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

Research Paper

German Users Within the Terrorgram Network: A Dark Field Study on the Activity of German Users in Militant Accelerationism

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Digital Seismograph
Monitoring
Terrorism

Key Findings

- Militant accelerationism is a serious threat to German democratic society, and militant accelerationist groups have been active in Germany since at least 2018. Since then, the attack in Halle in 2019 and numerous other planned attacks in Germany are to be considered as belonging to militant accelerationism.
- Since 2022, the CeMAS **Digital Seismograph Monitoring Terrorism** project has been systematically recording and classifying militant accelerationist Telegram groups as well as identifying users with a local connection to Germany. This is the first time that figures are available for the activity of *German users* in the Terrorgram network.
- Our findings show that *German users* are well-integrated and networked in the transnational Terrorgram network.
- We have identified 83 “heavy users” who are particularly active in Terrorgram. These users can be assumed to present an increased risk.
- When users are members of at least one Terrorgram group, there is an increased probability that they are involved in the broader network and that their activity is not limited to a single group.
- Bans can contribute to the exclusion of *German users* from the identified network and can therefore be considered an effective measure.
- Although bans have an impact on the network, Telegram’s bans were directed at specific groups in less than five percent of the total groups recorded.
- The number of active *German users* per month has fallen steadily since 2023. However, this is not necessarily linked to a decline in activity among *German users*. The phenomenon may also reflect adaptation towards using less public groups as a result of investigative pressure and platform suspensions.
- Authorities should develop an understanding of the ideology of militant accelerationism as a network and its changeable connection strategies to other parts of the far-right scene and other misanthropic online communities. This understanding is the precondition for containing the potential danger.

The Influence of Militant Accelera-tionism on the Far-Right Scene in Germany

In June 2018, a German-language propaganda video by a group called *Atomwaffen Division Deutschland* went viral on neo-Nazi forums. By this point at the latest, it became clear that the model of the US right-wing terrorist group *Atomwaffen Division* was also gaining ground in the German neo-Nazi scene. The emergence of the *Atomwaffen Division Deutschland*, which caused a stir with its threatening letters to politicians and flyer distribution campaigns in German libraries (Klaus & Metzger, 2022), cannot be explained solely by the desire for a German offshoot of the right-wing terrorist *Atomwaffen Division* founded in the USA in 2015. Rather, this moment is indicative of the first visible influence of militant accelerationism in the right-wing extremist scene in Germany. In addition to the right-wing terrorist attack in Halle in 2019, numerous planned attacks since then are to be considered as belonging to militant accelerationism have since been attributed to militant accelerationism (cf. Dittrich & Manemann, 2024).

The Goal: Collapse of Democratic Society

Following the working definition of the Acceleration Research Consortium (ARC), militant accelerationism can be understood as a variety of tactics and strategies "designed to put pressure on and exacerbate latent social divisions, often through violence, thus hastening societal collapse" (Kriner, 2022). These tactics and strategies are further developed and practiced by a network that follows a "strategic organizing approach of collapse, reshuffle, and re-emergence" (ibid.). The origins of this network lie in the skull mask network, which was established in 2011 in the online forum *Iron March* and has since developed into a multi-layered and cross-platform movement (Upchurch, 2021).

Thus, in addition to the self-proclaimed goal of accelerating a prophesied societal collapse by any means possible, the definition of the ARC also focuses on the network character of militant accelerationism, which can be used to examine new organizational forms and ideological manifestations. Societal collapse and associated fantasies of a "race war" are seen as a necessity for a new political order. The exact form of such an order is usually of secondary importance and is described differently in the individual ideological manifestations. The primary goal remains to bring about collapse. All ideological manifestations share consistent antisemitic, misogynistic and racist views (Kriner et al., 2024, p. 31). Various analyses have come to the conclusion that militant accelerationism is currently dominated by a neo-fascist interpretation (cf. Kriner, 2022; Shadnia et al., 2022). At present, however, there is also a growing threat from

other online subcultures influenced by militant accelerationism. These include the so-called *true crime community*, communities that worship school shooters, and more recent developments in the field of so-called “nihilistic accelerationism”[1] (Argentino, 2024, 2025).

