The Cold War in the Himalayas

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The Cold War in the Himalayas

*Multinational Perspectives on the
Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 1950–1970*

Reed H. Chervin

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
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"It is a little naïve to think that all this trouble with China is essentially due to a struggle over some territory. Two of the largest countries in Asia confront each other over a vast border. And the test is as to whether any one of them will have a more dominating position than the other in this border and in Asia itself."[1]

Jawaharlal Nehru, 1963

1   Jawaharlal Nehru, *Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers 1947–1963* (London: Penguin UK, 2015), 256–57.

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Acknowledgements

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Note on Chinese Romanization and Translations

This book features several styles of Chinese romanization. For place names, Pinyin is indicated either in the text or in brackets accompanying a name which normally has a different romanization (e.g., Quemoy). For personal names, Pinyin is used for individuals in Mainland China (e.g., Zhou Enlai). I also use Pinyin for Chinese publications and terms. For people and organizations in Taiwan, the Wade-Giles romanization is used since it was and remains the norm in Taiwan. Names of people in Hong Kong are rendered using Cantonese romanization found in primary sources. There are, however, exceptions to these rules. For instance, names of certain well-known figures are written in the most commonly understood form (e.g., Chiang Kai-shek). Lastly, unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

Introduction

Abstract

The introduction sets the stage for my book by connecting clashes at the Sino-Indian border in 2017, 2020, and 2021 with tension that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. It describes how this book differs from existing literature on the subject, the background of the border issue, the relevance of the Cold War as well as historical competition and cooperation between India and China.

Keywords: Sino-Indian, border, Cold War, introduction

In 2020 and 2021, Indian and Chinese troops fought in areas along their disputed border, including the Galwan Valley and Pangong Lake. In 2017, China and India had a dust-up over a frontier area called Doklam (Donglang). These confrontations were far from isolated incidents. Rather, they comprised part of a series of border disputes between India and China dating back to the 1950s.

This work explores the evolution of the Sino-Indian border conflict—broadly defined—from 1950 to 1970.[1] These dates are chosen for several reasons. The year 1950 was a watershed moment in Sino-Indian relations due to the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Furthermore, beginning with this year allows us to evaluate each nation during its infancy (the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China were founded in 1947 and 1949, respectively). The book ends in 1970 since the international scene changed in 1971 with the onset of the Indo-Pakistani War and ping-pong diplomacy. These dates also mark roughly ten years before and after the Sino-Indian Border War. Using ten years before and after as markers makes sense so that we can understand what events contributed to the conflict as well as what the medium-term ramifications of it were.

I specifically examine how conflict at the frontier destabilized spheres of influence and caused the countries involved to reassess their allies and rivals.

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1   The term "Sino" (originally from Latin) refers to China or Chinese.

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This contest was a revival of the nineteenth-century Great Game, garnering the interest of political entities both inside and outside the border region.[2] A range of actors viewed the border conflict as an opportunity to pursue their foreign policy goals, which comprised trade, security, and prestige.

To contextualize the border war, I divide this book into three parts: the 1962 war, antebellum, and postbellum. The first examines the 1962 Sino-Indian War and its aftermath in a global context. Chapter 1 traces the evolution of the 1962 war and domestic reactions from India and China. Chapter 2 addresses the immediate response from key international powers. Their response manifested itself in varying degrees of moral and material support.

The second part investigates the lead-up to the Himalayan confrontation. Chapter 3 discusses the ways that the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China engaged with Sino-Indian borderlands. It demonstrates how each Chinese government made similar territorial claims and used subversion and diplomacy to extend its influence. Chapter 4 analyzes Indian views and policies toward the frontier, which culminated with the 1961 Forward Policy—a policy intended to establish control over territory by placing sentry posts between and behind Chinese positions along the Sino-Indian border. Chapter 5 outlines the West's early interactions with Tibet, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Burma (now Myanmar) as important segments of the greater arc of the Sino-Indian border.

The third part evaluates how various countries dealt with the Sino-Indian frontier in the years following the border war. Chapter 6 examines Beijing and Taipei's attempts to use the post-war moment to gain new international alliances and secure old ones. Chapter 7 traces the ways that New Delhi bolstered its position at the frontier by requesting foreign assistance, dispensing additional aid to the Himalayan kingdoms, and countering Chinese activities through overt as well as covert actions. Chapter 8 considers post-1962 Western policies and practices toward South and Southeast Asia in the context of the U.S. strategy at the time to contain China. This chapter also considers how Pakistan responded to U.S. aid to India.

