Samgöngustofa

THE ICELANDIC PLAN FOR AVIATION SAFETY 2024 - 2026

IPAS

VERSION: 2.3

November 2024

ABBREVIATIONS

ADREP	ICAO Accident/Incident Data Report
AGNA	EASA Advisory Group of National Authorities
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
ALoS	Acceptable Level of Safety
AMC	Acceptable Means of Compliance
Annex 19	ICAO Safety Management
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATM	Air Traffic Management
ICETRA	Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CSP	EASA Community Safety Programme
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
EASP	European Aviation Safety Programme
EC	European Commission
ECCAIRS	European Co-ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting
EPAS	European Plan for Aviation Safety
ER	Essential Requirements
ESARR	Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirement
EU	European Union
Eurocontrol	European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
FDM	Flight Data Monitoring
GA	General Aviation
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IPAS	Icelandic Plan for Aviation Safety
IR	Implementing Rule
JAA	Joint Aviation Authorities
SAFA	Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft
SANA	Safety Assessment of National Aircraft
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARPs	ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices and Procedures
SES	Single European Sky
SIs/SRs	The safety issue or issues that this action aims to address, in accordance with the related safety risk portfolio and/or safety recommendations that are relevant to the action.
SMS	Safety Management System
SPAS	State Plan for Aviation Safety
SSP	State Safety Programme
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (ICAO)

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1.0 ICELAND AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAMME AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

1.1 The international Aviation System (ICAO) and Iceland´s role

As aviation is a global business that requires States to co-ordinate efforts to improve safety, the State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS) in Iceland is developed with due regard for international safety priorities. The figure below depicts how safety management is part of a global set of initiatives from ICAO to EASA to Iceland, where individual States work together at EASA and global levels to influence and implement best safety practices, as part of a top-down and bottom up approach.

The strategic hierarchy for safety management derives from the ICAO convention and is adopted at EASA level and in Iceland. This hierarchy includes

- Aviation Strategy: Policies and objectives for safety (eg National Aviation Policy in Iceland)
- Aviation Safety Programme: Integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety (eg State Safety Program for Iceland)
- Aviation Safety Plan: High Level set of actions to address identified safety issues (eg State Plan for Aviation Safety in Iceland)

The National Aviation Policy for Iceland is published by the Icelandic Transportation Authority and outlines the strategy and policy for civil aviation in the State - see XXXX. As an EU/EEA Member State, Iceland is also subject to the EU/EEA regulatory framework.

The New Basic Regulation (NBR), Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council, requires EASA to develop a European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP) and a European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) and EU/EEA Member States to develop a State Safety Programme (SSP) and State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS). The State Plan for Aviation Safety must include the risks and actions identified in the European Plan for Aviation Safety that are relevant for the Member State concerned.

Safety management is implemented by the civil aviation stakeholders via safety management systems. This is the final and most important link on the global aviation safety management chain. Whereas the State can enable safety management by sharing information based on aggregated risk assessments, individual organisations must, and are the only ones that can, identify risks specific to their operations and implement risk mitigation strategies to reduce these risks. This SPAS for Iceland identifies the safety priorities based on sector-based risk assessment and risk profiling, however, each organisation must assess it's own risk and act accordingly. The organisations must take due cognisance of the safety priorities identified in this Plan as part of it's own risk management processes. Management is widely distributed among ICAO regional organizations, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), national governments and aviation organizations.

1.2 The North Atlantic Aviation system (NAT) and Iceland´s role

Text pending

1.3 The European Aviation System (EASA) and Iceland´s role

The European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP) describes aviation safety management at the European level. It provides an overview of the applicable legislation, measures and processes.

The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) has been published since 2011, being updated annually for a four-year period. This document describes the identified key risks in aviation at the European level and strategic safety objectives and measures for attaining them, while acknowledging the global objectives set forth in the GASP. EPAS 2023 - 2025, which was published in November 2018, adopts a comprehensive approach to the European aviation system and, in addition to safety, contains objectives and prioritized measures for maintaining and improving the environmental performance, efficiency / proportionality and competitive-ness as well as a level playing field in European aviation.

The amended EASA Regulation (published in 2018) made EASP and EPAS as well as State Safety Programme and Plans mandatory. Similar requirements were earlier imposed on governments in ICAO Annex 19.

The EPAS is produced as part of the Safety Risk Management process (SRM) at EASA. EASA coordinates the development of the European aviation risk portfolio within its SRM process. ICETRA exerts influence on the contents of the EPAS in EASA's SRM process by being involved in the expert and decision-making forums. Through the forums of this process that progresses following an annual cycle, Member States and aviation stakeholders can participate in and influence European aviation risk management. Results are published in the Annual Safety Review and as prioritized measures compiled in the EPAS. EPAS is a risk- and information-based and anticipatory European "risk management portfolio" to which EASA Member States are committed.

Iceland incorporates the measures required in the EPAS of Member States into the Icelandic Plan for Aviation Safety. Aviation organizations must process, document and implement the measures for applicable parts. ICETRA oversees the processing and implementation of these measures and reports to EASA on the progress of measures assigned to the Member States.

1.4 The Icelandic Aviation Safety Programme (IASP/SSP)

The State Safety Programme for Iceland was developed in alignment with the European Aviation Safety Programme. This programme is consitiously being updated to reflect the latest developments in European aviation.

This document is the SPAS for Iceland and it is developed on behalf of the State by the Icelandic Aviation Authority, Safety Regulation Division, based on the safety priorities identified for the Icelandic civil aviation system. These safety priorities are developed as part of on-going risk management processes, including safety analysis and risk assessments, and in conjunction with the stakeholders through safety oversight, safety review meetings, and operational and safety workshops.

Under the new EU Basic Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (New BR), the Plan must now include the relevant actions identified for EU/EEA Member States in the EPAS.

2.0 ICELAND´S AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT AGREEMENTS

The Ministry of Transport and Local Government is responsible for all land, air and maritime transport matters, including legislation in the field, planning, development and operation of infrastructure systems, transport safety and protection. It is responsible for tele-communications, digital communication, Internet security and postal services, as well as local government administration, regional policy, registration of citizens and property and real estate valuation. According to Act No. 60/1998 on Aviation, the Aviation Act, authority is elegated from the Ministry of the Transport and Local Government to the Icelandic Transport Authority, ICETRA, where the ICETRA participates in the development and revising of operating regulations. Furthermore ICETRA has executing power and issues decisions, within the framework of the Aviation Act. Notwithstanding the before mentioned, it is the Ministry of Transport and Local Government which has the responsibility of issuing all operating regulations in the field of aviation, with legal basis in the Aviation Act.

2.1 The Icelandic Transport Authority, ICETRA

Article 1 of the Act on the Icelandic Transport Authority (ICETRA), administrative institution for transport affairs, No. 119/2012, with subsequent amendments, defines ICETRA as a special government institution, subject to the authority of the Minister.

