

ENDING RURAL HUNGER

Issues for consideration by
the Rome-based agencies

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASAP - Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Program (IFAD Grant)

CRS - Creditor Reporting System

ERH - Ending Rural Hunger (Brookings Project)

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization

FNS - Food and Nutrition Security

IFAD - International Fund for Agriculture Development

IFI - International Finance Institution

P4P - Purchase for Progress Program (WFP)

RBAs – Rome-based agencies

SDG 2 – Sustainable Development Goal 2

TCI - Investment Centre (FAO)

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP - World Food Program

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Historically, the international community has dealt with food insecurity through innovations in the multilateral system. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was established in 1945 as the post-World War II need for improved food supply became clear. The World Food Program (WFP) was created in 1963 as the first “workable scheme to provide food aid.” The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was born as a response to the food price spikes of 1973. More recently, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program emerged from a G-8 meeting in L'Aquila Italy. Other multilaterals, including the World Bank Group and regional development banks, have also emphasized agriculture and food security to varying degrees throughout their existence.

With this as context, the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a target of ending hunger by 2030. One central question remains: Who should take the lead and be accountable for achievement of this goal? This paper argues that the Rome-based food agencies of the United Nations (RBAs) should play this role. A more efficient, coordinated approach by the RBAs has considerable potential to result in a combined, sustainable impact that is greater than the sum of the individual parts alone. The presence of these three agencies in Rome—FAO, WFP, and IFAD—offers real opportunities to capitalize on their proximity as a source of diversified products and services, and to better-integrate packages that build on their respective strengths. This implies that a case can be made to build on their differences rather than their similarities, on their respective visions of the future (as agreed by their governance structures), and on their unique networks of partners.

The risk of overlap among the three RBAs dealing with hunger is concerning, but their mandates clearly define the unique purpose of each agency. The **FAO** is an important forum in which to formulate policies and negotiate international agreements; generate data, statistics and knowledge to inform policies and normative work; and provide technical assistance and capacity building to member countries. The **WFP** is a leader in the provision of emergency recovery and development-based food assistance; supports safety net programs; and is on the frontline of addressing the challenge of bridging humanitarian and development needs. **IFAD** is a specialized U.N. agency that operates as an international financial institution (IFI). It is the only IFI exclusively dedicated to smallholder agriculture, rural development, and related climate adaptation. It provides financing (loans and grants) for programs aligned with countries' own development strategies and generates the knowledge and policy advice needed to assist them in reducing poverty in rural areas.

Between them, the RBAs understand needs at the country level, assess the adequacy of policies and institutional commitments by government to end hunger, and track the financing available for investment in hunger-reducing projects and programs. This trio of needs, policies, and resources forms the conceptual basis for effective collaboration between the RBAs.

Currently, the WFP is more of a competitor with the other RBAs than a partner. Its stakeholders have opted to encourage WFP to undertake more development activities in its new strategy,¹ leading to potential overlap with other agencies. This is unfortunate. Achieving the SDG targets will require each agency to scale up activities and to focus on substantive areas of comparative advantage: technical and policy advice by FAO; logistics, storage and reduction of post-harvest losses by WFP; investments in smallholder community organizations, access to rural finance, value chains, and marketing by IFAD.

The RBAs are well-positioned to establish a shared analytical framework to guide operational programming decisions so as to contribute more effectively to SDG goals and targets, both through their own efforts and via partnerships with other stakeholders, including business, but have not yet taken steps to put this in place.

¹ https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000019573/download/?_ga=2.227429726.2122430296.1509131310-46389931.1496415650

While the comparative advantage of each institution should drive RBA collaboration, agency leaders should recognize the benefits of collaboration and design ways to facilitate coordination and processes to report progress and bottlenecks.

Staff incentives may well be what will ultimately make efficient and effective collaboration possible. Clearly, strong support and commitment from leadership in each agency will be an essential element in this respect. Collaboration requires mutual consultation, coordination, and detailed planning and will be judged on its merits (i.e., adding value in a more cost-efficient way to benefit smallholders, women, and youth in rural areas). The benefits of such collaboration invariably must justify the transaction costs. That said, learning and knowledge sharing among RBAs offers special benefits in view of the considerable experience within these three agencies, albeit sometimes with duplication of effort. This could offer efficiency gains, particularly in transmitting the outcomes of global policy dialogue on SDGs to the country level and, most importantly, in applying them at the field level to the benefit of the poor.

Improving RBA collaboration should not require the creation of additional bureaucracy, such as formal inter-agency mechanisms and committees. There are already initiatives underway that could facilitate collaboration. These include: regular meetings in which RBA heads discuss and decide on selected strategic/policy issues; the RBA Senior Consultative Group, which meets roughly every four months to discuss global issues and initiatives of mutual interest and also (as appropriate) to agree on targeted annual collaborative priorities; and several ad hoc working groups focused on specific undertakings. However, the chances of achieving greater collaborative efficiency will most likely come at the field office level where operational realities are in better focus and where staff more readily appreciate the specific areas of complementarity between the various RBA programs in that particular country.

Although the FAO clearly has the statistical monitoring capacity to play a major role in monitoring progress toward the SDGs (especially in “hot spot” countries and regions), there are large potential benefits to ensuring close collaboration with WFP’s extensive network of field staff who routinely collect information via the food security monitoring system to feed into their own programs. Relatedly, IFAD offers a particularly important element to scale up investments in smallholder agriculture and rural development as well as to monitor the state of the rural investment climate. Although improved coordination with other RBAs is clearly a necessary element in achieving SDG 2, it has been suggested that an equally (if not more) important factor would be to increase IFAD’s investment lending capacity and, in the process, improve its efficiency to disburse funds for smallholder development.

INTRODUCTION

Attention has turned to implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Achieving the targets set under SDG 2 (*SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture*) will require a significant departure from business-as-usual (see, for example, Kharas et al. 2015, *Ending Rural Hunger*, www.endingruralhunger.org). Against this backdrop, this report focuses on the roles, responsibilities and effectiveness of the three U.N. Rome-based agencies (RBAs): the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the World Food Program (WFP); and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).² It asks how they can support transformational changes in food and agriculture systems, which in turn requires “scaled-up efforts from all stakeholders involved—among developing countries, developed countries, scientists, educators, private investors, multilateral institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and advocacy organizations” (Kharas et al. 2015, p. 14).

Description of the three Rome-based agencies (RBAs)

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Background, mission statement and strategic objectives

FAO was developed out of a 1943 meeting in Hot Springs, Virginia, with countries committing to set up a food and agriculture organization. FAO was officially established as a specialized U.N. agency in 1945 in Quebec, Canada, to deal with the post-World War II food insecurity needs. Today, it is an inter-governmental organization with 194 Member Nations, two associate members, and one member organization (European Union). Its mission is to achieve food security for all, to ensure that all people have regular access to enough high quality food in order to lead active, healthy lives. To achieve this mission, FAO operates under five strategic objectives:

- (i) Help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition.
- (ii) Make agriculture more productive and sustainable.
- (iii) Reduce rural poverty.
- (iv) Enable inclusive and efficient agriculture and food systems.
- (v) Increase the resilience of livelihoods from disasters.

