 15 percent to 25 percent, although they are higher in a few instances where significant enrollment has been observed (e.g., large C&I curtailable tariff enrollment of 40%).

Enrollment in emerging DR options (BYOT, behavioral DR, smart water heating DLC) was based largely on the experience of pilot programs, because by nature there is limited full-scale experience with the emerging options at this point. In instances where the programs have not been piloted, expert judgment was used to develop plausible enrollment estimates that were intuitively consistent with participation assumptions for other programs in the study.

⁷ FERC, “Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering,” December 2012. Supporting database: <http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response/2012/survey.asp>

Changes in participation are assumed to happen over a five-year timeframe once the new programs are offered. The ramp up to steady state participation follows an “S-shaped” diffusion curve, in which the rate of participation growth accelerates over the first half of the five-year period, and then slows over the second half (see Figure 2). A similar (inverse) S-shaped diffusion curve is used to account for the rate at which customers opt-out of default rate options. This reflects an aggressive ramp-up in participation for a utility with relatively limited DR experience like PGE. See Appendix A for more detail on the development of the participation assumptions.

Figure 2: Illustration of S-shaped diffusion curve



PER-PARTICIPANT IMPACTS

Per-participant impacts for the pricing options were based on the results of 225 different pricing tests that have been conducted across 42 residential pricing pilots over roughly the past 12 years.⁸ These pilots have almost universally found that customers do respond to time-varying rates, and that the amount of price responsiveness increases as the peak-to-off-peak price ratio in the rate increases. The simulated impacts that were simulated for PGE in this study account for this non-linear relationship between a customer’s price responsiveness and the peak-to-off-peak price ratio. The impacts also account for differences by season, across rate designs, and whether the rates are assumed to be offered on an opt-in or default basis. The study has assumed a price ratio of two-to-one in the TOU rate, four-to-one in the CPP rate, and eight-to-one in the PTR rate.

⁸ Ahmad Faruqui and Sanem Sergici, “Arcturus: International Evidence on Dynamic Pricing,” *The Electricity Journal*, August/September 2013.

These price ratios were provided by PGE based on rate designs that they would consider offering in the future.

Impacts for conventional non-pricing programs remained relatively stable relative to PGE's 2012 DR potential study, given the long history of experience with these programs in the U.S. In this updated study for PGE, those impact assumptions were refreshed based on a review of ten DR pilot programs that have been conducted in the Pacific Northwest. For the emerging DR options, impacts were based on the findings of pilots where available and otherwise calibrated to the impacts of other DR programs in the study to ensure reasonable relative impacts across the programs. While estimates of impacts associated with all of the programs have some degree of uncertainty, there is less uncertainty in the impacts of the conventional and pricing programs due to significant experience with these programs through both a full-scale rollouts and scientifically rigorous pilots. There is a higher degree of uncertainty in the impacts of the emerging DR programs as, by nature, they are newer and less tested. See Appendix B for more detail on the development of the per-participant impact assumptions.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

The cost-effectiveness of each DR option was assessed using the total resource cost (TRC) test. The TRC test measures the total benefits and costs of a program, including those of both the utility and the participant. The TRC test is the cost-effectiveness framework that is commonly used by the Oregon PUC to assess the economics of demand-side programs. The present value of the benefits is divided by the present value of the costs to arrive at a benefit-cost ratio. Programs with a benefit-cost ratio greater than 1.0 are considered to be cost-effective.⁹

Benefits in the cost-effectiveness analysis include:¹⁰

- Net avoided generation capacity cost (\$145/kW-yr)¹¹
- Avoided peak-driven T&D cost (\$31/kW-yr)
- Avoided peak energy cost (\$32/MWh, growing over time)

⁹ For further information on cost-effectiveness analysis of DR programs, see Ryan Hledik and Ahmad Faruqui, "Valuing Demand Response: International Best Practices, Case Studies, and Applications," prepared for EnerNOC, January 2015.

¹⁰ Avoided cost estimates were provided by PGE and reviewed by The Brattle Group for reasonableness.

¹¹ The total cost of a peaking unit is reduced by an estimate of the unit's expected energy margins to arrive at a net avoided cost that would be roughly equivalent to the net cost of new entry (CONE) in an organized capacity market.

Costs in the cost-effectiveness analysis vary by program type and include:¹²

- Program development
- Administrative
- Equipment and installation
- Operations and maintenance
- Marketing and recruitment
- Incentive payments to participants

Treatment of participant incentives as a cost was given close consideration in the study. There is not a standard approach for treating incentives when assessing the cost-effectiveness of DR programs. In some states, incentive payments are simply considered a transfer payment from utilities (or other program administrators) to participants, and therefore are not counted as a cost from a societal perspective. Others suggest the incentive payment is a rough approximation of the “hassle factor” experienced by participants in the program (e.g., reduced control over their thermostat during DR events), and should be included as a cost.

While there is some merit to the latter argument – that customers may experience a degree of inconvenience or other transaction costs when participating in DR programs – the cost of that inconvenience is overstated if it is assumed to equal the full value of the incentive payment. If that were the case, then no customer would be better off by participating in the DR program. For example, it would be unrealistic to assume that an industrial facility would participate in a curtailable tariff program if the cost of reducing operations during DR events (e.g., reduction in output) exactly equaled the incentive payment for participating. In reality, customers participate in DR programs because they derive some incremental value from that participation. Further, in some DR programs customers experience very little inconvenience. Some A/C DLC programs, for instance, can pre-cool the home and manage the thermostat in a way that few customers report even being aware that a DR event had occurred, let alone a loss of comfort.

Given the uncertainty around this assumption, this study counts half of the incentive payment as a cost in the cost-effectiveness analysis. Two sensitivity cases were also analyzed, exploring how the findings change when the full incentive is counted as a cost as well as when it is entirely excluded from the calculation.¹³ This is similar to the approach adopted by the California Public

¹² Costs of the programs were typically annualized over a 15-year life in this study. Fifteen years is an illustrative but plausible assumption. While the life of individual appliances and technologies will vary around this number, the impact of that variance is well within the magnitude of other uncertainties in the analysis such as projections of marginal costs and load growth. In future research, sensitivity analysis could be conducted around uncertain variables such as these to develop a better understanding of the key drivers of the findings.

¹³ See Appendix C for the results of the sensitivity cases. Relative to the case where half of the incentive is included as a cost, when none of the incentive is included as a cost, water heating load control for

Utilities Commission, which considers a range of treatments of the incentive payment when evaluating DR cost-effectiveness.

Another important consideration in the cost-effectiveness analysis is how to derate avoided capacity costs to account for operational constraints of the DR programs. Unlike the around-the-clock availability of a peaking unit, DR programs are typically constrained by the number of load curtailment events that can be called during the course of a year. Further, there are often pre-defined limitations on the window of hours of the day during which the events can be called, and sometimes even on the number of days in a row that an event may be called. It is also often the case that hour-ahead or day-ahead notification must be given to participants before calling an event. All of these constraints can potentially limit the capacity value of a DR program.

Some utilities account for these constraints of DR programs through a derate factor that is applied to the avoided capacity costs that are estimated for any given DR program. The derate factor is program-specific and is estimated through an assessment of the relative availability of DR during hours with the highest loss of load probability. Historically, depending on program characteristics and utility operating conditions, some derate factors have ranged from zero to roughly 50 percent of the capacity value of the programs. The derate factor is program- and utility-specific.

In California, a methodology for establishing these derates has been codified by the CPUC in its DR Cost-Effectiveness Protocols.¹⁴ There are effectively three factors that are used to adjust the avoided costs attributable to DR programs:

1. The “A Factor” represents the “portion of capacity value that can be captured by the DR program based on the frequency and duration of calls permitted.” In other words, it accounts for limitations on the availability of the DR program, when DR events can occur, and how often.

Continued from previous page

small C&I, agricultural pumping load control, and technology-enabled PTR for residential and small C&I become moderately cost-effective. When the full incentive is counted as a cost, several DLC programs for residential and small C&I customers become slightly uneconomic. Across these cases, through the changes in the economics are relatively modest, with benefit-cost ratios that remain close to 1.0.

¹⁴ California Public Utilities Commission, “2010 Demand Response Cost-Effectiveness Protocols,” December 16, 2010. <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7D2FEDB9-4FD6-4CCB-B88F-DC190DFE9AFA/0/Protocolsfinal.DOC>. An Energy Division Staff Proposal to update the protocols, dated June 2015, includes additional information on the derate factors and changes that are being considered: <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/SearchRes.aspx?DocFormat=ALL&DocID=94268875>

2. The “B Factor” accounts for notification time. Programs requiring day-ahead notification are less likely than programs with hour-ahead or real-time notification to coincide with system peak or reliability conditions due to forecasting uncertainty.
3. The “C Factor” accounts for limitations on any triggers or conditions that would permit the utility to call a DR event. For example, a DR tariff might only allow an event to be called if the outdoor air temperature exceeds some predetermined threshold.
4. Additionally, the CPUC defines two factors used to adjust T&D costs and energy cost, but those are specific to avoided assumptions in California and not directly applicable to this analysis for PGE. The CPUC is currently examining the possible modification and expansion of these factors.

To develop derate factors for PGE, the derate factors applied by the California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to their extensive portfolio of DR programs were compiled.¹⁵ Based on a review of these derate factors, the values were calibrated to capture the appropriate relative relationships across the programs evaluated for PGE. Expert judgement was used to develop estimates for those programs for which there is not a clear example in the California data. This approach – starting with approved utility estimates from a nearby jurisdiction and modifying them to better reflect the programs that could be offered by PGE – ensures that the estimates are based on actual DR program experience and reasonably well tailored to PGE’s system conditions. As a result, the avoided capacity costs were derated anywhere between 19 and 47 percent. A summary of the portion of avoided capacity cost attributed to each DR program is presented in Table 1.

¹⁵ See the links for the utility programs at the CPUC website:
<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Demand+Response/Cost-Effectiveness.htm>

Table 1: Share of Total Avoided Cost Attributed to DR Program

Class	Program	A) Availability	B) Notification	C) Trigger	Combined
Residential	TOU - No Tech	65%	100%	100%	65%
Residential	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	PTR - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	PTR - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	DLC - Central A/C	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	DLC - Space Heat	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	DLC - Water Heating	85%	100%	95%	81%
Residential	DLC - BYOT	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	Behavioral DR	70%	88%	100%	62%
Small C&I	TOU - No Tech	65%	100%	100%	65%
Small C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	PTR - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	PTR - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	DLC - Central A/C	70%	100%	95%	67%
Small C&I	DLC - Space Heat	70%	100%	95%	67%
Small C&I	DLC - Water Heating	85%	100%	95%	81%
Medium C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Medium C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Medium C&I	DLC - AutoDR	75%	100%	95%	71%
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	75%	88%	100%	66%
Large C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Large C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Large C&I	DLC - AutoDR	75%	100%	95%	71%
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	75%	88%	100%	66%
Agriculture	DLC - Pumping	75%	100%	95%	71%

Notes: A-factor estimates for dynamic pricing (PTR and CPP), residential DLC, and curtable tariffs are derived from values estimated by the California utilities. A-factor estimates for other programs are based on intuitive relationships to those programs. B-factor estimates follow a general assumption observed in California that day-ahead programs have an 88% value and day-of programs have a 100% value. C-factor estimates in California tend to assume 100% for all programs except DLC, for which the assumption is 95%.


