Changing Values in the Middle East: Secular Swings and Liberal Leanings

MANSOOR MOADDEL

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Executive Summary

Two momentous events of the past 20 years have shaped debates and policy in the Middle East. Both marked the beginning of a new decade and have since had far-reaching consequences: in 2001, the 9/11 attacks on US soil prompted US President George W Bush to famously ask "Why do they hate us?"[1] as he went on to launch what he dubbed the "war on terror"; and in 2011, Arab nations experienced the largest popular protests to sweep the region.

Both events have deepened the desire to better understand Arab and Middle Eastern public opinion. Anecdotal observations, public demonstrations in both 2011 and 2019, and an increase in the availability of survey data from Middle Eastern nations show signs that societies in the region are undergoing a series of transformations that could fundamentally reconfigure both politics and culture over time. But is there evidence the region is moving in a positive direction?

This groundbreaking report is the result of close to 20 years of Middle East survey data comprising 70,000-plus face-to-face interviews. The results of these cross-national surveys carried out in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey throw light on the prospect for democracy in the region today. By assessing changes in values over a period of time towards secular politics, gender equality, the right to express one's individuality and liberal values – all key dimensions of liberal democracy – we can assess the turns already occurring in the direction of liberalism. We identify the countries and cohorts of society that demonstrate the biggest hunger for reform or are making the biggest shifts in attitudes towards liberal values. And we argue that there is a unique opportunity for a gradual, progressive policy shift towards a liberal transformation.

Over the next four pages, we highlight our major findings from across the report while each chapter opens with the key takeaways on our four liberalising indicators of secular politics, gender equality, expressive individualism and liberal values.

Grounds for Optimism

Over the past 15 years, gradual **liberalising trends** can be detected in Middle East nations, as shown by the increases on our four main indices.

Secular politics

3.0
2.5
2.0

Egypt | Iraq | Turkey | Saudi Arabia

Gender equality

3.0
2.5
2.0

Egypt | Iraq | Saudi Arabia | Turkey

Expressive individualism

3.0
2.5
2.0

Egypt | Iraq | Turkey

Liberal values

3.0
2.5
2.0

Egypt | Iraq | Turkey | Saudi Arabia

Secular Swing in Egypt

Looking closer at responses to individual questions, it's clear that Egyptians are **endorsing secular politics** more and more.

When designing future policies
#EngageMiddleEastYouth
– they're mobile, risk-taking, invested in individual choice and most likely to act for change

82%

believed their country would be better off with Western-style government, up from just 37% in 2011

81%

favoured separation of religion and politics in 2020, up from 56% in 2011

Tunisia's Big Hope

University-educated females aged 18–29 demonstrate the **greatest desire for gender equality** and openness to liberal values, making them a key group to support.

Access to Education: The Great Leveller

Even in patriarchal societies, more respondents are **rejecting** the notion that **boys be given priority** when it comes to education, with levels of disagreement on the rise.

2018
79%

2004
54%

Iraq

2011
59%

2003
39%

Saudi Arabia

Liberal Leaps for Egypt's Women

There's been a remarkable rise in **female liberal consciousness** – could they be the bedrock of any future political movement for **democratic change**?

The Male Awakening in Turkey

Men in Turkey have made the greatest progress towards gender equality in particular, catching up with their female counterparts and **shrinking the gender gap.**

Democracy + Islam = Compatible in Saudi Arabia

7%

Is democracy incompatible with the teachings of Islam? Only 7% of Saudis strongly agree with this sentiment, proving that **co-existence** between the two is acceptable to a sizeable majority of respondents in the country.

2011

67%

2020

32%

Challenges Aside, Tunisians Still Want Secular Politicians

The percentage of respondents who believe that people with strong religious views are suitable for public office has **dropped considerably**.

The Great Divide

Assessing responses to questions about governance, we see a **clear call for separation** of religion and politics across the region.

80% of Turkish respondents agree religious leaders shouldn't interfere in politics

69% of Iraqis agree with separation of religion and politics

Overwhelming support for separation of state and religion has remained constant in **Lebanon** from 2008–2018 at **80%**

Secular politics

0.34

0.32

Expressive individualism

0.27

0.22

Gender equality

0.17

0.13

Liberal values

0.25

0.12

When Life Experience Counts

Egyptians with no university education are **bucking the trend**, registering the biggest shifts towards liberalism across our indices.

To Love and Obey?

Must a wife always obey her husband? There are fewer and fewer who strongly agree with this particular **norm of male supremacy**.

69%

32%

Egypt

64%

42%

Iraq

70% of Egyptian respondents aged between 18–29

68% of Turkish respondents aged between 18–29

61% of Saudi respondents aged between 18–29

The Romeo & Juliet Revolution

The numbers of young respondents choosing **love as the basis of marriage** matters because it's a vital measure of expressive individualism – and could predict which societies are on the verge of widespread acceptance of individual rights.

What Could This Mean for Policy?

- **Build policies that further empower women.** Our findings show that women are leading the way and all policy approaches must invest in them. Serious and uncompromising efforts to enable education for women and girls must be made while removing institutional barriers to women's participation in the jobs market. This should be part of a wider campaign to promote women's mobility and active participation in the political process. Greater female activism will impel progress towards equality and liberalism.

- **Invest in education to catalyse change.** Equality of access to formal education is a force multiplier for change across all domains. University education is one of the strongest predictors of liberal thinking across all indicators for both genders and age groups. The role of education as a liberalising force is most powerfully represented among women. University education expands women's opportunities in terms of jobs and participation in public life while reinforcing independent thinking. Leaders should enhance access to formal education, particularly for women and girls.

- **Encourage individual choice and independent thinking.** As expressive individualism is key to liberal democracy, policies that foster future generations with the virtues of independence and imagination will be essential in societies that currently lean towards patriarchy and parental authority. Our data show young individuals are expressing a preference for love as the basis of marriage more and more – a key sign of increasing individualism. Critical thinking among children and young adults should be encouraged, as should diversity and inclusivity in order to institutionalise individualism.

- **Engage youth to envision the future.** Opening up to the innovative thinking of youth in the Middle East is critical for political liberalisation and for realising the region's full economic potential. In the past ten years, youth have demonstrated a clear desire for change and the results of our surveys show they remain at the forefront of this turn towards liberalisation. The desires and ambitions of young people today should be continually considered in designing policies of the future.

- **Strengthen secular political institutions.** The process of enhancing equality and individualism is impeded by the entrenchment of religion and politics. Our survey results demonstrate a strong desire for more secular forms of politics and a growing appreciation for Western models of governance. The history of the Middle East has long been mired in the struggle between Islamists and secular leadership; public opinion is trending towards the latter. Political institutions should assert the legitimacy of secular governance while still protecting the freedom of religious institutions as well as religious pluralism, which has been an important feature of cultural tradition in the Middle East.

Introduction

On 11 September 2001, close to 3,000 people perished after two hijacked planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon and the fourth in Pennsylvania. The horrific act was a culmination of the Muslim extremism thrown on to the world stage since the late 1970s. Before that, fundamentalism was simply a reactionary trend – not only in Islam but in Christianity and Judaism too. In the United States, the rise of the Moral Majority reflected the revival of Christian fundamentalism, boosted in subsequent decades by a broadcasting network of 250 Christian television channels and 1,600 radio stations. Jewish fundamentalism emerged in Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli and 1973 Yom Kippur wars when the Gush Emunim movement was established to shape religious discourse in the country and expand Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories.[2] In Muslim-majority countries, specific national factors contributed to the fundamentalist trend even though they all initially emerged in opposition to the secular state. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood's Sunni fundamentalism was prompted by Arab defeat in the 1967 war, contributing to the decline of pan-Arab nationalism.[3] In Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami party and other fundamentalist shifts accelerated as a result of the opportunism of secular politicians who invoked Islam as the language of unity to avoid addressing the problems of inequality among different ethnic groups.[4] In the 1970s, the shah of Iran managed to activate Shia fundamentalism and unite opposition to his rule by dissolving the two-party system – forcing Iranians to join the single entity he had established – and by changing the Islamic calendar to a royal one.[5]

Despite their heterogeneity and irreconcilable differences, Christian, Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists were commonly exclusivist and intolerant, espoused a disciplinarian conception of the deity and followed a literalist reading of the scriptures.[6] Nonetheless, in contrast to Christianity and Judaism, it was the arrangement of social forces in the Islamic world that provided a favourable context for the transformation of fundamentalism from just a trend into major religious movements, giving the appearance of a homogeneous, worldwide Islamic revivalism.

This transformation was the result of the near-simultaneous outbreak of four events that began with General Zia ul-Haq's military coup in Pakistan in 1977 and his regime's ensuing Islamisation campaign. Second, the Iranian Revolution brought Shia fundamentalists to power and created euphoria among global Muslim activists in the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. The regime enhanced its prestige among anti-American (and even leftist) contingents when it seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage, mobilising mobs and rebranding the United States. No longer was the US the seat of democracy, worthy of emulation; it now became the "Great Satan" and a decadent culture. Third, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year, which elicited strong reactions from the Islamic world and Western democracies seeking to push back the Soviets. The global mobilisation of Muslim activists against this invasion brought legitimacy to the extremist view of violent jihad as an individual duty or *fard al-ayn*,[7] a concept first presented by the Egyptian ideologue Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and more forcefully promoted by Abdullah Azzam, the leader and co-founder of al-Qaeda.[8] If the Iranian Islamic regime normalised reckless hatred of the West, Afghanistan paved the way for the expression of the idea of violent extremism among many Muslim activists the world over. And while these activists were willing to fight the Soviets, the financiers of the same fight (be it rich Persian Gulf states or Western democracies) were relatively unconcerned about the means of justification, which would go on to form the religious underpinnings of 9/11 and subsequent acts of Muslim terror in the West. The fourth and final event was the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by several hundred Muslim militants. They were swiftly crushed but their act demonstrated the vulnerability of the Saudi kingdom.

This quartet of events created a remarkable conjuncture that brought an extremist interpretation of concepts such as *jahiliyyah*, jihad, *fard al-ayn*, *kafir*, *taghut*, pharaoh, martyrdom and the "Zionist-Crusader Alliance" to the forefront of political discourse among a substantial number of Muslim activists. In historical Islam, *jahiliyyah* was used to characterise the decadent cultural order that purportedly existed in Arabia before the seventh century but now the term applied to the existing political order in Muslim-majority countries. Jihad had been reserved as a term for a defensive war or simply the utmost effort to excel but now it meant violence against the secular order. If *fard al-ayn* initially indicated religious obligations such as prayer, fasting or payment of *zakat*, it was now twisted to make violent jihad against secular regimes and suicide terrorism obligatory. If such terms as pharaoh and *taghut* has been used to mean infidel tyrants, they were now invoked to characterise secular Muslim rulers, notably the Egyptian president and Iranian shah. Finally, if the support of the West for the state of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians was considered unfair, it was now seen as an indicator of the Zionist-Crusader Alliance. These interpretations had been at the fringe of

Islamic political thought prior to 1979 but by the late 20th century they had come to constitute the guiding manifestos of Muslim extremism, as presented in Abdullah Azzam's *Join the Caravan*,[9] Abu Bakr Naji's *The Management of Savagery* and Abu Musab al-Suri's *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*.[10]

Bookended by the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and the fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2017, the Middle East's darkest episode in the modern era has meant living between a rock and a hard place for the people of the region. On the one hand, there has been the recurrence of religiously inspired violence and intolerance; the subjugation of women, perpetrated by Islamic regimes in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia; conscious attempts by Muslim extremists to generate the conditions of savagery and chaos in Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria; and the intensification of Shia-Sunni sectarian violence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, led primarily by the Islamic regime in Iran and the Saudis. On the other hand, there have been secular regimes whose authoritarianism and exclusionary policies are in fact among the crucial factors that have contributed to the rise of Islamic extremism. Despite this, political conditions have produced a variety of secular liberal responses across the Middle East. For instance, the rise of anticlerical secularism, religious reformism and liberal values among Iranian intellectual leaders, and the public at large, in recent decades is a clear indication that the installation of authoritarian religious regimes can still bring about liberal oppositional responses.[11]

Among the most remarkable manifestation of this secular turn was, first, the movement among Iranians for a more transparent, democratic and peaceful government that brought about success for reformists in the 1997 presidential election and, then, the 2009 Green Movement, not only bigger but much greater in the daring of its challenge to the absolutist power of the ruling cleric in Iran. Two years later, the region experienced upheavals in virtually every Arab country. Aptly labelled the Arab Spring, these movements managed to unseat entrenched dictators in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen in 2011. Finally, in 2018, Iran experienced the outbreak of nationwide demonstrations against both the weakened reformist movement and political Islam, displaying favourable attitudes toward the formation of a secular liberal government. But these movements failed. "Do whatever it takes to stop them," ordered Iran's religious despot Ali Khamenei and the result was the killing of 1,500 people in less than two weeks of unrest that started in November 2019, according to Reuters.[12] In Egypt, a military coup abruptly ended the unpopular presidency of Mohamed Morsi, with leader General el-Sisi installing himself as the president of the reconstituted authoritarian regime. The removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen gave rise to sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis. The overthrow of dictator Muammar Qaddafi turned Libya into

a theatre of violence between armed militias. In Syria, peaceful protests degenerated into tragic sectarian warfare in which over 500,000 perished and millions were displaced. The hope for Islamic democracy in Turkey was dashed as President Erdoğan turned increasingly authoritarian and his politics ever-more pan-Islamist. And, in Tunisia, while the conflict between the Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes parties was resolved at the ballot box and paved the way for a transition to democracy, the country is currently facing serious economic and political difficulties.

Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to conclude there is little prospect for democracy in the region. As this report shows, findings from a comparative cross-national survey of more than 70,000 face-to-face interviews conducted during the past 20 years reveal rather an optimistic picture of the region's future. To clearly document the change in values, this report considers secular politics, the role of religion in the state, liberal values, gender equality and expressive individualism in several domains as the key dimensions of liberal democracy. It measures these indicators by using responses to a series of questions included in cross-national surveys carried out in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. By assessing changes in successive waves of surveys, we demonstrate which sets of values have changed most dramatically, pointing to the prospect of liberal democracy, and which countries have been playing the leading role. We also analyse demographics such as age, gender and education to identify the groups most likely to play a leading role in any future process of value change.

Methodology

To assess trends in values, we analyse up to six different data sets. One set is from three-country panel surveys carried out in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey across three waves: 2011–2013, 2015–2016 and 2020. The second is from several longitudinal surveys conducted in Iraq between 2004 and 2011. The third consists of two national surveys in Lebanon in 2008 and 2011. The fourth is based on two national surveys in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2011. These are all drawn from Middle Eastern Values Study (MEVS). The fifth includes data from Arab Barometer and the sixth from World Values Survey.

For each chapter, we design a set of indicators or measures to assess each of our focus areas: secular politics, gender equality, expressive individualism and liberal values. These indicators are measured by survey questions using the Likert-scale response format (i.e. strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) in most instances, although variations do apply across chapters and data limitations have constrained comprehensive conclusions being made in places. By analysing how people's responses to the questions change over time, we are able to assess trends towards or away from liberal values.

From the responses to the questions, we have also formulated at least one index for each chapter. These indices are useful for measuring changes in attitudes towards secular politics, gender equality and expressive individualism across the survey periods in the six countries included – offering a broader picture of turns and shifts in values across the region. As these three are important components of liberal values, and the relevant indices are significantly correlated to make a single factor, we have created a single measure of liberal values using averages. To be designated as liberal based on this measure, the liberal-values index for any country must be higher than the median of 2.50.

Please refer to the Methodology Appendix at the end of each chapter and the Annex of Tables for further details.

Secular Politics

KEY TAKEAWAYS

One of the most remarkable aspects of our survey findings is the growing desire for secular politics across the region, with more respondents supporting the separation of religion and politics coupled with notable swings in favour of Western-style government. Since this turn towards secular politics is one of the sharpest and is significantly correlated with gender equality and expressive individualism, we believe this will pave the way for future advances in the other two domains of life – and, when combined, the conditions towards liberal democracy.

- Between 2011 and 2020, the percentage of Egyptians supporting **the separation of religion and politics** increased from 56% to 81% and Turkish respondents from 76% to 79%. Iraqis scored a rise from 54% to 69% in their main survey period of 2004–2011 (this figure rising to 80% by 2018 according to additional data) while in Lebanon the figure went up from 75% to 80% in the 2008–2011 period.

- The **desirability of a Western-style government** increased from 37% to 82% in Egypt, 47% to 53% in Tunisia, and 44% to 52% in Turkey between 2011 and 2020. Meanwhile, Iraqis witnessed a similar increase from 23% to 45% between 2004 and 2011.

- In Turkey and Iraq, in particular, respondents are **less supportive of absolutist Islamic governments** with percentages decreasing from 34% to 28% between 2011 and 2020 in the former, and from 64% to 49% between 2004 and 2011 in the latter.

- The percentage of Saudis who thought it was very important for government to implement only the sharia (Islamic laws) dropped from 73% to 31% in the 2003–2011 period and only 7% strongly agreed that democracy was incompatible with Islam. It can be argued that Saudis would have been bolder in expressing support for secular politics if the kingdom had allowed a more open political environment.

- There has been an increase among Middle Easterners who think that **religious leaders should not interfere in politics** from 62% to 78% in Egypt and 75% to 80% in Turkey between 2011 and 2020. Iraqis also saw a sharp rise in this sentiment, with percentages increasing from 52% to 67% between 2004 and 2011.

- Fewer Middle Easterners believe those with **strong religious views should run for office**. While Tunisians registered declines in support of secular politics more generally, there was still a notable fall in support for people with strong religious beliefs holding office, dropping from 67% to 32%. A similar drop in Turkey from 55% to 41% was also noted in the period between 2011 and 2020.

- Egyptians and Iraqis registered the largest swings on the secular-politics index from 2.36 in 2011 to 2.69 in 2020, and 2.20 in 2004 to 2.54 in 2011, respectively.

INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECULARISM IN HISTORICAL ISLAM

Between the tenth and 15th centuries, revisions made by leading Muslim jurists and political theorists to the Islamic precept on government resulted in the gradual admission of secular politics. In the 19th century, secular thought among Muslims was further reinforced by European influence, which shaped the belief that a constitutional government was not only superior to an absolutist monarchy but also necessary for economic development. This belief may explain why Muslim leaders had few qualms in supporting political modernity during the days of blossoming nationalist movements in the early 20th century. They did not see any contradiction between Islam and the principles of a constitutional government, which, for them, was a far superior alternative to the existing despotic rule of monarchs, the Ottomans' pan-Islamism or colonial rule. The formation of a constitutional government also involved recasting the sharia as common law (as opposed to God's law) – which could now be changed according to societal conditions. The traditionalists who thought otherwise were badly defeated or pushed to the sidelines.

The formation of modern Middle Eastern states, first in Egypt (1922), Turkey (1924) and Iran (1925), was the political outcome of this nationalist movement. But these developments did not lead to the rise of the inclusive and transparent system of liberal democracy that had been anticipated. Rather, they resulted in secular, authoritarian and interventionist states. Secularism also became associated with the rise of critical attitudes towards Islam, spurring the ruling elite to purportedly implement a series of policies to modernise and standardise the court system, foster modern education, reform the rule concerning Islamic charitable endowments and promote the participation of women in social affairs. Thus, the state began initiating cultural programmes to promote secular institutions, endorse national over religious identity and institute laws that ran contrary to the sharia.

These changes elicited fundamentalist reactions from religious activists and contributed to the perception, among the faithful, that their religion was under siege and core values were being offended. Such a perception of so-called besieged spirituality activated religious awareness, prompting some to use this lens to analyse and frame issues, culminating in the rise of alarmist attitudes and conspiratorial perspectives that suggested Islam was under attack by the Zionist-Crusader Alliance. An extremist trend within fundamentalist movements gained momentum as states in Egypt, Iran and Turkey turned increasingly authoritarian and intrusive in the second half of the 20th century. The authoritarianism of the secular state under the personal dictatorship of a single individual prompted, in turn, a disciplinarian conception of God whose forces must be mobilised to counter the all-encompassing power of the ruling dictator. On the societal level, the authoritarianism of the state undermined collectivity within civil society. As a result, oppositional politics was channelled through religion, expanding the resources and influences of Islamic fundamentalism in society.

Yet decades of Islamic rule in Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia – as well as the pervasive presence of Islamic extremism that culminated in the rise of al-Qaeda and ISIS – appear to have turned political Islam into a serious problem and liability in Muslim-majority countries, highlighting the problem of mixing religion and politics. As a result, and in opposition to political Islam, secular politics has increasingly become a desirable form of government among the public in many Middle Eastern countries.

THE MEASURE OF SECULAR POLITICS

Drawing on historical developments and regional debates, we have identified four measures whose significance among Middle Eastern people indicate the extent of support for secular politics, on the one hand, or Islamic government, on the other:

1. Islamic state under clerical absolutism

2. The importance of having a secular government that observes and implements the sharia

3. The separation of religion and politics

4. The importance of a Western-style government to ensure the country's level of economic development and mass prosperity

Four survey questions were developed that correspond to these measures of a desirable political system. By analysing how people's responses have changed over time, we have been able to assess whether the trend is towards secular politics or political Islam. The survey questions are:

Would it be (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad or (4) very bad to have an Islamic government [a Christian government for Christian respondents] where religious authorities have absolute power? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

Is it (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, (4) least important or (5) not at all important for a good government to implement only the laws of the sharia [only the laws inspired by Christian values for Christian respondents]?

Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree that [name of the country] would be a better society if religion and politics were separated? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree that [name of the country] would be a better society if its government was similar to Western government? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

The first question assesses the desirability of Islamic governments where religious authorities enjoy absolute power, usually in the form of religious rule supported by the theory of the caliphate or imamate. The second assesses the religious function of a secular government, which has been key to Islamic political theory as revised by theologians like Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328). The third addresses the orientation of respondents toward the separation of religion and politics, and, finally, the fourth gauges opinions about Western-style government.

The responses to the last two questions were recoded so that higher values indicate stronger agreement with the separation of religion and politics and the implementation of Western-style government. A secular-politics index was then created by averaging the responses to these four questions in order to provide an overall measure of the support for secular politics. This index ranges between 1 and 4, with higher values indicating stronger support for secular politics or weaker support for a religious government.

EGYPT, TUNISIA AND TURKEY: THE FINDINGS

Among Egyptians, the percentage of those who strongly agreed or agreed with separation of religion and politics went up dramatically between the first survey wave of 2011 and the third of 2020 from 56% to 81% while the respective increase for the desirability of a Western-style government went up from 37% to 82%. On the other hand, those who said it was very good or fairly good to have an Islamic government or Christian government (for Christian respondents) remained the same at 57%. Likewise, those who considered that it was very important or important for a government to implement only the sharia or laws inspired by Christian values (for Christian respondents) increased from 54% to 56%, which is not significant. However, the intensity of support for, or the strength of attitudes towards, either form of government declined significantly during the survey period. The percentage of respondents who stated that it was very good to have an Islamic or Christian government dropped from 25% to 16% and those who said that it was very important to implement the sharia also dropped from 28% to 18%. Overall, there was a significant increase in the value of the secular-politics index from 2.36 in 2011 to 2.69 in 2020. These findings demonstrate that Egyptians are more in favour of secular politics than specifically being against a form of religious government.

Among Tunisians, the picture is more conflicted and while there has been oscillation in support for both Western-style and Islamic government, with both registering increases, the majority of respondents still favoured secular politics during the period between 2013 and 2020. In more detail, the percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with separation of religion and politics decreased from 72% to 63%, while those who expressed agreement with the desirability of a Western-style government increased from 47% to 53% in the same period. In contrast, those who considered Islamic government very good or fairly good jumped from 37% to 50%, and those who considered that it was very important or important for a good government to implement the sharia also increased from 27% to 36%. The drop in the value of the secular-politics index from 2.81 in 2011 to 2.67 in 2020 therefore reflects this change, indicating that Tunisians grew less supportive of secular government over the period.