Implicit within these objectives is the sustainable management and utilization of natural resources (land, water, air, climate, genetic resources) for the benefit of current and future generations. Nutrition, food security, climate change, gender, and governance are cross cutting themes. FAO's strategic objectives dovetail well with the targets established under the SDGs.

Structure and finance

FAO comprises six departments (Agriculture and Consumer Protection; Economic and Social Development; Fisheries and Aquaculture; Forestry; Corporate Services; and Technical Cooperation and Program Management (See Organization Chart in Annex 1)). It has its headquarters in Rome plus a range of decentralized units: five regional, nine sub-regional, 80 country offices, and six liaison offices.

Fixed term (or continuing appointments) number over 1,700 professionals (covering a wide range of technical disciplines related to agriculture and food production) plus over 1,500 support staff; 57 percent based in Rome; 37 percent women. Of its total financial resources, approximately 8 percent are funded by assessed contributions through the FAO Technical Cooperation Program, and the remaining 92 percent comes from voluntary contributions through government cooperative programs (34 percent), the Unilateral

² Reference material includes: consultations with staff and advisers at all three RBAs; the paper entitled, “Perspective Paper on RBA collaboration,” presented to IFAD's Executive Board in September, 2015; public sources of information available on each individual RBA website; the author's personal experience working with these institutions over many years, primarily with IFAD and FAO; and the findings of Phase I of the Brookings study.

Trust Fund (8 percent), and other Trust Funds (50 percent) including U.N. joint programs. The total FAO budget for 2016-2017 is approximately \$2.6 billion, 39 percent from assessed contributions (covering regular FAO administrative budget and 61 percent from voluntary contributions (covering technical and emergency assistance to governments for clearly defined purposes linked to the results framework, as well as core FAO work). Although FAO works with governments, it does not leverage the funds it receives in contrast to the IFIs (World Bank, IFAD) with whom it provides technical support. FAO also has limited political power since its key counterparts, ministries of agriculture and food, are often weak interlocutors within government.

In terms of levels of FNS funding,³ FAO is the fifth-largest multilateral donor over the 2010-2014 period with \$376 million disbursed annually, disbursed for agricultural policy & administrative management (40 percent) and agricultural education/training.

Programs/projects

In addition to its core technical expertise, FAO focuses on governance and results-based management. It also recognizes (and provides technical support to) the crucial role of inclusive and efficient cooperatives and producer organizations in supporting small-scale agricultural producers and marginalized groups such as women and youth. FAO is also very active in facilitating South-South cooperation initiatives (technical expertise, study tours and training, policy dialogue, and frameworks for cooperation) using its extensive country level presence.

Corporate monitoring and reporting and statistics at FAO

FAO's results framework allows it to map results and impacts. A system of baseline studies from sample countries (up to 80 in some cases) is built up to feed into a corporate outcome assessment to identify changes in outcomes (against the baselines) in part to identify FAO's perceived contribution to the changes identified. In principle, FAO's Statistical Program allows for close monitoring of SDG 2 in high priority, targeted (including hot spot) countries. FAO is in effect a global depository for food and agriculture statistics, developing methods and standards, technical assistance services, and disseminating data for global monitoring. Clearly, the need for evidence-based decision making by governments and producer organizations puts a greater focus on statistics and their role in measuring and monitoring progress toward national and international development goals. In this context, FAO is the custodian of 21 indicators of SDGs, supporting country capacity to develop their own information indicators. Statistics help explain the implications on FNS, which needs by definition to be coordinated across sectors and development partners. FAO is constantly updating its statistics, with new work underway on food loss and waste, on a food-insecurity-experience scale, and on private investment in agriculture, for example, but it primarily works with government statistics offices and publishes only data that are approved by governments. This leads both to publication delays as well as to credibility issues with selected data.

The World Food Program (WFP)

Background, mission statement, and strategic objectives

Established in 1963, the WFP was initially started as a three-year experiment after the director of the U.S. Food for Peace Program spoke of the need for a larger, multilateral organization to promote world food security, i.e., it is the food aid arm of the U.N. system. The U.S. provides most of the basic funding and organizes fund raising campaigns during emergencies like famine and natural disasters. This means that WFP does not have to rely on regular multinational replenishments as IFAD does.

WFP's mission is to end global hunger by ensuring that no child goes to bed hungry and that the poorest and most vulnerable, particularly women and children, can access nutritious food. WFP supports national,

³ The ERH project uses the following definition of FNS: Basic Nutrition (CRS code 12240), Agriculture (311-), Fishing (313-), Agro-Industries (32161), Rural Development (43040), and Food aid/Food Security Programs (52010). Note that this excludes humanitarian aid, such as material relief assistance and services, as well as emergency food aid.

regional, and local food security and nutrition plans. It is able to respond to fast-moving, complex crises by scaling up logistics, supply chain, and telecommunications operations.

WFP's core objectives are to:

- (i) Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.
- (ii) Support food and nutrition security (FNS) and rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings following emergencies.
- (iii) Reduce risk and enable people, communities, and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs.
- (iv) Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger.

WFP's New Strategic Plan (2017-2021) is a comprehensive document that was recently updated. In essence, WFP (and its partners) will work to achieve zero hunger by 2030 in alignment with the SDGs. As the world's largest humanitarian organization addressing global hunger and nutrition, WFP's comparative advantage and long experience (vis-à-vis the other RBAs) is in emergency, life-saving efforts that benefit the poorest and most marginal people. However, WFP has recognized that most food aid is recurring; the same countries require support year-after-year. To end, this cycle requires investment in food supply. WFP's strategic plan recognizes that the SDGs require moving beyond saving lives to changing lives throughout the world, not only in least developed countries. Guided by humanitarian principles, WFP's plan pays special attention to strengthening local emergency responders and saving lives and livelihoods. In the process, "WFP will work in synergy with partners to combine and leverage complementary strengths and resources and thereby will rely on partners with stronger comparative advantages which might be better placed to respond to the specific challenges at the individual country level."

In the context of achieving SDG 2, WFP's plan specifically recognizes the "paramount" importance of the partnership between the three RBAs and the "significant" efforts made in recent years to enhance this collaboration to "capture all available synergies and complementarities and avoid conflicts, overlaps and duplication." Since no single agency has either the resources or capacity to deal with all the problems of hunger, WFP attaches great importance on collaboration with other agencies (the World Bank, NGOs, private traders, and others), particularly with its parent body, FAO and the U.N. system as a whole.