IV. Findings

The result of the analysis is an estimate of the maximum achievable peak reduction capability of each DR program for each year from 2016 through 2035, as well as a benefit-cost ratio for each program. These annual results are provided in Appendix D as a Microsoft Excel File. The results can be organized around 10 key findings:

1. The largest and most cost-effective DR opportunities are in the residential and large C&I customer segments
2. Residential pricing programs present a large and cost-effective opportunity to leverage the value of PGE's AMI investment
3. The incremental benefits of coupling enabling technology with pricing options are modest from a maximum achievable potential perspective and perhaps best realized through a BYOT program
4. BYOT programs offer better economics than conventional DLC programs but lower potential in the short- to medium-term
5. Residential water heating load control is a cost-effective opportunity with a broad range of potential benefits
6. EV charging load control is relatively uneconomic as a standalone program due to low peak-coincident demand
7. Small C&I DLC has a small amount of cost-effective potential
8. DR is highly cost-effective for large and medium C&I customers and the potential can be realized through a number of programs
9. Agricultural DR programs are small and uneconomic
10. The economics of some programs improve when accounting for their ability to provide ancillary services

Finding #1: The most cost-effective DR opportunities are in the residential and large C&I customer segments. In fact, nine of the ten programs with the largest potential are in the residential and large C&I sectors. Those also tend to be the sectors with the most cost-effective programs. Figure 3 below illustrates each program's cost effectiveness relative to its peak reduction potential. Those programs in the top-right portion of the chart provide the biggest "bang for the buck" whereas those in the bottom-left corner are small and uneconomic. The largest and most cost-effective programs tend to be pricing programs for residential and large C&I customers.

Figure 3: Winter Potential vs. B-C Ratio by Measure



Finding #2: Residential pricing programs present a large and cost-effective opportunity to leverage the value of PGE’s AMI investment. If offered on an opt-out basis, residential PTR and CPP programs could potentially provide over 100 MW of peak reduction capability.¹⁶ Offered on an opt-in basis, the potential is smaller but still in excess of 40 MW for both of these options. Impacts from TOU rates are smaller than those of PTR and CPP due to the lower peak period price in the TOU. However, the TOU impacts would represent a permanent shift in the daily system load profile due to the daily price signal embodied in the rate’s design.¹⁷ Based on the experience of recent pilot programs an opt-out BDR program could lead to peak demand reductions of close to 60 MW. However, given limited experience with BDR programs on a large scale, there is uncertainty around the extent to which the impacts would persist across multiple


¹⁶ In this analysis, the higher potential in PTR relative to CPP is driven by the assumption that the PTR would have a significantly higher price ratio, and therefore produce larger per-participant load impacts. If the PTR and CPP were assumed to have the same price ratio, there would be more potential in a CPP rate offering.

¹⁷ It is also important to note that a TOU design could be coupled with a CPP or PTR rate. The TOU rate would apply most days of the year, with the CPP or PTR peak price (or rebate) applying on a limited number of days. This would provide both the daily load shifting benefits of the TOU rate and the advantages of a dynamic CPP or PTR price signal that can be dispatched in response to changing system conditions.

events and when deployed to all customers in PGE’s service territory. There is significantly more certainty and reliability in the impacts of the pricing programs.

Figure 4 summarizes the potential estimates of residential pricing programs. All of these impacts are in the absence of enabling technology – they are purely based on behavioral response to the new prices and information. Additionally, it should be noted that the pricing options likely could not begin to be rolled out to customers on a full-scale basis until 2018 or 2019 due to constraints with the current billing system. While this would still leave time to reach significant enrollment levels by 2021, it means that the pricing options will not be available to address immediate needs for load reductions.

Figure 4: Winter Peak Reduction Potential for Residential Pricing and BDR



The programs are cost-effective in all cases except opt-in BDR.¹⁸ For conventional pricing programs the opt-in offering has a slightly higher benefit-cost ratio than the opt-out offering due to marketing and education costs that are lower on a dollars-per-kW basis. However, opt-out offerings provide greater net benefits in absolute dollar terms. In all cases, the cost of AMI is not accounted for in the cost-effectiveness analysis as the infrastructure is already in place regardless of whether or not a decision is made to offer pricing programs.

¹⁸ It is unlikely that BDR would be offered on an opt-in basis in any case. These programs are typically based on mass appeals to customers to reduce load, and customers could elect to opt out of the notifications if they desired.

Finding #3: The incremental benefits of coupling enabling technology with residential pricing options are modest and perhaps best realized through a BYOT program. The provision of enabling technology such as smart thermostats only modestly increases the potential of pricing options in the aggregate. On its surface, this appears counterintuitive because recent studies have found that enabling technology provides a 90 percent boost over the impact of price alone for a given customer, almost doubling their price responsiveness. The reason for the low incremental potential is that the eligible market for the technology is limited. We have assumed that only customers with both electric heat and central A/C would be eligible for pricing with enabling technology, as these are the only segment for which it is likely to be cost-effective given PGE's dual peaking nature and the need for load reductions in both the summer and winter seasons. Less than 10 percent of residential customers have both electric heat and central A/C. As a result, in the aggregate, potential increases only by about 5 MW for opt-in offerings and 10 MW for opt-out offerings.

Further, the provision of enabling technology by PGE does not appear to be incrementally cost-effective. Assuming there is already a plan to roll out dynamic pricing to customers, the incremental load reduction capability provided by enabling technology, above and beyond the impact that would be achieved in the absence of the technology, is not enough to justify the cost. This is a different outcome from some other jurisdictions, where a summer peak and significant air-conditioning market penetration can help to justify the investment.


This conclusion changes when customers already own a smart thermostat; a BYOT program coupled with a dynamic pricing program could be highly cost-effective. In the future there may also be additional value in a "prices-to-devices" concept with real-time pricing and end-uses that provide automated response to changes in the price with short notification, as these programs could provide significant energy and even ancillary services benefits, in addition to avoided capacity costs. Additionally, the provision of enabling technology has the potential to improve customer satisfaction and participation in the programs by automating load reductions and allowing customers to "set it and forget it."

Finding #4: BYOT programs offer better economics than conventional DLC programs but lower potential in the short- to medium-term. As is illustrated in Figure 5, A/C load control is a particularly large summer resource, representing over 100 MW of peak reduction capability. Potential is significant but smaller in the BYOT program, because it will take time for adoption of smart thermostats to materialize in the market. However, BYOT programs offer better cost savings than conventional DLC because there is no associated equipment cost. Whereas the benefit-cost ratio of conventional A/C DLC is around 1.1, the benefit-cost ratio of a BYOT A/C program is close to 2.0.¹⁹ A program design consideration, therefore, will be whether to pursue the larger potential in the conventional DLC program versus the most cost-effective potential in

¹⁹ Note that A/C load control in either form will become increasingly cost-effective as summer capacity needs escalate in PGE's service territory.

the BYOT program. The potential for differences in customer satisfaction with the programs is also an important consideration – this could be tested further through primary market research.

Figure 5: Seasonal Peak Reduction Potential for Residential DLC




DLC programs are typically offered as part of a bundled package targeting multiple end-uses. Customers could receive different incentive payments based on the number of end-uses (A/C, space heating, electric water heating) they enroll in the program. Both the conventional DLC approach and the BYOT approach are cost-effective as bundled packages, with the conventional DLC approach having a benefit-cost ratio of 1.3 and the BYOT approach having a ratio of 2.0. Additionally, for customers with an electric vehicle, EV charging load control could be added to the portfolio. In this case, the conventional approach would still be cost-effective, with a ratio of 1.2.

Finding #5: Residential water heating load control is a cost-effective opportunity with a broad range of potential benefits. As described in Section 3, two types of water heating load control programs were modeled. The first is conventional water heating DLC. With this type of program, it is assumed that the control technology is a retrofit on existing or new water heaters. The typical equipment and installation costs would amount to approximately \$300 per

participant.²⁰ The second type of program is “smart” water heating DLC. This assumes that DR-ready water heaters continue to gain market share. In this scenario, costs are lower, with roughly \$40 for equipment and installation (a communications module) and an incremental manufacturing cost to build in the DR capability of \$25 per water heater.

Smart water heating DLC potential is low in early years of the forecast horizon due to limited market penetration of “DR-ready” water heaters. However, if these water heaters gain market share, potential in the program will increase. Eventually, due to likely higher participation rates among customers who invest in DR-ready water heaters, the potential could exceed that of a conventional DLC program. Figure 6 illustrates the annual winter peak reduction potential estimate based on one plausible trajectory of smart water heating market penetration.²¹

Figure 6: Winter Peak Reduction Potential for Water Heating Load Control



Both program options are cost-effective, although the smart water heating DLC program has a considerably higher benefit-cost ratio of 2.2, compared to 1.3 in the conventional program. This is because DR-ready water heaters offer a number of cost saving opportunities relative to conventional DLC, primarily in the form of reduced equipment and installation costs. Smart water heaters could also incorporate more sophisticated load control algorithms that provide

²⁰ Cost assumptions for the water heating DLC analysis were derived from EPRI, “Economic and Cost-Benefit Analysis for Deployment of CEA-2045-Based DR-Ready Appliances,” December 2014. Some costs were modified to be consistent with assumptions for other DR programs in this study.

²¹ Assumes 6% annual replacement of the existing stock of electric resistance water heaters, the assumed annual share of new water heaters that are DR-ready reaching 60% by 2022, and 25% of those customers participating in a water heating DLC program.

harder-to-quantify benefits. These algorithms could facilitate larger load reductions than a conventional on/off switch in the long run by anticipating the water heating needs of the owner and responding accordingly. This technology could also reduce the risk of insufficient hot water supply following a DR event relative to the conventional technology.


Ultimately, with water heating load control programs, benefits will vary depending on the load control strategy and the characteristics of the electric water heater. For example, if equipped with the appropriate control technology, electric resistance water heaters can provide significant increases and decreases in average load with very little notification, making them an ideal candidate to offer ancillary services.²² Alternatively, or possibly in conjunction with this strategy, water heaters could be used as a form of thermal energy storage. Large tanks equipped with a mixing valve can super-heat the water at night and then require little to no additional heating during the day. This would be beneficial in a situation where the marginal cost of generating electricity is low or even negative at night (e.g., large amounts of nighttime wind generation coupled with inflexible baseload capacity) or when energy prices are high during the day; it provides an energy price arbitrage opportunity. The potential to provide this type of energy price arbitrage is highly dependent on the size of the water heater and the number of hours over which the load shifting is occurring.

Finding #6: EV charging load control is relatively uneconomic as a standalone program due to low peak-coincident demand. Most residential charging occurs during off peak hours. Figure 7 illustrates the average EV charging load profile across many EV owners. While any individual owner's charging load would likely be concentrated in a smaller number of hours, the average load profile is the relevant profile to use in this study, because it represents the load shape that would be associated with a number of DR program participants with naturally diverse charging patterns across the service territory. As shown in the figure, the average amount of peak-coincident load available to curtail on a per-participant basis is less than 0.2 kW. As a result, even if most or all of the charging load can be shifted away from the peak hours, the low peak reduction potential translates into small benefits relative to the cost of the charging control equipment and the program is not cost-effective on a standalone basis. Total load reduction capability in the program is less than 2 MW by 2021 and less than 8 MW by 2035.²³

²² The technology that would facilitate this type of operation is in development and has been proven through a number of demonstration projects. It would include a potentially significant additional incremental cost beyond the costs modeled in this study.

