PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Edited by James Foley and Umut Korkut

Contesting Cosmopolitan Europe

Euroscepticism, Crisis and Borders

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Protest and Social Movements

Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirical research, dealing with various types of mobilization, from neighborhood groups to revolutions. We especially welcome work that synthesizes or compares different approaches to social movements, such as cultural and structural traditions, micro- and macro-social, economic and ideal, or qualitative and quantitative. Books in the series will be published in English. One goal is to encourage non-native speakers to introduce their work to Anglophone audiences. Another is to maximize accessibility: all books will be available in open access within a year after printed publication.

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

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

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

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Introduction

James Foley and Umut Korkut

In 2019, the incoming executive of the European Commission nominated a vice-president for migration and security issues bearing the title "Commissioner for Protecting the European Way of Life". This allusion to a continent under attack, and in need of protection, prompted months of controversy about the meaning attached to "European" borders and boundaries. The centre-right European People's Party, who proposed the title, insisted they had not meant to raise the drawbridge against refugees: "this means to rescue people in the Mediterranean […] not to close harbours" (Zalan, 2019). Yet both supporters and critics saw matters differently and interpreted it as a move designed to absorb xenophobic narratives into the EU's most cosmopolitan structure. Marine Le Pen hailed "an ideological victory"; by contrast, socialist and Green MEPs saw it as surrendering to a notion of an embattled "European civilisation" promoted in the discourses of leaders such as Hungary's Viktor Orbán. The controversy would eventually force a small but crucial change, with "protecting" becoming "promoting" the European way of life. But the polarised reaction had already established a crucial fact about the continent's political identity: today, any talk of a "European way of life" carries new ideological baggage. Where the continent's institutional boundaries and political responsibilities have expanded, so have anxieties about proximity to a non-European "other".

Importantly, this was not always the case. For decades social theorists, commentators and political leaders pictured European institutions – with which the term *Europe* was usually synonymous – as the precursor to a fully cosmopolitan world system (Beck & Grande, 2007; Rifkin, 2013). In contrast to the Washington Consensus mode of globalisation, represented by the coercive force of IMF structural adjustment programmes and the Iraq War, the European project was imagined as prefiguring a consensual, peaceful, and inclusive global order. This comparison often formed an explicit point of rhetorical contrast. Leonard (2005), evoking

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

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the neoconservative Project for a New American Century, said: "Imagine a world of peace, prosperity and democracy [...] What I am asking you to imagine is the 'New European Century'". For many commentators, Fukuyama (2006) included, Europe as a project had become synonymous with the "end of history", reflecting the triumphant mood of border-crossing that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Even critics tended to endorse this premise, from the other angle, by critiquing a permissively cosmopolitan European superstate.

However, reality has struggled to live up to the rhetoric of an open, borderless world. Indeed, it is sobering to reflect that, since 1989, the EU and Schengen Area states have constructed an estimated 1,000 kilometres of land walls, equivalent to six Berlin Walls, largely in an effort to stop the flight of forcibly displaced people (Akkerman, 2019, 2018). With sea barriers included, a further 4,750 kilometres may be added to that figure. The result has been a death toll of drownings in the Mediterranean which, in the half decade since 2014, approaches 20,000 people. Europe's addiction to walled borders thus arguably exceeds the better publicised efforts of Donald Trump and the American state on the Mexican border.

Meanwhile, a system of detention centres and barbed wire fencing rings the European continent, including satellite states paid by the EU to maintain border control, such as Turkey, Niger, and Libya. Frontex, the EU agency charged with migration control, will command a budget of €11.27 billion for the financial period 2021–2027. Many have thus observed the paradox that the elimination of internal borders within Europe, and the expansion of the European Union to post-Soviet states, has brought both an ideological and an actual hardening of external boundaries. Frequently, this has pivoted on the discourse of a "clash of civilisations" (Huntington, 2000) between the Christian West and Islam, a notion that began in the upper echelons of Anglo-American foreign policy but has become one of the central points of populist mobilisation in Europe, particularly in states on the outer perimeter such as Hungary and Poland, but equally in France, the most unequivocally "European" of states. The result is not simply that there is now a "closed" as well as an "open" narrative of Europe. More disconcertingly, the two continental imaginaries now co-habit and may even be seen as co-dependent. Internal freedom of movement is premised on "security" of external borders, on externalising the problems on Europe's expanding periphery to zones where a lower standard of rights and protection applies. These themes are not new in European politics, but a decade of persistent crises has served to put them at the centre of the continental agenda.