WFP specifically needs to focus on coordinating with the other RBAs on country level strategies, specifically on improving food security and nutrition of smallholders and ensuring that food systems are sustainable. Smallholders account for a significant portion of WFP beneficiaries and potential food suppliers during emergencies. Beyond the humanitarian emergency response needs, WFP will have to be particularly aware of the major ongoing efforts of IFAD and FAO on increasing market access for farmers and related value chain initiatives.

WFP also has a comprehensive network of food security analysts who carry out a range of assessments to identify hunger and food insecure populations and study underlying causes, for example, the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analyses, emergency assessments, and, with other partners, food security monitoring systems, which also includes following market prices. However, these activities focus on a few countries and therefore cannot be used for global comparative analysis. WFP's statistical capacity will be particularly important with respect to FAO as the agency builds global references for FNS standards, statistics and information. At present, the latter is a key responsibility of FAO within the U.N. system. Relatedly, WFP's current performance management system comprises two results frameworks – one related to management (efficiency of service provision) and the other pertaining to strategic advancement (progress toward improving the lives of beneficiaries).

In terms of levels of FNS funding, WFP disburses \$218 million annually, of which \$181 million per year is for emergency food aid. Of WFP's FNS funding, half is allocated to basic nutrition, and half to food aid and security programs.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

Background, mission statement, and strategic objectives

IFAD is a specialized U.N. agency established in 1977 as an IFI as one of the major outcomes of the 1974 World Food Conference to finance agricultural development projects primarily for food production in developing countries. Its overall focus is on rural poverty reduction, hunger and malnutrition, raising rural productivity and incomes in developing countries, and improving the overall quality of life in these rural areas. IFAD supports investment projects and programs in a wide range of agro-ecological, socio-economic, and cultural environments.

IFAD's mission statement is "enabling inclusive and sustainable rural transformation." IFAD's Strategic Framework (2016-2025) links well with Agenda 2030. The targets under SDG 2 also offer clear support for IFAD's mandate of investing in rural people and enabling inclusive and sustainable transformation of rural areas, notably through smallholder agriculture-led growth. IFAD is recognized for its experience, knowledge, and implementation performance, and as such is well placed to play a larger role in helping countries fulfil their priorities relative to Agenda 2030. To fulfill this agenda, IFAD recognizes that it will need to work in a way that is:

- (i) Bigger: Mobilizing substantially more funds and resources for investment in rural areas.
- (ii) Better: Strengthening the quality of IFAD's country programs through innovation, knowledge sharing, partnerships and policy engagement.
- (iii) Smarter: Delivering development results in a cost-effective way that best responds to partner countries' evolving needs.

Structure and finance:

IFAD currently employs about 530 staff, mostly based at headquarters in Rome; however decentralization is underway and a growing number of small field offices are already operating. IFAD comprises 82 member states and has a geographically diverse staff, 59 percent of whom are women.

IFAD is an IFI that considers itself a global leader working exclusively on agricultural and rural development in developing countries. It has a record of successful projects (more than \$18 billion invested since 1978, affecting approximately 460 million people). It has a small core of in-house technical staff in its PT Department, supported by an extensive cadre of experienced, short-term consultants including some provided by FAO's Investment Center (TCI). Many of its projects are innovative as well as increasing awareness of the critical importance of investing in agriculture and rural development to reduce poverty and improve food security. As such, IFAD pilots activities that are often scaled up by client governments and other donors. IFAD's programs also recognize that smallholder farmers need to be at the center of this rural agenda. IFAD investments support and scale-up a wide range of investment initiatives to improve rural livelihoods, organize smallholder farmer groups to increase productivity and improve their access to markets. Based on its own experience (and lessons learned more broadly by other development agencies, the private sector and NGOs), IFAD has also developed valuable toolkits on such activities as strengthening smallholder institutions and organizations and value chains. The World Bank follows a similar approach (technical reports).

IFAD has a particular focus on gender equality, women's empowerment and youth, especially in its community-driven development activities. It also works closely with existing farmers' organizations already established in developing countries (e.g., Pan African Forum, FETRAECE in Brazil, and APACRA in Colombia). Importantly, IFAD also has a grant financing facility focused specifically on smallholders, the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Program (ASAP).

IFAD has its own internal Office of Evaluation (similar to other IFIs), which carries out ex-post evaluations of IFAD strategies and operations to promote accountability and learning and thereby improve IFAD and its partners' performance in supporting rural transformation in its client countries. This feeds into the pipeline

of projects and scaling up of successful approaches, as well as into discussions at the country level of IFAD's future country strategy papers.

In terms of levels of FNS funding, IFAD is the second-largest multilateral donor over the 2010-2014 period with \$688 million on average per year.⁴ This places it behind only the World Bank Group, who annually disbursed \$1.7 billion to the International Development Association and \$1.0 billion to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Just over half of IFAD's disbursement goes toward agricultural policy and administrative management (17 percent), rural development (17 percent), agricultural financial services (10 percent), and agricultural development (9 percent).

⁴ This study and the ERH project overall uses IFAD commitments since their disbursements are not reported in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).


HOW DO THE RBAS TARGET THEIR ACTIVITIES?

Targeting efforts

All three RBAs work diligently to target their programs, but each has its own system for establishing priorities. IFAD is particularly rigorous in monitoring of outputs, outcomes, impact, and sustainability. WFP's extensive network of field staff ensures that its emergency and development programs are reaching the desired target groups suffering from inadequate quantity and quality of food in their diet. Brookings' Ending Rural Hunger project provides a simple framework for assessing targeting. In general, international support contributes more to achievement of the SDGs when: i) countries are further away from the target (their needs are higher); ii) countries have supportive policy and institutional frameworks in place to encourage public and private investment (they have good policies toward agricultural and rural development); and iii) they are constrained from undertaking additional public investments because of a lack of resources.

When examining the three RBAs based on these targeting criteria of Needs, Policies, and Resources relative to other multilaterals, the following picture emerges.

Figure 1. Multilateral targeting



Source: www.endingruralhunger.org

WFP strongly targets the “needs” vector, unsurprising given its focus on countries in need of humanitarian efforts. It also operates in many of the poorest countries in the world that have the least resources available for investing in long-term food security. IFAD ranks in the middle of the pack; despite its focus on financing, a large share of IFAD resources go to countries that do not have sound enabling environments. In this, it is

closer to International Development Association than to the Asian Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, all of which operate in environments with better agricultural policies. FAO, meanwhile, operates more broadly across countries, regardless of their needs, policies or resources. The tensions involved in targeting are highlighted by the differences observed across agencies. In general, institutions that deal with middle-income countries operate in environments that have better policies and more domestic resources for investment, but less need for help in meeting the ending hunger targets. In middle-income countries, the role of external support becomes catalytic. Poor countries, on the other hand, need resources for investment. Those resources, however, will not achieve the transformational change required without appropriate policy reforms. Thus, the need-focused agencies like WFP cannot simply try to invest in improvements of food supply without an associated effort to conduct a policy dialogue, something that FAO and IFAD are better equipped to do.