ICETRA manages the administration of transport affairs, and conducts, as mentioned earlier, administration and regulation pertaining to aviation. It should be noted that the role of ICETRA is only of a regulatory and surveillance nature, it has not the role of a service provider. ICETRA's decisions may be appealed to the Ministry of the Interior in accordance with the Act on Public Administration No 37/1993.

2.2 Accident Investigation

The Act on Investigation of Transport Accidents, No. 18/2013 provides for the framework for the Icelandic Transportation Safety Board (ITSB). ITSB is an autonomous, independent organization, and is in its investigations independent in regard to other investigating parties, prosecuting authority, and courts.

The investigation institute is headed by a Director appointed by the Ministry of Transport and Local Government. The Director is responsible for and conducts the board's daily operations making sure that they are in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations. A board of specialists is responsible for reviewing the institute's investigation work and approves investigation reports.

3.0 SYSTEMATIC SAFETY & COMPETENCE OF PERSONNEL

This area addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation as a whole. In most scenarios, these problems are related to human factors, human performance limitations, competence of personnel, socio-economic factors or to deficiencies in organizational processes and procedures, whether at authority or industry level.

This area also includes the impact of security on safety.

3.1 Safety Management

Safety management is a strategic priority. Despite the fact that last years have clearly brought continued improvements in safety across every operational domain, recent accidents underline the complex nature of aviation safety and the significance of addressing human factor aspects. BY EASA recommendations, ICETRA and aviation organizations should anticipate more and more new threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles.

These principles will be strengthened through SMS implementation supported by ICAO Annex 19 and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 (reporting reinforcement).

What do we want to achieve?

- We want regulatory framework, requiring safety management to be in place across all domains of aviation, with proportionate requirements in the area of general aviation.
- We want regulatory framework for information security management to be in place.
- We want to improve the level of safety through effective implementation of safety management within ICETRA and organizations.

How will EASA monitor improvement?

ICETRA and organizations need to be able to demonstrate compliance and effective implementation. For ATM/ANS, this will be monitored as part of the ATM Performance Scheme. For the other domains (air operations, aircrew and aerodromes), it is proposed to start with collecting data on the status of compliance with organization and authority requirements as relevant to safety management.

3.1.1 SYS.001 – Priority to the work of SSP´s

EPAS ref	MST.0001
Type	Safety - General
Stakeholders	All
Dependencies	MST.028
	In the implementation and maintenance of the SSP, ICETRA shall in particular: • ensure effective implementation of the authority requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation, • ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management, • ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight, • ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored, • consider civil-military coordination aspects where relevant for State safety management activities, with a view to identifying where civil-military coordination and cooperation will need to be enhanced to meet SSP objectives, • establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, • establish a process to determine SPIs at State level addressing outcomes and processes, • ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and shared with other Member States and EASA, • ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that the SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed.
Reference	• ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2020-2024 Goal 3 'Implement effective State Safety Programme • GASP SEI-13 — Start of SSP implementation at the national level • GASP SEI-14 — Strategic allocation of resources to start SSP implementation • GASP SEI-15 — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to start SSP implementation • GASP SEI-16 — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation
SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of Safety Management
Deliverables	2021 SSP document made available as IASP 2025 SSP effectively implemented
Timeline	Continuous, annually
Status	Q1 2021 Updated version of SSP/IASP (6.0) issued in December 2019 https://www.samgongustofa.is/media/log-og-reglur-i-flugmalum/SSP-Icelandic-Plan-for-Aviation-Safety-Version-6.0-Issued-in-NOV-2019.pdf Q4 2023 SSP/IASP being reviewed and amended as found necessary. Q3 2024 Revised SSP/IASP available and will be presented to the ministry for review and approval.

3.1.2 SYS.002 – Promotion of SMS

EPAS ref	MST.0002
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	All
Dependencies	MST.001, SPT.057
	Member States should encourage the dissemination and implementation of safety promotion material developed by the European Safety Promotion Network, the SMICG and other relevant sources of information as regards safety management. The latest SMICG deliverables include: • Safety Manager's Role In SMS & brochure • 2022 Industry Day on 'SMS and resilience' • 2023 Industry Day on 'Benefits and challenges of SMS assessments' • Change Management at the State Level & brochure • SMS Factsheet for Design, Manufacturing, and Production Organizations (brochure) • SSP Factsheet: Planning and Conducting Surveillance Based on Risk Profiling and Performance Monitoring • Risk-Based and Performance-Based Oversight Guidance • Safety Oversight Following the Implementation of SMS • SSP Assessment tool - 2nd Edition, revision 1 (June 2023) Forthcoming SMICG material: • SSP and SMS Interfaces • Tool and Guidance for Evaluating Inspector SMS Competency • Guidance for Implementing or Improving Voluntary Reporting at State Level Latest EASA material: • 2023 EASA safety week: recordings and material at https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/safety-week-2023-summary • SIB 2023-05 'Risks Emerging During Summer 2023' at https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2023-05 and https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/summer-2023 • Updated EASA Management System assessment tool including Part-CAMO, Part-145 and Part 21: https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications/management-system-assessment-tool
Reference	
SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of Safety Management SI-8044 Ineffective safety management systems
Deliverables	Guidance/training material/best practices.
Timeline	Continuous
Status	Q2 2022: ICETRA has only partially been using the material issued by SMICG. ICETRA is not a formal member for the SMICG group. This will be evaluated, and decision taken how ICETRA will participate in the group and how the material will be used in a structural way. Q3 2024:

3.1.3 SYS.003 – SMS assessment

EPAS ref	MST.0026
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	Air operators – CAT & NCC, CAMOs, ATOs, AeMCs, ADR operators
Dependencies	MST.001, MST.032
	Without prejudice to any obligations stemming from the SES ATM Performance Scheme, ICETRA should make use of the EASA management system assessment tool to support risk- and performance-based oversight. ICETRA should provide feedback to EASA on how the tool is used, for the purpose of standardization and continual improvement of the assessment tool. ICETRA should regularly inform EASA about the status of compliance with SMS requirements and SMS performance of their industry. *Note 1: The EASA management system assessment tool is undergoing revision; a draft version including continuing airworthiness management organisations (CAMOs) and Part-145 approved maintenance organisations (AMOs) is available on request. A new version, which will include Part 21, will be available during the 2nd half of 2023; an editable version will follow.* *Note 2: The use of the tool and the need for updates are discussed with the SM TeB.*
Reference	• EASA Management System assessment tool • EASA BIS 'Safety Management' • GASP SEI-5 (Industry) Improvement of industry compliance with applicable SMS requirements
SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of Safety Management
Deliverables	• Feedback on the use of the tool • Feedback on the status of SMS compliance (cf. § 4.2) and performance
Timeline	Continuous, with annual reporting
Status	Ongoing Q4 2023:

3.1.4 SYS.004 – Establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety

EPAS ref	MST.0028
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	All
Dependencies	MST.001
	ICETRA shall ensure that a State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS) is maintained and regularly reviewed. The SPAS shall: • describe how the plan is developed and endorsed, including collaboration with different entities within the State, with industry and other stakeholders*, • include safety objectives, goals, and indicators*, and • reflect the EPAS actions as applicable to the State. * Unless these elements are described/included in the SSP document Member States • shall ensure that their SPAS is made available to the relevant stakeholders, and • are encouraged to share their SPAS with the other Member States and with EASA. **State Safety Risk Management (SRM):** As part of their State SRM process Member States shall identify the main safety risks affecting their national civil aviation safety system and define the necessary actions to mitigate those risks. In doing so, Member States shall consider the results of the European SRM process for the various aviation domains considered within of their State SRM process. Member States shall document the main safety risks and actions in their SPAS. In addition, the SPAS shall consider how to measure the effectiveness of the risk mitigation actions. **Results of the European SRM process to be considered in State SRM:** The European top key risk areas are identified in the EASA Annual Safety Review, per domain. The top safety issues are identified in the European domain Safety Risk Portfolios, included in EPAS Volume III. Member States shall review those key risk areas and safety issues to determine which ones are relevant to their aviation safety system. Such review shall be performed at least annually. The results of such review shall be documented to show how these were used within State SRM and justify where key risks and top safety issues identified as part of EU
Reference	ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2020-2024 Goal 3 'Implement effective State Safety Programme ICAO Doc. 10161 Appendix A 'ORG Roadmap' • GASP SEI-11 (States) — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner • GASP SEI-17 (States) — Establishment of safety risk management at the national level (step 1) • GASP SEI-18 (States) — Establishment of safety risk management at the national level (step 2) • GASP SEI-19(States) — Acquisition of resources to increase the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities • GASP SEI-20 (States) — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities • GASP SEI-21 (States) — Advancement of safety risk management at the national level • EASA Annual Safety Review 2023 EPAS Volume III 2024 edition

SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of Safety Management
Deliverables	SPAS (IPAS) established / SPAS (IPAS) reviewed
Timeline	SPAS (IPAS) established - Q4 2021 / SPAS (IPAS) reviewed - Q4 of each year starting in 2022
Status	SPAS (IPAS) issued in Q1 2022 Updated version (1.2) issued in Q2 2022 & 2.0 in Q3 2022 Updated version issued in Q3 2023 and Q4 2024

3.2 Human Factors and Human Performance

Human factors and the impact on human performance, as well as medical fitness are strategic priorities. As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to properly assess human factors and human performance, in terms of both limitations and its contribution to delivering safety, as part of the safety management implementation.

The safety actions identified currently — related to aviation personnel — are aimed at updating fatigue risk management (FRM) requirements and contributing to mitigating safety issues in all domains such as personal readiness, flight crew perception or crew resource management (CRM) and communication, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.

What we want to achieve? : Ensure continuous improvement in safety management activities as related to human factors and human performance.

Harmonise MED and FTL requirements where this ensures fair competition or facilitates the free movement of goods, persons and services.

How will we monitor improvements? : Feedback from the ABs and the HF CAG.

3.2.1 SYS.006 – Foster a common understanding and oversight of Human Factors

EPAS ref	MST.0037
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	EASA, MS competent authorities and their staff
Dependencies	SPT.105
	The task includes some preparatory activities which will be performed by EASA with the support of the Human Factor Collaborative Analysis Group (HF CAG) in terms of: • development of guidance and tools for the competency assessment of regulatory staff before and after training; • guidance for the appropriate level of Human Factors competency for Human Factors trainers; • development of promotion material to be provided as guidance to Member States and encourage implementation. These guidance and tools will be provided to ICETRA the implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff.
Reference	• ICAO Human Performance Manual • ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO 9859) • EASA BIS 'Human Factors competence for regulatory staff'
SIs/SRs	SI-3003 Human Factors Competence for Regulator Staff
Deliverables	Guidance for competency assessment of regulatory staff Guidance for competency for trainers
Timeline	2023
Status	Q1 2021 Training has been planned and executed for part of the respective regulatory staff of common understanding and oversight of Human Factors. The plan is for all staff to be fully trained by end of 2023. Q4 2023:

3.3 Competence of personnel

Competence of personnel is a strategic priority. As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the opportunities presented by new technologies to enhance safety.

The safety actions identified currently — related to aviation personnel — are aimed at introducing competency-based training for all licenses and ratings. These actions play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.

Rotorcraft: EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap aims at significantly reducing the number of rotorcraft accidents and incidents and focuses on traditional/conventional rotorcraft including General Aviation (GA) rotorcraft. It focuses on safety and transversal issues that need to be tackled through actions in various domains, including training, operations, initial and continuing airworthiness, environment and facilitation of innovation.

This chapter contains the actions in the area of training, existing and new training devices, simulators and new technologies available for training in line with EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap Training Safety work stream.

What we want to achieve? : Ensure continuous improvement of all aviation personnel competence.

How will we monitor improvements? : Measurable improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels (flight crew, cabin crew, maintenance staff and ATCOs)

3.3.1 SYS.007 – Language proficiency requirements - share best practices, to identify areas for improvement for the uniform and harmonised language proficiency requirements implementation

EPAS ref	MST.0033
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	ICETRA, ANSPs, ATCOs, training organizations, pilot license holders and students
Dependencies	SPT.105
	Member States should provide feedback to EASA on how LPRI is performed, including the delivery of training in English by ATOs, for the purpose of harmonised and uniform implementation. Note: EASA will collect such feedback at the opportunity of the various standardisation and oversight activities.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	SI-0054 Poor language proficiency causing communication breakdown
Deliverables	Feedback on the implementation status
Timeline	Continuous
Status	Q2 2022: Language proficiency requirements for all areas are both Icelandic and English. Phraseology is regularly reviewed by ICETRA in cooperation with other stakeholders. Q4 2023:

3.3.2 SYS.008 – PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the MET Info part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus

EPAS ref	MST.0036
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	ICETRA, PPL/LAPL pilots, training organisations
Dependencies	N/A
	ICETRA should develop proportionate learning objectives in the 'Meteorological Information' part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus. Such learning objectives to be of a basic, non-academic nature and address key learning objectives in relation to: • practical interpretation of ground based weather radar, strengths and weaknesses; • practical interpretation of meteorological satellite imagery, strengths and weaknesses; • forecasts from numerical weather prediction models, strengths and weaknesses
Reference	• EASA BIS 'Weather Information to Pilots (GA and Rotorcraft) • EASA 'Weather Information to Pilots' Strategy Paper
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Learning objectives, with related question bank
Timeline	Q4 2023
Status	New in 2021 MAR 2022: Learning objectives have been developed, in conection with related question bank. Q4 2023:

3.4 Maintenance Staff / Part-147

At present, Part-147 excludes the use of distance learning for the purpose of basic knowledge and aircraft type training as the training locations are part of the approval. Part-66 allows the use of 'synthetic training devices', but does not define them. According to Appendix III to Part-66, 'Multimedia Based Training (MBT) methods may be used to satisfy the theoretical training element either in the classroom or in a virtual controlled environment (…)'; however, Appendix III to Part-66 does not define these methods, and no guidance exists on how to evaluate, validate and/or approve courses based on MBT methods.

