



**Turkey's 'Self' and  
'Other' Definitions in  
the Course of the EU  
Accession Process**

Melek Saral



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# Abbreviations

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
ANAR	Ankara Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi (Ankara Social Research Center)
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
GAP	Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (South Eastern Anatolia Project)
IR	International Relations
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TRT	Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonları (Turkish Radio and Television Association)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



# 1 Socialization or Estrangement within the Framework of Turkey-EU Relations

## 1.1 International Institutions and Identity Change

Social environment and social interactions have a decisive impact on the identity of individuals. Personality and identity are developed by dealing with the social environment. States, like individuals, are affected by interactions with their social environment. Once they enter a social environment, or they interact with other actors, they are never the same (Johnston 2008). Interactions of states with international institutions not only change the normative characteristics and identities of states but, more importantly, shape their interests and their behavior. In international relations (IR) literature this is called the international socialization process during which the norms, rules, values, and ideals of the socializer are adopted by the socializee (Schimmelfennig 2002; Schimmelfennig 2003; Johnston 2001; Risse 2000; Checkel 2005; Flockhart 2006). If the socialization process is successful, it is expected to involve changes in self-conception, in conceptions of 'in-groupness' and new definitions of 'self' and 'other.' In successful socialization, the redefinition of 'self' and 'other' is consistently upheld and would not change under different circumstances, for example, for strategic or rational considerations (Gheciu 2005: 982).

The claim that the behavior of actors changes because of endogenous change in the normative characteristics and identities of the actors through socialization is a radical statement for IR theory (Johnston 2001; Wendt 1994: 384). If we accept that identity drives behavior, then a change of identity and tracing this change allows us to make assumptions about political actors' behavior and predict eventual changes, based on their identity. For example, the theory of democratic peace, which assumes that democratic states are more peaceful than other states, also relies on the connection between identity and behavior. It claims that states with a democratic identity are expected to behave according to this identity and they do not demonstrate violent behavior. However, one cannot describe the connection between identity and behavior as linear and a direct causal relationship. Identity and behavior take a rather meandering course. As Wendt puts it, states learn their identities through interactions with others, and these identities shape states' interests. Identities are significant because they provide the basis for interests (Wendt 1999). Therefore, identity does not directly cause the

action or behavior but indicates which behavior is expected or legitimate (Barnett 1999: 10). Identity is the source of interests and people pursue their interests. It opens or closes the individual to different political discourses, makes them more or less predisposed to opposition and exclusion, and makes them more or less likely to pursue their interests aggressively or to anticipate the possibility of compromise (Wendt 1992: 398; Risse et al. 1999a: 157). Thus, identity and the changes in identity involving the redefinition of 'self' and 'other' are of immediate political significance. Accordingly, questions touching on the effects of socialization on the identity of states and actors become urgent policy questions and require the attention of international relations researchers.

### **The EU as a Socializing Agent**

International organizations and institutions such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have a role in international socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999b; Wendt 1999; Alderson 2001; Johnston 2001; Flockhart 2006; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Checkel 2005). The EU is one of the most influential political actors, not only in continental Europe but also in the world arena. It is undoubtedly a leading and significant international actor in terms of socialization and one of the most essential forces for societal change. The IR literature and sociological literature on organization suggest that value and preference change is more likely in institutionally thick environments. Europe easily qualifies as the thickest institutional environment beyond the nation-state anywhere on the globe (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065; Risse-Kappen 1995; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Therefore, Europe and European institutions present the most likely case for socialization theory (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065). Checkel suggests that Europe is good laboratory for addressing some bigger issues concerning institutions and socialization (Checkel 2005: 802).

The EU operates within a framework of rules of membership and allocates values. It is based on common values and objectives, which are codified extensively in both the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union, as modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, states: 'The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states' (European Union 2006). Shortly after its establishment, the EU went beyond its technical, functional character and became a norm maker and a strong

identity-building actor. The EU has not only developed an international identity as an important actor in the international system, but the existence of the EU and its membership rules has a powerful impact on state identity in Europe. Its value system and beliefs about civic statehood also shape the values of the participating member states (Laffan 2004: 78-79). The membership applicants are expected to precommit themselves to this set of deep political beliefs. Accession criteria make socialization through EU institutions a process during which the rules and norms based on conditionality are transferred (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig 2000; Checkel 2000). Without this commitment to principle and practices on matters as wide-ranging as human rights, the rule of law, pluralism, and tolerance, membership should not be contemplated (Dyson 2007: 53). Through a strict preaccession conditionality, the candidate states are required to associate their legislation and institution with the entirety of the *acquis* prior to accession (Sedelmeier 2005: 141-153). As a result of EU conditionality and rule transfers, candidate and member states familiarize with the European norms (Grabbe 2001; Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b; Goetz 2005).

The EU socialization process goes beyond the mere transfer of predetermined norms based on conditionality. The values of the EU are not simply conditions to subordinate the states through membership. These conditions are regarded as appropriate and the right thing to do by the majority of applicant states. The states do not just subordinate themselves to the conditions, but do so because these values and norms are accepted as appropriate behavior (Checkel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2007). Thus, EU institutions and the interactions with them are expected to change the values, roles, and understandings of states by making them more democratic, more liberal, and more tolerant actors. Several empirical studies in the field of IR and Europeanization show that EU applicant states experience many of these transformations during the negotiation processes, as do the EU member states even after they become full members. Through interactions with the EU, candidate or member states over time increase social learning and adapt or internalize the EU's norms (Checkel 2001; Flockhart 2005a; Johnston 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b) or change their identities (Gheciu 2005; Hooghe 2005). States develop a transnational identity with the EU and feel that they belong to a group and define 'self' and 'other' within the values and norms of this group. Checkel identifies the end point of the socialization process as internalization, which he subdivides into two different types of socialization. Type I socialization is learning a role and then behaving appropriately, independent of agreement with the norms.

The second goes beyond role-playing, where agents accept the norms as the right thing to do (Checkel 2007). This type of internalization leads to a new definition of 'self' which provides self-evident and normal notions of expected behavior (Johnston 2008).