Finally, among Turkish respondents, the trend was consistently towards secular politics: up from 76% in 2011 to 79% in 2020 in support of the separation of religion and politics, and up from 44% to 52% in 2020 on the desirability of a Western-style government. We may have expected a larger increase on the last measure but a possible dampening down of support could be a result of President Erdoğan's attribution of a Western conspiracy to the failed military coup in 2016.[13] A minority of respondents, 34% in 2011, thought that Islamic government was very good or fairly good. In 2020,

this value had declined to 28%. Finally, the percentage of respondents who considered that it was very important or important for a good government to implement only the sharia remained around 20% during the survey period. While a small minority expressed support for Islamic government, the majority of the Turkish public favoured secular politics. Overall, the value of the secular-politics index increased from 2.85 in 2011 to 2.97 in 2020. This trend towards secular politics is remarkable considering that the country was under the rule of President Erdoğan during the survey period. This increase in support for secularism appears to have arisen in opposition to his Islamic-oriented authoritarian policies.

Figure 1 – Attitudes towards politics and government in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

My country would be a better society if religion and politics were separated

My country would be a better place if its government was similar to a Western-style government

Better to have an Islamic/Christian government where religious authorities have absolute power

A good government should implement only the sharia (Islamic laws)

To further validate our argument, we have also assessed trends in attitudes towards politicians. To measure the attitudes, we considered responses to two questions in Likert-scale format: 1) "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that religious leaders should not interfere in politics?" and 2) "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that people with strong religious views should run for public office?" We reasoned that people who more strongly agreed with the first question and disagreed with the second were the most in favour of politicians with a secular approach. We also created a secular-politicians index, with a higher value indicating stronger support for secular-leaning politicians.

Most Egyptians strongly agreed or agreed that religious leaders should not interfere in politics, with the percentage increasing from 62% in 2011 to 78% in 2020. On the other hand, those who strongly agreed or agreed that people with strongly religious views should run for public office also increased from 63% in 2011 to 74% in 2020. This inconsistency may reflect disapproval among Egyptians of religious leaders who have either been in cahoots with the government or have connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, on the one hand, and their misgivings about secular authoritarian politicians who have ruled the country, on the other. In any case, it resulted in no significant change to the secular-politician index during the survey period, which remained at 2.52 and 2.53 across the survey period (see the Annex of Tables for more details).

While there was a decline from 73% to 68% in the percentage of Tunisians who strongly agreed or agreed that religious leaders should not interfere in politics, simultaneously we noted a dramatic decline from 67% to 32% in the percentage who supported people with strong religious views getting involved in politics. This could reflect misgivings among Tunisians about the role of the Islamic party, Ennahda, and political Islam in the country. Notably, while the secular-politics index for Tunisians experienced a decrease, the equivalent index for secular politicians registered an increase from 2.59 to 2.93 between 2011 and 2020.

Turkish respondents, meanwhile, were consistent on both questions. The percentage who strongly agreed or agreed that religious leaders should not interfere in politics went up from 75% to 80% and those who supported a political role for people with strong religious views declined from 55% to 41%. The value of the secular-politician index increased from 2.75 to 2.99 during the survey period (again, see the Annex of Tables for more details).

IRAQ: THE FINDINGS

Findings from six national surveys carried out in Iraq between 2004 and 2011 showed significant increase in support for the separation of religion and politics. Those who strongly agreed or agreed with this view increased from 54% in 2004 to 69% in 2011. Those who strongly disagreed were 17% in 2004, which dropped further to 7% in 2011. Likewise, the support for Western-style governments also increased from 23% in 2004 to 45% in 2011. Those who thought it was very good or fairly good to have an Islamic government stood at 64% in 2004, dropping to 49% in 2011. During this same timeframe, those who considered it very important or important for a good government to implement only the sharia dropped from 54% in 2004 to 48% in 2011. Overall, the secular-politics index showed an increase from 2.20 in 2004 to 2.54 in 2011.

Figure 2 – Attitudes towards politics and government in Iraq (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

In terms of politicians, those who strongly agreed or agreed that religious leaders should not interfere in politics went up from 52% in 2004 to 67% in 2011, yet those who supported political roles for strongly religious people also increased from 64% to 71%. Despite this nuance, the index of secular politicians increased from 2.37 to 2.65 between 2004 and 2011, which is consistent with the increase shown on the secular-politics index.

Using data from Arab Barometer surveys between 2011 and 2018, we found additional evidence indicating growth in support for secular politics among Iraqis. The increase in the percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed that Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated, from 54% in 2004 to 69% in 2011, was corroborated further by Arab Barometer data for the later period, showing a rise from 72% in 2011 to 80% in 2018 on a similar question.

Figure 3 - Trending in Iraq: a move towards separation of religion and political or socioeconomic life

LEBANON: THE FINDINGS

Data on all the four questions relating to secular politics are only available for two national surveys carried out in Lebanon in 2008 and 2011 – not quite sufficient to construct trends in values. Between 2008 and 2011, the percentage of those who strongly agreed or agreed with the separation of religion and politics went up from 75% to 80% but there was no change in support for Western-style government, which remained constant at 63%. Support for Islamic or Christian government (for Christian respondents) went up from 16% to 31%, as did support for the government to implement the sharia (or laws inspired by Christian values for Christian respondents), which increased from 21% to 24%.

Figure 4 – Attitudes towards politics and government in Lebanon (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Overall, the secular-politics index showed a decline from 3.06 to 2.96 between 2008 and 2011. While support waned slightly, the Lebanese public was still predominantly in favour of secular politics. To gain a more comprehensive picture over a longer timeframe, we merged data from two sources to show that while Lebanese support for secular politics has fluctuated somewhat, ranging between 75% and 91% across survey periods running from 2007 to 2018, steady and overwhelming support has remained, as evidenced by percentage points above 80% in the main.

SAUDI ARABIA: THE FINDINGS

Saudi Arabia may appear to be a conservative society impervious to change yet available empirical data portrays a different picture. Across three national surveys covering the 2003–2011 period, the majority of Saudi respondents – 72% – considered democracy the best form of government. A sizeable minority of 46% meanwhile either strongly agreed or agreed that "religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from sociopolitical life" while only 7% strongly agreed that democracy was incompatible with Islam.

Even more significantly, there was a sharp decrease in support for the sharia and a notable decline in confidence in religious institutions between 2003 and 2011. The percentage of respondents who thought it was very important for government to implement only the sharia dropped from 73% to 31% over the eight-year period. Likewise, those who had a great deal of confidence in religious institutions fell from 85% to 46%.

Figure 5 – Attitudes towards politics and government in Saudi Arabia (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Considering that Saudi Arabia has historically been under the firm control of the government and the Wahhabi clerical establishment, a conservative bias could be expected in the responses. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for fear of the establishment to lead to preferences being falsified or left unexpressed; indeed, the percentage (between 16% and 25%) of "don't know" or "no answer" to many of the questions proved much higher in Saudi Arabia than in other Middle Eastern countries. This may indicate that respondents preferred not to express their true political views.

SECULAR POLITICS METHODOLOGY APPENDIX

As we noted earlier, Middle Eastern Values Study (MEVS) developed these four survey questions to correspond with measures of a desirable political system:

1. Would it be (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad or (4) very bad to have an Islamic government [a Christian government for Christian respondents] where religious authorities have absolute power? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

2. Is it (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, (4) least important or (5) not important for a good government to implement only the laws of the sharia [only the laws inspired by Christian values for Christian respondents]?

3. Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree that [name of the country] would be a better society if religion and politics were separated? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

4. Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) strongly disagree that [name of the country] would be a better society if its government was similar to Western governments? (Not asked in Saudi Arabia)

Responses to the last two questions were recoded so that higher values indicate stronger agreement with the separation of religion and politics and the implementation of Western-style government. A secular-politics index was then created by averaging the responses to these four questions. This index ranges between 1 and 4, with higher values indicating stronger support for secular politics.

In order to corroborate our findings, we used additional data from Arab Barometer. This survey also included a question that addresses the relationship between religion and politics in a sense similar to question 1: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from social and political life?" This question was used in the majority of waves but in the final one, the phrase "social and political life" was replaced with "socioeconomic life". Unfortunately, both versions of the question are vague, particularly the notion of "private matters". The question also probes respondents' opinions on three issues – whether "religious practice is a private issue", whether it should "be separated from social life", and "be separated from political/economic life" – but only allows for a single answer.[14] We realise the two questions are not quite comparable. Nonetheless, the senses that the two questions convey are compatible and also consistent with our question concerning the desirability of the separation of religion and politics. Therefore, using the data based on the responses to this question for the years there is no comparable data for Iraq and Lebanon has helped us to better understand trends in values in these two countries.

In the specific case of Iraq, we have combined MEVS data on attitudes towards the separation of religion and politics with Arab Barometer data in response to the statement that "religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from social and political life" (2011 and 2013 surveys), and that "religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from social and economic life" (2018).

In the specific case of Lebanon, we have merged MEVS data on attitudes towards the separation of religion and politics with Arab Barometer data in response to the statement that "religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from social and political life" (2007, 2011, 2013 and 2016 surveys), and that "religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from social and economic life" (2018).

Gender Relations and Equality

KEY TAKEAWAYS

There is a discernible trend towards gender equality in the region, with attitudes towards the norms of male supremacy weakening in some countries while others also reveal greater support for the idea of gender equality itself. The strength of people's attitudes towards an issue shift before they change their position on the accompanying value. When the strength of attitudes towards male supremacy weakens, there is less likelihood of respondents investing emotional energy in upholding the status quo; in contrast, strong disagreement with a norm of male supremacy may indicate emotional commitment to achieving gender equality.

It is worth noting there is more resistance to change in the home as well as continuing discrimination against women in the jobs market. This contrasts with the educational domain where attitudes are largely egalitarian. Gender equality is therefore most likely to be achieved first in education than in the home, at work or in politics.

- Middle Easterners no longer believe that **higher education** should be prioritised for men over women. Among Iraqis, the percentage of people who believed university education was more important for boys fell dramatically from 46% in 2004 to 22% in 2018. Between 2011 and 2020, the percentage of Egyptians believing the same decreased from 34% to 26%, in Turkey from 29% to 20% and, in Lebanon, it has remained the lowest, almost down to 10%.

- The numbers who believe that **men make better political leaders** than women are falling with notable drops among Egyptians from 83% to 77% and among the Turkish from 54% to 34% between 2011 and 2020. Over a 14-year period in Iraq, the number fell from 90% to 72%.

- The picture on the labour market is more nuanced. The Turkish showed the most dramatic decline in support of men having **more right to a job** than women, with percentages dropping from 56% to 34% between 2011 and 2020. Strong agreement with the rights of men over jobs also decreased in Egypt, falling from 62% to 36%. The Tunisians, on the other hand, have increased their support for male preference in the jobs market.

- At home, fewer respondents believe that a wife must always **obey her husband**, with the Turkish registering the most dramatic decline in the idea of wifely obedience, from 70% in 2011 to 42% in 2020. Egyptians in strong agreement fell from 69% to 32% while Iraqis too moved away from the sentiment, with those who strongly agreed dropping from 64% in 2004 to 42% in 2011. In Lebanon, in contrast, the change was reversed with those believing in wifely obedience increasing from 42% in 2008 to 61% in 2011.

- Turkish respondents registered a particularly positive swing on the gender-equality index, reflecting stronger disagreement with the norms of male supremacy.

INTRODUCTION: THE PERSISTENCE OF PATRIARCHY

One of the most critical factors holding back liberal democracy in the Middle East is the persistence of gender inequality and maltreatment of women. The issue has increasingly been the subject of acrimonious debates and culture clashes between, on the one hand, Western commentators and politicians, Middle East liberal-leaning intellectual leaders and Muslim reformers and, on the other, those who espouse patriarchal values of traditional culture, Islamic orthodoxy and fundamentalism.

Awareness of gender inequality has gradually been differentiated into specific social domains such as limited access to education, secondary status in politics and the jobs market, and the domination or even abuse encountered at home.[15] While serious attempts have been made to enact policies to uplift the social status of women in the 20th century, the decline of the secular state and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has slowed, or reversed, this process in some countries, further contributing to the deterioration of conditions for women in the region. The ruling Islamic regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have officially lowered the status of women to those of a second-class citizen.

One important reason for continuing gender inequality is the tenacity of the ideology related to male supremacy and the accompanying cultural values that justify using gender as an organising mechanism for social hierarchy. Despite this, the level of individual commitment to these cultural values is naturally different and varies across social domains. The likelihood of changes in attitudes also differs. In some Middle Eastern countries, for instance, the family head (i.e. the father, elder brother or husband) often exercises formal custodial power over the woman (i.e. the daughter, sister, or wife respectively).

