

STRANGER THINGS

VULNERABILITIES IN .NET PLATFORM

MIKHAIL SHCHERBAKOV AT DOTNEXT CONFERENCE_



About me

- Independent developer and consultant
- Co-organizer of .NET meetups in Saint Petersburg and Moscow
- Former Product Manager at Cezurity, R&D Developer at Positive Technologies and Team Lead at Acronis, Luxoft, Boeing



About the talk

- CVE-2015-2526 ASP .NET MVC Regular Expression DoS
- CVE-2002-1145 MS SQL Server Elevation of Privilege
- CWE-264 ASP .NET Core Elevation of Privilege
- CVE-2016-3255 XXE Information Disclosure
- Deserializing Untrusted Binary Data

Why?

- Clean look at your code and... your life
- Do not make typical vulnerabilities

Fun and Hardcore!




ASP .NET MVC

Regular Expression DoS


CVE-2015-2526

ASP .NET MVC ReDoS



The problematic Regex algorithm

$^+(a+)^+\$$



Non-Deterministic Finite Automata

How to fix it

- Simplify RegExp
- Replace RegExp to a custom algorithm

How to fix it

```
^(https?|ftp):\\\/((([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|(%[\da-f]{2})|[!\$&'\\(\)\*\+\,;=]|:)*@)?(((\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])\.(\\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])\.(\\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])\.(\\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5]))|((([a-z]|\d|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])*([a-z]|\d|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])))\.)+((([a-z]|\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF)|((([a-z]|\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF))*([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])))\.?)?(:\d*)?)(\/((([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|(%[\da-f]{2})|[!\$&'\\(\)\*\+\,;=]|:|@)+(\\/((([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|(%[\da-f]{2})|[!\$&'\\(\)\*\+\,;=]|:|@)*))*)?(\?((([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|(%[\da-f]{2})|[!\$&'\\(\)\*\+\,;=]|:|@)|[\uE000-\uF8FF]|\/|\?))*)?(\#((([a-z]|\d|-|\.|_|~|[\u00A0-\uD7FF\uF900-\uFDCF\uFDF0-\uFFEF])|(%[\da-f]{2})|[!\$&'\\(\)\*\+\,;=]|:|@)|\/|\?))*)?$
```

How to fix it

org:dotnet Syste x Microsoft Security Bulleti x Search · System.Compon x

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/dotnet/corefx/commit/070e282397b21450f80a20028c5e5eff10ec46a4>

★ Bookmarks verdure Gdeduet WindGURU V8 Wiki GA SpbDotNet Trello Microsoft/extendvs calm

```
33 24
34 25     var valueAsString = value as string;
35 -   return valueAsString != null && _regex.Match(valueAsString).Length > 0;
+   return valueAsString != null &&
+       (valueAsString.StartsWith("http://", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+       || valueAsString.StartsWith("https://", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+       || valueAsString.StartsWith("ftp://", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase));
36 30     }
37 31   }
38 32 }
```

How to fix it


- Set a timeout in new Regex()
- Set a global timeout for all regular expressions

```
AppDomain.CurrentDomain.SetData(  
    "REGEX_DEFAULT_MATCH_TIMEOUT",  
    TimeSpan.FromSeconds(1));
```

MS SQL Server Elevation of Privilege


CVE-2002-1145

Elevation of Privilege (EoP)




Have a fun with the EoP Card Game <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/adopt/eop.aspx>

Luring Attack



Luring Attack

CVE-2002-1145 “EoP in SQL Server Web Tasks”



ASP .NET Core Elevation of Privilege

CWE-264

Using scoped services in ViewComponent

```
10     public interface IScopeService
11     {
12         string GuidTest { get; }
13
14         void FillGuid();
15     }
16
17     public static class ScopeServiceExtension
18     {
19         public static IServiceCollection AddScopeService(this IServiceCollection services)
20         {
21             services.AddScoped<IScopeService, ScopeService>();
22
23             return services;
24         }
25     }
```

<https://github.com/gdegeneve/ViewComponentBug>

How to fix it

```
2 ■■■ ...spNetCore.Mvc.ViewFeatures/DependencyInjection/MvcViewFeaturesMvcCoreBuilderExtensions.cs
```

			@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ internal static void AddViewServices(IServiceCollection services)
			services.TryAddSingleton<
140	140		services.TryAddSingleton<
141	141		IViewComponentDescriptorCollectionProvider,
142	142		DefaultViewComponentDescriptorCollectionProvider>());
143		-	services.TryAddSingleton<ViewComponentResultExecutor>());
	143	+	services.TryAddTransient<ViewComponentResultExecutor>());
144	144		
145	145		services.TryAddSingleton<ViewComponentInvokerCache>());
146	146		services.TryAddTransient<IViewComponentDescriptorProvider, DefaultViewComponen

GitHub Commit <http://bit.ly/2guXVMo>

GitHub Issue <http://bit.ly/2gu0IUg>

[Discussion] Microsoft Security Advisory 3181759 <http://bit.ly/2f0JFiv>

How to fix it

- Double check a security sensitive code: impersonation, scheduling tasks, sandboxing, modification data from low privileged user, introducing between low and high privileged code, lifetime of security sensitive objects
- Runtime check invariants of security sensitive data
- Everywhere minimal privileges by default

XXE Information Disclosure

CVE-2016-3255

Understanding XML Entity

```
1  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
2  [-> <!DOCTYPE catalog [
3      <!ENTITY msg "Hello Word">
4  ]>
5  [-> <catalog>
6  [->   <person>
7      <gAddress>&msg;</gAddress>
8      <gAge>18</gAge>
9      <gPhone>777-777-777</gPhone>
10     </person>
11  ]> </catalog>
```