What we want to achieve is to ensure continuous improvement of all aviation personnel competence.

Part-147: The introduction of the new methods and technologies will lead to a level playing field, raise the efficiency, quality and safety of maintenance training. Additionally, this way, the training provided amongst the approved maintenance training organizations will be at a similar level. Moreover, it may result in an increased number of young people choosing to engage in maintenance career, which may help to tackle the expected shortage of maintenance staff in the near future.

3.4.1 SYS.009 – Oversight capabilities/focus area: fraud cases in Part-147

EPAS ref	MST.0035
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	ICETRA, ANSPs, ATCOs, training organizations, pilot license holders and students
Dependencies	SPT.106
	ICETRA should focus on the risk of fraud in examinations, including by adding specific items in audit checklists and collecting data on the actual cases of fraud. Member state authorities may exchange and share information as part of collaborative oversight.
Reference	EVT.002 - Evaluation report related to the EASA maintenance licensing system and maintenance training organizations (02/03/2018)
Action	No action necessary / See status below.
Deliverables	Feedback on the implementation status
Timeline	Continuous
Status	Q2.2023: No organization in Iceland is holding Part-147 authorization

3.5 Oversight and standardization

The safety actions in this area are aimed at addressing issues emerging from standardization activities, with focus on the safety oversight responsibilities of ICETRA. The conclusions of the EASA 2018 SAR are also taken into account.

Authority requirements, introduced in the rules developed under the first and second extension of the EASA scope, define what ICETRA is expected to implement when performing oversight of the organizations under its responsibility. In particular, they introduced the concept of risk-based oversight with the objective of addressing safety issues with a consideration to efficiency.

The safety actions in this area are aimed at addressing issues emerging from standardization activities, with focus on the safety oversight responsibilities of the Member States. The conclusions of the EASA 2018 SAR are also taken into account.

Below elements are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, as expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight.
2. ability to identify risks through a process to collect and analyses data;
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement;
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAs;
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where 'adequate' includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force

What do we want to achieve? A robust oversight system across Europe, where each CA is able to properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, with particular focus on management of safety risks, exchange of information and cooperation with other CAs. To that end, implementation of management systems in all organizations, as well as ensuring the availability of adequate personnel in CAs are essential enablers.

How will EASA monitor improvement? The elements above are constantly monitored during the Standardization activities conducted by the Agency. In addition, a number of indicators have been developed to measure the progress over time of point 6 above.

3.5.1 SYS.0010 – Oversight capabilities / focus areas

EPAS ref	MST.0032
Type	Safety – General
Stakeholders	All
Dependencies	N/A
	• **Availability of adequate personnel in CAs** ICETRA to ensure that adequate personnel is available to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities; • **Cooperative oversight in all sectors** ICETRA to ensure that the applicable authority requirements are adhered to in all sectors. The objective is to ensure that each organisation's activities are duly assessed, known to the relevant authorities and that those activities are adequately overseen, either with or without an agreed transfer of oversight tasks. NB: EASA will continue to support MS in the practical implementation of cooperative oversight, e.g. benefitting from the outcome of the trial projects conducted between the UK, NO, FR, CZ, as well as with exchanges of best practices and guidance. • **Organisations management system in all sectors.** ICETRA to foster its ability to assess and oversee the organisations' management system in all sectors. This will focus in particular on safety culture, the governance structure of the organisation, the interaction between the risk identification/assessment process and the organisation's monitoring process, the use of inspection findings and safety information such as occurrences, incidents, and accidents. This should lead ICETRA to adaptation and improvement of its oversight system.
Reference	• ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2020-2022 Goal 2 'Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities' • GASP SEI-4 & GASP SEI-10 — Strategic allocation of resources to enable effective safety oversight • GASP SEI-5 — Qualified technical personnel to support effective safety oversight • GASP SEI-6 — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner
SIs/SRs	SI-3003 Human Factors competence for regulatory staff SI-3004 Integration of practical HF/HP into the organisation's management system SI-3011 Training effectiveness and competence
Deliverables	SPAS / IPAS established
Timeline	SPAS (IPAS) established - Q4 2021 SPAS (IPAS) reviewd – Q4 each year starting Q4 2022
Status	Q2 2022: a) This is done with man-hour planning in all domains b) ICETRA has not been participating in cooperative oversight with other MS. Cooperative oversight between different domains is however in place, especially in the area of organization´s management systems. c) With regards to organizations, this is being addressed in mandatory oversight. Q4 2023:

4.0 FLIGHT OPERATIONS - AEROPLANES

This chapter groups all actions in the area of CAT by aeroplane (airlines and air taxi, passengers/cargo, aeroplanes of all mass categories), non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), as well as specialised operations (SPO) involving aeroplanes of all mass categories.

The operational domain CAT and NCC by aeroplane remains the greatest focus of the EASA safety activities. For CAT by large aeroplane and NCC, sufficient safety and exposure data is available in these domains to enable the definition of specific safety performance metrics.

4.1 Safety in CAT & NCC Operations

This section includes a significant number of EPAS actions and therefore it is further subdivided to group actions per key risk area (KRA) for which mitigation actions are included in the current EPAS issued by EASA. Section 0 includes the safety actions that do not relate to any of the KRAs in particular.

The top three KRAs identified in the EASA ASR 2021 for CAT aeroplane and NCC operations are listed below (refer to ASR 2021 Figure 24 and Table 7).

KRA 1	KRA 2	KRA 3
Airborne Collision	Runway Excursions	Aircraft upset

The top three Key Risk Areas or KRAs for CAT aeroplane and NCC operations within Iceland is listed below (refer to Iceland ASR 2021).

KRA 1	KRA 2	KRA 3
Runway Excursions	Airborne Collisions	Aircraft upset

The KRA 1 is mainly caused by hard landings and unstable approaches.

4.1.1 Airborne Conflict / Mid-air collisions

Airborne conflict refers to both actual collisions as well as near misses in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories or airspace infringements. Although there have been no CAT aeroplane airborne collision accidents in recent years within the EASA Member States, this key risk area has been raised by a number of Member States through the NoAs and also by some airlines, specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by aircraft without transponders in uncontrolled airspace.

This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area. The risk scoring of accidents and serious incidents warrants the inclusion of airborne conflict as a key risk area in this domain.

What we want to achieve? Continuously assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions.