Each chapter is written from the standpoint of a country or set of related countries. Using oral history interviews and original source materials from thirty-two archives distributed across ten countries, my book seeks to

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2   In *The Imperial Security State* (2012), James Hevia problematizes the term "Great Game." He argues that the term romanticizes a violent imperial process and that it was not used by key historical actors during the nineteenth century. In spite of the phrase's questionable origins, I will invoke the "Great Game" to refer to geopolitical rivalry in Asia and how nation-states dealt with real or perceived expansionism.

understand the Sino-Indian border conflict as a transformative process at the crossroads of the Global Cold War and the end of empire.[3] Regarding "boundary conditions," I will necessarily discuss the perspectives of certain countries in more detail than those of others (e.g., those of China, India, and the Anglophone West more than those of the Soviet Union). There are several reasons for this decision, not least linguistic and source limitations. For example, I tried to interview veterans of the 1962 war in India and China but was unsuccessful. I have also chosen to emphasize topics of global significance.

This book differs from existing scholarship on the Sino-Indian border conflict in several aspects.[4] It integrates bottom-up and top-down methodologies by considering the points of view of both ordinary citizens and high officials. By contrast, historian Anton Harder, for example, analyzes Sino-Indian relations through the lens of elite ideology.[5] In addition, my book employs an empirical approach, deviating from works that use international relations theory to explain how China or India have dealt with border disputes overall (e.g., *Strong Borders, Secure Nation* by political scientist M. Taylor Fravel).[6]

Regarding sources, I rely on broad, deep, and new archival evidence.[7] I secured successfully the declassification of 755 pages of material from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, fourteen files from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, and dozens of files from the National Archives of Australia. I also reference the post-1947 Jawaharlal Nehru papers in New Delhi as well as underused collections from repositories such as

3   I visited twenty-four of these archives in person.
4   For overviews of the historiography on the Sino-Indian border conflict, see Dai Chaowu 戴超武, "Zhongyin bianjie wenti xueshushi shuping" 中印边界问题学术史述评 (1956–2013) [Commentary on the Historiography of the Sino-Indian Border Issue (1956–2013)], *Shixue yuekan* 史学月刊 [Journal of Historical Science] 10 (2014): 91–115; Xuecheng Liu, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 9–10; Deng Hongying 邓红英, *Zhongyin bianjie wenti yu yindu duihua zhengce* 中印边界问题与印度对华政策 [China-India Border Disputes and India's China Policy], (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chuban she, 2019), 3–41.
5   See Anton Harder, "Defining Independence in Cold War South Asia: Sino-Indian Relations, 1949–1962" (PhD thesis, LSE, 2016) and Anton Harder, "Promoting Development without Struggle," in *India and the Cold War* ed. Manu Bhagavan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2019).
6   Steven Hoffman uses the international relations theory of realism to analyze the Sino-Indian border dispute (and Tibet) in particular. See Steven A. Hoffmann, "Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 165–94.
7   Another fairly recent work which relies for support on wide-ranging archival sources is *Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910–62* (2016) by Bérénice Guyot-Réchard.

Academia Historica in Taipei and the National Archives of Myanmar in Yangon. With respect to primary sources from the People's Republic, these materials are "black-boxed" and typically do not provide a window into internal debates, disagreements, and how certain decisions were arrived at. Nonetheless, I believe that these sources have value by shedding light on events and processes at the Sino-Indian frontier as well as Chinese Communist perspectives toward the border conflict. I should also note that perspectives from the Soviet Union and Socialist Bloc are largely absent after chapter 2 due to the non-availability of pertinent sources.

