



**Civil Society and Regional Peacebuilding
in the Horn of Africa:
A review of present engagement and
future opportunities**

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Civil Society and Regional Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa:
A review of present engagement and future opportunities

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The Life & Peace Institute (LPI) is an international and ecumenical centre that supports and promotes non-violent approaches to conflict transformation through a combination of research and action that entails the strengthening of existing local capacities and enhancing preconditions for building peace.

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Foreword

The story behind the story

This publication was never meant to see the light of day outside of the Life & Peace Institute's offices. Its journey began in 2012 when the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) embarked on designing a regional peacebuilding programme, after nearly two decades of community-based peacebuilding work in the Horn of Africa. The basic objective was fairly clear; the programme should be grounded in LPI's bottom-up peacebuilding approach, but go beyond particular locales and conflicts and seek to address the conflict system in the Horn in a strategic and comprehensive manner. While the overall goal was clear, the critical details of how to best go about such an amazingly ambitious endeavour, with whom, when and where to start certainly was not.

After inventorying LPI's past regional peacebuilding experiences, a few answers came into view, but most questions about the state-of-the-art regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa were outstanding. We turned to the general literature on regional peacebuilding for guidance, but it was scant. We searched for case studies and found some good examples from other regions, yet most findings were nascent in nature and not yet of the nature of "cemented truths" (though, perhaps, few things are in the peacebuilding field) that could easily be extrapolated to other contexts.

At this stage of our thinking, two realizations were made. Firstly, LPI's regional peacebuilding programme would not succeed unless it understood the lay of the land and traced the trail of other organizations who had gone into the territory of building regional peace in the Horn before us. Secondly, the information that we were looking for was not documented and readily available; hence the logical conclusion was to go out in the "real world" and find the answers ourselves.

Thus, from November 2012 to November 2013, LPI mapped out over 140 actors who had engaged in regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa, reviewed previous and current initiatives and travelled to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to gather the best practices and lessons from the most prominent and active regional peacebuilding actors. At the outset, the main purpose was to analyze all the col-

lected data to primarily fill our own knowledge gap and subsequently use the acquired insights to design a programme based on the latest and best evidence out there. However, as soon as we began to sit down with the various peacebuilding actors in the region, most shared that they had been grappling with the same questions that guided our study and expressed great interest in the findings of our mapping and requested we share the final report.

Thus, the report that was initially supposed to serve as reference material for a few interested readers in and around LPI was then refashioned into the publication that you are holding in your hands; the first, of hopefully many, to come out of LPI's new regional Horn of Africa peacebuilding programme.

Many of the findings are quite intuitive and well-known, while others are more surprising. It is my hope that these findings will begin to answer some of the questions that many of us share as to how regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa has been done so far, and what outcomes and lessons have been achieved. This overview of current practices might also help the various stakeholders understand their respective roles in the bigger regional peacebuilding puzzle and shed some light on how to work in an increasing synergetic manner in order to lay a more complete one.

Further, I hope that the closing thoughts on ways to advance regional peacebuilding in the Horn will not only serve as food for thought, but that the reflections – some of which are on the critical side (in the way that you might be with your family) – will awaken and re-energize the field to forge ahead towards its ambitious, but worthy objective.

Finally, I would like to thank those who have been involved in the background research and write-up of various versions of this report; Sarah Cussen, Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw, Najum Mushtaq, Stella Sabiiti and Esmeralda Van den Bosch. I am also grateful to LPI colleagues who have also read and provided input to various draft versions of this report.

Hannah Tsadik
LPI Resident Representative for the
Horn of Africa Regional Programme

Acronyms

AACC – All African Conference of Churches

ACORD – Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development

AMISOM – African Union Mission in Somalia

APSA – The African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF – African Standby Force

AU – African Union

AUHIP – African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan

CEWARN – IGAD's Early Warning Mechanism

CEWARU – Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit

CBO – Community Based Organization

COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPMR – Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

CS – Civil Society

CSO – Civil Society Organization

EAC – East African Community

EANSA – East Africa Network on Small Arms

EAPCCO – East Africa Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organization

EASSI – East African Sub-regional Support initiatives for the Advancement of Women

ECOSOCC – Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union

FAS – Femmes Africa Solidarité

GIMAC – The Gender is My Agenda Campaign

IANSA – The International Action Network on Small Arms

IDDRSI – Drought Disaster Resilience Sustainability Initiative

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority for Development

IGAD – CSU – Intergovernmental Authority for Development's Civil Society Forum

IGAD-IPU – Intergovernmental Authority for Development's Inter-Parliamentary Union

IGADD – Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

INGO – International Non-governmental Organizations

ISFA – Interim Security Force for Abyei

ISSP – Intergovernmental Authority for Development's Security Sector Program

KANSA – Kenya Action Network on Small Arms

LAPSSET – Lamu Port and Southern Sudan – Ethiopia Transport Corridor

LPI – Life & Peace Institute

M&E – Monitoring and Evaluating

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAR – Participatory Action Research

PSC – African Union Peace and Security Council

PSD – Peace and Security Department

REC – Regional Economic Communities

RM – Regional Mechanisms

SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons

SOPA – Seeds of Peace Africa

UN – United Nations

UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

Over several decades, the Horn of Africa has been recognised as a complex system of conflicts, where the conflicts in the region are interlinked and trans-boundary in nature. In the field of peacebuilding, there is a growing realization that peacebuilding efforts in complex systems such as the Horn of Africa require holistic and coordinated responses which regional approach to peacebuilding could facilitate. Hence, regional peacebuilding is often prescribed as a means to address the complexity of interlinked conflicts in the Horn. However, despite the well-recognized need for strategic and regional peacebuilding efforts that address root causes of conflicts, there is no consensus on what regional peacebuilding means and constitutes of in practical terms. In fact, several civil society organizations (CSOs) carry out “regional peacebuilding” as individually defined by themselves, without a clear or shared definition of what it actually means.

In order to better understand the regional peacebuilding landscape in the Horn of Africa, capture lessons learned and best practices especially in relation to civil society-led peacebuilding initiatives, the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) conducted a mapping research project that included desk reviews, a series of interviews and workshops. The research covered around 146 regional actors; from small grassroots NGOs to regional civil society networks, to think tanks and international NGOs operating in the region. Key insights and findings on the state of regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa, unearthed by the mapping, are summarized below.

One of the key findings of this research is that certain conflicts, such as the Sudans, and topics, such as “gender” and “governance” (no matter how widely defined) have received more attention than others. While this may be due to the immediate need for attention and intervention in these areas, the role of donors and the availability of funds coupled with the restriction imposed by some governments on civil society (CS) engagement in certain thematic areas are major determining factors driving which conflicts or issues are addressed by civil society organizations.

In terms of programming and operationalisation of peacebuilding efforts, organizations pursued different types of peacebuilding strategies. However, capacity building (e.g. in the form of trainings) and

advocacy are the two strategies that, despite their sweeping definition, were carried out by most organizations. Those organizations that engaged in some sort of advocacy mostly acted locally or nationally with Track II and III actors. There was limited regional level advocacy especially with Track I actors such as the African Union (AU).

Of the organizations that aimed at regional peacebuilding, most stated that the foundations for an effective regional approach lay in solid grassroots work. This is because locally owned and led peacebuilding initiatives work best in ensuring the success and the sustainability of peacebuilding interventions. Local ownership was championed as a key ingredient in fostering peace-dividend at the community level. However, many organizations had not attempted or succeeded in leveraging and aligning their peace work at the local level to peace writ large in the region, for several reasons. The reasons for this range from lack of coordination among CSOs at different levels, to shrinking space for CS in some countries, to inaccessibility of regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and AU, as well as lack of awareness among many CSOs of how to engage with these regional bodies.

From networking with like-minded organizations to partnering with organizations with a different type of expertise, both in country and regionally, many organizations shared that networks are essential for peacebuilding impact at the regional level.

They underscored the utility of networks not only in providing space for the exchange of analysis and best practices, but also in allowing some organizations to raise issues that they would not be able to raise by themselves. The mapping also found that while there is a general consensus in the peacebuilding field that a thorough conflict analysis is crucial for effective peacebuilding, most of the peacebuilding organizations covered in this mapping in fact did little analysis. Many organizations conducted analysis as a needs-assessment tool, rather than a programming tool. The reasons for this weak analysis practice ranged from lack of capacity, time, resources, and for some organizations (especially at the grassroots level) a sentiment that there was little need to write down analysis on conflicts and issues that they knew very intimately.

In identifying needs and gaps, most organizations expressed a need for improved capacities in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as well as documentation, in order to better identify, retain and build on lessons learned and best practices and translate them into improved programming of future interventions. “Similarly, other gaps in peacebuilding the Horn included a lack of concerted civil society action in regional peacebuilding and limited interactions with policy makers especially at the regional level.”

On the side of governmental and intergovernmental regional peacebuilding efforts, this research found that governments in the Horn, while in some instances being conflict parties themselves, have also pursued several socio-economic and political initiatives in order to promote peace and security in the region. Regional organizations such as the IGAD and AU that have the mandate to engage in regional peacebuilding are players that have increasingly solid track record of peacebuilding initiatives in the Horn. This includes IGAD’s early warning mechanism (CEWARN) and various peace support operations in the region. However, in relation of IGAD’s and AU’s peacebuilding interaction with CSOs, there is room for improvement, both in tapping into existing frameworks that open up space for CSO engagement such as the Livingstone Formula with the AU, but also in creating new spaces for a better interface between CSOs and regional policy actors.

As a result, and together other findings in the report, there is a need for the community of regional peacebuilders in the Horn of Africa (including LPI) to seriously reflect on these findings and develop concrete actions for improvement.

The recommendations emanating from this mapping, framed as key points and ways forward targeted primarily to civil society, serve as a good starting point

Key points and ways forward:

- **The vision of regional peacebuilding should be clearly defined.** Considering the dynamic, nature of peace and conflict matters in the Horn of Africa, the vision should be time specific and guide the individual and collaborative efforts of regional peacebuilding actors (both CSOs and governmental/intergovernmental agencies)
- **Peacebuilding responses should be coordinated and “strategic”:** holistic, inclusive, multi-level and

geared towards short-term as well as long-term needs, in order to effectively address the peacebuilding needs in the Horn.