How we monitor improvement: Increase safety by continuously monitoring safety issues identified in the SRP for CAT by aeroplane & NCC operations (see ASR 2019, Table 7).

4.1.2 SYS.011 – 'Due regard' for the safety of civil traffic over high seas

EPAS ref	MST.0024
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	AOC holders (CAT), aircraft operators (NCC), ATC providers
Dependencies	MST.001
	States must have due regard for the safety of civil aircraft and must have established respective regulations for national State aircraft. Several EU Member States had reported an increase in incidents involving close encounters between civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative international military traffic over the high-sea waters. Taking into account this situation and the possible hazard to civil aviation safety, the EC mandated EASA to perform a technical analysis of the reported occurrences. The technical analysis issued a number of recommendations for the Member States: • fully apply the ICAO Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Doc 10088); • closely coordinate to develop, harmonise and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained; • support the development and harmonisation of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at EU level and beyond if possible; • report relevant occurrences to EASA; and • facilitate/make primary surveillance radar data available in military ATC centres to civil ATC units. The objective of this action is to ensure that Member States follow up on the recommendations and provide feedback on the implementation. EASA continues to monitor occurrences reported by Member States, with a view to considering the development of specific actions (e.g. Conflict zone SIB). In addition, the military invasion by the Russian Federation into the territory of Ukraine triggered aviation safety risks affecting commercial aviation. For those risks EASA, in close cooperation with the Member States and industry developed , a dedicated safety risk portfolio 'Review of Aviation Safety Issues arising from the war in Ukraine'. Where already available, the portfolio provides mitigating actions alongside the corresponding safety issue. Member States are invited to assess the relevance of those safety risks and related actions within their SSPs. Member States should also encourage organisations under their oversight to assess the relevance of the safety issues listed in this safety risk portfolio to their own operations and, where appropriate, capture them in their management systems so that any associated risks can be mitigated effectively.
Reference	ICAO Doc 10088 'Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management'
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Report to EASA on related incidents and actions taken
Timeline	Q4 - 2023
Status	Q2 2022: This is being constantly monitored and analysed and has not been identified as risk in aviation in Iceland. Q4 2023:

4.1.3 SYS.012– Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to reduce the risk of mid-air collision en-route and in terminal manoeuvring areas

EPAS ref	MST.0030
Type	Safety & Human Factor
Stakeholders	ANSP
Dependencies	MST.001
	ICETRA should evaluate together with ANSPs delegated to provide services in their airspace the needs for implementing SESAR solutions related to enhanced Short Term Conflict Alerts (STCA)/enhanced safety nets such as solutions #60 & #69. These SESAR solutions, designed to improve safety, should be implemented as far as it is feasible.
Reference	ATM Master Plan Level 3 – Plan (2019): ATC02.9 – Enhanced STCA for TMAs
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	IPAS established
Timeline	• IPAS established 2021 – Q4 • IPAS reviewd Q4 of each year starting 2022
Status	Q2 2022: This is being evaluated by our ADR & ANS domains Q4 2023:

4.1.4 SYS.013 – Occurrences that could lead to Runway Excursions by Icelandic AOC holders

EPAS ref	N/A
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	CAT, AOC holders -
Dependencies	None
	The top Key Risk Area or KRA for CAT aeroplane and NCC operations within Iceland is occurrences that could lead to Runway Excursions, including but not limited to unstable approches, hard landings and ATA32 related occurrences. ICETRA should prepare provisions to facilitate and promote for AOC holders the importance of constant analyz and monitoring of this KRA and take the nessesary actions to establish positive trend.
Reference	Iceland ASR 2022
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Safety meeting Safety promotion material
Timeline	Q2 2022
Status	Ongoing Q2 2022: This KRA continues to be one of the top KRA.

5.0 ROTORCRAFT

chapter groups all actions in the area of rotorcraft operations and provides links to rotorcraft related actions in the domains of crew training, design, manufacture and maintenance, in line with EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap delivered and endorsed in November 2018.

The Roadmap aims at significantly reducing the number of rotorcraft accidents and incidents and focuses on traditional/conventional rotorcraft including GA rotorcraft where the number of accidents is recognised to be higher. It focuses on safety and transversal issues that are affected by the different domains including training, operations, initial and continuing airworthiness, environment and innovation.

Helicopter operators perform a wide range of highly specialised operations that are important for the European economy and citizens. There is a need to further develop towards an efficient regulatory framework, considering technological advancements.

This area includes four types of operations involving certified helicopters:

- passenger and cargo flights to and from offshore oil and gas installations in CAT (EASA Member States' AOC holders);
- other CAT operations, passenger and cargo (EASA Member States' AOC holders), excluding offshore;
- SPO, such as advertisement, photography, with an EASA Member State as the State of operator or State of registry; and
- non-commercial operations (NCO) with helicopters registered in an EASA Member State or for which an EASA Member State is the State of operator.

5.1 Safety in Rotorcraft Operation

Within EASA member states, the top three key risk areas for each of the four types of operation are as follows:

Key Risk Areas			
Type of Operation	KRA 1	KRA 2	KRA 3
Offshore Helicopters	Aircraft upset	Helideck Excursions	Obstacle collision in flight
Other CAT Helicopters	Aircraft upset	Terrain collision	Obstacle collision in flight
SPO Helicopters	Aircraft upset	Terrain collision	Obstacle collision in flight
NCO Helicopters	Aircraft upset	Terrain collision	Injuries / Damage

Based on the data supporting the different portfolios, the following priority 1 key risk areas can be highlighted:

- helicopter upset in flight (loss of control)
  This is key risk area with the highest priority in offshore and CAT helicopter operations. Loss of control for offshore helicopter operations generally falls into two scenarios: technical failure that renders the aircraft uncontrollable or human factors. In addition, it is the second most common accident outcome for aerial work operations. The following actions contribute to mitigating risks in this area: RMT.0127, RMT.0709 and RMT.0711.

- terrain and obstacle conflict
  This is the second priority key risk area for helicopter operations (offshore, other CAT, SPO and NCO), although equipment is now fitted to helicopters in this domain that will significantly mitigate the risk of this outcome. Obstacle collisions is the second most common accident outcome in the CAT helicopters domain. This highlights the challenges of HEMS operations and their limited selection and planning for landing sites. Terrain and obstacle conflict is the most common outcome for SPO (aerial work operations). The following action contributes to mitigating risks in this area: RMT.0708.

In addition, from an airspace perspective, it is important to ensure that the airspace and routes design facilitate safe operations of helicopters, which typically fly at low levels. Within SESAR 1, there have been solutions aiming to improve safety and efficiency of helicopter operations such as those supporting the establishment of low-level IFR routes.

What we want to achieve? Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls in the above areas. Increase efficiency by enabling implementation of appropriate and balanced regulation.

How we monitor improvement; Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the specific SRPs established for offshore CAT helicopter operations, other CAT helicopter operations, helicopter SPO and NCO (ref: ASR 2019).