## 1.2 Understanding Turkey's Socialization

Turkey's socialization through interaction with Western institutions goes beyond its relations with the EU and dates back to the Ottoman Empire's admission to the Concert of Europe in 1856. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the modernization process of the country's political, economic, social, and cultural life based on Western standards intensified and the country incorporated and adapted Western customs and practices, such as the Roman alphabet, dress, the calendar, the measurement system, and holidays (Müftüler-Baç 2005). Although Turkey is not a member of the EU, it interacts with its political, economic, legal, and security institutions as a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE (Rumelili 2011: 235-236). Associated with the European Communities since 1963, Turkey gained candidate status in 1999 and concluded a customs union agreement with the EU in 1995 and has participated since then in the Union's customs, competition, and common trade policies (Scherpereel and Zierler 2011: 30). Turkey also plays a critical role in the EU's evolving security and defense policy as a member of NATO and shapes the European human rights order as a party to the European Convention on Human Rights (Scherpereel and Zierler 2011: 30; Rumelili 2011: 235-236).

Beyond the EU and other European institutions, NATO has played an important role in the socialization of Turkey and its building of a European identity. From its establishment, NATO was more than a security alliance defending the territorial security of its allies. It has united a group of countries around common norms and identities against the ideological and identity-oriented challenges posed by the communist world. Turkey has also not regarded NATO membership as just a security alliance through which it balanced external threats, but rather as a mean to signal its Western/European identity (Kubicek et al. 2015; Gheciu, 2005). Membership in NATO suited Turkey's goal of Westernization and pursuing a Western/European identity. Through NATO membership Turkey legitimized its claim that it was a Western/European country and acted to represent the Western international community in the eastern Mediterranean (Oğuzlu 2012: 153). Turkey's geopolitical position and military capabilities made its admission

to NATO relatively easy compared to admission to the EU, with its exhaustive membership process. Since joining NATO, Turkey has never been asked to fulfill some of the membership criteria because of its military capabilities and geopolitical position (Oğuzlu 2013: 780-781).

Although all of the above-mentioned Western/European institutions have played a significant role (with varying degrees) in the socialization of Turkey and in Turkey's creating a Western identity, the focus of this book is on the EU. First, Turkey's relationship with the EU has a long history. Almost from the establishment of the EU, Turkey has interacted with the EU on several levels and to different degrees. Second, the EU is one of the most powerful socializing agent with its tick normative framework and it presents the most likely case for socialization theory (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1065).

### **Turkey's Relations with the EU**

Turkey's relations with the EU have a long history. Turkey has sought to become a member of the European community with varying degrees of determination since 1959 (Rumelili 2011: 235-236). Particularly since the 1995 Customs Union Agreement, Turkey has intensified interactions with the EU in spite of some interruptions and slowdowns caused by crises between the EU and Turkey. All the governments since 1987, despite the ups and downs in the relationship, have been enthusiastic about full membership. Based on the socialization literature, one would expect successful socialization of Turkey since it fulfills almost all the required conditions such as length and intensity of interaction as well as willingness of the socializee to join the institution. Turkey has also been desperately willing to be part of the community and its history over the last two hundred years can be understood in the context of Turkey's desire to be Westernized. EU membership is therefore seen as the final goal of this process, the final step in incorporating Turkey where it belongs, into Europe. The willingness to join the EU has not been limited to the political elite in Turkey. Public support for EU accession was also relatively high, compared to the other candidate states. At the start of negotiations, domestic support reached 75-80%.

Indeed, Turkey experienced many positive changes in its economic, political, and cultural life in the course of the EU membership process, changes that would be unimaginable without relations with the EU. The declaration of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999 had an important positive impact on Turkey's moving toward the EU standards on the issues of democratization and human and minority rights (Müftüler-Baç 2005). In this respect, many reforms have been made in regard to freedom of

expression and of association, prevention of torture, expansion of cultural rights, and the reduction of the role of the military in Turkish political life during the DSP-MHP-ANAP (Demokratik Sol Parti [Democratic Left Party]-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi [National Action Party]-Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party]) coalition government in 1999-2002 and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]) government after the 2002 elections (Rumelili 2011: 243-244). Turkey started to discuss national problems, which had been ignored for a long time, such as the Kurdish and Armenian issues. However, Turkey's interactions with the EU have also had negative, unintended, and counterproductive consequences and the shift in its definitions of 'self' and 'other' has been in the opposite direction than expected. Instead of defining itself as a Western and European country, Turkey has increasingly seen Europe as its 'other.' The estrangement of Turkey over the course of the development of its relationship with the EU is extremely striking since Turkey regarded and described its 'self' from the time of its establishment as Western and/or European. Based on its definition of its 'self' as European, its 'other' was consequently always the non-European, non-Western states.

It would be an oversimplification to trace the change in Turkish national identity only to its interactions with EU institutions. Several internal and external developments, including changes in domestic conditions and international and regional developments, have contributed to the change in Turkey's definitions of 'self' and 'other.' However, the EU has been – until the deadlock of relations – one of the most powerful factors influencing political decision-making and shaping political and public discourse in Turkey. This is supported by the fact that relations with the EU have not only brought about a lively discussion of national identity and self-concept but also put sensitive national concerns – such as the Kurdish issue, relations with Greece and Cyprus, and minority rights – at the center of political and public discourse.

The exhaustive EU accession process, which had no real future, gave rise to the debate over and questioning of Turkish identity by both sides – by both supporters and opponents of EU accession. It worked to shift in Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' in an opposite direction than expected. Within the framework of EU-Turkey relations, not only the EU but also Turkey made an issue of Turkey's Europeaness. In the course of the EU accession process, historical in- and out-group definitions were also resurrected. Historically, 'Turk' has been the dominant 'other' of the European states system because of the military might and physical proximity of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the strength of its religious tradition.

It was also the relevant 'other' in the evolution of European identity. The European self was defined from the beginning in terms of what it was not. The non-European Turk as the 'other' of Europe played a decisive role in the evolution of this European identity (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 329-330; Diez 2004: 11). Based on this historically constructed image – namely, the image of 'the Muslim enemy in front of the gates of Europe,' Turkey has continued to be the ideal 'other' of the EU (Diez 2005: 633). It is also worth recalling Europe's role as Crusader and Christian enemy in the course of the long history of Turkish-European relations.