The Many Layers of Militant Accelerationism

The influences of militant accelerationism have varying degrees of external visibility in the far-right scene – including in Germany. On the one hand, there are those actors who explicitly classify themselves as militant accelerationists (e.g. the *Atomwaffen Division*). Others are inspired to imitate the cultural elements of militant accelerationism (e.g. *Saints Culture*). A further category can be identified consisting of individuals who are part of militant accelerationist networks but do not see themselves as militant accelerationists (Kriner et al., 2024). They influence other organizations or groups with ”the goal of co-opting or shifting their identity, actions or end-goals [in the militant accelerationist sense, TM note]" (Kriner et al., 2024, S. 21).

Militant Accelerationists in Germany

The boundaries between right-wing extremist and right-wing terrorist groups that are preparing for a "Day X", i.e. a specific point in time when the system collapses (Quent, 2019), are blurred. Most recently, investigators focused on members of the suspected right-wing terrorist group *Sächsische Separatisten* (Saxon Separatists), who were arrested in November 2024. Jörg S., the alleged leader of the group, was part of a militant accelerationist network. He presented himself as a recruiter for an offshoot of the *Atomwaffen Division* and was in contact with members of the right-wing terrorist *Feuerkrieg Division* and the *Vorherrschaft Division*. This contact was not exclusively online. An US neo-Nazi explicitly traveled to Saxony for a meeting and is said to have scouted out the Bundestag in Berlin. It was only through S.'s activity on the Telegram platform that US investigative authorities became aware of the group in 2021 and passed the information on to German authorities (Naber & Pfahler, 2024).

While the *Sächsische Separatisten* networked both digitally and in analog form, the main activity in most other known cases in Germany has been concentrated on digital platforms. This includes the case of Fabian D., sentenced in December 2020, who was active in the right-wing terrorist *Feuerkrieg Division* in 2019 and reported the planning of attacks there, and Lukas F., sentenced in December 2023 before the juvenile court,

[1] In contrast to militant accelerationism, which at least claims to want to bring about collapse as a necessity for establishing white hegemonic rule, nihilistic accelerationism only aims for collapse through violent means, without connecting this to any vision of a social order.

who was active in the *Feuerkrieg Division* as well as in the chat *Totenwaffen* and had already attempted to construct explosives.

Since 2018, the CeMAS "Database on right-wing terrorism in Germany since the *NSU*[2] has listed a total of nine known (suspected) cases of right-wing terrorist attacks and planned attacks in Germany that can be attributed to militant accelerationism. This means that these (suspected) cases account for a quarter of all (suspected) cases recorded in the database since 2018. Right-wing terrorists have so far been convicted in five of these cases. The longest prison sentences were handed down to the right-wing terrorist behind the attack in Halle, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, and to Marvin E., 19 years old at the time of his offense, who was sentenced to three years and ten months for his planned attacks. This indicates that militant accelerationism is presently having a significant impact on the potential threat posed by right-wing terrorism in Germany.

The Significance of the Terrorgram Network

The Telegram platform is so central to the networking of the militant accelerationist scene that the network established on the platform is commonly referred to as “Terrorgram”. Terrorgram describes a loosely connected transnational network which honors right-wing terrorists, creates and distributes propaganda, and discusses ideologies and strategies (Kriner et al., 2024). The significance of Terrorgram has evolved significantly over the last ten years (Barbarossa, 2024): In the first phase from 2013 to 2015, community building was increasingly shifted from *Iron March* and imageboards to Telegram (Rathje et al., 2022, p. 16). Users benefited from platform-specific advantages such as the almost non-existent moderation and the anonymous and uncomplicated uploading and distribution of files.

In the second phase from 2015 to 2019, ideological influences from the neo-Nazi/Satanist sphere were added and propaganda was shaped by so-called *Siege Culture*; *Saints Culture*, the scene glorifying right-wing terrorists, also gained subcultural influence.

