



Edited by Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans

The Holocaust, Israel and 'the Jew'

Histories of Antisemitism
in Postwar Dutch Society

Amsterdam
University
Press

The Holocaust, Israel and 'the Jew'

NIOD Studies on War, Holocaust, and Genocide

The series encompasses peer-reviewed scholarly work on the impact of war, the Holocaust, and genocide on twentieth-century societies, covering a broad range of historical approaches in a global context, and from diverse disciplinary perspectives.

Series Editors

Peter Keppy, Ingrid de Zwart, Conny Kristel and Karel Berkhoff

The Holocaust, Israel and 'the Jew'

Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society

*Edited by
Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans*

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: Graffiti on the poster of the musical 'Yours, Anne' in the Valkenburgerstraat – incidentally the street which in the old Jewish Quarter of Amsterdam intersects the Anne Frank Straat (photo: Thomas Schlijper / Hollandse Hoogte, 2 January 2011)

Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden

Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout

Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press.

ISBN 978 94 6298 608 4

e-ISBN 978 90 4852 702 1 (pdf)

DOI 10.5117/9789462986084

NUR 689

© Remco Ensel & Evelien Gans / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2017

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher.

'A password to madness. Jew. One little word with no hiding place
for reason in it. Say "Jew" and it was like throwing a bomb.'

– Howard Jacobson, *The Finkler Question* (2010)

Table of Contents

Preface	11
1 Why Jews are more guilty than others [!] An introductory essay, 1945-2016 <i>Evelien Gans</i>	17
Part I Post-Liberation Antisemitism	
2 'The Jew' as Dubious Victim <i>Evelien Gans</i>	61
3 The Meek Jew – and Beyond <i>Evelien Gans</i>	83
4 <i>Alte Kameraden</i> Right-wing Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial <i>Remco Ensel, Evelien Gans and Willem Wagenaar</i>	107
5 Jewish Responses to Post-Liberation Antisemitism <i>Evelien Gans</i>	127
Part II Israel and 'the Jew'	
6 Philosemitism? Ambivalences regarding Israel <i>Evelien Gans</i>	153
7 Transnational Left-wing Protest and the 'Powerful Zionist' <i>Remco Ensel</i>	181
8 Israel: Source of Divergence <i>Evelien Gans</i>	215

- 9 'The Activist Jew' Responds to Changing Dutch Perceptions of Israel 241
Katie Digan
- 10 Turkish Anti-Zionism in the Netherlands 259
From Leftist to Islamist Activism
Annemarike Stremmelaar

Part III The Holocaust-ed Jew in Native Dutch Domains since the 1980s

- 11 'The Jew' in Football 287
To Kick Around or to Embrace
Evelien Gans
- 12 Pornographic Antisemitism, Shoah Fatigue and Freedom of Speech 315
Evelien Gans
- 13 *Historikerstreit* 341
The Stereotypical Jew in Recent Dutch Holocaust Studies
Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans

Part IV Generations. Migrant Identities and Antisemitism in the Twenty-first Century

- 14 'The Jew' vs. 'the Young Male Moroccan' 377
Stereotypical Confrontations in the City
Remco Ensel
- 15 Conspiracism 415
Islamic Redemptive Antisemitism and the Murder of Theo van Gogh
Remco Ensel
- 16 Reading Anne Frank 445
Confronting Antisemitism in Turkish Communities
Annemarike Stremmelaar

17	Holocaust Commemorations in Postcolonial Dutch Society <i>Remco Ensel</i>	475
18	Epilogue Instrumentalising and Blaming 'the Jew', 2011-2016 <i>Evelien Gans</i>	499
	References	545
	Index	587

List of Illustrations

Illustration 1	Cartoon by Maarten Meuldijk for the NSB newspaper, <i>Volk en Vaderland</i> , 25 June 1935	21
Illustration 2	Fake train ticket. German original, 1931	21
Illustration 3	Photo of a protest against the expiration of war crimes on Dam Square, 28 February 1965	31
Illustration 4	Photo of a demonstration against the military operation in Jenin on Dam Square, 13 April 2002	32
Illustration 5	A photo of the Jewish Quarter in the postwar years	60
Illustration 6	Photo of a protest against the pension for the neo-Nazi widow of a Nazi in The Hague, 27 November 1986	108
Illustration 7	A news clipping on the distribution of neo-Nazi material in newspaper <i>Het Parool</i> , 23 October 1964	117
Illustration 8	Photo of a demonstration against airtime for an extreme right party, 18 May 1981	120
Illustration 9	A news clipping on an incident with a student initiation ceremony from the <i>Haagse Post</i> , 27 October 1962	141
Illustration 10	Volunteers for Israel, 5 June 1967	172
Illustration 11	Postcard with a drawing by Burhan Karkutli, 1980	199
Illustration 12	Postcard with a drawing by Burhan Karkutli, 1980	199
Illustration 13	Photo of the laying of a wreath for the victims of an antisemitic bombing in Paris, 14 December 1980	202
Illustration 14	Photo of the protection a synagogue receives, 21 October 1981	203

Illustration 15	Photo of a demonstration against the mass murder in Sabra and Shatila, 25 September 1982	205
Illustration 16	Photo of a demonstration against the mass murder in Sabra and Shatila, 25 September 1982	206
Illustration 17	Photo of a Feyenoord football fan	294
Illustration 18	Photo of a Feyenoord football fan	295
Illustration 19	Photo of a stand with Ajax fans	296
Illustration 20	The cover of 'Allah knows best', a collection of columns by Theo van Gogh, January 2004	333
Illustration 21	Photo of Jews being forced to leave their house	340
Illustration 22	Photo of rapper Salah Edin in a talk show, 27 March 2008	389
Illustration 23	Cartoon on the Holocaust by Abdou Bouzerda	393
Illustration 24	Cartoon on the Holocaust by Abdou Bouzerda	394
Illustration 25	Photo of graffiti thematizing Jews and media, Rotterdam, 2 June 2006	433
Illustration 26	Photo of a demonstration against the politics of Geert Wilders, 22 March 2014	507
Illustration 27	Cartoon on ritual slaughter by D.C. Lama	516
Illustration 28	Photo of a protest against the assault on Charlie-Hebdo, 8 January 2015	526
Illustration 29	Photo of a demonstration against the entry of refugees in Europe, 12 March 2016	542

Preface

This book is about antisemitism and the stereotypical Jew in postwar Dutch society. When we embarked on this project we envisioned a series of interconnected chapters that follow the transfer of antisemitic tropes over time as manifested in everyday interactions, public debates, mass media, protests and commemorations. By investigating how old stories and vocabularies concerning ‘the Jew’ get recycled and adapted for new use, we sought to bridge early postwar antisemitism with current manifestations. While it is clear that Sartre’s incisive view on ‘the Jew’ as a construct of the antisemite is still topical, we were not convinced that reflection on ‘the [stereotypical] Jew’ is a privilege of ‘the [stereotypical] Antisemite.’¹ We therefore expressed a common ambition to cast our net wider and make an effort in exploring how ‘real people’, including Jews, have dealt with their stereotypical counterparts. By following a wide range of participants in the Dutch public debate – including Jewish and non-Jewish publicists, various solidarity movements and migrant interest groups – *The Holocaust, Israel and ‘the Jew’. Histories of Antisemitism in Postwar Dutch Society* thus aims to demonstrate how in the Netherlands the Holocaust and the founding of Israel have come to act both as points of fixation for antisemitic expressions as well as building blocks for postwar Jewish identity.

The Netherlands may seem like an unlikely candidate for such an exploration of antisemitic stereotyping over time. The general feeling always has been that antisemitism in the Netherlands only exists in isolated incidents or in ‘mild form’. When in the early 1880s the neologism *Antisemitismus* was coined, Dutch newspapers exclusively applied the term to incidents abroad. In several newspapers commentators wrote disapprovingly of the rise of the ‘antisemitic movement’ in Germany and the Habsburg Empire, but more than once they did so by simultaneously sneering about the assumed obtrusive presence of Jews. This was also the rhetorical strategy when finally a newspaper reported on a local incident. ‘*Anti-semitisme in Nederland*’, was the headline of *De Tijd* in 1890. The Catholic newspaper reported on the distribution of a periodical, *De Talmudjood*, in which Jews were literally portrayed as bloodsucking vampires.² Although the reporter expressed

1 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Réflexions sur la question juive* (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (s.l.: Schocken, 1948).

2 ‘There’s only one way to get rid of those bloodsucking vampires ... deport them all, the whole bunch of Jews, to Russia where their friends will be so good as to send them to Siberia

his surprise, he nevertheless fully understood the rising tide in anti-Jewish sentiment: 'Even though we reject every attempt to root antisemitism in the Netherlands, we do feel obliged to point out the unhealthy and worrying developments, i.e. the way some Jews cash in on the economic downturn in agriculture The Jew is the natural enemy of agriculture What this means, history has shown.'

Despite these overt expressions of anti-Jewish sentiments in print, the early modern legacy of tolerance became part of national self-identification in the modern era. In this respect the Holocaust and the both relatively and absolutely high percentage of Jews murdered, when compared to other West-European countries, must have seemed like an enigma in the post-Liberation years. In any case, it didn't rhyme with the prevalent self-image of tolerance. Antisemitism turned out to have increased during the German occupation, burst into the open and even renewed itself during the post-Liberation years. Also, when it became taboo to express anti-Jewish feelings openly soon afterwards, it would never ever disappear.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the self-image of the tolerant nation came under pressure once again, under the influence of an escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a concomitant anti-multicultural and anti-Jewish mood. 'The stereotypical Jew' got deployed in a politics of national and ethnic identities, and real people bore the burden, as evidenced by the dissemination of anti-Jewish images and texts over the internet and a significant rise in so-called real life incidents. It is in light of these observations that we address in this volume the long-term unease with Jewish presence in Dutch society.

This book is one of the results of a research project, 'The Dynamics of Contemporary Antisemitism in a Globalising Context', that springs from an initiative by Evelien Gans and the NIOD Institute for War-, Holocaust- and Genocide Studies. The project was funded by NWO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW), and facilitated by the NIOD. The project aimed to investigate current anti-Jewish stereotypes in Dutch society focusing on some of its major ethnic groups. Earlier results of the project were both the publication, in 2014, of the monograph *Haatspraak. Antisemitisme – een 2^e-eeuwse geschiedenis* by Remco Ensel, which was, just like this book, published by AUP (Amsterdam University Press), and,

with a free ticket.' In: 'Anti-semitisme in Nederland', *De Tijd, Godsdienstig-staatkundig dagblad*, 8 October 1890. *De Talmudjood* was then already published for three months, and due to its success upgraded to a bigger format.

with extra funding by the KNAW (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences), the website www.antisemitisme.nu (coordinated by Iwona Guść). In addition to publishing in academic media, we felt it was important to contribute to the public debate, in various media, about these crucial issues. With regard to this book, it is clear that it would have been incomplete without the valuable contributions of our co-authors Annemarike Stremelaar (University Leiden), Katie Digan (University Ghent) and Willem Wagenaar (Anne Frank House).

Two notes about terminology are necessary. As the attentive reader probably noticed, we write antisemitism without hyphen, because, as Evelien Gans once put it, ‘nothing like Semitism ever existed. The term anti(-)Semitism was an invention or construction of confirmed antisemites who, at the end of the nineteenth century, transplanted the designation of Semitic languages to a concept of social-political and racist Jew-hatred.’ We wish to dissociate ourselves from this origin and take antisemitism to be the proper term for referring to hatred or antipathy of Jews. The unhyphenated spelling of antisemitism in this volume concurs with the recommendation by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.³

We are furthermore aware of the public discussions about the use of ‘Holocaust’ to denote the systematic mass murder of Jews and other victim groups between 1939 and 1945. For a long time in the Netherlands the customary way to refer to the genocide and the German occupation alike was to speak of ‘the war’. With respect to the Jewish victims, the term *Holocaust* (literally: burnt offering) has become both more conventional and controversial than *Shoah* (Hebrew for: destruction, calamity). While the title of this volume follows the series title, the NIOD Studies on War, Holocaust and Genocide, in our chapters we alternately use ‘Holocaust’ and the more appropriate term ‘Shoah’.⁴ Actually, the organised *persecution*

3 Evelien Gans, “‘They have forgotten to gas you.’ Post-1945 Antisemitism in the Netherlands,” In: Philomena Essed and Isabele Hoving (eds.), *Dutch Racism* (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2014), 71-100: 95; David Hirsh, ‘Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections.’ The Yale Hirsh Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA) (Working Paper Series #1. New Haven, CT, 2007): 16; Memo on the spelling of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (<https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/>).

4 See, e.g., Dan Michman, ‘Shoah, Holocaust, Churban and More: On the Emergence of Names for the Lethal Nazi Anti-Jewish Campaign’, Public Lecture At Wiener Library, 1 July 2015; Dan Michman, ‘Waren die Juden Nordafrikas im Visier der Planungen zur Endlösung? Die “Schoah” und die Zahl 700.000 in Eichmanns Tabelle am 20. Januar 1942.’ In: Norbert Kampe and Peter Klein (eds.) *Die Wannsee-Konferenz am 20. Januar 1942. Dokumente, Forschungsstand, Kontroversen* (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau, 2013), 379-397.

of the Jews started in 1933, when Hitler came into power in Germany, and went on wherever Nazism took over, as with the Anschluss in Austria, in March 1938.

We want to thank several institutions and individuals for their contributions and support with respect to the realisation of this book. In the first place NOW for recognising the academic and social relevance of our project. Secondly, we thank the NIOD for its confidence and its never-ending and generous support. These thanks most certainly also apply to the editors of the AUP-NIOD series for including our manuscript in an inspiring line of books. Both the Anne Frank House, the CIDI (Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel) and the Registration Centre for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI) helped us whenever we needed information and documentation. The same goes for the International Institute for Social History (IISH), the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision (*'Beeld en Geluid'*) and the Dutch Institute in Morocco (NIMAR).

Subsequently we are grateful for the assistance of Rachid Aouled Abdallah, René Deelen, Gülsen Devre, Silke Eyt and Ralph Plum who all did most important research in the context of this volume. We thank René Kok and Harco Gijssbers, both working in the audio-visual department of the NIOD, for their efforts to collect a large number of adequate photos and illustrations, and the National Archive (NA) for supplying us several photos for free. The Chair for Modern Jewish History at the University of Amsterdam (UvA) funded part of the illustrations.