In terms of periodization, this book uses a "middle-of-the-road" chronology. Political scientist Steven A. Hoffman in *India and the China Crisis* (1990) examines the particularly tense period of Sino-Indian relations from 1959 to 1963, and Chinese foreign policy scholar John W. Garver in *Protracted Contest* (2001) surveys relations between the two countries throughout the twentieth century. I strike a balance by analyzing the transformative period of India-China relations while providing the appropriate, focused context of the middle Cold War. Lastly, and most importantly, my book offers new arguments that the mid-century Sino-Indian border conflict—not just the 1962 war—transformed international conceptions of the frontier and how power was exercised in that region.[8] In other words, I contend that this frontier was more important for countries and individuals than in previous centuries and that governments became more active in that region following the war. To date, the border dispute between China and India remains unresolved.

With respect to this book's analytical framework, I engage with the following five concepts: the end of empire, the Global Cold War, spheres of influence, national interest, and ideology. All these concepts played a major role in determining the foreign policies of countries during the twentieth century. What is more, ordinary people inside and outside the Sino-Indian border region were affected by issues such as imperial legacies. Because no single framework fits every context or event, I invoke each of these concepts when relevant evidence is present.[9] Nevertheless, the overarching theme

8   One book that similarly draws on international archival sources and examines twentieth-century conflict in Asia from multiple points of view (in the context of the Korean War) is *The Korean War: An International History* (1997) by William Stueck.

9   An excellent example of an analytical framework that deals with both India and China is that of historical trauma, which is invoked by international relations scholar Manjari Chatterjee Miller. She argues that a sense of victimhood—stemming from colonialism—shaped Indian and Chinese foreign policy. For more, see Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

which ties this work together is that of alliances and rivalries. Countries used the Sino-Indian border conflict to bolster partnerships and undermine adversaries in the international arena throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Background of the Border Issue

The Sino-Indian frontier remained tranquil for centuries. With the Himalayas as a natural barrier, people on opposite sides only came into contact when the occasional caravan or religious pilgrimage transited mountain passes. For this reason, "neither British India nor Tibet nor Imperial China, respectively Republican China, had felt an urgent need to define the boundary."[10]

During the nineteenth century, the British government drew up boundary lines in Central and South Asia to create buffer zones with the Russian Empire.[11] One example was the 1865 Johnson Line, which placed the Aksai Chin—a barren 37,000 square kilometer region in the western section of the Sino-Indian frontier—in Kashmir. In 1897, British army officer John Ardagh repositioned this border along the crests of the Kunlun Mountains with the justification that "Russia was expanding in this region."[12] Two years later, British India proposed to Qing China a more conservative alignment known as the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which ran southwest of the Kunlun range and placed the Aksai Chin in Chinese territory (see figure 0.1). The Chinese government did not respond to this offer, however, and the Macartney-MacDonald Line fell to the dustbin of history.[13] Furthermore, with the Great Game taking on new dimensions after the 1917 Russian Revolution, Britain "reverted to claiming [the] Aksai Chin up to the Kuenlun [Kunlun] mountains."[14]

10   *The Sino-Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives*, eds. Amit R. Das Gupta and Lorenz M. Lüthi (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2016), 3.

11   Historian Kyle Gardner deftly states that "many of today's borders embody linear legacies of empire, reflecting the territorialization of the globe in the nineteenth century as European empires reached the zeniths of their power." See Kyle J. Gardner, *The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 1, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108886444.

12   A. G. Noorani, *India-China Boundary Problem, 1846–1947: History and Diplomacy*, First edition (New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 94–95.

13   Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 104.

14   W. F. van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China: A New Look at Asian Relationships*, Lam edition (Leiden; Boston: Brill–Nijhoff, 2015), 173; *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization: V. X, Pt. 6: Aspects of India's International Relations 1700–2000 South Asia and the World*, ed. Ray Kumar (New Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2007), 195. Regarding the new dimensions of the Great Game, Soviet Russia became active in Xinjiang during the interwar period.

By the early twentieth century, Britain had become more concerned with China than with Russia. Movements near India's northeastern frontier by Chinese General Zhao Erfeng and resumed southward advances by China after the 1911 Xinhai Revolution galvanized the British to reevaluate Indian security. Thus, in 1913 and 1914, representatives from Britain, Tibet, and China convened in Simla, the summer capital of British India, to discuss frontier matters. The British representative, Henry McMahon, pressured the Chinese to accept a zonal division of Tibet, which included a new Indo-Tibetan boundary that ran along the crests of the Himalayas. Although China refused, McMahon had secretly persuaded the Tibetans to accept his terms.[15] From this skullduggery, the McMahon Line was born (see figures 0.2 and 0.3). Post-independence India carried forward the British imperial legacy by continuing to recognize this boundary line as proper and established. This problem has endured, with China and India still holding opposite views on the legality of the line.