²³ Assumes roughly 140,000 personal EVs in PGE's service territory by 2025.

Figure 7: Average Hourly Home Charging Profile of EV Owner



There are several important considerations to be aware of when interpreting these results, however. DR potential would be higher if targeting the late evening period with the most charging load; this time period could in fact eventually be the target of future DR programs that are designed to address distribution feeder-level constraints that are peaking at that time. The potential could also be higher in the future if EV owners adopt high-speed chargers that concentrate a larger amount of load in a smaller number of hours. It is also possible that there is more potential in programs focused on charging load outside the home. For example, the economics of load control at public charging stations might be more cost-effective. Control of commercial vehicle charging could also be cost-effective as part of a broader load control strategy, perhaps integrated with an Auto-DR program. Finally, as noted earlier in this section of the report, when EV charging load control is included as part of a broader DLC program, the package as a whole is cost effective.


Finding #7: Small C&I DLC has a small amount of cost-effective potential. Space heating DLC is the only cost-effective measure identified for the small C&I segment and its potential is small (around 6 MW in the winter). This is partly because small C&I customers tend to be unresponsive to time-varying rates unless equipped with enabling technology. Generally, electricity costs are a small share of the operating budget for these customers and they lack the sophisticated energy management systems of larger C&I customers. Further, while there is some potential in technology-enabled options, these customers have historically tended to be less likely to enroll in a DR program and generally represent a small share of the total system load.

Finding #8: DR is highly cost-effective for large and medium C&I customers and the potential can be realized through a variety of programs. All of the analyzed DR programs are cost-

effective for medium and large C&I customers. Customer acquisition costs tend to be lower on a dollars-per-kilowatt basis for these segments, leading to improved economics for DR. The large C&I segment accounts for the majority of the DR market in other regions of the U.S. for this reason.

In addition to being highly cost-effective, several large/medium C&I programs have large peak reduction potential. Figure 8 summarizes the potential in each DR option. There is significant potential in a curtailable tariff and a third-party DLC program. A CPP rate would provide similarly large impacts. In general, these programs could be considered the “low hanging fruit” of the available DR options.

Figure 8: Winter Potential for Medium and Large C&I DR Programs



Finding #9: Agricultural DR programs are small and uneconomic in PGE’s service territory. There are large irrigation load control programs in the Pacific Northwest, such as Idaho Power’s Irrigation Peak Rewards program. However, PGE has little irrigation pumping load. Relative to other options, programs focused on agricultural customers are small and not cost-effective in PGE’s service territory. While pumping load control could become slightly cost-effective if PGE were to become a more heavily summer peaking utility, it is still too small to be considered a top priority given the other DR opportunities that exist.

Finding #10: The economics of some programs improve when accounting for their ability to provide ancillary services. There is emerging interest in the Pacific Northwest in DR programs that can provide load reductions on very short notice in response to fluctuations in supply from


intermittent generation resources like wind and solar. DR options that can provide both load decreases and increases provide even more value to the grid as ancillary services.

Since there is not currently an ancillary services market in the Pacific Northwest, the avoided cost of a reciprocating engine was used as a proxy for the value associated with these “fast” DR options. Reciprocating engines are more expensive than a conventional combustion turbine, but also have more operational flexibility and are better suited to address some of the reliability challenges posed by intermittent sources of generation.

Benefit-cost ratios were recalculated for those options capable of providing fast response (i.e., only DR options relying on automating technology). While the reciprocating engine is a good first-order approximation of this additional value, there are limitations to this approach and more granular analysis of the ancillary services value of the DR options would be informative in future research activities. Further, it should be noted that this cost-effectiveness analysis is based on the full coincident peak reduction capability of the programs; in practice, they would not be able to provide a reduction of that magnitude at regular intervals as an ancillary service, and the economics could change accordingly.

With a reciprocating engine as the basis for avoided costs, the economics improve for all programs and small C&I water heating DLC becomes cost-effective. Mass market water heating load control and medium and large C&I load control could provide fast ramping capability in the form of load increases and decreases, and would be particularly valuable as sources of ancillary services. Figure 9 illustrates the cost-effectiveness of these DR programs.

Figure 9: Cost-effectiveness for measures with “fast” load decrease and increase capability



V. Considerations for Future DR Offerings

This study utilized a detailed bottom-up approach to estimating PGE's peak demand reduction potential through DR programs. These estimates were carefully tailored to PGE's system conditions through research on likely adoption rates, per-customer impacts that are consistent with the experience of utilities around the country including the Pacific Northwest, and market conditions that are consistent with PGE's projections. The market potential for a variety of DR options and the economics of these options were assessed under a range of assumptions. The findings of the study suggest several considerations for future DR offerings by PGE.

Run a new dynamic pricing and behavioral DR pilot. A new pilot could provide insight about relatively untested issues such as the impact of a PTR in PGE's service territory, persistence in behavioral DR impacts, the relative difference in seasonal impacts of these programs, and even the difference in impacts when the rates are offered on an opt-in versus default basis. A pilot could also be designed to test a "prices-to-devices" concept involving real-time prices and automated response from specific end-uses, to address fluctuations in supply from renewable generation.

Develop a water heating load control program. There is a clear economic case for water heating load control and the potential benefits are diverse. Piloting or even a larger scale program would help to identify optimal load control strategies and further test the technical feasibility.

Continue to pursue opportunities in the large and medium C&I sectors. DR potential in the large C&I sector can be cost-effectively achieved through curtailable tariffs, third-party programs, and pricing options. Which of these programs to pursue is largely a strategic question, as each have their advantages and disadvantages. To maximize the participation from this customer segment, it may be beneficial to eventually pursue all of the program options through a portfolio-based approach.

Establish well-defined cost-effectiveness protocols. There does not appear to be a well-established approach to analyzing the cost-effectiveness of DR programs in Oregon. For example, the appropriate treatment of incentives as costs and the methodology for establishing derate factors to account for operational limitations of DR programs are two areas in need of further discussion. Reviewing the approaches being used in other states and tailoring these to the specific needs of the Oregon utilities would be a productive starting point. Well-defined protocols should be established while developing utility DR portfolios and strategies.

Develop a long-term rates strategy enabled by PGE's AMI investment. The strategy should address important considerations such as whether to offer new rates on an opt-in or default basis, the advantages and disadvantages of CPP versus PTR, whether a demand charge or increased customer charge is needed to address emerging inequities in cost recovery due to growing market penetration of distributed energy resources, how to transition customers to the new rate options, and other such considerations.

Explore the distribution system value of DR. Recent initiatives in other states have highlighted that the distribution-level value of DR may be understated in current practices. Additional analysis of distribution system constraints and the potential to deploy DR locally to address these constraints would be a useful research activity.

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Appendix A: Participation Assumptions

Estimating Maximum Achievable Enrollment in DR Programs for PGE

PRESENTED TO

Portland General Electric

PRESENTED BY

The Brattle Group

Applied Energy Group

THE **Brattle** GROUP

In this presentation

This presentation summarizes the methodology and assumptions behind estimates of enrollment in potential new DR programs in PGE's service territory

The presentation is divided into three sections

- Pricing programs
- Non-pricing programs included in prior PGE studies
- Non-pricing programs that are new to this study

Participation rates shown in this presentation are “steady state” enrollment rates once full achievable participation has been reached; they are expressed as a % of eligible customers



Pricing Programs

We developed enrollment estimates based on an extensive review of pricing participation studies

The enrollment estimates are derived from a review of 6 primary market research studies and 14 full scale deployments:


Primary market research studies

- A survey-based approach designed to gauge customer interest
- Adjustments were made to account for natural tendency of respondents to overstate interest in survey responses
- Respondents were randomly selected from utility customer base and confirmed to be representative of entire class
- Samples were large enough to ensure statistical validity of findings

Full-scale deployments

- Based on enrollment levels reported by utilities and competitive retail suppliers to FERC and other sources
- Restricted to programs with significant enrollment
- Focus on well marketed deployments

The market research studies and full-scale rate deployments span many regions of the U.S.



Additionally, our analysis includes the Ontario, Canada TOU rollout and three non-public market research studies in the Upper Midwest, Central Midwest, and Asia

Full-scale rate offerings have mostly been for residential and large C&I customers

Utility/Market	State/Region	Applicable class	Rates	Offering type	Approx. years offered
Arizona Public Service (APS)	Arizona	Residential	TOU	Opt-in	30+
Ontario Power Authority (OPA)	Ontario, CA	Residential	TOU	Opt-out	2
Salt River Project (SRP)	Arizona	Residential	TOU	Opt-in	30+
Gulf Power	Florida	Residential	CPP	Opt-in	14
Oklahoma Gas & Electric (OGE)	Oklahoma	Residential	CPP	Opt-in	2
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)	California	Residential	CPP	Opt-in	3
Oklahoma Gas & Electric (OGE)	Oklahoma	Large C&I	TOU	Opt-in	?
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)	California	Large C&I	CPP	Opt-out	3
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E)	California	Large C&I	CPP	Opt-out	3
Southern California Edison (SCE)	California	Large C&I	CPP	Opt-out	3
Los Angeles DWP (LADWP)	California	All C&I	TOU	Opt-in	?
Progress Energy Carolinas	North/South Carolina	All C&I	TOU	Opt-in	15+

Notes:

BGE, Pepco, SDG&E and SCE have rolled out default PTR to their residential customers, but enrollment data is not available. Results are forthcoming. The OPA TOU deployment is considered opt-out rather than mandatory because customers can switch to a competitive retail supplier.


The six market research studies primarily surveyed residential and small/medium C&I customers

Utility/Market	Year of Study	Applicable classes			Rates	Deployment type	
		Res.	Small/Med	Large C&I		Opt-in	Opt-out
California IOUs	2003	X	X		TOU, CPP	X	X
ISO New England	2010	X	X		TOU, CPP, PTR, RTP	X	
Asian Utility	2013	X			TOU, PTR	X	
Large Midwestern IOU	2013	X	X	X	TOU, CPP	X	X
Mid-sized Midwestern Utility	2013	X	X		TOU, CPP	X	
Xcel Energy (Colorado)	2013	X	X	X	TOU, CPP, PTR	X	X

- These market research studies were conducted in order to form the basis for utility AMI business cases or DSM potential studies
- They were led by Dr. David Lineweber and a team of market researchers who are now with Applied Energy Group (AEG)


There are 57 enrollment observations across all of the studies (sorted low to high)

Enrollment in Time-Varying Rates




There is no obvious bias in market research results relative to full-scale deployments

Enrollment in Time-Varying Rates



Opt-out offerings result in significantly higher enrollment on average

Enrollment in Time-Varying Rates



The enrollment data can be further organized with additional granularity


We have organized the data across the following elements

- Customer class (residential vs non-residential)
- Rate (TOU, CPP)
- Offering (opt-in vs opt-out)

We summarize the key findings of this comparison in the slides that follow

The results of our residential TOU analysis are summarized below

Residential TOU Enrollment Rates




Comments

- Opt-in average = 28%
- Opt-out average = 85%
- Opt-out rate offerings are likely to lead to enrollments that are 3x to 5x higher than opt-in offerings
- Arizona's high opt-in TOU participation is attributable to heavy marketing as well as large users' ability to avoid higher priced tiers of the inclining block rate
- In Ontario, the 10% opt-out rate includes some customers who switched to a competitive retail provider even before the TOU rate was deployed

Residential dynamic pricing enrollment observations are similar to those of TOU

Residential Dynamic Pricing Enrollment Rates



Comments

- Dynamic pricing options considered include CPP, variable peak pricing (VPP), and peak time rebates (PTR)
- PTR enrollment is roughly 20% higher than CPP enrollment
- OG&E's VPP rate was rolled out on a full scale basis in 2012 and has reached its target enrollment rate of 20% a year ahead of schedule
- Availability of Gulf Power's CPP rate is limited
- Additionally, Pepco, BGE, SCE, and SDG&E have deployed a default residential PTR; results are forthcoming

Note: Pepco and BGE have deployed a default residential PTR. Results forthcoming.


