Designing with capabilities (DotNext 2021)

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Topics

- What does security have to do with design?
- Introducing capabilities
- Designing an API using capabilities
- Using capabilities in different ways

WHAT DOES SECURITY HAVE TO DO WITH DESIGN?



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A counterexample

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lt's not just about security...

...hiding irrelevant information is good design!

David Parnas, 1971

- If you make information available:
 - Programmers can't help but make use of it
 - Even if not in best interests of the design
- Solution:
 - Don't make information available!







Too little information available

Too much information available

Good Software Design

Intention-revealing interface Minimize coupling Make dependencies explicit Ak.a. Minimize your surface area (expose only desired behavior)

Good Security

Principle of Least Authority (POLA)

Ak.a. Minimize your surface area (to reduce chance of abuse)

Good security => Good design

Good design => Good security

Security-aware design

• "Authority" = what can you do at any point?

- Be aware of authority granted

- Assume malicious users as a design aid!

Stupid people



Evil people



What's the difference? 😕

Security-aware design

• "Authority" = what can you do at any point?

- Be aware of authority granted

- Assume malicious users as a design aid!

- Use POLA as a software design guideline
 - Forces intention-revealing interface
 - Minimizes surface area & reduces coupling

INTRODUCING "CAPABILITIES"

Typical API



Rather than telling me what I can't do, why not tell me what I can do?

The ultimate "Intention-revealing interface"

Capability-based API



Capability-based API



Capability-based API



API DESIGN WITH CAPABILITIES

Tic-Tac-Toe as a service Proper name is "Nonghts and Crosses" btw



Tic-Tac-Toe API (obvious version)

```
type TicTacToeRequest = {
player: Player // X or 0
row: Row
col: Column
}
```

Tic-Tac-Toe API (obvious version)

"Choice" type

Demo: Obvious Tic-Tac-Toe API

What kind of errors can happen?

- A player can play an already played move
- A player can play twice in a row
- A player can forget to check the response and keep playing

Not an intention-revealing interface

Intention-revealing interface

"If a developer must consider the implementation of a component in order to use it, the value of encapsulation is lost." — Eric Evans, DDD book Yes, you could return errors, but...

Pon't let me do a bad thing and then tell me off for doing it...

"Make illegal operations unavailable"











Tic-Tac-Toe API (cap-based version)
Tic-Tac-Toe API (cap-based version)

An intention-revealing interface

Tic-Tac-Toe API (cap-based version)

type InitialMoves = MoveCapability list

Where did the "request" type go? Where's the authorization?

Demo: Capability-based Tic-Tac-Toe

What kind of errors can happen?

• A player can play an already played move

• A player can play twice in a row

 A player can forget to check the response and keep playing

All fixed now! 🙂

Is this good security or good design?

HATEOAS Hypermedia As The Engine Of Application State

"A REST client needs no prior knowledge about how to interact with any particular application or server beyond a generic understanding of hypermedia."

How NOT to do HATEOAS

POST /customers/ GET /customer/42

> If you can guess the API you're doing it wrong Security problem! Also, a design problem too much coupling.

How to do HATEOAS

POST /81f2300b618137d21d GET /da3f93e69b98

> You can only know what URLs to use by parsing the page

> > Each of these URIs is a capability

Tic-Tac-Toe HATEOAS



Demo: Tic-Tac-Toe HATEOAS

Good security => Good design

Good design => Good security

DESIGN CONSEQUENCES OF USING CAPABILITIES

Not just for APls -- use these design techniques inside a bounded context too

Example: Read a customer from a database















```
public class CustomerController : ApiController
{
    readonly ICustomerDb _db;
```

public CustomerController(ICustomerDb db)

```
[Route("customers/{customerId}")]
public IHttpActionResult Get(int customerId)
{
    var cust = _db.GetProfile(customerId);
    var dto = DtoConverter.CustomerToDto(cust),
    return Ok(dto);
}
```

Use the authority



public interface ICustomerDb

CustomerProfile GetProfile(CustomerId id); void UpdateProfile(CustomerId id, CustomerProfile cust);

void CreateAccount(CustomerId id, CustomerProfile cust); void DeleteAccount(CustomerId id);

void UpdateLoginEmail(CustomerId id, string email); void UpdatePassword(CustomerId id, string password);

- void LaunchMissiles();
}



Func<CustomerId,CustomerProfile>

A single method interface is just a function!

Tip:

Inject capabilities, not interfaces!

```
public class CustomerController : ApiController
                                           Inject authority
ł
  Func<CustomerId,CustomerProfile> *readCust;
  public CustomerController(Func<...> readCust)
    readCust = readCust;
  [Route("customers/{customerId}")]
  public IHttpActionResult Get(int customerId)
    var cust = _readCust(customerId);
    var dto = DtoConverter.CustomerToDto(cust);
    return Ok(dto);
                                 Use the anthority
```

Vertical Slices





But wait, there's more!

Should we be allowed to access ANY customer?

We need more fine-grained control

```
public class CustomerController : ApiController
ł
  public IHttpActionResult Get(int custId)
    var fnReadCust = authorizer.ReadCust(custId);
    if (fnReadCust != null)
    {
                                     Attempt to get the capability/function for this
  }
                                         particular customer
                                      Check whether we
                                      got the capability
```

```
public class CustomerController : ApiController
ł
  public IHttpActionResult Get(int custId)
    var fnReadCust = authorizer.ReadCust(custId);
    if (fnReadCust != null)
    ł
      var cust = fnReadCust(); 
      var dto = DtoConverter.CustomerToDto(cust);
      return Ok(dto);
                                         . Use the capability.
                                          We don't need to
    else
                                         pass in customer id
      // return error
  }
```

TRANSFORMING CAPABILITIES FOR BUSINESS RULES








How to revoke access in a cap-based system? It's hard to revoke physical keys in the real world... But this is software!







Demo:

Transforming Capabilities

DELEGATING AUTHORITY USING CAPABILITIES

Reasons for access control

- **Prevent** any access at all.
- Limit access to some things only.
- **Revoke** access when you are no longer allowed.
- Grant and delegate access to some subset of things.

It's not always about saying no!



A set of capabilities



Delegation of authority examples

Delegation of authority (gdocs)



Delegation of authority (dropbox)





Security risk

Decurity risk & implicit dependency





Delegated capabilities can be transformed too!



Delegated capabilities can be transformed too!



Delegated capabilities can be transformed too!



CONCLUSION

Common questions

- Is this overkill? Is it worth it?
 - It depends....
 - Useful as a thought experiment
- How does this relate to design process?
 - Intention-revealing interfaces
 - Map commands from event storming to capabilities

Common questions

- Are you saying that *all* external IO should be passed around as capabilities?
 - Yes! You should never access any ambient authority.
 - You should be doing this anyway for mocking.
- How do you pass these capabilities around?
 Dependency injection or equivalent

Common questions

- Won't there be too many parameters?
 - Less than you think!
 - Counter force to growth of interfaces
 - Encourages vertical slices (per use-case)
- Can't this be bypassed by reflection or other backdoors?
 - Yes. This is really all about design not about total security.

Summary

• Good security \rightarrow good design

- Bonus: get a modular architecture!

- Use POLA as a design principle
 - Don't trust other people to do the right thing
 - Don't force other people to read the documentation!
- Intention revealing interfaces
 - Don't force the client to know the business rules
 - Make interfaces more dynamic
 - Change the available capabilities when context changes