In particular, the EU's requirements regarding the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus conflict awakened Turkey's historical fears of being invaded by the Western powers, which in turn caused Turkey to regard the EU as a danger to its territorial integrity rather than as a partner in negotiations. Over time, these fears, combined with the impression that Turkey will never be accepted as a part of the EU, meant that the required resolutions of the Kurdish and Cypriot issues were regarded as a threat coming from an 'other,' thereby influencing Turkey's definition of its 'self' and accordingly, its behavior.

### **Research Questions**

How did interaction with the EU influence Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other'? What are the reasons for Turkey's new understanding of 'self' and 'other'? How could a process promising the adoption of new norms, roles, and definitions of 'self' and 'other' fail in the case of Turkey, which even before the interactions intensified, saw and described itself as a part of Europe? What are the implications of this estrangement process? These questions are at the center of this book and will be answered based on the comparative case studies of three crucial time periods in Turkey-EU relations.

The theoretical approach taken to analyze these research questions is a constructivist one. The reason for making use of a constructivist approach is not only that identity is at the center of constructivist theory (Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996), but also because these identities are socially constructed and reconstructed rather than given. In constructivist understanding, identity is shaped through language and discourse, which are powerful forces constructing reality. Constructivism emphasizes the importance of normative as well as material structures, as well as the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action (Price and Reus-Smith 1998). The basic principles of constructivism in conjunction with socialization, identity, and identity change will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 2.



## Positions of Turkish Parties on Turkey's EU Membership

Since the 1960s, the objective of joining the EU has been one of the major pillars of Turkish foreign policy. The 1960s and 1970s were years of ideological radicalization and political polarization in Turkey. The radical left was represented in the political arena by TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi [Workers Party of Turkey]) and the radical right was represented by MHP and MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi [National Salvation Party]), which were opposed Turkey's relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) because of economic, cultural, or religious reasons (Yılmaz 2011: 190). The radical left and radical right opposed the EEC, arguing its imperialist and colonialist intentions would ruin Turkey's economy. This Euroscepticism grew as a result of economic factors in the 1970s, including developing economic crises and Turkey's struggle to get the aid promised by the EEC. Inevitably, relations with the Community cooled down (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 213). The Turkish political discourse on the issue of EU membership is relatively straightforward and, at least since the late 1980s, there has been somewhat of a consensus among the major political parties that Turkey should seek EU membership (Avcı 2004: 195). The following short description of the positions of the main Turkish political parties on EU membership illustrates this perfectly.

The National Action Party (MHP) is, as its name indicates, a nationalist party. It has serious reservations about Turkey's accession, but throughout the history of EU relations, it has been a supporter of the EU. The party program states that the MHP supports Turkey's full membership in the EU as this issue acquired the status of state policy over time. In the 1980s the MHP supported the government's decision to resume the frozen relations with the EU and to continue fulfilling the conditions for full membership, mainly because of the threat of communism. In the 1990s, the elimination of the threat of communism and the independence of the Turkic republics after the fall of the Soviet Union changed the MHP's interest toward establishing a union with these republics rather than with the EU. Moreover, the increasingly political focus of the EU, such as the Copenhagen criteria, which raised issues like the Kurdish problem and minority rights, increased the alienation of the MHP (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 208-211). Nevertheless, the MHP's position on EU membership from 1999 until 2002, when it was part of three-party governing coalition, was softer than after 2002. After parliament set elections for 3 November 2002, the MHP hardened its position, which then gradually became more rigid after the MHP was no longer in parliament as a result of the elections (Bardakçı 2010: 29-30). However, the MHP



still did not totally reject EU membership. According to MHP's chairman, Devlet Bahçeli, the party's official position was that despite reservations, the MHP always worked for integration with the EU, while in power and in the opposition (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 211; Bahçeli 2002). The MHP's party platform in 2009 also stated that the party supported EU membership, provided Turkey's interests were not compromised: 'Our fundamental policy is that as long as the EU's approach to Turkey's national unity and integrity, and to the issues of Cyprus, Greece, and Armenia, does not damage Turkey's interests, we are for continuing negotiations and for not accepting anything other than full membership' (MHP 2009).

The two main leftist parties – the Democratic Left Party (DSP), which has a national left position, founded in 1985 and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]), a center-left party established by Atatürk in 1923 – are the principal supporters of EU membership. Until the DSP came to power in 2002, it had reservations about policy issues involving agriculture and defense, which had been lifted by the time of the Ecevit government from 11 January until 28 May 1999. Bülent Ecevit's government accepted and signed the conditions for candidacy in Helsinki and adopted major constitutional and legal reforms to start the accession negotiations (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 214).

The CHP states in its party program that it always supported Turkey's membership in the EU and regards it as a process of societal change, which is the extension of Atatürk's modernization. However, it requires a relationship based on equality and respect. It rejects the connection between Cyprus and Turkey's membership as well as conditions that are in conflict with the Lausanne Treaty (CHP n.d.). Until the 1980s, the CHP's position on the EU can be described as Eurosceptic. Although it perceived relations with the EU as closely related to secularization, Westernization, and democracy, it claimed that the integration process might affect Turkey's economy, agriculture, and industry negatively. In the 1970s, the CHP distanced itself from the EU because of the global economic crisis. The turning point in the position of the CHP was the military coup in 1980. After the military coup, the left-wing parties strengthened their support of EU membership despite their differences of opinion on the EU as guarantor of individual rights and freedoms. The new political content of the EU, supporting multiculturalism and human rights, turned the left-wing parties, especially the Social Democratic People's Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti [SHP]) and the CHP, which later replaced it, into parties in favor of the EU (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 213-214). The CHP's position changed again after the 2002 elections and it became more nationalistic and oppositional. The CHP, together with the

MHP, became the strongest opponents of EU reforms and skeptical of the EU's demands for negotiations, responding to widespread fears regarding the EU's position on the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. Particularly from 2005 on, the CHP's opposition, based on a nationalist agenda, was strengthened. The CHP's motive was not only resistance to the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party [AKP]) government. It was due more to the dramatic decline in support for EU membership caused by widespread fears regarding the EU's position on the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. This decline in public support was decisive in determining the CHP's position on the EU and on issues closely connected to EU relations. The CHP hoped to strengthen its political position by playing on the fears of the Turkish public and opposing reforms closely linked with the EU membership criteria (Bardakçı 2010: 30-31).

