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The Online Supplement, available at [www.AspenPublishing.com/Effross-CorpGov3](http://www.AspenPublishing.com/Effross-CorpGov3), includes the following items:

### Committee Charters

- Audit Committee Charter (Discussed in Section 3.08(A)(3))
- Executive Committee Charter (Section 3.08(B))
- Nominating Committee Charter (Section 5.03(A))
- Compensation Committee Charter (Section 6.01(C))
- Public Responsibility Committee Charter (Section 7.03(B))
- Nomination Form for Board Candidates (Section 5.03(A))
- Clawback (Recoupment of Unearned Compensation) Policy (Section 6.02(B)(3))
- (Simplified) Compensation Disclosure and Analysis (Section 6.03(E))
- Appendix D—Recommended Reading (and Reviewing) for New and Current Directors
- Appendix E—Preparing Professional Programs: Projects, Prototypes, Portfolios, and Priorities