The EASA ABs regularly provide feedback on the actions where efficiency/proportionality is the main driver.

5.1.1 SYS.014 – Helicopter safety events

EPAS ref	MST.0015
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	HE
Dependencies	None
	ICETRA, in partnership with industry representatives, to organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years. The EHEST, IHST, CA, Heli Offshore or other sources of safety promotion materials could be freely used and promoted.
Reference	N/A
ASIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Workshop
Timeline	Continiuous
Status	Q2 2022: Due to the size of the rotorcraft operation in Iceland this is not considered to be necessary as this is covered in informal meetings and mandatory oversight. Q4 2023:

5.1.2 SYS.015 – SESAR solutions to facilitate safe IFR operations

EPAS ref	MST.0031
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	HE
Dependencies	None
	ICETRA, together with its ANSPs and their flight procedure designers (if different from ANSPs) should evaluate the possibility to establish a network of low-level IFR routes in their airspace to facilitate safe helicopter operations. These SESAR solutions, such as solution #113 that are designed to improve safety, should be implemented as far as it is feasible. See SESAR Solutions Catalogue2019 Third Edition: https://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/SESAR_Solutions_Catalogue_2019_web.pdf
Reference	ATM Master Plan (Level 3 Ed 2019) action NAV12 (ATS IFR Routes for Rotorcraft Ops)
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	IFR routes / report
Timeline	2025
Status	Q2 2022: Due to the size of the rotorcraft operation in Iceland this is not considered to be necessary as the risk has not been identified. Q4 2023:

6.0 GENERAL AVIATION

This Chapter covers GA non-commercial operations involving aeroplanes with MTOMs below 5 700 kg. registered in an EASA Member States, as well as all operations with balloons and sailplanes.

GA is remaining a high priority for EASA and the EC. This has been emphasized by Patrick Ky, Executive Director, during the EASA Annual Safety Conference 2018 in Vienna, and by the EC during Aero Friedrichshafen 2019.

GA in Europe is maintaining a stable activity involving 10 times more aircraft and airfields than CAT. GA has been since its origin the cradle for innovation and recruitment of young professionals (ATCOs, mechanics, pilots, etc.) and a means to connect people across Europe. Recognizing the importance of GA and its contribution to a safe European aviation system, EASA in partnership with the EC and other stakeholders has created the GA roadmap and is now starting a new phase of the project called GA Roadmap 2.0.

EASA is dedicating effort and resources to make GA safer and cheaper.

Addressing safety risks in GA in a proportionate and effective manner is a strategic priority. In the last years, accidents involving recreational aeroplanes have led to an average of 86 fatalities per year in Europe (based on 2008-2017 figures, excluding fatal accidents involving microlight airplanes, gliders and balloons), which makes it one of the sectors of aviation with the highest yearly number of fatalities. In 2018, there were 49 accidents causing 95 fatalities in non-commercial operations with aeroplanes and 16 fatal accidents causing 17 fatalities in the domain of sailplane operations (the 2008-2017 average was 28 fatalities per year in Europe). The GA roadmap is key to the EASA strategy in this domain. 2018 seems to show an improvement for gliders, and a deterioration for GA fixed wing.

Although it is difficult to precisely measure the evolution of safety performance in GA due to lack of consolidated exposure data (e.g. accumulated flight hours), the above statistics justify the various initiatives and efforts already undertaken, ongoing or planned, to mitigate risks leading to those fatalities; these are explained on the following pages.

Based on the data supporting the SRP for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes (MTOMs below 5 700 kg), the following top three KRAs can be highlighted (refer to ASR 2021 Table 13):

For sailplanes, the top three KRAs indicated by EASA are indicated below (refer to ASR 2021 Table 30):

KRA 1	KRA 2	KRA 3
Aircraft upset	Landing area excursions	Terrain collision

The associated priority 1-safety issues are:

- approach path management;
- Airborne conflict;
- incomplete winch launches;
- system reliability; and
- in-flight decision-making and planning;

The top three KRAs for balloons are of course different from KRAs for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes and sailplanes. However, no balloons are registered and operating in Iceland and will therefore not be part of this chapter.

6.1 Safety in General Aviation

This section addresses system-wide or transversal issues that affect GA as a whole and are common to several safety risk areas. In combination with triggering factors, transversal factors can play a significant role in incidents and accidents. Conversely, they also offer opportunities for improving safety across risk domains.

What we want to achieve? Reduce the number of fatalities in GA through the implementation of systemic enablers.

How we monitor improvement; Increase safety by continuously monitoring safety issues identified in the SRP for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes as well as for sailplanes and balloons. (refer to ASR 2020 Tables 13, 28 and 25 respectively).

6.1.1 SYS.016 – Improvement in the dissemination of safety messages

EPAS ref	MST.0025
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	GA
Dependencies	SPT.0125
	Member States should increase their engagement and dissemination of safety promotion and training material by their competent authorities, associations, flying clubs, and insurance companies, targeting flight instructors and/or pilots through means such as being part of the pan-EASA Member State GA Season Opener/ Closing by hosting local events/ workshops and promoting the material developing through the Safety Promotion Network (SPN) on the most important safety issues for General Aviation. This activity considers EASA safety promotion deliverables and content, whose timeline changes in return impact the timelines of the present task.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Safety workshops and safety days/evenings
Timeline	2022/2023
Status	Q2 2022: ICETRA has been publishing number of promotion materials aimed for the GA. This has partly been in association with other stakeholders and interested parties. Dirty Dozen calendar has been re-issued. Q4 2023

6.1.2 SYS.017 – Promotion of safety culture in GA

EPAS ref	MST.0027
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	GA
Dependencies	None
	Member State NCAs should include provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture (including just culture) in GA as part of their State safety management activities in order to foster positive safety behaviours and encourage occurrence reporting. EASA will support this MST by providing promotion material and guidance to support Member States in that task Safety promotion video published in 2022 can be found on the EASA Youtube Channel: GA Season Opener Day 1 - Be Ready and Fly Safely Introduction – YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCV1E8CejuA&list=PLYhk72r7SyLJPybQ3vw4XULi7qNryLg7X&index=13&t=139s
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture as part of IASP/IPAS (SSP/SPAS)
Timeline	Continuous
Status	Q2 2022: This has been continuous encouragement. We have very low number of occurrences reported from GA. Plan is to prepare and issue new promotion material about just culture and the importance of reporting occurrences. In this regards we plan to issue special guidance material to use the E2 portal, as number of pilots have informed that the portal is way to difficult to use. Our FCL domain has been promoting safety culture, including just culture during meetings and oversight of ATO´s. Q4 2023