- **Analysis is not only a prerequisite but an indispensable tool for operationalising regional peacebuilding.** A thorough and systemic assessment of causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict in a context that goes beyond the local to include the regional environment is an essential part of strategic peacebuilding; it should not be taken as an optional undertaking. Furthermore, analysis is an essential tool for policy making; hence it is an instrument with which civil society actors can influence policy processes.
- **Division of labour is key;** strategic regional peacebuilding requires capitalizing on the expertise, lessons learned, resources and opportunities of each peacebuilding actor. A competitive environment is not only un-strategic but destructive to regional peacebuilding.
- **CSOs at all levels should locate themselves in the “peace writ large”** and coordinate with others who have complementary resources and expertise to build on their work and link it to other levels or across themes.
- **“Speaking truth to power”** does not solely prescribe a “naming and shaming” advocacy strategy. Although civil society predominantly pursue more confrontational advocacy, other collaborative means of speaking truth to power are possible and sometimes more strategic.
- **Policy makers should not be omitted** from the collaboration and coordination **aspect of strategic regional peacebuilding.** The “us” (civil society) against “them” (policy makers) dichotomy defeats the purpose of inclusive peacebuilding and is un-constructive.
- **The Horn of Africa needs to be seen as a system,** as more than the sum of its individual countries or predominant themes. Hence, CSOs should coordinate not amongst themselves but also with governmental and intergovernmental actors in order to ensure that areas legally off-limits to civil society led peacebuilding activities, or themes that are either politically sensitive or lack sufficient funding are adequately covered for a comprehensive peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa.

- **Governments and intergovernmental organizations should also understand the value-added of civil society's contribution** and provide a conducive environment for interaction.
- **Donors should understand that strategic peacebuilding is a process** that includes short-term, emergency response, mid to long-term structural change driven approaches, and a holistic understanding of a conflict system. Hence, they should not shy away from funding peacebuilding initiatives that are transformative (rather than reactive). Though long-term peacebuilding approaches may bear less visible/tangible results in the short-term/programme reporting cycle, their contribution to laying the foundation for cultural or structural transformation should not be neglected.
- **Donors can contribute to a strategic regional peacebuilding** in the Horn of Africa by encouraging and supporting peacebuilding interventions that are inclusive of all actors, holistic in their thematic or geographic coverage, and mindful of the various peacebuilding timeframes (short-term, mid, long-term).

Introduction

Political Violence in the Horn of Africa 1990-2010¹

- 32 state-based armed conflicts where a government is one of the belligerent parties
- 179 non-state armed conflicts fought between non-governmental groups
- 22 campaigns of one-sided violence where civilians are massacred (mainly in Sudan and Uganda)

In recent years, it has become commonplace to call for regional approaches to peacebuilding, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Internal conflicts can spill over and cause instability at the regional level, while regional instability can prevent growth and development at the national level. Border regions can become zones of danger and backslide into conflict and poverty. In the Horn of Africa, refugees, weapons and combatants can easily flow through the region's porous borders. This makes even more stable states in the region unable to stop armed raiding across their borders from states struggling to control and govern their territory. For example, there is the threat of border conflicts over strategic natural resources (particularly oil) between North and South Sudan spilling over into neighbouring states with interests in imports or pipelines.

It stands to reason that interlinked conflicts require an approach that goes beyond a single conflict or a single country. As a result, international organizations, governments, and NGOs in the Horn of Africa (and elsewhere, in other regions) are promoting regional peacebuilding.

But what does “regional peacebuilding” mean? How is it operationalised in the Horn? Have such regional efforts been effective thus far and how can future initiatives be rendered even more so?

In order to better understand regional peacebuilding work taking place in the Horn of Africa, LPI

Institute conducted a desk review, a series of interviews as well as workshops to answer some of these questions. The desk review, finalized in late 2012, covered 146 actors operating in the Horn of Africa. Twenty-three organizations (all but six of which were also included in the desk review) were interviewed and/or participated in a workshop held in Kampala in spring 2013. These actors ranged from many types of organizations; from small grassroots NGOs and regional civil society networks, to think tanks and international NGOs that operate all over the world, and everything in between. Some were peacebuilding organizations, while others did peacebuilding as part of their wider programming.

Later the same year, in fall 2013, LPI held a series of validation workshops in Addis Ababa, Kampala, and Nairobi with the organizations that had been interviewed, as well as a few additional organizations. These workshops validated the findings to a great extent and gave an opportunity to interrogate certain findings further, which has added depth to this report.

Based on the desk review, interviews and workshops, this paper will review approaches taken in the Horn to address the questions identified earlier. The organization of the paper is as follows: the first section is an overview of the meaning of regional peacebuilding in general and how it is characterized in the Horn of Africa in particular. Following that, the second section provides a review of regional peacebuilding initiatives in the Horn divided by type of actors (non-state actors, state actors, and continental/sub-regional actors). The third section then examines the peacebuilding needs and gaps as identified by peacebuilding actors in the Horn. The fourth and last section is LPI's closing reflections and suggestions for ways forward in regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa.

¹ UCDP (2014)

1. Defining regional peacebuilding – challenges

In 1997, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recognised “that effective strategies to proactively engage conflict situations will require a coordinated regional approach”.² In 2011, the World Bank again reiterated that “excessive focus on assistance to the individual nation state is mismatched with the challenge of transnational and cyclical violence”.³ There are countless examples of similar acknowledgments from civil society organizations small and large all over the world and all over the Horn. But there is no broad agreement, either internationally or regionally, about the definition of regional peacebuilding or best practices in regional approaches to peacebuilding.

Nonetheless, there does seem to be coalescence around the broad goal of regional peacebuilding, what Professor Peter Wallensteen, Department for Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, describes as “turning conflictual regions into areas of positive cooperation, where the likelihood of another war is reduced or even eliminated”.⁴ However, this general description is of limited value for civil society organization trying to develop and implement programs with a regional approach.

Van Leeuwen’s description⁵ of regional approaches in the Great Lakes region also offers a useful conceptualization for civil society organization in the Horn of Africa. Looking at the role of civil society organizations in the regional peacebuilding discourse in the Great Lakes, he identifies several limitations of many current responses to conflict. He notes that the absence of regional analysis in the Great Lakes made it difficult for civil society “to define regional programmes as a collaborative effort of organizations from different countries”, a deficiency the Horn of Africa shares. He observes that many organizations adopt “minimalist” regional approaches – such as prioritizing very general themes across the region (e.g. governance, gender, etc.). This observation keeps with the findings about civil society organizations in the Horn as well. Rather than defining regional peacebuilding and externally prescribing

programming, Van Leeuwen suggests an approach that “ask[s] instead how local people imagine (the possibilities of) their region”.⁶

Characteristics of regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa

Organizations in the Horn also face the same conceptual challenge described above, as they attempt to define regional peacebuilding, its specific goals in the Horn, and how it could be implemented. Should all peacebuilding programming that crosses national borders be considered regional, or is something more required? If regional peacebuilding addresses structural causes of conflict across a region, does that mean working on a key issue (e.g. governance) in multiple countries can be considered regional peacebuilding? Or would a regional program require more – such as joint learning, shared networks and platforms? How do regionally mandated bodies such as the IGAD and the AU fit into the picture?

The multiplicity of definitions and approaches found in the desk review and interviews of this research are good indicators of the lack of consensus or shared understanding on the meaning of regional peacebuilding. Some organizations were working directly on conflict issues, and others were working on issues they felt to be related – what might be termed “root causes” such as poverty or gender inequality. Some organizations discussed all peacebuilding initiatives taking place in the region, regardless of approach, while others focused on either cross-border initiatives or regional approaches, such as networks, working with regional bodies, or multi-country programming.

Organizations agreed that the lack of clear definitions hampered discussions and possibly also regional coordination. Some felt strongly that the next step for the region should be forging these definitions together. Yet at the same time, civil society groups had little interest in giving up their autonomy to sign up to a one-size-fits-all definition of peacebuilding or regional peacebuilding.

² OECD DAC, *Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (Paris: OECD DAC, 1997).

³ World Bank (2011)

⁴ Wallensteen (2012, 3)

⁵ Leeuwen (2008)

⁶ Ibid

In the validation workshops, some organizations saw a clear path to working regionally through engaging the AU and IGAD, while others were more concerned with working across borders with civil society while promoting other types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. For example, one organization saw regional cooperation in light of the challenges it had faced in dealing with different policies and levels of implementation on pastoralism along the Ugandan and South Sudanese border. Their approach was to work with communities along both sides of the border while engaging with the Ugandan government on policing and other issues that could be addressed bilaterally with South Sudan.

Another interesting finding that emerged during the validation workshops was the sentiment that these conceptual discussions about definition and scope of regional peacebuilding should be held first at the national level. A number of participants believed civil society in Uganda and in Kenya should agree amongst themselves to avoid “exporting the confusion” regionally.

While the lack of coordination on peacebuilding even at national level is an important concern, this appears to indicate that many civil society organiza-

tions, even those with a regional scope and mission, regard themselves as national actors.

With this in mind, the review’s methodology deliberately did not prescribe definitions for peacebuilding or regional peacebuilding. While the flexibility in the definition of regional peacebuilding elicited a great deal of information about what these organizations are doing, it became clear that nearly every organization examined in both the desk review and the interview had its own definition of both, determined by its history, mandate, and context.

Despite the varying definitions given to regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa, most analysts agree that “one central characteristic of the Horn is that analysis can start with any conflict situation ... and map out a trail linking to other countries and their internal or bilateral conflicts”.⁷ Yet, in spite of the growing chorus of agreement that regional approaches are vital to peace and stability in the Horn, regional programming that transcends the local or national environment has been uncoordinated and scattershot.

The section below gives an overview of regional peacebuilding initiatives led by civil society organizations as well as governmental and intergovernmental entities in the Horn of Africa.

2. Review of regional peacebuilding initiatives in the Horn of Africa

2.1. Initiatives by non-state actors⁸

Key findings

- Certain conflicts and countries have received substantially more attention in terms of peacebuilding.
- The most cited themes of peacebuilding work in the Horn were gender, gender-based violence and women’s inclusion, as well as pastoralist conflict.
- The most common peacebuilding strategy was capacity building, although the term was not well defined.
- The most important lesson learned by civil society groups was that locally owned and supported initiatives work best.

Conflict coverage

In the interviews and in the desk review, it was striking that certain conflicts and certain countries and border regions had received substantially more attention in terms of peacebuilding than others. For example, work in the Sudans on a variety of themes and at multiple levels came up over and over again. Participants in the validation workshops said that in their own organization, the choices on which conflicts to focus on (beyond their organisation’s suitability and ability to respond) relied on access to and availability of funding. Many participants speculated that it was also linked to the heat of the conflict and international attention. Most pointed to donors as the major decider in conflict coverage.

⁷ Cliffe, Love and Tronvoll (2009)

⁸ This section is primarily based on the desk research on 146 civil society actors and the in-depth discussions with 23 organizations; see Annex 1 for a full list of the civil society actors interviewed.