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Crisis and Continuity

This book addresses the impact of the politicisation of "Europe" in national politics, particularly though not exclusively through the prism of burgeoning populist right-wing narratives about migration. It adds to a growing literature addressing the impact of crisis, contestation, and public resistance on underlying assumptions about European integration. Since these themes have been focal points of cultural and political mobilisation, our methodology has drawn on ideas from social movement studies. Equally, whereas many studies focus on the experiences of the European core, this study draws on primary research that emphasises, firstly, the peripheral experience of Europe, and, secondly, the growing influence of that peripheral experience on the core narratives of European purpose, as highlighted by the "way of life" controversy. Crucially, it seeks to transcend dichotomies of national sovereignty versus the cosmopolitan outlook the European Commission represents for the populist right in Hungary, Greece, Italy, Poland and UK. Instead, it examines the complex interplay of conflict, coalition, and incorporation between these actors, and how both address their messages to "audiences" at the national and European level. This is our second contribution to studying social mobilisation.

Historically, most theories of European order were devised to explain the puzzle of success (see Haas, 2008; Milward et al., 2000; Moravcsik, 1993). How did the rival interests of post-imperial states, which had twice driven the world to war, end up producing, against all odds, the appearance of a higher mode of social harmony and cosmopolitan order? In the neo-functionalist tradition, the project of integration at the top level would eventually drive cohesion and solidarity at the level of citizens: small steps are taken that imply subsequent and further steps of coordination, with public opinion trailing afterwards. For Milward (2000), in the neo-realist tradition, European integration had "rescued the nation state" from its collapse during the Nazi invasions of the Second World War, allowing political elites to guarantee their citizens security and growing prosperity. For Moravcsik (1993), equally, order is a product of inter-governmental bargaining. These competing theories have radically different emphases in terms of actors and causes, but all are premised on a benevolent cycle involving free trade, economic growth and a "permissive consensus" in public opinion.

In the past decade, researchers, like Europe's leaders, have been forced to reckon with a succession of shocks (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2009), beginning with the post-2008 Eurozone crisis, continuing with the rise of external migration following the Arab Spring (the so-called "refugee



crisis"), and culminating in the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. As European institutions confronted an unmanageable crisis of currency and capitalism, this conjuncture's ideas were initially shaped by contestation from the left. Negri (2015) was not alone in contrasting "neoliberal Europe" to an emerging "democratic Europe" formed politically of Syriza and Podemos, and concentrated geopolitically in the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) (see also e.g., Badiou, 2012). However, that framing was reversed after Syriza's surrender to the Troika's bailout demands, which, crucially, coincided with rising migration from the Muslim majority countries on Europe's periphery.

The next phase was dominated by contestation from the populist right, with the radical left now feeling obliged – most notably in France – to back pro-austerity candidates to stem the right-wing advance. Public protest at the ballot box was joined by governments explicitly committed to an anti-establishment, anti-immigrant agenda, principally in Eastern Europe and Italy. As early as 2011, European states agreed to suspend the system of passport-free travel within the Schengen Area, in a bid to halt a surge in forced migration following the Arab Spring. Subsequently, the events of 2015, the so-called "refugee crisis", exposed conflicts between the EU's competing commitments for internal open borders and hard external borders. Initially, events such as the drowning of Alan Kurdi prompted outpourings of pro-refugee sympathy, most famously with the German government's response. However, proposals for a Europe-wide quota for relocating asylum seekers provoked conflict both within and between states. Supported by a group of founder EU states, Italy, Germany and France, the Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed a system to distribute 160,000 asylum seekers across the continent. A majority decision was taken to accept a similar proposal at a meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, against heavy resistance from the Visegrad Group leaders that involved prime ministers of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Orbán went so far as to initiate a referendum of the Hungarian public, which produced a 98.4% rejection of the relocation plan, albeit that the referendum failed to meet the necessary turnout threshold to become legally binding (see e.g., Gessler, 2017). By September 2016 the EU effectively announced the abandonment of the scheme due to non-cooperation.