The third phase was finally initiated by numerous international arrests of members of right-wing terrorist groups. As a result, Terrorgram developed into a space in which the focus was less on founding new groups and more on indirectly influencing

[2] The database is available online in German: https://www.terror-seit-nsu.de; *NSU* stands for *Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund* (National Socialist Underground) and was a neo-Nazi terrorist organization founded in Germany around 1999 that killed ten people and carried out 43 attempted murders, three bomb attacks and 15 robberies between 2000 and 2007.

networks and members. The right-wing terrorist attack in Christchurch in 2019 furthered the mystification of *Saints Culture* and, together with the focus on action-oriented and radicalizing far-right concepts such as the *Great Replacement*, laid the foundation for further lone-actor terrorists inspired by earlier attacks.

The *Terrorgram Collective* played a leading role. This association of members of the militant accelerationist community published internal magazines outlining ideological and technical foundations (Kupper & Dittrich, 2024). The right-wing terrorist Juraj Krajčík, who shot two people outside a queer bar in Bratislava in 2022, cited the work of the *Terrorgram Collective* as a major source of inspiration in the written confession he left behind (Barbarossa, 2024). In April 2024, the UK officially recognized the *Terrorgram Collective* as a terrorist group with the aim of "radicalising readers and encouraging individuals to commit acts of terrorism" (GOV.UK, 2024). On January 13, 2025, the US State Department followed suit and announced the classification of the Terrorgram Collective as a transnational terrorist group as well. It also published the names of three alleged leaders (US Department of State, 2025). Australia also imposed sanctions against the Terrorgram network and associated groups such as *The Base* (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025) on February 3, 2025 as part of its counter-terrorism measures.

The assessments of international authorities, the attacks originating from the network, and references to the network by right-wing terrorists illustrate the importance of Terrorgram for the militant accelerationist scene. In recent years, researchers have repeatedly published new findings on the significance of Terrorgram (cf. Argentino, 2025; Barbarossa, 2024; Kriner et al., 2024; Newhouse, 2021; Shadnia et al., 2022). A key observation is the constant reorientation of tactics and strategies as well as the ideological characteristics of militant accelerationism. Pressure from investigative authorities and more consistent moderation on the relevant platforms are forcing the network to adapt. However, there is hardly any data on the specific activity of members in individual countries. Although the transnational nature of the network does not require country-specific identification of the members in order to trace its development, the localized real-world threat of terrorism posed by militant accelerationism makes the analysis useful and necessary to provide information about potential country-specific threats and possible radicalization approaches. This research paper makes an initial attempt at analysis by looking at *German users* in the Terrorgram network.

Method

Data collection for the present analysis was carried out in two parts. First, we identified Telegram groups which can be attributed to militant accelerationism and are considered part of the Terrorgram network. In a second step, users were classified as *German users* based on a select set of criteria outlined below.

Identification of Terrorgram Groups

Since January 2022, researchers at CeMAS have been monitoring the Terrorgram network at regular intervals. Our focus was on using so-called “sock puppet” accounts to join relevant groups attributed to Terrorgram. Links to these groups, which the researchers joined and which were included in the dataset, were found in publicly accessible Terrorgram channels. Invitations to further groups could be shared in these public groups, which the researchers followed with their accounts. If a group had content that was considered Terrorgram-related in the broadest sense, the sock puppet account joined the group. The researchers exclusively behaved passively and did not participate in internal communication but simply acted as an observer.