Several translators have worked on our texts. We thank Jane Hedley-Prole and David McKay who translated the Introductory Essay, Beverley Jackson who translated the Epilogue, Luuk Arens and Han van der Vegt who translated or corrected the chapters in-between, and finally Asaf Lahat who edited the complete manuscript. All editorial decisions, including minor overlaps between different chapters, and any remaining errors are of course ours.

Valuable to us were all those – and we thank them collectively – who gave or sent us information during informal conversations or in e-mails about their experiences with antisemitism and other topics. Last but not least, we are grateful to those who spent time and energy with one or both of us during an interview. We name here: Mohammed Abdallah, Wim Bartels, Ronald van den Boogaard, Mellouki Briec-Cadat, Erwin Brugmans, Job Cohen, René Danen, Fatima Elatik, Joop Glimmerveen, Bertus Hendriks, Mohammed Jabri, Lody van de Kamp, Haci Karacaer, Sami Kaspi, Hans Knoop, Anneke Mouthaan, Ronny Naftaniel, Leo Nederstigt, Harry Polak,

Karen Polak, Mohamed Rabbae, Mehmet Sahin, Menachem Sebbag, Harry de Winter. Obviously we carry full responsibility for the translations of the interview excerpts, for the contexts in which these occur and for their interpretation.

Finally, while all our themes – the Holocaust, Israel, ‘the Jew’, and last but not least antisemitism – add up to a genuine minefield, we are happy we managed to finish the book in a spirit of excellent cooperation, mutual understanding and friendship.

Remco Ensel

Evelien Gans

Amsterdam, September 2016

1 Why Jews are more guilty than others?¹

An introductory essay, 1945-2016

Evelien Gans

*Denkend aan Holland
zie ik breede rivieren
traag door oneindig
laagland gaan ...*

Thinking of Holland
I picture wide rivers
slowly meandering through
unending lowland ...

The famous poet Hendrik Marsman (1899-1940) wrote these words in 1936, in a poem entitled 'Memory of Holland', later proclaimed Dutch poem of the century.² In that same year he published an article about the so-called 'Jewish Question', in which he postulated that Jews could not assimilate into Western society. The differences between 'them' and 'us' in terms of race, blood and origin, he wrote, were so unbridgeable that co-existence should 'if at all possible, be terminated and avoided'. In Marsman's view, the only solution was Zionism.³ He did see Jews as possessing various positive qualities, including 'a distinctive kind of acuteness'. But he couldn't imagine them ever taking root in Holland.

Until fairly recently the Netherlands was internationally known as a tolerant country. Events such as the murders of the politician Pim Fortuyn (1948-2002) and the filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh (1957-2004), as well as the anti-Islam politics of both Fortuyn and Geert Wilders have upset this image.⁴ This book focuses on the continuum of antisemitism, in various forms and gradations, before, during and particularly after 1945. The proverbial tolerance of the Dutch and their supposed tradition of non-violence have always been disputed, certainly in academic circles.

1 [‡]: Irony mark, created by *Underware* and introduced in: 'Nieuw: een leesteken voor ironie', CPNB (foundation for the Collective Promotion for the Dutch Book), 13 March 2007.

2 This English version of the poem is a combination of a translation by the author (E.G.) and one by the Irish poet Michael Longley, who, in 1939, translated the first four lines as follows: 'Thinking of Holland / I picture broad rivers / meandering through / unending lowland'. For the whole poem, see <http://4umi.com/marsman/herinnering> (consulted 12 December 2015).

3 H. Marsman, 'Brief over de joodsche kwestie; antwoord aan Dr. G.D. Knoche', *Het Kouter* 1 (1936), 289-302, quoted in: Hans Anten, 'Bordewijk en de joden', *Nederlandse letterkunde* 7 (2002), 61-86: 8.

4 See chapters 12 and 18 (Epilogue).

Both tolerance and non-violence have had their limits. It is not as if there was never any hostility or violence towards, say, Catholics or, conversely, Protestants, political adversaries or outsiders.⁵ The same applies to the Jews. In the fourteenth century, especially in the east of the country, entire Jewish communities were burnt at the stake. Just as elsewhere in Europe, they were held responsible for bringing the plague and other calamities.⁶ But as of the sixteenth century, fleeing from the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, and the pogroms in Eastern Europe, Jews found a relatively safe haven in the Dutch Republic – along with a great many religious, social and economic constraints. Here, too, certain cities and professions were out of bounds to Jews, and there were a great deal many more prohibitions, along with a host of anti-Jewish prejudices. But Jews were free to worship in their own communities and in a sense formed a little state within the state – the *Joodsche Natie* [Jewish Nation] – with its own jurisdiction and language. The government benefited from the international trade networks of these new citizens. No violent persecution took place. There were antisemitic incidents, disturbances, scandals – but no pogroms.

In the wake of the French Revolution came the Emancipation of 1796, when Jews in the Dutch Republic were granted the same rights and obligations as Gentiles. The Emancipation did not come about without a struggle. Jewish leaders and clergy feared the loss of the community's internal political influence, and a section of the Jewish population was afraid that the 'Jewish Nation' would lose its autonomy. Non-Jewish opponents stressed the danger of fraudulent business practices by Jews and, more generally, of growing competition for small and medium-size businesses. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the number of Jews, and thus their share in trade, had increased considerably. The word 'Jew' came to be synonymous with shady trader and con man – '*smous*' the common term of abuse. Moreover, Jews were regarded as heathens and foreigners whose loyalty to the 'Dutch Nation' was questionable. The historian Rena Fuks-Mansfeld

5 See, e.g., Piet de Rooij, *Republiek van rivaliteiten: Nederland sinds 1813* (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2002); Piet de Rooij, "'De reuk des doods." De fakkels van het antipapisme in Nederland 1848-1865.' In: Conny Kristel (ed.), *Met alle geweld. Botsingen en tegenstellingen in burgerlijk Nederland*. (Amsterdam: Balans, 2003), 60-77; Niek van Sas, 'Het beroerd Nederland. Revolutionair geweld en bezinning omstreeks 1800.' In: *ibid.*, 48-59.

6 For the position – and persecution – of the Jews in the Dutch Middle Ages see, B.B.M.J. Speet, 'De Middeleeuwen.' In: J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland* (Balans: Amsterdam, 1995), 21-49.

(1930-2012) summed it up as follows: 'an emancipation that was bestowed as reluctantly as it was accepted'.⁷

This led, by fits and starts, to a process of integration and assimilation, at different speeds and to varying degrees, of the various groups that made up the Jewish community. However, that certainly didn't put an end to social antisemitism in the form of exclusion and antisemitic stereotypes, or to religious or theologically motivated antisemitism, i.e. anti-Judaism. In 1878, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the charismatic leader of the newly-formed Dutch Reformed Party, wrote a series of articles entitled '*Liberalisten en Joden*' [Liberals and Jews]. In his view, liberalism provided a cover under which Jews held absolute sway, not just in the Netherlands but throughout Europe, despite it being obvious that, as 'guests' of a Christian society, they should wield no political influence at all. Kuyper's views met with both outrage and approval.⁸ In the 1930s and before, racist antisemitism had taken root in science and popular belief. Moreover, it became institutionalised and politically organised in National Socialist and Fascist organisations and movements like the Dutch National Socialist Movement (NSB).⁹ In *Volk en Vaderland* [People and Fatherland], but also in several other papers and journals which were affiliated with the NSB such as *Het Nationale Dagblad* [National Newspaper] and *De Misthoorn* [The Foghorn] antisemitism was propagated already before the war, and even more so, during the occupation.¹⁰ According to a senior NSB official in 1935 75% of the NSB members hold on to antisemitic beliefs.¹¹

Inspired by nineteenth-century racial doctrines, a new racist form of antisemitism had emerged that, waving its pseudo-scientific publications, presented Jewishness as a biological issue: a dangerous, infectious virus transmitted from generation to generation. This racist antisemitism was new in that it ruled out any possibility of escape, even through conversion:

7 Rena Fuks-Mansfeld, 'Verlichting en Emancipatie omstreeks 1750-1814.' In: J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland* (Balans: Amsterdam, 1995), 177-203; 203; Evelien Gans, *Jaap en Ischa Meijer. Een joodse geschiedenis 1912-1956* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 32.

8 Evelien Gans, 'The Netherlands in the Twentieth Century.' In: Richard Levy (ed.), *Antisemitism. A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution* (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2005), vol. 2, 498-500; 498.

9 J.C.H. Blom and J.J. Cahen, 'Joodse Nederlanders, Nederlandse joden en joden in Nederland.' J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), *Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 245-310; 284-287.

10 Bas Kromhout, *Fout! Wat Hollandse nazi-kranten schreven over Nederland, verzet, Joden* (Amsterdam: Veen Media, 2016).

11 Bas Kromhout, 'Het ware gezicht van de NSB', *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, 24 November 2015.

Jewishness was in the Jews' blood.¹² A Dutch version was made of the German racist, antisemitic rhyme *'Ob Jud, ob Christ ist einerlei / in der Rasse liegt der Schweinerei'*:

Wat de Jood gelooft, komt' d'r niet op an / Jewish or Christian it's all one /
't ras zelf is de zwijnepan It's their race that makes them
scum¹³

In 1940 Jewish integration was far from complete, and the degree of assimilation varied strongly within the community.¹⁴ In his article, Marsman had explicitly placed Jews beyond the pale of Dutch society, but others did this more actively.

In March 1938, very probably on the instructions of NSB officials, around 10,000 cardboard 'railway tickets' were printed bearing the text: '1st CLASS / PASSENGER TRAIN TICKET / TO / JERUSALEM / ONE WAY / Never to RETURN / Valid from / Any station'.¹⁵

In 1934, the Dutch government had found it necessary to add two new articles to the Criminal Code concerning the defamation of a population group. It took this step largely because insults aimed at 'our Israelite fellow citizens' had taken on a kind of 'epidemic character'.¹⁶ Before that time, only insults targeting individuals, primarily public officials, were grounds

12 Evelien Gans, "They have forgotten to gas you." Post-1945 Antisemitism in the Netherlands.' In: Philomena Essed and Isabelle Hoving (eds.), *Dutch Racism* (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2014), 71-100: 74.

13 Evelien Gans, 'Antisemitisme: evolutionair en multi-functioneel.' Paper presented at the *Anne Frank Stichting*, Amsterdam, 3 October 2007.

14 Evelien Gans, *De kleine verschillen. Een historische studie naar joodse sociaal-democraten en socialistisch-zionisten in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Vassallucci, 1999), 900-904 (English Summary); Gans, 'The Netherlands in the Twentieth Century', 498. Remco Ensel and Evelien Gans, 'The Bystander as a non-Jew.' Paper presented at the international conference *Probing the Limits of Categorization: The 'Bystander' in Holocaust History*, 24-26 September 2015, Amsterdam.

15 The misprint on the train tickets (Jerusalem instead of Jeruzalem) betrays the German origins; the tickets over there had been distributed in 1931, in Berlin: *De Telegraaf*, 31 March 1938; *Utrechts Nieuwsblad*, 30 March 1938; *Volksdagblad* and *Het Volk*, 29 March and 11 May 1938, NIOD, KA II 977 A.

16 Wetboek van Strafrecht [Criminal Code], 19th ed. [till 1968], ed. C. Fasseur (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1969), 69. Sections 137 a and b of the law turned against the abuse of public authorities. See, e.g., Esther H. Janssen, *Faith in Public Debate. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech Pertaining to Religion and Race in France, the Netherlands and European and International Law* (PhD thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 9 September 2014) and Marloes van Noorloos, *Hate Speech Revisited. A Comparative and Historical Perspective on Hate speech Law in The Netherlands and England & Wales* (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011).

Two examples of prewar antisemitic prints by the Dutch National-Socialist Movement (NSB)

Illustration 1 Cartoon by Maarten Meuldijk for the NSB newspaper, *Volk en Vaderland*, 25 June 1935



NIOD archive / Imagebase

'In the hospitable Netherlands ... cuckoo!' In 1935 –, when the NSB had achieved a victory in the elections for the Dutch Provincial Councils – its journal *Volk en Vaderland*, published a cartoon that depicted 'the Jew' as a parasite: that is, like an alien cuckoo which devours all the food, while the native chicks are starving.

Illustration 2 Fake train ticket. German original, 1931



NIOD archive / Imagebase

In March 1938, around 10,000 'railway tickets' were distributed in the Netherlands from the ranks of the NSB: 1st CLASS / PASSENGER TRAIN TICKET / TO / JERUSALEM / ONE WAY / Never to RETURN / Valid from / Any station'.

for criminal prosecution. The motive for adopting these new articles were concern not so much about Jews as about disturbances of the peace. Furthermore, an insult was defined by its form; supposed 'statements of fact' could still be made. It was a crime in 1940 to describe Jews as parasites, but not to express the underlying idea that Jews do well for themselves even in times of crisis.¹⁷ In the Netherlands, 'the Jew' was also still very much seen as 'the Other', not just by National Socialist members and sympathisers, and in Christian circles, but also outside these groups.

During the Second World War, more Jews would be murdered in the Netherlands than in any other occupied country in Western Europe, both in relative and absolute terms: around 104,000 of the country's 140,000 Jewish citizens, that is to say 75%. The contrast between this fact and the Netherlands' above-mentioned reputation for tolerance would give rise to a concept that historians dubbed 'the Dutch paradox'.¹⁸ During the German occupation, antisemitism in the Netherlands increased – as it did in other occupied countries in Europe – manifesting itself openly after the country's liberation in May 1945.¹⁹ A case in point is the insult 'They have forgotten to gas you', a first, radical expression of how, after 1945, the Shoah or Holocaust was turned against the Jews. In June 1945, the re-established Jewish weekly *Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad* (NIW) called antisemitism 'Hitler's foremost legacy'.²⁰

This study centres on the 'dark side' of the Dutch paradox, so to speak, and above all on its manifestations after 1945. It addresses processes of antisemitic stereotyping in the Netherlands by considering how the Shoah

17 Van Noorloos, *Hate Speech Revisited*, 199.

18 J.C.H. Blom, 'The persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands from a comparative international perspective.' In: Jozeph Michman (ed.), *Dutch Jewish History II* (Assen, Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1989), 273-289; 289; Philo Bregstein, 'De Nederlandse paradox.' In: Philo Bregstein, *Het kromme kan toch niet recht zijn: Essays en interviews* (Baarn: de Prom, 1996), 45-72: 45-47; Wouter Ultee and Henk Flap, 'De Nederlandse paradox: waarom overleefden zoveel Nederlandse joden de Tweede Wereldoorlog niet?'. In: Harry Ganzeboom and Siegwart Lindenberg (eds.), *Verklarende sociologie. Opstellen voor Reinhard Wippler* (Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 1996); Guus Meershoek, 'Een aangekondigde massamoord. Wat wisten Nederlanders van de jodenvervolgning?', *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 31 January 2013.