The effect was to outsource problems of everyday refugee management to Mediterranean border states or to third countries, often run by brutal strongmen. Internally, everyday refugee management has often imposed disproportionately on Greece and Italy, two countries which also suffered the brunt of the Eurozone crisis, where anti-migrant hostility has shaped



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fluctuations of politics and the rise and fall of governments. Their problems are compounded by the ongoing effect of the Dublin Regulation, an earlier move towards integrating European protection policy, designed to prevent asylum seekers applying in multiple countries but effectively ensuring that applications can only be made in the first European point of entry, meaning that asylum seekers taking the Mediterranean route are barred from applying in the country of their choice. Thus, the system effectively distributes prospective refugees back to overburdened, overpopulated asylum systems where they are guaranteed a rougher mode of justice, and likewise guaranteed to inflame the hostility of local populations.

In retrospect, a crucial turning point occurred when Angela Merkel, having come under pressure for leading a mass acceptance of Syrian refugees, turned to the continent-wide alternative of externalising the refugee problem. During 2015, the Commission signed up to a notorious border policing deal with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, a leader widely condemned for pursuing oppression against his opponents, leading to a variety of human rights abuses. Critics charged the EU with making a deal that was morally entangled with one of the most oppressive powers on the Eurasian periphery, effectively nullifying its moral authority on wider foreign policy questions. As Guy Verhofstadt remarked, "by signing up to a grubby deal with Turkey, EU leaders have forfeited any right to lecture [...] Erdoğan – and Erdoğan knows it" (Verhofstadt, 2016). By contrast, European Council President Donald Tusk insisted that Turkey offered "the best example in the world" (BBC News, 2016) of how to treat Syrian refugees (this book will offer a contrary perspective in Chapters 4 and 9, based on substantial fieldwork in Turkey). Similar deals were struck with other states, such as Libya and Morocco, with similar consequences. In Morocco, the European Parliament was forced to back the illegal occupation of the Western Sahara; the United Nations, meanwhile, has condemned the consequences of the EU-Libya deal as "inhuman".

The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 further testified to the dysfunctional nature of recent European integration. Initially, the EU was substantially hostile to border closures, before eventually being forced to concede to full closures by late March 2020. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was forced to issue a public apology to the people of Italy for numerous failings at the level of empathy and solidarity. Controversy centred on the continued imposition of neoliberal spending restrictions at a time when such rules had palpably become a barrier to saving businesses from implosion. On the other side, previously dormant questions about the European Central Bank's role in crisis prevention were reopened by a German Constitutional

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Court ruling, stating that the ECB acted illegally in 2015 when it bought up troubled government debt (Tooze, 2020). Coronavirus has thus reprised the twin conflicts over borders and neoliberal economics that dominated the twin crises of 2008–2010 and 2015. At this stage, it remains unclear which political forces will dominate this emerging conjuncture. What is likely, however, is that the European leadership will be less confident about its premises of austerity and open borders than it has been previously. This may not preclude adventurous political responses built around a reimagining of solidarity and internationalism. But it arguably does foreclose any assumptions built on virtuous cycles of economic growth and citizen consent, not to mention the various neoliberal programmes of previous decades that were designed to engineer these ends.

The overall impact of these crises has also left a legacy for social theories of Europe. It has become increasingly impossible to treat the internal workings of the nation-state as a "black box". Conflicts between political parties, between insiders and outsiders, between social classes and ethnic groups, and between voters and political establishments have become central factors shaping the course of European integration. With integration taking an increasingly inter-governmental form, and governments being increasingly wary of their limited platform of consent, interaction within the European elite becomes increasingly centred on the presumed "audience" of the domestic and European public.

Europe: Expansion and Unevenness

From its inception, the boundaries of the European project have expanded significantly, a process which has inevitably brought unevenness and tension. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU has not only jumped from 12 to 28 Member States, it has also assumed a host of new responsibilities, from macroeconomic policy and financial supervision to police cooperation and migration affairs. Until recently, expansion and integration scored apparent successes, which shaped the optimism of most EU theorising. Thus, the inclusion of Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1980s was initially controversial: all three had just emerged from dictatorships and their economic systems lagged far behind the European Community mainstream. However, thanks in part to significant structural payments from European taxpayers, all three (and Ireland) had achieved significant convergences with EU averages by the time of the Eastern European "big bang" of 2004. Not just economically, but also institutionally, these countries had become comparable with the



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core EU countries, exhibiting, for example the stable pattern of government transition between centre-left and centre-right politics. All seemed to share in the hegemonic European value system, a fact which added to the aura of inevitability that surrounded the integration project.