Why are the full scale residential dynamic pricing enrollment levels slightly lower than the market research results?

- The primary market research identifies all “likely participants” in the dynamic pricing rate, some of whom are very proactive and eager to sign up, while others would sign up but require more education, clear explanation, and additional outreach
- Most utility marketing budgets for dynamic pricing programs have been relatively low and are not designed to provide the type of outreach necessary to enroll customers falling in the latter category
- These customers represent untapped potential in the program and could likely be signed up with a more intensive marketing effort
- For example, heavily marketed utility energy efficiency programs with similar bill savings opportunities reach enrollment rates of 60%

C&I TOU enrollment levels are slightly lower than those of the residential class

Commercial & Industrial TOU Enrollment Rates

Comments




- Opt-in average = 13%
- Opt-out average = 74%
- Estimates are reported separately for Small, Medium, and Large C&I customers (as designated by the utility) where possible
- Full-scale opt-in deployment estimates were derived from FERC data, with a focus on the highest enrolled programs
- TOU rates are often offered on a mandatory basis to Large C&I customers; these are excluded from our assessment

Note: Size of applicable C&I customer segment indicated in parentheses.

There is limited full-scale CPP deployment experience for C&I customers

Commercial & Industrial CPP Enrollment Rates



Note: Size of applicable C&I customer segment indicated in parentheses.

Comments

- Opt-in average = 18%
- Opt-out average = 63%
- C&I preferences for CPP rates tend to be slightly higher than for TOU rates – the opposite of the relationship observed among residential customers
- The California IOU default CPP offering began in 2011 and has experienced significant opt-outs - it may not have been effectively marketed. The rate is being deployed to smaller customers and further results are forthcoming


Preliminary conclusions can be drawn from our assessment, although further research and experience are needed

- Opt-out rate offerings produce enrollment levels that are between 3x and 5x higher than opt-in rate offerings
- Residential customers express a slightly higher likelihood to enroll in time-varying rates than small/medium C&I customers, both through market research and in full-scale deployments
- When offered in isolation, residential customers appear to have a slight preference for TOU over CPP; when offered as two competing rate options, more customers choose CPP
- Customers appear more likely to enroll in PTR than CPP
- Market research and full scale deployment results generally align well; in cases where full deployments produces lower enrollment estimates, it is likely that additional enrollment could be achieved through more focused marketing efforts

The results of our assessment can be averaged across the studies for each customer class and rate option

Time-Varying Pricing Enrollment Rates

Average Across 6 Market Research Studies and 14 Full Scale Deployments



Offering enabling technology is likely to slightly increase participation among eligible customers


- For residential and small C&I customers, programmable communicating thermostats (PCTs) would automate reductions in air-conditioning load during critical peak periods
- For medium and large C&I customers, Auto-DR technology could be integrated with a facility's energy management system to automate load reductions during high priced periods of the CPP rates
- Market researchers have estimated that enrollment among tech-eligible customers will increase if they are also offered these technologies as part of the rate deployment
- **Opt-in enrollment among eligible customers is likely to increase by around 25% if offered enabling technology** (i.e., an enrollment rate of 20% would become 25% among tech-eligible customers)
- **For an opt-out rate offering, enrollment would likely increase by roughly 10%** (i.e. an enrollment rate of 80% would become 88% among tech-eligible customers)
- Large C&I customers are assumed to have more interest in Auto-DR than medium C&I customers due to a higher degree of sophistication in energy management capability

The proposed “steady state” enrollment rates

Class	Option	Opt-in	Opt-out
Residential	TOU - No Tech	28%	85%
Residential	CPP - No Tech	17%	82%
Residential	CPP - With Tech	22%	91%
Residential	PTR - No Tech	21%	93%
Residential	PTR - With Tech	26%	95%
Small C&I	TOU - No Tech	13%	74%
Small C&I	CPP - No Tech	18%	63%
Small C&I	CPP - With Tech	20%	69%
Small C&I	PTR - No Tech	22%	71%
Small C&I	PTR - With Tech	27%	78%
Medium C&I	CPP - No Tech	18%	63%
Medium C&I	CPP - With Tech	20%	69%
Large C&I	CPP - No Tech	18%	63%
Large C&I	CPP - With Tech	25%	69%

We account for a multi-year transition to the steady state enrollment levels

- Changes in participation are assumed to happen over a 5-year timeframe once the new rates are offered
- The ramp up to steady state participation follows an “S-shaped” diffusion curve, in which the rate of participation growth accelerates over the first half of the 5-year period, and then slows over the second half
- A similar (inverse) S-shaped diffusion curve is used to account for the rate at which customers opt-out of default rate options



References

- Faruqui, Ahmad, Ryan Hledik, David Lineweber, and Allison Shellaway, “Estimating Xcel Energy’s Public Service Company of Colorado Territory Demand Response Market Potential,” prepared for Xcel Energy, June 2013
- FERC, “Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering,” December 2012
- FERC, Form 1 Database, 2012
- Lineweber, David, “Understanding Residential Customer Opinions of Time-Based Pricing Options in New England,” prepared for ISO New England, May 2010
- Lineweber, David, “Understanding Business Customer Opinions of Time-Based Pricing Options in New England,” prepared for ISO New England, May 2010
- Momentum Market Intelligence, “A Market Assessment of Time-Differentiated Rates Among Residential Customers in California,” December 2003
- Momentum Market Intelligence, “A Market Assessment of Time-Differentiated Rates Among Small/Medium Commercial & Industrial Customers in California,” July 2004
- PG&E, “PG&E’s SmartRate Program Tops 100,000 Participants,” PG&E Currents, May 28, 2013
- Various utility tariff sheets, as of January 2014



**Non-Pricing Programs
Included in Prior PGE Studies**

Participation in non-pricing programs was updated using the most recent FERC data

FERC conducts a bi-annual survey of utility DR programs, including information on program impacts and enrollment

The 2012 PGE DR potential study enrollment estimates were based on data in the 2010 FERC survey, which was the most current information available at the time

FERC has since released the 2012 survey results and has discontinued the survey; information is now collected through EIA form 861, but with much less granularity

We have updated the enrollment estimates using the 2012 FERC survey

The 75th percentile of achieved enrollment is used as a “best practices” estimate

The FERC data provides a national distribution of actual enrollment in DR programs

To establish a “best practices” estimate of what could eventually be achieved through a new program, we use the 75th percentile of the distribution for each program type

The recent PacifiCorp DR potential study used the 50th percentile

However, since the purpose of our study is to estimate maximum achievable potential rather than the average participation rate, we recommend using the 75th percentile

We will acknowledge throughout the final report that the figures presented are estimates of maximum achievable potential rather than what is necessarily likely to occur, particularly in the short run given the relatively limited experience with DR in the Pacific Northwest

Updated estimates are fairly similar to those of the 2012 PGE potential study

Class	Option	PGE (2012)	PacifiCorp (2014)	PGE (2015)
Residential	DLC - Central A/C	20%	15%	20%
Residential	DLC - Space Heat	20%	15%	20%
Residential	DLC - Water Heating			25%
Small C&I	DLC - Central A/C	20%	3%	14%
Small C&I	DLC - Space Heat	20%	3%	14%
Small C&I	DLC - Water Heating			2%
Medium C&I	DLC - AutoDR	18%		15%
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff		24%	20%
Large C&I	DLC - AutoDR	18%		25%
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	17%	24%	40%

Note:

An average curtable tariff participation rate of 30% for C&I customers was adjusted upward for large customers and downward for medium customers, based on an observation that large customers are more likely to participate (e.g., Xcel Energy's ISOC program)

In a couple of instances, we deviated from the 75th percentile assumption

Space heating DLC participation is assumed to be the same as air-conditioning DLC due to lack of better data

The 75th percentile participation rate of 30% for C&I customers in a curtailable tariff was adjusted upward for large customers and downward for medium customers, based on an observation that large customers are more likely to participate (e.g., Xcel Energy's highly subscribed "ISOC" program)

There is limited data available on Auto-DR adoption rates when deployed at scale; we have assumed that adoption would be similar to that of technology-enabled CPP for C&I customers, since it offers a similar financial incentive to manage load



**New Non-Pricing Programs
Not Included in Prior PGE Studies**

We estimated participation rates for three new programs; two more are in development

Draft participation rates have been developed for:

- Bring-your-own-device (BYOD) load control (residential)
- Behavioral DR (residential)
- Irrigation load control (agricultural)

Participation rates are in development for:

- Smart water heating load control (residential)
- Electric vehicle charging load control (residential)
- All assumptions for these two programs are being developed in parallel and in coordination with PGE staff

Enrollment in BYOD programs will be driven partly by the market penetration of smart thermostats

We have based our estimates of the eligible population for BYOD programs on projections of market deployment for communication-enabled thermostats

Research by Berg Insight projects that over 25% of homes in North America will be equipped with a 'smart system' by 2020, relative to 6% currently

CMO, and Adobe Company, reports that smart thermostats are expected to have over 40% adoption by 2020

Acquity Group's 2014 Internet of Things (IoT) survey reports that approximately 30% of consumers will adopt smart thermostats in the next 5 years

To be conservative, we use an assumption at the low end of this range

Source	Year	Market Penetration (%)
Berg Insight – N. America	2020	25%
CMO	2020	40%
Acquity Group – N. America	2020	30%

- We assume that smart thermostat market penetration in PGE’s service territory will reach 25% of all homes by 2020
- The Energy Trust’s interest in promoting smart thermostats could drive this estimate upward
- Additionally, rapid growth in central air-conditioning adoption in the Pacific Northwest relative to other parts of the country could lead to a future scenario that exceeds this estimate, as new A/C systems are installed with smart thermostats
- Note: Estimate could be refined further upon receiving the Navigant Research report on smart thermostats

Participation among eligible customers is likely similar to participation in conventional DLC programs

The BYOD program is assumed to be offered on an opt-in basis only

With a similar participation incentive as in the conventional DLC program, we assume that participation in the BYOD program would be similar to but slightly higher than that of the conventional DLC program

The intuitive reasoning for this is that customers who purchase a smart thermostat are more likely to be conscious about their energy usage and keen on using the features of their new device

To capture this, we estimate that participation in BYOD programs to be 25%, which is 5% higher than in DLC programs

We have modeled Behavioral DR both on an opt-in and an opt-out basis, similar to pricing programs

Behavioral Demand Response is essentially a peak time rebate (PTR) program without the accompanying financial incentive to reduce consumption during event hours