Two main rightist parties have made important steps in regard to the question of EU membership. The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi [ANAP]) – a center-right party founded in 1983 – called membership in the EC the ultimate aim of the government program under the government of Özal. In April 1987, Özal submitted the formal application for full membership. Under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz, the ANAP assumed a leading role in achieving EU membership and realizing the required reforms. The True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi [DYP]), founded in 1983 as the reincarnation of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti [DP]), was one of the governing parties and, with the CHP, carried Turkey into the Customs Union. After defeat in the 2007 elections, the DYP changed back to its original name, DP, with which the ANAP merged in 2009. The DP's party manifesto indicates its pro-EU agenda and states that the DP is the party that submitted the application for EU membership and is determined to continue the membership process it started (DP n.d.).

The Islamist parties – the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi [National Order Party]), the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi [National Salvation Party]), the RP (Refah Partisi [Welfare Party]), the SP (Saadet Partisi [Felicity Party]), the FP (Fazilet Partisi [Virtue Party]), and the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]) – had serious reservations against Turkey's EU membership. Erbakan rejected EU membership not only for economic reasons but also for political and cultural reasons. He defined the EU as a Christian club, established to demonstrate that the cross was superior to the crescent and regarded Turkey's EU integration as the last stage of the assimilation of Turkey's Islamic identity into the Christian West. He considered it a Kemalist plot to bring Turkey into Western civilization and weaken the growing political influence of Islam

there (Duran 2004; Erbakan 1991; Özen 2010: 87). The radical position of Islamist parties shifted after two crucial events: First, the end of the coalition between the RP and the DYP through the intervention of the National Security Council, and, second, the elimination of the RP by the constitutional court. Since 1999 all Islamist parties (FP, SP, and AKP) have taken a pro-EU position. AKP discourse represented a total departure from the Islamism of the National Outlook Movement and declared its commitments to unconditional EU membership (Duran 2004: 133-134). In the elections of 2002, both the AKP and SP openly advocated membership in the EU. After coming to power, the AKP repeated its intention to not only adopt EU rules but also to apply them effectively (Güneş-Ayata 2003: 216-217).

EU membership is mostly regarded by the political elite in Turkey as the final goal of Turkey's Westernization, the final step in bringing Turkey to where it belongs, to Europe. Although the Islamist and nationalist parties focus mainly on the strategic benefits of membership rather than on the cultural- and identity-related arguments, their position on Turkey's membership basically does not differ from that of the rest of the parties.

### 1.3 Discourse and Discourse Analysis

Analyzing identity is not an easy task and even more challenging is detecting and measuring identity change. Scholars analyzing identity and identity change face several challenges, including selecting the level of analysis, conceptualizing identity, finding the right method for measuring identity change which fits the theoretical framework, and extending the research time span since identity change does not occur overnight. This research will analyze the discursive reconstruction of 'self' and 'other' in Turkish national identity, applying the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the media reports on the political actors.

Discourse is a broad term, which integrates a whole palette of different meanings ranging from a reference to a small sequence of text, through a complete textual variety or very abstract phenomenon (Titscher et al. 2000: 25-26). According to Foucault, discourse does not refer simply to language or speech but to how language works to organize a field of knowledge and practice (Tonkiss 2004: 374). 'Discourse' is a wider term than 'text,' which refers to 'the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part' (Fairclough 1989: 24). The discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way and at the same time limits the other

ways in which the topic can be constructed (Hall 1995: 291). Discourses as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak [...] are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so they conceal their own invention' (Foucault 1974: 49). Drawing from this definition, discourses first construct reality as they shape thoughts and behavior. They also involve the exercise of power in their exclusion of certain possibilities and consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4; Dyberg 1997). Discourse constructs the reality. However, it has a dialectical relationship with social reality, meaning that social reality also reconstructs the discourse. As a systematic ordering of language, discourse involves certain rules, terminology, and conventions, which allow us to analyze how social identities are shaped by looking at media reports. The role of discourses in reproducing social identities becomes more important over time (Fairclough 1992). The relationship between identity and discourse is very powerful. Identity as a two-way process is the result of joint production (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 41; Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002: 23). The way we speak and the way we speak to and about others is an affiliation. Who we are is shaped constantly by the taken-for-granted concepts and assumptions embedded in discourses, but we also contribute to existing discourse by the way we speak (Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002: 23).

Discourse analysis is a broad and complex interdisciplinary field, including theoretical and methodological approaches from diverse disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology, sociology, education, history, politics, and social policy. Different interpretations of the meaning of discourse – such as understanding it solely in linguistic terms as the units of written and spoken communication, or as being derived from, and dependent on, social practices – shape also the methods applied by the researcher. Language as the object of analysis is central to discourse analysis. However, as already outlined, for many researchers, discourse is not equivalent to language and language is not simply a neutral medium for communicating information, but a domain which shapes people's knowledge of the social world (Tonkiss 2004: 373). Language is seen as forming the social meaning and reproducing social identities. Accordingly, discourse analysis is not narrowly limited to the study of texts or language. Discourse analysis is a methodology for analyzing social phenomena that is qualitative, interpretive, and constructionist. It explores how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 3-4; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 7). It not only embodies a set of

techniques for conducting structured, qualitative investigations of texts, but is also a set of assumptions concerning the constructive effects of language (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 5).

Doing discourse analysis, one also faces several challenges. Part of the difficulty in establishing methods for discourse analysis is that discourse analysis is not singular. Distinct forms of analysis are collected under this label, invoking different understandings of discourse, drawing on different disciplines, and specifying different methodologies (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). There is no common way to do discourse analysis. One reason is because in different disciplines researchers apply various frameworks. Second, it is research which is data driven (Tonkiss 2004: 376).

While standard terminology and methods are relatively lacking in discourse analysis, this research draws among the wide range of approaches, on CDA in particular, based on the following definition of CDA:

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice.’ Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. To put the same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258)

Since CDA perceives language use as social practice and explores the links between textual structures and their function in interaction within society, such an analysis is complex and multilevel and can bridge the gap between the micro- and macrolevel (Horvath 2009), which form, according to Van Dijk, one unified whole in everyday interaction and experience. For instance, a racist speech delivered in parliament is a discourse at microlevel, but its enactment as a part of legislation is a discourse at macrolevel (Van Dijk 2001: 354). Socialization and Europeanization research mostly focus on a particular level, the microlevel, and analyze the elite, which creates an aggregation problem. Showing the socialization of agents does not prove the change or shift in the beliefs and norms of a state or society, which is actually as relevant and as effective as the microlevel regarding policy issues. The CDA offers rather a multilevel analysis and helps to capture the interactivity between the levels.