Focus on nutrition in rural areas

All three RBAs have a focus on rural nutrition as part of their strategic objectives as noted previously. However, WFP has a clearer link to nutritional needs than FAO and IFAD. In this respect, WFP is working to develop closer links between smallholder production and providing food aid to schools, hospitals, and children. WFP procurement from smallholders for distribution to the needy is currently being piloted in several countries, e.g., Brazil, Senegal, Mozambique, and Malawi. Governments are also showing increased willingness to buy in bulk from smallholders and then distribute the food locally to the needy. This clearly requires a government policy framework supported by effective donor coordination to prepare and implement such national nutrition strategies. WFP's Purchase for Progress (P4P) program is an integral part of this process, although it has not always been considered successful (e.g., in Haiti) by other RBAs. In the case of IFAD, all nutrition activities have apparently been moved out of technical operations to the office of the president, presumably to raise the profile of nutrition in IFAD's work. FAO and WFP are among the top 10 bilateral and multilateral donors to nutrition official development assistance efforts; however, the gap between them at below \$25 million on average per year and the top bilateral donors like the U.S. and Canada (both over \$150 million) is large. IFAD, meanwhile, does not register any nutrition assistance in the creditor reporting system over both the study period (2010-2014), as well as more recently. If the profile of nutrition is to be raised in IFAD's work, reporting and scaling up of nutrition efforts must be improved.

Focus on smallholders, women, and youth

All three RBAs have a clear focus on smallholder farmers, women and youth. That said, apart from WFP's procurement plans to purchase more from smallholders, among the RBAs, IFAD (as an IFI) has the greatest potential (with continuing strong technical cross support from FAO) to upscale investments in smallholder agriculture and rural development in order to achieve SDG 2 targets. Although it is clear that improved coordination with other RBAs is a necessary element of improving the focus on smallholders (see "RBA Coordination" section below), it could also be argued that an equally important factor would be to increase the actual level of resources to, and efficiency of disbursement from, IFAD. At current operational levels, IFAD cannot make a significant dent in the hundreds of millions of smallholders that are estimated to be food insecure. It can scale up in two ways: by expanding its program of work (investments made with IFAD-mobilized resources, either grants or loans) and by expanding its program of work (co-financing with other partners, including governments). Scaling up will be easier for IFAD to achieve in middle-income countries, where the absorptive capacity for loans is higher and co-financing is more feasible. That could in turn release more concessional resources for investments in the poorest countries.

It is also worth noting that the RBAs have distinct comparative advantages. For example, in countries with weak ministries of agriculture or where FNS gaps are technical in nature, FAO (with its relatively strong technical and policy capacity compared to the other RBAs) would be best suited to address generic issues affecting smallholders, although with the caveat that many agriculture ministries do not themselves prioritize smallholders. But if solutions are to be found in reducing post-harvest losses, and improving storage and quality control of food products, then WFP would have more experience to offer. IFAD would have the

comparative advantage in community group organization, value chains, marketing, and access to rural finance. Furthermore, IFAD has a solid grants program, including for smallholders, called the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Program (ASAP). In general, FAO is already the largest recipient of IFAD grants, with \$8 million granted in the last year and a half. IFAD grants to FAO or WFP could also provide much more flexibility in jump starting innovative collaborative ideas and processes in country programs and possibly leveraging a larger IFAD lending portfolio. However, access to IFAD grants will increasingly call for a competitive process and therefore would not necessarily be allocated to a partner RBA.

Role and capacity to provide operational support to agriculture activities

In principle (as noted above) FAO, among the RBAs, has the distinct comparative advantage in technical areas of agricultural production and policymaking in support of smallholder farmers. In this respect, FAO does work closely with IFAD and is a major recipient of grants from ASAP in support of smallholder agriculture. The challenge of working with FAO tends to be internal institutional (notably administrative) bottlenecks and inefficiencies. In addition, experienced technical staff are often oriented toward global public goods and modeling activities and are therefore less likely to join scheduled missions in the field as technical specialists either preparing or supervising projects. Even FAO's own TCI unit, which supports IFAD and other IFIs in project development, sometimes finds it hard to obtain in-house skills to staff its missions and therefore tends to use a number of independent consultants. However, there are many examples of FAO staff participating on projects under preparation by IFAD. This may be a welcome sign of that IFAD and FAO are building on their solid history of cooperation at the design phase of projects.

JOINT ACTIVITIES AT THE CORPORATE, FIELD, AND COUNTRY LEVELS

Headquarters in Rome

In Rome, the RBA Inter-Institutional Coordination Committee has identified opportunities for collaboration. IFAD's board, which actively pursues joint collaboration, went one step further and commissioned a joint strategy (presented to its board in December 2015),⁵ in which FAO actively participated. However, WFP withdrew from the process, causing some friction with the other RBAs and illustrating a general point: Coordination at the regional level between FAO and IFAD is better than between those agencies and WFP. This may reflect the fact that IFAD and FAO both deal with long-term issues of food supply, while WFP deals primarily with short-term issues of meeting food demand.

Field level

In February 2013, IFAD and FAO entered into a framework agreement setting forth the general principles and terms related to FAO provision of office space, as well as logistical and administrative support to IFAD in establishing its own country offices, including in Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burundi, Egypt, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone. WFP has also provided office space and services to IFAD in several countries, e.g., Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal, Niger, Sri Lanka, Zambia, and others.

Overall, the sense, by staff at the field level, is that coordination in the field happens organically. The question then is how did the coolness, especially between FAO and WFP, at the institutional level develop. Its roots may lie in the fact that some believe that disaster assistance and food aid would not be a long-term business for WFP; therefore, its survival depends on developing a business model with greater focus on development assistance, overlapping with other agencies (Annex 2). Such a shift would permit a sustainable way to employ WFP's large cadre of field agents and cover the large overhead in field offices. This argument, however, seems thin given the continual massive needs in places such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and South Sudan. One potential question is whether to (re)consider having FAO and WFP function operationally under one institutional umbrella. In effect as noted above, WFP is actually already (in a legal sense) a subsidiary of FAO. The political challenge with that scenario may be that the U.S. currently holds the position of head of WFP and is its major source of funding. The "one country one vote" approach in FAO may not therefore be particularly palatable to the WFP's largest contributor in the event of such a formal union.