It was not just the delimitation of the Sino-Indian border that provoked conflict.[16] Since time immemorial, India and China have enjoyed vast, overlapping spheres of influence (see figure 0.4). India's influence largely stemmed from the diffusion of Buddhism. Its spread facilitated deep connections between India and areas such as Tibet, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Sri Lanka.[17] Connections between India and many political entities were further deepened due to cultural and linguistic affinities.

China's influence has spread through similar cultural means, but also via its historical tributary system.[18] From the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) to the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912 CE), China bestowed titles on heads of states in exchange for their subservience to the emperor. Burma and the "'five fingers' of Tibet"

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15   Karunakar Gupta, "The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy," *The China Quarterly*, 47 (July 1971): 521–45, 522–23; Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries* (London: Barrie & Rockliff the Cresset P., 1969), 147–83. For more on the McMahon Line, see Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904–1914* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge & K. Paul, 1966).
16   The term "delimitation" refers to the drawing of a border on a map. By contrast, "demarcation" means placing physical boundary markers on the ground.
17   This was not the case in Southeast Asia, however, where India's influence was also through Hindu kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Angkor. Hindu-Buddhist rivalry defines much of the history of this region.
18   One should note that there are historiographical debates around this term. A significant source of Chinese influence was the Chinese mercantile presence in Southeast Asia—not a state-backed process. For a nuanced examination of imperial China's tributary system, see Ji-Young Lee, *China's Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

(Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and so-called South Tibet), for example, fell within China's sphere of influence.[19] Although these areas are on the periphery of China and India, they became central to Sino-Indian border conflict—especially during the second half of the twentieth century.[20]

The border dispute peaked with the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This war was fought in three sections of the Himalayas. The western sector contained the Aksai Chin, claimed by India as part of Jammu and Kashmir and by China as a part of Xinjiang. The small middle arc consisted of "the narrow sub-sector of frontier between the Aksai Chin region and Nepal."[21] India interpreted this region as part of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, whereas China deemed it part of Tibet. The eastern sector featured the McMahon Line, and in particular, the Tawang tract claimed by India as part of Arunachal Pradesh (known previously as the North-East Frontier Agency or NEFA for short) and by China as a section of South Tibet. The military confrontation that emerged from these competing claims altered the geopolitics of the border region.[22]

Cold War Context

Exploring the larger Cold War context is crucial to comprehending how Sino-Indian relations developed. Numerous works discuss how the Cold

19   *The Sino-Indian War of 1962*, eds. Das Gupta and Lüthi, 3. For more on the history of Chinese foreign relations, see Geoff Wade, "The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,* 78, no. 1 (2005): 37–58; Timothy Brook, *Great State: China and the World* (London: Profile Books, 2019); Tansen Sen, *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600–1400* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003); Kathlene Baldanza, *Ming China and Vietnam: Negotiating Borders in Early Modern Asia*, Reprint edition (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

20   I recognize that these areas are only peripheral if we adopt the perspective of the larger agrarian empires that dominated the Gangetic plain in India and the Yellow River plain in China.

21   Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, First American edition (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 37–38.

22   For an overview of the Sino-Indian border dispute, see Parshotam L. Mehra, *Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007). Although Indian foreign policy scholar Sumit Ganguly criticized this work, I believe that it nevertheless has some value. For Ganguly's critique, see Sumit Ganguly, review of *Essays in Frontier History: India, China and the Disputed Border*, by Parshotam L. Mehra, *The Historian* 71, no. 1 (2009): 139–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.2008.00233_35.x. To understand the Sino-Indian border conflict from the perspective of literature, see Adhira Mangalagiri, "Can Literature Help Us Respond to the China–India Border Clash?," 55, no. 34 (August 2020): 17–19. Finally, to understand the nature of borders in general, see Manlio Graziano, *What Is a Border?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018).

