



THE SCHOLASTIC PROJECT



Clare Monagle

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*This little book is devoted to the memory
of Terry Monagle, 1946-2008.*

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Introduction

Throughout the Middle Ages, scholars in northern Europe were engaged in a project of argument, codification, and synthesis. Their task was to make a curriculum for the emerging universities that would enable students to see Christian teachings as a coherent and rational system, as something teachable. The intellectual inheritance bequeathed to these scholars encompassed the classical world, the Bible, the writings of the Church Fathers, as well as a limited range of texts written in the early Middle Ages. In addition, they had received a number of important texts via Muslim and Jewish scholars who were working in centres such as Toledo and Cairo. Medieval scholars had to reconcile this vast array of textual material with the Christian truth that they held to be absolute. Their job was to give students the benefit of the wisdom and the methods of the ancients, but always couched in the guiding knowledge of Christian revelation.¹

The adjective “scholastic” has been used to describe this work of university-based theologians in the Latin West between approximately 1100 and 1450. They are called “scholastic” because they emerged from the cathedral schools of Europe. The *scholae* emerged during the eleventh century, concomitant to the economic and demographic

renewal that took place over that century in western Europe. In places such as Paris, Chartres, and Tours, young clerics undertook training in the *trivium* (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric) as training for future careers in episcopal and secular administration. Prior to the development of the schools, higher education was conducted almost entirely in monasteries, and framed within the pedagogical objective of biblical exegesis. These flourishing towns, however, required clerics capable of ministering in an urban environment, to more fluid populations, engaged in a variety of economic activities. The intellectual program of the new schools was always intimately linked with the social transformations occurring in Europe at that time.

Their intellectual program was paradoxically timid and bold. It was timid, at least to our eyes, because these scholars were always aware of the fragility of human knowledge in a post-lapsarian world. Knowledge was always partial, as a result of the expulsion of humanity from the Garden of Eden. Yet, humans had been made in God's image, and so existed in a relationship of resemblance to God. Surely, then, this resemblance could be studied in order to learn something about God? Since God created the world, including humanity, then his creation must indicate something about his being. Medieval people knew about their separation from God, as well as their resemblance to him, through the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Their sense of what knowledge was possible in the world pivoted entirely upon the revelations they perceived as emerging through scripture, and was reinforced in the wisdom of the patristic fathers. Ideas that emerged from classical and Muslim worlds could be put to use, but they must always be subordinated to the truths of Christian revelation.

In order to perform this subordination, to enforce intellectual compliance, scholastic theologians employed dialectical reasoning. They placed contradictory ideas side by side, and argued towards resolving their differences and brokering orthodoxy. In the preface to his *Sic et Non*, the twelfth-century theologian Abelard (1079–1142) laid this method out in one of the earliest discussions of what came to be called “the scholastic method.” In the first half of the twelfth century, he wrote:

it seems right, as we have undertaken to collect the diverse sayings of the Holy Fathers, which stand out in our memory to some extent due to their apparent disagreement as they focus on an issue; this may lure the weaker readers to the greatest exercise of seeking the truth, and may render them sharper readers because of the investigation.²

The method of the schoolmen was dialectical reasoning. This way of thinking emerged from the curriculum in liberal arts in which these young men were trained, which had its origins in the classical world. They studied three core subjects: grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. This was called the *trivium*. Grammar was the first part of their training, and constituted much more than the word signifies today. Grammar, as an area of analysis, was concerned with how language worked. As Christian theology had it, language was God-given, and enabled man’s ennoblement over the beasts. Therefore, language could be read as an aspect of creation, just like the natural world. To think about a noun, then, was to think about more than a part of speech: it was also to think about what made something a thing. To say that thing was something—for example, to say, “That car is white”—invited further questions. Where does that whiteness come from? Scholars wanted to know whether every

adjective—strong, pink, elaborate, wicked—corresponded to God. Grammar invited a science of correspondence, with every part of speech reflecting a higher reality.