Operational incentives for collaboration

FAO believes WFP support on logistics would indeed be helpful. IFAD, on the other hand, may place a greater premium on partners interested in co-financing its investment projects (and vice versa), e.g., World Bank, Regional MFIs, the OPEC Fund for International Development, Global Environment Facility, rather than major support from the other RBAs. Similarly, WFP's main incentive may be to work with partners that will make its logistics network (of large-scale procurement and distribution of staple foods) work more effectively, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, food companies, and traders. At its core, FAO's principal interest, by contrast, may be to bring its knowledge and expertise to support global consultations around normative and policy negotiations with a wide range of participatory entities.

In many respects, IFAD's expansion of its country office network should increase opportunities for country-specific and client-driven collaboration among RBAs. FAO's technical capacity and expert presence in the

⁵ <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/116/docs/EB-2015-116-R-28-Rev-1.pdf>

field, combined with WFP's logistics network and large-scale procurement of staple foods, could add value to IFAD operations. Likewise, IFAD-funded investment projects offer many opportunities to build on FAO policy and technical expertise in order to scale up innovative approaches (e.g., farmer field schools, which are already an integral element in many IFAD operations). In this same vein, WFP procurement initiatives with smallholder producers' organizations would complement IFAD and FAO initiatives to improve smallholder access to local markets and value chains.

Country level

At the country level, the differences between the respective RBA business models and instruments become most obvious, e.g., differences in organizational cultures, operational processes, and programing and budgeting cycles. As a result, the three RBAs have evolved quite different relationships with national governments. This, in turn, affects interagency consultation, coordination, and strategic priorities. For example, even though IFAD supports U.N. Resident Coordinator functions and programs, the agency gives higher priority to its own country strategy work than to the U.N. Development Assistance Framework process.* As a result, expanding the IFAD country office network requires a more rigorous cost-benefit analysis compared with a much larger existing FAO and WFP network of offices that are, relatively speaking, more independently funded (see below).

Financing

On financing, FAO and WFP typically implement projects directly through grant resources and can derive fees. In the case of IFAD, except for its relatively smaller grants portfolio, resources, provided via regular Replenishments from member countries, are on-lent to national governments that are responsible for project implementation and consequently have a much greater say in determining priorities. It is important to note that WFP (in its 2017-2021 Strategy Proposal) has also recognized the need for greater client government involvement in its country-level strategy formulation.

It is also worth noting, however, that a number of existing initiatives (Annex 3) already demonstrate the opportunities (as well as some challenges) for country level RBA collaboration: FAO's TCI; WFP's Purchase for P4P initiative; IFAD/WFP Weather Risk Management Facility; IFAD's ASAP; and Accelerating Progress toward the Economic Empowerment of Rural Women. Since FAO is already a major recipient of IFAD grants, these IFAD potential grants to either FAO or WFP could help innovative new collaborative ideas and processes in country programs and possibly, in the process, leverage increased levels of IFAD lending. However, this is only possible if FAO and WFP can win the competitive process for grant allocation.

INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO FNS TARGETING

Setting targets and priorities across and within countries

Each of the RBAs has their own process for targeting activities across countries. WFP has been updating its operations to meet the challenges of SDG 2, as evidenced by its 2017-2021 Strategic Plan. Initially WFP was strictly emergency food aid; however, after 2008, there has been an increase in the use of other tools (financial resources, technical assistance, services), as borne out by its support to other FNS efforts, such as basic nutrition and food security programs. Now the focus is on country strategies and plans (CSP) and how to coordinate and target their work with other U.N. agencies and development partners. However, CSPs by their very nature take a longer-term development path looking at FNS gaps rather than just emergency responses to crises and puts governments in the driving seat to prepare a coherent strategy to end hunger. This equates well with IFAD's country strategic paper model. WFP assistance in development activities via P4P now fits closely with SDG 2, by increasing its focus on resilience and risk mitigation as part of development activities, e.g., land, water, and climate change.

Capacity to focus on investment support (e.g., marketing and value chain support to improve FNS)

In this context, IFAD has the clear comparative advantage through its investment operations. That said, FAO's competence on policy issues and technical capacities already offer solid complementary skills to IFIs like IFAD. Although not yet fully realized, WFP has an important role to play via its procurement program involving smallholders. However, more work is needed to build the necessary formal links to IFAD and WFP in this respect.

Building community-level capacity (to plan and set investment priorities)

This is a key component of IFAD investment operations and is significantly larger than the other two RBAs. FAO also provides strong technical support in this area in support of IFIs, including IFAD. In this context, WFP has begun to test approaches to creating supply chains from smallholders as part of their P4P program.

DIALOGUE WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES ON SDG 2

Do RBAs advocate for SDG 2 and FNS?

In principle all three RBAs in their own way advocate for a strong focus on FNS, be it at the individual RBA institution level or with client countries in the development of individual RBA country level strategic documents (primarily in IFAD and WFP). FAO plays an important role in raising the awareness of FNS through its global convening power on food and agriculture, while IFAD and WFP are more operational at the field level.

Mechanisms to improve efficiency of actions between the RBAs (and other donors)

The RBAs each have a role to play and there does not yet appear to be a lot of stepping on each other's toes, with FAO focusing on technical aspects and statistics, WFP primarily on food aid, and IFAD on investment finance. A more relevant question may be how to continue to improve operational efficiency of working together in the field.

It is understandable that WFP would want to ensure a sustainable business model with its large worldwide overhead costs, which are subject to the peaks and troughs of demand for staff to respond to emergencies and famines. During periods of reduced need for staff to become involved full time on emergency response work, it is more efficient to complement, rather than duplicate the roles of IFAD and FAO, until the next emergency unfortunately arises. Planning therefore becomes a big logistical issue, given the vagaries of WFP demands, vis-a-vis crises.

At the senior management level in FAO and WFP (and to some extent at the field office level), the principle of greater coordination seems to be accepted and progressively internalized. However, there remains some skepticism amongst some in mid-level management in the headquarters of FAO and IFAD.

RBA mandates and smallholder development

In many respect, among the RBAs, FAO clearly has the comparative advantage to lead the global effort on monitoring progress on SDG 2, with IFAD and WFP providing important operational support, along the lines of their current programs. FAO already has a respected global capacity of statistical monitoring and analysis, already disaggregated country by country, including hot spots when needed. WFP's statistical field gathering efforts would complement well with FAO's global mandate in this sense. See the next section on details regarding RBA data programs.

As an interesting sidebar, the World Bank has long had a large and dynamic "investment" program in agriculture and rural development that exceeds all three RBAs combined. In that context the World Bank's Agriculture team had actually taken an initiative (in 2015) to develop an agriculture action plan to meet SDG goals. Unfortunately, this coincided with a period when the World Bank was de-emphasizing sectoral action plans for a more countrywide approach. However, what did result was a series of comprehensive operational booklets on such areas as agriculture and food security; climate smart agriculture; agriculture and nutrition. The latter included state of the art, technical thinking on how to achieve SDG 2. Fortunately, in recent months, senior management of the World Bank has shown renewed interest in this work and has requested the Agriculture staff to prepare a "Plan to Eliminate Hunger." Clearly, the RBAs (especially IFAD and FAO) should maintain close cooperation with the World Banks on these potentially highly complementary studies.