Classification of Groups

The groups identified through this method were also classified in more detail for further analysis. All groups could be considered as being located within the Terrorgram network. However, these groups differed in terms of their function and involvement in Terrorgram. Three classifications were therefore assigned to the groups surveyed:

loosely affiliated: This included groups whose content could not be uniformly associated with militant accelerationism, but which were consistently characterized by antisemitic and racist communication. These groups were classified as "loosely affiliated" if they also disseminated content that clearly originated from militant accelerationism. This included propaganda by militant accelerationist groups and content intended to motivate supporters to commit acts of violence, which, according to the militant accelerationist worldview, would fuel the collapse of society. Characteristic of this were scene-specific aesthetic features from *Siege Culture*, the skull mask movement, or *Saints Culture* (Shadnia et al., 2022, 25 et seq). The publications of the *Terrorgram Collective*, classified as a terrorist group by several countries, could also be distributed in these groups. The dissemination of such content in these groups, some of which had been forwarded directly from militant accelerationist propaganda channels, provided direct points of contact into the narrower Terrorgram network for already-radicalized members of these groups.

affiliated: The "affiliated" classification includes groups that have integrated themselves into the Terrorgram network by adopting key aesthetics, concepts or strategies of militant accelerationism. These included, in particular, groups such as the so-called *true crime community*, communities worshipping school shooters, or more recent developments in the area of nihilistic accelerationism (Argentino, 2024, 2025).

central: All groups in which militant accelerationism was the focus of group communication were classified as "central". This included the production and dissemination of scene-specific propaganda, the exchange of information on terrorist attacks, and the provision of materials deemed necessary for this purpose, such as instructions on how to build bombs or weapons.

Identification of *German Users*

The aim of the second step was to identify users in these groups who had a local connection to Germany. The text messages recorded in the Terrorgram group dataset served as the starting point. If one of the two following criteria were met, the corresponding users were marked as *German users* by the researchers:

- Users stood out due to their use of colloquial German language
- Users stated that they were from Germany or lived in Germany

Using the language identification program "Compact Language Detector 2" by Google in the dataset, it was possible to automatically determine the proportion of German-language text messages in the number of all text messages from a user in Terrorgram groups. The dataset was only analyzed locally. A high proportion of German-language text messages from a user enabled the researchers to assess whether a user had a colloquial command of the German language. The identification of colloquial language reduced the risk of inadvertently classifying users as *German users* who used translation programs in their group communication.

Another criterion taken into account was the self-description of users who stated that they were from Germany or lived in Germany. However, this criterion is prone to error, as users, especially in networks with terrorist intentions, may deliberately provide false information or spread misleading information about themselves on social desirability grounds.

In order to minimize the potential error in both criteria, the researchers checked additional text messages for users matching the criteria in order to identify possible inconsistencies resulting from country and city mentions, incorrect use of German or contradictory information. The aim of this method was to minimize the risk of incorrect classification to the greatest possible extent. However, it is not possible to guarantee that all users classified as *German users* actually live in Germany or have some other

clear connection due to various sources of error. Nevertheless, the term *German user* was retained to make the analysis more comprehensible. To draw attention to the fact that this is a category formed according to particular criteria, the term is highlighted in italics throughout. The classification and updating of *German users* has been carried out by the researchers at regular intervals since 2022. It should also be emphasized that the *German users* recorded in the dataset are only those users who can be identified as *German users* through their text messages. It can be assumed that these criteria only cover a small part of *German users* and do not apply to many others, for example, those who only communicated in English or were reluctant to make local references.

Determination of Heavy Users

Certain criteria were used to filter those *German users* who were particularly active. These so-called “heavy users” were *German users* who

- had sent more than 80 total messages in one to two groups with the classification "central" **or** in three to four groups, of which at least two had the classification "central" and the rest "affiliated", **or** in at least five groups, regardless of the classification
- were active in more than 75 percent of the months (but at least three months) since their initial appearance in the dataset **and** had sent an unspecified number of messages in at least one group classified as "central" or at least three groups regardless of their classification

If one of the two criteria were met, a *German user* was classified as a heavy user. The criteria thus took into account both their proximity to the network and activity within it. In addition, the criteria ensured that only those *German users* were recorded who were active beyond an observational role, such that active involvement in the Terrorgram network can be assumed.