Rhetoric was the art of persuasive speech. Again, we use a less nuanced sense of the word, often using “rhetorical” as an adjective to mean shallow or insubstantial. How often do we hear our politicians decry the “empty rhetoric” of their opponents? Within the scholastic educational system, however, rhetoric was the study of making a point, and taking your audience with you, to put it crudely. In classical Rome, rhetoric was deployed to train lawyers and orators. It was usually put to the ends of the *res publica*, or what we might call public affairs. In the European Middle Ages, however, rhetoric was put to both secular and religious ends. As a practice, it informed emerging judicial process across western Europe, as this period of educational codification was joined by one of legal consolidation. Rhetoric was also used in the production of letters, which increasingly did much of the diplomatic heavy-lifting in this period. Most importantly, however, rhetoric aided the preacher. All of the men in the schools were clerics, and many would go on to have significant careers in the clergy. Rhetoric was the structure by which they could communicate complicated theological ideas to a broader audience. Rhetoric, as a discipline, taught them when they should insert a memorable story, an *exemplum*, into their sermon, or the types of metaphors that worked best in given circumstances.

Dialectic was, put simply, training in two-fold argument. When there are two positions on any given question, how do you argue through them to find an agreement? Because scholastic theologians believed that there was an ultimate reality to which language corresponded, even if this

correspondence was cloudy, they assumed that contradictions could be resolved. In fact, contradiction was a path to the truth; the path to resolution was an opportunity to define doctrine and to clean out problematic notions. For example, a budding theologian in the school might be encouraged to consider why the gospels contradicted each other at key points. The gospels of Matthew and Luke provide different genealogies for Joseph. Obviously, the gospels could not be in error, as the foundational assumption for these men was the sacredness of these texts. Therefore, working out how they could both be true offered a way into the mechanism of revealed truth. The budding theologian when confronted with this problem might then think about how we should read for allegorical or historical truth. That is, he would find a way within human logic as he understood it to contrive to make it all fit. This was why scholastic theology was highly productive if we understand “productive” to mean the development of applied knowledge. In order to resolve contradictions, theologians developed nuanced forms of literary theory, of theories of reading, that enabled them to read for different levels of meaning, with different burdens of proof.

A Project?

Within the discipline of Medieval Studies, scholastic thought has been considered a method rather than a project.³ The reasons for this relate to the structural world of the schools, and the universities they later became. The schools emerged organically, rather than programmatically. They arose with demand in the growing towns of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and usually responded to local need for more clergy and ecclesiastical bureaucrats. As such, they

were completely *ad hoc*, especially when compared to the universities of today, with unit guides, learning outcomes, and standardized forms of assessment. As far as we know, and quite a lot of the early period is cloudy, a scholar would usually seek approval from the local bishop or relevant administrator to use rooms attached to the bishopric to run a class. Once approval was granted, a process that was eventually regulated to the provision of a licence to teach (*licentia docendi*), the teacher would attempt to attract students by reputation, and the students would pay the teacher directly. In the twelfth century both Abelard and John of Salisbury (ca. 1120-1180) write accounts of these schools that depict them as very loosely organized indeed.⁴ They both tell the story of students following the teacher with the best reputation. They moved often, attracted by word-of-mouth recommendations. As there was no formal curriculum, and no degree structure, students were free to move as they pleased, providing they had the resources to compensate the teacher.

Perhaps because of these market forces, as we might see it, teachers defined themselves against each other. Competition was fierce for students, and so a young, up-and-coming teacher might challenge a more established figure to a disputation on a topic, an intellectual duel of sorts, in order to prove their authority. Consequently, scholastic thought itself developed dialectically, in as much as thinkers thought against each other to stake their own claims for legitimacy. This emerging theological practice, seen from a bird's-eye view, does not present as a project, but rather as a competitive practice defined by opposition. In addition, during the twelfth century a number of these schoolmen were hauled before papal councils to defend their orthodoxy. Their method was so new, and their findings so creative and

seemingly counterintuitive, that the papacy was moved on a number of occasions to censure their texts, and/or restrict the verbal dissemination of their teaching. It is hard to see a homogenous project among this world of novelty and competition, one that pitted scholars against each other, and the papacy against the scholars.