Van Dijk suggests four ways to bridge the micro- and macrolevel through consideration of:

- 1 Members-groups: Language users engage in discourse as members of social groups, organizations, institutions, and, conversely, social groups may act through their members.
- 2 Actions-processes: Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent parts of group actions and social processes, such as legislation and news making.
- 3 Context and social structure: Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part or constitutive of social structure.
- 4 Personal and social cognition: Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with members of the group or culture as whole. Both types of cognition influence interaction and discourse of individual members, whereas shared 'social representations' govern the collective actions of a group. (Van Dijk 2001: 354)

In addition to its potential to conduct multilevel analysis, CDA has the significant strength of being able to deal with the higher level of abstraction in analyzing or measuring identity change. Researchers mostly regard the empirical study of identity change as problematic since it is not something that can be readily observed, like behavior (and as a result most try to draw conclusions about beliefs and identity through observing behavior). Since social identities are created and represented through discourses, CDA offers an ideal way to deal with high levels of abstraction, such as tracing changes in national identity as well as in the definitions of 'self' and 'other,' through the interpretation of discourses. This helps to link analysis to the social context. A common objection to the use of discourse analysis is that it does not actually show the real thoughts and motives of the elites – only what they represent for the masses (Payne 2007: 505-506). However, discourse analysis is not interested in the real motives and interests of the actors. As Waever states:

An advantage of this approach (discourse analysis) compared with psychological approaches studying perceptions and belief systems is that it stays totally clear of any relationship to what people really think. It is not interested in inner motives, in interests or beliefs; it studies something public, that is how meaning is generated and structured in a national context. (Waever 1994: 254)

Moreover the interdisciplinary approach of CDA makes it the most fitting method for the analysis of national identity change. The multidisciplinary approach of CDA combines linguistic historical and social-political perspectives, which enables the researcher to explore the interconnectedness of the discourses and structures (Wodak 2009: 9).

There are many types of CDA, which may be theoretically and analytically quite different (Van Dijk 2001: 353). Among the various CDA I apply in this book is the discourse-historical approach of the Vienna School, which goes beyond pure linguistic analysis and focuses more on the relationship between linguistic means, forms, and structures (Wodak et al. 2009: 9). The Vienna School is a proven method for the analysis of national and collective identity (De Cillia et al. 1999; Weiss 2002; Wodak and Weiss 2004) and has been applied in the analysis of the construction of European identities (Krzyzanowski 2010) in several studies (Ayдын-Düzgıt 2013: 529). The discourse-historical approach is interested in discursive strategies, which are involved in the presentation of a positive 'self' and a negative 'other.' It views the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them' as the basic fundamentals of discourses of identity and difference (Wodak 2001: 73). The main concern of the discourse-historical approach is not to study the linguistic system and its functional and semantic potential in all its dimensions per se, but to include the historical, political, sociological, and psychological dimensions in the analysis, theory, and interpretation of a specific discursive event (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 9).

To identify topics and arguments of the political elite discourse on Turkish identity and definitions of 'self' and 'other' the research will apply CDA to a large sample of textual data. The analysis particularly focuses on the arguments supporting the Europeaness of Turkey and the otherness of the EU from geographical, cultural, historical, and religious perspectives. The analysis will make use of three discursive strategies, as adopted from Wodak:

- 1 Referential or nomination strategies, by which social actors are constructed and represented, for example, through the construction of in-groups and out-groups. This is done through us/them categorization, including metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches.
- 2 Predication strategies, by which social actors as individuals, group members, or groups are labeled negatively or positively (positive representation of the self and negative representation of the other through the stereotypical, evaluative attributions). These strategies are closely related to nomination strategies.



- 3 Argumentation strategies, through which positive and negative attribution are justified. For instance, topoi and fallacies to legitimate the exclusion or inclusion. (2009: 38-44)

Through applying Wodak's discursive strategies, the book will provide answers for the following significant questions related how the Turkish 'self' and 'other' is constructed in the course of the EU accession process: How does Turkey linguistically name and refer to 'self' and 'other' (us/them)? Which characteristics and traits are attributed to 'self' and 'other' (negative or positive labeling)? Which arguments and argumentation, such as topoi, are used to legitimize, justify, and naturalize the certain representations of self and other? (Wodak 2001: 72-73).

#### 1.4 Case Selection: Three Different Time Periods in Turkey-EU Relations

Turkey is an important case to examine for analysis of identity change through interaction with international institutions. There is a considerable amount of academic literature on EU-Turkey relations, but little scholarly work has been done on the impact of the EU on Turkish national identity and/or on Turkey's definitions of 'self' and 'other.' Bahar Rumelili (2004, 2008, 2011), Beyza Tekin (2010), Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues and Ann-Kristin Jonasson (2011), Luigi Narbone and Nathalie Tocci (2009), and Catherine MacMillan (2013) conduct a certain degree of research on EU-Turkey relations from an identity-related perspective. Turkish identity as related to the EU accession process, however, is still an understudied topic, even though it is a critical aspect of EU relations since identity defines behavior.

Turkey searched for a European identity, not only upon the establishment of the republic, but in the twentieth-century Ottoman Empire. To be Western and European was a panacea for all the problems of the country; a path from underdevelopment to the civilized, modern world. Turkey itself redefined its identity as a European and Western country and enforced Westernization of the country. It defined 'self' as European and 'other' as non-European and based its foreign policy on this 'self' and 'other' definition. It was always on the side of Western countries as an ally of NATO and as a member of many European institutions. The views of the Turkish public on the effects of EU membership were mostly positive. Public opinion was, for a long time, overwhelmingly in favor of European membership. For a



long time, Turkey ranked among the countries with the highest enthusiasm for Europe. A huge number of Turkish people wanted to join the EU, thinking that membership would bring more welfare, better health and living conditions, and more democracy. According to opinion polls, about 70% of the Turkish people supported full membership at one point. This readiness to join the EU makes a case study of Turkey of upmost importance, because it was expected that it would have a positive impact on the socialization/identity change of the country. The great willingness of Turkey to be part of a group and to define itself as European and Western should have enhanced the efficiency and success of the socialization process in the course of EU relations. If we cannot find the positive impact of EU relations on Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' or if we find different outcomes than expected, then discovering the conditions which cause an othering process rather than socialization and its consequences is significant not only for researchers but also for policy makers.