Furthermore, legal frameworks that limit the thematic areas on which CSOs work also influence why certain topics have received more attention than others. In countries where there is limited space for civil society, issues that are deemed too “political” are strictly under the domain of the state/government and legally out of reach for CSOs.

Organizations also frequently raised long-established work on the pastoralist conflicts in the Karamoja cluster. Although there were still many projects in this cluster, it was noticeable that a number of organizations talked about the work that they used to do, rather than on-going or new work. One long-time observer of peacebuilding in the Horn commented that organizations operating in the Karamoja cluster and in Kenya are experiencing fatigue and shifting elsewhere, such as into South Sudan.

Finally, a lot of organizations mentioned work in the Great Lakes. For example, many organizations were working on rape and sexual and gender based violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, or on cross-border conflicts. During validation workshops in Kampala, organizations pointed out that they could not work on regional conflicts involving Uganda without looking at both the Horn and the Great Lakes. This clearly illustrates the problem with focusing too strictly on the geographical region of the Horn of Africa while conflicts cross regional as well as national boundaries. The geographical and

thematic distribution of peacebuilding interventions will be discussed further in section three, under peacebuilding needs and gaps in the Horn of Africa.

Predominant peacebuilding themes

Organizations referred to different areas of work ranging widely from community conflict resolution to developing alternative livelihoods to sexual and gender-based violence. The themes are grouped and simplified in the chart below. Many organizations engaged in multiple themes, often with overlapping projects covering these themes. The interviews allowed further exploration of which conflict issues the organizations focused on. Those 21 organizations alone referred to work on about 25 different conflict issues in the Horn of Africa.

However, certain themes did stand out. Many organizations cited work on women or on gender, often women’s leadership, with several mentioning work on implementing UN Security Council 1325 on women and peacebuilding, as well as on sexual and gender-based violence and rape in conflict. This work is taking place both at the local/community level, and at the national, regional, and international levels. Another common theme is pastoralist conflict in the border regions. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) was another common theme, mainly for advocacy work. Many organizations also worked on electoral violence (particularly in Kenya), although

Type of conflict issues




Figure 1
Type of conflicts issues identified by organizations taking part in the desk review and interviews

a few seemed to work on other governance issues, with the exception of some of the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Other common programming themes included religious conflict and engaging religious leaders in community conflict resolution and national peace processes; as well as a focus on livelihoods, although it was unclear how organizations were linking this work to peacebuilding.

The chart in figure 1 (p 13) summarizes the main themes.

Predominant peacebuilding strategies

Although there was a diverse range of strategies used in peacebuilding by the different organization, certain key strategies continued to come up. Capacity Building was by far the most commonly mentioned strategy in both the desk review and the interviews. However, the term was not well defined and appeared to range from one-off paid trainings to longer processes of training, mentoring, and accompaniment. Further review would be necessary to dissect and understand this approach to peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa. In the interviews, another popular strategy was arranging exchanges, either internally with their own staff working in different regions, or sponsoring leaders and civil society organization to travel and understand how issues were dealt with in

other places. There were many calls for more of this type of exchange.

Finally, the desk review revealed that many organizations undertake some form of advocacy work. Again, organizations did not provide a definitions of advocacy, but generally used either experience or research to encourage attention to certain issues or to lobby for policy change on topics as wide-ranging as the themes listed above. The graph below (figure 2) looks at the major advocacy issues for the organization reviewed and analyses the tracks used to pursue policy change in that area. Track I is generally understood to involve official channels (i.e. government or multilaterals). Track II involves influential civil society actors, such as academic, religious or NGO leaders. Track III is “people to people” diplomacy, usually driven by local leaders and organizations at the grassroots level.

In discussing advocacy, more than one organization raised the idea that local community based organizations should be the implementers of peacebuilding policies and frameworks and NGOs at national or international levels should be focused on advocacy to promote the policy change necessary to address root causes of conflict.

Of those that carried out advocacy, very few appeared to engage with the AU, only some listing AU engagement in their documents and websites

Non-state actors in the Horn: Level of engagement and types of conflict issues




Figure 2: Level of engagement and types of conflict issues identified by organizations taking part in the desk review and interviews

reviewed during the desk review and less than half of the 21 organization speaking about it during the interview. More organization engaged with national governments and donors.

Engaging with continental and regional policy bodies (AU & IGAD)

Despite the view among organizations that the AU and IGAD still have a long way to go in opening up space for civil society, many organizations had good reasons to engage with these bodies at the regional level. Participants talked about being able to raise issues at the AU or IGAD that they would not be able to raise in their own countries. Others talked about being able to access high-level national policymakers in these institutions, who they would be unable to access at home.

Although some organizations have had success in engaging with the AU, many still feel unable to approach it. Grassroots NGOs particularly felt intimidated by the AU bureaucracy and their lack of knowledge and networks. Although they may have useful information, they were unsure about the policy language used at the AU or IGAD. In addition, as one long-time observer put it, these policy bodies are constantly “changing their colours”. How the AU engages with civil society depends on changes in the Commission and in membership on relevant committees.

For a considerable amount of time, neither the AU nor civil society organizations have pushed forcefully for a more formal space of engagement or for existing frameworks to be used. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC) and its peace and security cluster in specific have the mandate to facilitate and coordinate civil society’s engagement with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). However, narrow ECOSOCC membership criteria and its institutional limitations have been cited as factors that hinder a full and broad participation of civil society organizations (especially grassroots organizations). Though the Livingstone Formula highlights the framework through which civil society organizations can interact with and contribute to the work of the AU PSC, many organizations are not aware about the Formula or its provisions. As a result, there is a lot of room to revise and revisit the provisions of the Formula, as well as the structural set-up of ECOSOCC in order to create an

environment conducive for civil society contribution to the work of the PSC⁹.

The role of donors

The role of donors in determining where, when, and how civil society engages in conflict in the Horn of Africa did not come up in the initial desk review or the interviews. During the validation workshops, however, it became clear that donors play a major and often leading role in deciding which conflicts get attention, the types of interventions, and the extent of coordination and cooperation among civil society. Smaller national civil society organizations even referred to international NGOs as “donors”, since their funding comes mainly from these sources. Although the LPI mapping focused on civil society, it is clear that the role of donors cannot be ignored in any future consideration of regional peacebuilding in the Horn.

Lessons learned

In the interviews with non-state actors working in the Horn of Africa, organizations shared many lessons learned and some of their success stories. Some of these lessons are on working in peacebuilding generally in the region, while others are more specifically about regional peacebuilding.

The major lesson that came up over and over was that locally owned and supported initiatives work best. Organizations talked about ensuring that local community organizations are always involved as one key ingredient of success. Many were, or had been part of, wider networks which allowed them to be responsive to local needs, while giving them access to national and regional level fora. Organizations also highlighted the importance of networking and collaboration in regional peacebuilding. Some organizations achieved this by working with likeminded partners (e.g. religious institutes or women’s groups); some shared lessons with other organizations operating in the same region or implementing a similar project in other regions. In several cases the project itself brought CSOs/CBOs together. Many believed that such networks or partnerships were necessary to have an impact at regional level. More than one person interviewed said they were “reinventing the wheel” and not learning from other organizations or

documenting their experiences – sometimes forgetting lessons they have learned themselves.

For example, the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) does cross-programme learning and has been sharing lessons across the region from the community model it developed in facilitating dialogue and developing contracts and agreements in Burundi. It has successfully replicated the model in other countries.

Experiences with networks were not uniformly positive however. Some organizations said that networks were rarely self-sustaining, and that once funding dried up, the network disappeared. Others also found that successful networks became competitors, as donors pushed for the networks to become implementers. It was frequently pointed out that it is difficult to get funding for networking and coordination.

Many organizations talked about the political challenges of regional peacebuilding. There was concern that raising issues to the regional level can sometimes be perceived as subverting the sovereignty of governments in the region. A few organizations expressed fear of working regionally even to the point of worrying that their licenses to operate would be revoked. Indeed, a number of analysts have seen regional peacebuilding as a way to “dilute state sensitivity to sovereignty through collective purpose and goals”.¹⁰

However, there are examples of successful work at the regional level in spite of the political sensitivity around certain topics. Networks are helpful in diffusing the individual political responsibility of an organization, and there were many examples of organizations using networks to raise sensitive topics regionally. Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), for example, campaigned (The Gender is My Agenda Campaign or GIMAC) successfully for gender parity policies and the establishment of a gender directorate at the African Union. However, they admit that implementation at the national level has been a challenge, and that “all roads do not lead to Addis”, meaning the AU may not always be the most useful target. Women do not always have a common voice and common agenda, nor do the national civil society organizations that make up the network. FAS shared the lesson that success at regional level does not always mean success nationally and locally, where political rifts and sensitivities may be stronger.

While perhaps not unique to regional peacebuilding, many organizations shared successes from their work in using shared interests of conflicting communities as a vehicle for peacebuilding, drawing examples from their cross-border work. More than one organization engaged pastoralist youth in peacebuilding through sports. Several others engaged pastoralist communities in peacebuilding by developing alternative livelihoods or trade links. Cross-border

Success story

Seeds of Peace Africa (SOPA)

SOPA began in Kenya as a community based organisation in 2002, and grew into the international organisation it is today, operating across borders in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Their strategy is to use sports as an entry point to work on peace and development with youth, and work in many pastoralist communities along the borders.

SOPA brings together communities who usually only meet during hostile cattle raiding. Communities begin to play together and confidence is built, and SOPA helps them talk about the issues. They have also engaged elders to play a role in stopping cattle raids or negotiating the return of raided cattle.

One of its most successful strategies has been building common infrastructure for market and water access in border regions. Communities previously in conflict work together to manage the resources and share the dividends of peace.

SOPA's success has allowed it to become more of a coordinator of local organisations. It has facilitated exchanges between partners in the region and supported local partners in resource mobilisation.

¹⁰ Ramsbotham (2012)

Success story

The All African Conference of Churches

The All African Conference of Churches (AACC) ensures local ownership of its interventions through its membership. This close relationship with member churches allows the AACC to respond quickly to local needs and pass messages through regional church leaders to local congregations. The AACC follows a strict principle of subsidiary, and doesn't compete with churches and council on the ground, depending on them to implement.

Sometimes their close links to the ground make it difficult to be strategic, and the AACC has to tread carefully around local politics.

The AACC's strength is that it recognises member churches may be partisan in local conflicts, and sees part of its role as mediating within its own membership, giving the example of its work with congregations on the M23 rebel group in the DR Congo.

communal conflict was such a key issue for organizations working in the Horn of Africa that shared learning and documentation of successful approaches to peacebuilding would be useful to investigate further.