The no-incentive, no-risk nature of BDR programs could make customers slightly less likely to opt-in and slightly more likely to opt-out

To establish the BDR participation rates, we start with the PTR participation rates discussed previously in this presentation, and make adjustments to the share of customers that opt-in and opt-out

Three sources suggest that BDR participation could resemble that of a PTR program

OPower estimates that customer adoption of their opt-out BDR programs is upwards of 90%

Green Mountain Power (2012-2013)

- Recruitment strategies used a combination of mail, web and phone
- Participation in the opt-in, notification-only program achieved a 34% participation rate

MyMeter Program (four electric co-ops in Minnesota)

- Opt-in participation rates range from 9% to 16% per co-op, with more weight toward the high end of the range

Research supports a 20% opt-in and a 80% opt-out participation rate

Utility/Program	Opt-In Participation Rate (%)	Opt-Out Participation Rate (%)
OPower BDR program adoption rate		90%
Green Mountain Power	34%	
MN electric co-ops (MyMeter Program)	9-16%	

- In both the opt-in and opt-out deployment scenarios, we choose fairly conservative participation rates relative to the data that is available on BDR enrollment
- This is in recognition of the long-term uncertainty in enrollment in these programs and the fairly small scale at which the existing pilots were conducted

Irrigation Load Control Programs typically target large irrigation & drainage pumping systems

Many utilities, such as SCE, Entergy Arkansas, and Idaho Power focus on large customers

The 2014 PacifiCorp potential study sets the eligibility threshold at customers with pumps 25 HP and higher, representing 78% of total agricultural load

We propose that the eligible population be limited to customers on Schedule 49

- Comprises Irrigation & Drainage Pumping customers with loads >30 kW
- These customers represents about 75% of total Irrigation and Drainage load (based on PGE's February 2015 Rate Case Filing)

There are a few data points upon which to base PGE's irrigation DLC participation estimate

EnerNOC's 2013 Irrigation Load Control Report provides enrollment estimates for Rocky Mountain Power

- The Utah service territory had a participation rate of about 20% of eligible load, whereas the Idaho service territory had participation of 48% of eligible load
- All irrigation customers were eligible to participate
- Customers with loads <50 kW required to pay an enablement fee

Idaho Power has achieved significant enrollment

- Conversations with Idaho Power staff indicate that roughly 10% of irrigation customers are enrolled
- These participants are significantly larger than average, representing peak reduction capability of 39% of system peak coincident irrigation load

The recent PacifiCorp DSM potential study suggested a lower participation rate for Oregon

- Participation in California, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming assumed to be 15% of eligible load, based on PacifiCorp program experience
- Assumed participation rates for Idaho and Utah were significantly higher, likely reflecting the different nature of the crops in those two states, leading farmers to be more likely to allow more regular curtailments to their irrigation cycle

There is support for a 15% participation rate assumption for Irrigation Load Control programs

Utility/Program	Opt-In Participation Rate (% eligible load)
PacifiCorp 2015 (CA, OR, WA, WY)	15%
RMP 2013 (Utah)	20%
Idaho Power	39%
RMP 2013 (Idaho)	48%

- The range of participation rates observed in existing programs is wide
- We have chosen an estimate on the low end of the range to avoid overstating participation that may be associated with hotter, drier climates like those of Idaho and Utah
- This assumption has the added benefit of being consistent with the Oregon assumption in the PacifiCorp potential study

Summary of Participation Assumptions for New Non-Pricing programs

Program	Eligible Population in 2020 (%)	Opt-In Participation Rate (%)	Opt-Out Participation Rate (%)
BYOD	25% of Residential Customers	25%	N/A
Behavioral DR	100%	20%	80%
Irrigation Load Control	75% of Irrigation Customers	15%	N/A

Sources for new non-pricing participation assumptions

- Acquity Group, The Internet of Things: The Future of Consumer Adoption, 2014.
- Applied Energy Group, PacifiCorp Demand-Side Resource Potential Assessment for 2015-2034 Volume 5: Class 1 and 3 DSM Analysis Appendix, January 30, 2015.
- Berg Insight, Smart Homes and Home Automation, January 2015.
- CMO, 15 Mind-Blowing stats about the Internet of Things, April 17, 2015.
- Edison Institute, Innovations Across the Grid, Volume II, December 2014.
- EnerNOC, 2013 PacifiCorp Irrigation Load Control Program Report, March 3, 2014.
- Honeywell, Structuring a Residential Demand Response Program for the Future, June 2011.
- Illume, MyMeter Multi-Utility Impact Findings, March 2014.
- J. Bumgarner, The Cadmus Group, Impacts of Rocky Mountain Power's Idaho Irrigation Load Control Program, March 24, 2011.
- Opower, Using Behavioral Demand Response as a MISO Capacity Resource, June 4, 2014.
- R. Kiselewich, The Future of Residential Demand Response: BGE's Integration of Demand Response and Behavioral, E Source Forum 2014, September 29 - October 2, 2014.
- S. Blumsack and P. Hines, Load Impact Analysis of Green Mountain Power Critical Peak Events, 2012 and 2013, March 5, 2015.

Appendix B:

Per-Participant Load Impact

Assumptions

Estimating Per-Participant DR Impacts for PGE

PRESENTED TO

PGE

PRESENTED BY

Ahmad Faruqui

Ryan Hledik

Lucas Bressan

THE **Brattle** GROUP

In this presentation

This presentation summarizes the methodology and assumptions behind our estimates of per-participant peak demand reductions for DR programs that could be offered in PGE's service territory

The presentation is divided into three sections

- Pricing programs
- Non-pricing programs included in prior PGE studies
- Non-pricing programs that are new to this study

Note that the impacts in this presentation are per average participant; they are not multiplied into participation rates to arrive at estimates of system-level impacts



Pricing Programs

Pricing impact estimates have undergone a significant overhaul relative to the 2012 study

Incorporated new findings of 24 pilots and full-scale rollouts that have occurred since the 2012 study, including the DOE-funded consumer behavior studies

Modified the impact estimation methodology to take advantage of the greater number of data points that are now available

- Differentiation in price responsiveness between TOU, CPP, and PTR rates
- Accounting for difference in average response under opt-in versus opt-out deployment
- Improved differentiation between winter and summer impacts

The following slides provide a step-by-step description of our approach

First, we established a reasonable peak-to-off-peak price ratio for each rate option

The peak-to-off-peak price ratio is the key driver of demand response among participants in time-varying rates

A higher price ratio means a stronger price signal and greater bill savings opportunities for participants – on average, participants provide larger peak demand reductions as a result

Price ratios are based on rate designs that have recently been offered by PGE or are currently under consideration

- **TOU: 2-to-1**
- **CPP: 4-to-1***
- **PTR: 8-to-1***

*** Rate designs were provided by PGE. It would alternatively be useful to explore CPP and PTR rates with consistent price ratios.**

Impacts of time-varying rates were then simulated based on a comprehensive review of recent pilot results

PGE has recently conducted a CPP pilot and previously conducted a TOU pilot; the results are incorporated into our analysis, but have been supplemented with findings from dynamic pricing pilots across the globe to develop more robust estimates of price response


For residential customers, we rely on results from 225 pricing tests that have been conducted in a total of 42 pilots in the U.S. and internationally over roughly the past decade

Small and Medium C&I impacts are based on results of a dynamic pricing pilot in California

Large C&I impacts are based on experience with full-scale programs in the Northeastern U.S.

To estimate residential impacts, we begin with a survey of impacts from recent pilots

Results of All Residential Time-Varying Pricing Tests



Our database of dynamic pricing pilots includes seven that have been conducted in the Pacific Northwest

Utility/Organization	State/Province	Name of Pilot	Year(s)	Rates Tested	Range of Price Ratios	Range of Peak Prices	Range of Impacts	Number of Pilot Participants	Season of System Peak
BC Hydro	British Columbia	Residential TOU/CPP Pilot	2007-2008	TOU CPP	TOU: 3.0-6.2 CPP: 7.9-11.1	TOU: 19-28¢ CPP: 50¢	TOU: 3-13%, CPP: 17-22%	TOU: 1,031 CPP: 273	Winter
Idaho Power	Idaho	Energy Watch (EW) and Time-of-Day (TOD) Pilot Programs	2005-2006	TOU CPP	TOU: 1.8 CPP: 3.7	TOU: 8¢ CPP: 20¢	TOU: 0% CPP: 50%	TOU: 85 CPP: 68	Summer
PacifiCorp	Oregon	TOU Rate Option	2002-2005	TOU	Summer: 1.7-2.1 Winter: 1.7	Summer: 11-14¢ Winter: 11¢	Summer: 6-8% Winter: 7%	~1200	Summer Winter
Portland General Electric (PGE)	Oregon	Residential TOU Option	2002-2003	TOU	2.7	8¢	8%	1,900	Winter
Portland General Electric (PGE)	Oregon	Critical Peak Pricing Pilot	2011-2013	CPP	4.4	44¢	11%	996	Winter
Puget Sound Energy	Washington	TOU Program	2001	TOU	1.4	See notes	5%	300,000	Winter
US DOE, PNNL, BPA, PacifiCorp, Portland General Electric, Public Utility District #1 of Clallam County, and City of Port Angeles	Washington/ Oregon	Olympic Peninsula Project	2006-2007	CPP	7.0	35¢	20%	112	Winter


Notes:

Could not find published estimates of TOU prices for Puget Sound Energy; only the price differential was available.

Price ratios are presented on an all-in basis.


The Pacific Northwest price ratios and impacts are generally consistent with those of other pilots

Results of All Residential Time-Varying Pricing Tests



To estimate TOU impacts, we focus only on those pilots which tested TOU rates


Results of Residential TOU Pricing Tests



Note: 65 data points.


We then fit a curve to the summer data to capture the relationship between price ratio and impacts

Results of Residential TOU Pricing Tests with Arc




We use the arc to simulate the impact of the residential TOU rate for our study

Results of Residential TOU Pricing Tests with Arc



The same approach was used to estimate CPP impacts


Results of Residential CPP Pricing Tests with Arc



Note: 40 data points, 2 not shown, 1 dropped as outlier in regression. 5 winter impacts are shown for reference purposes only.

PTR impacts were also estimated using the same approach


Results of Residential PTR Pricing Tests with Arc



Note: 24 data points.
2 winter impacts are shown for reference purposes only.

Price elasticity appears to be higher for CPP rates than PTR or TOU


Results of All Residential Time-Varying Pricing Tests




Note: 129 data points, 1 dropped as outlier in regression. 26 winter impacts are shown for reference purposes only.