19 See Dienke Hondius, *Terugkeer. Antisemitisme in Nederland rond de bevrijding*. With a story by Marga Minco (Den Haag: Sdu, 1998; revised version of 1990), translated version: Dienke Hondius, *Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism* (Westport, CO: Praeger, 2003); Evelien Gans, "'Vandaag hebben ze niets, maar morgen bezitten ze weer een tientje.'" Antisemitische stereotypen in bevrijd Nederland.' In: Conny Kristel (ed.), *Polderschouw. Terugkeer en opvang na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Regionale verschillen* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 313-353. See, e.g., chapters 2 and 3.

20 J.S. (Jacob) Soetendorp, 'Eerbied voor onze monumenten', *NIW*, 22 June 1945.

and Israel have come to function both as the most important new – that is, postwar – points of fixation for expressions of antisemitism, and at the same time, and not coincidentally, as the two most important building blocks of postwar Jewish identity.

Its contribution to the field of antisemitism studies is twofold. One original aspect is the effort to connect old stories and repertoires of stereotyping with new vocabularies and forms of deployment in a historical study that links early postwar everyday antisemitism with current manifestations. Secondly, by focusing on a wide range of participants in the public debate on the Shoah and Israel – including Jewish and non-Jewish public intellectuals, various solidarity movements and migrant interest groups – this volume presents the historical entanglements and global transfer of ideas about Jews on a national scale.

The Dutch case is of particular interest when tackling issues of stereotyping in the postwar era. As stated above, the relatively high percentage of Jews murdered during the war was difficult to reconcile with the tradition of tolerance that had become ingrained in the country's perception of its own identity. An increase of antisemitism was signalled, mainly by Jewish organisations, after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and in response to several incidents thereafter. The details of these events did not generally come to the attention of the outside world, but several of them will be discussed in this book. At the beginning of this century, the self-image of the Netherlands as a tolerant nation came under pressure once again. Like other parts of the world, the country experienced outbursts of antisemitism, this time triggered by the clashes between Israelis and Palestinians after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, in September 2000, and in Jenin, in April 2002.²¹ This was also the period of Fortuyn's rise to political prominence and subsequent assassination. Two years later, the Islamist assassination of Theo van Gogh led to a strong anti-multicultural and nationalist backlash. This event was felt to be the Dutch equivalent of the 9/11 attacks. What is hardly known beyond the Dutch borders, and increasingly forgotten or denied in the Netherlands itself, is that Theo van Gogh, resenting what he called the dominance of the Shoah, had been extremely provocative towards Jews in his pamphlets, columns and utterances – and later on, towards Muslims as well.

21 See, e.g., Evelien Gans, "On Gas Chambers, Jewish Nazis and Noses." In: Peter R. Rodrigues and Jaap van Donselaar (eds.), *Racism and Extremism Monitor: Ninth Report*. Transl. Nancy Forest-Flier (Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting and Universiteit Leiden, 2010), 74-87: 75-76.

As mentioned before, Israel would become the second point of fixation for antisemitism after 1945. The initially hesitant support for Israel on the part of postwar Dutch governments developed into a strong sense of solidarity. The Six-Day War, or June War, of 1967 led to seemingly contradictory reactions in the Netherlands: an outburst of support in favour of Israel, along with more outspoken criticism of the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. In 1969 the Dutch Palestine Committee was founded. At the same time, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants brought their mostly negative ideas about Israel and 'Zionism' with them, mingled with old, sometimes hostile images of 'the Jew' or nostalgic views on Jewish-Islamic coexistence in their respective home countries. This contributed to a broader aversion to Israel.

Against the background of the long-term debate on the Shoah and Israel, this study investigates the unease with the Jewish presence in Dutch society as manifested in commemorations of the Second World War, public debates, protests against Israel and everyday interactions. It shows the transfer of antisemitic tropes over time, between ethnic groups and across national borders. The emphasis is on qualitative historical research, with theory and analysis combined in a set of postwar narratives. All case studies are based on original research, drawing on a wide variety of sources, such as archival sources, newspapers and journals, websites, DVD's and music CD's, impromptu conversations and observations.

Operating in a minefield

A small book could be compiled of all the many different definitions of antisemitism drawn up and used as a yardstick by scholars, writers, institutes, monitors and bloggers. Two will be looked at here. According to the social historian Helen Fein (b. 1934), antisemitism is 'a persisting, latent structure of hostile beliefs toward *Jews as a collectivity*'. This wording forms, as it were, the body of her definition, which she continues by concluding that the 'hostile beliefs' she mentions manifest themselves,

in individuals as attitudes, and in *culture* as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in *actions* – social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence – which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace or destroy Jews as Jews.²²

22 Helen Fein, 'Dimensions of Antisemitism: Attitudes, Collective Accusations, and Actions.' In: Helen Fein (ed.), *The Persisting Question: Sociological Perspectives and Social Contexts of Modern*

Although Fein's definition is almost more of a miniature exposé, as a guideline it is certainly satisfactory in a number of respects. The description does justice to the complexity, the multi-layeredness and the persistence of the phenomenon, and makes clear that while hostile beliefs target the Jews as a group, they can manifest themselves at different levels: individual, cultural and political. Moreover, Fein postulates that antisemitic feelings need not necessarily lead to anti-Jewish behaviour.²³

The Dutch social historian Dik van Arkel (1925-2010) defines antisemitism as 'Verbal or active manifestations of antagonism towards the Jewish group as such, 'irrespective of whether they are direct or indirect, intended or not'.²⁴ By speaking of 'active manifestations' and 'antagonism', his definition is more limited and less subtle than that of Fein. But like Fein, he posits that antisemitism can be purely verbal in nature, and he, too, adds an extra dimension: it is possible for antisemitism to be manifested indirectly and unintentionally.

Nevertheless, the usefulness of definitions is limited. Anyone speaking or writing about antisemitism will almost automatically find themselves embroiled in discussion. Just as 'the Jew' can represent the embodiment of the conflict with 'the Other', the concept of 'antisemitism' inevitably elicits opposition, polemics, denial and exaggeration. This ongoing debate and the different interpretations of antisemitism necessarily feature in this volume. A major obstacle for scholars and analysts of postwar antisemitism is that their findings tend to provoke disbelief and defensive reactions – often because people, consciously or unconsciously, use Nazi antisemitism and Jewish persecution as a yardstick. As long as the issue is not about politically organised antisemitism – about calls to exclude, discriminate against or persecute Jews, or programmes with that goal – the conclusion that certain verbal and written utterances are 'antisemitic' is very often seen as an

Antisemitism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 67. Elsewhere Fein leaves out the characterisation 'persistent and latent', and speaks briefly of 'anti-Semitic beliefs and culture': *ibid.*, 85. Mark Cohen also offers an interesting definition: 'a religiously-based complex of irrational, mythical, and stereotypical beliefs about the diabolical, malevolent, and all-powerful Jew, infused, in its modern, secular form, with racism and the belief that there is a Jewish conspiracy against mankind': Mark R. Cohen, 'The "Convivencia" of Jews and Muslims in the High Middle Ages.' In: Moshe Maoz (ed.) *The Meeting of Civilizations. Muslims, Christians and Jewish* (Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 54-65.

²³ Fein, 'Dimensions of antisemitism', 85.

²⁴ Dik van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain. A Socio-historical Analysis of the Growth of Anti-Jewish Stereotypes* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University, Press 2009), 77.

exaggerated, moralistic, possibly even scandalous accusation – as casting unfair doubt on the integrity of the author or source in question.²⁵

That attitude can lead to contemporary antisemitism being trivialised. People forget that antisemitism preceded Nazism, and that it did not disappear with the Nazis. They ignore the fact that antisemitism is not just a phenomenon, a term originally conceived by those who, because of their convictions, profiled themselves explicitly as antisemites, but has also entered common usage as ‘an analytical or critical category’.²⁶ In other words, concluding that someone’s words or deeds are antisemitic is not the same thing as claiming that someone is a ‘Nazi’ or even an ‘antisemite’. The primary aim is to reach an analysis as such – an analysis founded on arguments. The charged debate about what may or may not be considered antisemitic is muddied yet further by those who, as soon as any criticism is expressed of Jews, Judaism or Israel, claim that it is ‘antisemitic’. At the opposite end of the spectrum from those who trivialise antisemitism (‘deniers’) are those who exaggerate and exploit antisemitism to further their own (political) goals, or because of understandable, but not seldom unfounded fears (‘alarmists’).²⁷ In short, to make antisemitism an object of study is to enter an academic, political, social and emotional minefield.

A huge body of work exists on historical and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, including after the Second World War. The Netherlands stands out for the paucity of its contribution to this corpus. Strikingly little Dutch research has been done on the history of antisemitism, either in previous centuries or after the war.²⁸ But then what could we add to

25 See chapter 13.

26 Robert Fine, ‘Fighting with Phantoms: a Contribution to the Debate on Antisemitism in Europe’, *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, 5 (2009), 459-479: 460, n. 2.

27 Fine, ‘Fighting with Phantoms’, 459ff; Evelien Gans, ‘De strijd tegen het antisemitisme is verworden tot ideologie tegen moslims’, *NRC Handelsblad*, 8 January 2011; See Ron van der Wieken, *Jodenhaat. Het verhaal van een uiterst explosief en destructief element in de westerse cultuur* (Amsterdam: Mastix Press, 2014), 14-16.

28 Before and after the Second World War, Dutch antisemitism was often dealt with in a very fragmented way in historical studies on Jewish history or quite different topics (like the Dutch labour movement): Evelien Gans, ‘Gojse broodnijd. De strijd tussen joden en niet-joden rond de naoorlogse Winkelsluitingswet 1945-1951.’ In: Conny Kristel (ed.), *Met alle geweld. Botsingen en tegenstellingen in burgerlijk Nederland* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2003), 195-213: 196-198. Since 1945, however, several studies have appeared that focus on antisemitism immediately after the Second World War (Hondius, *Terugkeer, 1990/1998*) and on the image of the Jew in Catholic and Protestant circles: Marcel Poorthuis and Theo Salemink, *Een donkere spiegel. Nederlandse katholieken over joden. Tussen antisemitisme en erkenning, 1870-2005* (Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers, 2006), and G.J. van Klinken, *Opvattingen in de gereformeerde kerken in Nederland over het Jodendom, 1896-1970* (Kampen: Kok, 1996). Evelien Gans has published *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme. Over*

this prodigious international collection of books on antisemitism, both academic and non-academic? In the following sections we will expound the central questions of this book and the added value, the aims and the innovative aspects of our approach.

Stereotypes and points of fixation

In the first place this volume examines how, and by what dynamic processes, antisemitism, an age-old and global phenomenon, manifested itself in the Netherlands after 1945. As stated above, up to now, Dutch historians have not paid much attention to this subject, nor has it been much examined by historians outside the Netherlands.²⁹

It is not for nothing that the term 'stereotype' appears frequently in this introduction. The second aim of this volume is to examine the historical and social development, function and relevance of antisemitic stereotypes. Stereotypes are manifestations of the view that people belonging to a certain group have specific characteristics – qualities that are predominantly, but not exclusively, negative. Stereotypes arise in a particular historical and social context and sometimes possess a grain of historical 'reality', albeit one which is exaggerated, distorted and removed from its historical context. For example, the Jews were forced by Christian society to specialise in money lending, and this led to the stereotype of the rich, materialistic Jew. But at least as often, stereotypes are completely irrational from the start (think of the Jewish child killer or the blood libel). These negative perceptions become fixed and take on a life of their own. The mechanism of 'collective liability' is directly linked to this. It suffices for one member of the group (or a few) to make a false step or commit a crime, for the whole group to be blamed.³⁰

de verhouding tussen joden en niet-joden in Nederland (Amsterdam: Arena, 1994) and written several articles on the topic, which are occasionally mentioned in this book, particularly in the footnotes and bibliography; Remco Ensel (b.1965) has published *Haatspraak. Antisemitisme – een 21^e-eeuwse geschiedenis* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), which focuses on antisemitism, anti-Zionism and images of Jews in the Netherlands during the last decade, mainly, but not only, in the Moroccan-Dutch community.

29 An exception is *Terugkeer* by Dienne Hondius, mentioned above. In historical, chronological studies on Dutch and Dutch Jewish history, the theme 'antisemitism' is dealt with only briefly and in a fragmentary way: Gans, *Gojse broodnijd*, 196-197.

30 Gans, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 77; 'De grens van assimilatie verlegt zich keer op keer', (Interview with Evelien Gans) in: Bart Top, *Religie en verdraagzaamheid. 10 gesprekken over tolerantie in een extreme tijd* (Kampen: Ten Have, 2005), 47-60: 54-55.

Fein does not use the term 'stereotype', in contrast with the cultural historian George Mosse (1918-1999). 'Ideas can be weapons', Mosse said. It was 'the formation and diffusion of stereotypes and attitudes that paved the way to the rise of Nazism and favoured its success'.³¹ Dik van Arkel even goes so far as to regard stereotypes as the backbone of antisemitism (and racism); their exclamatory power and functionality are of eminent importance to his work, as is clear from a whole series of articles and his magnum opus *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain: A Socio-historical Analysis of the Growth of Anti-Jewish Stereotypes* (2009).³²

In a comparative analysis of various European countries, Van Arkel examines the conditions that allow antisemitism to grow into a political factor: stigmatisation of a minority by the elite or those in power, the creation of a social divide between majority and minority, whereby stereotypes and stigmas can no longer be corrected, and, finally, terrorisation of those who are unwilling to discriminate.³³ Anti-Jewish prejudices could never have become so deeply ingrained had not Christianity, as a young church, perceived Judaism as its greatest rival and seized upon ways of profiling itself as the only true heir of a common source. Dik van Arkel introduces the enlightening concept of 'secession friction'. A minority that distinguishes itself by a divergent interpretation of an element or elements of a shared ideology stands to gain by presenting itself as the only true heir of a once shared source. Accordingly, in the New Testament, the Jews serve as a 'marker of difference'. The Jew became the Christ killer in a predominantly Christian Europe.³⁴

Van Arkel's focus was never systematically on contemporary history, nor did he devote much attention to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, his conceptual framework and also the kernel of his analysis – the emergence and function of stereotypes – transcend the time-specific, local nature of his research. Van Arkel coined the term 'genealogy of stereotypes', meaning that when stereotypes have a big enough social support base, they

31 Quoted in: Emilio Gentile, 'A provisional dwelling. The origin and development of the concept of fascism in Mosse's historiography.' In: Stanley G. Payne, David J. Sorkin and John S. Tortoise (eds.), *What History Tells. George L. Mosse and the Culture of Modern Europe* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 41-109: 50.