RBA COORDINATION AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

In principle, there really should be no major issue impeding more efficient RBA coordination, but key board members (some of whom sit on all three boards) still prefer having three separate institutions with three separate mandates. As expected, there are issues of protecting institutional turf to avoid mandate creep. One potential obstacle is WFP's New Strategic Framework Program. In this context, there is a perception in certain quarters of FAO (and to a lesser extent IFAD) that WFP is trying to institutionalize their changed mandate that would lead to a duplication of efforts, notably on support to smallholders. An example of this is FAO's concern that its role (mandate) is WFP is encroaching upon providing information on South-South cooperation.

The agencies are aligned around the SDGs already and have their mandates fairly clearly defined, as explained above. Therefore, with a view toward increasing the leadership of RBAs with regards to SDG 2, the issue is of scaling up, as opposed to identifying mandates. On overall effort, small programs such as WFP's FNS program are well targeted on needs and resources, but efforts would have to increase in quality and quantity across all three RBAs according to their respective comparative advantages. This could take the form of a more broad-based lending program through IFAD, adding more resiliency measures to WFP operations (though difficult to imagine given today's political climate in the United States, WFP's biggest funder), and using FAO's policy expertise to support governments in policy creation and execution.

Focus of coordination

The place to start would be greater RBA coordination at the design stage of operations, which IFAD senior management now requires in the concept stage of its project cycle. However, logistical and administrative challenges remain. For example, FAO technical staff are not always available for cross support to IFAD or even to its own Investment Centre (TCI). FAO also tends to be slower responding to Government requests than WFP who have many staff on the ground and good marketing and fund raising capacity. It is also clear that many FAO technical staff are tied up in cumbersome administrative duties or global initiatives and, as a result, there is a sense of declining field-level orientation. This is all complicated by FAO's ongoing discussions on downsizing. That said, WFP, with its relatively strong sources of funding, has the capacity to recruit the same short-term consultants that FAO and its TCI, increasingly rely on. This has the potential to further exacerbate competition for human resources with FAO.

Coordination and formal agreements

The need for formal agreements is a current issue between the RBAs and a fundamental requirement moving forward. The aim should be to harmonize with other donors and be careful of overlap in areas such as smallholder development. Some believe that IFAD, FAO, and WFP need a joint framework. This could be along the lines of the agreement between WFP and UNICEF on nutrition, which has clarified their respective roles. A second aspect is on accountability in the field as part of the "One U.N." WFP already has a separate RBA coordination unit; FAO does not appear to have this.

Food supplies

Food supplies are clearly an important element of FNS. In the past, WFP purchased exclusively from big international suppliers. However, since 2008, WFP has been looking for ways to purchase more from smallholders (600,000 MT of food so far⁶). Unfortunately, WFP has not yet fully developed its procedures in this respect. However, it has been piloting initiatives (with funding from the Gates Foundation) to test

⁶ <http://www1.wfp.org/purchase-for-progress>

ways to ensure sustainable supplies and in the process build capacities at the smallholder level. This entire initiative warrants much closer coordination with IFAD (and FAO) on links between smallholders, markets, and WFP's procurement processes. Pilot projects in Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya have apparently provided some important lessons and gaps. FAO has been part of this piloting process; IFAD has to a lesser extent.

WFP and FAO challenges

Coordination between WFP and especially FAO is reported to have declined over the last three years. While several board members and major donors of the three RBAs appear to wish that the agencies retain their traditional roles, others are more encouraging of competition and consider that effectiveness is a more important criterion than mandate for who does what. If that means using WFP more in an operational capacity, so be it. This has led to more development activities being included in WFP's New Strategy Framework and related country strategy plans; practically, it has led to WFP taking over from FAO on a key initiative in Laos. IFAD and FAO have also voiced concerns that WFP is pushing limits on food policy, food security, planning, smallholder development, and on the South-South dialogue.

With competition, overlap may be inevitable. WFP's new approach to country strategy planning does include more focus on development, which is not necessarily a bad thing in principle. From a funding standpoint, FAO cannot compete with WFP's funding sources. However, it would appear that WFP's main competition on its development agenda would more likely to be with NGOs (and their funding abilities) rather than with FAO.

Competing successfully for donor resources may not always result in a more efficient system. Donors have their own priorities and might be more impressed by short-term, visible results from humanitarian assistance undertaken by WFP than longer-term results from building technical capacity undertaken by FAO, for example. It may simply be the nature of the business that the job of technical support to governments and the rural poor is harder to finance. Also, institutions like WFP and UNICEF are able to raise funds (like NGOs) during emergencies which raises their profile, and so are in a different funding paradigm to that of FAO and IFAD that rely solely on government donors. WFP also is not as concerned with funding, given the major support from its primary donor, the U.S., who traditionally also selects the head of the institution.

IFAD

Staff already indicate that IFAD's president and board have recently begun to emphasize the need to explicitly discuss potential areas for greater RBA coordination in (a) country strategy papers and early stages of project preparation (project concept documents). Likewise, IFAD now sets up regular meetings of the RBAs on operational issues. However, as previously noted, WFP is reported to have participated less with FAO and IFAD in preparing their strategy document.

Clearly, the business models are different among the RBAs. IFAD, which is dependent on replenishments from members, has more of an economic model (servicing investment loans) compared to WFP, which operates primarily with grant funds. However, much more needs to be done to effectively communicate within the RBA community about IFAD's comparative advantage in this partnership. In this context, IFAD is preparing a new rural development report that is expected to not only internalize these interrelationships, but also explore new, more flexible instruments as well as outline a more comprehensive analysis of the rural sector today. IFAD's administrative obligations also requires it to focus on issues such as slow disbursements, which is not necessarily a challenge in the same way for the other RBAs.

Staff incentives

Collaboration happens when staff incentives are aligned, transaction costs are low, and mutual benefits clear. There are many examples of effective and genuine collaboration generated by RBA staff directly,

often driven primarily by the personal, professional conviction that working together would deliver better products and results to smallholders, women, and youth in rural areas. Annex 3 outlines several examples. These kinds of ad hoc situations may actually offer the best potential for collaboration, as they reflect genuine demand and possibly (most likely) a high sense of professional collegiality.