The Analyzed Dataset

The analysis is based on a dataset that includes all recorded *German users* who have posted at least one message in at least one Terrorgram group. “Messages” include text messages and metadata, but only text messages were stored and analyzed. The dataset includes the timestamps of all messages, the type of message, and for text messages, the corresponding content, membership status in the respective Terrorgram groups, and the automatically evaluated proportion of text messages written in German. In addition, the analysis includes the information publicly provided by Telegram concerning justifications for banning certain terrorist groups in which *German users* have sent messages as well as the mobile operating systems affected.

Limitations on Data Collection

In addition to possible sources of error in data collection, there were further limitations. These limitations had Terrorgram-specific, platform-specific and technical reasons:

Terrorgram-specific: Certain Terrorgram groups expected group members to participate actively in group communication. Due to the passive behavior of the researchers' sock puppet accounts, there was a high probability of being removed by the administrators of particularly militant and conspiratorial groups.

Platform-specific: In individual cases, Telegram has removed Terrorgram groups or their administrators, thereby impairing or completely preventing activity in the Terrorgram group. While the former could be determined by information provided by Telegram, the latter could not.

Technical: While the messages in some individual Terrorgram groups could be retroactively retrieved when joining the group, meaning that data prior to 2022 could also be included in the database, this was not possible in others, meaning that data for some groups could only be retrieved starting from the time of joining the group. In particularly active groups to which the latter case applied, this may have led to distortions in the data analysis and to a sudden increase in recorded messages in the dataset at the time the group was joined.

Analysis of the Results

This analysis is based on the dataset collected as of April 1st, 2025. In total, this dataset included 651 *German users*, 164 Terrorgram groups and over 317,000 messages posted by *German users* in the monitored groups.

In order to ensure a more detailed analysis, a distinction was made between *German users* who were members of at least one group and those who had posted a message in a group but have never been a member. The latter is possible if groups have not required membership for participating in internal communication. This applies in particular to so-called discussion groups which are opened alongside a Telegram channel and are intended to serve the discussion of certain content by subscribers. This distinction is key: Almost 43 percent of German users are not members of the relevant groups and have only sent messages. However, these 43 percent are responsible for fewer than 9 percent of the total messages recorded in the groups.

	Total	Group members	Messages only
German Users	651	372	279
Groups	164	163	57
- Central	65	65	11
- Affiliated	30	30	11
- Loosely affiliated	69	68	35
Messages	317.844	289.705	28.139
German-language messages	9.421	6.868	2.553
Heavy users	83	80	3

Data collection period: January 1, 2022 - March 30, 2025

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Figure 1: Overview table of the data available and analyzed in the data set.

At just under 22 percent, heavy users make up a very high proportion of *German users* who are members of at least one group. These heavy users can be assumed to be particularly active in the Terrorgram network and therefore pose an increased risk.

Integration of *German Users* in the Terrorgram Network

The active involvement of *German users* in the Terrogram network is also reflected in the number of groups in which a user is active. This is particularly clear in relation to *German users* who are members of at least one group. Here, only around one third are active in one group and over a quarter in more than three groups. Compared to users who are not members of a group and of whom almost three quarters are only active in one group, it is clear that membership in at least one Terrorgram group goes in hand with activity in several groups and thus suggests greater integration in the Terrorgram network.



Figure 2: Pie chart showing the number of *German users* who were active in a certain number of groups.

Classification of Terrorgram Groups

This also becomes clear with respect to the groups in which *German users* are active. Among *German users* who are members of at least one group, the proportion of groups classified as "central" is only slightly lower than the proportion of groups which are "loosely affiliated". In contrast, the proportion of groups categorized as “loosely affiliated” is significantly higher among *German users* who are not members and have only posted messages, at over 60 percent. Here, too, it can be assumed that membership of at least one Terrorgram group goes in hand with involvement in the Terrorgram network. This conclusion is supported by the fact that *German users* who are members of at least one group are responsible for over 91 percent of the messages in the dataset, although they only account for 57 percent of all *German users* recorded. As the progression of membership status is not tracked in this analysis, it can only be

speculated here that the groups in the "loosely affiliated" category may serve as an entry point into the Terrorgram network and that messages in such groups also eventually lead to membership.



