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# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	xix
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>Why Mergers Happen: Macroeconomic Trends</b>	1
A. Merger Waves	1
B. Macroeconomic Factors That Contributed to Merger Waves	3
C. Who Captures the Benefits of Acquisitions?	4
1. Target Shareholders and Acquirer Managers	4
2. Impact on Other Stakeholders	6
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>Financial and Economic Incentives that Shape Mergers</b>	9
A. Synergies	10
B. Change of Control Benefits and Changes in Financial Aspects of the Business	10
C. Summary of Gains from Acquisitions	11
D. Costs of Acquisitions; Why Acquisitions Fail	13
1. Costs Incurred in Acquisitions	13
2. How Acquisitions Destroy Wealth	13
E. Acquisition Financing Decisions	14
1. How Much of the Target Does the Bidder Wish to Acquire?	14
2. Currency Choices	15
a. Stock or Cash	15
b. Economic Effects of Financing Choices	15
c. Impact on the Acquirer's Capital Structure and Costs of Capital	16
d. Ownership Structure	16
e. Tax Liability	17
f. Risk Bearing Under Alternative Currencies	17
Problems	18
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>Legal Shaping of Deals</b>	19
A. The Law's Distinctive Roles	19
B. Mergers and Other Acquisitions as a Decision Governed by Law	20
1. Corporate Law Reduced to Four (Overly Simplified) Rules	20

2. The Merger Form as a Template for Understanding Legal Regulation of Acquisition Transactions	22
3. Alternative Legal Structures for Acquisition That Permit Planners to Avoid One or More of the Requirements of the Merger Template	24
C. Judicial Limits on Private Planning to Avoid Particular Merger Effects: De Facto Merger	31
<i>Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.</i>	31
<i>Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.</i>	33
<i>Terry v. Penn Central Corp.</i>	39
Notes and Questions	43
D. Federal Law Affecting Deals	47
1. Securities Law	47
a. “Disclosure, Again Disclosure, and Still More Disclosure”	47
<i>Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc.</i>	50
Notes and Questions	54
b. Substantive Regulations from Securities Law, Particularly Tender Offers	55
c. Avoiding Securities Regulation	56
2. Tax	56
3. Antitrust	57
4. National Security	59
CHAPTER 4	
<b>Deal Strategy: The Bidder’s Approach</b>	61
A. Beginning the Deal Dance: Who to Approach?	61
B. Getting to a Definitive Agreement	63
1. Deal Terms: Financial, Legal, and Social	63
2. Due Diligence	64
3. Negotiating the Acquisition Agreement	65
<i>In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation</i>	65
Notes and Questions	74
<i>Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.</i>	76
Notes and Questions	86
CHAPTER 5	
<b>The Target’s Approach: Remaining Independent or Getting the Best Deal From the First or Another Bidder</b>	89
A. The Legal and Economic Framework	89
1. Financial Defenses	90
2. Legal Defenses	90
B. Fiduciary Duties and Legal Challenges to Board Action	91
<i>Smith v. Van Gorkom</i>	92
Notes and Questions	109

<i>Gantler v. Stephens</i>	111
Notes and Questions	119
<i>Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan</i>	121
Notes and Questions	128
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	
<b>Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics</b>	131
A. The Corporate Law Template for Considering Takeover Defenses	131
<i>Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.</i>	133
Notes and Questions	140
<i>Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &amp; Forbes Holdings, Inc.</i>	142
Notes and Questions	148
B. Applying <i>Unocal</i> and <i>Revlon</i> —The Two Paramounts	149
<i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.</i>	149
Notes and Questions	159
<i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.</i>	161
Notes and Questions	175
C. The Evolution of <i>Unocal</i> ; Deal Protection Devices	178
<i>Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.</i>	178
Notes and Questions	188
<i>Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.</i>	189
Notes and Questions	203
D. State Anti-Takeover Statutes as Defensive Mechanisms	208
<i>Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.</i>	210
Notes and Questions	219
<b>CHAPTER 7</b>	
<b>Poison Pills: A Case Study of Defensive Tactics and Judicial Review</b>	221
A. The Challenge Facing the Drafters of the Poison Pill	221
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan	222
Notes and Questions	227
B. Judicial Review of Director Action to Implement or Not Redeem a Poison Pill	230
<i>Moran v. Household International, Inc.</i>	230
Notes and Questions	237
<i>City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc.</i>	238
Notes and Questions	251
<i>Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.</i>	253
Notes and Questions	272
C. Evolution in the Poison Pill and Judicial Responses	274
1. <i>Dead Hand and No Hand Pills</i>	274
<i>Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc.</i>	274