32 Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, and Dik van Arkel, 'Genealogisch verband van antisemitische vooroordelen.' In: D. van Arkel et al. (eds.), *Wat is antisemitisme? Een benadering vanuit vier disciplines* (Kampen: Kok, 1991), 48-74.

33 Gans, 'Vandaag hebben ze niets', 325; Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 64-65, 119.

34 Nicholas de Lange, 'The origins of anti-Semitism: Ancient evidence and modern interpretations.' In: Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz, *Anti-Semitism in times of crisis* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1991), 29-30; Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 114.

engender new ones, creating a network or system of linked stereotypes, stigmas and prejudices that connect different public domains. The first two are Christianity and the socio-economic sphere, which spawned the above-mentioned stereotypes of the Christ killer and the grasping, moneylending Jew, respectively.³⁵ Instead of a 'genealogy of stereotypes' one could also speak of a Pied Piper effect.³⁶

Van Arkel's approach is also important because he is careful to avoid the post hoc fallacy. Although he occasionally makes the link with Nazi antisemitism and the Third Reich, he approaches antisemitism first and foremost as a phenomenon with an age-old, complex and dynamic history. This volume adopts the same perspective, in effect building on Van Arkel's work. The focus is on perceptions of Jews, anti-Jewish stereotypes, reasoning and actions after the Second World War. But it goes without saying that these did not appear out of the blue in 1945. They were grafted onto earlier perceptions and, moreover, did not stop developing in the years that followed. In this respect, the view of the historian Robert Chazan (b. 1936) is extremely enlightening: antisemitism develops by an evolutionary process and dialectical interplay. Blending a legacy from the past and new social circumstances, it results from constant interplay between old stereotypes and the reality of a changing historical context.³⁷ This work investigates which old stereotypes survived and played a role in a new historical context. Which ones were generated by changing circumstances, and which became dominant? It seeks to chart the interplay between old and new stereotypes.

Thirdly, unlike Van Arkel, the authors of this volume distinguish between stereotypes and their points of fixation. Old, familiar points of fixation were – and still are – the domains of religion ('the Christ killer'; Judas, 'the Jewish traitor'), the economy ('the grasping Jewish moneylender', 'the rich Jew') and sexuality ('the obscene Jew').³⁸

From 1945 and 1948 onwards two new points of fixation appear, to which antisemitic stereotypes attach themselves. The first is the Shoah or Holocaust ('they forgot to gas you'). A new question, certainly for a country such as the Netherlands that experienced Nazi occupation, is the extent to which

35 Van Arkel, 'Genealogisch verband van antisemitische vooroordelen', 15; Gans, *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*, 15.

36 In Dutch: 'zwaan-kleef-aan-effect'; Gans, *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*, 15.

37 Robert Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 134-140.

38 Judas represents both the stereotype of the Jewish traitor and the Jew who will do anything for money ('a handful of pieces of silver'): an early form of the Pied Piper effect.

the Shoah itself influenced the development of postwar antisemitism and in that sense turned itself against the Jews.³⁹

Israel became a second point of fixation. After a very complex previous history, its founding was politically legitimised by the United Nations in 1947, and morally legitimised by the Shoah and the fact that many nations had closed their borders to Jews before, during and after the Second World War. But before, and certainly after its establishment, the Jewish state was controversial – loved and hated, admired and vilified. Israel, too, or its politics, would increasingly work against not only itself but also, more generally, against ‘the Jew’. Just as in the case of religion, the economy and sexuality, the two new points of fixation would regularly connect with one another – and with other points of fixation. How could Jews still invoke their victimhood, given the way in which they, or the Israelis (a distinction that is often not made) trampled upon the Palestinians? At the end of 2008, in response to constant rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, Israel launched an offensive against Gaza, dubbed Operation Cast Lead, which attracted international criticism, being seen as a disproportionate reaction. The Dutch-based Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI), which, although independent, cites solidarity with Israel as its key principle, was sent the following antisemitic hate mail: *‘Hitler was een aardige man vergeleken bij de joden in Israel. Allemaal aan het gas die varkens en dan opvoeren aan de honden.’* [Hitler was a nice man compared to the Jews in Israel. Gas all those pigs and then feed them to the dogs].⁴⁰ This line of thinking results from looking through the prism of the Shoah at Jews in Israel. And the same principle operates in reverse. It is not for nothing that the Shoah and the preservation of the state of Israel are both crucial building blocks of postwar Jewish identity as well; we see a mirror image here.⁴¹

The Netherlands from a multicultural perspective

This book focuses on the postwar Netherlands as a multicultural society, and as the setting of a social phenomenon that provokes fierce debate in a global context.

39 In this book the authors alternately use the terms Shoah and Holocaust.

40 Elise Friedmann, *Monitor antisemitische incidenten in Nederland: 2008. Met een verslag van de Gazaperiode: 27-12-2008 – 23-1-2009* (Den Haag: CIDI, 2009), 25.

41 See Gans, *Jaap en Ischa Meijer*, 11.

These two photos mirror a main theme of this book: both the Holocaust and Israel as points of fixation for postwar reflections on ‘the Jew’. At different moments in time very diverse groups of people, for most divergent goals, nonetheless gather at the same *lieu de mémoire*: the National Monument at Dam Square in Amsterdam.

Illustration 3 Photo of a protest against the expiration of war crimes on Dam Square, 28 February 1965



Photo: Arthur Bastiaanse / ANP

Former camp prisoners, some of whom have a yellow badge in the form of the Star of David pinned on their coat, protest against the premature expiration of German war crimes, 28 February 1965. The protest signs read: ‘Former prisoners of Auschwitz protest against premature expiration’, ‘Our millions of dead demand justice’ and ‘Monday protest meeting at Krasnapolsky’ (which refers to the hotel behind the Monument).

Illustration 4 Photo of a demonstration against the military operation in Jenin on Dam Square, 13 April 2002



Photo: Bram Buddel / De Beeldunie

'Palestine is one big concentration camp,' 'Zionism is Racism'. Demonstration on Dam Square against the Israeli military operation in the Jenin refugee camp, 13 April 2002. The Star of David – also the symbol on the Israeli flag – is equated with a Swastika.

Certain manifestations, patterns and turning points will become visible – several of which have a more or less typically Dutch flavour, and quite a few of which parallel Western European or global developments. Unlike in some other countries in Western and especially Eastern Europe, there has hardly been any physical violence against Jews in the Netherlands since the Second World War. Verbal and social antisemitism, however, have remained serious issues. The so-called swastika epidemic (the chalking of swastikas on synagogues and other Jewish institutions), which originated in West Germany in 1959-1960 and spread throughout the world from there, was copied in the Netherlands only sporadically. But because it took place right across the border, in a country that had recently occupied the Netherlands, it was the subject of intense debate and made an impact on the Dutch Jewish community. After the Eichmann trial in 1961, and partly in connection with the worldwide publicity that the trial generated, the 1960s saw several anti-Jewish incidents, which will be dealt with in the following chapters. Apparently, figuring out how to cope with the legacy of the Shoah was an ongoing process. One relevant factor, for Jews and Gentiles alike, is which generation was dominant in the political and cultural establishment and in public debate.

This factor may be most relevant to the Dutch debate on Israel. As mentioned above, the Six-Day War or June War of 1967, was a turning point in the Netherlands and throughout Europe, after which sympathy for Israel declined, although it certainly did not disappear. This decline in sympathy took place more slowly in the Netherlands than elsewhere. In the Arab world, Zionism and the founding of Israel had been fiercely rejected from the start; in 1967 the aversion increased enormously. Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands brought this political baggage with them, including their memories and perceptions of the place of 'the Jew' in their mother country and in the world. Much the same can be said of Turkish immigrants – even though Turkey had a much more ambivalent relationship to Israel than Morocco and other Arab countries. Precisely because of its solidarity with Israel, the Netherlands was hard hit by the Arab oil embargo of 1973, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. The political and economic harm done to Dutch trade and commercial relations by this measure, as well as the responses to it, will be examined in this book. The country's political stance towards Israel changed, as did the degree of organisation among Jews in the Netherlands, which monitored not only antisemitism but also what they took to be political manifestations of anti-Israel sentiment, and took action when they saw the need for it. Anti-Israeli tendencies were reinforced by the Lebanon War of 1982 – after which the Netherlands contributed to the international peacekeeping force – and the Intifadas of 1987 and 2000,

Israel's military actions and reactions, and the military operation in Gaza, Cast Lead, in 2008/9. These events had a particular impact on opinion in Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch communities. In Dutch government circles, however, which were usually dominated by Christian Democrats and Liberals, a benevolent stance continued to prevail. Yet in all strata of Dutch society, to differing degrees, a fateful triangle of antisemitism, anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel was at work.⁴²

The fourth aim of this volume is, while keeping in mind the patterns described above, to adopt an innovative approach by putting the spotlight on different population groups and their perceptions of Jews – on their interactions with 'the Jew'. An important question in our research is the extent to which the ideas and stereotypes about Jews held by Moroccan and Turkish newcomers changed and became connected – in whatever direction – with perceptions that were current in their new home country.⁴³

The very first group to be considered is the dominant majority among the Dutch population – the so-called native Dutch. The members of this group are Christian, or they or their forefathers were raised in the Christian tradition – by now they are often completely or largely secular. In any event, they identify with, see themselves as and are perceived as being both the heirs and representatives of dominant, mainstream ('Dutch') history and culture – however volatile and mutable these concepts might be. Naturally, this approach has its limitations. The native Dutch community is by no means a homogenous group. Its members come in all shapes and sizes, in terms of age, gender, generation, social background, religion, ideology and political affiliation. Moreover, they think and act in a specific historical and social context. Several groups fall into grey areas, like those who are partly of Indonesian descent, known as Indos, and the Moluccan-Dutch community. So this category is intended merely as an initial, rough demarcation.

The (Dutch) Jews – also far from being a uniform population group – occupy an intriguing middle ground here. In late December 1945 the Jewish population of the Netherlands stood at 21,674; by 1947 that number had risen to an estimated 28,000 – only a quarter of what it had been before the war.⁴⁴ These survivors would fan out into numerous, very diverse groups – or

42 Gans, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 90-94.

43 In the mid-1960s, Morocco and Turkey replaced Spain and Italy as the main countries supplying migrant labour: Rob Witte, *'Al eeuwenlang een gastvrij volk'. Racistisch geweld en overheidsreacties in Nederland 1950-2009* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2010), 63.

44 Chaya Brasz, 'Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog: van kerkgenootschap naar culturele minderheid.' In: J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Manfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), *Geschiedenis van de joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 351-403: 351-352.

remain lone wolves – in terms of their religious and political leanings, social position and involvement in Jewish causes such as Zionism.⁴⁵ Interestingly, the Dutch Marxist and Zionist Sam de Wolff (1878-1960) primarily saw Jews as ‘a community with a common destiny’ [*Schicksalgemeinschaft* in German; *lotsgemeenschap* in Dutch]. According to De Wolff, even before the war they had come to belong to two such communities: the Jewish and the Dutch, along with a double nationality and loyalties, having lived for centuries in the Low Countries.⁴⁶

How Jews in the Netherlands have perceived antisemitism since 1945 is strongly bound up with their experiences prior to and especially during the German occupation, as well as the place they have assigned the Shoah in their lives and world view. Other contributory factors are the extent to which they see themselves as Dutch or as Jews, or both – or as one more than the other; whether they were born before, during or after the war – a factor which in fact applies, in varying degrees, to every population group examined here; and their views on Israel and degree of solidarity with the Jewish state. In this volume, Jews are not only seen as being ‘acted upon’ – as the passive target of antisemitism. They are also active players, who can opt to be silent, to shrug off what they have seen or experienced, to make themselves heard or to take action. In the fifth place, this is, in fact, an innovative approach in itself. Most literature on antisemitism focuses on antisemitism, its manifestations and on those who practice and/or preach it. Moreover, much literature separates the analysis of antisemitism completely from that of Israeli politics.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, when this research project was conceived, the perpetrators of antisemitic utterances or aggression who were taken to court still came primarily from extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi circles. They too are discussed in this book.⁴⁷ But media attention was devoted primarily to the acts of Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin. An

45 See Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 556ff; Chaya Brasz, ‘Onontbeerlijk maar eigengereid. De zionistische inmenging in de naoorlogse joodse gemeenschap.’ In: Conny Kristel (ed.), *Binnenskamers. Terugkeer en opvang na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Besluitvorming* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 235-260; Conny Kristel, ‘Leiderschap na de ondergang. De strijd om de macht in joods naoorlogs Nederland.’ In: *ibid.*, 209-234.

46 Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 279ff; 391ff; Evelien Gans, ‘Sam de Wolff (1878-1960): een typisch geval van én-én.’ In: Francine Püttmann et al. (ed.), *Markante Nederlandse Zionisten* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1996), 50-63; 53, 56-58.

47 Remco Ensel and Annemarike Stremmelaar, ‘Speech acts: Observing antisemitism and Holocaust education in the Netherlands.’ In: Gunther Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun (eds.), *Perceptions of the Holocaust in Europe and Muslim Communities: Sources, Comparisons and Educational Challenges* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 153-171. See chapter 4.

incident when Moroccan youths shouted antisemitic slogans and played football with wreaths laid on Dutch Remembrance Day on 4 May 2003 caused a public outcry. ' Hamas, Hamas, all Jews to the gas' was, originally, a slogan that native Dutch football fans would and still do chant at matches where their team was playing against Ajax, Amsterdam's football club, traditionally labelled as 'Jewish'. Later this slogan was shouted by Moroccans on the street, and during anti-Israel demonstrations.⁴⁸ That fact prompted the authors of this work to look back in time to see how Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands related to Dutch perceptions of Jews, Israel and the Shoah.

Just as we find when looking at the make-up of the Dutch or Dutch Jewish population, there is no such thing as 'the' Dutch Moroccan. People of Moroccan origin fall into different groups, in their own perception and in how they are looked upon. Just like Jews, they can emphasise their Dutch and Moroccan identities in differing combinations and gradations. In this respect they have a hyphenated identity – like many other population groups, such as Dutch Jews.⁴⁹

The first generation of migrant workers cherish a nostalgic picture of Jews and non-Jews living harmoniously side by side in their mother country, back in the old days. In their view, Zionism and Israel disrupted what was originally a peaceful relationship. In the Arab world as a whole, especially since 1967, anti-Zionism, often involving antisemitic stereotypes, has become rampant. Commentators across the international scene argue that a 'new antisemitism' has arisen – 'new' in that 'Israel' has been substituted for 'the Jew'. This is a controversial idea. As Robert Chazan has pointed out, antisemitism has 'renewed' itself time and again, in a dialectical and evolutionary process. From 1967 onwards 'Israel' did indeed constitute a crucial point of fixation, but is the issue not primarily about 'new' environments and regions in which antisemitism has become reinforced, often to a very extreme degree? Right from the outset, Israel was the object of sharp debate, a debate that would sometimes – and nowadays with increasing frequency – cross over into antisemitism. But alongside this phenomenon, old forms of antisemitism continued to exist, while new ones came into being.⁵⁰

48 See also Ensel, *Haatspraak*; Gans, 'On Gas Chambers, Jewish Nazis and Noses', 84.

49 Heba M. Sharobeem, 'The hyphenated identity and the question of belonging. A study of Samia Serageldin's *The Cairo House*', *Studies in the Humanities* 30, 1 & 2 (2003), 60-84. Remco Ensel applies this concept in the Dutch context and translated it as 'koppelteken-identiteit': Ensel, *Haatspraak*, 216, 222, 237, 242, 275, 331, 336. See, e.g., chapter 14.

50 For the debate on 'new antisemitism', see Helga Embacher, 'Neuer Antisemitismus in Europa – ein historischer Vergleich.' In: Moshe Zuckerman (ed.), *Antisemitismus – Antizionismus*

Mohammed Bouyeri, born in the Netherlands in 1978, is not typical of his generation in one respect – he murdered Theo van Gogh – but in many other ways he is. Second-generation Moroccan migrants like him have at most heard family stories about Moroccan Jews, but have no personal experience or memories of such co-existence. They grew up in the Netherlands where, as they saw it, Jews were perceived as victims, while actually belonging to the establishment and, in Israel, pursuing ruthless anti-Palestinian policies. The seeds for identification and a sense of solidarity with Palestinians had already been sown in Morocco, and these feelings became gradually stronger in the Netherlands, not just among the younger generations.

Again, more generally, the self-image of Moroccans changed in that the religious component became increasingly dominant, relegating the national component more to the background. In the course of the 1990s, adherence to Islam became a trend in the Moroccan – and Turkish – communities. Among young people, in particular, living as a conscious, active Muslim provided a counterbalance to cultural and social rootlessness, and the experience or perception of belonging to a discriminated population group. In the case of a small minority, including Bouyeri, this led to political Islamisation and fiercely anti-Western views, including antisemitism and hatred of Israel.⁵¹ Anti-Israel, anti-Judaism and anti-Jewish feelings, most certainly, also exist more widely in Muslim circles, albeit, often in a less extreme form.

In today's largely secularised Western Europe, conservative segments of the Muslim population have ideas and traditions that depart from the mainstream on issues such as the position of women, homosexuality and apostasy. These views tend to provoke surprise and, in extreme cases, aversion, fear and hatred. Actually, discriminatory views of this kind are also present within – admittedly smaller – Christian fundamentalist and Jewish ultra-orthodox circles. Muslims too are targets of fear and hatred, because of their religious or cultural identity: anti-Muslim racism, anti-Muslim xenophobia, and most common by now, though not unchallenged, generally

– *Israelkritik. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* XXXIII (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005), 50-69; Jonathan Judaken, 'So, what's new? Rethinking the "new" anti-Semitism in a global age', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 42, 5/5 (2008), 531-560; Esther Webman, 'The challenge of Assessing Arab/Islamic Anti-Semitism', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 46, 5 (September 2010), 677-697; Ensel, *Haatspraak*, 330-331; Véronique Altglas, 'Anti-Semitism in France: past and present', *European Societies* 14, 2 (2012), 259-274; Alejandro Baer and Paula López, 'The blind spots of secularization. A qualitative approach to the study of antisemitism in Spain', *European Societies* 14, 2 (2012), 203-221; Robert Fine and Glynn Cousin, 'A common cause. Reconnecting the study of racism and anti-Semitism', *European Societies* 14, 2 (2012), 166-185.

⁵¹ Helga Embacher and Margit Reiter (eds.), *Europa und der 11. September 2001* (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2011); Ensel, *Haatspraak*, 271-291.

referred to as Islamophobia, all of which generalise, and therefore stereotype, by definition. Geert Wilders, the leader of the right-wing populist Freedom Party (pvv), is an undisguised example of this phenomenon in the Netherlands. Signals of Muslim emancipation and integration – such as the Muslim boat in Amsterdam's Gay Pride festival, as well as the particularly good educational performance of Muslim girls – are often overlooked. Obviously, the long series of attacks by Al-Qaida, Islamic State (IS) and other Islamic terrorist organisations, some of which have had Jewish targets, have roused anxiety and anger. These feelings are quite understandable, but Wilders does capitalize on them and reinforces them, in every possible way.⁵²

The question arose as to why relatively little antisemitism was reported among the Turkish community. Were they perhaps not averse to Jews for historical reasons – because of the Jews' relatively favourable status in the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires and, as of 1923, Turkey, as compared to Christian Europe? And did the reasonably cordial – or at least not hostile – though increasingly delicate relations between the Turkish and Israeli governments play a role here? Just like the Moroccans, most Turks were Muslims – so did that prove there wasn't a connection between Islam and antisemitism? Or was the Turkish community so closed that very few controversial reports reached the outside world? According to informal sources, antisemitism did exist among Turks – also in the Netherlands. An incident arose concerning an Iranian television series *Zahra's Blue Eyes* (2004), copies of which were covertly sold in Turkish mosques in 2004 and 2005. Besides anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist elements, the series also portrayed outright antisemitic stereotypes. Gradually, more reports were heard of antisemitic incidents within the Turkish community.⁵³ That raised plenty of questions and provided grounds for also turning the spotlights on the Turkish community in the Netherlands, which, like the Moroccan community, forms a large and heterogeneous group.

52 See, e.g., chapters 10, 17 and 18. There is quite some literature – and polemic – on the parallels and differences between antisemitism and Islamophobia. One of the most well-known but also controversial books is by Matti Bunzl, *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007). See also Jaël Elkerbout, 'Fear and Hatred of "the Other": Comparing Stereotypes of Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia' (Master thesis, Conflict Resolution and Governance, Universiteit van Amsterdam) (unpublished).

53 Inspraak Orgaan Turken (IOT), 'Quickscan antisemitisme in de Turkse gemeenschap in Nederland': www.republiekallochtonie.nl/userfiles/files/Quickscan%20iOT%20antisemitisme.pdf. The Dutch current affairs TV programme NOVA devoted an item to the illegal sale of *Zahra's Blue Eyes* on 18 June 2005 with the cooperation of Evelien Gans. Esther Brommersma, 'Filmvertoning *Zahra's Blue Eyes*', 9 June 2006 (unpublished) (Personal Archive Evelien Gans).

In the sixth place, this volume will examine both the differences and similarities in images and stereotypes among the three above-mentioned population groups and, where possible, their resultant interaction. Reference has already been made to the leader of the Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party, Abraham Kuypers, and his agitation against the pernicious Jewish influence in politics and elsewhere; he saw Judaism and godless liberalism as being hand in glove.⁵⁴ The fact that in conservative, and Christian circles, especially, 'the Jew' embodied the dangerous, perverse aspects of modernity was mentioned earlier. Christian groups – and they were not alone – seized on the Talmud as a source of accusations against the Jews. Mohammed Bouyeri, mentioned above, did exactly the same. He, too, used Talmud texts to claim, among other things, that the Jews were responsible for the pernicious democratic system. In doing so, he drew on a publication by two American Christian antisemites, Michael A. Hoffman and Alan R. Critchley: *The Truth about the Talmud*, which was posted, in a poor translation, on the site islamawakening.com.⁵⁵ In conservative Catholic circles, especially before but even after the war, Jews were the embodiment of communism, 'Jewish Bolshevism' or 'Judeo-Bolshevism'. In its most extreme form, this attitude was manifested in the refusal of the Dutch Catholic Church to condemn the 1946 pogrom in Kielce, Poland.⁵⁶ The Catholic periodical *De Linie* [The Line] approvingly quoted the Polish cardinal August Hlond, who condemned the pogrom but explained it by reference to the large number of Jews in the Polish Communist governing cadres.⁵⁷

Similar views were held by the Islamic-Turkish movement Milli Görüş which, inspired by religious and nationalist principles, sought a third way between capitalism and communism, and which had branches outside Turkey, including in Germany and the Netherlands. A pamphlet published in 1982 by a Turkish cultural centre in Amsterdam largely visited by right-wing Turkish migrants, warned against the dangers of Zionism and

54 Abraham Kuypers, *Liberalisten en Joden* (Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1878); Gans, 'Netherlands in the Twentieth Century', 498.

55 Ensel, *Haatspraak*, 289, 400 and chapter 14. See, e.g., the English version: Michael A. Hoffman and Alan R. Critchley, *The Truth about the Talmud. Judaism's Holiest Book* (Coeur d'Alene, Idaho: Independent History and Research, 1998) (consulted 9 February 2014). On this bluntly antisemitic Dutch-language site (consulted 9 February 2014) the Talmud is one of the goals of anti-Jewish hatred, Holocaust denial included.

56 Poorthuis and Salemink, *Een donkere spiegel*, 217, 359, 358-361, 375; *De Linie*, 26 juli 1946, 2 August & 6 September 1946.

57 *De Linie*, 26 July 1946, 2 August 1946, 6 September 1946. See, e.g., Lowe, *Savage Continent*, 206.

communism as the antitheses of Islam. ‘The Jew’ formed the link between the two ideologies.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, people associated with Christian churches continued to make anti-Jewish religious statements. The Goerees, an ‘evangelist couple’, were a Protestant *cause célèbre* in the 1980s; they claimed that the Holocaust was God’s punishment for the rejection of Christ and regarded Israel as the ideal location for a Christian eschatology.⁵⁹ The same phenomenon could be observed among Catholics. In the 1980s, two editors of the Catholic periodical *Bazuin* [Trumpet] were convicted in court (and acquitted on appeal). Their activities had included publishing an open letter that described the new wave of theological interest in Israel as naive and ‘born of belated guilt feelings about the Shoah’. They had also urged theologians to come to the aid of the true victims of their day, arguing that ‘the name of Israel’ had come to refer more truly to ‘the forcibly scattered and displaced Palestinian people’ than to their Jewish counterparts.⁶⁰

Mention is made above of the emergence of two new points of fixation for postwar antisemitism: the Shoah and Israel. Both feature in the views of all the examined population groups. The only difference is in where emphasis is placed. In the perceptions of Moroccans and Turks, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict ranks very high, though Israel’s popularity has also progressively diminished among the native Dutch population. In the case of all three of the above-mentioned population groups, ‘competing victimhood’ emerges as a factor. The fact that the Jews were the pre-eminent victims of Nazi genocides would, even though partially and at times wholly recognised, be denied all over again, trivialised and contradicted – often

58 See chapter 10.

59 The Goerees were associated with the *Jezus Beweging Nederland* [‘Dutch Jesus Movement’] and the *Stichting Evangelieprediking* [‘Gospel Preaching Association’] See: E.G. Hoekstra and M.H. Ipenburg, *Wegwijs in religieus en levensbeschouwelijk Nederland: handboek religies, kerken, stromingen en organisaties* (Kampen: Kok, 2000). Jenny Goeree-Manschet has a website: www.jennygoeree.com. One of the statements that led to a court case was that ‘one can conclude from the Bible that everything done to Jews, including the Holocaust, is their own fault’. A civil suit and criminal prosecution followed: Bas van Stokkom, Henny Sackers and Jean-Pierre Wils, *Godslastering, discriminerende uitingen wegens godsdienst en haatuitingen. Een inventariserende studie* (Ministerie van Justitie, 2006), 79. See, e.g., chapter 8.

60 Poorthuis and Saleminck, *Een donkere spiegel*, 70–71. Another source of inspiration was the Israeli chemist Israel Shahak, an anti-Zionist, who had written about the supposed age-old hatred towards Christians in orthodox Judaism, argued for the abolition of the religion on these grounds, and criticised Zionism for using a combination of the aforementioned hatred and the entire history of anti-Jewish persecution to legitimise the Zionist persecution of the Palestinians: *ibid.* See, e.g., chapter 8.

provoking a furious defence by Jews. It has gradually become standard practice to invoke Israel to support the argument that it is time to stop putting all the emphasis on 'Jewish suffering'. The circle is then complete – Jews are not just there to be gassed, they are the Nazis of today, with the Palestinians as the new Jews: 'Hitler was a nice man compared to the Jews in Israel. Gas them all ...' The comparison with Hitler and the 'Jews in Israel', to the detriment of the latter, illustrates the phenomenon of *nivellering* [levelling] – reducing existing differences in position, circumstances, motives, dilemmas and emotions between victim, perpetrator, bystander and accomplice.

Antisemitism as a multifunctional projection screen: Why the Jews?

'Why the Jews?' is a question which time and again has puzzled scholars, students, adults, children, and all kinds of people in the academic, public and private spheres, whether Jews or Gentiles. This section introduces a number of concepts developed by other scholars of antisemitism who tried to answer this question, and shows their interrelationships. We hope that by applying and combining these concepts, and by introducing and using concepts of our own, we can deepen both academic and public understanding of and insight into contemporary antisemitism, including the Dutch version. We attach great importance to a multidisciplinary approach. To succeed in their aims, antisemitism studies must, at a minimum, draw on history, sociology and psychology.