The analysis of Turkey's interactions with EU institutions and their impact on identity change in Turkey will be drawn based on three crucial time periods: from 1995 until 1999, from 1999 until 2005, and from 2005 until 2010. Socialization means that actors need some experience and time before they adopt new roles, norms, values, and beliefs. It is exactly this notion of 'time' that troubles the construction of an 'ideal' data set for socialization and identity research (Beyers 2005: 917-918). To deal with this covered time problem, I applied the analysis of party discourses over a long time span, from the start of the Customs Union in 1995 until 2010. This was time consuming but promised a meaningful comparative analysis.

These three different time periods were approached to take account of the ways in which they each demonstrated the following:

- the intensity of Turkey's interactions with the EU;
- the degree of the impact of the EU on Turkey;
- the readiness of Turkey to accept EU conditions;
- the EU's attitude toward Turkey in terms of inclusiveness and/or exclusiveness.

Turkey has a long history of relations with the European Union, beginning in 1963. These relations had significant historical turning points, including engagement with the framework of association (1963), Customs Union (1995), candidacy (1999), accession negotiations (2005), and the partial freeze of Turkey's membership negotiations (2006). I divided the case studies based on important incidents opening or closing new phases in Turkey-EU

relations. The first case study starts with the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1995. This was surely not the most important step for Turkey's full EU membership, however, it was the most important step in which the interactions between Turkey and the EU intensified. Turkey regarded the Customs Union Agreement as a crucial development for its EU membership and as the acknowledgement of its Europeanness by the EU. This caused the illusion in Turkish society that Turkey was one step closer to membership and made the issue of EU membership the number one subject of public and political discourse in Turkey. It also dominated media discourse. In contrast to this great enthusiasm for being part of Europe, readiness for the required conditions was very low. The mentioning of problems like the Kurdish or Cyprus issues by the EU caused discomfort among Turkish politicians and the public. At the same time, the EU lacked the weapon of real conditionality, since there was no real membership negotiation until the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

The second case study starts with the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999, when Turkey was given 'candidate status,' and lasts until the start of the negotiations in 2005. Helsinki was a turning point in Turkey-EU relations because since then the political and economic criteria for membership have become much more stringent and EU candidacy and reforms have become contentious issues in Turkey. After the Helsinki Summit, the salience of EU membership increased remarkably in political and public discourse. During this second period, the European Commission, the part of the EU responsible for implementing decisions of the EU, also decided at the 2002 Copenhagen Summit to start accession negotiations with Turkey without delay in December 2004. In December 2004 at the Brussels Summit, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.

This decision constituted an important and historical landmark in Turkey's relationship with the EU and also marks the start of the third case study. Shortly after the start of the negotiations in 2006, the EU decided to partially suspend the negotiations with Turkey. Since then, relations with the EU have slowed dramatically. The period from 1999 to 2006 can be interpreted as the upturn of the cycle whereas the period since 2006 clearly corresponds to the downward phase (Öniş 2009: 46). In the period from 2006 to 2010 Turkey-EU relations experienced a real deadlock. The exclusivity of the EU had caused a dramatic loss of trust on the Turkish side. In this period Turkey's willingness to join the EU and commit itself to the membership conditions was at the lowest level in parallel with the EU's low willingness to integrate Turkey.

## 1.5 Data Selection

The selection of sources within a case is an important concern for discourse analysis. Discourse analysts incorporate a wide range of linguistic and nonlinguistic data such as speeches, reports, manifests, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions. This empirical data is seen as sets of signifying practices that constitute a 'discourse' and its reality (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). The primary source materials used for this research are newspaper reports of political elite discourse to trace the shift in discourses regarding Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other.' Analyzing the discourses political elites is important since they, according to the work of several constructivists, illustrate how elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies (Cerulo 1997: 390).

Media is the major actor in the transmission of communication (which can affect the national identity dynamic), a forum for exchange, and a medium for the self-observation of society. It is a political actor in the public sphere, raising a voice and contributing to opinion formation by commenting on political issues and events (Koopmans and Pfetsch 2006: 118). It has great power since it can communicate symbols of national identity to the whole nation at the same time (Bloom 1990: 85). As media has a leading role in construction of the nation-state (Siapera 2004: 129), namely construction of the nation-state through unifying experiences of space, time, and language (Anderson 1991) and providing a political space for the citizens (Habermas 1989), media resources provide powerful data for the investigation of national identity discourses. Newspapers can reflect the discourses of political actors and, at the same time, public opinion, as well as illustrate the linkage between the political elite and the citizens by showing which messages are conveyed from the elite to the public. This enables the capture of two important dimensions of identity measurement at the same time: the views of the political elite and what is delivered to the masses as well as the actual interface between the elite and the reactions of the citizens. To achieve this, I examined the political discourses in the Turkish newspapers with the restrictive goal of revealing the changes in the definition of 'self' and 'other' in Turkish political discourse within the framework of EU relations. This is important because political actors' discourses in public media are mostly discourses accessed by the citizens, not the debates in the parliament about specific political issues. This is demonstrated by the data collected in the Eurobarometer, a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly by the European Commission since

1973. As the Eurobarometer shows, the communication between the EU and the public is strongly dependent on media since more than two-thirds of EU citizens consistently identify the media as their most important source of political information (Peter and De Vreese 2004: 3-4).

Particularly in the case of Turkey, mass media analysis is of great importance. Since the establishment of Turkey, media has been the second political power (in some cases even the first power) and intentionally used for the top-down construction of the Turkish national identity. In both Ottoman and republican Turkey, journalists have played an important role in introducing national identity. Journalists compete with political elites in their claim to be the true expression of popular aspiration, which, in a true Jacobinist manner, they actually define what those aspirations should be. They challenge governments when the governments do not hold the same views that they themselves support, or when the governments do not function the way journalists think they should. In short, journalists have become the second estate in Turkish politics, after the politicians. As Turkish politicians of the early 1990s tended to place as much emphasis on their images as on concrete policies as a means to gather votes, one may even say that journalists became the first estate (Heper and Demirel 1996: 110-112).