Figure 3: Pie chart with all recorded groups and the group classification.

Activities of *German Users*



Figure 4: Curve diagram with the recorded messages of *German users* per month.

Data collection began at the start of 2022, during what we have classified as the third phase of Terrorgram (Barbarossa, 2024). At this point in time, the militant accelerationist scene was shaped in particular by publications of the Terrorgram Collective (Argentino, 2025). The then-19-year-old right-wing terrorist from Bratislava was also significantly motivated by these publications to commit the crime in October 2022 and became the first "Saint" to be significantly influenced by developments in the third phase of Terrorgram and the Terrorgram Collective (Kupper et al., 2023). A high number of messages from *German users* were recorded during this period, but this number plummeted in August 2022. This is mainly due to a highly active group called "Terror Wave CHAT" in which *German users* were extremely active and which was classified as "central" due to the group's orientation. However, this group was only active from the beginning of March to the beginning of August 2022 and was then shut down by Telegram. During this period, 33 *German users* participated in the group with 22,126 messages in total. In general, it can be stated that the number of messages recorded per month is subject to strong fluctuations. Due to insufficient data, no clear causal relationships can be determined. Nevertheless, the banning or restriction of groups or administrators can be viewed at least as a plausible explanation. However, the data

also showed that *German users* were consistently posting messages in other Terrorgram groups. The spike in March 2025 can be explained by more intensive observations of Terrorgram by researchers at the beginning of 2025, as a result of which new groups were discovered and included in the dataset. It can be seen that the collection of data from Terrorgram groups is also heavily dependent on close monitoring, which is a necessary condition for being able to record new group formations in a timely manner. This connection between close monitoring and larger datasets, as well as the sometimes short periods of activity of individual Terrorgram groups, can also be understood as an indication that the network of militant accelerationism is subject to constant change and adaptation dynamics.



Figure 5: Curve diagram showing the number of active *German users* per month.

Aside from the high messaging activity and comparatively high number of active users per month, especially in 2022, it can be seen that the number of active *German users* per month recorded in the dataset is declining. There may be several reasons for this. For one, Telegram seems to have been taking more restrictive action against

Terrorgram channels, groups, and their administrators since at least 2021, and pressure from investigating authorities on group and channel operators has also increased, which is why groups often disappear (Shadnia et al., 2022). This can severely restrict the network and active users. However, this can also result in the Terrorgram network increasingly shifting its activities to less public groups, which are more difficult to find because invitations to the groups are sent via private online contacts instead of public groups.

Bans and Restrictions

There are many reasons as to why groups can no longer be found. This may include administrators who have deleted the groups of their own accord, administrators whose accounts have been deleted (thus affecting their respective groups), or groups that have been deleted as a result of group settings, for example because administrators have been inactive for too long. As it has not yet been possible to fully determine the causes, only information made publicly available by Telegram has been analyzed. This information includes whether and for what reasons certain groups have been restricted by mobile operating systems or banned by Telegram. However, they do not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the actual discoverability of a group, which depends on various factors.

If a group is restricted by certain mobile operating systems, it can only be accessed via another operating system or via the desktop version of Telegram. Instructions on how to circumvent these restrictions are widespread and these restrictions have no visible effect on a group's membership growth. Over 95 percent of all groups in which at least one *German user* is a member can be discovered online. Only eight of the 163 groups were banned by Telegram.

Group Restrictions and Group Blockings

The values show the number and percentage of groups (n = 163) in which at least one *German user* was a member and which were affected by restrictions and blockings. The restrictions are based exclusively on publicly available information from Telegram and provide no information about the actual findability of a group.

Type of Restriction	Number of Groups
limited findability	**36 (22.1%)**
- of which Android blocking	34 (20.9%)
- of which iOS blocking	36 (22.1%)
complete blocking	**8 (4.9%)**
no blocking	**119 (73.0%)**
currently findable	**155 (95.1%)**

As of April 1, 2025

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Figure 6: Overview table of group restrictions and group bans.