The planned title of this book was 'Why Jews are more guilty than others!', but we abandoned this idea because of the risk that readers would miss the irony, and therefore the concealed analytical meaning of the phrase. If those words are taken literally – 'Why Jews are more guilty than others' – they seem to have roughly the same implications as those of the notorious German Nazi Julius Streicher: *'Die Juden sind unser Unglück'* ('The Jews are our misfortune'). The real point of our original title, however, was to express why it has been so tempting, and remains tempting even today, to assign disproportionate guilt to the Jews for all sorts of catastrophes and unwanted developments. What has made 'the Jew' such a good scapegoat, to this day? This tendency is not limited to Christians or Muslims, the *petit bourgeoisie* or the establishment, the left or the right. Jews are seen as 'guilty' by a wide array of nations, groups and individuals, who may have very different or entirely contradictory objectives, opinions, interests, and ideals. 'The Jew'

is evidently a multifunctional projection screen.⁶¹ That has remained true after the Shoah, or Holocaust – in other words, since 1945 – and after the foundation of Israel three years later, right up to the present.

The phrase ‘Why Jews are more guilty than others!’ was inspired by George Orwell’s famous maxim, ‘All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.’ Orwell expresses something timeless: there is an ideology, a theory – but actual practice deviates from it. Jesus preached love and tolerance. According to John 8:7, he said, ‘He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone ...’ But the same Christian tradition taught that, although all people are ‘sinful’, Jews are more so than others. After all, they had refused to acknowledge the true Messiah, and then they had nailed him to the cross.

The Enlightenment and the French Revolution proclaimed the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity in a new, modern world to be designed from the ground up. Yet this did not prevent their exponents from excluding Jews in many ways – both Jews who openly wanted to maintain their Jewish identity, whether in a religious or non-religious sense, and those who showed a high degree of assimilation, but not enough to satisfy the non-Jews. In psychoanalytic terms, this phenomenon has been called a *double bind*, a term coined, in the context of Jewish studies and of antisemitism, by the historian Sander Gilman (b. 1944).⁶² Actually, this *double bind* doesn’t apply solely to Jews. Other minorities, such as Dutch people of Moroccan and Turkish descent, are confronted with the same mechanism.⁶³

The firm foundation for hatred of Jews laid by the Christian tradition has already been mentioned as a causal factor behind the almost inexhaustible repertoire of antisemitism, alongside the impact of socio-economic envy, rivalry and resentment – exacerbated by the Pied Piper effect. But there are still other possible responses to the ever-fascinating question, why the Jews in particular? And therefore to the provocative, fictional challenge, ‘Why Jews are more guilty than others’. The tenacity and diversity of antisemitism,

61 Evelien Gans organised an international symposium (under the auspices of the Menasseh ben Israel Institute, Amsterdam), titled *‘The Jew’ as a multifunctional projection screen. The dynamics of contemporary anti-Semitism in a globalizing context*, 12 May 2010, Amsterdam; amongst the speakers were Prof. Dr Werner Bergmann (Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung, Berlin), Prof. Dr Moishe Postone (University of Chicago) and Dr Esther Webman (University of Tel Aviv).

62 Sander Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred. Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3; Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 207; and for the double bind in a study of ‘established and outsiders’ in Moroccan society: Remco Ensel, *Saints and Servants in Southern Morocco* (Leiden, Köln: Brill, 1999), 9-12.

63 ‘De grens van assimilatie verlegt zich keer op keer’, 58.

as well as the many questions about the reasons behind it, have inspired psychoanalysts to try to shed light on the phenomenon. In *Der Mann Mozes und die monotheistische Religion* [*Moses and Monotheism*] (1939), Freud drew a connection between the Jewish tradition of circumcision and the fear of castration that he felt this must arouse among non-Jews. As a second major factor, he suggested that Christians feel envious of the Jews as the first-born, chosen children of God. Freud's thinking was revolutionary in exposing the role of unconscious drives in human life. Aggressive tendencies play an especially central role: 'It is always possible to unite considerable numbers of men in love towards one another, so long as there are still some remaining as objects for aggressive manifestations' (*Civilization and Its Discontents*, 1929).⁶⁴ Furthermore, he accorded at least as much weight to the irrational as he did to the rational.⁶⁵

Five years after Freud's death, in June 1944, a number of psychoanalysts and sociologists in exile, including such prominent intellectuals as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Ernst Simmel and Otto Fenichel, held a symposium in San Francisco on the subject of antisemitism – motivated not only by the genocide of European Jews that was then taking place, but also by mounting anti-Jewish sentiment in the United States. In 1946 their essays were published in the collection *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*. Simmel (1882-1947) opened his introduction with a concise, crystal-clear statement that prefigures Saul Friedländer's concept of 'redemptive antisemitism' with respect to the Nazis⁶⁶: 'The anti-Semite hates the Jew because of his belief that the Jew is responsible for his unhappiness. He persecutes the Jew because he feels persecuted by him.'⁶⁷ The most useful instruments or

64 Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (London: Penguin, 2002); first Austrian edition: Sigmund Freud, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (Wien: Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1930).

65 Gans, *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*, 24-25.

66 Saul Friedländer (b. 1932) described redemptive antisemitism as coupling murderous anger to an 'idealistic' target. It was not enough for the Jews to dominate the world: they wanted to destroy it. The parasite that was consuming the healthy Aryan body from within – or the mighty Jew that would sweep away the foundations of Germany, and then the world – had to be made visible and then eradicated before it was too late: it was 'them' or 'us'. Indeed, the aim was to destroy not just Jews of flesh and blood, but everything that had become contaminated with the Jewish 'spirit' – in other words, with 'The Jew': Saul Friedländer, *Nazi-Duitsland en de joden I: De jaren van vervolging 1933-1939* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1998), 16, 121-123, and idem, *Nazi-Duitsland en de joden II: De jaren van vernietiging* (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2007), 17. See, e.g., chapter 15.

67 In German: 'Der Antisemit hasst den Juden, weil er glaubt, dass der Jude an seinem Unglück schuld ist. Er verfolgt den Juden, weil er sich von ihm verfolgt fühlt': Ernst Simmel, 'Einleitung.' In: Ernst Simmel (ed.), *Antisemitismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993), 12-19:

concepts that psychoanalysis provides for gaining a better understanding of antisemitism are, without a doubt, 'projection' and 'repression' – two 'defence mechanisms', in the jargon of the field.⁶⁸

The psychoanalytic approach does not come close to exhausting the explanatory factors. Another important feature of the antisemitic stereotype is the image of the Jew as both parasitic and all-powerful – Janus-faced.⁶⁹ 'The Jew' was feared and despised, admired and envied. He was – and is – both inferior and superior, powerful and dangerous but also weak and unmanly. There are no limits to the possibilities that 'the Jew' presents. The diverse historical manifestations of antisemitism – the broad range of prejudices and stereotypes, which both complement and contradict each other – are what makes it so persistent, flexible, and multifunctional. They allow it to serve as a frame, an explanatory model for all sorts of social and political problems that are experienced as threatening to some degree.⁷⁰ Similarly, Dik van Arkel has argued that one remarkable characteristic of antisemitism is its ability to develop new beliefs, time after time, about the 'degeneracy' of 'the Jew'; crucially, the 'Christ killers', after an initial period of tolerance, were massacred during the Crusades. This introduced a dimension of violence, which later became associated with the social question, and the stereotype of the 'Jewish usurer'. That paved the way for the transition to a secular ideology. Van Arkel describes this development as 'accusatory innovation' and argues that it has played a decisive role in the spread of antisemitism, setting it apart from other forms of racism.⁷¹

15 (Original edition: *Antisemitism. A social disease* (New York/Boston: International University Press, 1946).

68 For definitions of psychological and psychoanalytical concepts like projection and repression, we use: Harry Stroeken, *Nieuw psycho-analytisch woordenboek – begrippen, termen, personen* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2000). Projection: activity with the help of which one wrongfully describes wishes or thoughts one denies or rejects for oneself, to another person or matter. So, it is a defence mechanism: *ibid.*, 180-181. Repression: 'Push away thoughts, images, memories or wishes into the unconscious or trying to keep it there': *ibid.*, 209. For a more extensive elucidation: *ibid.*

69 See, e.g., Friedländer, *Nazi-Duitsland en de joden I*, 121; Gans, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 74. For how the stereotype of the Jew as a parasite became current, see, e.g., Sven Oliver Müller, *Deutsche Soldaten und ihre Feinde. Nationalismus an Front und Heimatfront im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2007), 65.

70 See, e.g., Gans, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 94.

71 Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 391ff, 394-395, 417. In his recent Dutch-language book *Anti-Joodse beeldvorming en Jodenhaat* [Anti-Jewish Image and Jew-hatred] (Hilversum: Verloren, 2016), on the history of Western European antisemitism, Chris Quispel builds on the work of Van Arkel. For instance by means of the concept of 'labelled interaction', explaining how (forced) Jewish economic specialisation confirms already fixed anti-Jewish stereotypes.

Contradictions between stereotypes do not diminish their impact. The function of stereotypes is to create order in chaos, to gain control of events and clarify conflict situations by making causal connections. The people who use them seek, find and contrive evidence to support their stereotypical views in any way they can. You might ask, how can 'the Jew' be a Bolshevik one moment and a capitalist the next? This is because behind the scenes, these two stereotypes work hand in hand. Furthermore, both capitalism and Bolshevism fall outside of national frameworks – just like 'the Jew' – and they are both the degenerate projects of a modernity run amok.⁷² Stereotypes are self-justifying.⁷³ Still other explanations have been offered of the multifunctionality of 'the Jew', some of which are closely linked to the ones already discussed. The frequent social role of the Jews as intermediaries is another answer to the question of why they, in particular, formed such an obvious target of exclusion and hostility. 'The Jew' occupies a whole series of intermediary roles, which stem from his status as outsider, such as the medieval Jew in Western Europe, seen as a creditor moving between the local population and the ruler and, in the magical scenes in bestiaries, as half-animal, half-human;⁷⁴ or the Jew as an effeminate

Contrary to Van Arkel, however, Quispel has written a chronological, more general and at the same time well-wrought history of antisemitism in Western Europe – including the Netherlands – until the first decade of the twenty-first century. One might say that our book begins where his last chapter on postwar Europe, titled 'Nobody is an antisemite anymore', ends: *ibid.*, e.g., 12, 90, 120, 267-279.

72 See Blom and Cahen, 'Joodse Nederlanders, Nederlandse joden en joden in Nederland', 283. Steven Beller states that both capitalism and socialism were felt as two sides of a modernisation which would be harmful to the more traditional economic branches. Jews were attracted to both, various other population groups felt threatened by them: Steven Beller, "Pride and Prejudice" or Sense and Sensibility"? In: Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential Outsiders. Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), 99-124.

73 Yaacov Schul and Henri Zukier, 'Why do stereotypes stick?' In: Robert Wistrich (ed.), *Demonizing the Other. Antisemitism, Racism, and Xenophobia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 31-43; Chris Quispel, 'Introduction.' In: Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 11-19; 17-18. Images of Jews and non-Jewish 'Slavs' in the Soviet Union, emaciated and reduced by wartime conditions to dressing in rags, confirmed the belief on the part of the Wehrmacht and SS that both groups were *Untermenschen* [subhumans]: Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, *Soldaten. Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2011). And when, despite the stereotype of Jews as lazy and averse to manual labour, a Jew proved to be a hard worker, one could always fall back on the stereotype of the sly, untrustworthy Jew who is merely pretending.

74 See the 'bestiaries', moralising animal stories about 'the Jew' as the owl or the ass: Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 415. There was also the image of the menstruating male Jew, see Henri Zukier, 'The transformation of hatred: Antisemitism as a struggle for group identity.'

man (and a homosexual); as positioned between white Europeans and colonised peoples; or as an artisan and shopkeeper, between the elite and the industrial proletariat. According to the social psychologist Henri Zukier, it is the hybrid Jew, the Jew as a 'transitional figure', who exposes a society's weak points and the mutability of its boundaries and dividing lines, thus disturbing the peace and embodying fear and insecurity.

The imaginary Jew obsesses society as one who crosses boundaries, combines contradictory features, breaches the barriers of the natural species and otherwise violates the order of nature.⁷⁵

Zukier contends that the historical role of the Jew as an outsider and intermediary created the psychological distance that made demonisation possible.⁷⁶

Jews' intermediary role offered advantages both to them and to non-Jews, for instance by permitting the money markets that society required. The American sociologists R.E. Park (1864-1944) and E.V. Stonequist (1901-1979) introduced the concept of the 'marginal man', which they claimed was applicable to Jews in the diaspora. Jews were among those who identified with two or more social groups. That made the modern Jew a 'cultural hybrid', as they put it, unfettered by provincialism and endowed with a creative potential that enabled him or her to 'see the life of the enviroing nation from the outside as well from the inside'. Yet Park and Stonequist were not at all blind to the fact that this role made Jews not only productive, but also vulnerable, as targets of opposition from both spheres of influence.⁷⁷

The German historian Klaus Holz (b. 1960) introduced the concept of 'the Jew' as *der Dritte* [the third party].⁷⁸ The whole world can be organised according to the fundamental pattern of 'us' and 'them', except for 'the Jew', who disrupts this unambiguous two-way distinction. Jews fall outside the

In: Robert Wistrich (ed.), *Demonizing the Other*, 118-130: 126; See, e.g., '... the Jew is the feminised Other ...'; Gilman, *The Jew's Body*, 76. The virulent antisemitic leader of the Dutch SS, Henk Feldmeijer, referred to Jews and Bolsheviks as '*beestmensen*' [beast people]: Bas Kromhout, *De voorman. Henk Feldmeijer en de Nederlandse SS* (Amsterdam: Atlas Contact, 2012).

⁷⁵ Zukier, 'The transformation of hatred', 126. See also: Amir Vodka, *The Human Chameleon. Hybrid Jews in Cinema* (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 5 July 2016). Vodka looks, on the contrary, at the Hybrid Jew emphatically in positive terms (PhD thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 9 September 2014)

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 126-127.

⁷⁷ Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 17-18.