As Habermas (2012) observed, the underlying assumption was that integration would be to the mutual benefit of core and periphery. Political stability, liberal values and economic opportunity would flow to new members, while established members would get the benefits of expanding markets and cheaper labour costs. With each enlargement, the expanding frontiers of Europeanisation would also ensure a secure buffer against encroachments against "European values". But this all presumed, Habermas (2012) noted, "complementary steps of enlargement and consolidation". Each new phase of expansion would be followed by a bedding in process of catching up to European norms.

However, since 2008, notions of Europeanisation built around convergence and assimilation must be heavily qualified. Increasingly, the story has been of fragmentation, both geopolitically and in electorates. The cost of managing the Eurozone crisis has effectively meant that the rich Northern countries that stayed outside of the single currency have been semi-secluded from the costs of integration. Britain, most notably, took the opportunity afforded by the crisis to leave the EU altogether. By contrast, the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), peripheral countries that initially gained from European entry, suffered the brunt of currency crisis shocks (see e.g., Lapavitsas, 2012). After decades of success, their integration went backwards. Many underwent political turmoil precipitated by the austerity programmes demanded by European institutions. The crisis also exposed longstanding tensions between the major powers behind the European project, France, and Germany, with Emmanuel Macron's federalist approach running up against resistance from Merkel's inter-governmental bargaining approach. Underlying this is a basic problem in all European integration since the early 1990s, namely the growing disequilibrium between the two major continental powers that followed from German reunification and the pivoting of the continent's attention to the East.

Compared to earlier phases, eastward expansion has been a turbulent process, in economic, political, and cultural terms. At first, conflict pitted Western European populations against the entrance of poorer Eastern European workers into their labour markets. Significant concessions were made over welfare and migration to compensate for the anxieties of citizens in wealthier European countries. Since 2015, however, anti-immigrant tensions have been focused on external migration towards more easily


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stigmatised migrants from Muslim majority countries. In this debate, Eastern European governments have emerged as key political actors, often in active collusion with Western European right-populists who, ironically, had previously made political capital by inflaming tensions about migration from Eastern Europe.

Hungary and Poland were initially fast-tracked into NATO and subsequently the European Union as the post-Soviet countries most likely to make a quick transition to Western-style liberal norms. However, not only have they regressed into self-styled "illiberal democracies", they have also exposed the weakness of European sanctions against Member States who violate perceived ethical norms. Aside from pronounced anti-migrant and Islamophobic rhetoric, the Hungarian state under Fidesz has become notorious for attacks on freedom of the press and academic freedom; bigotry and sexism; and numerous violations of the rule of law. However, sanctions have been weak, and Fidesz still technically belongs to the EU's ruling European People's Party, albeit under suspension. Poland's problems were encapsulated by the creation in 2020 of "LGBT-free zones" covering a third of the country and most recently an ongoing conflict with the Commission over the Constitutional Court. While the EU expressed rhetorical objections, sanctions again amounted to little beyond the removal of funding for town twinning programmes for those towns with LGBT-free zones.

Thus, far from convergence towards an assumed set of European norms, there have been cases of rollback. The Southern European periphery has regressed economically and in terms of its Euro-enthusiasm, while the most fêted entrants from Eastern Europe have effectively gone rogue. The former group were disciplined by imposing intense rounds of austerity but disciplining the latter group has proved more difficult. Thus, the establishment has often responded with efforts to meet illiberal sentiment halfway: for critics on both sides of the fence, this is the purpose of the "way of life" agenda.

Politicisation/Depoliticisation/The Rise of Euroscepticism?