C&I impacts were estimated using a similar approach, but fewer pilots have been conducted for these customers

C&I Arcs without Tech



C&I Arcs with Tech



Seasonal variation is based on the relationship observed in a limited number of pilots

To develop winter impact estimates, we created a scaling factor based on the relationship observed in pilots that tested both rates

The challenge is that there is not a consistent seasonal relationship across these pilots (see table)

Recognizing this uncertainty, but remaining consistent with the directional relationship in the PGE studies, we assumed a slightly higher degree of price responsiveness (10%) in the winter than in the summer

New primary research (e.g., the upcoming PTR pilot) is needed to refine this assumption

Pilot	Winter impact relative to summer
PGE TOU	Much larger (6x)
PGE CPP	Slightly larger*
PacifiCorp	Similar
Ontario TOU	Slightly smaller
Australian TOU	Much smaller (0.4x)
Xcel	Relationship varies

* Based on very limited summer data


Impacts are scaled to account for enabling technology

Based on the relationship observed in other pilots, we assume a 90% increase in response attributable to technology (largely smart thermostats)

Winter technology impacts are assumed to be 80% of summer technology impacts based on the relationship observed in direct load control programs

TOU is not coupled with enabling technology because it does not have a dispatchable price signal

Price Response with and without Tech



Per-customer pricing impacts are scaled down in the opt-out deployment scenario

A new dynamic pricing pilot by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) found that the average residential participant's peak reduction was smaller under opt-out deployment than under opt-in deployment

This is likely due to a lower level of awareness/engagement among participants in the opt-out deployment scenario; note that, due to higher enrollment rates in the opt-out deployment scenario, aggregate impacts are still larger

Per-customer TOU impacts were 40% lower when offered on an opt-out basis

Per-customer CPP impacts were roughly 50% lower

We have accounted for this relationship in our modeling of the residential impacts

We also simulated the impact of a TOU rate for irrigation customers

A 2001/2002 irrigation TOU pilot in Idaho found that customers produced, on average, a 9% reduction in peak for a TOU with a 3.5-to-1 price ratio

We used the Arc of Price Responsiveness to scale these impacts to the TOU price ratio we're analyzing in this study

The resulting peak reduction estimate is 4.7% for a TOU rate

Summary of draft results

		Without Tech			With Tech		
		TOU	CPP	PTR	TOU	CPP	PTR
Opt-in Deployment							
Residential	Summer	5.2%	11.7%	12.9%	N/A	31.0%	34.2%
	Winter	5.8%	12.8%	14.2%	N/A	24.8%	27.4%
Small C&I	Summer	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	N/A	9.6%	14.6%
	Winter	0.2%	0.5%	0.7%	N/A	7.7%	11.7%
Medium C&I	Summer	2.6%	5.6%	N/A	N/A	9.0%	N/A
	Winter	2.6%	5.6%	N/A	N/A	9.0%	N/A
Large C&I	Summer	3.1%	6.4%	N/A	N/A	12.0%	N/A
	Winter	3.1%	6.4%	N/A	N/A	12.0%	N/A
Agricultural	Summer	4.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Winter	4.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Opt-out Deployment							
Residential	Summer	3.1%	5.8%	6.4%	N/A	15.5%	17.1%
	Winter	3.5%	6.4%	7.1%	N/A	12.4%	13.7%
Small C&I	Summer	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	N/A	9.6%	14.6%
	Winter	0.2%	0.5%	0.7%	N/A	7.7%	11.7%
Medium C&I	Summer	2.6%	5.6%	N/A	N/A	9.0%	N/A
	Winter	2.6%	5.6%	N/A	N/A	9.0%	N/A
Large C&I	Summer	3.1%	6.4%	N/A	N/A	12.0%	N/A
	Winter	3.1%	6.4%	N/A	N/A	12.0%	N/A
Agricultural	Summer	4.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Winter	4.7%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes:

Impacts are average per eligible participant – individual participants could produce larger or smaller impacts

For ease of comparison, tech impacts are expressed as a % of the average customer even though they would only apply to customers with electric A/C or space heat, who have higher peak demand



**Non-Pricing Programs
Included in Prior PGE Studies**

We estimate per-participant impacts for the following non-pricing programs from prior studies

	Residential	Small C&I	Medium C&I	Large C&I
DLC - A/C	X	X		
DLC - Space heat	X	X		
DLC - Water heating	X	X		
DLC - Auto-DR			X	X
Curtable tariff			X	X

Updates to assumptions for conventional non-pricing programs were fairly minor

Impact assumptions remain stable for the conventional non-pricing programs analyzed in prior studies for PGE, since these programs are well established with a long history of performance

Where applicable, we revised the estimates to be more consistent with findings of studies in the Pacific Northwest

We also compared the 2012 assumptions to those of the more recent PacifiCorp potential study and resolved any discrepancies to ensure consistency

We relied on the following Pacific Northwest DR studies to refine our impact estimates

- Avista, “Idaho Load Management Pilot,” 2010
- Cadmus Group, “Kootenai DR Pilot Evaluation: Full Pilot Results,” 2011
- Cadmus Group, “OPALCO DR Pilot Evaluation”, 2013
- Itron, “Draft Phase I Report Portland General Electric Energy Partner Program Evaluation,” 2015
- Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, “Northwest Open Automated Demand Response Technology Demonstration Project,” 2009
- Michaels Energy, “Demand Response and Snapback Impact Study”, 2013
- Navigant and EMI, “2011 EM&V Report for the Puget Sound Energy Residential Demand Response Pilot Program,” 2012
- Navigant, “Assessing Demand Response (DR) Program Potential for the Seventh Power Plan”, 2014
- Nexant, “SmartPricing Options Final Evaluation - The Final report on pilot design, implementation, and evaluation of the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's Consumer Behavior Study”, 2014
- Rocky Mountain Power, “Utah Energy Efficiency and Peak Reduction annual Report”, 2014

The following assumptions were updated for this study

Residential air-conditioning DLC

- Reduced slightly from 1.0 kW to 0.8 kW to reflect lower-than-average impacts observed in Pacific Northwest studies

Residential space heat DLC

- Increased from 0.6 kW to 1.0 kW
- Even higher impacts are observed in Pacific Northwest studies, but a 2004 PGE study found impacts in the 0.7 kW range
- Note that the relationship between space heat and air-conditioning has been reversed based on this revision

Assumption updates (cont'd)

Small C&I air-conditioning and space heat

- Scaled to be consistent with residential assumption (1.5x residential load reduction capability)

Medium and Large C&I Auto-DR

- Increased from 15-20% of peak load to 30% of peak load to establish appropriate relationship between curtailable tariff impacts and Auto-DR impacts
- Assumed to be offered in conjunction with curtailable tariff type of program and provides 50% incremental increase in load reduction relative to impact with no technology
- There is a significant range of uncertainty around this assumption; to be discussed further with PGE relative to the findings of its Auto-DR pilot, which referenced a fairly broad range of impacts

Summary of assumptions for non-pricing impacts from prior studies

Class	Program	Season	2012 Assumption	Updated 2015 Assumption
Residential	DLC - Central A/C	Summer	1.0 kW	0.8 kW
Residential	DLC - Space Heat	Winter	0.6 kW	1.0 kW
Residential	DLC - Water Heating	Summer	0.4 kW	0.4 kW
Residential	DLC - Water Heating	Winter	0.8 kW	0.8 kW
Small C&I	DLC - Central A/C	Summer	2.0 kW	1.2 kW
Small C&I	DLC - Space Heat	Winter	1.2 kW	1.5 kW
Small C&I	DLC - Water Heating	Summer	1.2 kW	1.2 kW
Small C&I	DLC - Water Heating	Winter	0.6 kW	0.6 kW
Medium C&I	DLC - Auto-DR	Year-round	15%	30%
Medium C&I	Curtable tariff	Year-round	N/A	20%
Large C&I	DLC - Auto-DR	Year-round	20%	30%
Large C&I	Curtable tariff	Year-round	20%	20%



**New Non-Pricing Programs
Not Included in Prior PGE Studies**

We estimated per-participant peak demand impacts for three new programs; two more are in development

Draft impact estimates have been developed for:

- Bring-your-own-device (BYOD) load control (residential)
- Behavioral DR (residential)
- Irrigation load control (agricultural)

Impact estimates are in development for:

- Smart water heating load control (residential)
- Electric vehicle charging load control (residential)
- Developing assumptions for these programs requires ongoing interaction with PGE staff, which is already underway

We relied on the following data sources to develop our impact estimates for new non-pricing programs

- Applied Energy Group, PacifiCorp Demand-Side Resource Potential Assessment for 2015-2034 Volume 5: Class 1 and 3 DSM Analysis Appendix, January 30, 2015
- Austin Energy, PowerSaver Program website, Accessed May 1, 2015
- Con Ed of NY, Rider L – Direct Load Control Program filing, Case C14-E-0121, April 3, 2014
- Edison Foundation, Innovations Across the Grid, December 2013 and December 2014
- Hydro One website, Accessed May 1, 2015.
- Illume, MyMeter Multi-Utility Impact Findings, March 2014.
- J. Bumgarner, The Cadmus Group, Impacts of Rocky Mountain Power’s Idaho Irrigation Load Control Program, March 24, 2011.
- Nest Inc., White Paper: Rush Hour Rewards, Results from Summer 2013, May 2014.
- Opower, Using Behavioral Demand Response as a MISO Capacity Resource, June 4, 2014.
- Rocky Mountain Power, Utah Energy Efficiency and Peak Reduction Annual Report, June 26, 2013 and May 16, 2014.
- S. Blumsack and P. Hines, “Load Impact Analysis of Green Mountain Power Critical Peak Events, 2012 and 2013”, March 5, 2015.
- Southern California Edison website, Accessed May 1, 2015.

We have identified key elements of “Bring Your Own Device” Type Programs

Bring Your Own Device/Thermostat (“BYOD” or “BYOT”) programs provide an alternative to utility direct-install programs, reducing equipment and installation costs

The incentive structure for participating in BYOD programs is diverse

- One-time rebate/refund, with or without a minimum time commitment
- Fixed annual/monthly participation incentive in addition to a one-time rebate
- Variable monthly incentive based on kWh savings

Programs also include monetary incentives to thermostat vendors and annual compensation for portal/interface maintenance

Customers can opt out of individual events without penalty

Our assumptions are based on research of five different BYOD programs

We have identified five primary programs

- Hydro One
- Austin Energy
- Con Edison of NY
- Southern California Edison
- “Rush Hour Rewards (RHR)” program by Nest Inc.