Finally, nearly every organization interviewed emphasized the importance of sustained funding. Many of the organizations had suffered from a lack of continuous funding and cited a number of good initiatives that lost traction or were unable to consolidate impact because of this, and others described sustained funding as key to success in achieving long-term impact.

Case study of civil society-led advocacy: Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Introduction to SALW

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a global arms trade treaty in April 2013, marking a milestone in efforts to control and limit illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. It took the world body more than a decade of follow-up work on the 2001 UN Program of Action to negotiate and pass this treaty.¹¹

The role of civil society groups from around the world has been widely acknowledged as critical to the success of the process. Since the introduction of the UN Program of Action, "the standards, implementation, and legitimacy of ... [the] process have to a very

large extent been driven by the energy and commitment of civil society groups".¹² These groups have not only been influential in defining the program's conceptual framework, they have also been partners in building and sustaining political support at multiple levels for the program as well as in its implementation.

Why did the SALW issue particularly receive this attention? And what makes SALW advocacy effective? What factors account for the strength of civil society in this particular area? A review of developments over the last decade or so suggests that, among others, the following five elements can be identified to have contributed to the effectiveness of the campaign.

1. Multilayered architecture

Civil society networks working on SALW issues built an elaborate network that includes not only global forums and activities but, more importantly, regional and national level bodies. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), to give one example, has over 250 full members that undertake research, advocacy and campaigning to promote local, national, regional and global measures to strengthen human security.¹³ Its scope of networking, however, is much broader than just its membership and it can best be described as an umbrella network to which almost all national and

¹¹ The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, driven by the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was adopted in 2001.

¹² McLay (2012, 6)

¹³ IANSA (2014)

regional gun control groups belong. It is estimated to represent over 800 gun control organizations in 120 countries.¹⁴ Additionally, the IANSA model has been replicated in many sub-regional and national contexts through local chapters. For example, in the Horn there is an East Africa Network on Small Arms (EANSA) complemented by national structures such as the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA).

The interconnectedness of local-regional-global organisational networks has a multiplying effect as it also ensures that decision-makers are approached at all appropriate levels.

2. Liaison with intergovernmental regional and sub-regional initiatives

The civil society structure is mirrored by intergovernmental bodies dealing with SALW issues. Since the turn of the century, there has been a groundswell of initiatives at the regional and sub-regional levels to address the illicit SALW trade. The 2001 UN Program of Action spurred intergovernmental organizations in almost all regions of the world to engage in the implementation process. The Organization of American States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Caribbean Community, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – all have played an important role in defining standards and supporting regional implementation of the UN plan.

For example, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, signed by 11 regional states in 2004, was a follow-up to the UN Program of Action. Likewise, the work of dedicated small arms organizations and programmes such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms and the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons has also been increasingly important.

As arms trade and proliferation of small weapons has its own different characteristics in each region, these regional and sub-regional initiatives have been fundamental in pushing forward Program of Action implementation. Civil society has been able to diversify its work through regional and national bodies,

strategies and initiatives tailored to specific regional/national contexts and had more traction than a global, one-size-fits-all approach.

Moreover, access to policymakers is not an obstacle in advocating on SALW issues as the UN and other intergovernmental bodies officially recognize the role of civil society in this field and, instead of marginalizing them, include them in their deliberations.

3. Mutuality of civil society-state interests

On many aspects of peacebuilding and conflict resolution the views of civil society and states are not always in line with one another (for example, the question of including certain armed groups in peace processes remains controversial in almost every civil war context, and human rights issues often create tension between NGOs and governments). SALW, however, brings the two together. States have an interest in gaining and maintaining monopoly over means of violence. Criminal networks and politically motivated armed groups in possession of SALW pose threats to state authority. Hence the high levels of political will by UN members states to curb illicit arms trade, which corresponds to civil society's advocacy agenda. States are more receptive to – and in need of – input from civil society on this particular issue than other more politicised dimensions of peace and conflict.

4. Resource mobilization

The funding base for research and advocacy on small arms control is diverse. Since SALW advocacy tackles concrete and tangible realities of guns and weapons, it is possible to demonstrate the extent and impact of the problem in concrete and tangible terms. Also, SALW encompasses a variety of sectors – trade, security, police and judiciary, humanitarian actors – which means that a variety of donors can be approached.

The resource base for SALW is exceptionally diverse. A number of European countries – most notably, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and UK – have committed significant amounts of funds for work on SALW issues over the last decade. Private foundations in both Europe and North America also make significant contribution to advocacy on SALW. The role of UN agencies is equally important in mobilizing resources. In addition to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, agencies like UNICEF, the Department of Political Affairs and peacekeeping

¹⁴ Morton (2006)

missions also address matters related to SALW from different perspectives.

5. *Comprehensive approach*

Addressing SALW issues requires a wide range of technical skills. From international and domestic law to hands-on policing, and from collection of arms to academic research and policy analysis, civil society groups have to develop comprehensive context-specific approaches to be able to play their role in decision-making processes and actual implementation of policies. No single organization can do this on its own. A look at the composition of various SALW networks shows that the movement has been able to pull together disparate strands of activism together to focus on SALW policy work. IANSA, for example, is a member organisation whose main mandate is to promote the gender component in the debate on SALW along with de-mining organization. The strength of the movement lies not in single-issue advocacy but in its diversity to tackle a complex, multi-faceted problem.

2.2 Initiatives by state actors/governments in the Horn of Africa

For a region characterised by conflict, poverty and recurring humanitarian crises, the Horn of Africa has a remarkable record of cordial and cooperative interstate relations. In fact, outright inter-state conflicts, compared to the rampant intra-state conflicts, are relatively rare in the Horn.¹⁵ Over the last decade, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and the Sudans have launched several initiatives to boost trade, manage resources and infrastructure jointly, and maintain cross-border peace and security.

Besides steps taken under the auspices of IGAD and the AU, bilateral and multilateral cooperation among Horn states is also on the rise.

Below is a brief description of some of the key bilateral and multilateral initiatives taken by different states in East Africa and the Horn that signify a trend of growing cooperation among the states in the region. This is by no means an exhaustive list but a pointer to a trend emerging over the last ten years or so. While only some of these initiatives have the primary goal to increase peace and stability, there

is hope and will that they will have the secondary effects of building confidence among states in the Horn, raising the cost of interstate conflict, and creating incentives to maintain peaceful borders.

The Lamu Port Project: Joint resource management and infrastructure development

The Lamu Port Project was initially conceived by Kenya in 1975 but was shelved due to lack of financial resources and operational feasibility.¹⁶ It was revived in 2009 as part of Kenya's Vision 2030 plans and renamed as the Lamu Port and Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET).¹⁷ Estimated to cost around 30 billion US dollars, the centrepiece of the project is a 30-berth port in Lamu and an oil pipeline through South Sudan. The project will connect Kenya's Lamu coast and Isiolo with Juba in South Sudan and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia through a railway line. The main pieces of infrastructure in the project include:

- A port at Manda Bay, Lamu, Kenya
- Railway track to Juba, South Sudan
- Road network connecting 3 countries
- Oil pipelines to the port through South Sudan and Ethiopia
- Oil refinery in Kenya
- Three airports

In addition to its economic dimension, this ambitious plan, if completed, will be an example of joint resource and infrastructure management by three countries. Even so, the project is not without its critics. There are fears that the project will displace tens of thousands of people, exacerbate the marginalization that has led to ethnic tensions in Kenya, and degrade marine environments essential to local livelihoods. Although Kenya leads the process and houses its secretariat, LAPSSET is of immense significance to the landlocked South Sudan and Ethiopia as it will give them access to the Lamu Port. As a Chatham House report notes, "there is a recognized potential for enhancing regional economic interdependence through the development of transport corridors to sea ports, the management of shared water resources and improved energy security".¹⁸

It remains to be seen if this interstate interdependence will also result in lowering the level of

¹⁵ Bereketeab (2013)

¹⁶ Rugoiyo (2010)

¹⁷ For the full project see: Kasuku (2012)

¹⁸ Healy (2011)

intra-state conflict in South Sudan as the regions through which the railway and oil pipeline are planned to run are highly volatile and will pose serious impediments to the construction project.

East Africa Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organisation

The presence of transnational ethnic groups and movement of people across state borders in the Horn of Africa have been sources of tension and even armed conflicts. It is not surprising then that 11 East and Greater Horn countries decided in 2001 to set up the East Africa Police Chiefs' Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) to prevent cross-border crimes and undertake joint investigations and operations. Established in Kampala, EAPCCO comprises police chiefs from Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Eritrea, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Djibouti, and the Seychelles.

The four core areas of cooperation include human trafficking, drug trafficking, vehicle theft, and illicit trade of small arms and light weapons.¹⁹ Over the last few years, however, counterterrorism has become the top priority for this regional police organisation, which meets at least once a year.

Conflict mediation and peacekeeping in Abyei

The presence of a 4200-strong Ethiopian military contingent in the Sudanese Abyei region is a unique case of peacekeeping where both parties to a conflict requested one country to send its forces under a UN resolution. Almost immediately following South Sudan's independence in 2011, the question of joint control over the Abyei region became a source of tension and potential conflict. According to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Abyei area was to be administered under the two Sudans' joint presidency until its final status was determined by a referendum. As both North Sudanese and South Sudanese were present in the region, skirmishes between the two raised fears of a full-blown conflict.

Ethiopian mediation paved the way for an agreement between Sudan and the new South Sudan. According to the agreement, signed on 20 June 2011 in Addis Ababa by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir Maryadit,

Northern and Southern forces were replaced by an Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA), composed exclusively of Ethiopian troops. The arrangement was given UN sanction on 23 June 2011 when the USA submitted a resolution authorizing a peacekeeping mission of Ethiopian troops. Under the agreement, ISFA is expected to pave the way for a temporary administration and police force for Abyei, pending a final resolution of the status of the area.

Ethiopian mediation has also been instrumental in bringing the two countries together to sign a set of agreements of cooperation in September 2012.

The Djibouti-Ethiopia deals

In terms of size and influence, multi-ethnic Ethiopia and Somali-dominated Djibouti are at two extremes. While the former has a huge territorial and population advantage in the region, Djibouti's strategic significance is due to its port which at present offers the only direct sea access to Ethiopia for trade. Currently, 70% of all trade through Djibouti involves movement of goods into and from Ethiopia. In 2009-10, for example, more than 11 million tons of cargo went through its port into Ethiopia.²⁰ Which is why, instead of hostility or competition, the two countries have been developing closer economic cooperation.