THE MEASURE OF GENDER EQUALITY

Male domination rests on a complex set of structures, exercised in multifaceted environments. It not only encompasses inherent beliefs about gender difference but is grounded in a variety of organisational settings with power and resources at the disposal of men, allowing them to enforce institutional rules on gender relations. Such beliefs are symbolised in ways that include a constraint on clothing styles and garments deemed acceptable for women. They are enacted in the rituals of courtship, reinforced by the desire (and perceived necessity) of shielding one's mother, sister, wife or daughter from harm. The belief in male supremacy also shapes political discourse and daily conversations while informing rules sanctioned by the state and non-state actors. Gender-specific socialisation of children, in which mothers play an active role, is another factor that contributes to the regeneration of patriarchal institutions.

To measure beliefs in the norms of male supremacy in family, political, economic and educational domains, we formulated five questions in the Likert scale, probing respondents on whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the following:

1. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do (*men are better leaders in politics*)

2. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (*men have more right to a job*)

3. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (*priority for boys in university education*)

4. A wife must always obey her husband (*wifely obedience*)

5. It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife (*polygamy*)

We consider attitudes as a combination of belief and emotional investment in that belief. For example, the belief in men making better political leaders is binary – one either agrees or disagrees – but the strength of agreement or disagreement also indicates stronger emotional investment in favour or against. We conclude that those who strongly agree or strongly disagree are more likely to engage in activities towards either changing or maintaining the status quo. Moreover, in longitudinal surveys, the percentage of respondents who agree with the norms of male supremacy may not change, yet a shift may occur from strongly agree to agree; from this, we can deduce a decline in

emotional commitment to such norms. Likewise, the change from disagree to strongly disagree may be indicative of a stronger commitment to reinforcing gender equality.

Our gender-equality index, ranging between 1 and 4, is constructed by averaging responses to these five questions, with responses recoded in such a way that higher values indicate a stronger support for gender equality.

EGYPT, TUNISIA AND TURKEY: THE FINDINGS

Among Egyptian respondents, with the exception of support for polygamy, all other measures shifted in favour of gender equality between 2011 and 2020. The percentage of respondents who either strongly agreed or agreed that a wife must always obey her husband decreased from 95% to 87%; that men make better political leaders declined from 83% to 77%; that university education is more important for boys fell from 34% to 26%; and that men should have more right to a job from 85% to 83%. While the responses indicate a general trend towards more egalitarian relations between the genders, an interesting feature is the accompanying decline in the emotional commitment of respondents to gender *inequality*. For instance, people who agree that a wife must obey her husband are believers in the institutions of patriarchy and male supremacy, but those who strongly agree show a deeper emotional commitment to them and are thus more likely to resist shifts towards gender equality than those who simply agree.

Therefore, it is worth considering the dramatic falls in the percentage of those who strongly agreed with wifely obedience from 69% to 32%; with men making better political leaders from 59% to 33%; with prioritising university education for boys from 20% to 7%; and with men having more right to a job from 62% to 36%. These declines are reflected by the increase in the gender-equality index from 2.10 to 2.26. While there is still considerable support for the values of male supremacy and patriarchy across the four different domains of life, the changes undoubtedly reflect a trend towards the weakening of such values among Egyptians. The one anomaly, however, is the increase in support for polygamy during the survey period.

Tunisian respondents registered an inconsistent pattern of attitudinal change during the survey period. On the issues of polygamy and preference for boys over girls in university education, they shifted towards gender inequality with the percentage in agreement going up from 19% to 24% and 20% to 24% respectively. But on wifely obedience and men making better political leaders, the respondents grew more egalitarian with percentage declines in strong agreement and agreement from 78% to 72% and 55% to 49% respectively. Finally, while there was a slight increase in favourable attitudes towards

men having more rights to a job, the degree was not statistically significant. Overall, there was no significant difference in the gender-equality index, from 2.50 to 2.49 during the survey period.

Turkish respondents, in contrast, were more egalitarian across the board. An overwhelming majority rejected polygamy, with less than 8% strongly agreeing or agreeing with the practice at the beginning of the survey period, falling further to 6% by the end. On other issues, there were significant drops as well: the percentage of respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing with wifely obedience dropped from 70% to 42%; men making better political leaders from 54% to 34%; university education being more important for boys than girls from 29% to 20%; and men having more rights to a job from 56% to 34%. Of considerable significance is the dramatic increase in the percentage of respondents who strongly disagreed with wifely obedience, from 10% to 28%; men making better leaders from 13% to 31%; more rights to a university education for boys from 26% to 39%; and priority for men in the jobs market from 13% to 29%. Overall, the value of the gender-equality index in Turkey increased from 2.73 to 3.06, clearly indicating increasing support for gender equality.

Figure 6 – Attitudes towards gender equality in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife

A wife must always obey her husband

Men make better political leaders than women do

University education is more important for a boy than a girl

When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women

While there was little overall change in Tunisia, respondents in both Egypt and Turkey displayed promising attitudinal shifts. The pattern of these changes is quite different between the two countries. Since attitudes among Egyptians came about through a dramatic decline in those who strongly agreed with the norms of male supremacy across different domains of social life, this indicates a reduction in the emotional commitment to such norms and thus constitutes the weakening of attitudes rather than values. But among Turkish respondents, there was a dramatic increase among those who strongly disagreed with the norms of male supremacy and patriarchy, which can be interpreted as a significant enhancement in the emotional investment in gender equality, reflecting a change in both attitudes and values.

Incorporating World Values Survey data to construct a longer survey period for Turkish respondents, we found the percentage who agreed that men make better political leaders declined from 65% in 1996 to 34% in 2020. On the question of university education being more important for boys, agreement also fell from 34% to 20% over the same period. With the trend across these two significant domains showing positive correlation and the gap between attitudes narrowing in the latter years (specifically 2016–2020), there is a degree of normative convergence between the two. This is because the rate of decline in favourable attitudes towards male domination in politics was higher than the equivalent rate of decline in the education domain. Still, since attitudes toward male supremacy in politics have shown more fluctuations than in education, we can deduce that female political participation is the more contentious of the two.

Figure 7 - Trending in Turkey: moving away from male domination in politics and education

Using Arab Barometer data, we also bolstered our findings on Egypt to show that the percentage of respondents who strongly agreed that men make better political leaders fluctuated between 59% and 33% over the survey period of 2011–2020, dropping off consistently from 2016 onwards. The decline in the percentage, from 20% to 7%, of those who strongly agreed that university education is more important for boys was comparatively smoother. Again, this is an indication of normative convergence between the two domains, a phenomenon that points in favour of gender equality.

Figure 8 - Equality in Egypt: getting ever closer in the domains of education and politics

IRAQ: THE FINDINGS

While those Iraqi respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with polygamy remained constant at 48% between 2004 and 2011, the intensity of the overall commitment to the practice decreased because those who strongly agreed dropped from 22% to 11%. On wifely obedience, those who strongly agreed or agreed also remained somewhat constant around 89% but it's worth noting that those who strongly agreed dropped from 64% in 2004 to 42% in 2011, indicating a weakening emotional commitment to male supremacy in the family domain. Attitudes toward male supremacy in politics, education and the labour market followed similar patterns although the decline in the first two indicators was more reassuring. In 2004 and 2006, 90% of Iraqi respondents strongly agreed or agreed that men make better political leaders, but this value had dropped to 72% in 2018. A noteworthy aspect of this shift is the considerable decrease in the percentage of those who strongly agreed from 71% in 2004 to 45% in 2018, again signifying a decline in attitudes toward male domination. The same is detectable when it comes to jobs, with the percentage of those in agreement with preference for men stagnating around 78% but those strongly agreeing dropping from 46% to 27% in the period between 2004 and 2011. These findings tend to indicate a change in attitudes rather than values – a similar picture to Egypt.

Figure 9 – Attitudes towards gender equality in Iraq (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Attitudes favouring university education for boys showed both a dramatic decline among those who strongly agreed from 29% in 2004 to 11% in 2018 and an even more dramatic increase among those who strongly disagreed from 24% to 55%. This is the only domain in which we detect changes in both attitude and value. Overall, the value of the gender-equality index significantly increased from 1.96 in 2004 to 2.21 in 2011 but much of this was a result of the decline in strong attitudes towards male supremacy, rather than a genuine increase in support for gender equality.

Other attitudinal shifts towards male supremacy in politics and education include a decline among those who strongly agreed and agreed that men make better political leaders, falling from 90% to 72%, and from 46% to 22% on the question of university education. Yet the downward trend has flattened out for both measures in recent years, indicating levels of resistance to change and an indication that Iraq remains a relatively patriarchal society except in the field of education. Thus, greater female activism and more extensive implementation of egalitarian gender policies are needed to make further progress towards gender equality.

LEBANON: THE FINDINGS

Although the Lebanese have showed more preference for gender equality than in other countries in the region, there was not enough data to show conclusively whether the country had grown more egalitarian of late. Based on six surveys spanning 2008 and 2018, there appears to be a downward trend in favourable attitudes towards male supremacy in the political and educational domains, with those strongly agreeing or agreeing that men make better political leaders dropping from 55% to 50% and that university education is more important for boys declining from 16% to 11%.

Figure 10 – Attitudes towards gender equality in Lebanon (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

SAUDI ARABIA: THE FINDINGS

Data on Saudi Arabia are equally limited. Differences in the response categories on questions relating to polygamy, wifely obedience and men's rights to jobs between 2003 and 2011 mean it's not possible to compare them directly. However, by making reasonable adjustments and working with averages to produce values, rough indications of a shift towards gender equality in Saudi Arabia can be made on these three measures. Greater data availability on the remaining two questions shows no significant change on the question of men making better political leaders – Saudis remain in favour – but a notable swing away from male supremacy in education is registered, with the percentage dropping from 61% to 43% between 2003 and 2011.

Figure 11 – Attitudes towards gender equality in Saudi Arabia (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

GENDER RELATIONS AND EQUALITY METHODOLOGY INDEX

As mentioned, we formulated the following five questions to assess beliefs in the norms of male supremacy across the domains of family, politics, jobs and education, asking respondents whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed that:

1. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do (men are better leaders in politics)

2. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (men have more right to a job)

3. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (priority for boys in university education)

4. A wife must always obey her husband (wifely obedience)

5. It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife (polygamy)

Middle Eastern Values Survey (MEVS) included all these five questions in longitudinal surveys carried out in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. We also drew additional responses to the first three questions from the World Values Survey in Turkey and responses to the first and third from Arab Barometer surveys in Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. By using findings from all these longitudinal surveys, we were able to assess changes in respondents' attitudes towards gender relations and the extent to which they represented trends towards gender equality over time.

In more detail, the surveys conducted in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey spanned the three waves of 2011–2013, 2015–2016 and 2020. Additional data from the World Values Survey relating to two of the five questions (political leadership and education) allowed us to further validate our conclusions about Turkish respondents and construct a more comprehensive pattern across an expanded 24-year period from 1996 to 2020. Additional date from Arab Barometer surveys in Egypt in 2011, 2013 and 2016 bolstered our findings in Egypt.

For our Iraqi findings, three data sets have been analysed to gauge changes in attitudes towards gender equality. One set is from the three full-scale national longitudinal surveys carried out in the country in 2004, 2006 and 2011 by MEVS, which includes all five gender-related questions. The second data set includes a select number of questions on sociopolitical values, including a single question related to wifely obedience that was added to the

existing surveys. Finally, the third is from Arab Barometer, conducted in Iraq in 2011, 2013 and 2018, which included two of the five questions specifically relating to politics and university education.

Nationally representative sample data on all five questions were available for Lebanon only in the 2008 and 2011 surveys, meaning it was not possible to construct trends in value changes for all. Data on attitudes toward male supremacy in politics, education and the jobs market were available for at least three years, however, collated from Arab Barometer and World Values Survey.

Three full-scale national surveys were carried out in Saudi Arabia, two from MEVS in 2003 and 2011 and the other from Arab Barometer, also in 2011. The Arab Barometer survey included only two of the five questions relating to politics and university education. With the available data on the other three questions, it was not possible to construct a trend in value changes and further limitations relating to the number of response categories meant it was not strictly speaking possible to compare all answers. To make an educated comparison, however, we adjusted the range[16] of questions to vary between 1 and 4, averaging variables across all the surveys to make calculations and comparisons (once more, a higher value indicated stronger support for gender equality).

Expressive Individualism

KEY TAKEAWAYS

For liberal democracy to come to fruition, individuals must be able to express themselves freely. Focusing on areas where people express this individuality, we note a growing desire for independence and freedom of choice when it comes to making private decisions such as choosing a spouse, how to dress, or nourishing virtues of independence and imagination as part of a child-rearing philosophy. While there is less change among older respondents, incredible shifts in support for love marriage among young respondents were registered in Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The freedom to select one's own spouse is considered a rebellion against the traditional norms of obedience to parental authority and patriarchal domination.

- More respondents in the Middle East want to choose their own spouse, free of family control, with an increase in Egyptians believing love should be the basis for marriage, up 32% to 46%, and Tunisians trending in the same direction, up 26% to 35%, both between 2011 and 2020. With the percentage in favour of love marriage among young Egyptian, Turkish and Saudi respondents reaching 70%, 68% and 61% respectively, these countries could be on the verge of what social scientist Karl Deutsch coined the "Romeo and Juliet Revolution" – in other words, societal acceptance of the rights of individual choice.

- Between 2011 and 2020, more Egyptians believed women should dress as they wish, with the percentage in favour increasing from 17% to 24%, although the Turkish showed the largest rise from 52% to 71%.

- Indicating a preference for children to be imaginative and independent, the Turkish scored highly on the child-quality index. Iraqis no longer placed as much of an emphasis on religious faith as a favourable quality, the percentage decreasing from 93% in 2004 to 77% in 2011. Saudis moved in favour of imagination, with the percentage increase from 31% to 36% between 2003 and 2011, while also placing less importance on religious faith and obedience for children.

- Turkish respondents showed a particularly strong turn towards expressive individualism.

- In Lebanon, there were clear moves away from individualistic qualities for children but equally away from more patriarchal values such as religious faith and obedience. Could this be indicative of a change in values away from both individualism and patriarchy?

INTRODUCTION: WHY INDIVIDUAL CHOICE MATTERS

Where people value the right of individuals to express themselves freely, there is a higher likelihood for the development of liberal democracy. Individualism elevates the premise that individuals have the right to and should be able to exercise private judgement in matters relating to their personal lives. Precedence is thus given to individual choices and preferences over parental and patrimonial authority as well as religious instruction. Although wider political struggles for liberation may complicate or even limit individual choices in a country, the ultimate objective of any struggle for democratic change is the expansion of individual freedoms in addition to the recognition and institutionalisation of individual choice in different domains of life – from the religious, economic and political to social, gender and family matters.[17]

Although the freedom of political and religious expression, gender equality, rights to individual property, opportunity in the jobs market and autonomy over one's lifestyle are all reflective of individualism, we narrow the scope here to focus on pertinent areas where people express their individuality. For example, children being raised to be independent and imaginative rather than following others or a religion without critical thought; love representing the foundation for spouse selection; and women dressing as they please.

THE MEASURE OF EXPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM

We measure the concept of expressive individualism on the basis of the following:

- Preference for love over parental approval as the more important basis for marriage

- Endorsement of a woman's right to dress as she wishes

- Recognition of imagination and independence, not obedience and religious faith, as favourable qualities for children to have

Recognition of the individual's freedom to select one's mate can be viewed as a historical rebellion against traditional norms of obedience to parental and patrimonial authority. The rationale justifying this rebellion is rooted in the humanist tradition that stresses not only individual freedom to choose whom to marry, but also equality between spouses. To assess the extent of support for love as the basis for marriage, respondents were asked whether parental approval or love was the more important basis for marriage. Those who responded with love were considered to have more individualistic values than those who placed greater importance on parental approval.

Dress is an important symbol of individual self-expression. The right of women in particular to dress as they please is therefore an effective indicator of support for expressive individualism. We asked respondents whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed that it was up to a woman to dress whichever way she wished.

Those with individualistic values are likely to instil similar values among their children, preferring to raise them to be more independent and imaginative, and less obedient and religious (assuming that religiosity promotes blind obedience to authority).[18] To measure this, respondents were asked to select five among ten qualities that children should have. These qualities were (1) independence, (2) hard work, (3) feeling of responsibility, (4) imagination, (5) tolerance and respect for other people, (6) thrift, (7) determination and perseverance, (8) religious faith, (9) unselfishness and (10) obedience. Based on these findings, we then created a set of variables to produce a children's-qualities index.

An expressive-individualism index was also constructed, which indicates that respondents who considered love to be the most important basis for marriage, believed it was up to a woman to dress as she wishes, and preferred independence and imagination were the most supportive of expressive individualism.

EGYPT, TUNISIA AND TURKEY: THE FINDINGS

Among Egyptian respondents, all measures increased between 2011 and 2020, with the percentage of respondents choosing love as the basis for marriage rising from 32% to 46%, the children's-qualities index increasing from 1.71 to 1.91, and the percentage who strongly agreed or agreed that a woman should dress as she wishes increasing from 17% to 24%. Thus, the expressive-individualism index for Egypt increased from 1.81 to 2.07 during the survey period.

While support for love marriage increased among Tunisians from 26% to 35%, the percentage of those who felt a woman should dress as she wishes declined from 56% to 50%.

Among Turkish respondents, the increase on the children's-qualities index proved a bright spot, increasing considerably from 2.25 to 2.53 while those supporting a woman's right to dress as she wishes also went up from 52% to 71%. While support for love marriage decreased, the combined effect was a rise in the expressive-individualism index among Turkish respondents from 2.46 to 2.66.

It is worth noting that the increase in the value of the children's-qualities index among Egyptian respondents was not a result of more support for the qualities of independence or imagination but rather a significant decline in the selection of religious faith and obedience. In other words, this decline among Egyptians indicated the weakening of patriarchy and parental authority but not the strengthening of a preference for independence and imagination as characteristics in an individual. Nonetheless, the weakening of patriarchal values indicates suitable conditions for the rise of expressive individualism.

Figure 12 – Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Love as the basis for marriage over parental approval

Women dressing as they wish

Children's qualities

IRAQ: THE FINDINGS

Support for love marriage increased from 26% in 2004 to 31% in 2011. Consistent with this was the choice of independence as a favourable quality for children, from 30% to 41%, and an accompanying decline in the choice of religious faith, from 93% to 77%, and obedience, from 76% to 69%. These changes are reflected in a rise in the children's-qualities index from 1.60 to 1.92 for the period between 2004 and 2011. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who supported a woman dressing as she wishes increased from 17% to 27%. Overall, the value of the expressive-individualism index rose from 1.72 in 2004 to 1.93 in 2011. While Iraq remained a patriarchal society during this period, there was a notable shift away from associated values and a trend toward expressive individualism.

Figure 13 – Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Iraq (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

LEBANON: THE FINDINGS

The trend among Lebanese respondents shows a significant drop in support for individualistic values between 2008 and 2011/2018. The percentage of those in favour of love marriage dropped from 77% to 69% while those who considered independence and imagination as important qualities for children declined from 66% to 42% and 34% to 24% respectively. But these declines do not necessarily equate to a rise in patriarchal values because the percentage of respondents who selected religious faith and obedience also declined from 54% to 35% and 25% to 10% respectively. With both individualist and patriarchal values declining during the ten-year period, this may be indicative of a value change among the Lebanese away from either ideal and in an entirely different direction. As the value of the children's-qualities index remained basically unchanged and there was a decrease in those supporting a woman's right to dress freely from 84% to 49% between the two surveys, the expressive-individualism index saw a notable fall from 3.04 in 2008 to 2.68 in 2011. Despite this, the majority of Lebanese respondents still tended to support individualistic values rather than vehemently disagree with them.

SAUDI ARABIA: THE FINDINGS

Among the Saudi respondents, there is a complex picture overall with no definitive conclusion in the direction of change towards individualism. Love as the basis for marriage has stagnated among respondents with 50% in favour. Those who selected independence as a child quality declined from 72% to 52% although the choice of imagination increased somewhat from 31% to 36%. Interestingly, the more conservative value of obedience declined from 68% to 62%. Meanwhile, 94% of respondents said it was very important or important for a woman to wear the veil in 2003 yet, in 2011, 50% strongly agreed or agreed that it was up to a woman to dress how she wished. Given that half of Saudi respondents supported a woman's right to dress as she wished in 2011, we can speculate that a much smaller percentage of these respondents would have said that it was very important or important for a woman to wear the veil in public in 2011 than they did in 2003 (if this same question had been included in 2011). While it was not possible to calculate the expressive-individualism index for Saudi Arabia because of the lack of sufficient comparative data, other indicators we have noted suggest growing support for associated values, especially among Saudi youth.

Figure 14 – Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Love as the basis for marriage over parental approval

Women dressing as they wish   **Women wearing the veil in public**

Children's qualities

EXPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM METHODOLOGY APPENDIX

Once again, to construct trends, five different data sets from nationally representative samples are used. One set is from the three-country longitudinal surveys in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey that were carried out between 2011–2013, 2015–2016 and 2020. The second is from three national surveys conducted in Iraq in 2004, 2006 and 2011. The third consists of two national surveys in Lebanon in 2008 and 2011. The fourth is based on two national surveys in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2011. Finally, the fifth includes data from a range of questions on children's qualities from the 2018 World Values Survey in Lebanon.

As discussed, we measured the concept of expressive individualism on the basis of the following:

- Preference for love over parental approval as the more important basis for marriage

- Endorsement of a woman's right to dress as she wishes

- Recognition of imagination and independence, not obedience and religious faith, as favourable qualities for children to have

Basis for marriage: Recognition of the individual's freedom to select one's mate can be viewed as a historical civic rebellion against traditional norms of obedience to parental and patrimonial authority. The rationale justifying this rebellion is rooted in the humanist tradition that stresses not only individual freedom to choose whom to marry, but also equality between spouses.[19] To assess the extent of support for love as the basis for marriage, respondents were asked whether parental approval or love was the more important basis for marriage. Those who responded with love were considered to have more individualistic values than those who placed greater importance on parental approval. This variable was then recoded to range between 4 for "love" and 1 for "parental approval".

A woman dressing as she wishes: Dress is an important symbol of individual self-expression. The right of women in particular to dress as they please is therefore an effective indicator of support for expressive individualism. We asked respondents whether they (1) strongly agreed, (2) agreed, (3) disagreed or (4) strongly disagreed that it was up to a woman to dress whichever way she wished. The coding for this variable was reversed so that a higher value indicated stronger support for a woman's right to dress as she wishes.

Favourable qualities for children: Those with individualistic values are likely to instil similar values among their children, preferring to raise them to be more independent and imaginative and less obedient and religious (assuming that religiosity promotes blind obedience to authority). To measure this, respondents were asked to select five among ten qualities that children should have. These qualities were (1) independence, (2) hard work, (3) feeling of responsibility, (4) imagination, (5) tolerance and respect for other people, (6) thrift, (7) determination and perseverance, (8) religious faith, (9) unselfishness and (10) obedience. We reasoned that, on the face of it, those who selected independence and imagination were more supportive of individualistic values than those who did not. Furthermore, those who did not select religious faith or obedience were more individualistic than those who did. Based on this reasoning, we created four dummy variables: 1) independence (1 = independence, 0 = otherwise); 2) imagination (1 = imagination, 0 = otherwise); 3) nonreligious faith (0 = religious faith, 1 = otherwise); and 4) nonobedience (0 = obedience, 1 = otherwise). We then added these four dummies to create a children's-qualities index, ranging from 0 to 4. To be consistent with the other two measures, the range of this index was recalibrated to vary between 1 and 4 using this formula: Children's-qualities index-recalibrated = 1 + .75*(children's-qualities index). Higher values indicated stronger support for individualism as a favourable quality for children.

Finally, an expressive-individualism index was also constructed using the following formula: Expressive-individualism index = (love + women dress as they wish + children's-qualities)/3. Respondents who considered love as the most important basis for marriage, who believe it is up to a woman to dress as she wishes, and who prefer independence and imagination over religious faith and obedience in children are therefore more supportive of expressive individualism.