⁷⁸ Klaus Holz, *Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus. Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005) 30.

framework of ‘one people, one state, one nation’. This leads to their image as possessors of a secret, supranational power, who are plotting not only to rule the world but also to undermine the ‘natural’ differences between all its peoples, races and religions. Which reminds us of the never-ending impact of the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* – a fabricated document which purports to be the minutes of a secret meeting of Jewish leaders. The Protocols were published in 1903 and have been reprinted in all major languages ever since, notwithstanding the fact that it was exposed as a forgery as early as 1921.⁷⁹

From this perspective, Jews embody universalism and cosmopolitanism. Holz writes, “*Der Jude*” als Dritter transzendiert, bedroht und zersetzt die binäre Unterscheidung zwischen uns und den anderen, dank deren die partikuläre Gruppenidentität konstruiert wird’ ([The Jew as third party transcends, threatens and breaks down the binary distinction between us and the others, on which the group bases its particular identity]. The Jews can neither become a ‘normal people’ nor come to feel at home [*heimisch werden*] among one of the ‘normal peoples’.⁸⁰ The Dutch poet Marsman, in 1936, had pinned his hopes on the former of these two possibilities – a Jewish state – and given up on the achievement of the latter.

As Holz sees it, ‘the Jew’ is the antagonist of all *Wir-Gruppen* [Us Groups], at both the national and transnational levels. Antisemitism therefore occurs at both of these levels: not only one’s own group, but a range of groups, can collectively feel threatened by ‘the Jew’, seen as the *Weltfeind* [World Enemy].⁸¹ The World Wide Web embodies this development. The internet is both a symbol and an instrument of a world in which the mutual dependence between people and countries around the globe is increasing daily, in economic, political and cultural terms. ‘The Jew’ can be found there in countless manifestations, and usually in a negative light. Building on Shulamit Volkov’s concept of antisemitism as a ‘cultural code’,⁸² one might well ask whether contemporary antisemitism has not become an integral part of a global, digital culture.

As noted above, Jews are seen as ‘guilty’ by a wide variety of nations, groups and individuals, who may have very different or entirely contradictory objectives, opinions, interests and ideals. In that sense, it is reasonable

79 The tenacity might be located in the seeming truthfulness of the genre of conference proceedings: Richard Levy, *Antisemitism in the modern world. An anthology of texts* (Lexington, MA, Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1991), 147. See, e.g., chapter 7.

80 Holz, *Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus*, 33-34.

81 *Ibid.*, 36.

82 Shulamit Volkov, *Antisemitismus als kultureller Code. Zehn Essays* (München: Beck, 2000).

to assert that ‘the Jew’ can serve as a negative source of social cohesion. Holz’s concept of ‘the Jew’ as a third party can be connected to one of the English historian Steven Beller’s conclusions about the role of Jews in Vienna from the late nineteenth century onwards. In the city of Vienna, which was expanding enormously because of an influx of immigrants with a remarkably wide range of nationalities, antisemitism facilitated what Beller (b. 1958) calls ‘negative integration’. Hostility toward Jews enabled newcomers to win a place for themselves by defining and approaching each other in terms of what they were *not*: namely, Jewish.⁸³

In our own day, antisemitism can still serve as a negative – although often not a lasting – source of social cohesion or solidarity between individuals, national organisations or international groups. For instance, temporary alliances – sometimes unwitting, unintended or half-hearted – occasionally arise between right-wing extremists and Muslim and Islamist groups, or between the far right and the far left. Holocaust denial can be observed in various forms and gradations both among right-wing extremists and in Muslim circles. The extreme or radical left and the extreme right are sometimes strange bedfellows in matters regarding Israel, as will be made clear in several chapters of this book.⁸⁴

‘The Jew’ can also be a source of solidarity between fundamentalist Christians and Palestinians. The highly controversial film *The Passion of the Christ* (2004), made by the Catholic fundamentalist Mel Gibson (b. 1956), which was a huge success at the box office, continued the old tradition of holding the Jews responsible for Christ’s death, and used the techniques of modern cinematography to create a highly visceral, almost pornographic presentation of its violent story: the lashing, the journey to the cross, and the crucifixion. Around the world, the film provoked heated debate about whether it was antisemitic. Enlightened Christians, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, opposed the film, but others saw it as an excellent instrument for missionary work.⁸⁵ In the Arab world, the film drew full houses, even though Christ is a minor religious figure in Islam. Despite this different cultural

83 Steven Beller, “Pride and Prejudice” or “Sense and Sensibility”?

84 See, e.g., chapter 4.

85 Rianne Wijmenga, ‘De passie van de toeschouwer. Receptieonderzoek naar de reacties van het publiek op Mel Gibsons *The Passion of the Christ*’ (MA thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 29 April 2011, www.slideshare.net/RianneWijmenga/ma-thesis-film-studies-rcw) (consulted 15 June 2015); See, e.g., Sergio I. Minerbi, ‘The Passion by Mel Gibson: Enthusiastic Response in the Catholic World, Restrained Criticism by the Jews’, *Jewish Political Studies Review* 17:1-2 (Spring 2005): www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-minerbi-s05.htm; Frank Rich, ‘2004: The Year of “The Passion”’, *The New York Times*, 19 December 2004.

heritage, the film offered Muslims plenty of opportunities for identification, equating the despicable role of the Jews in the crucifixion with Israel's role in the Middle East and, in particular, the Israelis' treatment of the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, called Gibson's *Passion* a 'moving and historical' film, and his aide said that the Palestinians still endured the same kind of pain as Jesus on a daily basis.⁸⁶ The 'hybrid Jew' with a Janus face, *der Dritte* – these concepts are as relevant as ever.

'The Jew' as both victim and victimiser: a continuing postwar theme

This section revolves around the argument that Jewish victimhood has turned against 'the Jew'. Paradoxically, the stereotype of 'the powerful Jew' has been reinforced by his role as victim.

That brings us back to the image of the 'Janus-faced' Jew – powerful and powerless, prosperous and impoverished, cowardly and cruel, inferior and superior – along with the notion of 'the Jew' as 'the guilty victim'. In the postwar period, one such stereotypical duality, one Janus face in particular, has gradually become the most prominent: the dual role of victim and perpetrator, victim of the Nazis and their collaborators during the Shoah, and perpetrator of injustices against the Palestinians in Israel and in Gaza and the West Bank. This Janus face is not a Dutch invention; it is perceived around the world. It is also directly connected to the above-mentioned phenomena of *nivellerig* [levelling] and of the reversal of perpetrator and victim. 'Victim' and 'perpetrator' form an explosive combination. Victims arouse not only compassion, but also revulsion. Compassion is the twin brother of revulsion, wrote the Dutch Jewish lawyer and author Abel Herzberg (1893-1989), a survivor of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, as early as 1950. He saw this as an explanation for the increase in antisemitism in the Netherlands after the war.⁸⁷

Jewish survivors also aroused feelings of rivalry and envy: envy of 'the Jew', who presents himself as the ultimate victim. We regard this as a crucial component of antisemitism and ambivalence toward Jews: goyish envy, Gentiles' envy of talents, qualities and privileges supposedly possessed by

86 See (website) Palestinian National Authority State Information Service, International Press Centre, 10 March 2004; (website) RKK, Katholiek Nederland, 21 March 2004.

87 Abel J. Herzberg, *Kroniek der Jodenvervolging 1940-1945* (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1978), 25 (reprint of: *Onderdrukking en verzet*, 1950). See, e.g., chapters 2, 3 and 5.

Jews.⁸⁸ These feelings underlay arguments that, after all, the Jews weren't the only ones who had suffered in the war, were they? And there were plenty of mass murders before the Holocaust, weren't there – not to mention the many 'Holocausts' that took place after 1945. Where there were feelings of guilt and shame – perhaps a sense of not having done enough, a sense that one could or should have done more to help Jews – those could also lead to irritation and aggression. The Dutch Jewish historian Jacques Presser (1899-1970), who had gone into hiding and survived the war, wrote – three years after Herzberg and again in reference to postwar antisemitism – that guilt among non-Jews must have played a major role. Was it any wonder that so many people who had fallen short 'took vengeance on those who so painfully reminded them of their failures: the surviving Jews?' It was inherent to the human spirit, he wrote, to hate the people you have hurt.⁸⁹

Changing power relations through history have an undeniable influence on the prominence of particular stereotypes. Israel – with its series of military victories over Arab countries, its repressive policies and forceful domination of the Palestinians, and, more generally, its outspokenly assertive if not offensive stance – has unmistakably shifted the stereotype of the craven, powerless Jew to the background and brought that of the powerful Jew to the fore.⁹⁰ In contrast, for many Jews outside its borders, Israel has become not only a living *lieu de mémoire* [site of memory], anchoring the recollection of a horrific past, but also a form of compensation for that past and a source of pride in the ability to forge a new Jewish future.⁹¹ They have no intention of letting that be taken away from them, despite growing criticism from outsiders. Since the Six-Day War in June 1967, more and more Jewish committees, task forces and lobbying groups have emerged in the Netherlands and elsewhere – not only stepping forward as defenders of the Jewish state, but also making a clean break with the reticence of earlier generations regarding expressions of antisemitism.⁹² This assertiveness can even lead to the rejection of all criticism of Israel, Jews or Judaism. That could be described as Jewish narcissism: a self-image organised entirely around the two poles of suffering and pride. Whatever does not fit is denied or ignored.⁹³

88 Gans, *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*; Gans, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 78.

89 Jacques Presser, *Ondergang. De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse jodendom*, II (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1965), 518-519.

90 Evelien Gans, 'De Joodse almacht. Hedendaags antisemitisme', *Vrij Nederland*, 29 november 2003.

91 Idem, *De kleine verschillen*, 898.

92 See chapters 5, 6 and 8.

93 Gans, *Gojse nijd & joods narcisme*, 46-48; idem, 'They have forgotten to gas you', 81-84.

After 1945, there was a counterweight to antisemitic statements: support and solidarity from non-Jews, which was accepted with both gratitude and scepticism. The term philosemitism was heard with some frequency. The most flattering interpretation of this phenomenon is as the idealisation of Jews; the least flattering is as the other side of the antisemitic coin, the love of Jews simply because they are Jews – just as much of a stereotype as antisemitism.⁹⁴

The power of ‘the Jew’ gradually seems to have become the central theme of antisemitism today. In his analysis of modern antisemitism, the Jewish-American sociologist Moishe Postone (b. 1942) emphasises its supposedly anti-hegemonic nature. It was for this very reason that traditional socialism made use of it, portraying the Jews as the capitalist enemy. The nineteenth-century socialist August Bebel (1840-1913) called this short-sighted strategy the ‘socialism of fools’.⁹⁵ Social democrats in the Netherlands, though certainly less radical than their predecessors, were not immune to antisemitism either. Henri Polak (1868-1943), the well-known Jewish Diamond Union leader, wrote a pamphlet, at the request of several of his Jewish party members, in which he refuted a large number of antisemitic remarks and prejudices they had been confronted with. It is also noteworthy that, after years of unsuccessful attempts, the Dutch branch of the internationally active socialist-Zionist organisation *Poale Zion* [Workers of Zion] was founded in 1933. Socialism alone was no longer enough for its members.⁹⁶ The Dutch socialist anarchist Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846-1919), a former Lutheran minister, was triply prejudiced; he not only carried the anti-Jewish baggage of Martin Luther (1483-1546), but also, following in the footsteps of the widely read utopian socialist and anarchist thinker Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), stigmatised the Jews both as inveterate hucksters and as the mainstays and profiteers of the capitalist system. As late as 1912 he wrote in racist terms, in the *Vrije Socialist* [Free Socialist] that if the Jews ‘wanted to live on the basis of equal rights with other races’, they should stop ‘forming a clique in their ghetto, always favouring their own nation in trade, and carefully preventing every mixing of race’.⁹⁷

94 See, e.g., chapters 5, 6, 8 and 18.

95 For August Bebel, see Van Arkel, *The Drawing of the Mark of Cain*, 24-25.

96 Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 42, 492, and for Poale Zion: *ibid.*, *passim*. Henri Polak, *Het ‘wetenschappelijk’ antisemitisme. Weerlegging en betoog* (Amsterdam: Blitz, 1933). Because of his fierce attacks against (also Dutch) antisemitism in his journalistic columns, the mainly non-Jewish party leadership would reproach him for his allegedly over-emotional, even ‘hysterical’ stance: *ibid.*, 86-90. See, e.g., Ensel and Gans, ‘The bystander as a non-Jew’.

97 Jan Willem Stutje, *Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis. Een romantisch revolutionair* (Amsterdam: Atlas/Contact, 2012), 193-98; See, e.g., Gans, *De kleine verschillen*, 48.

Postwar groups within the leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-colonialist movement have also taken an antisemitic line, precisely because of a perceived Jewish – and Israeli – hegemony. All forms of racism use essentialist biological and cultural categories to explain complicated social and historical categories, according to Moishe Postone. But what is specific to antisemitism is its populist and apparently anti-hegemonic and anti-globalist nature.

Whereas most forms of race thinking commonly impute concrete bodily and sexual power to the Other, modern anti-Semitism attributes enormous power to Jews, which is abstract, universal, global, and intangible.⁹⁸

The importance that Postone attaches to the ‘all-powerful, elusive Jew’, and to antisemitism’s appeal as an anti-hegemonic interpretive framework, is very persuasive, as is his emphasis on the political and economic domains. But alongside this approach, we also want to emphasise the envy of ‘the Jew’ as ‘the ultimate victim’, or as an object of sexual revulsion, fascination and resentment. This erotic dimension, it should be added, involves not only the attribution of ‘concrete bodily and sexual power to the Other’, as in the case of racism against blacks. Suspicions of perversion play an equal, if not greater, role. Moreover, some recent Dutch and international historiography on the Second World War is riddled with stereotypes of the Jews as passive, obedient victims.⁹⁹

There is one final, crucial aspect of the supposition of Jewish power in postwar antisemitism. As observed above, ‘the Jew’ as victim arouses both compassion and revulsion. Paradoxically, the stereotype of ‘the powerful Jew’ has actually been reinforced in the postwar period by his role as victim. First of all, ‘the Jew’ is resented for claiming to be the ‘ultimate victim’ and accused of maintaining a monopoly on suffering at the expense of non-Jewish victims. Secondly, Jewish victims are accused of using their professed status as victim as an instrument of power – of cashing in on it, in political, material, moral and emotional ways.