Since 2011, Ethiopia has been exporting more than 20 megawatts of electricity to Djibouti. At the beginning of the year 2013, the two countries have also signed a contract to construct a pipeline supplying drinking water to Djibouti.²¹

Ethiopia will soon begin the construction of a railway line connecting the two countries, upgrading the old colonial period 781 km track between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. The construction of the railway is a key component of Ethiopia's train expansion plans to establish a series of eight rail corridors 4,744 km creating a series of key trade routes to neighbouring Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and – crucially – to Djibouti's port.²²

2.3 Initiatives by continental and sub-regional intergovernmental actors

The progress towards peace, stability and growth in the Horn of Africa has undoubtedly been helped along by the regional structures of Africa, focused mainly

19 Candia (2013)

20 Index Mundi (2013)

21 Davison (2011)

22 Condensed from <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130309/chinese-railway-ethiopia-replace-historic-french-line>

on economic integration, export and trade promotion and development. While there is clear support for the view that trade and economic integration are beneficial for and possibly critical to regional peace and security, it remains true that organizations like the East African Community (EAC) or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are “not necessarily the right forum to tackle conflict and insecurity”.²³ The two organizations with a clear mandate for continental and regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa are the AU and IGAD respectively. The section below focuses on these two bodies with particular attention paid to IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism.

The African Union – The African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established by the AU in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities. Since 2002, it has grown to include a Peace and Security Council (PSC), an African Standby Force (ASF), a Continental Early Warning System and the Peace Fund. The APSA should, when fully operational, provide means for the AU to tackle conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict work. The eventual aim is for the Continental Early Warning System to analyze information from across the continent to trigger discussion (e.g. in the AU Peace and Security Council) and a possible intervention (e.g. from the AU Commission, the AU Chair, the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, AU political offices in country or even the African Standby Force).

Although the architecture looks impressive, its operational record is patchy. As Alex Vines of Chatham House summarizes: “AU-deployed missions have been fully dependent on external donors; harmonization is a major problem; serious questions remain over AU capacity; and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are developing at a quicker pace than the AU”.²⁴ He goes on to say that politics in AU member states continues to hold APSA back from realization of its goals. Even so, APSA has demonstrated its potential with the qualified successes of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU

High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AU-HIP), discussed below.

The way the AU is structured means that all crises including operations sit under the Peace and Security Department (PSD), reporting to the AU Chairperson who subsequently reports to the Peace and Security Council.

The Peace and Security Council, modelled on the UN Security Council, has 15 member states from five regions, elected by rotation (three from Central Africa; three from East Africa; two from North Africa; three from Southern Africa; and four from West Africa). PSC membership is important because their decisions almost always become AU decisions, which then get discussed by the UN Security Council as an African position. The PSC often takes recommendations from the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms as well.

In January 2004, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the Policy Framework for the African Standby Force and it was approved by the African Head of State in July 2004. It was intended to provide the AU with a means of responding to conflict in a manner that was timely and efficient. Further, it provided Africa with a common position and action plan for the development of its Peace Support Operations capacity, for the first time.


Currently, Africa’s five regions are in the process of setting up their regional standby forces and agreeing on issues of harmonization and standardization between them. The deadline for operationalisation has been pushed back three times, and is currently 2015. The East African Standby Force has announced that its 10 active members are capable of mobilizing troops for immediate deployment in crisis situations, but cannot do so until 2015 in line with African Union policy.²⁵ Apart from the military component of the ASF, there has been some progress in the development of the police components, but progress has been slow on the civilian component side. The AU will also need to be able to address the civilian crisis management element of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (police, rule of law, etc.).

In spite of the many challenges of building the APSA, AU and IGAD policymakers point to a number of initiatives they qualify as successes, discussed

²³ Conciliation Resources (2011)

²⁴ Vines (2013)

Principal Institutions of the African Peace and Security Architecture²⁷



below.²⁶ Although some of these initiatives are controversial, each example provides evidence of the ability of the regional economic communities to agree and take action.

AMISOM

On 19 January 2007, the AU PSC authorized the deployment of AMISOM. The mission has been controversial in some quarters, with many observers pointing out civilian casualties, human rights violations and high costs. Still, the AU was able to prove that it could deploy and sustain troops (with the help of partners) in dangerous and difficult situations where no other international organization would deploy.

Further, policymakers claim AMISOM and Somali government forces have been able to make considerable gains against the militant group al-Shabab, providing space for the conclusion of the political transition and the establishment of the new federal government. The UN Security Council also continues to rely on AMISOM as the lead international peace operation for Somalia, even as UN presence in the country has grown.

The AU is also prepared to deploy troops in similar missions in when necessary and AMISOM has provided a blueprint for financing and deploying such future operations. Challenges remain for future AU operations, including sustainable financing and a lack of logistical capacity and equipment in AU

troop contributing countries. Nevertheless, the AU aspires to continue to deploy peace support operations in the future.

AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan

In March 2009, the AU established a high-level panel on Darfur, headed by three former African presidents: Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Abdulsalami Abubaker (Nigeria) and Pierre Buyoya (Burundi). Its original mandate was to investigate and recommend policies to achieve peace, reconciliation and justice in Darfur. The panel undertook wide consultations in Darfur and produced its report in October 2009. The AU Peace and Security Council then re-mandated the same three former presidents as the AU High-Level Implementation Panel to oversee the implementation of the recommendations on Darfur, promote democratization, assist in the implementation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and facilitate post-referendum negotiations.

Since then President Mbeki and his panel have patiently engaged with the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, and worked to engineer a compromise including the resumption of oil production and creation of de-militarized buffer zone 10km north and south of the contested border, that nobody thought the UN would have been capable of. While many observers have pointed out a lack of progress on many of the recommendations, the panel did demonstrate

²⁵ Oluoch (2013)

²⁶ Series of interviews by Life & Peace Institute with regional policymakers

the utility of the AU vis-à-vis other institutions that could have taken the lead. AU involvement was free from some of the laborious political processes that would have taken place through the UN. A common AU position was easier to agree than one between permanent members of the UN Security Council. In addition, Mbeki and Abubakar were able to negotiate directly with both President Kiir and President Bashir as equals. The members of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel are respected by other leaders across Africa, and this trust gave them more freedom to negotiate than a UN official would have had. Finally, the AU held more equity in the decision-making, and were able to make the case that a resolution of various issues would strengthen Africa.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGAD was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Its broad mandate is to coordinate efforts of its Member States (including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Eritrea (currently suspended) in achieving peace, prosperity and regional integration. It does this through a series of interrelated activities, collectively housed in three different divisions: the Agriculture and Environment Division, the Economic Cooperation and Social Development Division, and the Peace and Security Division, all supported by an Administration and Finance Division. Within the Peace and Security Division, an elaborate peace and security architecture is starting to emerge. This architecture is grounded in a combination of legal documents (e.g. The Protocol Establishing the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) and institutions created by the agreement establishing the IGAD. Collectively, these mechanisms reflect the aspirations of member states for mutual security.

This emerging peace and security architecture fits within and or is reflected in the broader frameworks of the UN and the AU. Essentially, it includes institutions whose core functions relate to peace and security and those whose auxiliary activities influence peace and security decisions.

The architecture envisioned is as follows:

- IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government
- IGAD Council of Ministers
- IGAD Committee of Ambassadors

- IGAD Program of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR)
- The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which was established by Protocol and has an elaborate structure reaching out to all the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) in each member state
- IGAD Civil Society Forum (IGAD-CSO Forum)
- IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IGAD-IPU)
- IGAD Women’s Desk
- IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP)
- IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI)
- Panel of the Wise
- Mediation Support Unit (MSU), under which the Somali Facilitation Office and the Office for the Special Envoy for South Sudan fall

While it has many sceptics, IGAD has managed a few successes in its short life. The most prominent example is the Sudan Peace Process, which culminated in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Through this Agreement, calm was brought to Sudan, and South Sudan was created as a new nation following a series of meetings, resolutions and agreements mediated by Kenya. In 2004, IGAD started to involve itself in Somalia and continues to-date, through the Somalia Facilitation Office.

When the conflict in South Sudan broke out in December 2013, IGAD quickly moved in to secure a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and lead the way in facilitating peace talks between the warring parties in South Sudan. Despite its role in regional peacebuilding, IGAD faces an uphill battle in securing sustainable funding to build its institutional capacity and ensuring its continued relevance to all member states.

CEWARN

Both policymakers and observers highlight the CEWARN as one of IGAD’s most successful programs targeted at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts among its member states. CEWARN has played an active role in the development of the AU’s Continental Early Warning System, and has been lauded as a model by the AU for other Regional Economic Communities.

CEWARN, which houses an elaborate local information collection network, was initially established to collect and document information on cross-border and related pastoral conflicts. Over the years, CEWARN has expanded its mandate to include collection of information on virtually all conflicts in the region. In terms of its operations, CEWARN partners with organizations in each IGAD member state to act as national research institutes and supervise field monitors. There is a regional hub in Addis Ababa to collect, analyze, and share the data, as well as support capacity building in the different member states. Each member state also has a Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWARU) integrated into its government, with representatives of relative ministries and security bodies, as well as other relevant leaders. They are responsible for country response initiatives.

Unlike other research bodies, member states claim ownership over CEWARN and hence have a responsibility to listen to their analysis. While it works at the local level and within the structures of member states, CEWARN has a mandate to lift up findings

beyond the national conversation to a regional platform. CEWARN has increased awareness among regional stakeholders of the intensity and magnitude of cross-border pastoralist conflicts, and as noted above, is building capabilities to monitor a broad-range of other conflict-inducing variables. It has managed to bring together state and non-state actors together to work towards addressing these violent conflicts.

CEWARN is not without its challenges. Pastoralist conflicts were selected as its pilot focus because sharing security information is so sensitive. The current strategic plan is to expand beyond pastoralist conflict and look at other serious sources of conflict. It remains to be seen whether member states' concerns on information sharing can be overcome. Even regarding pastoralism, there is much frustration that CEWARN is unable to compel action. Many observers complain that early warning does not mean early response – or prevention.

Section 2 examined the existing (past and present) regional peacebuilding initiatives by both state/interstate and non-state actors. This section will look at what remains to be done in this field. Of course,

3. Peacebuilding Needs and Gaps in the Horn of Africa

Needs/Gaps in Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa




Figure 4 Needs/Gaps mentioned by 21 organisations participating in interviews and workshops

the peacebuilding needs and gaps in the Horn of Africa depend on the vantage point of the analyst. The tools, capacity, and mandates of civil society versus governments in the region are very different. There is a lot of analysis that looks at how regional bodies, governments, and donors can promote peace in the region, but the role of civil society is often absent or relegated to a few sentences. This section will focus on the role of civil society, and relevant needs, gaps and opportunities in the region that they can address.