Much of the literature on the European Union before 2008 assumed a "permissive consensus", with the public passively accepting the economic benefits of integration without marked enthusiasm for European citizenship. Public audiences were thus subordinate in most theories to questions of functional integration and elite bargaining. This assumption of public indifference was not entirely without foundation: in most countries, opinion polls have always tended to show a broad, moderate majority in favour of

EU membership. Equally, however, on the rare occasions where the public was consulted on further steps of integration, the results were decidedly mixed. Even before the present phase of crisis, EU membership was rejected twice in Norway, twice in Switzerland and once in Greenland; in Sweden, the decision to join was narrow, with just 52% opting for participation. Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty and Euro membership; Swedish voters rejected Euro membership; Irish voters rejected the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon; and French and Dutch voters rejected the European Constitution. With hindsight, it would be misleading to suggest that a passive consensus prevailed even before 2008.

Organised Euroscepticism may have been a marginal political force, studied by an often equally marginal academic cottage industry. But these cases of public resistance arguably had significant and lasting impacts on subsequent integration. Each referendum defeat tended to define the nature of post-Maastricht integration in a less federalist and more intergovernmental direction. Jacques Delors, for instance, was forced to substantially modify his federalist vision for economic integration after the failure of the Danish referendum (and, perhaps more significantly, the very narrow *petit oui* in the French vote). Similarly, the succession of defeats in the 2000s ensured that the EU lacked the federalist powers to manage the range of new contradictions that emerged from the "big bang" of rapid eastward expansion and the single currency. Among other things, this effectively curtailed any prospect of a serious response to the 2008 crisis. A last and important effect of public resistance was to curtail efforts at establishing a mode of European citizenship. Faced with defeats, government elites were less and less inclined to involve the public in any way, particularly where plebiscites were involved (the Brexit referendum being a notable and confounding exception). Tentative approaches to public involvement have been curtailed.

The overall conclusion must be that public mobilisation, even before 2008, has served as a limitation on the federalist ambition of some political elites; and, conversely, other political elites (here, the Danish case is instructive) have mobilised public opposition to extract concessions towards national sovereignty.

Nonetheless, the post-crisis emergence of organised "populist" resistance has made a marked qualitative impact on ideas about Europe. On the one hand, European elites put ever greater emphasis on national public consent and the so-called "constraining dissensus" as a limit to their own power, ambition, and responsibility. An apparent form of self-critique became a key feature of European elite rhetoric. Donald Tusk remarked: "Obsessed with


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the idea of instant and total integration, we failed to notice that ordinary people, the citizens of Europe, do not share our Euro-enthusiasm". Herman Van Rompuy likewise conceded, "Without public support, Europe cannot go forward [...] This is something I know all leaders, in Brussels and in our member states, realise acutely". Thus, while there has been evidence that structures such as the Eurozone currency will not function effectively without further federalisation, actors at the European level stress their inability to advance the project further.

Conversely, the politicising effect of populist actors may have paradoxically served to restore some measure of legitimacy to EU democracy. For decades, turnout has declined at election after election to the European Parliament, a fact which became synonymous with what Mair (2013) called the "void" separating political elites and voters. However, the elections of 2019, taking place in the shadow of rising populist power and Brexit negotiations, brought a surge of apparent voter enthusiasm, with turnout rising sharply from 42.6% to 50.7%. Part of this can be accounted for by the populists themselves, but their performance, overall, was significantly poorer than expected. Indeed, arguably the biggest successes of the 2019 election belonged to Europhile formations such as the Greens. This lends credence to Taggart's view that politicisation along the so-called "GAL-TAN" spectrum cuts both ways: fear of TAN (traditional-authoritarian-nationalist) sentiment worked to mobilise voters on the GAL (green-alternative-liberation) side (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004).

Cutting against this trend was by far the biggest ever practical success for organised Euroscepticism, the United Kingdom's referendum decision to leave the EU. Brexit has seen the loss of the EU's second largest country by population, second largest economy and second largest military, and is clearly a phenomenon of some significance. If nothing else, it served as a reminder that the European project can go backwards as well as forwards: previously, the notion of exit was barely imagined as a possibility, and indeed, Article 50 allowing states to leave was only thought worth enacting in 2009. Nonetheless, the UK's difficult experience of concluding Brexit has arguably served – for now at least – to reinforce continental unity, emphasising to potential imitators the complexities of breaking legal, economic, and cultural ties. This is especially true if Brexit is framed in context with the earlier notion of "Grexit", when Greece's left-wing government confronted European institutions over the country's extreme austerity package, only to find themselves forced to implement yet more radical measures. These twin cases, where European institutions seemed closest to breaking down, may have served to discipline potentially recalcitrant groups of voters and political actors.