In response to calls from their governing bodies to increase collaboration and identify priority areas for enhancing synergies, the RBAs jointly formulated directions for collaboration document in 2009.⁷ IFAD also prepared its own partnership strategy in 2012⁸ to achieve greater outreach and expanded impact. While these provide a valid framework for working together, in practice collaboration still has considerable room for improvement. Similarly, directors of information and communication technology service at RBAs do meet regularly to discuss these matters. RBAs have also been making active efforts to strengthen cooperation in evaluation activities, and signed a joint statement of intent to that effect in April 2013.⁹

RBAs and data

Since the RBAs have the potential to be the focal point of action on all dimensions of FNS implementation, it makes sense that they should also be the focal point of data collection and reporting on SDG 2. Already, FAO through FAO Corporate Statistical Database publishes data on hundreds of indicators from all countries around the world. The ERH framework derives 30 percent of its developing country indicators from the RBAs, with the lion's share from the FAO's suite of food security indicators and IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessments. Aside from the World Bank's data repository, the RBAs are therefore already among the leaders in supplying data to track progress toward SDG 2. However, on a goal as comprehensive as SDG 2, major gaps in data still exist that the RBAs are uniquely placed to address and report. FAO, in particular, has an institutional motivation to collect information, as it is charged in Article I of its constitution to "collect, analyze, interpret and disseminate information relating to nutrition, food, and agriculture."¹⁰

Food loss and waste

Though global food production is sufficient to meet the caloric needs of every person on earth, it is distributed unevenly and often wasted, during either production, distribution, or consumption. FAO already has global estimates surrounding food loss and waste, compiling them in its program SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction. According to its estimates, "a [third] of all food produced for human consumption" is lost or wasted, which equates to 1.3 billion tons of food. Yet such figures are not available on an actionable country level. Furthermore, the study, which produced the aforementioned global and regional figures, dates from 2011, and no similar effort has been published since. Food loss and waste is a difficult indicator to capture, as it exists in a variety of dimensions from production to consumption. However, given the magnitude of the problem at hand and the fact that countries will need different strategies depending on where in the food chain the problem lies, country-level food loss and waste data will be critical to achieving SDG 2. To provide this level of granularity, FAO is currently developing the Global Food Loss Index,¹¹ which will supply country-level modeled results for SDG 12.3, to halve per-capita food loss. This index will be a welcome addition also to efforts to capture SDG 2. Aside from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and FAO's Technical Platform on the Measurement and Reduction of Food Loss and Waste, many other initiatives seek to develop ways of quantification and standards for reducing food loss and waste.¹²

⁷ <http://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/k5809e.pdf>

⁸ <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/ec/72/docs/EC-2012-72-W-P-9.pdf>

⁹ <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/90ad0511-997d-4df4-b8ab-c794efd85f9d>

¹⁰ <http://www.fao.org/3/a-mp046e.pdf>

¹¹ <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/meetings/iaeg-sdgs-meeting-03/3rd-IAEG-SDGs-presentation-FAO--12.3.1.pdf>

¹² <https://champions123.org/resources/>

Domestic investment

Cross-country comparable data on external flows of FNS investment can be found for official development assistance and other official flows of assistance through the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD, as well as for FDI through U.N. Conference on Trade and Development's World Investment Report and private sources such as the *Financial Times*. To find domestic investment figures for agriculture, however, other sources are needed. FAO already publishes data on government expenditure on agriculture, yet this data series often has gaps in coverage and was complemented by ERH with data from IFPRI's SPEED database, as well as the World Bank's BOOST Public Expenditure Reviews database. These sources together reveal that domestic public spending accounts for the vast majority of FNS resources available to a country. However, domestic private spending was absent from the analysis and likely outstrips all other sources of investment available. FAO has recently published the Credit to Agriculture dataset,¹³ which seeks to "[provide] national data for over 100 countries on the amount of loans provided by the private/commercial banking sector to producers in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, including household producers, cooperatives, and agro-businesses." Aggregates for 2015, the last year in which the fullest sample of countries is available, amount to \$245 billion in credit to agriculture, dwarfing estimates by Brookings about the FNS flows to developing countries by a factor of 10. This indicator is quite new, however, and will need to be further reviewed for accuracy. In any case, by building out its capacity for collecting and publishing data surrounding domestic resources for FNS, the RBAs, and FAO chief among them, can contribute to a comprehensive assessment of resources available, which can then be used to better target investments by both public and private sector actors.

Vulnerability indicators

WFP assesses surrounding food security in the countries in which it operates. It consolidates these under its Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM).¹⁴ VAM's various analysis tools and assessments are aimed at providing baseline and timely updates for emergencies, rather than long-term, continuous data for researchers. Nevertheless, since famines represent the complete absence of food security, obtaining useful data on short- and long-term vulnerability to famines, whether caused by natural disasters, or more commonly, by man, will produce improve the global community's ability to identify countries in need of support.

¹³ <http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/investment/credit/en/>

¹⁴ <http://vam.wfp.org/>

CONCLUSION

The RBAs cover the main areas highlighted by Agenda 2030, with a strong focus on smallholders, women and youth, nutrition, and data. They have the instruments to increase investments, provide policy advice on removing historical anti-agricultural policy in many countries, and to improve the functioning of food markets and access of smallholders to those markets.


However, the RBAs are missing opportunities to exercise joint leadership on SDG 2. They continue to operate in siloes in selected areas, including on common operational strategies, targeting of activities, and coordinated and comprehensive operations in selected countries, building on their areas of comparative advantage. These issues are institutional. Collaboration is better in the field where staff can more clearly identify specific potential for mutually beneficial activities.

Globally, there are also opportunities for greater collaboration, starting with joint monitoring of the SDGs, including implementation issues of policies and investments, as well as progress on outcomes of adequate nourishment, nutrition, productivity growth, and resilience. The data gathering and analysis by RBAs should be broadened and coordinated to ensure that adequate review and follow-up can take place.


Data at country and sub-national levels can be used to target activities more clearly to places where the greatest impact can be achieved. Often, a comprehensive strategy building on the strengths of all three agencies will be needed to generate transformational change. That requires an ability to coordinate the disparate targeting strategies that each agency currently employs to ensure that staff at field level have the opportunity to join forces.

Even together, the RBAs are small players in the overall financing of food and nutrition security investments. All the more reason for them to build partnerships with development banks and private business based on strong analysis of gaps and opportunities. They could jointly advocate for a scale up of resources, rather than taking a competitive approach vis-à-vis each other.