The University of Paris was officially founded in 1215, although the schools of that town had been in operation for at least a century before that. The process of foundation necessitated other formal structures, such as degree structure and a set curriculum. The founding statutes of Paris set these out. During this period, universities were usually founded under the protection of the papacy or a secular ruler. They became interlocked with the establishment, as these graduates filled key administrative posts across Christendom, which was the name they gave to western Europe. It is no coincidence that the inquisition was founded at the same time, and by the same people, as those that founded the university. This was a period during which the papacy was defining its authority through the creation of new institutions that would define orthodoxy (in the case of the universities) and enforce it (in the case of the inquisition). Is it possible now to speak of scholasticism as a project, as a shared endeavour with agreed upon aims? Not really, if we think about the way these institutions operated day to day, and year to year. The universities remained highly competitive institutions, in which disputation remained one of the key means of building reputation, often at the expense of your opponents. The universities, in spite of training Europe's intelligentsia, or perhaps because they trained Europe's intelligentsia, received rigorous scrutiny from the authorities. Scholars disagreed ferociously with each other,

on the page and in public. Despite attempts by Catholic historians to portray the scholastic period as a time of flowering for the Church, most recent intellectual historians of medieval thought have stressed that it was a period of competition, intellectual diversity, and creativity. In thinking of scholasticism as a method, one defined by the articulation of arguments, they have refused the totalizing vision of perfectly orthodox medieval universities. Instead contemporary scholars have shown the scholastic method as one that encouraged debate, absorbed intellectual diversity, and was often perceived with hostility by authorities.⁵

In short, much recent scholarship on scholastic theology has stressed its disruptive and contentious qualities, presenting it as an open system of inquiry, rather than a closed dogmatic structure. Scholasticism was indeed a method; I have no argument with this designation. However, it was also a project, when taken as a whole. It was a project, in as much as the Enlightenment can be conceived as such, one that depended upon a shared idea of reason as a means of coming to know the world, as well as a way of building knowledge in the world. The entry-level assumption of the scholastic project, as I am conceiving of it, is the conviction that reason is a real thing in the world (albeit God-given), and that productive knowledge of the world can best be developed by the application of reason. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) argued that the world was constituted by the *ratio fidei*, the reason of faith. This was the principle that Christian faith was underscored by reason, the concepts were mutually interwoven. For Anselm, faith in a Christian God in fact enabled the apprehension of reason. Later medieval theologians understood themselves to have access to the *ordo rationis*, the order of reason, which existed as

reality and was able to be apprehended by those with both the faith and the education to perceive it.⁶

The task of the scholastic project was to deploy this reason to build structures of orthodoxy in the world. Reason was used to define doctrine. Then it was used to disseminate doctrine to believers. Reason was also used to defend the faith against its critics, both internal and external. Finally, it was used to prosecute heretics and infidels through legal argument and the creation of legal structures. Underscoring all of these endeavours, even among scholars who would have vociferously disagreed with each other in the classroom, was the idea that the practice of reason was the best guarantee of building watertight doctrine for Christendom. Reason was the gift given to humankind by God; it was in fact one of the ways humanity participated in his divinity. Reason, once given, operated independently from God, but it always bore his presence in the world.