Billion Laughs Attack

```
1  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
2  <!DOCTYPE catalog [
3      <!ENTITY a0 "dos" >
4      <!ENTITY a1 "&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;&a0;" >
5      <!ENTITY a2 "&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;&a1;" >
6      <!ENTITY a3 "&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;&a2;" >
7      <!ENTITY a4 "&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;&a3;" >
8  ]>
9  <catalog>
10 <person>
11     <gAddress>&a4;</gAddress>
12 </person>
13 </catalog>
```

Understanding XML External Entity

```
1  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
2  <!DOCTYPE catalog [
3      <!ENTITY msg SYSTEM "file:///c:/inetpub/project/Web.config">
4  ]>
5  <catalog>
6      <person>
7          <gAddress>&msg;</gAddress>
8          <gAge>18</gAge>
9          <gPhone>777-777-777</gPhone>
10     </person>
11 </catalog>
```


Classic XXE Attack



Understanding XXE Attack

- No a direct feedback channel
- Get `Web.config` file
- Use XML parser settings by default

Understanding XXE Attack



It's very simple. I know these are standard methods, but you can create your own library to deal with that much better.

Here are some examples:

```
XmlDocument xmlDoc= new XmlDocument(); // Create an XML document object
xmlDoc.Load("yourXMLFile.xml"); // Load the XML document from the specified file

// Get elements
XmlNodeList girlAddress = xmlDoc.GetElementsByTagName("gAddress");
XmlNodeList girlAge = xmlDoc.GetElementsByTagName("gAge");
XmlNodeList girlCellPhoneNumber = xmlDoc.GetElementsByTagName("gPhone");

// Display the results
Console.WriteLine("Address: " + girlAddress[0].InnerText);
Console.WriteLine("Age: " + girlAge[0].InnerText);
Console.WriteLine("Phone Number: " + girlCellPhoneNumber[0].InnerText);
```


Also, there are some [other methods](#) to work with. For example, [here](#). And I think there is no one best method to do this; you always need to choose it by yourself, what is most suitable for you.

<http://stackoverflow.com/questions/55828/how-does-one-parse-xml-files>

XXE Attack



XML Out-of-Band Data



Black Hat EU 2013 - XML Out-of-Band Data Retrieval

A.Osipov, T.Yunusov 2013
“XML OOB Data Retrieval”
https://youtu.be/eBm0YhBrT_c

T.Morgan 2014
“XML Schema, DTD, and Entity Attacks”
<http://bit.ly/2h6wtTH>

How to fix it

XML Object	Safe by Default?
<u>XMLReader</u>	
Prior to FW 4.0	Yes
FW 4.0+	Yes
<u>XMLTextReader</u>	
Prior to FW 4.0	No
FW 4.0+	No
<u>XMLDocument</u>	
Prior to 4.6	No
FW 4.6+	Yes

<https://www.jardinesoftware.net/2016/05/26/xxe-and-net/>

How to fix it

- Prohibit DTD processing
- Nullify references to resolvers
- Utilize a secure resolver
- Limit expansion size and set default timeouts

Deserializing Untrusted Binary Data

Binary Serializing

```
public class Hello : ICommand
{
    public string Execute()
    {
        return "Hello DotNext 2016!";
    }
}
```

Binary Serializing

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Upload(HttpPostedFileBase file)
{
    var serializer = new BinaryFormatter();
    var command = (ICommand)serializer.Deserialize(file.InputStream);
    var result = command.Execute();

    return RedirectToAction(result);
}
```

Binary Serializing

```
public class Converter : ICommand
{
    private string converterName;
    private string arguments;

    public Converter(string converterName, string arguments)
    {
        if (converterName != "ConverterXML.exe" && converterName != "ConverterJSON.exe")
            throw new ArgumentException();

        this.converterName = converterName;
        this.arguments = arguments;
    }

    public string Execute()
    {
        Process.Start(converterName, arguments);
        return "OK";
    }
}
```

Binary Serializing

- Runtime Checks Bypass
- Unmanaged Data References
- Delegates and Events

Binary Serializing

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Upload(HttpPostedFileBase file)
{
    var serializer = new BinaryFormatter();
    var command = (ICommand)serializer.Deserialize(file.InputStream);
    var result = command.Execute();

    return RedirectToAction(result);
}
```

Implicit Functionality

- `ISerializable` interface
- `OnDeserialized` or `OnDeserializing` attributes
- `IDeserializationCallback` interface
- `IObjectReference` interface
- `Finalize` method

.NET Remoting Binary Deserializing


```
if (this.TypeFilterLevel != TypeFilterLevel.Full)
{
    permissionSet = new PermissionSet(PermissionState.None);
    permissionSet.SetPermission(
        (IPermission)new SecurityPermission(SecurityPermissionFlag.SerializationFormatter));
}

try
{
    if (permissionSet != null)
        permissionSet.PermitOnly();
    requestMsg = CoreChannel.DeserializeBinaryRequestMessage(
        str, requestStream, _strictBinding, TypeFilterLevel);
}
finally
{
    if (permissionSet != null)
        CodeAccessPermission.RevertPermitOnly();
}
```

Deserializing Untrusted Binary Data



Binary Serializing



James Forshaw “Are you my Type? Breaking .NET Through Serialization”

https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf

How to fix it

- Use custom serializer
- Use minimal privileges in serialization process

Summary

- OWASP Top Ten Project 2013 <http://bit.ly/10ffew0>
- OWASP Developer Guide <http://bit.ly/1JcQLoh>
- OWASP .NET Security Cheat Sheet <http://bit.ly/2h2fDrQ>
- Tom FitzMacken “What not to do in ASP.NET, and what to do instead” <http://bit.ly/2h2sfyU>

Thank you for your attention!

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