6.1.4 SYS.018 – Airspace complexity and traffic congestion

EPAS ref	MST.0038
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	Pilots, aircraft operators, CAs, ANSPs
Dependencies	SPT.0120 Promoting good practices in airspace design
	ICETRA should consider 'airspace complexity' and 'traffic congestion' as safety-relevant factors in airspace changes affecting uncontrolled traffic, including the changes along international borders.
Reference	European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction (EAPAIRR) BIS 'Airborne collision risk'
SIs/SRs	SI-2025 Airspace infringement SI-4009 Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic SI-4010 Airborne separation
Deliverables	Best practice
Timeline	2023
Status	Q2 2022: This has been evaluated and not considered to affect GA in Iceland Q4 2023:

6.1.5 SYS.019 – Awareness on fuel and fuel consumtion

EPAS ref	N/A
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	GA
Dependencies	RNSA 19-085F023
	ICETRA should include provisions to facilitate and promote for GA pilots the importance of constant overview of fuel on boad the aircraft and the risk of fuel shortages.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	AIP AIC & social media
Timeline	Q1 2021
Status	Q1 2021 – Guidance material regarding airspace infringement issued on ICETRA webside and social media. https://eplica.samgongustofa.is/media/flug/FYRIRBYGGJA-ELDSNEYTISSKORT-2021.pdf Q2 2022: Deliverables in AIP AIC pending. Q4 2023:

6.1.5 SYS.020 – Airspace Infringement

EPAS ref	N/A
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	GA
Dependencies	RNSA 19-085F023
	ICETRA should include provisions to facilitate and promote for GA pilots the improtance of receivning clearance before entering controlled airspace.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	AIP AIC & social media
Timeline	Q2 2021
Status	• Q1 2021 – Guidance material regarding airspace infringement issued on ICETRA webside and social media. • https://eplica.samgongustofa.is/media/flug/LOFTRYMISATRODNINGUR-2021.pdf • Continuous monitoring and analysis has indicated positive trendin Q3 & Q4 as well as in Q1 2022. • Q2 2022: Deliverables in AIP AIC pending.

6.1.6 SYS.021 – Pre-flight inspections

EPAS ref	N/A
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	GA
Dependencies	RNSA 19-115F031-T01
	ICETRA should include provisions to facilitate and promote for GA pilots the importance of preflight inspections.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	AIP AIC & social media
Timeline	Q1 2022
Status	Q1 2022 – Guidance material regarding preflight inspections issued on ICETRA webside and social media. https://www.samgongustofa.is/media/flug/thjalfun-og-skirteini/FYRIRFLUGSSKODANIR-IISLENSKA.pdf Q2 2022: Deliverables in AIP AIC pending. Q4 2023:

7.0 AERODROMES

This chapter addresses aerodrome design and operations, as well as aerodrome operators. Actions in this Chapter address safety, as well as efficiency/proportionality in terms of developing and maintaining a legal framework commensurate with the complexity of ADR activities and management of potential risks. This Chapter also includes actions to ensure a level playing field on the basis of the regulatory requirements stemming from the Basic Regulation.

Actions in this Chapter aim at maintaining a high uniform level of safety in the Member States, ensuring compliance with the ICAO SAPRs and a harmonized approach which will support the free movement of services within the Member States.

How we monitor improvement; the key risk areas and underlying safety issues will continue to be monitored as part of the joint SRP for ADR and GH, with the support of the ADR CAG. The EASA ABs will provide feedback on the efficiency/proportionality of the actions.

7.1 Safety at Aerodromes

The top three Key Risk Areas or KRAs for aerodromes (ADR) and ground handling (GH) within EASA member states are listed below (refer to EASA ASR 2021 Figure 117 and Table 33).

The most frequent key risk area for aerodrome and ground handling related accidents and serious incidents is aircraft upset, followed by ground damage and runway collision. In terms of aggregated risk, aircraft upset and ground damage are on a similar high level of aggregated risk, followed by runway collision.

The top three Key Risk Areas or KRAs for aerodromes (ADR) and ground handling (GH) within Iceland listed below (refer to Iceland ASR 2021).

KRA 1	KRA 2	KRA 3
Runway collision	Ground damage	Aircraft Upset

The KRA 1 is mainly caused by hard landings and unstable approaches. KRA 2 is mainly due to runway incursion at BIRK airport. SYS.019 refers to Iceland only.

7.1.1 SYS.022 – Implementation of SESAR runway safety solutions

EPAS ref	MST.0029
Type	Safety & Human Factor (HF)
Stakeholders	Aerodrome operators, AOC holders, ANSPs and CAs
Dependencies	None
	ICETRA should evaluate together with the ADR operators and ANSPs the needs for implementing the related SESAR solutions such as those related to ground situational awareness, airport safety net vehicles and enhanced airport safety nets . These SESAR solutions (solutions #01, #02, #04, #26, #47, #48, #70), designed to improve runway safety, should be considered as far as it is feasible. See SESAR Solutions Catalogue 2019 third edition.
Reference	GASP SEIs (States) – Mitigate contributing factors to the risks of RE and RI
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	IPAS (SPAS)
Timeline	Q1 2024
Status	Ongoing Q2.2022: This is being evaluated by our ADR & ANS domains Q4 2023:

7.1.2 SYS.023 – Runway incursions at BIRK

EPAS ref	N/A
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	Aerodrome operators, AOC holders, ANSPs and CAs
Dependencies	ICE KRA 2020, MST.0029
	Continuous monitoring and analysis has indicated negative trend since 2018 in number of runway incursions occurrences in BIRK. ICETRA should together with the ADR and ANSPs operator the needs to include provisions to facilitate and promote for GA pilots the improtance of receivning clearance before entering controlled airspace.
Reference	Iceland ASR 2013 - 2021
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Guidance material
Timeline	Q2 2021
Status	Q2 2022: Guidance material prepared Q1 2023: Continuous monitoring and analysis indicating continuos negative trend. Q4 2023:

8.0 AIRCRAFT TRACKING, RESCUE OPERATIONS AND ACCIDENT INVESIIGATION

Competence of personnel is a strategic priority. As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the opportunities presented by new technologies to enhance safety. The safety actions identified currently — related to aviation personnel — are aimed at introducing competency based training for all licenses and ratings. These actions play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.

Rotorcraft:

EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap aims at significantly reducing the number of rotorcraft accidents and incidents and focuses on traditional/conventional rotorcraft including General Aviation (GA) rotorcraft. It focuses on safety and transversal issues that need to be tackled through actions in various domains, including training, operations, initial and continuing airworthiness, environment and facilitation of innovation. This chapter contains the actions in the area of training, existing and new training devices, simulators and new technologies available for training in line with EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap Training Safety work stream

What we want to achieve: Ensure continuous improvement of all aviation personnel competence.

How we monitor improvement: Measurable improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels (flight crew, cabin crew, maintenance staff and ATCOs)

9.0 MISCELLANEOUS

This section gathers the actions that do not relate to any of the KRAs listed in Section 0. They may involve different types of actions in the domain CAT by aeroplane & NCC operations. The need for having such a category was driven by the constant development of EPAS towards new safety areas. For example, standardization in the OPS domain will continue to focus on the effective implementation of operators' flight time specifications schemes, particularly those including provisions subject to fatigue risk management. A dedicated MST action (MST.034) has been included, following discussions and agreement by the Air Ops TeB.