Data sets on favourable qualities for children to have are incomplete in the Tunisian survey, so an associated index for the country is not constructed. Similarly, imagination as an option was not included in the list of qualities for children in the 2004 Iraqi survey so the children's-qualities index was calculated using three indicators only – independence, religious faith and obedience. For Lebanon, we expanded the timeframe for the surveys to include available data from 2018, which means we were able to expand the children's-qualities index to this period.

On trends in Saudi Arabia, we noted the 2003 Saudi survey did not include the question on a woman's right to dress as she wishes but instead asked about the wearing of the veil in public places. We have made a rough comparison between the two survey years, postulating that those who said it was less important for a woman to wear the veil were more likely to agree that it is up to a woman to dress as she wishes. Given that half of Saudi respondents supported a woman's right to dress as she wishes in 2011, we can speculate that a much smaller percentage of these respondents would have said that it was very important or important for a woman to wear the veil in public in 2011 than they did in 2003 (if this same question had been included in 2011). This supposition is supported by looking at those who strongly disagreed with the right for women to dress as they wish in 2011 – limited to 23% respondents. Still, due to the lack of sufficient comparative data between the two survey years, the index of expressive individualism was not calculated for Saudi Arabia.

Liberal Values

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Respondents aged 18–29 are driving shifts towards liberal values, as highlighted by almost all our indices, showing a higher receptiveness to change than citizens aged 30-plus – and therefore a higher likelihood of acting to realise that change.

- Turkey showed a positive trend on our liberal-values index, with a notable increase from 2.68 in 2011 to 2.89 in 2020. By cross-tabulating the indices across gender, age and education, the big picture emerging was of the degree of shift in favour of liberal values among those aged 18–29, especially males without university education. A leading role for Turkish youth in any movement for democratic change is therefore likely. There is also a growing consensus between men and women in Turkey in favour of liberal values, with men registering the highest increase between 2011 and 2020 on gender equality.

- While Egypt remains, by the definition of our index, an illiberal society, the trend is in the right direction. Specifically, there has been a remarkable rise in female liberal consciousness in Egypt, which could increase the likelihood of Egyptian women getting involved in political movements for democratic change. The results also equate to a widening gender gap in the country as well as a widening gap between those aged 18–29 and the over-30s.

- Tunisia has registered notable declines in liberal values, except in the case of gender equality where young, university-educated females showed strong movement in favour, suggesting this is the group to nurture in furthering democratic values in the country.

• Perhaps one of the more important findings is the rise in support for liberal values among Saudis, noted among younger respondents in particular. The findings are drawn from the survey period of 2003–2011. Given the ultra-conservative nature of the kingdom, this increasing support for liberal values and overwhelming rejection of the idea that democracy is not compatible with Islam – contrary to the Wahhabi political perspective – coupled with the significant decline in both trust in religious institutions and support for the sharia could all be indicative of a stronger desire for liberalisation than currently shown by the data.

Figure 15 – Trends in liberal values in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, as measured by indices (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

INTRODUCTION: THE DEMOGRAPHICS DRIVING CHANGE

Changes in values are not uniformly distributed among all individuals in society. So, while we take a general overview, we also consider the demographic characteristics of respondents, including gender, age and education. It has been argued that young people (aged 18–29) comprise a populational group more likely to drive shifts in cultural values because they have fewer social and family obligations, are more mobile and more open to risk. As a result, they are more likely to participate in collective action to realise change than citizens aged 30-plus.

Women are also more likely to lead on gender-related issues and support measures in favour of equality and liberal values than men. Moreover, the persistence of patriarchal values in the Middle East provides an important area of focus for the mobilisation of women in movements for structural change.

Finally, education is another critical factor in shaping people's values and attitudes towards significant sociopolitical issues. With education supporting cognitive enlightenment and the ability of individuals to create and implement solutions, those with higher education are more likely to accept the benefits derived from adopting liberal values.

THE MEASURE OF LIBERAL VALUES

Secular politics, gender equality and expressive individualism are components of liberal values, as measured by our indices. Since these indices are significantly correlated with one another, we have averaged them to create a single measure of liberal values or the liberal-values index.

To assess the variation in trends by gender, age and education, we focus on Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, where complete data on the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics and liberal values are available. We split the data by gender (male versus female), age (18–29 versus 30-plus), and education (university-level education with a degree versus without university education – which could range from no formal education to some university-level education without a degree).

VALUE CHANGE BY GENDER: THE FINDINGS

Figure 16 – Trends in liberal values by gender in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, as measured by indices (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

In **Egypt**, the expressive-individualism index increased for both sexes but the degree for women was almost twice that for men, although both are statistically significant. There was a notable widening of the gender gap when it came to expressive individualism, with women more supportive of the values by 2020. Gender difference is more marked in the gender-equality index, with values increasing more than four times among women than men during the survey period, again indicating a widening gender gap. On secular politics, both sexes scored higher in 2020 than 2011. Although men scored higher than women, the degree of increase among women was sharper, closing the differences between men and women on secular politics. The overall liberal-values index increased for both men and women, although the increase for women was significantly higher than for men during the survey period. This amounts to a remarkable rise in female liberal consciousness in Egypt, which could increase the likelihood of Egyptian women getting involved in political movements for democratic change.

In **Tunisia**, the expressive-individualism index declined for both men and women. While the amount of the decline was not statistically significant for men, for women it was. Although women scored higher on the expressive-individualism index, the gender gap narrowed during the survey period. Scores on the gender-equality index were higher for women than men throughout the survey period. On secular politics, declines occurred among both sexes, but this fall was more pronounced among women. While scores on the liberal-values index for women were higher, the decline across the survey period was more notable for women, closing the gender gap.

Trends toward liberal values across all indices were consistent for both **Turkish** men and women on all the indices – sweeping the board between 2011 and 2020. Notably, the gender-equality index registered a much higher increase among men than women in the survey period.

VALUE CHANGE BY AGE: THE FINDINGS

Figure 17 – Trends in liberal values by age in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, as measured by indices (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

Both age groups in **Egypt** scored significantly higher on all indices of liberal values in 2020 compared to 2011, although those aged between 18–29 registered a higher score across the board. The only statistically significant difference in this amount between the two groups was on the liberal-values index where the youth grew significantly more liberal than older respondents during the survey period.

Both age groups in **Tunisia** scored lower on the indices of expressive individualism, secular politics and liberal values during the survey period. This decline was not statistically significant, however, except on the secular-politics index. On gender equality, those aged 18–29 in Tunisia represented the biggest hope, moving in favour. To further assess changes towards gender equality among Tunisians, we cross-tabulated results by age and gender. Younger female Tunisians were the only group to score higher on the gender-equality index in 2020 compared to 2013 (see Annex of Tables for more details). Given that in all other categories, attitudes toward liberal values declined, we deduce that younger female Tunisians are more receptive to liberal values and more likely to participate in the movement for democratic change than other groups in the country.

And in **Turkey**, both age groups scored significantly higher on all the liberal-values indices, with statistically significant increases across the board. Without exception, those aged 18–29 scored higher than over-30s, indicating a widening gap between the two groups.

VALUE CHANGE BY EDUCATION: THE FINDINGS

Egyptian respondents with or without university education scored significantly higher, representing statistically significant change on all the liberal-values indices in 2020 compared to 2011.

Figure 18 – Trends in liberal values by education in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, as measured by indices (see Annex of Tables for full data sets)

While we could expect people with a university education to be more supportive of liberal values, it's interesting to note that the degree of increase in the liberal-values index during the survey period was higher among the less educated in Egypt compared to the more educated respondents. This is the case across all indices, perhaps indicating that practical experience in life may be more of an important factor than reflective thought in encouraging individuals to change their orientation.

A similar pattern is detected in **Tunisia** among people without university education but this change is in the opposite direction, with all indices showing statistically significant negative shifts, with the exception of gender equality. Among the university-educated group during the survey period, the swing in favour of gender equality was very positive. This swing was driven by female respondents. And while this trend towards gender equality was most significant among younger females with a university education, the opposite occurred among older males without university education (see Annex of Tables for more details).

In **Turkey**, both groups scored significantly higher on all the liberal-values indices during the survey period, with the increases all statistically significant. Without exception, those with university education scored higher than those without on the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics and liberal values, although the degree of change was similar.

LIBERAL VALUES METHODOLOGY APPENDIX

To assess the variation in trends by gender, age and education, we focused on Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, where complete data on the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics and liberal values are available. We split the data by gender (male versus female), age (18–29 versus 30-plus) and education (at least university-level education with a degree versus without university education – which could range from no formal education to some university-level education without a degree).

When considering the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics and liberal values by male/female split, we have calculated the amount of change in the values of each of the indices across the survey period and measured whether the gender gap expanded, contracted or did not change.

About the Author

MANSOOR MOADDEL

Mansoor Moaddel is Professor of Sociology at University of Maryland–College Park. He has carried out values surveys in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. His most recent project focused on a comparative analysis of religious fundamentalism in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. He is currently engaged in a cross-national panel survey in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey in order to understand the dynamics of value changes and political engagements. For his previous empirical research, he studied Islamic modernism in Egypt, India and Iran between the late 19th century and early 20th; liberal nationalism in Egypt, anti-clerical secularism in Iran, liberal Arabism and pan-Arab nationalism in Syria and Iraq in the first half of the 20th century; and Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria in the second half. Moaddel's latest book is *The Clash of Values: Islamic Fundamentalism versus Liberal Nationalism*, published by Columbia University Press (2020).

Endnotes

1 On 20 September 2001, President George W Bush addressed a special joint session of Congress and the American people. He answered his own question: "They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."

2 Ian Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish fundamentalism in Israel* (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); George Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).

3 Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna* (1906–1949), translated by Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*, translated by Jon Rothschild (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and McGregor, A., "Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 23(2) (2006): 92-113.

4 Hamza Alavi, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan," *Secular Pakistan*, March 10, 2009.

5 Mansoor Moaddel, *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

6 Mansoor Moaddel and Stuart Karabenick, "Measuring Fundamentalism Across the Abrahamic Faiths," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (May 2021):1–29.

7 Abd al-Salam Faraj, *The Neglected Duty* (1981).

8 Abdullah Azzam, *Join the Caravan*; and McGregor, A., "Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 23(2) (2006): 92-113.

9 https://archive.org/stream/JoinTheCaravan/JoinTheCaravan_djvu.txt

10 https://archive.org/details/TheGlobalIslamicResistanceCall

11 Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); Mehran Kamrava, Kamrava, Mehran, *Iran's Intellectual Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Mahdavi, Mojtaba, "Post-Islamist Trends in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 31,1 (2011): 94-109; and Mansoor Moaddel, "The Iranian Revolution and Its Nemesis: The Rise of Liberal Values Among Iranians," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 29,1 (2009): 126–36.

12 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport-idUSKBN1YR0QR

13 One reason for the lower than expected support for Western-type government in Turkey in 2020 might be the attribution of the failed military coup in July 2016 by President Erdogan and his followers as a Western conspiracy.

14 For a discussion on some of the critical methodological issues in comparative cross-national surveys in the Middle East, see Julie de Jong and Linda Young-Demarco, "Best practices: lessons from a Middle East survey research program," in *The Arab Spring and Changes in Values and Political Actions in the Middle East*, edited by Mansoor Moaddel and Michele Gelfand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

15 For debate on gender issues in the Muslim world, see Qasim Amin, *The Liberation of Women*, trans. Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1992; originally published in Arabic in 1899); Gail Minault, "Sayyid Mumtaz Ali and Huquq un-Niswan: An Advocate of Women's Rights in Islam in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Modern Asian Studies* 24, no. 1 (1990): 147-172; and Mansoor Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).

16 To change the range of the first two variables from 1 to 5 to 1 to 4, these variables were multiplied by .75 +.25, and to change the range of the third variable from 1 to 3 to 1 to 4, this variable was multiplied by 1.5 - .5.

17 For a discussion on individualism, see Steven. Lukes, 2006. *Individualism* (Wivenhoe Park, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2006), and "The Meaning of Individualism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32, 1 (1971): 45–66; and Stephanie M. Walls, *Individualism in the United States: A Transformation in American Political Thought* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).