<i>Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro</i>	280
Notes and Questions	284
2. Anti-Activist Pills	288
<i>The Williams Companies Stockholder Litigation</i>	288
Notes and Questions	308
CHAPTER 8	
<b>Is a Defense Affecting Voting Different?</b>	311
A. Initial Judicial Moves to Protect the Shareholder Franchise	312
<i>Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.</i>	312
<i>Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.</i>	315
Notes and Questions	324
B. The Evolution of Blasius and its Interaction with Unocal	325
<i>MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.</i>	327
Notes and Questions	336
CHAPTER 9	
<b>Finance Foundation for Valuation</b>	339
A. Introduction	339
B. A Primer on Financial Theory Underlying the Discounted Cash Flow Method of Valuation	340
Problem	343
C. The Mechanics of a Discounted Cash Flow Analysis	343
1. Forecasting Free Cash Flow	344
a. The Explicit Forecast Period (i.e., The First Five Years)	344
b. Terminal Value	346
2. Picking an Appropriate Discount Rate	346
3. Adjustments	347
4. Forecasting Change in Free Cash Flow from the Merger	347
D. Deal Comparables, Company Comparables, and Other Measures	347
CHAPTER 10	
<b>Cash-Out and Other Mergers</b>	351
A. Majority Power, Minority Rights to Exit Via Appraisal or Gain Judicial Review for Breach of Fiduciary Duty	351
<i>Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.</i>	351
Notes and Questions	364
<i>Cede &amp; Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.</i>	369
Notes and Questions	379
B. Valuation Techniques	383
<i>In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation</i>	383

<i>Fir Tree Master Fund LP v. Jarden Corporation</i>	406
Notes and Questions	423
C. Short-Form Mergers	424
<i>Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.</i>	424
Notes and Questions	429
<i>Berger v. Pubco Corp.</i>	430
D. Planning to Minimize Judicial Review	438
<i>Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp.</i>	438
Notes and Questions	452
<i>In re Volcano Corporation Stockholder Litigation</i>	454
Notes and Questions	461
Notes on Shareholder Litigation in Mergers	461
 CHAPTER 11	
<b>Sale of Control for a Premium</b>	465
<i>Perlman v. Feldmann</i>	466
Notes and Questions	471
<i>Mendel v. Carroll</i>	473
Notes and Questions	484
<i>In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation</i>	484
Notes and Questions	494
 CHAPTER 12	
<b>Disclosure and Limits on the Use of Information</b>	495
A. Risk Arbitrage, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Search for Information	495
B. Law's Effect on Information	498
1. Mandatory Disclosure from Federal Law	498
2. Mandatory Disclosure's Impact on Information About Merger Transactions and the Additional Effect of Antifraud Prohibitions	501
a. When Will Merger Information Have to Be Disclosed?	501
b. Remedies for Failure to Comply with Mandatory Disclosure or Antifraud Provisions Relating to Mergers	503
3. Disclosure Duties Arising from State Law Fiduciary Duty	503
C. Law's Limits on the Use of Inside Information	505
1. Classical Insiders and Misappropriators	505
<i>Chiarella v. United States</i>	505
Notes and Questions	509
<i>United States v. O'Hagan</i>	510
Notes and Questions	515
2. Extensions of Classical and Misappropriation Liability	516
a. Tippee Liability	516
<i>Salman v. United States</i>	517

Notes	524
<i>United States v. Martoma</i>	525
3. Assembling the Bases for Insider Trading Liability	543
<b>CHAPTER 13</b>	
<b>Financial Reorganizations: Highly Leveraged Transactions, Going Private, Asset Restructuring</b>	<b>545</b>
A. Leveraged Buyouts, Going Private, and Other Transactions	
Making Use of Leverage	545
1. Economic Factors Used to Create Wealth in LBOs	546
2. It's Not for Everyone: The Ideal Candidate for an LBO; Empirical Evidence on Post-Transaction Performance	548
3. Exit	549
4. Law Shaping the LBO Deal	549
<i>Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.</i>	552
5. HCA's LBO as a Case Study	565
6. <i>Topps</i> as a Case Study of the Overlap of Federal Disclosure and State Intermediate Scrutiny	570
<i>In re The Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation</i>	570
Notes and Questions	580
B. Leveraged Recapitalizations	581
C. Asset Restructuring	584
1. Divestitures	584
2. Carve-Outs	585
3. Spinoff	586
<b>CHAPTER 14</b>	
<b>Activist Shareholders</b>	<b>587</b>
A. Who Are Activist Shareholders?	587
B. Patterns of Engagement	588
<i>CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Management (UK) LLP</i>	591
Notes and Questions	612
<b>CHAPTER 15</b>	
<b>International Transactions</b>	<b>615</b>
A. Determining Which Law	616
B. More Expansive Roles for Shareholders in Friendly Deals	617
C. Roles for Groups Other than Shareholders	617
D. Different Approaches to Ability of Management to Oppose Deals Favored by Shareholders	618
E. Different Rules in Deals by a Controlling Shareholder	619
F. Different Methods of Conflict Resolution	619
G. Cadbury/Kraft as a Case Study	620

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<i>Appendix A: Delaware General Corporation Law</i>	623
<i>Appendix B: Federal Statutes &amp; Regulations</i>	655
<i>Table of Cases</i>	681
<i>Index</i>	685