War rapidly became global.[23] The Third World emerged as a Cold War battleground during the 1950s and 1960s.[24] In Asia, there were four key areas where the Cold War became "hot": Korea, the Taiwan Strait, Tibet, and Vietnam. After Japan's defeat in the Second World War, the Korean Peninsula was divided into North and South Korea—administered by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. Upon receiving permission from Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung invaded the South on June 25, 1950. India warned Western powers that China would enter the war if United Nations forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel; it subsequently sought to mitigate the severity of Western condemnation of and sanctions on China; and to help mediate an end to the war. No Indian combat troops participated in the conflict.[25] After three years of fighting, this war ended in a stalemate. Thereafter, the United States maintained a military presence in South Korea and regarded it as a bulwark to communist expansion.[26]

During the Korean War, American President Harry Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent war from occurring on that front. In 1953, the fleet was removed by then President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the Republic of China in Taiwan began fortifying the islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu).[27] In response, the People's Republic commenced shelling these islands. Although the United States

23   For example, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017).

24   For more on the Third World as a Cold War battleground, see Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

25   For more on India's role in the Korean War, see Shiv Dayal, *India's Role in the Korean Question: A Study in the Settlement of International Disputes under the United Nations* (New Delhi: Chand, 1959).

26   For more on the Korean War and its geopolitical effects, see Gregg A. Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy*, New edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, Revised edition (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996); *The Korean War at Fifty: International Perspectives*, ed. Mark F. Wilkinson, First edition (Lexington, VA: Virginia Military Institute, 2004). For a thorough account of the historiography on the Korean War, see James I. Matray, "Korea's War at 60: A Survey of the Literature," *Cold War History* 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99–129, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2011.545603.

27   This "China" refers to the Nationalist government that retreated to Taiwan after its defeat to the Communists during the Chinese Civil War, which occurred from 1927 to 1949 (with truces, however, between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists from 1937 to 1941 and again briefly at the end of 1945).

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did not intervene militarily, it threatened the People's Republic with a nuclear strike and signed the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.[28] Heavy shelling resumed in 1958 during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. These two crises illuminate how the Taiwan Strait represented a frontline of the Cold War.[29]

At approximately the same time, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency began training guerilla fighters to disrupt Chinese Communist governance in Tibet. Yet these efforts failed to bring about Tibetan independence. As the late Central Intelligence Agency officer John Knaus suggested, Tibetan guerillas did not achieve their goals because they received assistance only from the United States.[30] One could attribute other countries' reluctance to provide aid to Tibet to their prioritization of amicable relations with the People's Republic over prosecuting a war based on Cold War ideology.

The United States also became increasingly interested in Vietnam. Following the country's partition in 1954, the United States deepened the divide between North and South Vietnam by providing substantial military support to the South Vietnamese government and by opposing reunification efforts by the communist revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. Similarly, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic provided moral and material support to the North. Antagonism between these two sides culminated with the Vietnam War (1955–1975).

During this period, another Cold War flashpoint emerged on the other side of the world. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 brought the world to the edge of nuclear war. According to journalist Max Frankel, the roots of the crisis lay in American President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's collective "fear above all of being judged weak and wanting."[31] This event involved the Soviets' protracted refusal to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba and a threat by the United States to respond with military force.

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28   For more on how this treaty came into existence, see Michael Szonyi, *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 43–44, 62, and 245.
29   For excellent descriptions of these crises and their greater Cold War context, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s*, Reprint edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2001), 163–204.
30   John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival*, First edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999), 159.
31   Max Frankel, *High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Presidio Press, 2005), 43.

These examples showcase the expansive scope of enmity between the United States and Soviet Union and the extent to which these superpowers would go to further their ideologies. Even though diplomatic relations between India and China initially had little to do with this framework, the outbreak of the 1962 border war made these countries a focal point in the Global Cold War.

Sino-Indian Competition and Cooperation[32]

From the beginning of the Cold War, the People's Republic and India competed for the allegiance of the Third World. Each presented alternative political and economic models. India's constituted a combination of leftist-oriented democracy and Fabian socialism, whereas the People's Republic opted for communism and one-party rule.

Tensions between India and China arose at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, where the depiction of Tibet on a large map behind the main dais nearly created a diplomatic incident. The People's Republic in many respects adopted the borders of the Republic of China, which, in turn, had largely adopted the borders of the Qing. With Tibet as a zone of contestation between India and China, this cartographic depiction caused tensions to emerge.