Thus, while Mair's "void" between voters and institutions remains, there is also an "abyss" facing those who contemplate breaking apart from European institutions. The UK's ultimate success in breaking with the bloc may eventually serve to shift those calculations, but voters elsewhere have been so far unwilling to contemplate a final break, no matter how severe the burden of EU or Eurozone membership. There may be signs of resilience, and even enthusiasm, in the growing turnout of liberalised younger voters. But, in a more pessimistic analysis, the small successes of Green and liberal parties may simply testify to further polarisation and fragmentation, as the great battalions of European order, social and Christian democracy, continue to fracture.

Euroscepticism Today

An easily forgotten chapter of this story is the motivations and strategies of so-called "Eurosceptics" themselves. Very often they are classified as a public policy nuisance to be addressed rather than distinct agents with their own values, traditions, and conception of "Europe". To add to the problem, they are an increasingly heterogenous group in a confounding array of national contexts, stretching from the mainstream, governing centre-right of the United Kingdom to the far-right Hungarian government and the ideologically eclectic Five Star Movement in Italy; this is before we even consider the range of non-governing parties and movements.

One provisional conclusion from the events of the last decade is that Brexit appears to be an anomaly: the rising profile of populism has not tended towards the collapse or even the dis-integration of European institutions. Instead, as many researchers had predicted, proximity to power and increasing public profile tended to make Euro-critical parties wary of pushing boundaries. Faced with the complexities of Grexit and Brexit, and a public opinion unprepared for a radical break, populist parties tended to revise their stance towards European Union. Ahead of the European elections of 2019, leaders such as Matteo Salvini, Le Pen and Orbán all issued statements formally denying that they would contemplate breaking from European institutions. Salvini, who ran in 2014 under the slogan "No Euro", revised his position to insist that "the Euro is irreversible"; Le Pen likewise promised to "change the EU from within".

However, the above does not necessarily represent an abject surrender to federalists in Brussels. It may instead amount to a strategy of organised subversion. Indeed, populist resistance has taken more organised and



ideologically coherent forms, albeit largely on the right-wing of politics (the radical left, since Syriza, having all but disintegrated as an organised component of European politics). Islamophobia, inflamed by the "refugee crisis", has served to unify political blocs with apparently conflicting agendas: Western parties that made their name opposing Eastern European migration can thus find common ground with Orbán or Jarosław Kaczyński; and Orbán, while talking up the legacy of Hitler ally Miklós Horthy, can enter into a near-formal geopolitical alliance with Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu. The EU, lacking democratic legitimacy and serious formal disciplinary powers, has felt the need to incorporate sentiments felt both at public and inter-governmental level. The former European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker even went as far as to call Orbán "a hero" whom he holds "in the highest regard". The tendency, then, has been for Euro-critical elements to accept a measure of incorporation in return for credibility. Discourses of the "European way of life" may represent the culmination of this tendency.

Importantly, our research has demonstrated that supposed Eurosceptics are not merely addressing domestic audiences on issues purely based on national sovereignty. Instead, they have sought to mobilise public opinion more broadly, across Europe. A further finding of our research is that parties and governments critical of the European Union are not necessarily wanting "less Europe", in a crudely quantitative sense. Anti-migrant populists may well demand more Europe-wide intervention on borders, more assistance with managing migration issues, and so on. Anti-austerity critics are as liable to criticise Europe for the absence of federalised mechanisms for economic management as to call for a return to national sovereignty.

The question of Europe thus revolves more around what type of Europe and how Europe is imagined in relation to its "other". Occasioned by rising immigration from Muslim majority and African countries, populist actors have drawn on tropes of European identity that seemed to have been submerged beneath the liberal consensus. The continent is imagined increasingly as a white, Christian civilisation bordered by a hostile rival civilisation which, via immigration, has its own fifth column within Europe's states. This idea has converged with anti-establishment discourses centred on the complicity of cosmopolitan insiders with growing Islamic immigration. For Caldwell, "Europe became a destination for immigration as a result of consensus among its political and commercial elites" (2009). Even relatively respectable commentators with mainstream audiences have complained that "Europe is committing suicide" (Murray, 2017) due to external migration. European identities are thus not inconsistent with xenophobic fears of the external Other, and simply asserting continental unity will increasingly beg the question – unity against what?



Outline of This Book

The book will contribute to three distinct research literatures – on Europeanisation, European integration and Euroscepticism – that occupy the broad field of "European studies". We argue that post-crisis events and processes are working to draw these sub-fields together. In common with the research agenda of postfunctionalism (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2009), the most obvious example of the convergence of previously distinct "European" research agendas, we reflect the growing importance of national identities and the normalisation of movements and parties labelled as "Eurosceptic". However, our intention is to consider the added puzzles that emerge when such movements, far from leading to processes of disintegration, are instead normalised in the mainstream of European institutions. The "salience" of these populist movements (Moravcsik, 2018; Mudde, 2012) is increasingly reflected not in institutional ruptures but rather in a framing of "Europe" as a civilisation under threat, perhaps by internal enemies, but, especially, in national and the Commission discourse, by movements of external migration.

Our intention is to explore some of the limits of existing disciplinary and theoretical assumptions about the function of "Europe" in domestic politics and the impact of populist realignments on perceived European norms. The book will particularly add to the debate about the paradoxical impact of enlargement and integration, with contributions looking not just at Europe's periphery, but at the impact of Eastern and Southern politics on the European "core". We aim to transcend divisions between case study, comparative, and transnational research, looking, for example, at the complexities that emerge as populist actors increasingly develop a continental agenda for a "Europe of nations" and at the national politics and imaginary of the European border.

The book's opening section tackles conceptual dilemmas arising from recent crises, with a particular focus on the contradictions of cosmopolitan discourse. Jørgensen's chapter focuses directly on the difficulties of EU institutions and Member States when faced with the 2015 "refugee crisis". His research demonstrates how crises are constructed and the deadlock facing cosmopolitan responses, while concluding on the importance of local responses in preserving a framework of solidarity under crisis conditions. From a socio-legal perspective, Smieszek argues that the legal categories of European citizenship are shaped and limited by deeper categories of identity and otherness. Her chapter likewise takes the occasion of multiple crises to reconsider underlying questions of how discourses of European unity relate to the external world. Meanwhile, Özdüzen and Ianoşev use Twitter



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methodology to examine the real-time proliferation of anti-cosmopolitan discourses, particularly in response to the 2015 "refugee crisis" in Turkey at the European periphery.

Comparative studies focus on themes of emergency in relation to borders, security and sovereignty. In two chapters in this collection, contributors examine how European states have sought to insulate their own and Europe's borders under the cover of morality. Basbuğoğlu and Korkut show how Orbán and Erdoğan have simultaneously generated their own understanding of humanitarianism to serve their needs of blaming the European Union as the cosmopolitan liberal other while extending their obligation to protect beyond European borders, to defend ethnic or religiously defined affiliates. This chapter demonstrates that populist critics of Europe often tactically respond by extending the seemingly universal boundaries of humanitarianism to generate a scale of who needs protection. Foley, Gyollai and Szałańska compare the rhetoric of humanitarianism and solidarity in three countries on Europe's periphery: the UK, Hungary, and Poland. They find a variety of tactical responses to the dominant European discourses, with a complex framing of cosmopolitanism and sovereignty.

The case study chapters address how themes of Europe, crisis and borders have manifested in individual countries. Nicolson explores underlying themes of exclusion in Scotland, where a minority nationalist government has used cosmopolitan and Europhile rhetoric to differentiate itself in UK politics. Josipovic and Reeger explore the impact of migration discourses in Austria, where anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic populism has a longstanding role in shaping government power. Papatzani and Petracou, meanwhile, explore the interaction of two crises in Greece, a nation that experienced the brunt of both the Eurozone crisis and the so-called "refugee crisis". Finally, Hoare examines the one case of a breakaway from the European Union, with the United Kingdom's "Brexit" referendum and its aftermath. Drawing on the theories of Mair, Bickerton and Loughlin, he demonstrates the contradictions of cosmopolitan discourse and argues for the continuing importance of popular sovereignty.

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
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

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