Learning and sharing

The interviews with non-state actors in the region (discussed in depth in section 2) revealed that although a variety of themes were mentioned, learning and documentation was identified as a key need for civil society organizations in the region (see figure 4). Grouped with coordination and monitoring and evaluation, a large majority of organisations mentioned the need for knowledge management and networking. Many specifically called for civil society networks to be built across the region. They felt that as part of regional networks, they would have more leverage with regional bodies such as the AU and IGAD. They also believed networks would facilitate the sharing of knowledge across organizations who work in similar areas and also serve as coordinating bodies to prevent duplication of programming.

These views are not uncommon. Maina and Razia write about “unnecessary duplication of peacebuilding activities and unhealthy rivalry between and among many peacebuilding actors ...”²⁸ in the Mano River region. Ramsbotham also discusses the value of networks by citing Conciliation Resources’ support for a Regional Civil Society Task Force in East and Central Africa as an example, which facilitated “traditional, religious and civil leaders from affected countries to join together to combine and amplify their voice and capacity regionally”,²⁹ and there are many more.

It does seem to be true that there are limited platforms for civil society to share knowledge and expertise across the Horn of Africa (even in much-maligned “talk shops”). Many of the networks interviewed were issue-specific, such as the All African Conference of Churches or the East African

Sub-regional Support initiatives for the Advancement of Women (EASSI).

There is room for networks focused on knowledge sharing for peacebuilding. Some of the participating organizations in the CEWARN network complained that while they fed information in, they were unable to get information out on pastoralist conflicts. Small, local civil society organizations had fewer opportunities for exchange than larger international organizations and they also exhibited a need for access to learning, sharing and documentation networks. But even international organizations claimed a lack of opportunity, time and funding for lesson learning, even across their own country programs.

Although lesson learning, documentation and sharing is a clear gap in the Horn of Africa, building networks can be expensive and time-consuming. Organisations talked about their difficulties in sharing lessons across their membership, and the political rifts that crept into their work. This challenge is sometimes exacerbated by the tendency of the international community to see civil society as “a counterweight to governments, a role to which many of their partners did not aspire”,³⁰ and assume that network building will create this dynamic. Van Leeuwen’s analysis of the Great Lakes suggests that one approach to overcoming this challenge is “fostering...regional identification between civil society organization, rather than assuming it”. He proposes that the “sharing of similar experiences is...more important than exchanging dissimilar views on what the conflict is about”, quoting Galtung to “let one thousand conferences blossom”.³¹

Furthermore, networks should not be seen as a panacea for fixing regional peacebuilding. From lack of funding to internal dynamics among organizations in a network, to lack of administrative capacity, networks face several challenges; the organizations that mentioned learning and documentation as a gap, and a key need, were networks themselves.

Monitoring and evaluation

Building organizational capacity for monitoring and evaluation was cited repeatedly as a need in the mapping research. The demand for improving monitoring and evaluation in peacebuilding is not

²⁷ From EIIPD Desk Review on the AU and EASF

²⁸ Maina and Razia (2012)

²⁹ Ramsbotham (2012)

³⁰ Leeuwen (2008)

unique to the Horn of Africa, and it goes hand in hand with the desire to improve lesson learning and documentation. Organizations all over the world want to improve their ability to measure and show impact, and their donors demand it. While peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation is a challenge, there is an opportunity to build the capacity of civil society in the Horn on monitoring and evaluation, which will improve their results and facilitate lesson sharing with other organizations.

Coverage of conflicts

In the desk review and interviews, and as seen in section two, it was notable that the certain conflict areas are getting much more attention – and funding – from civil society organizations, networks, donors, and regional bodies. For example, many organisations and all regional bodies are working in the Sudans on a variety of themes and on multiple levels, from pastoralist conflicts in the border regions to an official peace process under AU auspices. The organisations reviewed also had long-established work on the pastoralist conflicts in the Karamoja cluster, and a great deal of work was done on conflict prevention during recent Kenyan elections.

This is not to suggest that there are no gaps in addressing peacebuilding needs in the Sudans, the Karamoja cluster, or Kenya. Both the organizations themselves and other analyses confirm that more work is desperately needed in these areas. In the 2012 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) East Africa Conflict Assessment, for example, expansion of USAID’s work in pastoralist conflicts in border regions, including the Karamoja cluster, was recommended, as was peacebuilding at all levels in the Sudans and Kenya.

However, certain conflicts in the region were rarely or never mentioned by the civil society organization participating in this review. Few peacebuilding civil society organizations participating in the review mentioned working in Somalia, or in Somaliland and Puntland, and those that did were mainly international NGOs. Since the interviews were conducted in Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Kampala, this may explain part of it (although it came up rarely in the desk review as well), but it would be worth exploring the role civil society organizations play in peacebuilding in Somalia.

Further, despite many of the interviews being conducted in Addis Ababa, apart from some work

on pastoralist conflict on Ethiopia’s borders, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea came up in the review – indicating that there is a gap in peacebuilding coverage in these areas as well. In spite of this need, there are limited opportunities for intervention for a variety of reasons. Most analysis of these conflicts suggests potential roles for regional bodies and the international community, but not for civil society.

In addition to a deeper exploration of the role of civil society in these conflicts, another opportunity is for civil society to engage with regional bodies that are working in these areas. Many organizations interviewed were interested in engaging the AU and IGAD, and these bodies could potentially facilitate more civil society involvement in the regions with less civil society peacebuilding coverage. However, the organizations talked about being unsure how to go about appropriate and useful engagement with regional bodies. This may be an opportunity for capacity building and network building.

Analysis

One of the most surprising results from the interviews was the fact that very few of the organizations conducted any analysis prior to programming. While some of the think tanks were exceptions to this, their main mandate is analysis which they do not generally use to develop peacebuilding programs (although other organizations may). In the rare instances when organizations that implemented peacebuilding programs on the ground did analysis, it was generally basic to develop a baseline, include in a donor report/proposal or occasionally a needs assessment. One organization said its analysis for the work it does in pastoralist communities along a border had not been updated since 2006. Most organizations were aware of the gap this lack of analysis creates in their understanding and therefore their programming.

Although only two organizations specifically identified analysis as a gap, when questioned about this during the interviews, nearly all organizations expressed a desire for capacity building and particular funding. Even so, during validation workshops some organizations remained sceptical on the utility of analysis, seeing themselves as “doers” rather than analysts. Some saw it as the role of donors to bring in international consultants to undertake any analysis, while others believed that they did not need analysis to design appropriate interventions because they live in the communities where they work.

With only some exceptions, the analysis done at the organization level is generally not published and is therefore not easily accessible. There are examples of organizations using analysis as a peacebuilding process in and of itself rather than a programming tool, like LPI's Participatory Action Research (PAR) process³² and, the work done in the Great Lakes with high-level leaders by the Burundi Leadership Training Program; but none at the regional level in the Horn of Africa.

At the regional and national levels, there are many analyses of the Horn of Africa. For example, the AU has full-time analysts providing regular briefings to AU officials – they often draw from external analysis – and there are some African think tanks and academic institutes which can be counted on for quality regional analysis.

The African analysis is complemented by analysis from research organizations all over the world especially from the US and Europe. However, while much of it is based on analysis of what people are saying in the region and relies on contributions from African policymakers, activists and academics, policymakers in national governments and regional bodies can be sensitive to criticism from perceived outsiders. Further, even if a substantial proportion of such scholarship is concerned with developing policy advice for international donor governments (or perhaps this is also the problem), many countries in the region do not welcome highly politically sensitive studies.

In spite of all of these contributions, some observers contend that while there are many analysts, scholars, and organizations researching specific conflicts in the Horn, there is a shortage of expertise on the Horn of Africa as a region. Analysts noted that because so many issues are politically sensitive, it is difficult to get reliable and accurate data and to interview policymakers. There is a great deal of secrecy particularly around military and political affairs. At the validation workshops, there were calls for more constructive engagement between governmental and nongovernmental actors on research and analysis.

Implementation and Response

Another gap evidently of concern to civil society organizations in the region is a lack of policy implementation, and closely related, a lack of response to

early warning. Organizations in interviews talked about policy successes that they had achieved, particularly with regional bodies but also national governments, only to find that the policies were not implemented, and no change was seen on the ground. A repeated example of this was CEWARN's excellent early warning system often failing to lead to any response. Civil society organizations seemed to be disillusioned with policy work, especially in the sense of pushing for new and/or improved policies, and many called for a focus on implementation of already adopted policies instead.

Organizations recognized that this would take painstaking work not only with the member governments of the AU and IGAD, but also with national government, local government, and local communities. The recognition of this implementation gap, and the willingness to work with governments to address it, is a major – albeit daunting and complex – opportunity to work with civil society. Clearly, implementation also requires political will on the part of relevant policy-makers. Further analysis will be required to determine the key implementation gaps, where there is scope for cooperation between government and civil society, and policy areas where headway may be made. There may be some “quick wins” to start with, before moving into more politically sensitive areas such as responses to early warnings.

Governance and gender

Some of the themes identified as needs were fairly generic (e.g. governance, gender, women). While clearly important and impossible to disagree with, they are also difficult to pinpoint. Organizations were working on electoral violence, but few other projects or programmes that could be classified as governance came up in the interviews and desk review. Paul Williams' conflict analysis of the Horn lists governance as a key cross-cutting issue and specifies that governments in the region have not “facilitated genuine space in which civil society groups can flourish”.³³ It may be that civil society organizations have not been able to do substantial work on governance issues and are unable to be more specific about governance needs. Opportunities to work on governance likely vary by country and by type of project, so further information is required. A first step

³¹ Leeuwen (2008, 422)

³² PAR is an approach to generating a deeper understanding of a conflict system through the direct participation of communities affected by the conflict, in a way is reflective and guided by a research methodology, in order to inform action that would direct the conflict transformation process. More can be found at www.life-peace.org

could be sharing information among organizations on where and how they have found the space to work on politically sensitive governance issues.

Another generic theme identified as a need and gap is work on gender or specifically with women. Although gender programming can be considered much broader than working with women, most organizations used these terms interchangeably. Organizations referred to both women's representation, as well as projects that addressed violence against women. Although a lot of organizations were working with women, they still felt that there were not enough women involved in many aspects of peace and security issues in the region. This included the lack of representation of women in civil society organizations – including some of those interviewed. It was indeed noticeable that many of the analyses reviewed for this paper relegated references to women's inclusion to discussions about civil society or referred to them mainly as victims of conflict. The recognition by civil society organizations that they are not doing enough to ensure meaningful inclusion of women even internally is a good opportunity and a starting point for further discourse.