These programs have been able to successfully sign up new customers

- As of December 2014, Austin Energy had enrolled 7,000 thermostats (out of ~383,000 residential customers), with a planned expansion to 70,000 thermostats
- Con Edison enrolled 2,000 customers in its first year and believes that it can achieve 5,000 new sign-ups each year
 - Low enrollment may be explained by a relatively small number of eligible thermostats currently installed (~30,000)
- In 2013 Nest’s Rush Hour Rewards program included over 2,000 customers from Austin Energy, Reliant, and Southern California Edison. Nest is currently expanding this program, and enrollment has likely increased since then

Our BYOD program impact estimates are similar to those of other Residential A/C DLC programs

Austin Energy's *Power Partner Thermostat* program has achieved a per device load shed of up to 33% during a peak event

Con Edison expects 1.0 kW of peak load reduction per thermostat based on its experience with other Residential DLC participants

Nest's "RHR" program studied the peak load impacts across three different utilities (Austin Energy, Reliant, and Southern California Edison)

- A total of 19 events were studied across the three utilities
- Each event reduced load by an average of 1.18 kW per device
- Only 14.5% of customers reduced their temperature during an event

Research suggests a per-customer peak reduction of around 1 kW

Utility/Program	Number of Participants	Customer Incentive	Peak Demand Impact (%/customer)	Peak Demand Impact (kW/customer)
Austin Energy	7,000	\$85/one-time	33%	N/A
SCE	N/A	\$1.25/kWh reduced	N/A	N/A
Con Ed of NY	2,000	\$85/one-time; \$25 annual for additional participation	N/A	1.0
Hydro One	2,000	\$100-125/one-time	N/A	N/A
Nest Inc.'s "RHR"	2,000	N/A	55%	1.18

The available data suggests that per-customer impacts are similar to that of a utility-administered DLC program; we therefore assume the same summer and winter impacts that are being modeled in the conventional programs

Impacts of Behavioral DR programs were based primarily on programs conducted by OPower

Behavioral Demand Response aims to increase customer engagement

Achieved via a software-centered approach based on targeted and customized email, mobile, and interactive voice response (IVR) communications

Customers are notified of DR events ahead of time and receive post-event feedback on performance

Easy to deploy and scale relative to other DR programs that require hardware installations

No financial incentives are offered for load reductions

OPower reports significant summer peak savings from BDR programs

Deployed to 150k customers in Consumers Energy (MI), Green Mountain Power (VT), and Glendale Water & Power (CA)

- Achieved peak load reductions of 3% on average (max 5%)

BGE launched BDR in combination with a Peak Time Rebate Program

- 5% average reduction at peak across homes without a device (~0.2kW/home)

Added benefit of customer engagement and increased satisfaction, although it is possible that customers could find the notifications to be intrusive

Others are also exploring the potential of Behavioral DR

In Minnesota, four electric co-ops used MyMeter – a program that gives utility customers more detailed info about their energy use

- In 2013, demand reduction ranged between 1.8 – 2.8% per customer
- This program is different from those offered by Opower, as information is driven through an in-home display

In the fall of 2012 and summer of 2013, Green Mountain Power study tested a behavioral DR-like program

- GMP ran fourteen peak event tests for seven treatment groups with varying rate structures and informational treatments
- Customers who stayed on a flat rate, but were notified of peak events, reduced by peak demand by 3.4% and 8.2% in 2012 and 2013, respectively (0.030 - 0.073 kW)

We have heard that Silver Spring Networks may be developing BDR capability. However, we have not yet found any evidence and further research is needed

Research suggests a 3% reduction impact for Behavioral DR programs would be reasonable

Utility/Program	Summer Peak Demand Impact (%)
Consumers Energy, Green Mountain Power, and Glendale Water & Power	3.0%
BGE	5.0%
MN electric co-ops (MyMeter Program)	1.8-2.8%
Green Mountain Power	3.4-8.2%

- Since little is known about the persistence of BDR impacts over the long-term, we assume an impact from the lower end of this range, of 3%
- To establish a winter impact, we use the same assumption that is used in our dynamic pricing analysis, that winter impacts are 10% higher than summer impacts; this is because BDR similarly relies on behavioral response from customers rather than targeting a specific end-use

There is support for high per-customer impacts from Irrigation Load Control programs

Irrigation Load Control consists of scheduling or shutting off irrigation pumps above a certain size

The programs researched are available only during the summer and typically provide a fixed (per event) incentive payment

Customers can opt out of a maximum number of events per year

In the Pacific Northwest, PacifiCorp has experience with such programs in Idaho and Utah; Idaho Power and a number of electric cooperatives also offer irrigation load control programs

Southern California Edison and Entergy also offer irrigation load control programs, as do coops in other parts of the US

Estimates of irrigation peak load reductions are fairly large on a per-participant basis

Rocky Mountain Power (part of PacifiCorp) ran its irrigation load control program in 2009 and 2010 with customers in Idaho

- About 2,000 customers were enrolled between 2009 and 2010
- Aggregate reductions in 2009 was 206 MW out of 260 MW of irrigation load
- In 2010, reductions amounted to 156 MW out of 283 MW of load

RMP also ran a program in Utah that achieved reductions in the 62-73% range

FERC's DR Study reports peak demand reductions of about 60% for electric cooperatives

Southern California Edison and Entergy report impacts of 82% and 49%, respectively

In its 2014 DR potential study, PacifiCorp's assumed that 100% of agricultural irrigation load could be curtailed during an event

Our research suggests peak reductions in the 65%-75% range for Irrigation Load Control programs

Utility/Program	Peak Demand Impact (MW)	Baseline Demand (MW)	Peak Demand Impact (%)
PacifiCorp DR potential study	N/A	N/A	100%
Southern California Edison			89%
RMP 2009	205	260	79%
RMP 2010	156	283	55%
RMP 2012	35	48	73%
RMP 2013	16	26	62%
Various Coops (FERC 2013 Study)	N/A	N/A	60% (mean)
Entergy (Arkansas)			49%

Notes: Peak demand impact % calculated for RMP 2009-2012 as (peak demand impact) / (baseline demand).

RMP 2009-10 from The Cadmus Group, *Impacts of Rocky Mountain Power's Idaho Irrigation Load Control Program*, March 24, 2011, pp. 1-2.

RMP 2012 from Rocky Mountain Power, *Utah Energy Efficiency and Peak Reduction Annual Report*, Revised June 26, 2013, p. 19.

RMP 2013 from Rocky Mountain Power, *Utah Energy Efficiency and Peak Reduction Annual Report*, May 16, 2014, p. 19.

Summary of Impact Assumptions for New Non-Pricing programs

Program	Winter Peak Demand Impact (kW)	Winter Peak Demand Impact (%)	Summer Peak Demand Impact (kW)	Summer Peak Demand Impact (%)
BYOD	1.0 kW		0.8 kW	
Behavioral DR		3.3%		3%
Irrigation Load Control		N/A		70%

Appendix C: Cost-Effectiveness Adjustments

Should the incentive payment be included as a cost in the TRC cost-effectiveness test?

If every participant valued their loss of comfort at an amount equal to the incentive payment (assume \$90/year), then it would be correct to include the full incentive amount as a cost in the TRC test

However, every participant is unique and will therefore value the loss of comfort differently; consider four prototypical customers in a DLC program:

Customer A, for example, is rarely home and therefore only values his loss of comfort from participating in the DLC program at \$20/year – his “profit” from participating in the program would be \$70/year


Customer B is home more often, but does not particularly mind relinquishing control of his air-conditioner occasionally; he values the loss of comfort at \$50/kW year

Customer C places higher value on comfort, and the cost of participating is roughly the same to him as the incentive payment that he receives; this is the “marginal” customer

Customer D is more temperature-sensitive and does not like the idea of curtailing use of his air-conditioner; his value of lost comfort is \$130/year, or \$40 more than the incentive payment that is being offered


The prototypical customers represent a “supply curve” of participants in the DLC program

Illustrative Supply Curve of DLC Participants



The cost associated with “loss of comfort” should be the average across all participants

Illustrative Supply Curve of DLC Participants



- Customers will only participate if their loss of comfort is less than the incentive payment
- In this purely illustrative example, the average loss of comfort among participants is \$50 per year, which is 55% of the incentive payment
- The remaining 45% is simply a transfer payment and should not be considered a cost in the TRC test (which is consistent with treatment of energy efficiency programs)
- While that estimate would change depending on the slope of the supply curve, it is more realistic than assuming all customers incur a cost of \$90/year
- We count 50% of the incentive as a cost in the base case of our analysis for this reason

We tested the sensitivity of our findings to the amount of incentive counted as a cost

Class	Program	Opt-in		
		Base Case (50%)	0%	100%
Residential	AC DLC	1.12	1.57	0.87
Residential	Space Heating DLC	1.31	1.78	1.03
Residential	Water Heating DLC	1.30	2.09	0.94
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	1.82	3.10	1.29
Residential	TOU	1.24	1.24	1.24
Residential	PTR	1.75	4.49	1.24
Residential	PTR w/Tech	1.32	2.26	0.98
Residential	CPP	1.62	1.62	1.62
Residential	CPP w/Tech	1.49	1.49	1.49
Residential	Behavioral DR	0.85	0.80	0.80
Residential	BYOT - AC	1.94	3.55	1.27
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	1.98	3.30	1.41
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	2.43	5.39	1.57
Small C&I	AC DLC	1.00	1.51	0.75
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	1.07	1.52	0.83
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	0.79	1.14	0.60
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	1.40	2.41	0.98
Small C&I	TOU	0.06	0.06	0.06
Small C&I	PTR	0.17	0.18	0.16
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	0.79	1.03	0.64
Small C&I	CPP	0.08	0.08	0.08
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	0.55	0.55	0.55
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	1.59	2.09	1.23
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	5.37	28.26	2.96
Medium C&I	CPP	1.94	1.94	1.94
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	1.38	1.38	1.38
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	1.57	2.06	1.22
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	6.30	168.36	3.21
Large C&I	CPP	14.42	14.42	14.42
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	6.70	6.70	6.70
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	0.78	1.02	0.63
Agricultural	TOU	0.29	0.29	0.29

The table at left shows benefit-cost ratios assuming that 50%, 100%, and 0% of the incentive payment is counted as a cost in the TRC cost-effectiveness test, for **opt-in** program deployment

Cost-effectiveness sensitivity case results (cont'd)

Class	Program	Opt-out		
		Base Case (50%)	0%	100%
Residential	AC DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	TOU	1.24	1.05	1.05
Residential	PTR	1.49	2.76	1.06
Residential	PTR w/Tech	0.86	1.16	0.69
Residential	CPP	1.15	1.04	1.04
Residential	CPP w/Tech	0.83	0.80	0.80
Residential	Behavioral DR	1.04	0.97	0.97
Residential	BYOT - AC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	0.11	0.09	0.09
Small C&I	PTR	0.30	0.30	0.26
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	0.82	1.07	0.66
Small C&I	CPP	0.11	0.10	0.10
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	0.60	0.58	0.58
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	4.80	3.56	3.56
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	1.76	1.63	1.63
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	42.10	34.79	34.79
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	7.15	7.02	7.02
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	N/A	N/A	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	0.83	0.63	0.63

The table at left shows benefit-cost ratios assuming that 50%, 100%, and 0% of the incentive payment is counted as a cost in the TRC cost-effectiveness test, for **opt-out** program deployment

Avoided costs derates are derived from the California cost-effectiveness protocols

The California PUC currently defines three factors that are used to adjust avoided capacity costs to better reflect the value of demand response:

- (A) **Availability:** “The A Factor is intended to represent the portion of capacity value that can be captured by the DR program based on the frequency and duration of calls permitted.”
- (B) **Notification time:** “The B factor calculation should be done by examination of past DR events to determine how often the additional information available for shorter notification times would have resulted in different decisions about events calls... By examining past events, an estimate can be made of how often a curtailment event would have been accurately predicted, not predicted but needed, or predicted but not needed in advance of the notification time required by a particular program.”
- (C) **Trigger:** “The C factor should account for the triggers or conditions that permit the LSE to call each DR program. LSEs consider customer acceptance and transparency in establishing DR triggers. However, in general, programs with flexible triggers have a higher value than programs with triggers that rely on specific conditions.