Speaking of scholasticism as a project invariably invokes the Enlightenment as a category, and one that would seem to be the opposite of scholastic thought. Scholasticism has been commonly reviled as obscurantist and dogmatic. From the advent of humanist intellectual culture in the fifteenth century, it has been normative to relegate scholasticism as irrelevant and nonsensical. Scholasticism seems to offer the opposite of Enlightenment in fact, to be a reductive intellectual program whose purpose was to rationalize articles of faith that could not be critiqued or un-thought. For scholastic theologians, the Incarnation could never be rejected, nor the Trinity, nor the Logos. How can this foreclosed intellectual system be spoken of in the same breath as the Enlightenment, the project that proclaimed that reason enabled people to think for themselves, to transcend the

verities they had taken for granted? Kant said that the motto of Enlightenment was *sapere aude*, dare to know. Given that scholastic theologians already thought they knew, we might imagine their motto was merely “dare to know how?,” as they sought to defend those very verities that their Enlightenment counterparts sought to undo.

The other side of the Enlightenment project, however, are the peoples who were excluded from its regimes of reason. Through the work of postcolonial studies, in particular, we have come to understand the Enlightenment project as embedded in notions of reason to which all did not have equal purchase. The Enlightenment, it has been argued, reified a white, Western, and masculine form of reason as universal and aspirational. In so doing, Enlightenment thinkers, and the forms of governance that they inspired, produced a codified system of canonical knowledge, dogmatic in its own way. Enlightenment thought was more than a system of reasonable questions, it could be argued. Rather, Enlightenment thinkers produced an intellectual program that risked excluding forms of knowledge that could not be defended within their methodology. Within the frames of colonial and imperial practice, this enabled the rejection of ways of life, thought, and government practised by indigenous peoples on the basis that these peoples were not enlightened.

The Enlightenment project, as we conceive of it now, was much more than an injunction to know. It was a mode of thought that engendered the white Western man as the default human being, and all who were outside of that as necessarily inferior. As a mode of knowledge, the Enlightenment had emancipatory capacities, but at the same time it had the capacity to naturalize and exclude. Thinking of the Enlightenment as a project enables us to register that

both things were possible in the same program, that its emancipatory and universalist ambitions sat alongside its embedded gendered, elitist, and racialized dimensions. The idea of a project enables us to attempt to come to terms with the movement as a whole. It is in this spirit that I seek to speak of a scholastic project in this book.⁷

The Reverse Side of the Project

Scholasticism was creative, disruptive, and diverse, as recent scholarship has shown us. It was also dependent on the articulation of a Western male subject, with access to reason, as the default human being, because he was made most closely in God's image. In this book I want to argue that we need to think of scholasticism as a coherent project if we are to come to terms with the constitutive work performed by this theology in the history of Western thought. Much changed between the Middle Ages and the time of Enlightenment. What did not change, however, was that the reasonable white man was the thinking subject who was allowed access to the life of the mind, and defined what it was to be reasonable. This book is the story of how scholastic theology defined this universal subject, and a catalogue of the exclusions it ensued. These exclusions still obtain today. Thinking about scholasticism as a project enables us to link the past to the present.

In what follows, I will produce a taxonomy of some of these exclusions. The categories of woman, Jew, and heretic were core others against which ideal Christian subjectivity was implicitly defined. Through their readings of Paul the Apostle, theologians mooted a putative Christian universalism in which the mechanism of baptism guaranteed equal

access to salvation to all comers, be they Jews, Greeks, slaves, free, man, or woman. All Christian souls were equal before God. Life on earth, however, was a different matter. Christians lived alongside Jews. Men and women were understood to have different access to reason, and to be made in God's image in very different ways. There were always heretics who refused orthodox Christianity, as it was decreed by the papacy. Theologians used these categories as sites of investigation: how did they tell us about God's presence in the world? What epistemological and ontological purpose did these distinctions serve? In short, what work did they do? *The Scholastic Project* offers an account of this intellectual work done by categories of difference in medieval theology. In so doing, it will show just how constitutive the woman, the heretic, and the Jew were for the production of orthodoxy in the Middle Ages.