Three pieces make up the suit of this stereotypical Jew. In France, the French comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala (b. 1966), who is of Cameroonian and Breton origin, illustrates the third piece – the ‘jacket’. He has drawn a

98 Moishe Postone, ‘History and Helplessness: Mass Mobilization and Contemporary Forms of Anticapitalism’, *Public Culture* 18, 1 [special issue on *Anticapitalism, Xenophobia, Imperialism*], 93-110: 99.

99 See chapters 12 and 13.

direct link between the roles of victim and perpetrator with his antisemitic jokes about the Shoah or about leading Jews and gas chambers, his rants against ‘the system’ in France, and his accusation that the Jews were the driving force behind the transatlantic slave trade. ‘He hits France where it hurts – in the memory of the Holocaust,’ the Moroccan-Dutch writer Hassan Bahara wrote in *De Groene Amsterdammer*, a progressive and independent weekly magazine of current affairs.¹⁰⁰ When a victim becomes a perpetrator in someone else’s eyes, that not only neutralises and even annihilates earlier claims of victimhood (acknowledged or otherwise), but also provides an opportunity to free oneself of any feelings of guilt and shame: we are even, at the very least. Dieudonné appeals not only to young people in immigrant communities in the French *banlieues*, but also to young ethnically French people and to those who feel drawn to ‘far-left radical chic’.¹⁰¹ Again, ‘the Jew’ serves as a negative source of social cohesion.¹⁰²

The same tendencies are visible in the Netherlands. Just as in France, the Shoah is the Achilles heel of Dutch society. And here too, Israel’s actions – and sometimes its very existence – have excited growing controversy. The stereotype of the Jew forms the link between the Shoah and Israel. To sum up, the third piece of the puzzle is ‘the Jew’s’ complex role, not only as Janus-faced victim and perpetrator, but also as *Dritte*; ‘the Jew’ falls outside the apparent dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, and arouses all the more animosity and hatred because he is felt to *pose* as a victim while *actually* being a victimiser. The tangled combination of these two roles, victim and victimiser, has given postwar antisemitism a powerful new dimension.

Organisation of the book

Apart from this introductory chapter and the epilogue, this collection has four parts, ordered in a systemic, cohesive way. The first part, *Post-Liberation Antisemitism*, focuses on antisemitic, dubious and ambivalent statements, opinions and feelings about ‘the Jew’ from 1945 to the 1960s. In chapter 2, ‘The Jew as a Dubious Victim’, Evelien Gans both investigates the importance of

100 Hassan Bahara, ‘Een antisemitische ananas. De ongemakkelijke populariteit van Dieudonné’, *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 16 January 2014; zie ook: Pascal Bruckner, ‘Racisme tegen blanke bestaat heus, Dieudonné’, *NRC Handelsblad*, 11 /12 January 2014. For parallels and differences between Dieudonné and Theo van Gogh: Jaap Cohen, ‘Provoceren: over de top kwetsend of heel erg lomp’, *NRC Next*, 5 February 2014.

101 Bahara, ‘Een antisemitische ananas’.

102 In the Netherlands, the same goes for Theo van Gogh, see chapter 12.

the psychological factor in postwar antisemitism – building on the German concepts of secondary antisemitism and *Schuldabwehrantisemitismus* – and identifies a gap in Dutch historical writing about both the phenomenon of antisemitism and its psychological dimension. She relates this to the widespread antisemitic curse, ‘They have forgotten to gas you’.

Chapter 3, ‘The Meek Jew – and Beyond’, opens with a discussion of a suit against a former member of the Dutch wartime resistance who accused the Jews of meekness. Again, Gans shows how the Shoah, or Holocaust, came to be used against the Jews, in this case through accusations by former resistance members and others that the Jews had not put up any, or not enough, resistance to the Nazis – the old stereotype of the ‘cowardly Jew’. She describes turning points such as the Eichmann trial (1961) as well as the dissenters who argued that relatively many Jews were involved in the resistance. In this chapter, the vague outlines also become visible of a parallel world in Israel: ‘the Jew’ was regarded both as a brave fighter and as a perpetrator of injustices against ‘the Arabs’ – the first, still sporadic expressions of anti-Zionist dissent, which very occasionally crossed the line into antisemitism.

Chapter 4, *Alte Kameraden*, is a joint ‘project’ of Remco Ensel, Evelien Gans and Willem Wagenaar. Until now, there has been very little research into antisemitism in Dutch neo-Nazi and far-right circles, partly because even though there was antisemitism in those circles, there was also a taboo, at first, on revealing it to outsiders. This essay unveils some of the first covert signals. It addresses Holocaust denial in the Dutch context in connection with efforts to cast former SS and NSB (Dutch Nazi party) members in the role of victim, also examining overtly antisemitic acts and statements. In the 1970s, the direct influence of the ‘veterans’ began to wane. A new political party, the *Nederlandse Volks-Unie* [Dutch People’s Union] aimed its poison arrows at the new group of immigrants from the Mediterranean region, but was also unique in that its own writings expressed antisemitic attitudes.

In chapter 5, ‘Jewish Reactions’, Gans describes how Jews responded to expressions of anti-Jewish feeling, examining antisemitic incidents that varied from verbal abuse to the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and a scandal among university students. The responses were highly diverse: swearing back, starting a fistfight, emigrating to Israel, keeping silent, withdrawing and ignoring the problem, and taking the stance, dominant in leading circles of Zionists and politically conscious Jews, that antisemitism was the problem of non-Jews. This point of view emerges clearly from the culminating section of chapter 5, a lengthy debate on this issue published in the Dutch Jewish magazine *NIW*. In less than twenty years’ time, beliefs about what ‘Jewish dignity’ required would undergo a complete reversal.

After this discussion of the Shoah as a point of fixation for postwar antisemitism, part II, *Israel and 'The Jew'*, turns to Israel. In chapter 6, 'Philosemitism? Ambivalences regarding Israel', Gans explores the complex phenomenon of philosemitism in general, and particularly in relation to the attitude of the Netherlands toward Israel. Although guilt feelings clearly play a role, the Dutch government was late to recognise Israel, mainly for political and strategic reasons. But during the Suez crisis in 1956, the Netherlands became an outspoken friend of Israel, and in 1967, during the Six-Day War, this 'special relationship' reached its height. A turning point came in 1967 as well, however – a year of paradoxes that ushered in a period of divided loyalties, among both Jews and non-Jews.

In chapter 7, 'Transnational Left-wing Protest and The Powerful Zionist', Remco Ensel describes the evolution of protest in Dutch left-wing circles against Israel's policies on the Palestinians, with the *Nederlands Palestina Komitee* [Dutch Palestine Committee] as the fulcrum. The stereotype of the 'Powerful Zionist' arrived on the scene – and was here to stay. Furthermore, Moroccan immigrants – mainly intellectuals, as individuals and in small groups – began making common cause with already existing anti-Israeli activism, although their emphases were sometimes distinctly different.

Gans goes into 'divided loyalties' more deeply in chapter 8, 'Israel: Source of Divergence', in which the contrasts come into sharper focus. While in 1973, the Netherlands was the target of an Arab boycott because it was 'friendly to Israel', it later became clear that many Dutch companies had escaped this boycott by signing what was known as a '*niet-Jood verklaring*' ['non-Jew declaration'], more or less with the knowledge of the Dutch government. This scandal, as well as a more general tendency toward greater criticism of Israel and the fear that antisemitism was on the rise, led to the formation of several powerful, pro-active Jewish organisations, such as STIBA and CIDI, which came out in support of Israel and took on antisemitism.

In chapter 9, "'The Activist Jew' Responds to Changing Dutch Perceptions of Israel', Katie Digan continues the examination both of the growing criticism of Israel in various, mainly left-wing, circles, and of activism among Jews, concentrating on the small radical Jewish group that called itself the *Joodse Defensie Liga* [Jewish Defence League]. The central topic is an incident in which the League barged into the radio studio of the progressive left-wing broadcasting company VPRO, which was then airing a number of programmes on the Palestinians, including one on torture by Israel. Progressive intellectuals and different groups of Gentiles and Jews – both fiery left- and right-wingers and moderates – debated the thorny question of the line between criticism of Israel and antisemitism.

In Chapter 10, 'Turkish Anti-Zionism in the Netherlands', Annemarike Stremmelaar describes experiences in the Netherlands in the 1980s with expressions of antisemitic sentiment by representatives of Dutch Muslim organisations. With political Islam on the rise internationally, Muslims in the Netherlands became familiar with the language and concepts of Islamic ideology, which involved negative stereotypes of Jews and Zionism. During demonstrations against Israel in the Netherlands, ethnically Turkish supporters of a radical Turkish imam in Germany characterised Jews as bloodthirsty occupiers of Palestine and enemies of Islam. The groups in question were regarded as radical and extreme by the large majority of Muslim organisations in the Netherlands.

This brings us to part III of the book: *'The Holocaust-ed Jew' in Native Dutch Domains since the 1980s*. In Chapter 11, 'The Jew' in Football: To Kick around or to Embrace', Gans addresses the issue of football-related antisemitism up to the present day. This phenomenon, targeting Jewish football clubs and players, had its origins in the pre-war Netherlands and continued after the war. The Amsterdam club Ajax was still seen, largely mistakenly, as a Jewish club. What changed, in the 1980s, was that supporters of rival clubs began to insult Ajax with slogans and songs that linked traditional antisemitic put-downs to the Holocaust in various ways. Football, or soccer, antisemitism is a global phenomenon. The main questions explored in this chapter are why the Shoah entered the domain of football in the 1980s and why Ajax supporters (*Ajaciëden*) have so stubbornly clung to their nickname of 'Jews' or 'Super Jews'.

The Holocaust also became a subject of satire and pornography in the 1980s. Gans opens chapter 12, 'Pornographic Antisemitism, Shoah Fatigue and Freedom of Speech', by looking at the historical origins of the image of the 'perverse Jew', showing that it dates back many centuries. As mentioned above, the film director and columnist Theo van Gogh was the master of linking the perverse Jew to the Holocaust. Van Gogh, who had many admirers and even some followers, took a similarly pornographic approach to Muslims, systematically calling them 'goat fuckers', all in the name of defending absolute – that is, unrestricted – freedom of speech and, later, of combating the threat of the 'multicultural society' (read: 'Islam'/'Muslims'). The overarching themes of this chapter are the right to free speech and political incorrectness, projected onto the image of 'the Jew'.

This is followed, in chapter 13, *'Historikerstreit: The Stereotypical Jew in recent Dutch Holocaust Studies'*, by an exploration of the theme of 'historical incorrectness' with regard to the Shoah and the role of the Jews themselves with respect to their persecution. Ensel and Gans describe an influential tendency in Dutch historiography that involves depicting 'the

Jew' as passive, resigned and obedient. This stereotype evidently appeals to a broad public, considering the popularity of the two historians. The phenomenon of levelling, briefly mentioned above, plays a key role in this tendency. Themes such as rehabilitation and the absolution of guilt (or alleged guilt) also resurface.

Part IV, *Generations. Migrant Identities and Antisemitism in the Twenty-first Century*, focuses on the Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch populations. In the twenty-first century, antisemitism became part of a politics of ethnic identity. Chapter 14, "The Jew" vs. "The Young Male Moroccan": Stereotypical Confrontations in the City', looks at the new manifestations of anti-Israeli protest and everyday antisemitism. In particular, Ensel investigates the ways in which members of the second generation in immigrant communities are actively opposing the Dutch system of power relations as they perceive it, with the Moroccan-Dutch and other Muslim groups in the Netherlands and elsewhere at the bottom of the heap. In demonstrations against Israel, in songs, on the internet and in day-to-day confrontations in the streets, we see that 'the Jew' symbolises the power against which they are fighting.

The focus of chapter 15, 'Conspiracism: Islamic Redemptive Antisemitism and the Murder of Theo van Gogh', is the Islamisation of the image of 'the Jew' as a symbol of the powerful, secular West. Specifically, Ensel scrutinises the writings of Mohammed Bouyeri, Theo van Gogh's assassin. Bouyeri and those who share his opinions have emphasised the corrupt and conspiratorial nature of the Jews and used this as the basis for an ideology which Ensel links to Saul Friedländer's concept of redemptive antisemitism.

In chapter 16, 'Reading Anne Frank. Confronting Antisemitism in Turkish communities', Annemarike Stremmelaar describes how Turkish-Dutch organisations and individuals have handled antisemitism since 2000. The organisation Milli Görüş, which has its roots in Turkish political Islam and controls many European mosques, has been criticised by the Dutch authorities and media as a source of antisemitic and anti-Western views. Among the Milli Görüş rank and file, expressions of antisemitism have been observed, such as anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and descriptions of Israel as an evil force. The issue has exposed serious disagreements within and between mosque boards, whose positions have ranged from taking a stand against antisemitism to ignoring or even practicing it. Stremmelaar goes into detail about a case in 2013 in which a group of young Dutch people of Turkish descent said on television that they hated Jews.

In chapter 17, 'Holocaust Commemorations in Postcolonial Dutch Society', Ensel describes how the first and the second/third generations in immigrant communities in the Netherlands are involved in Holocaust commemoration.

This chapter was prompted by a series of incidents in 2003-2004 in which children, adolescents and adults disrupted commemorative events. The interrelationships between different and sometimes antagonistic perspectives on the past – specifically, on the Shoah, transatlantic slavery and Palestine – are analysed in terms of two concepts: secondary antisemitism and Michael Rothberg's 'multidirectional memory'.

In 'Instrumentalising and Blaming "the Jew"', this book's epilogue, Evelien Gans argues that the Second World War, the Shoah, 'the Jew', Israel and antisemitism will remain subjects of 'a never-ending debate'¹⁰³ in the Netherlands and elsewhere. This final chapter ties together strands from some of the preceding ones and touches on a few recent developments. New topics include the rise of the politician Geert Wilders, his Islamophobic *Partij van de Vrijheid* (Freedom Party; PVV) and his instrumentalisation of 'the Jew', the debate on the ban on ritual slaughter as well as the impact of the bloody attacks by Muslim extremists on Charlie Hebdo in Paris and Jewish targets in Toulouse, Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen on debates in the Netherlands about free speech and antisemitism.

103 History as '*een discussie zonder einde*' [literally: A discussion without ending] was a famous statement of the equally famous Dutch historian Pieter Geyl (1887-1966) in Pieter Geyl, *Napoleon for and against* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949; first Dutch edition 1946) and idem, *Die Diskussion ohne Ende. Auseinandersetzungen mit Historikern* (Darmstadt: Gertner, 1958).