18 We are not arguing that religiosity is *always* linked to obedience to authority. In fact, in the context of the Middle East, the relationship between religiosity and authoritarianism is complex, depending on how authoritarianism is operationalised. Measured in terms of a strongman or army rule, religiosity has little connection with authoritarianism, but if it is measured in terms of attitudes toward Islamic government where religious leaders have absolute power, then it is significantly linked to this form of religious absolutist rule. Religiosity is also significantly connected to a disciplinarian conception of the deity, literalism, religious exclusivity and religious intolerance – the four components of religious fundamentalism. Finally, religiosity has a weak but significant negative relation with independence and positive relation with obedience as favorably qualities for children. See Mansoor Moaddel and Stuart Karabenick, "Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 57, 4 (December): 676-706; and "Measuring Religious Fundamentalism Across the Abrahamic Faith."

19 Karl W Deutsch, "On Nationalism, World Religion, and the Nature of the West," in *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and National Building*, edited by Per Torsvik (Bergen, Norway: Universitestsvorlaget, 1981).

Annex of Tables

All the findings included in the main body of this report are based on different data sets, the majority drawn from Middle Eastern Values Study (MEVS), supplemented by data from Arab Barometer and World Values Survey.

All indices range from 1 to 4, with a higher amount indicating stronger support for the stated value of secular politics, gender equality, expressive individualism or liberal values.

For more details on the original data and MEVS, which documents changing values in the Middle East through systematic comparative studies, visit mevs.org or contact Mansoor Moaddel, Professor of Sociology, University of Maryland, at moaddel@umd.edu.

SECULAR POLITICS

Table 1: Attitudes towards secular politics and government in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (%)

	Egypt			Tunisia			Turkey		
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
My country would be a better society if religion and politics were separated									
Strongly agree	37	52	29	50	50	34	40	41	41
Agree	19	30	52	22	22	29	36	35	38
Disagree	28	9	16	15	14	22	17	19	17
Strongly disagree	16	9	3	13	14	15	7	5	4
My country would be a better place if its government was similar to Western government									
Strongly agree	17	24	35	23	30	23	11	19	20
Agree	20	31	47	24	27	30	33	33	32
Disagree	31	24	14	28	20	29	39	34	37
Strongly disagree	32	22	3	25	23	17	17	14	11
Having an Islamic/Christian government where religious authorities have absolute power									
Very good	25	11	16	16	11	26	8	6	7
Fairly good	32	18	41	21	19	24	26	18	21
Fairly bad	24	34	28	19	19	21	35	30	36
Very bad	20	37	15	43	52	29	31	46	37
A good government should implement only the laws of the sharia									
Very important	28	21	18	13	8	15	6	6	7
Important	26	30	38	14	11	21	14	12	14
Somewhat important	23	29	22	19	16	14	13	14	17
Least important	12	10	13	21	22	16	21	21	21
Not important	10	9	9	33	43	34	46	48	42
Secular-politics index	*2.36*	*2.72*	*2.69*	*2.81*	*2.99*	*2.67*	*2.85*	*3.00*	*2.97*
Sample size	*3,454*	*3,385*	*3,334*	*2,943*	*2,211*	*2,294*	*2,739*	*2,552*	*2,309*

Table 2: Attitudes towards politicians in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (%)

	Egypt			Tunisia			Turkey		
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Religious leaders should not interfere in politics									
Strongly agree	35	44	29	49	49	42	41	44	46
Agree	27	38	49	24	23	26	34	37	34
Disagree	27	12	19	16	16	20	16	12	14
Strongly disagree	12	6	3	11	12	12	9	6	6
People with strong religious views should run for public office									
Strongly agree	28	22	26	36	37	11	13	10	10
Agree	35	31	48	31	28	21	42	28	31
Disagree	22	29	21	20	19	35	32	34	35
Strongly disagree	14	18	4	12	15	33	13	28	25
Secular-politician index	*2.52*	*2.8*	*2.53*	*2.59*	*2.61*	*2.93*	*2.75*	*3.00*	*2.99*
Sample size	*3,395*	*3,515*	*3,311*	*2,900*	*2,224*	*2,256*	*2,955*	*2,664*	*2,366*

Table 3: Attitudes towards secular politics and government in Iraq (%)

	2004	April 2006	Oct 2006	2008	2010	2011
Iraq would be a better society if religion and politics were separated						
Strongly agree	28	41	52	37	36	30
Agree	26	22	17	39	39	39
Disagree	30	20	18	18	19	24
Strongly disagree	17	18	13	6	6	7
Iraq would be a better place if its government was similar to Western government						
Strongly agree	12	18	9			12
Agree	11	12	14			33
Disagree	32	28	24			36
Strongly disagree	45	42	52			19
Having an Islamic government where religious authorities have absolute power						
Very good	30	22	21			15
Fairly good	34	26	27			34
Fairly bad	24	29	26			34
Very bad	13	24	26			17
A good government should implement only the laws of the sharia						
Very important	34	28	21			14
Important	20	20	19			34
Somewhat important	22	19	24			26
Least important	16	21	20			19
Not important	8	12	17			7
Secular-politics index	*2.2*	*2.43*	*2.47*			*2.54*
Sample size	*2,084*	*2,357*	*6,692*			*2,832*

Table 4: Attitudes towards politicians in Iraq (%)

	2004	2006	2011
Religious leaders should not interfere in politics			
Strongly agree	23	24	30
Agree	29	28	37
Disagree	31	30	26
Strongly disagree	18	18	7
People with strong religious views should run for public office			
Strongly agree	32	28	21
Agree	32	24	50
Disagree	24	25	21
Strongly disagree	12	23	9
Secular-politician index	2.37	2.51	2.65
Sample size	*2,021*	*2,330*	*2,830*

Table 5: Attitudes toward secular politics and government in Lebanon (%)

	2008	2011
Lebanon would be a better society if religion and politics were separated		
Strongly agree	52	48
Agree	23	32
Disagree	15	15
Strongly disagree	10	4
Lebanon would be a better place if its government was similar to Western government		
Strongly agree	29	27
Agree	34	36
Disagree	24	26
Strongly disagree	13	11
Having Islamic/Christian government where religious authorities have absolute power		
Very good	6	8
Fairly good	10	23
Fairly bad	29	34
Very bad	55	36
A good government should implement only the laws of the sharia		
Very important	7	9
Important	14	15
Somewhat important	19	25
Least important	32	24
Not important	27	27
Secular-politics index	*3.06*	*2.96*

Table 6: Attitudes towards secular politics and government in Saudi Arabia (%)

	2003	2011	2011*
Democracy as the best form of government			
Strongly agree	33	31	24
Agree	39	44	48
Disagree	18	17	18
Strongly disagree	11	8	10
Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from sociopolitical life			
Strongly agree			20
Agree			26
Disagree			31
Strongly disagree			24
Democracy is a system that is incompatible with the teaching of Islam			
Strongly agree			7
Agree			24
Disagree			40
Strongly disagree			29
A good government implements only the sharia			
Very important	73	31	
Important	16	32	
Somewhat important	7	22	
Least important	3	11	
Not important	2	4	
How much confidence do you have in religious institutions?			
A great deal	85	46	
Quite a lot	12	37	
Not very much	2	14	
None at all	1	2	

*Arab Barometer

GENDER RELATIONS AND EQUALITY

Table 7: Attitudes toward gender equality in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (%)

	Egypt			Tunisia			Turkey		
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife									
Strongly agree	7	22	15	7	10	7	3	2	2
Agree	20	25	35	12	9	17	5	4	4
Disagree	30	17	27	16	11	25	24	24	28
Strongly disagree	43	36	23	65	71	51	69	71	67
A wife must always obey her husband									
Strongly agree	69	55	32	44	50	34	19	17	9
Agree	26	34	55	34	28	38	51	49	33
Disagree	5	9	10	18	17	22	20	23	30
Strongly disagree	0.3	3	2	4	5	6	10	11	28
Men make better political leaders than women do									
Strongly agree	59	50	33	33	44	22	11	11	7
Agree	24	25	44	22	18	27	43	35	27
Disagree	11	15	18	28	20	37	33	39	35
Strongly disagree	7	10	5	17	19	15	13	15	31
University education is more important for a boy than for a girl									
Strongly agree	20	11	7	11	8	10	7	6	5
Agree	14	11	19	9	6	14	22	20	15
Disagree	34	20	34	35	15	44	45	46	42
Strongly disagree	32	58	40	45	71	32	26	28	39
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women									
Strongly agree	62	58	36	52	60	46	16	16	7
Agree	23	25	47	22	15	30	40	39	27
Disagree	9	10	12	16	10	16	31	32	37
Strongly disagree	6	7	5	11	15	9	13	13	29
Gender-equality index	*2.1*	*2.2*	*2.26*	*2.5*	*2.52*	*2.49*	*2.73*	*2.78*	*3.06*
Total	*3,490*	*3,810*	*3,442*	*3,063*	*2,378*	*2,387*	*2,966*	*2,760*	*2,469*

Table 8: Attitudes towards gender equality in Iraq (%)

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2011	2011*	2013*	2018*
It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife								
Strongly agree	22	18			11			
Agree	26	30			37			
Disagree	29	22			36			
Strongly disagree	24	30			17			
A wife must always obey her husband								
Strongly agree	64	63	47	47	42			
Agree	25	28	41	44	47			
Disagree	9	7	9	9	10			
Strongly disagree	2	2	2	1	1			
Men make better political leaders than women do								
Strongly agree	71	69			33	34	36	45
Agree	19	21			43	40	35	27
Disagree	7	7			21	16	21	16
Strongly disagree	3	3			4	8	5	11
University education is more important for a boy than for a girl								
Strongly agree	29	25			8	5	5	11
Agree	17	24			21	20	17	11
Disagree	30	24			49	45	49	24
Strongly disagree	24	27			23	29	26	55
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women								
Strongly agree	46	57			27			
Agree	32	27			52			
Disagree	17	11			17			
Strongly disagree	6	5			4			
Gender-equality index	*1.96*	*1.94*			*2.21*			
Sample size	*2,305*	*2,660*	*1,480*	*1,708*	*2,959*	*1,234*	*1,215*	*2,462*

*Arab Barometer

Table 9: Attitudes towards gender equality in Lebanon (%)

	2008	2010	2011	2011*	2013*	2016*	2018*
It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife							
Strongly agree	8		7				
Agree	13		22				
Disagree	40		33				
Strongly disagree	39		38				
A wife must always obey her husband							
Strongly agree	16		17				
Agree	26		44				
Disagree	41		28				
Strongly disagree	18		10				
Men make better political leaders than women do							
Strongly agree	22		20	27	18	18	13
Agree	33		36	16	21	34	37
Disagree	35		30	17	19	31	30
Strongly disagree	10		14	40	40	16	18
University education is more important for a boy than for a girl							
Strongly agree	6		8	13	8	3	2
Agree	10		18	5	4	5	9
Disagree	46		39	14	16	42	37
Strongly disagree	38		35	68	71	50	52
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women							
Strongly agree	21		26				
Agree	29		40				
Disagree	34		23				
Strongly disagree	16		10				
Sample size	*3,039*		*3,026*	*1,388*	*1,200*	*1,200*	*2,400*

*Arab Barometer

Table 10: Attitudes towards gender equality in Saudi Arabia (%)

	2003	2011	2011*	2011-Average
It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife				
Strongly agree	21	23		
Agree	24	27		
Neither agree nor disagree	27			
Disagree	15	24		
Strongly disagree	13	27		
Average (range 1 to 4, higher value more egalitarian)	2.31	2.54		
A wife must always obey her husband				
Strongly agree	53	48		
Agree	29	31		
Neither agree nor disagree	13			
Disagree	3	16		
Strongly disagree	2	5		
Average (range 1 to 4, higher value more egalitarian)	1.54	1.79		
Men make better political leaders than women do				
Strongly agree	53	49	46	48
Agree	23	30	35	33
Disagree	17	14	14	14
Strongly disagree	8	8	6	7
Average (range 1 to 4, higher value more egalitarian)	1.79	1.81	1.82	1.82
University education is more important for a boy than for a girl				
Strongly agree	40	31	9	21
Agree	21	26	18	22
Disagree	22	28	35	32
Strongly disagree	17	15	39	27
Average (range 1 to 4, higher value more egalitarian)	2.16	2.28	3.06	2.69
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women				
Strongly agree		39		
Agree	69	39		
Neither	24			
Disagree	8	17		
Strongly disagree		5		
Average (range 1 to 4, higher value more egalitarian)	1.58	1.89		
Gender-equality index	*1.87*	*2.11*		