What we want to achieve? To increase safety with a combination of actions that address more than one issue.

How we monitor improvement: The EASA ABs regularly provide feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

9.1 SYS.024 – Dialogue on FDM programmes

EPAS ref	MST.0003
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	AOC holders (CAT)
Dependencies	EVT.0009 (completed)
	• **Making the professionals concerned aware of the European operators FDM forum (EOFDM)** Member States shall publish on their website, as part of SMS-related information, general information on EOFDM activities. Member States should organise an information event (physical meeting or teleconference) to present EOFDM goodpractice documents to their AOC holders (CAT). Safety managers and FDM programme managers of all the operators concerned should be invited. • **Promoting FDM good practice** Member States that have 10 or more operators running an FDM programme, should organise a workshop (physical meeting or teleconference) dedicated to EOFDM good-practice documents with the FDM specialists at these operators.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Information on EOFDM published in the SMS section of MS website: 2024 Detailed report of the workshop: 2024
Timeline	Continuous (see deliverables)
Status	Q2 2022: Due to the size of the aviation sector in Iceland it has not been seen as effective to have common FDM forum. For the same reason it has not being seen as effective to issue FDM data on ICETRA website for the interest of the general public ICETRA has however been active in promoting FDM good practice with informal meetings and mandatory oversight. Q4 2023:

9.2 SYS.025 – Operators governance structure

EPAS ref	MST.0019
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	AOC holders (CAT)
Dependencies	None
	ICETRA to have a thorough understanding of operators' governance structure. This should in particular apply in the area of group operations. Aspects to be considered include: • extensive use of outsourcing, • the influence of financial stakeholders, and • controlling management personnel, where such personnel are located outside the scope of approval. Note: EASA will support this MST by providing guidance on how to effectively oversee group operations.
Reference	Guidance for the oversight of group operations: https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications/guidance-oversight-group-operations
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Research / guidance material
Timeline	Q2 2022 / 2023
Status	Q2 2022: Operators' governance structure has not been complexed in Iceland. Recently we have been seeing increase in the area of group operations. This is being monitored and evaluated and newly issued guidance material is and will be well examined and used. Q4 2023:

9.3 SYS.026 – Oversight focus area / Flight and duty time schemes

EPAS ref	MST.0034
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	AOC holders (CAT)
Dependencies	None
	ICETRA to ensure that the they possess the required competence to approve and oversee the operators' flight time specification schemes; in particular, those including fatigue risk management. ICETRA should focus on the verification of effective implementation of processes established to meet operators' responsibilities requirements and to ensure an adequate management of fatigue risks. ICETRA should consider the latter when performing audits of the operator's management system. Feedback from Member States on the implementation of this action is normally obtained via EASA standardisation activities.
Reference	GASP SEI-5 — Qualified technical personnel to support effective safety oversight
SIs/SRs	SI-0039 Fatigue
Deliverables	Report on actions implemented to foster capabilities
Timeline	2022 / 2023
Owner	Flight Operations
Status	Q4 2023:

9.4 SYS.027 – Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism

EPAS ref	MST.0040
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	Pilots, aircraft operators, NCAs, ANSPs, industry.
Dependencies	RMT.0720
	Without prejudice to the obligations stemming from Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Member States shall ensure that appropriate coordination mechanisms are established between safety and security reporting systems in order to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks.
Reference	N/A
SIs/SRs	N/A
Deliverables	Coordination mechanism established
Timeline	2022/2023
Status	Q2 2022: This has been briefly addressed within ICETRA but will be structurally evaluated and executed before end of 2023. Q4 2023:
Expected output	Starting date: Q2 - 2021 Interim Report: Q4 – 2022 Final Report: Q2 – 2024

9.5 SYS.028 – Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procs and docs

EPAS ref	MST.0041
Type	Admin
Stakeholders	Aircraft Operators - CAT – Helicopters, ATOs (aircrew), CAMOs, NCAs
Dependencies	N/A
	Member States should harmonise and, to the extent possible, simplify the application processes in the area of *commercial* operations with helicopters, including the use of common application forms and compliance lists with an indicative scope as follows: • establish a harmonised process, a standardised checklist/guide for application for and changes to a helicopter AOC (OPS SPECs), with possible extension to CAMOs and ATOs; • harmonise the process to add/remove a helicopter from the AOC; • harmonise/standardise Member States' practices and development of a common application process (e.g. common application form for the removal of an item from the MEL); • develop guidance on the implementation of the EFB provisions with regard to the versatility of helicopter operations. The Agency will facilitate and support the development of this task with the Helicopter Expert Group, a Subgroup of the Air OPS TEB.
Reference	• EASA Article 89 Report Edition 2021 • Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 • SMICG Industry Safety Culture Evaluation Tool and Guidance
SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of safety management
Deliverables	Coordination mechanism established
Timeline	2023/2024
Status	NEW IN 2023 Q4 2023:
Expected output	• Paper to harmonise the AOC issue/change process (with interface to CAMOs and ATOs) • Paper to harmonise the process to add/remove an aircraft from the AOC • Paper to harmonise the process of a common application form for approval/removal • of an item from the MEL • Paper to promote the simplification processes, including the use of common application • forms, compliance lists, etc. • Paper to harmonise the process in implementation of the EFB provisions.

9.6 SYS.029 – Assessment of safety culture at air operators

EPAS ref	MST.0042
Type	Safety
Stakeholders	AOC holders (CAT)
Dependencies	MST.026
	A strong safety and reporting culture is an essential enabler of an effective management system. This task aims to improve ICETRA´s capacity to assess the safety culture at air operators involved in CAT operations, and complements EPAS action RES.0053 'Mapping the socio-economic impact on aviation safety'. In a first phase (2023), in order to support national competent authorities (NCAs), EASA will develop guidance and practical tools to measure safety culture at air operators. As soon as finalised, such guidance and tools will be made available to the Member States. This phase will be an interactive phase where contributions/feedback from MS and industry stakeholders will be sought. In a second phase (2024), the task for ICETRA will consist in including in its oversight programmes the assessment of safety culture of air operators with the support of the EASA guidance and practical tools. Based on the outcome of the first phase, the scope and details of the second phase will be further discussed and adjusted in EPAS 2024-2026
Reference	EASA Article 89 Report Edition 2021 Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 SMICG Industry Safety Culture Evaluation Tool and Guidance
SIs/SRs	SI-0041 Effectiveness of safety management
Deliverables	Coordination mechanism established
Timeline	2023/2024
Status	NEW IN 2023 Q4 2023:
Expected output	2023-Q4: Guidance and practical tools to measure safety culture at air operators 2024-Q2: Oversight programme for air operators includes the assessment of safety culture: