Development Zones in Asian Borderlands

Edited by Mona Chettri and Michael Eilenberg
Development Zones in Asian Borderlands
Asian Borderlands presents the latest research on borderlands in Asia as well as on the borderlands of Asia – the regions linking Asia with Africa, Europe and Oceania. Its approach is broad: it covers the entire range of the social sciences and humanities. The series explores the social, cultural, geographic, economic and historical dimensions of border-making by states, local communities and flows of goods, people and ideas. It considers territorial borderlands at various scales (national as well as supra- and sub-national) and in various forms (land borders, maritime borders), but also presents research on social borderlands resulting from border-making that may not be territorially fixed, for example linguistic or diasporic communities.

Series Editors
Tina Harris, University of Amsterdam
Willem van Schendel, University of Amsterdam

Editorial Board
Franck Billé, University of California Berkeley
Duncan McDuie-Ra, University of Newcastle, Australia
Eric Tagliacozzo, Cornell University
Yuk Wah Chan, City University Hong Kong
Development Zones in Asian Borderlands

Edited by
Mona Chettri and
Michael Eilenberg

Amsterdam University Press
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 9

Introduction 11

**Enclave Development and Socio-spatial Transformations in Asian Borderlands**

*Mona Chettri and Michael Eilenberg*

1 Post-disaster Development Zones and Dry Ports as Geopolitical Infrastructures in Nepal 33

*Galen Murton*

2 Onwards and Upwards 55

**Aerial Development Zones in Nepal**

*Tina Harris*

3 Casinos as Special Zones 73

**Speculative Development on the Nation's Edge**

*Juan Zhang*

4 Thinking the Zone 97

**Development, Climate, and Heterodystopia**

*Jason Cons*

5 From Shangri-La to De facto SEZ 117

**Land Grabs from “Below” in Sikkim, India**

*Mona Chettri*

6 Development Zones in Conflict-Affected Borderlands 141

**The Case of Muse, Northern Shan State, Myanmar**

*Patrick Meehan, Sai Aung Hla and Sai Kham Phu*

7 Smart Enclaves in the Borderland 165

**Digital Obligations in Northeast India**

*Duncan McDuie-Ra*
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Overview map of chapter authors and locations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Roads and dry ports of Sindhupalchok, Rasuwa, and Mustang Districts</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Larcha dry port, April 2019</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>A Lion Air flight landing at Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, July 2019</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Proposed Himalaya 2 Route</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Climate Smart Integrated House, Gabura, Bangladesh</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Backyard of the Climate Smart Integrated House, Gabura, Bangladesh</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Concrete aspirations: Sun Pharmaceuticals factory and new constructions along the Seti river</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Ambiguous claims: dilapidated CWC signboard</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.3  ‘Tight spaces’: bordering on the edges of licit and illicit 133
Figure 6.1  Map: Muse-Ruili 145
Figure 7.1  Screenshot of the Imphal Smart City Webpage, April 2020 178
Figure 8.1  Tsum in a regional context 189
Figure 8.2  Habitual cross-border geographies in Tsum 191
Figure 8.3  Appey’s tented shop at Bachu 199
Figure 8.4  A woman pauses during construction on a walking trail in Tsum 202
Figure 9.1  As a way to brace themselves for an urbanised future, sub-district and village offices worked together to expand the village's settlement area (Long Nawang, 2018) 221
Figure 9.2  On the corner of the non-functioning diesel power plant, the facility’s in-situ technician/guard uses one of the transformers to dry his kitchen towels (Long Nawang, 2018) 226
Figure 10.1  Abandoned swimming pool near an apartment complex in Boten 239
Figure 10.2  Bulldozers working 24/7 to clear ground for a new housing project in the Boten SEZ (2017) 246
Figure 11.1  Locations of proposed KEKs I and II 256
Figure 11.2  What is today a grazing field for livestock was once the site of some of the most productive oil wells in Indonesia, attracting capital and labour from all over the world 264
Figure 11.3  Thousands of tambaks – freshwater ponds for farming tiger shrimp – steadily proliferate up the rivers and waterways of North Kalimantan 267

Tables
Table 6.1  Militias operating in Muse 153
Table 7.1  Table of number of projects in bid 175
Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank all the authors for their enthusiasm, active engagement with, and support for this project. Despite being in the middle of a pandemic, with additional demands on their personal and professional time, all authors contributed excellent chapters, and on time! Thank you all. The majority of the contributors to this book project first met in June 2019 as part of the Special Development Zones in Asian Borderlands workshop convened by Michael Eilenberg and Mona Chettri in the RISEZAsia Research Programme at the Department of Anthropology, Aarhus University, Denmark. This workshop served as a launching point for this volume and a generative moment for many of the ideas expressed in it. We would like to thank the Aarhus University Research Foundation – AUff – for providing financial support, and Aarhus University for their hospitality in hosting this event. Their support made it possible to gather such a vibrant group of scholars working on development zones across Asian borderlands. Of the original participants, Jamie Doucette, Steven Schoofs, and Pal Nyiri have not included essays in this volume. We thank them for participating in the workshop and encouraging the project.

We would like to thank Jason Cons and Dunchu Lepcha for their insightful comments on earlier iterations of the Introduction, and Stephen Campbell, who reviewed the manuscript on behalf of AUP, for his invaluable feedback.

Finally, we wish to thank Saskia Gieling and the production team at AUP and the editors of the Asian Borderlands book series for their support of this project and their work in bringing it to publication.

Two chapters presented in this book were originally published as journal articles. Chapter 4 in the American Anthropological Association journal Cultural Anthropology volume 33, no. 2 (2018) and Chapter 5 in Geoforum, 109 (2020).
Introduction

Enclave Development and Socio-spatial Transformations in Asian Borderlands

Mona Chettri and Michael Eilenberg

*Development Zones in Asian Borderlands* traces the social, spatial, and economic transformation of Asian borderlands into development zones of capital accumulation, experimentation, and dispossession. While the economic imperative remains central to the origins of development zones, equally important are the individuals, institutions and networks that emerge from them. In turn, these networks and relationships are entangled in cross-cutting and overlapping relationships that create and maintain a development zone. Development Zones therefore encompass the various social, political, and economic networks specific to spatially bound, development-related activity, including Special Economic Zones (SEZs), export processing zones, casinos, and technology enclaves. *Development Zones in Asian Borderlands* locates a set of common vocabulary to identify and analyse economic zones in borderlands as sites of productivity, development, and politics in the borderlands of South and Southeast Asia.

Borderlands as Productive Spaces

As the chapters in this volume illustrate, development zones are barometers of geopolitical interest and cross-border financial investments, sometimes even despite their stagnation or eventual failure (see Rippa; Hargyono; Mc-Duie-Ra, this volume). Although financial incentives and political networks are important in this changing perception towards borderlands as productive spaces, local factors, like the aspirations, desires, and motivations of people living in these areas are equally important. Borderlands, by virtue of their geopolitical locations, have in the past been sites of reluctant economic investment, especially by the private sector, due to uncertain geopolitical
situations and security concerns (Chettri and McDuie-Ra 2018; Eilenberg 2012; van Schendel and Abraham 2005). Simultaneously, they have also been considered areas of strategic state making (Cons 2016; Jones 2012; McDuie-Ra 2016). The desire and need for “development” in areas that have historically been considered remote, out of the way, contributes to the support for the establishment of enclave development in the borderlands as SEZs, including casinos, smart cities, dry ports, and more. Not all borders and borderlands, however, are equal in their historical relevance as sites of refuge, mobility, and cultural exchange or in their contemporary utility as areas of economic productivity. Their relevance waxes and wanes in response to changing socio-political situations. Similarly, development zones of various sizes and functions now proliferate in borderlands. Every development zone is imbued with its own set of aspirations for socio-economic development across different scales and each has its own history of success and failure. Thus, while enclave economic zones are ubiquitous, with similar mechanisms of production and extraction, or share similar financial circuits or geopolitical motivations, each development zone is unique owing to localised differences in demography and socio-political history. This volume situates different types of socio-economic enclaves in the analytical framework of development zones, which accounts for their spatial, social, and temporal diversity. Following from and contributing to ongoing discussions on borderland transformations, this conceptual realignment enables a holistic view of the connections enabling this transformation.

The gradual change in perception of borderlands from remote, backward areas to productive spaces can be considered a natural extension of the shift in national economic and political policies towards greater liberalisation, increased integration with the global economy and “exportism” (Billé, Delaplace, and Humphrey 2012; Nyíri 2012; van Schendel and de Maaker 2014; Zhang and Saxer 2017). In the last three decades, changes in sectoral contributions and the increased movement of goods and people have ushered in a period of volatile dynamism, characterised by widening socio-economic disparity, environmental degradation and labour exploitation (Chettri, 2020; Cons and Eilenberg, 2019a; Dey and Grappi, 2015; Lindquist 2009; Jones and Ferdoush 2018). Shifts in economic policies have been complemented by changes in political priorities around sovereignty, territory, and citizenship (Ong 2006). In large parts of Asia, state-led liberalisation has emerged as a resolution to managing demands for economic growth while still controlling (and often curbing) political and territorial sovereignty (Campbell 2018; Cons and Eilenberg 2019b; Horstmann, Saxer, and Rippa 2018). Alongside economic goals and geopolitical priorities, technological innovation and investment
in infrastructure have been crucial to the transformation of borderlands from “frontiers to gateways” of neoliberal incursions (McDuie-Ra, 2016; also see Harris and van der Veen 2015; Murton 2017; Rippa 2020). Development zones, as key sites of spatial experimentation, therefore constitute new forms of territorialisation. Borderlands are now repositioned as central locations (ironically) within this new economic schema, primarily owing to their geopolitical position. State-led liberalisation consolidates both economic and political concerns around territory and economic growth, incentivising the movement of capital and the commodification of (human, environmental) resources and/or creating easier access to them. This is complemented by the generation of demand for new commodities and access to new markets while gradually cementing sovereign control over borderlands through (promises of) economic development (Amster and Lindquist 2005; Eilenberg 2014; Woods 2019). On the other hand, borderlands are simultaneously being converted into development zones by non-state actors, too. These informal development zones are often aided and abetted by the same infrastructural, social, economic, and political changes that trigger planned development. Furthermore, formal economic zones may act as the catalyst for informal and/or illegal networks and activities (see Meehan et al.; Chettri; Plachta, this volume) within the development zone. The active conversion of borderlands into productive space has led to the reorganisation of relations, space, and society (Murton 2017). The chapters in this volume illustrate how new forms of state building, international collaborations, and financial investments are couched in the apolitical language of economic development and modernity through development zones.

Borderlands have long been considered sites of nested exceptionalism: the interplay of exception and rule that creates intersections for networks, markets, and politics (Bach 2011). This exceptionalism is further accentuated by the increasing appearance of development zones, which with their enclave economies and emergent socio-spatial networks, add another layer of exceptionalism in an already exceptional space. However, the increasing ubiquity of development zones does not negate their exceptionalism. Instead, they represent new constellations of productivity, control, and regulations which are mapped onto pre-existing socio-political, spatial, and economic networks in areas of variegated sovereignty and contested belonging (Ong 2004). In her discussion of urban enclaves in the Philippines, Jana Kliebert describes these enclave economies as “spaces of exception 2.0”, as these zones “signal an intensification of a development trajectory based on socio-spatial exclusions and are qualitatively different from earlier mono-functional
enclave spaces” (Kleibert 2018, 474-475). Following suit, the relationships, networks, challenges, and opportunities that may emerge from enclave economies are different from other types of economic activities within the borderland. Thus, enclave economies often give rise to a more intense set of politics, imagination and affect (hope, failure, anxiety, abandonment) that is different to other spaces even within the borderland. Development zones can therefore be considered a heuristic device through which to map (i) the dialectic relationship between different (and sometimes new) sets of actors, institutions, and issues, (ii) larger international and national policies and their implementation, adaptation, and/or subversion on the ground and finally (iii) everyday experiences of living in a development zone.

What Makes a Zone a Development Zone?

Over the last few decades, many countries in South and Southeast Asia have undergone gradual but sustained change that can be attributed to accelerated liberalisation, greater integration in the global economy, advancement in infrastructure and technology, and heightened mobility of goods and people. In many parts of Asia, economic enclaves have received institutional stimulus as sites of economic and spatial experimentation. Petri dishes of sorts, these economic zones are sites where local and foreign capital, national/international law, politics, technology and innovation, modernist fantasies, and infrastructural hope and decay coalesce within a tight space. Territorially moored economic activities (and/or the aspirations of economic productivity) lie at the core of economic zones, which are organised around layers of spatial, political, and economic exceptionalism. These zones produce attractive regulatory environments and infrastructure for investment, exploitation, and securitisation of resources and populations (Bach 2011). A development zone encapsulates such an economic enclave within a wider network of relationships. Therefore, as a conceptual schema, development zones offer a useful framework through which to analyse the different actors, institutions, and interactions emerging out of the logic of development through zones. The development zone framework enables us to map the flows, frictions, interests, and imaginations that accumulate in specific locations at particular moments to transformative effect and to analyse their interconnections from multiple vantage points. Consequently, it facilitates the simultaneous analysis of localised manifestations of capital accumulation and their regional, national, and global connections.
As the chapters in this volume illustrate, the proliferation of development zones of various sizes and functions across different borderlands in Asia heralds a marked shift in political and economic discussions around borders and borderlands. The chapters in this volume add depth and diversity to these ongoing discussions on the transformation of borderlands and offer a conceptual platform to understand and analyse them better. Development zones emphasise borderlands as productive spaces, albeit with their own set of complexities as a result of their geopolitical location. This volume, while privileging the capacity of local actors to define and shape development zones, also brings to focus the dialectic relationship between people, institutions, and resources in a fluid landscape. The chapters in this volume highlight how development zones in borderlands further complicate pre-existing questions around sovereignty, individual agency, modernity, hope, decay, and development itself.

Development zones come in various shapes and sizes. While some are real and tangible, others exist only on paper, in blueprints and maps. Nevertheless, underlying the rationale for enclave development (whether real or imagined) is its discursive power as a “modernist fantasy of rationality and new beginnings” (Bach 2011, 99). Thus, despite differences in their structure (formal, informal), provenance (official, illegal), and scale of operation, powerful sentiments of hope and aspirations are often linked to the creation and maintenance of development zones, even in instances where an economic enclave no longer exists or never materialised as intended (see Rippa; Hargyono; Mikkelsen and Eilenberg, this volume). However, hope and aspirations are fleeting and changing. An examination of their source therefore reveals different dynamics that have been set in motion in development zones. In borderlands, things often happen to people and places without their active collaboration. New borders are created overnight (Datta 2012; Shewly 2013), resources are extracted and exchanged (Pangsapa and Smith 2008; Singh 2014) and new infrastructure is planned (Kobi 2020; Murton and Lord 2020; Rippa 2018). Individual hope then gets tagged onto national/and or regional hope and aspirations in line with the vision of national/regional development. Thus, formal economic zones can be seen as tangible manifestations of national/regional aspirations. On the other hand, localised negotiations, hustle, and surreptitious (and often illegal) bypassing of rules and regulations within the development zone highlight how people and communities respond, cope and mould their lives around these often unforeseen changes. Development zones are therefore spaces where national/regional, corporate, communal, and individual aspirations coalesce around widely held but different understandings of development.
itself. Development zones open new ways of analysing what development means and the ways in which it occurs across scales in Asian borderlands.

In Asia and many other parts of the developing world, hope and aspiration are often articulated in the language of infrastructure (new or more), urbanisation, and modernity. In borderlands, infrastructure and technological connectivity is vital for the realisation of these aspirations of urbanity and modernity. Without infrastructure, or the promise of infrastructure, development zones would not be possible. The success of enclave economies in borderlands is often predicated on the construction of infrastructure that can be seen, shown and displayed (durable roads, bridges, and highways more specifically), connecting borderlands and border communities to bigger towns, markets, and new opportunities. However, infrastructural hope extends beyond just roads and highways to incorporate a constellation of other elements (concrete buildings, ports, market sheds) that are crucial for the transformation of borderlands.

As borderlands turn into (or are expected to become) productive spaces, a range of aspirations and politics are built around infrastructure (Dwyer 2020; Murton and Lord 2020; Rippa 2020). Without the tangible, whether it be roads or mobile phone towers, there would be no seamless movement of people, goods, or ideas within and outside the development zone. Neither would the surveillance and disciplining of borderland landscapes and communities be possible. While infrastructure remains central to narratives of national integration and modernity in the borderlands, all the chapters in this volume illustrate different types and levels of power, prestige, and influence of the tangible on ideas, hope, and aspirations across scales. Thus, whether it be as new expressions of diplomatic relations (see Murton; Plachta, this volume), territorialisation (see McDuie-Ra; Harris, this volume), or economic opportunities (see Zhang; Cons; Chettri; Meehan et al., this volume), infrastructure occupies a central position in all narratives of development. Even when in a state of ruin or abandonment (see Hargyono; Rippa; Mikkelson and Eilenberg, this volume) infrastructure links aspirations, political patronage, transgressions, and fissures within and between different people, institutions, and countries into its built environment.

The proliferation of development zones in Asian borderlands signals a specific form of capital accumulation, experimentation, and dispossession, one which profits from the socio-economic and political location of borders and borderlands while simultaneously introducing/imposing new changes on the borderland landscape. These transformations, although ubiquitous, are not uniform in their manifestations, politics, or impact. This book hopes to make a significant contribution to borderland studies by offering a new
analytical framework for thinking of borderlands as new spaces of capital accumulation, especially as a result of formal and informal development zones. These transformations within an already exceptional space have led to new forms of territorialisation, assemblages, and socio-spatial changes, as illustrated by the empirically rich case studies presented in the book.

**Identifying Development Zones**

This volume emerged from a writing workshop on development zones in Asia, at Aarhus University, Denmark in June 2019. Irrespective of ethno- graphic variation, all contributors at the workshop described similar and simultaneous processes across different parts of Asia: enclaves, socio-spatial transformations, infrastructure, sovereignty, cross-border politics, and localised agency. Different regions across Asian borderlands were connected through a global circuit of extraction, production, consumption, and mobility. These processes, in turn, were shaped by national/regional politics and ideas of development. The similarities running through all the papers presented at the workshop highlighted the absence of a framework encapsulating this phenomenon in all its diversity. With this volume, we aim to initiate a conversation towards creating a conceptual platform through which to understand, analyse, and verbalise this phenomenon. We start this conversation by identifying three interrelated characteristics of development zones – porosity, informality, and spatial-temporal unboundedness – shared by all development zones to different degrees.

Erik Harms’ (2015) description of the porosity of urban enclaves provides a useful starting place for thinking about development zones. Urban enclaves, with their high walls and gated communities, may appear to be completely sealed off from the outside world. According to Harms, however, “demarcations and distinctions of public and private that mark the idealized enclave are compromised and breached by social and spatial processes and practices of porosity” (ibid, 153). Similarly, development zones can be understood as enclaves that are demarcated from surrounding areas through tangible markers, administrative regulations and/or social practices. Akin to the urban enclaves described by Harms, development zones are also characterised by the movement of humans, goods, services, technology, ideas, and so forth between and within different spheres of (political,

1 The workshop was organised by the RISEZAsia project and funded by the Aarhus University Research Foundation (AUFF).
social) activities that gravitate towards economic zones. Development zones in Asian borderlands exhibit porosity on different scales, especially between global, national and situated, localised practices, often resulting in a recalibration of established spatial and socio-cultural relations. Porosity works both ways: ideas, technology, people, and materials move in and out of the development zone. Such movement is directly proportional to the level of informality between different actors/institutions, regulatory bodies, and so on. The development zone, which comprises many moving parts, is dynamic: it expands and contracts in response to influences from within and without. This leads to a variation in the concomitant reconfiguration of space, power, and the tangible, material that determines choices and outcomes for those living within the development zone. Such inherent porosity enables the proliferation of development zones of different sizes, functions, and component parts and allows the exploration of a diverse range of cases within the same analytical framework.

Informal/illegal development zones can also emerge either alongside or as a response to new opportunities for economic production/extraction (which themselves may be legal). Some development zones therefore constitute an offshoot or a node of a bigger development-related activity at some other location further inland and are made relevant by their border location. Furthermore, as Zhang's chapter on casinos and McDuie-Ra's chapter on smart cities make explicit, despite their separate locations, all development zones can be interconnected through similarities in their social, aesthetic, and financial circuits and imaginations. Motivated by aspirations of development and modernity, development zones can create their own sets of networks by connecting one to the other, thus creating their own map of global/national connections. Development zones therefore enable different types of connections at multiple scales and bring to the fore the importance of networks, both new and old. This necessitates acknowledgement of the different kinds of development zones – formal/informal, legal/illegal, and across scales, both big and small – that have emerged as a result of socioeconomic interventions either in the borderlands or their vicinities. The formation of development zones, organic or otherwise, therefore facilitates focused interaction and engagement between different actors and across issues that may have very little resonance beyond their immediate context. As new economic and political opportunities, networks, and interactions become available, new forms of group and individual identification (such as labourers, brokers and traders) may also emerge. This in turn can create spaces for ‘bottom-up’ contestations as different actors have access to different spheres of power and control.
The networks, spatial interventions, and politics that emerge illustrate the temporal and spatial unboundedness of development zones. While spatial mooring is central to all development zones, its impacts, manifestations, and experiences are not limited spatially or even temporally. As Harris’ chapter on Kathmandu Airport shows, development zones may even extend to the sky and spread across many time zones. Thus, although it may be easy to determine what the economic zone at the heart of the development zone looks like or where its boundaries lie, it is equally difficult to predict the form or size of the development zone itself. Yet unboundedness does not imply that the impacts and resultant experiences are unlimited. The more direct and intense the networks and relationships radiating out of the economic activity, the stronger the interconnections between actors and institutions within a development zone. When thought of as a collage, development zones therefore establish a holistic, causal link between different actors, motivations, and manifestations in a particular time and place. The unboundedness of development zones and the resultant unpredictability of the forms they may take therefore marks a crucial conceptual distinction between economic zones with distinct spatial boundaries (e.g. SEZs, export processing units, dry ports) and development zones. Such unboundedness is also visible in the assemblage of people, networks, finances, and infrastructure that come together in the development zone. The chapters in this volume discuss aspects of porosity and spatial-temporal unboundedness across different scales, from climate change mitigation in Bangladesh, where the physical landscape changes with almost every tide and the borders of Nepal where geophysical events and geopolitical imperatives collide and have transformative effects, to the borderlands of Indonesia and Laos, where time and change are slow and cumbersome.

Organisation of this Volume

This volume is divided into three themes: (i) Making the Development Zone; (ii) Disciplining the Development Zone; and (iii) Zones of Ruination and Abandonment. All three themes discuss different aspects of development zones in Asian borderlands. As indicated above, development zones in borderlands are actively created by different actors (multinational companies, private companies, international organisations, nation-states, regional governments, rebels, warlords, and mafia) often working collaboratively for specific economic goals and visions of development. They may promise
a combination of tax/tariff incentives, streamlined customs procedures, ownership limits, securitisation, infrastructure, and deregulation in order to attract investment to these often “underdeveloped”, “unruly”, and “sensitive” places. Borderland spaces are increasingly the locations of new development zones$^2$ in Asia. The authors in this volume, in various ways, study the emergence and proliferation of development zones, promoting the development of these remote and resource-rich borderlands across Asia. Through closely observed case studies, they offer explorations of development zones in the borderlands of Indonesia (Hargyono; Mikkelsen and Eilenberg), Laos (Rippa), Myanmar (Meehan, Aung Hla and Kham Phu), Bangladesh (Cons), Nepal (Harris; Plachta; Murton), Cambodia, (Zhang), and India (McDuie-Ra; Chettri). Each one of these studies raises broader conceptual and analytical issues about zones, borderlands, and the political economy of development. Although the chapters in this volume cover a wide range of geographical and political spaces, development-related issues, and actors, we anticipate this volume to be the beginning of new conversations and discussions, especially around actors, issues, and dynamics with which we have not been able to engage in this volume.

Making the Development Zone

One of the themes of this volume is to establish a broader understanding of the different financial, infrastructural, and political networks that enable the creation of these development zones. How does such territorial planning shape and entice capital expansion and privatisation? Has it also led to the “de facto” effect in regions officially not designated as development zones? Or has it additionally led to the creation of new, informal zones? These questions are all crucial to our understanding of the rise and fall of development zones.

In developing answers to these questions, development zones allow us to map the flows, frictions, interests, and imaginations that accumulate in specific locations at particular moments to transformative effect. Economic enclaves have played an important role in the rapid industrialisation of many nation-states in Asia (Arnold 2012; Cross 2014; Levien 2012) and beyond (Neveling 2015, 2020). As stated by Jonathan Bach, “[s]tates have long enjoyed the ability, in principle, to lure investors seeking a higher return on their money by sectioning off and leasing their sovereign space in part or all to

---

$^2$ Ishida (2009) mentions four spatial types of development zones like metropolitan areas, ports and harbors, junctions or intersections, and Border areas.
the highest bidder” (Bach 2011, 11). In Asia, borderland zones have become “backyards” for the manufacturing industry (e.g. electronics, textiles), for agricultural expansion (oil palm, rubber, rice), and for resource-extraction regimes (minerals, timber). At times, all three constellations overlap and become “export enclaves” or “investment enclaves” that are largely separated from the overall economy and often run by cheap migrant labour. In his discussion of zoning and enclaving and the process of converting land and natural resources for commercial production purposes, Edward Barbier (2007, 2012) mentions the benefits of thinking of such spaces and their exploitation as both horizontal and vertical. By vertical downwards, Barbier refers to extractive activities like mining; by horizontal, he means the opening of land, such as new agricultural frontiers and plantation development. These two processes, however, often overlap or are exceeded by each other and trigger an accelerated process of dispossession (Levien 2011). Nevertheless, the process of opening up new spaces of economic accumulation has triggered a new wave of border development, increasingly focused on the exploitation and transformation of land through infrastructure development rather than on manufacturing. Over time, development zones have changed their form and purpose significantly, turning from “export-processing zones to information technology parks, to adapt to the new demands of the post-industrial economy” (Kleibert 2018, 472).

In certain instances, border economic zones become places where stronger neighbouring governments can export environmentally degrading projects (like dams for hydroelectric power) and maintain access to resources that have already been depleted at home by securing concessions. For example, several resource-rich states like Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar throughout the 2000s handed out large-scale land concessions for plantation, timber, mining, and hydropower development projects to foreign companies and governments from Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, India, and China. Such resource-dependent development does not always result in sustained economic progress, as rent is not reinvested in more dynamic sectors like

---

3 See for example the Batam SEZ: Indonesia-Singapore border, Mae Sot SEZ: Thailand-Myanmar border, Swayne Rieng SEZ: Cambodia-Vietnam border, Golden Boten City SEZ: Laos-China border.


5 See the Golden Triangle SEZ located in the sub-Mekong region of Bokeo province, close to Laos’ borders with Myanmar, Thailand, and China (Dwyer 2014). The Shan State Special Zone: Myanmar-China border (Nyiri 2012; Tan 2017; Woods 2011), the Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone: Laos-Thailand border (Brown 2019), and the Mae Sot SEZ: Thailand-Myanmar border (Campbell 2018).
manufacturing. Also, larger environmental ruptures have created new opportunities for neighbouring governments to extend their sovereignty and export infrastructure into cross-border disaster zones. This is made evident in the first chapter of this volume by Galen Murton on the geopolitics of infrastructure in the borderlands of post-disaster Nepal. Murton discusses the construction of the new Larcha import-export dry ports in the northern Nepal-China borderlands. He demonstrates how the 2015 earthquakes opened up new spaces for Chinese geopolitical interventions through post-disaster infrastructure development, which was embedded within its wider Belt and Road Initiative. The huge financial and logistical muscle of the Chinese state developed Nepalese borderland infrastructure at an immense pace and raised local hopes for landlocked Nepal to gain access to Chinese markets. Simultaneously, however, the economic expansion created social and political ambivalence in Nepal. Here Murton poses the question “development for whom, by whom, and at what costs?” and highlights the inherent asymmetries of power in post-disaster landscapes, as well as widespread anxieties among minority populations like ethnic Tibetans over the extra-territorial control that may follow such state-led territorialisation outside the borders of China.

Tina Harris takes up a similar focus on infrastructure development as a lens to understand the making of development zones in Nepal’s borderlands. In her chapter she shifts our focus to the sky and the ground simultaneously and presents the temporal and spatial unboundedness aspects of development zones. In landlocked Nepal, Harris portrays how increased congestion in the skies has forced planners and governments to envision new aerial development zones such as new air routes, airports, and joint cross-border airline ventures. By taking a “volumetric” approach (Billé 2020), Harris challenges the terrestrial bias in our thinking of development zones and discusses how contestation and control over space are intermeshed with issues of national sovereignty between neighbouring India and China.

While zoning in the sky creates new opportunities for economic accumulation in landlocked Nepal, Juan Zhang in her chapter discusses the new frontier of speculative investment through the case of integrated resorts (IRs) or mega-casinos in Asian borderlands. Besides being zones for economic growth, Zhang discusses how casino zoning includes both the politics of permissiveness and are social spaces of opportunity and discipline with their own exceptional regulations and thus become spaces of exclusive development. In Asia as elsewhere, these special kinds of development zones often attract strong suspicion and criticism because of their associations with illicit activities and moral decay. They also promise potential futures
of large profits, growth, and development and have proved to be an effective tool to capture travelling foreign and national investment.

In his attempt to think through the “zone”, Jason Cons provides a detailed exploration into another kind of experimental development zoning that involves processes of anticipation, not of large profits as in the case of casino zoning, but of a dystopian climate crisis. Cons discusses how governmental and international organisations, through anticipatory planning, attempt to prepare vulnerable populations and landscapes in the delta of south-western Bangladesh's borderlands with India from more widespread infrastructural damage and displacement. He argues that the delta has become a test zone or site for future climate infrastructural interventions and intense management, promoting spectacles of both containment and securitisation.

Mona Chettri’s chapter on the de facto SEZ in Sikkim, India, discusses the emergence of land grabs from “below”, triggered by the establishment of pharmaceutical enclaves. Chettri positions Sikkim as a de facto SEZ, which despite the absence of official recognition as an SEZ, behaves like one in terms of the various incentives, exclusions, and concessions made available for private investment (especially hydropower and pharmaceutical industries). In a state with strict legal safeguards around the ownership and transfer of land, increased demand for land by private companies and migrant workers has recalibrated state and community relationships, leading to land grabs and new rent-seeking activities from “below”. Chettri's chapter explores the liminal (official/unofficial) spaces occupied by some development zones and the porosity of ideas and aspirations within them.

**Disciplining the Development Zone**

In borderlands, enclave development brings forth new questions, challenges, and anxieties around changes to local environments, community life, and livelihoods. The success, proliferation, or decline of development zones is dependent on the alignment of local development aspirations with the regional/national and the relationships emerging from this alignment. In essence, it is only when local communities “buy into” the idea of enclave development that development zones can be integrated and successful. Given the geopolitical history of borderlands and borderland communities, however, interpersonal and institutional relationships can often be fraught with political hostility, ambiguity, suspicion, competing claims over territory and resources, multiple understandings of and expectations from development. More often than not, consensus and allegiance for a
particular vision of development has to be cultivated and maintained. The second theme of the book looks at the various (legal and illegal) economic, infrastructural, political, social, and regulatory mechanisms employed to control and discipline people, space, and the different relationships emerging from and within development zones. What, how, and who is disciplined and surveyed can illustrate the processes by which borderlands are being converted into productive spaces, the shift in power dynamics and changes in public opinion around governance, development, politics, and more. But it is not always possible to anticipate or predict responses to technologies of surveillance and discipline. Furthermore, how are these strategies of control and discipline affected by culture, gender, and ethnicity? How are they employed, by whom and what contestations, solidarities, and inequalities may emerge as a result? How is this manifested spatially? Different chapters in the volume engage with many questions around technologies, actors, impacts, and responses to discipline and surveillance in development zones.

In the case of the Myanmar border city of Muse, located in the northern state of Shan on the border with China, Patrick Meehan, Sai Aung Hla, and Sai Kham Phu discuss the formal status of Muse as an SEZ and how a borderland afflicted by conflict and controlled by overlapping authorities (both formal national governments and various militant entrepreneurs) is being disciplined through acts and/or threats of violence. The authors show how processes of political reform, economic liberalisation, and peace building with ethnic opposition are opening up resource-rich borderlands for investment (both legal and illicit) from governments and private business. Myanmar's economy is based on patron-client relationships in the allocation of natural resource concessions. The opening of the Muse SEZ is used as a negotiation tactic in ceasefire/peace talks between government and ethnic opposition groups and in the establishment of economic corridors for neighbouring China to the wider Mekong region. Investments primarily target extractive sectors instead of manufacturing (due to ongoing political and economic uncertainties). Meehan et al. here echo similar observations made throughout the region showing that, in development zones, sovereignty is often vested in private corporations and farmed out to military entrepreneurs which feed pre-existing inequality, uneven development, and surveillance (Nyíri 2012; Sidaway 2007; Woods 2019).

Aspects of surveillance and control are also evident in the chapter by Duncan McDhue-Ra exploring the formation of a “smart city” project in the city of Imphal in the borderlands of Northeast India. As a part of India's digital urbanisation, such bids for “smart enclaves” in the unruly borderlands paradoxically attempt to lure investment and promote electronic
surveillance, identification, and control at the same time. McDuie-Ra considers how Imphal, like other parts of Northeast India, has been managed as an enclave for exceptional rule because of separatism, violence, and not least the region’s conflictual relationship with the Indian armed forces, paramilitary and various other militant entrepreneurs in recent history. Unlike many zone-making projects in Asia, the extension of India’s Smart Cities Mission to Imphal has been driven more by obligation than desire on the part of local governments and elites. Furthermore, smart cities are zones of a different kind: they seek to “open up” the city rather than enclose it behind high walls or heavy security as with other forms of urban enclave. Despite this, Imphal is enrolled in the national smart city mission and regardless of the barely adequate bid produced by the municipal and state governments, it is clear that Imphal was always going to be awarded smart city status; it is far too important to India’s geopolitics to leave out of the scheme.

Nadine Plachta explores another “sensitive” and “restricted” borderland region – Nepal’s Tsum Valley – which borders the Tibet Autonomous Region in China, the former fighting ground of the Tibetan resistance force. She discusses how this emerging informal development zone in the strategic north-south economic corridor between Nepal and China is navigated by local marginal entrepreneurs in anticipation of large-scale infrastructure investments. The opening of the Nepal borderlands as an economic corridor has triggered new rules and regulations from the Nepal state security apparatus in order to govern investments and the movement of people and thereby control and discipline the margins. Plachta shows how such developments have created opportunities for well-connected and resourceful local entrepreneurs to navigate these new tools of governance while excluding many others, increasing local inequality as a result. Such “intensified processes and patterns of uneven development are increasingly expressed in enclave spaces” (Sidaway 2007, 332). As Galen Murton also indicates in the first chapter, increasing Chinese influence in the northern borderlands of Nepal brings colossal infrastructural might and investment but potentially also increased security influence (for example with regard to ethnic minorities) and extra-sovereign control.

**Zones of Ruination and Abandonment**

Development zones in Asian borderlands have increasingly become laboratories of economic and political change that go through cycles of boom and
bust, spaces where national governments can experiment with futuristic state making, landscape control, and economic constellations of capital accumulation that would be ethically and morally unthinkable in the national heartland. They have become spaces where representations of idealised models of planning, development, and modernity can be found. They may also constitute spaces where neighbouring states or transnational companies are able to experiment with “export” infrastructure and socio-economic engendering like population resettlement or new forms of surveillance. They are “other spaces”, often set apart from the rest of society, in which different relations of power and hence different forms of government rationality can be imagined and implemented.

The strategy of zoning through trial and error has often resulted in failed zones. Many new zones never get going or are poorly run. With no substantial employment or export earnings, they become “white elephants”, exploited for instant riches (Farole and Akinci 2011). There are several examples of how these development zones in sparsely populated areas like borderlands collapse as soon as natural resources are depleted or when economic corridors are redirected and former hotspots of development are circumvented to fulfil changing sovereign politics. Development zones may also go through extended periods of suspensions, ruination, and crisis due to unfulfilled political commitments (or larger global pandemics; see Zhang, this volume) and suddenly blossom when new political (or environmental; see Murton and Cons, this volume) ruptures create new incentives for investments and development interventions (Lund and Eilenberg 2017).