*Arab Barometer

EXPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM

Table 11: Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (%)

| | Egypt | | | Tunisia | | | Turkey | | |
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Basis for marriage (parental approval versus love)									
% Love as the basis for marriage	32	28	46	26	29	35	54	40	51
Children's qualities									
% Independence	38	42	39			36	37	34	46
% Imagination	9	10	7			18	24	29	36
% Religious faith	87	86	79			74	72	69	58
% Obedience	65	85	49			47	21	16	19
Children's-qualities index	*1.71*	*1.5*	*1.91*			*2*	*2.25*	*2.32*	*2.53*
Women dressing as they wish									
Strongly agree	6	6	4	29	38	18	12	14	27
Agree	11	12	20	27	26	32	40	43	44
Disagree	36	27	40	25	19	30	36	32	23
Strongly disagree	48	55	36	18	17	21	12	11	7
Expressive-individualism index	*1.81*	*1.68*	*2.07*	*2.24*	*2.36*	*2.17*	*2.46*	*2.37*	*2.66*
Sample size	*3,463*	*3,816*	*3,439*	*3,050*	*2,374*	*2,366*	*2,969*	*2,754*	*2,477*

Table 12: Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Iraq (%)

	2004	2006	2011
Basis for marriage (parental approval versus love)			
% Love as the basis for marriage	26	28	31
Children's qualities			
% Independence	30	30	41
% Imagination		9	16
% Religious faith	93	91	77
% Obedience	76	76	69
Children's-qualities index	*1.6*	*1.62*	*1.92*
Women dressing as they wish			
Strongly agree	8	4	5
Agree	9	6	22
Disagree	33	25	38
Strongly disagree	49	65	35
Expressive-individualism index	*1.72*	*1.65*	*1.93*
Sample size	*2,618*	*2,701*	*3,000*

Table 13: Attitudes towards expressive individualism in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia (%)

	Lebanon			Saudi Arabia	
	2008	**2011**	**2018***	**2003**	**2011**
Basis for marriage (parental approval versus love)					
% Love as the basis for marriage	77	69		49	50
Children's qualities					
% Independence	66	63	42	72	52
% Imagination	34	19	24	31	36
% Religious faith	54	38	35	72	70
% Obedience	25	43	10	68	62
Children's-qualities index	2.65	2.5	2.66	2.22	2.15
Women dressing as they wish/Importance of women wearing veil in public					
Strongly agree/Very important	40	17		85	20
Agree/Important	44	32		9	30
Somewhat important				5	
Disagree/Not very important	13	34		1	27
Strongly disagree/Not at all important	3	17		1	23
Expressive-individualism index	3.04	2.68			
Sample size	3,039	3,027	1,200	1,025	2,005

*World Values Survey

LIBERAL VALUES

Table 14: The trends in liberal values in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey (2011–2020)

	Egypt			Tunisia			Turkey		
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Expressive Individualism	1.81	1.68	2.07	2.24	2.36	2.17	2.46	2.37	2.66
Gender Equality	2.10	2.20	2.26	2.50	2.52	2.49	2.73	2.78	3.06
Secular Politics	2.36	2.72	2.69	2.81	2.99	2.67	2.85	3.00	2.97
Liberal Values	2.09	2.2	2.33	2.51	2.62	2.44	2.68	2.72	2.89

Table 15: The trends in liberal values in Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia

	Iraq			Lebanon		Saudi Arabia	
	2004	2006	2011	2008	2011	2003	2011
Expressive Individualism	1.72	1.65	1.93	3.04	2.68		
Gender Equality	1.96	1.94	2.22	2.74	2.58	1.87	2.06
Secular Politics	2.20	2.42	2.54	3.06	2.96	2.10	2.41
Liberal Values	1.95	1.99	2.23	2.94	2.74	1.97	2.26

Table 16: Trends in values by gender (range 1–4) in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey

	Egypt				Tunisia				Turkey			
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1
Expressive Individualism												
Male	1.83	1.66	2.01	0.18	2.16	2.28	2.13	-0.03	2.45	2.35	2.67	0.22
Female	1.78	1.70	2.12	0.34	2.31	2.43	2.21	-0.10	2.46	2.39	2.65	0.19
Male/Female Difference	-0.05	0.04	0.11	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.08	-0.07	0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.03
Gender Equality												
Male	2.02	2.05	2.08	0.06	2.36	2.36	2.33	-0.03	2.60	2.66	2.98	0.38
Female	2.18	2.36	2.43	0.25	2.60	2.64	2.61	0.01	2.82	2.88	3.13	0.31
Male/Female Difference	0.16	0.31	0.35	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.04	0.22	0.22	0.15	-0.07
Secular Politics												
Male	2.43	2.81	2.74	0.31	2.83	3.01	2.75	-0.08	2.87	3.00	2.98	0.11
Female	2.28	2.63	2.63	0.35	2.80	2.97	2.60	-0.20	2.83	3.00	2.96	0.13
Male/Female Difference	-0.15	-0.18	-0.11	0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.15	-0.12	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.02
Liberal Values												
Male	2.09	2.16	2.28	0.19	2.45	2.55	2.41	-0.04	2.64	2.67	2.88	0.24
Female	2.08	2.23	2.39	0.31	2.57	2.67	2.47	-0.10	2.70	2.75	2.91	0.21
Male/Female Difference	-0.01	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.06	-0.06	0.06	0.08	0.03	-0.03

Table 17: Trends in values by age (range 1–4) in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey

	Egypt				Tunisia				Turkey			
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1
Expressive Individualism												
30+	1.74	1.63	2.03	0.29	2.21	2.35	2.15	-0.06	2.38	2.3	2.49	0.11
18-29	2.14	1.9	2.38	0.24	2.36	2.45	2.31	-0.05	2.65	2.64	2.97	0.32
Older/younger difference	0.4	0.27	0.35	-0.05	0.15	0.1	0.16	0.01	0.27	0.34	0.48	0.21
Gender Equality												
30+	2.08	2.19	2.25	0.17	2.48	2.5	2.47	-0.01	2.71	2.76	3	0.29
18-29	2.14	2.26	2.35	0.21	2.55	2.63	2.63	0.08	2.76	2.83	3.17	0.41
Older/younger difference	0.06	0.07	0.1	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.16	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.12
Secular Politics												
30+	2.35	2.7	2.68	0.33	2.78	2.97	2.66	-0.12	2.85	3	2.92	0.07
18-29	2.38	2.8	2.77	0.39	2.9	3.07	2.75	-0.15	2.85	3.01	3.05	0.2
Older/younger difference	0.03	0.1	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.1	0.09	-0.03	0	0.01	0.13	0.13
Liberal Values												
30+	2.05	2.17	2.32	0.27	2.49	2.6	2.43	-0.06	2.65	2.68	2.8	0.15
18-29	2.15	2.32	2.49	0.34	2.6	2.71	2.56	-0.04	2.76	2.83	3.07	0.31
Older/younger difference	0.1	0.15	0.17	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.02	0.11	0.15	0.27	0.16

Table 18: Changes towards gender equality in Tunisians by gender and age between 2011 and 2020

	Wave 1	Wave 3	t-value
Male			
Older	2.38	2.32	-1.94 (not sig.)
Younger	2.31	2.38	1.21 (not sig.)
Female			
Older	2.56	2.58	0.66 (not sig.)
Younger	2.75	2.88	2.58 (sig., p < 0.01.)

Table 19: Trends in values by education (range 1–4) in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey

	Egypt				Tunisia				Turkey			
	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 3-1
Expressive Individualism												
No Uni	1.78	1.64	2.05	0.27	2.21	2.32	2.13	-0.08	2.41	2.31	2.6	0.19
Uni	1.98	1.92	2.2	0.22	2.42	2.58	2.42	0	2.83	2.79	3.01	0.18
No Uni/Uni Difference	0.2	0.28	0.15	-0.05	0.21	0.26	0.29	0.08	0.42	0.48	0.41	-0.01
Gender Equality												
No Uni	2.07	2.19	2.24	0.17	2.45	2.48	2.43	-0.02	2.7	2.75	3.03	0.33
Uni	2.24	2.3	2.37	0.13	2.75	2.73	2.84	0.09	2.9	2.96	3.23	0.33
No Uni/Uni Difference	0.17	0.11	0.13	-0.04	0.3	0.25	0.41	0.11	0.2	0.21	0.2	0
Secular Politics												
No Uni	2.33	2.7	2.67	0.34	2.8	2.97	2.64	-0.16	2.82	2.98	2.94	0.12
Uni	2.49	2.87	2.81	0.32	2.89	3.1	2.82	-0.07	3.07	3.16	3.15	0.08
No Uni/Uni Difference	0.16	0.17	0.14	-0.02	0.09	0.13	0.18	0.09	0.25	0.18	0.21	-0.04
Liberal Values												
No Uni	2.06	2.17	2.31	0.25	2.48	2.58	2.4	-0.08	2.64	2.68	2.85	0.21
Uni	2.34	2.36	2.46	0.12	2.69	2.8	2.69	0	2.93	2.97	3.13	0.2
No Uni/Uni Difference	0.28	0.19	0.15	-0.13	0.21	0.22	0.29	0.08	0.29	0.29	0.28	-0.01

Table 20: Changes towards gender equality in Tunisians by gender and education between 2011 and 2020

	Wave 1	Wave 3	t-value
Male			
No Uni	2.303	2.258	-1.689, not sig.
Uni	2.666	2.671	0.077, not sig.
Female			
No Uni	2.567	2.542	-1.170, not sig.
Uni	2.826	2.981	2.939, sig, p <01.

Table 21: Changes towards gender equality in Tunisians by gender, age and education between 2011 and 2020

	Wave 1			Wave 2			t-value
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	
Older male							
No Uni	2.31	0.56	857	2.26	0.59	714	-1.94*
Uni	2.71	0.61	163	2.66	0.54	149	-0.89
Younger male							
No Uni	2.27	0.59	269	2.26	0.53	110	-0.09
Uni	2.53	0.74	56	2.73	0.49	38	1.58
Older female							
No Uni	2.53	0.53	1189	2.51	0.56	1053	-0.69
Uni	2.84	0.64	141	2.95	0.53	177	1.64
Younger female							
No Uni	2.72	0.57	287	2.8	0.55	113	1.29
Uni	2.81	0.54	102	3.12	0.5	38	3.24^

*sig, p < 0.05. ^sig, p < 0.01.

Table 22: Changes in the liberal-values indices by gender, age and education (range 1–4) in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey between 2011 and 2020

	Egypt			
	Mean Wave 1	Mean Wave 3	t-value	Wave 3-1
Older male				
No Uni	2.04	2.24	13.16*	0.20
Uni	2.23	2.38	3.91*	0.15
Younger male				
No Uni	2.14	2.39	6.89*	0.25
Uni	2.20	2.43	2.91*	0.23
Older female				
No Uni	2.02	2.35	20.71*	0.33
Uni	2.23	2.56	7.13*	0.33
Younger female				
No Uni	2.13	2.55	12.39*	0.43
Uni	2.31	2.77	6.20*	0.46
	Tunisia			
Older male				
No Uni	2.38	2.34	-1.66	-0.04
Uni	2.74	2.65	-1.43	-0.09
Younger male				
No Uni	2.46	2.38	-1.47	-0.08
Uni	2.53	2.77	1.93	0.24
Older female				
No Uni	2.51	2.42	-4.77*	-0.09
Uni	2.67	2.66	-0.15	-0.01
Younger female				
No Uni	2.71	2.56	-2.94*	-0.15
Uni	2.70	2.90	2.59*	0.20
	Turkey			
Older male				
No Uni	2.58	2.74	6.24*	0.16
Uni	2.86	3.04	2.64*	0.18
Younger male				
No Uni	2.68	3.03	9.28*	0.35
Uni	2.86	3.04	2.49*	0.18
Older female				
No Uni	2.64	2.78	6.38*	0.14
Uni	3.05	3.25	2.65*	0.20
Younger female				
No Uni	2.74	3.06	8.78*	0.32
Uni	2.99	3.27	3.71*	0.28

*sig, $p < 0.001$.

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