Additionally, the CPUC defines two factors used to adjust T&D costs and energy cost, but those are specific to avoided assumptions in California and not directly applicable to this analysis for PGE

For more information, see the 2010 California DR Cost Effectiveness Protocols report:

<http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7D2FEDB9-4FD6-4CCB-B88F-DC190DFE9AFA/0/Protocolsfinal.DOC>

The CPUC is currently examining the possible modification and expansion of these factors

Avoided cost derates used in the PGE analysis

Class	Program	A) Availability	B) Notification	C) Trigger	Combined
Residential	TOU - No Tech	65%	100%	100%	65%
Residential	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	PTR - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	PTR - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Residential	DLC - Central A/C	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	DLC - Space Heat	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	DLC - Water Heating	85%	100%	95%	81%
Residential	DLC - BYOT	70%	100%	95%	67%
Residential	Behavioral DR	70%	88%	100%	62%
Small C&I	TOU - No Tech	65%	100%	100%	65%
Small C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	PTR - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	PTR - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Small C&I	DLC - Central A/C	70%	100%	95%	67%
Small C&I	DLC - Space Heat	70%	100%	95%	67%
Small C&I	DLC - Water Heating	85%	100%	95%	81%
Medium C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Medium C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Medium C&I	DLC - AutoDR	75%	100%	95%	71%
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	75%	88%	100%	66%
Large C&I	CPP - No Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Large C&I	CPP - With Tech	60%	88%	100%	53%
Large C&I	DLC - AutoDR	75%	100%	95%	71%
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	75%	88%	100%	66%
Agriculture	DLC - Pumping	75%	100%	95%	71%

- Values at left represent the percent of the avoided cost that is attributed to the DR program
- Estimates are based on a survey of values developed by the California IOUs across a wide variety of DR programs
- Values are calibrated to capture appropriate relative relationships across the programs evaluated for PGE and intuitive estimates were developed for those programs for which there is not a clear example in the California data

Appendix D:

Annual Potential Estimates and Benefit-Cost Ratios

See the accompanying MS Excel file titled "PGE DR Potential Results - Annual Tables.xlsx".

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Summer (MW, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-Out Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	TOU	Summer	0.0	42.0	43.2	44.6	45.7
Residential	PTR	Summer	0.0	94.3	97.2	100.3	102.9
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0	23.5	24.3	25.0	25.7
Residential	CPP	Summer	0.0	76.2	78.3	80.8	82.9
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	20.4	21.0	21.6	22.2
Residential	Behavioral DR	Summer	45.2	38.1	39.3	40.6	41.7
Residential	BYOT - AC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	Summer	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Small C&I	PTR	Summer	0.0	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.1
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0	3.7	4.0	4.3	4.6
Small C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	21.9	23.3	25.2	26.8
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	38.5	41.1	44.4	47.3
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	40.9	44.3	48.4	52.1
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	83.9	90.9	99.4	106.9
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	Summer	0.0	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Summer (MW, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-In Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Summer	11.0	106.5	120.9	134.2	144.3
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Summer	3.6	31.0	32.3	33.8	35.2
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	1.4	12.3	13.0	13.7	14.3
Residential	TOU	Summer	0.0	22.7	23.9	24.6	25.3
Residential	PTR	Summer	0.0	42.6	44.7	46.1	47.3
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0	12.9	13.5	13.9	14.3
Residential	CPP	Summer	0.0	31.9	33.5	34.6	35.5
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	9.6	10.1	10.4	10.7
Residential	Behavioral DR	Summer	1.1	9.5	9.8	10.2	10.4
Residential	BYOT - AC	Summer	1.9	42.1	44.5	46.9	49.0
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Summer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Summer	0.9	7.7	8.1	8.6	8.9
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Summer	0.1	7.6	20.5	33.7	44.5
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Summer	0.4	1.3	2.7	4.9	6.9
Small C&I	AC DLC	Summer	1.5	12.8	13.8	14.9	15.9
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Summer	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.4	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.2
Small C&I	TOU	Summer	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Small C&I	PTR	Summer	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6
Small C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	5.2	46.1	49.6	53.6	57.1
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	Summer	23.3	24.6	26.5	28.6	30.4
Medium C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	6.1	6.7	7.2	7.7
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	10.9	11.9	12.9	13.7
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	7.0	62.8	68.6	75.1	80.7
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	Summer	75.5	80.4	87.8	96.1	103.3
Large C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0	11.4	12.6	13.8	14.9
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0	29.6	32.9	36.0	38.7
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Summer	0.5	3.8	3.5	3.2	2.9
Agricultural	TOU	Summer	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Summer (% of System Peak, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-Out Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	TOU	Summer	0.0%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%
Residential	PTR	Summer	0.0%	2.6%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Residential	CPP	Summer	0.0%	2.1%	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%
Residential	Behavioral DR	Summer	1.3%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Residential	BYOT - AC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Small C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	2.3%	2.4%	2.5%	2.5%
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Summer	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Summer (% of System Peak, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-in Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Summer	0.3%	3.0%	3.2%	3.3%	3.4%
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Summer	0.1%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	0.8%
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	TOU	Summer	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Residential	PTR	Summer	0.0%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.1%
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	Behavioral DR	Summer	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%
Residential	BYOT - AC	Summer	0.1%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Summer	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.2%	0.5%	0.8%	1.1%
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
Small C&I	AC DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Summer	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Small C&I	TOU	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	0.1%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%
Medium C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Summer	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%
Medium C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Summer	0.2%	1.7%	1.8%	1.9%	1.9%
Large C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Summer	2.1%	2.2%	2.3%	2.4%	2.5%
Large C&I	CPP	Summer	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Summer	0.0%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Summer	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Agricultural	TOU	Summer	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Winter (MW, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-Out Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	TOU	Winter	0.0	61.7	62.8	64.1	65.2
Residential	PTR	Winter	0.0	136.2	138.9	141.8	144.1
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0	24.6	25.0	25.6	26.0
Residential	CPP	Winter	0.0	109.4	111.3	113.6	115.5
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	21.2	21.6	22.1	22.4
Residential	Behavioral DR	Winter	65.6	54.6	55.7	56.9	57.9
Residential	BYOT - AC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	Winter	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Small C&I	PTR	Winter	0.0	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.3
Small C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	18.1	19.2	20.7	22.0
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	31.8	33.9	36.5	38.8
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	35.4	38.2	41.6	44.7
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	72.5	78.4	85.5	91.7
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Winter (MW, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-In Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Winter	2.3	20.1	21.2	22.4	23.3
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Winter	7.2	61.9	64.5	67.6	70.4
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	1.7	15.4	16.2	17.1	17.9
Residential	TOU	Winter	0.0	33.0	34.3	35.0	35.6
Residential	PTR	Winter	0.0	61.0	63.4	64.7	65.8
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0	13.4	13.9	14.2	14.5
Residential	CPP	Winter	0.0	45.4	47.2	48.2	49.0
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	10.0	10.4	10.6	10.8
Residential	Behavioral DR	Winter	1.6	13.6	13.9	14.2	14.5
Residential	BYOT - AC	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Winter	1.4	12.6	13.2	14.0	14.6
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Winter	1.1	9.6	10.1	10.7	11.2
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Winter	0.2	15.1	41.1	67.5	88.9
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Winter	0.3	0.9	2.0	3.5	5.0
Small C&I	AC DLC	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.7	6.0	6.5	7.1	7.5
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Winter	0.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.5	4.3	4.6	5.0	5.3
Small C&I	TOU	Winter	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Small C&I	PTR	Winter	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.1
Small C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	4.2	38.1	40.9	44.1	46.8
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	19.0	20.3	21.8	23.5	25.0
Medium C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	5.0	5.5	5.9	6.3
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	9.0	9.8	10.6	11.2
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	6.0	54.3	59.2	64.5	69.2
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	64.3	69.5	75.7	82.6	88.6
Large C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0	9.8	10.9	11.9	12.8
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0	25.6	28.4	31.0	33.2
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Agricultural	TOU	Winter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Winter (% of System Peak, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-Out Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	TOU	Winter	0.0%	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
Residential	PTR	Winter	0.0%	3.7%	3.6%	3.5%	3.4%
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Residential	CPP	Winter	0.0%	3.0%	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%
Residential	Behavioral DR	Winter	1.8%	1.5%	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%
Residential	BYOT - AC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Small C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.1%
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.1%	2.2%
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Winter	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Measure-level Peak Reduction Potential: Winter (% of System Peak, grossed up for line losses)

Maximum Achievable Potential Opt-in Scenario

Class	Program	Season	2016	2021	2026	2031	2035
Residential	AC DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Residential	Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.1%	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%
Residential	Water Heating DLC	Winter	0.2%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%	1.7%
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Residential	TOU	Winter	0.0%	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%
Residential	PTR	Winter	0.0%	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
Residential	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%
Residential	CPP	Winter	0.0%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Residential	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	Behavioral DR	Winter	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%
Residential	BYOT - AC	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	Winter	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	Winter	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.4%	1.1%	1.7%	2.1%
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Small C&I	AC DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	Winter	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Small C&I	TOU	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	0.1%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%
Medium C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Winter	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
Medium C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	Winter	0.2%	1.5%	1.5%	1.6%	1.6%
Large C&I	Curtailable Tariff	Winter	1.8%	1.9%	2.0%	2.0%	2.1%
Large C&I	CPP	Winter	0.0%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	Winter	0.0%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Agricultural	TOU	Winter	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Benefit-Cost Ratios

Opt-out Scenario (Red text indicates ratio is less than 1.0)

Class	Program	Ratio
Residential	AC DLC	N/A
Residential	Space Heating DLC	N/A
Residential	Water Heating DLC	N/A
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	N/A
Residential	TOU	1.24
Residential	PTR	1.49
Residential	PTR w/Tech	0.86
Residential	CPP	1.15
Residential	CPP w/Tech	0.83
Residential	Behavioral DR	1.04
Residential	BYOT - AC	N/A
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	N/A
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	N/A
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	N/A
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	N/A
Small C&I	AC DLC	N/A
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	N/A
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	N/A
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	N/A
Small C&I	TOU	0.11
Small C&I	PTR	0.30
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	0.82
Small C&I	CPP	0.11
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	0.60
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	N/A
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	N/A
Medium C&I	CPP	4.80
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	1.76
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	N/A
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	N/A
Large C&I	CPP	42.10
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	7.15
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	N/A
Agricultural	TOU	0.83

Benefit-Cost Ratios

Opt-in Scenario (Red text indicates ratio is less than 1.0)

Class	Program	Ratio
Residential	AC DLC	1.12
Residential	Space Heating DLC	1.31
Residential	Water Heating DLC	1.30
Residential	AC/Space Heating DLC	1.82
Residential	TOU	1.24
Residential	PTR	1.75
Residential	PTR w/Tech	1.32
Residential	CPP	1.62
Residential	CPP w/Tech	1.49
Residential	Behavioral DR	0.85
Residential	BYOT - AC	1.94
Residential	BYOT - Space Heating	1.98
Residential	BYOT - AC/Space Heating	2.43
Residential	Smart Water Heater DLC	2.22
Residential	Electric Vehicle DLC	0.14
Small C&I	AC DLC	1.00
Small C&I	Space Heating DLC	1.07
Small C&I	Water Heating DLC	0.79
Small C&I	AC/Space Heating DLC	1.40
Small C&I	TOU	0.06
Small C&I	PTR	0.17
Small C&I	PTR w/Tech	0.79
Small C&I	CPP	0.08
Small C&I	CPP w/Tech	0.55
Medium C&I	Third-Party DLC	1.59
Medium C&I	Curtable Tariff	5.37
Medium C&I	CPP	1.94
Medium C&I	CPP w/Tech	1.38
Large C&I	Third-Party DLC	1.57
Large C&I	Curtable Tariff	6.30
Large C&I	CPP	14.42
Large C&I	CPP w/Tech	6.70
Agricultural	Pumping Load Control	0.78
Agricultural	TOU	0.29

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