It is a more commonplace approach to look at what scholasticism has built, rather than what it excludes. Scholars have talked of a "scholastic culture," building a vision of the medieval world within which Gothic cathedrals, courtly love, and high theology are all part of the same cultural moment.⁸ Within this articulation, the highest Christian ideals of universal love coalesce in new cultural forms that celebrate human flourishing through love of the divine. In thinking through the scholastic project, I seek to disaggregate the universal claims of scholasticism from the very particular forms of privilege that it inscribes. None of this is to suggest that ideas work in a vacuum, and produce their own reality. I will show, below, that the insights of scholastic theologians were produced in tandem with larger political and social shifts. The theology of Mary's Immaculate Conception evolved alongside a rise in the popular devotion to Mary.

Scholastic approaches to Jews noticeably harden alongside the increasingly persecutory regimes of Christian monarchs during the High Middle Ages. It is not always possible to work out which came first, persecutory rhetoric or practice. In this short book I am not determined to unravel that knot, but rather to demonstrate the correlations that occur between ideas, culture, and politics.

My Purpose and its Limits

I have focused primarily on three key scholastic thinkers: Peter Lombard (ca. 1096–1160), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), and John Duns Scotus (ca. 1265–1308). This is an inadequate sample, clearly, given the rich range of intellectuals that can nestle under the category “scholastic.” However, for the purposes of this small volume, I have chosen each scholar because they are emblematic of a stage in scholastic theology, and so their comparison can tell something of a story of change over time. Lombard’s epochal *Sentences* was the core textbook in theology throughout the Middle Ages. As such he is a foundational figure from the period that some call the “Twelfth-Century Renaissance.” His *Sentences* constituted a core intervention during that period, transforming the new forms of theological speculation into a cogent curriculum.⁹ Aquinas, of course, was the thirteenth-century author of the *Summa theologica*, the vast theological compendium that synthesized Christian theology with an Aristotelian worldview. What did this mean? It meant that Aquinas sought to understand the world of created things through the core Aristotelian idea of the *telos*, whereby everything that was found in the world was understood to be for a reason, and for an end. Aquinas wanted to understand the ends

imbued within creation, and to map those ends upon an understanding of revelation.¹⁰ Finally, I have focused upon Scotus because he had very particular things to say about Mary's Immaculate Conception, as well as the Jewish problem as he understood it. Scotus is most often considered in the light of his theory of univocity or through his arguments for the proof of God's existence. For the purposes of this book, I am interested less in his high theology, and more in how that looks when applied to doctrinal controversies on the ground.¹¹

I want to be clear that this is not a survey. I am aware that the intellectual life of any period is usually more contingent and messy than any historical accounts can convey. Other scholars have done precise, meticulous, and important work on medieval thought that reveals the field as always contested. They have also shown that scholars themselves were often marginal figures, themselves prosecuted for heresy, or at least subject to censure. I am well aware that my depiction of scholastic theologians as the voices of orthodoxy does an injustice to their complicated status in the world. On the one hand, they worked in elite institutions that enjoyed the patronage of kings and popes. On the other hand, the nature of their jobs meant that they sometimes produced ideas that were displeasing to authorities, or incurred the wrath of jealous rivals. There are many moments in the history of scholastic theology where scholars were themselves maligned and marginalized. This book does not tell that story, however. My approach is to take the long view of the project, to map those categories of people who are used in the service of Christian self-definition. I have not been exhaustive in this—I could also have spoken about Muslims, lepers, or slaves as important figures in medieval theology.

When looking from twenty-first century Australia, however, it is the categories of women, heretic, and Jew that demand my attention. But this is by no means a thorough accounting. This book is a somewhat polemical, and very passionate, plea for more scholarly work that tells us not only about the house that scholasticism built, but also about those who were excluded from it.

This book is also designed for students. Firstly, I want to sketch scholastic theology as a system within which a complicated set of ideas were made to relate to each other under an overall ambition of the production of orthodoxy. Students tend to think that popes used theology instrumentally, in order to bolster their own power. Or they tend to think that theologians developed theology in order to please secular leaders. Both scenarios are too crude, and fail to register the complicated ways culture both makes and reflects reality.