SALW and community conflict

SALW and community conflict are grouped together because both were frequently mentioned themes in the review of the current projects of organizations in the Horn, while also being mentioned as a needs or gaps. Work in the region on SALW has been widely considered a success and a model partnership between government and civil society (see case study in section 2). Still, those interviewed believed that while much had been achieved, there is still a lot more work to do on SALW especially on linking it up with regional security structures. A regional expert interviewed thought that this may be because civil society feels that their work on SALW has been co-opted by governments to an extent that they have been shut out of the process.

Even so, the USAID East Africa Conflict Assessment finds the availability of cheap small arms to be an important factor in the region's conflict, and the problem remains. The networks built for civil society and government to partner on the issue still exist, and offer platforms to carry forward work on SALW and open a dialogue about the continuing role of civil society.

Many organizations believed that there was not enough focus on communal conflict, and almost every analysis of the Horn of Africa includes threats from pastoralist conflicts along the borders. Yet the organizations interviewed were working largely on pastoralist conflicts, more at the community level than at any other level. It may be that organizations working at this level recognize the sheer amount of work that needs to be done at the community level. Nonetheless, there does appear to be recognition and focus on pastoralist conflict by funders, national governments and regional bodies.

This raises the question of whether there is enough focus on community conflict beyond pastoralist conflict. It also raises the question of why organizations working at the community level are not linking projects to higher levels. Beginning to document the types of ongoing projects at community level is a good starting place, along with building networks among organization interested in addressing pastoralist conflict at multiple levels.

Terrorism

The conflict analysis coming out of major donor governments to the Horn of Africa and the AU identifies terrorism and violent extremism as a serious threat to regional stability. The problem of terrorism has a global reach, but varies considerably by country. Somalia is the hardest hit by the problem, but Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have experienced terrorism fairly recently. Most threats in recent times have come from the Somali extremist group al-Shabab, and two major cross-border military campaigns have taken place as a result. Still, the role of civil society plays in addressing terrorism appears to be limited. It may be that civil society organizations in the Horn do not want to venture into such a globally political territory. But it is also likely that they have been affected by the same politicization and securitization of aid that has affected humanitarian INGOs who have been sounding the alarm about shrinking humanitarian space in Somalia.³⁴ It would be useful to understand the impact of these trends on local civil society.

³³ Williams (2011)

4. Closing reflections: An indicative way forward

Though not exhaustive, this mapping is a representation and overview of the state of regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa as carried out primarily by civil society organizations. The findings of the study present some of the strategies and lessons learned from civil society, government and intergovernmental actors engaged in regional peacebuilding. The report further provides a sketch of the challenges and gaps in regional peacebuilding in the Horn, as identified by civil society actors. But more importantly, it presents thought-provoking realities that call for reflection and action from peacebuilders in the region. In light of these findings, LPI would like to make three broad suggestions for the way forward for regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa, rather than providing specific recommendations for each major finding. As most of the peacebuilding actors reviewed in this study are CSOs, most of the recommendations are targeted to CSOs. LPI is forwarding these ideas to the “peacebuilding family” in the Horn of Africa, of which it is a member. LPI thus does not see itself as different from the CSOs; hence it is with this understanding that the following ways forward are suggested.

1. On the meaning of regional peacebuilding

As one of the key findings of this research reveals, there is neither a clear definition, nor a vision of what regional peacebuilding means in the context of the Horn of Africa. Setting a vision and common objective of regional peacebuilding is crucial for more reasons than disentangling the conceptual challenge of defining regional peacebuilding. It is essential because peacebuilding in the Horn is an ambitious task that requires coordination. Regional peacebuilding can perhaps be likened to one big puzzle where the peacebuilding actors in the region are working on different, smaller pieces. However, for the pieces to fit together and add up in a meaningful and logical way, the actors have to agree on, share and own the overall picture of the puzzle onset.

This lack of a common understanding or shared vision of regional peacebuilding is one of the reasons why civil society finds it difficult to coordinate

its peacebuilding efforts. Hence, first and foremost, the meaning and vision of regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa should be clearly defined under a certain time frame and it should be widely shared among peacebuilding actors. Given the dynamic nature of the region, however, the vision of regional peacebuilding cannot be expected to be static; it can change depending on emerging and altering factors.

Currently, most organizations agree that there is a need for a common understanding of regional peacebuilding, but the question of how and where to start building this common understanding remains unsettled and unresolved. While there may not be a ready-made recipe for how to go about it, it is clear that regional peacebuilding for the Horn of Africa needs to be defined by peacebuilding actors themselves. One way could be to use existing shared peace frameworks such as IGAD CEWARN’s strategic framework in which the vision or “Big Prize” is “an IGAD region in which conflicts are resolved peacefully and justly and whose peoples live in shared prosperity”³⁵. Another possibility is to find other appropriate forums or mechanisms where peacebuilders from the Horn can come together to arrive at a new consensus on a contextualized and appropriate vision of regional peacebuilding.

2. On coordinated and strategic peacebuilding

Regardless of how regional peacebuilding is concretely defined, it needs to be well coordinated to tackle a complex conflict system like the Horn of Africa. The coordination should be among CSOs, between CSOs and governmental/intergovernmental organizations, as well as with short-term and mid-to-long term initiatives. In order to effectively address the peacebuilding needs in the Horn, peacebuilding responses should be holistic, inclusive, multi-level and short as well as long-term. Such an integrative form of peacebuilding is well captured in the theory and praxis of “strategic peacebuilding” which “... recognizes the complexity of the tasks required to build peace... [where] resources, actors, and approaches are synchronized to accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues for the long term”³⁶.

³⁴ See ODI (2011) or Mungcal (2012).

³⁵ CEWARN (2012)

While there is a growing realization among peacebuilding CSOs in the Horn and elsewhere that peacebuilding is a collaborative, concerted effort, there is little literature in the field on how coordination can actually be realized. In order to fill this gap, the peacebuilding field can learn from the humanitarian field which has a better developed a culture of coordinating emergency response/humanitarian assistance geographically but also programmatically (in terms of linking emergency response with development programmes (livelihood programme for example), and division of labour among organizations based on mandate, resources and expertise. A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on (UN led) humanitarian coordination sets forth seven critical ingredients to coordination analysis, strategy and plan, standards, division of labour, advocacy and monitoring and evaluation³⁷ – most of which have been touched upon as gaps and needs for regional peacebuilding. These components of coordination are good ways to start thinking about what strategic peacebuilding for the Horn could mean and how it could be operationalised. They are thus applied to peacebuilding below.

Analysis is not only a prerequisite for effective peacebuilding programming where the different actors of the conflict, levels, causes and forces of the conflict are thoroughly assessed, but it is also how in the process of coordinating peacebuilding, common goals are identified and set. Once there is adequate information on the dynamics of the conflict system, a regional peacebuilding vision can be painted. Coordinating activities, setting priorities and building peace will be superficial without analysis and a deeper and thorough understanding of the conflict system conducted at the organizational level but also at the regional level.

As this mapping research revealed, very few organizations do a thorough conflict analysis that goes beyond needs assessment, before peacebuilding interventions. While program reports and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports are prerequisite for funding and are therefore part of program outputs, conflict analysis is not always a funding requirement. Though it is the heart of peacebuilding praxis, conflict analysis has increasingly become more of an optional task and less understood as one of the core standards for good peacebuilding.

Perhaps this calls for reflection from CSOs in the region as to whether or not peacebuilding has become just another “business” where it is caught in organizational bureaucracy, and donor-led technical programming in lieu of its value-driven history? This is also a point that speaks to the **standards** element of coordination; what drives peacebuilding today? Is it the availability of funds or the need on the ground? What are the values, principles or standards by which peacebuilding actors operate?

Strategy and plan is another critical element of how coordination can work. It is concurrent with the first recommendation about having a common vision of regional peacebuilding and is similar to the idea of the “moral imagination” where a shared vision is set.

Further, **division of labour** is also a wise strategy for enhancing efficiency and optimizing comparative advantages in coordination. Strategic regional peacebuilding requires capitalizing on the expertise, lessons learned, resources and opportunities of each CSO. In the case of the Horn of Africa, there seems to have been a lack of division of labour among CSOs. In fact, in the struggle to secure funding for programming, it seems like what Schirch has identified as “Ideological difference, ego-driven efforts to monopolize peacebuilding program, and competition for resources”³⁸ is as endemic in the region as it is globally.

Such a competitive environment where organizations look at each other in suspicion and cannot work together cordially will prove problematic in operationalising regional peacebuilding. In the interviews conducted for this study, most organizations recognized the need to collaborate more and were interested in joining forces. Hence, there needs to be a forum for exchange of ideas, sharing of information and lessons learned, and a reflection by CSOs on their willingness to genuinely collaborate with others in the field in good faith. Practical ways to go about fostering such relationships include effective networks that have more functional than nominal purposes. Collaboration and sharing of information can also be facilitated through the use of technological tools where the profile and resources of organizations can widely be shared. Donors should also understand the utility of networks and be comfortable funding networks, M&E and analysis as part of their support to regional peacebuilding.

³⁶ Schirch (2004)

³⁷ Reindorp and Wiles (2001, 4 – 42)

Advocacy is one way of carrying out vertical coordination where lessons from the ground are carried over to other levels, to effect policy change at national or regional levels. Creating formal spaces for interaction between civil society organization and policy making bodies is one way to realize vertical coordination. In the case of the Horn of Africa, the Livingstone Formula despite its limitations is supposed to encourage interaction between civil society at different levels and regional peace and security policy makers at the AU.

According to this mapping research, many organizations conduct advocacy of some sort, however, advocacy is limited to local or national level advocacy, mostly with track II and III actors. Advocacy is rarely conducted at the regional level or with track I actors.

While lack of structured space for engagement is one explanation, it also questions CSOs understanding of the different levels of change. While bottom-up peacebuilding is key and local ownership vital for peacebuilding success, CSOs, especially those at the local level, should rethink how their work at the local level fits into the bigger “peace writ large” of the Horn of Africa. Granted, not every organization has the expertise and resources to do peacebuilding at all levels (track I, II and III), but organizations should be strategic and identify their part in the regional peacebuilding “puzzle” and coordinate with others who have other, complementary types of resources and expertise to build on their work. Unless such vertical coordination is done through advocacy or other means, the local perspectives, evidences and lessons learned cannot be translated into policy changes and hence cannot have a regional impact that all agree local CSOs have the potential for.