Telegram almost exclusively cites violations of its own guidelines as grounds for these bans. If a group violates these guidelines, it can no longer be accessed via mobile operating systems and consequently these bans are not included in the breakdown by operating system. The restrictions are a different matter. The data show that Apple is more likely to take action against Terrorgram groups than Android. While no reason is provided by Telegram for restrictions on Android devices, the main reason given for restrictions on iOS devices is a violation of Apple guidelines, specifically with respect to depictions of violence. Groups that are restricted by both operating systems are listed twice in the figure above.



Figure 7: Pie chart showing the reasons for restriction and blocking.

The figures on the impact of these restrictions and bans on *German users* who are members of at least one group and their retention in the network suggest that suspensions are effective in removing users from the Terrorgram group network. Although the dataset only represents part of the full network, the bans still mean that around ten percent of *German users* appear to be losing access to the network, including four heavy users. However, it also shows that nearly 90 percent can still remain active on the network due to the limited use of bans.



Effects of group bans

The figures show the number of *German users* limited by bans. The bans are based exclusively on publicly available information provided by Telegram.

Affected users	Number
No ban	256 (68.8%)
Limited by ban	78 (21.0%)
Removed by ban	38 (10.2%)
- Heavy users	4 (1.1%)

The numbers refer to *German users* who are members of at least one group. (n = 372)

As of April 1, 2025

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Figure 8: Overview table of the effects of group blocks on *German users*.

Use of the German Language

A language identification program was used to determine the German-language content of a user's text messages. With respect to users who are members of at least one group, the results show that *German users* also adapt linguistically to the transnational network. Almost two thirds of these *German users* have a German-language share of less than 25 percent in their total number of text messages. These users thus communicate in other languages, mostly English. Not even 15 percent of *German users* predominantly use the German language.



Figure 9: Pie chart showing the number of *German users* who use a certain percentage of German in text messages.

Conclusion

In the present study, CeMAS was able to identify over 651 *German users* in 164 groups of the Terrorgram network based on certain criteria and evaluated their activity since 2022. It is the first analysis in this form to determine local users and their activity in the transnational network. Therefore, with reference to the data collection and evaluation methodology, the results should only be seen at this juncture as initial starting points for the further investigations which will have to follow to expand on these results.

Our results suggest that *German users* are an active part of the Terrorgram network. They show that *German users* who are members of at least one group do not limit their activity to that group, but appear to be involved in the broader Terrorgram network.

Among these 651 German users, 83 can be classified as heavy users. Their messages indicate a high level of activity in Terrorgram and therefore a particularly high-risk profile. This integration of *German users* into the network of militant accelerationism is worrying and must be understood as part of the high threat potential from right-wing terrorism, which has been confirmed time and again in recent years by planned and successful attacks.

A prerequisite for containing this potential threat is an understanding of militant accelerationism as a network with adaptable strategies for connecting with parts of the far-right scene and other misanthropic online communities. Pressure on this network appears to be effective. This includes, for example, investigating authorities calling out the intentions of militant accelerationism and its network for what they are: an attack on democratic society using all the available means of right-wing terrorism. Although this investigation suggests significant German involvement in the network, as far as regulation is concerned, Germany appears to have lagged behind countries such as the USA, Australia, and the UK, which have recently identified the terrorist potential of the network. Adjustments could be made here by classifying militant accelerationist groups as terrorist organizations and making online networks of users the focus of criminal prosecution.

Furthermore, the results once again highlight the responsibility of platforms: efficient moderation and suspension of communication channels can restrict the network. However, Telegram still takes only rare and insufficient action against these groups.

Militant accelerationism is also adaptable, as researchers have repeatedly shown in recent years. In order to recognize new developments in this area at an early stage, significantly more resources are needed for research. This will allow new methods to be developed and international cooperation to be expanded, as only international cooperation can capture the extent of militant accelerationism as a transnational network. This in turn is necessary to link current militant accelerationist developments with local connections in order to realistically determine the potential for local attacks.

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