Four newspapers associated with various citizens groups and linked to different political parties were chosen for discourse analysis in order to mirror the political diversity of the discourse. *Hürriyet* identifies itself as liberal-conservative, has a strong nationalist stance and is one of the three largest newspapers in Turkey. *Milliyet* can be viewed as left-liberal. In the first years after its establishment, it supported the DP, which was a right-wing party but, with time, it shifted more to the left. Although the same media mogul has owned *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet* for a long time and there is a certain overlap in their daily coverage, *Hürriyet* has a larger circulation and a more nationalist approach. *Yeni Şafak* is a conservative newspaper that supports the ruling Justice and Development Party. *Cumhuriyet* is a center-left, Kemalist, and secular newspaper, founded on 7 May 1924. Politically, it mainly supports the CHP. Choosing four different newspapers will help avoid the selection bias of the press. For each of these four newspapers, political actors' discourses related to the national identity dynamic were analyzed. Moreover, I looked at the articles of columnists and analyzed their discourses to enable a diversity of the textual choices since they also are influential political actors and have a very significant role in Turkish politics. Columnists write daily articles on important political issues, mainly supporting a particular party and delivering this party's discourse

on the issues. Therefore, the writings of columnists are also used as relevant data in this research.

The data selection is not limited to texts that directly discuss Turkish national identity in course of EU relations. Texts about the Kurdish issue and to a limited extent about the Cyprus issue in the framework of EU relations were also selected as relevant data for the investigation since these two issues were from the beginning at the center of the negotiations with the EU and widely affected Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' as highly sensitive national issues.

*The Kurdish Issue:* The Kurdish issue is Turkey's most imminent and crucial problem. As Kirişci puts it: 'The Kurdish question in Turkey can be seen as a function of the state's failure to reconsider the definition of its national identity in a manner that allows Kurds to express and live their ethnic and cultural identity in public' (Kirişci 2011: 336). Turkey has been tackling the Kurdish problem since the establishment of the new republic in the early 1920s. The new geopolitical conditions after World War I gave the Kurds hope that they could establish their own national state. The Treaty of Sèvres signed after the peace negotiations in 1920 divided the Ottoman territory between France, Britain, Italy, and Greece and foresaw an independent Kurdish and Armenian state in the territories today belonging to Turkey (Hurewitz 1956: 74). The Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified and replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, establishing an independent Turkish state and removing all promises of independence for Kurds and Armenians. As a result, within the period from 1920 to 1938, Turkey faced seventeen rebellions, three of which were major, namely the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, the Ararat Rebellion in 1930, and the Dersim Rebellion in 1937, which were harshly crushed. In the 1960s and 1970s Kurds resisted against the repressive policies of the Turkish state. Following the 1980 coup many of the key figures of the Kurdish movement were imprisoned and others escaped from Turkey, as the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan [Kurdistan Workers' Party]), the head of the Kurdish separatist movement, gradually became more radicalized. The socioeconomic inequalities between the Kurdistan region and Western Turkey, the emergence of a Kurdish movement in Iraq, and the highly ethicized public political space in Turkey also gave rise to the radicalization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Then between 1984 and 1999, Turkey was the scene of armed conflict between the PKK and government forces, leading to the loss of about 35,000 lives on both sides. The terrorist activities of the PKK and the discourse of separatism strongly linked the Kurdish issue with terrorism. This led in turn to favoring a military solution,

which made a peaceful resolution of the problem impossible (Heper 2007: 1-11).

Turkey's handling of the Kurdish issue was impacted by the intensification of Turkey-EU relations beginning in the late 1990s. In 1999, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya and brought back to Turkey, where he was detained. At this time Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for membership in the European Union. The interaction between the EU and Turkey at the time meant that there was official support for an open debate about the Kurdish issue in Turkey, which gave rise to a reform process (Dyson 2007: 53). Since the intensification of relations with the EU and the developments in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish issue has been perceived not only as a security and military issue but also as a problem with social, economic, and identity dimensions. After avoiding discussion of the issue for many years, reforms, such as granting the right to broadcast in Kurdish and the right to learn Kurdish in private language schools, were enacted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the lives of Kurds in Turkey improved (Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007: 81-82). However, Turkey's approach to the EU's requests in regard of the Kurdish issue was ambivalent. On the one hand, it was ready to enact reforms to improve the rights of Kurdish citizens. At the same time, the reform process awakened Turkey's fears that the EU had a hidden agenda and wanted to divide Turkey and damage its territorial integrity.

*The Cyprus Conflict:* Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, the situation has been a constant source of international tension. The EC's involvement in the Cyprus issue goes back to the 1960s when Turkey and Greece became associate members of the EC and when the UK applied for full membership. Over the next decades, the EC's involvement increased after the main actors in the conflict joined the EC – the UK joined the EC in 1973 and Greece in 1981 – or was accepted as a candidate. Turkey was accepted as a candidate in Helsinki in 1999. Turkey's joining the Customs Union and its ambition to become a full EU member created a significant linkage between the Cyprus issue and Turkey-EU relations (Müftüler-Baç and Güney 2005: 281-287). Accession to the EU demanded from Turkey a good relationship with its neighbors such as Greece and Armenia and peaceful external relationships with other states. Consequently, this historical problem became a great obstacle in negotiations for EU membership (Tsakonas 2009: 109).

From the beginning of the current decade, the Cyprus issue was a key marker of national identity and political change for Turkey. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey's stance was based on rejecting any linkage

between the Cyprus issue and relations with the EU. In late 2002 the Turkish attitude toward accepting such a linkage began to shift (Ulusoy and Verney 2009: 115-117) because EU membership was closely linked to resolution of the Cyprus dispute and the obvious benefits of full membership were overriding issues (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008: 135-136). However, generally speaking, Turkey has perceived the EU's intervention in the issue negatively, considered it an application of the Treaty of Sèvres, and felt discriminated against by EU policies. The Greek Cypriots' acceptance into the EU, in spite of their rejection of the reunification of the island as well as the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006 because Turkey did not open ports and airports to Greece as required in the Additional Protocol, caused significant feelings of discrimination and loss of trust. Now the EU took the position of Turkey's 'other,' joining Greece, which had perpetually been the 'other' of Turkey.