Secondly, students often assume a sharp divide between the Middle Ages and modernity, seeing the Middle Ages as backward and modernity as enlightened. In telling this long story of Western othering, I hope to destabilize this narrative. The timing is right. We live in a world that is very conscious of the political realities, and implications, of entrenched privilege. We talk now of white, masculine, or heterosexual privilege. Consequently, we need to examine the history of these forms of privilege, to try to understand how they have become so embedded. That is, despite the sweeping social revolutions of recent history, we are surprised to find ourselves still living in a world where the dominant culture is patriarchal, Eurocentric, and fearful of religious others to Christianity. The reason for this dominance, I want to suggest, is the deep historical root of the idea that the universal default subject is a Western man. If we want to understand why it

obtains, we need to understand deeper intellectual histories that go beyond the modern.

Thirdly, I want to suggest to students that scholastic theology was not monolithic. I hope to show how it changed over time, and that theologians of different periods took very different lines over certain things. This is not to say that it was not the discourse of elites, for elites. By this I mean that it manifested and reproduced the core interests of the ruling class, which was that of clerical men. This ruling class was ideologically invested in the masculine orthodox Christian subject as the universal human, as the measure against which all others were to be judged. As a project, scholasticism was flexible and inquiring, and creative. However, at its core it had entirely naturalized assumptions about the essential superiority of this universal *homo*. So, the project itself was highly contested and controversial in its own time, subject to censure and debate. This is not to say, however, that it did not function as a type of hegemonic soft power. I would say exactly the same thing about a myriad of intellectual movements, including those in our own day. The work of intellectuals tends to straddle the strange combination of manufacturing consent, while also producing radical critique. Scholastic theologians were no different.

Notes

¹ For background to this process, see Marcia Colish's chapter, "The Theological Enterprise," in her magisterial *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 1:33–90.

² Abelard, *Sic et Non*, ed. Blanche Boyer and Richard McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), Prologue, p. 103, trans. by W. J. Lewis (aided by the helpful comments and suggestions of S. Barney), published at <http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/Abelard-SicetNon-Prologue.asp> (accessed July 5, 2016). On Abelard, see also John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Constant J. Mews, *The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

³ The classic text putting forward the idea of the scholastic method is Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, 2 vols. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957; rept. of Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1911). For a great introduction to debates around the definition of scholasticism, as well as to the theology itself, see Ulrich Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), trans. Michael J. Miller.

⁴ John of Salisbury's account of his studies is found in his *Metalogicon*, ed. J. B. Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, *Corpus Christianorum continuatio mediaevalis*, 98 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), p. 84, trans. D. McGarry, *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955). Abelard's story is most famously recounted in his own words in his *Historia Calamitatum*, ed. J. Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1978), translated in a Penguin Classics edition by Betty Radice, *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).

⁵ For some important recent work in the field that stresses disruption and contention, see Constance Brittain Bouchard, "Every Valley Shall be Exalted": *The Discourse of Opposites in Twelfth-Century Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Alain Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle: Le cas de Jean Peckham* (Paris: Belles-Lettres, 1999); and Alex J. Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice and Performance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

⁶ On Anselm, see *Anselm, Aosta, Bec and Canterbury*, ed. David Luscombe and G. R. Evans (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996).

⁷ On thinking about and through the idea of the Enlightenment project, see *What's Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hans Reill (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010); *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment: New Perspectives in Eighteenth-Century French Intellectual History*, ed. Peter Gordon (New York: Routledge, 2001). On the relationship between Enlightenment thought and Postcolonial theory, see Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa, *The Postcolonial Enlightenment: Eighteenth Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁸ See John W. Baldwin, *The Scholastic Culture of the Middle Ages: 1000–1300* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland, 1971).

⁹ On Lombard, see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, and Philipp Rosemann, *Peter Lombard (Great Medieval Thinkers)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹⁰ On Aquinas, see Brian Davies, *Aquinas: An Introduction* (London: Bloomsbury, 2003), and Bernard McGinn, *Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae: A Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

¹¹ On Scotus, see Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus (Great Medieval Thinkers)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).