ANNEX 1. ORGANIZATION CHARTS



* Available at <http://www.fao.org/about/structure/en/>



21 September 2017

* Available at <https://www.wfp.org/about/corporate-information>

IFAD Organigramme as of 1 September 2017



* Available at https://www.ifad.org/who/internal_structure/overview

ANNEX 2. INVESTMENT PROJECT COMPARISONS: IFAD VS. WFP

	WFP ¹⁵		IFAD	
	Number of development projects	Expenditure on development projects (\$ million)	Number of effective programs and projects under implementation	Total program and project cost (\$ million)
2005	23	259	183	1,018
2006	27	268	187	911
2007	26	309	196	1,276
2008	29	292	204	1,180
2009	27	276	217	1,321
2010	na	288	231	2,370
2011	na	316	238	2,198
2012	22	365	256	2,003
2013	19	376	241	1,720
2014	22	346	224	1,553
2015	27	300	231	3,320

¹⁵ Strictly speaking, WFP development assistance is not directly comparable to IFAD's more traditional IFI investment project approach. That said, this table should be viewed primarily as a way to equate the relative scale of both programs

ANNEX 3. COUNTRY- AND PROGRAM-LEVEL RBA COLLABORATION EXAMPLES

The below is an excerpt from the annex of the IFAD report “Collaboration of the United Nations Rome-based agencies; IFAD perspective—position paper,” EB 2015/115/R.23.¹⁶

The collaboration between IFAD and the FAO Investment Centre (TCI) is the longest-standing example of RBA institutional partnership. TCI has been the main interface between IFAD and FAO and the site of more active, regular and country focused collaboration. However, lack of a structured agreement that would make IFAD requests for TCI support more predictable and stable makes a more dedicated partnership difficult to sustain and programming more challenging. A recent IFAD and FAO initiative on capacity development for better management of public investments in small-scale agriculture in developing countries is being implemented by FAO-TCI in the period 2014-2015 through an IFAD grant. This initiative aims to strengthen the implementation performance of certain weak country programs in nine fragile states.

WFP’s P4P initiative presents a clear opportunity to link IFAD traditional support to farmers’ organizations with a stable potential buyer of staple foods. Some concrete joint activities were developed in Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zambia, but a more operational partnership and integration into IFAD country programs should be pursued where possible. However, P4P is also an example that could lead WFP to venture into value chain financing, rural finance, farmers’ organizations, market access, infrastructure, etc.—all areas in which WFP does not necessarily have a comparative advantage.

The RBA joint Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda illustrates the potential for tapping the expertise of the three agencies in an area of common interest through external financing. A “community of practice” has been launched and food-loss assessments are being carried out in the three countries. These will be followed by mini-grants to scale up tested technologies or processes.

The IFAD/WFP Weather Risk Management Facility is a good example of leading-edge research in an area of common interest, using innovative satellite-based products in the design of index insurance for smallholder agriculture. The project focuses on Senegal, but its findings are intended for the entire sub-Saharan region. A number of strategic partners have joined this initiative (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, European Space Agency, Swiss Re, World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, Institut Senegalais de la Recherche Agronomique, etc.) and are keen to use the final output, which could push the frontier of risk mitigation and risk transfer for smallholder farmers.

The three RBAs are part of the advisory committee of PARM, and enhanced cooperation takes place at diverse levels. At the country level, risk assessment studies and workshops are being organized (e.g. Ethiopia, Niger and Uganda) with the participation of IFAD, FAO and WFP, together with other organizations and stakeholders. At the global level, FAO and IFAD are engaged in developing e-learning on agricultural risk management, with the participation of experts from WFP and other organizations.

The Kenya Cereal Enhancement Program – Climate Resilient Agricultural Livelihoods (KCEP-CRAL) is a rare example of an IFAD program being co-financed by the three RBAs and the European Union in support of a government request. A key feature of the collaboration was to determine the comparative advantage of each partner as follows:

- (i) WFP provides support to food- and nutrition-insecure farmers, including gradually building productive assets and acquiring agricultural production and agricultural risk management skills to meet basic food needs.

¹⁶ <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/115/docs/EB-2015-115-R-23.pdf>

- (ii) IFAD provides support to subsistence farmers to graduate to market-oriented farming in value chains with market potential, while retaining the diversified livelihood coping strategy supported by WFP. Through the ASAP, IFAD also supports investments for improved natural resource management and resilience to climate change at all levels.
- (iii) FAO, throughout this graduation process, will support targeted farmer groups and counties in the adoption of good agricultural practices and conservation agriculture.
- (iv) The European Union will sustain expansion of the KCEP by providing additional funding through IFAD—to strengthen institutional capacity to manage droughts and improve food security and livelihood—and by providing a contribution to FAO. The collaboration was made possible owing to proactive leadership by the decentralized country offices; alignment of incentives; careful programming and budgeting; and assessment of the respective implementation capacities.

The Program for Accelerating Progress toward MDG1c (eradicating hunger) in Mozambique was financed by a 67 million euros grant from the European Union, complemented by a contribution of 10 million euros from the government of Mozambique and jointly implemented by the RBAs. The RBA team designed the program to tackle the complex issue of food security by leveraging their complementarities. The main areas of intervention were clustered around: access to markets, reduced post-harvest losses and better nutrition (all three RBAs); pro-poor value chains, access to inputs and good agricultural practices (FAO and IFAD); fishery and aquaculture development, rural finance and infrastructure (IFAD); and staple foods fortification (WFP). The design and implementation process was more efficient because joint teams, saving logistics, time and transport, visited beneficiaries and communities. Considerable trust and mutual reliance was built within the RBA team.

The Program for Strengthening Decent Rural Employment Opportunities for Young Women and Men in the Caribbean is an example of effective cooperation between IFAD and FAO. Designed in full coordination in 2014, the program aims to promote rural youth employment opportunities in the Caribbean by facilitating the development of targeted policies, partnerships and pilot investments, thus generating knowledge to effectively support investments in favor of youth. It was financed mostly by IFAD and implemented by the FAO sub regional office for the Caribbean, based in Barbados. The two RBAs joined forces, capitalizing on each agency's comparative advantage: IFAD is investing grant resources in the Caribbean, a highly vulnerable and indebted area, while FAO offers its technical expertise as well as its broad network of country offices—all coordinated by the full-fledged sub regional office—to catalyze interest among regional stakeholders (Caribbean governments, sector associations and relevant NGOs) in the issue of youth and rural employment.

Accelerating Progress toward the Economic Empowerment of Rural Women. Launched in 2012, this five-year joint program, implemented by the RBAs and U.N. Women, aims to economically empower rural women in Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Nepal, Niger and Rwanda. Supported by a trust fund open to contributions, the program capitalizes on each agency's mandate and comparative advantage and focuses on national priorities established in consultative processes with the government of each recipient country. Leadership of the country program is divided among the participating agencies, which facilitates coordination.

Climate: Cooperation with WFP is geared toward a more systematic exchange of risk and vulnerability data, which can be used to inform IFAD investment designs (e.g., in Niger, Sudan, and Uganda). To that end, IFAD is sharing the costs of a P-4 level geographic information system/earth observation expert with WFP. The border between WFP's FoodSECuRE Facility and IFAD's ASAP is the difference between looking at the next impending climate shock and the longer-term transformation of rural space and adaptive capacities.