The next clearest indication of competition between the two countries was at the 1955 Bandung Conference. This conference provided an opportunity for newly independent nations as well as those seeking independence to form a bloc removed from Cold War politics. Due to their strength, size, and influence, India and China emerged as its leaders. Although these two countries advocated anti-colonialism, non-aggression, and respect for sovereignty, there were "undertones of personal rivalry between [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru and [Chinese Premier] Zhou [Enlai]." While Nehru argued against global polarization, Zhou would argue in favor of it. After Bandung, Beijing advanced Afro-Asian solidarity rather than nonalignment to edge out Indian influence in the Third World.[33]

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32   For a broader analysis of Sino-Indian interactions than can be covered in this book, see, for instance, Kanti P. Bajpai, *India versus China: Why They Are Not Friends* (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2021), Tansen Sen, *India, China, and the World: A Connected History* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), *India-China Relations: Civilizational Perspective*, eds. Wang Shuying and B. R. Deepak (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2012), and Bhawna Pokharna, *India-China Relations: Dimensions and Perspectives* (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009).

33   John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, New edition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 119–20; "Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Political

Despite this competition, China and India professed friendship for one another.[34] Zhou traveled to India in 1954, 1956, 1957, and 1960, and Nehru reciprocated in 1954. When Zhou first visited India, he and the Indian prime minister toasted to peaceful coexistence.[35] During these visits, officials and people on the street chanted the Hindi expression, "*Hindi-Chini bhai bhai*" (India and China are brothers).[36] This slogan represented the zenith of amicable Sino-Indian relations during the mid-1950s.

On April 29, 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Treaty (also known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). It stipulated "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."[37] This agreement established trade agencies on each side of the Sino-Indian border and allowed for religious pilgrimage between India and Tibet. More importantly, India agreed to relinquish special privileges in Tibet. The Panchsheel Treaty served as the bedrock for the Bandung Conference the following year. Although rivalry between India and China surfaced at this conference, the two countries agreed to combat imperialism and racism. It was from this general commitment that the so-called "Bandung spirit" temporarily unified the Third World. Its dissipation will be discussed in the following two chapters.

Committee of the Afro-Asian Conference," April 23, 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 207-00006-04, 69–75, Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo中华人民共和国外交部档案馆 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive of the People's Republic of China] (PRC FMA). Translated by Jeffrey Wang. Obtained by the Wilson Center for the Cold War International History Project (CWIP). http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114678.pdf?v=c74c1dboc699996d9fe8acb7b0783eaf.

34   For more on the reality of competition between India and China during this period, see Arunabh Ghosh, "Before 1962: The Case for 1950s China-India History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76, no. 03 (August 2017): 697–727. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911817000456. For more on the reality of Sino-Indian relations over the long term, see B. R. Deepak, *India and China: Beyond the Binary of Friendship and Enmity* (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9500-4.

35   "Remarks by India's and Red China's Premiers," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1954.

36   "India Welcomes a Chinese Team," *The New York Times*, January 31, 1975; "Chou's India Trip is a Sedate One," *The New York Times*, December 5, 1956. The slogan "*Hindi-Chini bhai bhai*" was coined by the poet, actor, and one-time Indian parliamentarian Harindranath Chattopadhyay. Chattopadhyay traveled to China in 1953 and his collection of poems *I Sing of Man* was translated into Chinese in 1955.

37   "India and People's Republic of China: Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and inter-course between Tibet Region of China and India," No. 4307 *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 299, United Nations, 70. These countries signed a more comprehensive trade treaty later that same year. See Ghosh, "Before 1962," 712.

Figure 0.1.   Map of the western sector of the Sino-Indian border.

Source: Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 11.

**Figure 0.2.   Map attached to the 1914 Simla Accord.**

Source: *Map to Illustrate Article 9 of the Simla Convention, 1914*, (London: The Geographical Journal, September 1960) [Map] Retrieved from the RGS-IBG Collections, Royal Geographical Society.

Figure 0.3.   Eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border.

Source: *The Sino-Indian War of 1962*, eds. Das Gupta and Lüthi, 5.

Figure 0.4.   Depiction of Indian and Chinese spheres of influence.

Source: Garver, *Protracted Contest*, 15.

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