A development zone is a “spatial capital accumulation machine” (Bach 2011, 100) that waxes and wanes due to global economic trends and regional political concerns. As already discussed above, development zones are imbued with aspirations for modernity and economic and political power by a wide range of actors (including states, elites, landowners and common people) and represent opportunities for individual advancement. Such aspirations are precarious, often failing to fulfil its vision and are consequently abandoned at least for a while (Chettri and Eilenberg 2019). Our third goal of this volume is to look at the temporal aspects of development zones: how they, more often than not, become harbingers of cycles of boom and bust that accelerate processes of dispossession and resource exploitation. We seek to understand why and how development zones are linked to modernity and by whom? How do social relations transform during different stages of boom and bust? What happens when these hallmarks of developmentalism do not materialise as intended, collapse, and are abandoned? What are the tangible ruins of development and how
do people living in former development zones reconcile themselves or cope with their changed circumstances and spatial ambiguity? As elucidated by Jonathan Bach in his eloquent treatise on the “zone” phenomenon, development zones can be seen as “contemporary capitalist utopia and heterotopia, as the urban interface of the geographies of management and imagination” (Bach 2011, 116).

In the chapter by Sindhunata Hargyono, uncertain waiting and “suspended” development becomes a window to understand the circles of development zoning in the neglected and “left-behind” Indonesian-Malaysian borderlands on the island of Borneo. Hargyono discusses how a renewed governmental focus on narratives of under-governed spaces and issues of national sovereignty have accelerated development zoning in the Indonesian borderlands, at least on paper and in state rhetoric. He shows how local elites in their appropriation of government visions of development and urbanised dreams construct an image of their district and themselves as highly desirable and qualified for investment. The government’s grand development plans and visions slowly deaccelerate and entrap villagers as development subjects in an affective-temporal state of uncertain waiting that leaves behind a variety of tangible and intangible infrastructural ruins and decay.

Alessandro Rippa brings up a similar theme of “suspended” development in his discussion of the different periods of boom and bust of the Boten SEZ in the China-Laos borderlands. Rippa takes us through the booming Boten days when the SEZ was a vibrant hub of gambling and smuggling to its bust when Chinese authorities issued security warnings against visiting the zone due to crime and mismanagement. Boten again became an out-of-the-way place, its hotels and casinos entering a phase of ruination and infrastructural suspension. Not entirely abandoned, Rippa discusses how Boten’s few remaining inhabitants try to carve out a life in the ruins while waiting for the next development boom to appear. The Boten case is a vivid example of how political ruptures can suddenly suspend capital accumulation in development zones, at least for a while, until a larger infrastructural development like China’s Belt and Road Initiative redirects investors’ focus on the borderland corridors (see also Murton; Plachta; Harris, this volume).

In the last chapter of this volume, Thomas Mikkelsen and Michael Eilenberg provide a detailed historical exploration of cycles of boom and bust in de facto development zones on the island of Tarakan in the Indonesian-Malaysian borderlands. The study interrogates the genealogies of extraction and the continual process of the reconstruction and
deconstruction of development zones in the borderlands, developments that have left ruins upon which new developments have been built. The chapter investigates the formation of informal development zoning by highlighting the case of the Tarakan SEZ, which failed to materialise as a consequence of power struggles between central and regional government over access to resources and borderland autonomy. The experience of the failed Tarakan SEZ shows how such formal development zones only thrive through local support. Indeed, if they do not fulfil local aspirations of development, they are prone to fail or are drastically reshaped to reflect local political realities and economic needs.

This book and its chapters offer an approach that privileges both the specificities of place and broader linkages across sites and allows for a grounded political engagement within and across different development zones. The chapters offer critical engagement with the unique forms of capitalism and governance instigated by new development zones and contribute to theoretical framings of borderland political economy in a new era of borderland colonialisation. The studies are important because they document the processes through which Asian borderlands are currently experiencing some of the largest development initiatives in modern history that will significantly reshape borderland lives and landscapes.

References


Arnold, Dennis. 2012. “Spatial practices and Border SEZs in Mekong Southeast Asia”. Geography Compass, 6 (12): 740-751.


McDuie-Ra, Duncan. 2016. Borderland City in New India: Frontier to Gateway. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


Neveling, Patrick. 2015. “Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones and Global Imperial Formations 200 BCE to 2015 CE”. In


**About the Authors**

**Mona Chettri** is a Next Generation Network Scholar at the Australia-India Institute, University of Western Australia. She is the author of *Constructing Democracy: Ethnicity and Democracy in the eastern Himalayan borderland* (Amsterdam University Press, 2017). Her current research focuses on infrastructure, urbanisation, and gender in the Sikkim-Darjeeling Himalaya.

**Michael Eilenberg** is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Aarhus University, Denmark. His research focuses on issues of state formation, sovereignty, autonomy, citizenship, and agrarian expansion in frontier regions of Southeast Asia. He is the author of *At the Edges of States* (KITLV Press/Brill Academic Publishers, 2012) and co-editor with Jason Cons of *Frontier Assemblages: The Emergent Politics of Resource Frontiers in Asia* (Wiley, 2019).