These two national issues are highly relevant in defining Turkish identity and for examining relations with the EU and addressing the self/other definitions within the framework of EU relations. Resolution of the Kurdish issue and Cyprus conflict are not official conditions for EU membership. However, the tolerance for internal minorities has emerged as one criterion of European identity. Demonstrated commitment to this principle is one test would-be members of the European Union must pass (Citrin and Sides 2004: 178). The Kurdish issue and conflict in Cyprus are unstated obstacles to Turkey's membership (Hughes 2011; Öniş 2001: 40). They are at the center of the negotiation process and are additional membership requirements among the Copenhagen criteria (Yeşilada 2013: 45). Debates and discourses on these issues were almost always linked to the identity issue and led to questioning of Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other.' For instance, the debates on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues within the framework of EU relations, as well the EU's requirements regarding these issues, reminded Turkey of Europe's position as 'other' during and after World War I when efforts were made to divide the country based on the Treaty of Sèvres. The debates on this issue caused Europe to be seen in Turkey as 'other.' Since discourses on the 'self' and 'other' are to be found more intensively in debates on these sensitive national issues, the analyses of political actors' discourses on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues within the framework of EU relations is a good way to analyze the 'self' and 'other' definition.

In the preparation phase of the discourse analysis, I first selected all articles which seemed to be related to EU relations, the Kurdish issue, and Cyprus. In a second step, I filtered this initial body of documents and eliminated the duplicate and irrelevant articles, which were either multiple appearances in different newspapers or not directly related to the research



topic. The final dataset contained 342 articles. Since in the center of the discourse analysis in this study is the question of how Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' shifted over time, I analyzed and commented in more detail on those documents, which delivered directly relevant information on the definitions of 'self' and 'other.' Analyses of identity change done through the discursive analysis of the definition of 'self' and 'other' – as in this book – offer more promise for tracing socialization and identity change than studies utilizing quantitative analysis. This is potentially a more promising method because it allows for a fundamental look at the most difficult, though most central, component of the socialization process, namely, how one shows changes in how agents understand their identities and preferences in the course of the socialization process (Johnston 2005: 1041; Abdelal et al. 2009). Translation of all analyzed articles was done by me. I attempted to keep the meaning and style of the original articles.

## 1.6 Outline of the Book

This book consists of eight chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter provides a short introduction of key concepts such as socialization and social and national identity as they are related to the theoretical framework for the case studies. The chapter also presents the basic features of Turkish national identity. The three subsequent chapters then deal with empirical analyses of the changes in 'self' and 'other' of Turkey. The third chapter presents the first case study, which deals with the time period from 1995 to 1999 (from the Customs Union to the Helsinki Summit) and analyzes two important turning points, the Customs Union and the Luxembourg Summit. The analysis of the discourses during and after the Customs Union shows that Turkey's readiness to join the EU was very high. Accordingly, the description of self was predominantly European. However, analysis of the period of the Luxembourg Summit which left Turkey outside of the group of candidate states gave rise to the negative labeling of the EU and the definition of Europe as Turkey's 'other,' grounded in historical negative memories. This chapter illustrates how the discourses shifted parallel to the EU's exclusivity and Turkey's enthusiasm for joining Europe was dampened.

The following chapter, Chapter 4, analyzes the period from 1999 to 2005. During this period Turkey experienced intensive interactions, demonstrated great enthusiasm for EU membership, and underlined its 'Europeanness.' The chapter's analysis focuses on two main turning points regarding Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' which impacted its behavior: the



September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks and the elections which brought a landslide victory for the AKP and changed the Turkish political landscape dramatically. The discourse analysis illustrates that these two incidents resulted in Turkey's increasing use of the topoi of usefulness, the clash of civilizations, and values by portraying of itself as a (European) Muslim country and a bridge between two civilizations, in a bid to be accepted by the EU. This period was also fruitful for Kurdish reforms. Nevertheless, the belief that the EU did not intend to accept Turkey, but only wanted it kept busy, contributed to Turkey's distrust of the EU and strengthened the otherness of the EU for Turkey, giving rise to an increasing negative labeling of the EU in conjunction with the topos of history.

The last case study, in the fifth chapter, illustrates the influence of the very short-lived negotiation process and the stagnation of the process on account of Turkey's description of 'self' and 'other.' The analysis shows that during this period, the increasingly exclusive behavior of the EU gave rise to dramatic changes in Turkey's self/other definition. As a result of the EU's exclusive stance, Turkey's enthusiasm for the EU was replaced in this period with indifference and public support for the EU declined dramatically. The slowdown of the EU negotiations also gave rise to Turkey's search for new alternatives, created desire to develop relations with the Middle East, and caused the debate to shift on its axis. This was strengthened by the suspension of the negotiations only one year after they started, creating the fear of a hidden EU agenda, or Sèvres Syndrome (Sevr Sendromu), which, in turn, strengthened the use of the topoi of threat and history.

The sixth chapter deals with the new role, identity, and direction for Turkey. This chapter focuses particularly on Turkey's new regional role in the Middle East, resulting from its exclusion from the EU and several other individual, systemic, structural, economic, ideological, and pragmatic factors. It illustrates how Turkey was assuming a leading role in the region based on its multidimensional unique identity and how this role to a great extent was diminished in the course of developments in the region after the Arab Spring uprisings.

The concluding chapter of the book summarizes the main argument and central findings of the research. It makes clear the implications and results of the change in Turkey's definition of 'self' and 'other' and evaluates the comparative case studies. It argues that favorable international and domestic conditions together with the EU's exclusive manner and its top-down approach, gave rise to a more self-confident Turkey. Driven by strategic, economic, ideological, and emotional motivations, Turkey increasingly stressed its unique multidimensional identity. The EU process, recognized

in the international arena as one of the most powerful socialization process, precipitated a change in Turkey's almost solely European self-definition, which, in turn, had significant consequences in its domestic policies and international relations.