Therefore, it is essential that peacebuilding actors at all levels coordinate their efforts and create channels where analysis and lessons learned flow from grassroots to national and regional levels and vice-versa. This flow of information and complementarities is particularly important since it is one way of ensuring that local ownership – which was identified as a key to success – has trickled up to national or regional peacebuilding interventions. Hence, though grassroots organizations are proximate to local perspectives, organizations at the national and/or regional level are the ones that are closer to the national/regional policy tables; which is why the responsibility of linking up lies with organizations at all levels.

Further, the research findings on lack of engagement with track I or regional actors is indicative of civil society’s perception of power or those with power. It is true that CSOs, especially peacebuilding CSOs, should not neglect their role of “speaking truth to power”. However, this role should not solely subscribe to a “naming and shaming” advocacy strategy; other collaborative means of speaking truth to power are possible and sometimes more strategic. The “us” (civil society) against “them” (policy makers) dichotomy that CSOs are often caught up in does not only defeat the purpose of inclusive peacebuilding but is often unconstructive. Therefore, as key actors, policy makers at various levels should not be omitted from the collaboration and coordination aspect of strategic regional peacebuilding.

Monitoring and evaluation is one tool that facilitates coordination. In a dynamic environment such as the Horn of Africa, programme monitoring and evaluation is essential for learning from peacebuilding work and informing future programming at the organization’s level. M&E is important for identifying effective approaches and to shape what kind of coordination is needed in order to replicate, expand or invent peacebuilding strategies that fit well in the regional context.

3. On conflict and thematic coverage

This mapping study’s findings indicate that certain themes and conflicts have received more attention than others. While availability of funding for some conflicts rather than others and legal restrictions on some countries or themes explain this reality well, CSOs are not free from responsibility.

Funding for one conflict over another can be attributed to the intensity of the conflict, potential spillover effects and relevance for regional disability. However, the significance of the conflict to the geopolitical and economic interests of donors is also a key determinant factor for some donors. Politicized funding and support for peacebuilding which prioritizes the interest of the donor over the real peacebuilding needs compromises the impartiality of peacebuilding organizations and erodes the value-driven culture of peacebuilding. Though this phenomenon does not legitimize the legal restriction imposed on CSOs in some countries based on these types’ arguments, the rationale behind such frameworks should be recognized before anything can be done about it.

Further, there has been little effort made and strategy planned by CSOs to find ways of working in restrictive legal environments or on important yet poorly funded thematic areas. While it is easier to go where space is open, security is replete and money is available, CSOs should also think about what opportunities – even if limited or narrow – remain in such environments that could allow for some sort of peacebuilding work.³⁹ CSOs should also commence the discussion on how to attract new sources of funding as well as innovative peacebuilding ideas that can attract traditional funding.

For regional peacebuilding to be effective, the Horn of Africa needs to be seen as a system, as more than the sum of its individual countries or predominant themes. Hence CSOs should coordinate not only with other CSOs that can work despite narrow operating environments, but also with government and intergovernmental organizations in order to give as full of a coverage of the region as possible.

That said, governments and intergovernmental organizations that have the mandate and a legal responsibility to foster regional peacebuilding in the Horn should also recognize the value-added of civil society and provide a conducive environment for interaction. In addition to providing structured spaces for CS involvement in policy making, governments and intergovernmental organizations in the region should provide clear and reasonable legal environments that regulate yet allow for vibrant and constructive civil society.

Similarly, donors who are also key indirect peacebuilding players in the Horn should understand that strategic peacebuilding is a process that includes short-term emergency response interventions as well as mid to long-term structural change-driven approaches. Both approaches are essential for durable peace. Further, strategic peacebuilding requires that a holistic understanding of a conflict system where every aspect of the system is analyzed and addressed as a whole is pursued. Hence, donors should revisit their contribution to peacebuilding in the Horn and encourage and support peacebuilding interventions that are inclusive of all actors, holistic in their thematic or geographic coverage and comprehensive in their approach (short-term, mid, long-term).

Overall, the findings of the study invite us all peacebuilding actors – state and non state – to ask the question “what are we working towards; what is

the vision we’re trying to realize?”, which can only be answered after an open and inclusive consultation among relevant actors. But establishing that regional vision is just one step of building peace in the Horn of Africa; the other step is to reflect and strategize on how we can reach that vision. Considering the nature of conflicts in the Horn of Africa (complex and dynamic), coordination will be essential for effective regional peacebuilding. Furthermore, coordination should be not only be among civil society organizations working in different regions and themes, across different levels but also between civil society organizations and state actors (local, national or regional). While civil society organizations should be strategic, locating their efforts into the bigger picture (peace writ large), policy makers should also open up space for civil society to thrive and engage in regional peacebuilding.

By adopting a collaborative approach that is neither competitive nor solely confrontational, civil society should work with each other and with policy makers in good faith. Similarly, by establishing platforms that are neither co-optive nor constrictive, government and intergovernmental bodies can find that civil society provide complements to existing state/interstate-led peacebuilding initiatives in the Horn. It is only if and when all relevant actors share a common vision and have joined arms for comradeship in peacebuilding that the tremendous peacebuilding need in the Horn of Africa can be addressed.

Key points:

- **The vision of regional peacebuilding should be clearly defined.** Considering the dynamic, nature of peace and conflict matters in the Horn of Africa, the vision should be time specific and guide the individual and collaborative efforts of regional peacebuilding actors (both CSOs and governmental/intergovernmental agencies)
- **Peacebuilding responses should be coordinated and “strategic”:** holistic, inclusive, multi-level and geared towards short-term as well as long-term needs, in order to effectively address the peacebuilding needs in the Horn.
- **Analysis is not only a prerequisite but an indispensable tool for operationalising regional peacebuilding.** A thorough, broad and systemic assessment of causes, actors and dynamics of a conflict

³⁸ Schirch (2004, 9)

³⁹ Life and Peace Institute (2013)

that goes beyond the local context to locate the conflict in the regional context is an essential part of strategic peacebuilding; it should not be taken as an optional undertaking. Furthermore, analysis is an essential tool for policy making; hence it is an instrument with which civil society actors can influence policy processes.

- **Division of labour is key**; strategic regional peacebuilding requires capitalizing on the expertise, lessons learned, resources and opportunities of each peacebuilding actor. A competitive environment is not only un-strategic but destructive to regional peacebuilding
- **CSOs at all levels should locate themselves in the “peace writ large”** and coordinate with others who have complementary resources and expertise to build on their work and link it to other levels or across themes.
- **“Speaking truth to power”** does not solely prescribe a “naming and shaming” advocacy strategy. Although civil society predominantly pursue more confrontational advocacy, other collaborative means of speaking truth to power are possible and sometimes more strategic.
- **Policy makers should not be omitted** from the collaboration and coordination **aspect of strategic regional peacebuilding**. The “us” (civil society) against “them” (policy makers) dichotomy defeats the purpose of inclusive peacebuilding and is unconstructive.
- **The Horn of Africa needs to be seen as a system**, as more than the sum of its individual countries or predominant themes. Hence, CSOs should coordinate not amongst themselves but also with governmental and intergovernmental actors in order to ensure that areas legally off-limits to civil society led peacebuilding activities, or themes that are either politically sensitive or lack sufficient funding are adequately covered for a comprehensive peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa.
- **Governments and intergovernmental organizations should also understand the value-added of civil society’s contribution** and provide a conducive environment for interaction.
- **Donors should understand that strategic peacebuilding is a process** that includes short-term, emergency response, mid to long-term structural change driven approaches, and a holistic under-

standing of a conflict system. Hence, they should not shy away from funding peacebuilding initiatives that are transformative (rather than reactive). Though long-term peacebuilding approaches may bear less visible/tangible results in the short-run/programme reporting cycle, their contribution to laying the foundation for cultural or structural transformation should not be neglected.

- **Donors can contribute to a strategic regional peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa** by encouraging and supporting peacebuilding interventions that are inclusive of all actors, holistic in their thematic or geographic coverage, and mindful of the various peacebuilding timeframes (short-term, mid, long-term).

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Unpublished documents:

- Desk review on IGAD, prepared by Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, 2013.
- Desk review on AU and East Africa Standby Force, prepared by Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, 2013.

Annex I: List of interviewed organizations from April – September 2013

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Date</i>
<p>Africa Peace Forum (APFO)</p> <p>Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD)</p> <p>All Africa Council of Churches (AACC)</p> <p>Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA)</p> <p>Danish Refugee Council (DRC)</p> <p>Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA)</p> <p>Institute for Security Studies (ISS)</p> <p>Interpeace</p> <p>Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) - Africa</p> <p>Saferworld</p> <p>Seeds of Peace in Africa (SOPA)</p> <p>Sisi Ni Amani Kenya (SNA-K)</p>	Nairobi	<p>Interviews between 23-26 April, 2013</p> <p>Validation workshop on 7 November, 2013</p>
<p>International Alert (IA)</p> <p>Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN)</p> <p>Alpha Media</p> <p>Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)</p> <p>Teso Initiative for Peace (TIP)</p> <p>National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NFP/SALW), Ministry of Internal Affairs,</p> <p>Refugee Law Project (RLP)</p> <p>Centre for Basic Research (CBR), National Research Institute (NRI) for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)</p> <p>Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)</p> <p>Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI)</p>	Kampala	<p>Consultations on 19 April 2014</p> <p>Validation workshop on 16 September 2014</p>

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Date</i>
Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) Isis-Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) Minority Rights Group (MRG) Pastoralism and Poverty Frontiers	(Kampala)	
Femmes African Solidarite (FAS) Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Oxfam InterAfrica Group (IAG) Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD)	Addis Ababa	Interviews between 10-15 April, 2013 Validation workshop conducted on 13 September, 2013

There is a growing understanding among state and non-state peacebuilding actors that addressing the complex system of conflicts in the Horn of Africa warrants coordinated and strategic regional peacebuilding. However, regional peacebuilding is neither clearly defined, nor strategically coordinated in the context of the Horn of Africa.

The findings of this one-year mapping study prompt peacebuilding actors – state and non-state – to take a step back from the specific implementation of local peacebuilding programmes and to jointly envision the peace writ large of the Horn of Africa. It also summons actors to ask what their respective and concerted roles should be in that vision.

By sharing these findings, spurring critical questions and indicating ways forward, the Life & Peace Institute hopes to initiate new discussions and revive old ones. The aim is to set the ground for a common vision, strategic coordination and creative solutions which are necessary for timely and effective peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa.



The Life & Peace Institute (LPI) is an international and ecumenical centre that supports and promotes non-violent approaches to conflict transformation through a combination of research and action that entails the strengthening of existing local capacities and enhancing preconditions for building peace.