Final Report

Summative Evaluation:

Life & Peace Institute
Somalia Programme 2020-2023

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BODHI
GLOBAL ANALYSIS

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Acronyms

CRM	Conflict Resource Management
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease of 2019
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FMS	Federal Member State
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
HDP	Humanitarian Development Peace
IPIP	Inclusive Peace in Practice team
KII	Key Informant Interview
LPI	Life & Peace Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MoIFAR	Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
NBSA	Nabadeynta Beelaha Somaliya
NRF	National Reconciliation Framework
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PAR	Participatory Action Research
SD	Sustained Dialogue
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPA	Somali Public Agenda
SPL	Somali Peace Line
SWSC	Somali Women's Studies Center
SWSO	Somali Women's Solidarity Organization
ToC	Theory of Change
WPP	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding
WYPD	Women and Youth in Peacebuilding and Development
ZZF	Zamzam Foundation

I. Executive Summary

Introduction

In March 2023, LPI, on behalf of LPI and its donors, contracted Bodhi Global Analysis Ltd to undertake a summative evaluation of LPI's Multi-Level Conflict Transformation Programme in Somalia from 2020 to 2023. The evaluation is utilisation-focused to enable learning about programme performance – against the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact – to generate recommendations for LPI to consider in the design of the next phase of strategic engagement in Somalia.

Methodology

Bodhi used qualitative data collection methods, including a desk review and primary data collection through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The use of different data collection methods enabled triangulation of multiple sources of data, ensuring a high level of robustness and reliability to the findings of the evaluation. The team conducted 30 KIIs and 24 FGDs across the nine programme locations, involving 164 participants (54 percent men, 46 percent women), including youth, elders, and persons with disabilities.

Findings

Relevance:

The programme was found to be relevant in Somalia's complex and dynamic conflict system. It is delivering interventions that are well suited to achieve its objectives in the local context, and is meeting community peace and security needs. However, in some areas, socio-economic needs may have hampered peacebuilding gains, raising the need to adopt an Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) triple nexus approach. The much-needed, but short-lived three-month drought emergency response project, confirms the need for more longer-term integrated programming.

Effectiveness:

Overall, the programme made considerable progress towards its intended outcomes, with considerable evidence that target communities are cooperating to manage and reduce conflict, women and youth are participating more, and that local authorities are more engaged. The programme has supported clans to engage in dialogue, reach agreements, and implement those agreements through the support of intra- and inter-clan peace committees. Women and youth, through their own committees, have been highly active, often catalysing dialogue processes which have stopped violence from escalating. Local authorities have become increasingly engaged in community-led efforts, often buttressing and helping to legitimise and enforce agreements.

Impact:

The programme has demonstrably had a positive impact in target locations, changing attitudes, perceptions, and behaviours towards nonviolent conflict management and peaceful co-existence. The programme has contributed to: reducing intra- and inter-clan violence and increasing security in target communities; increased participation and self-confidence among women and youth; peaceful interactions and coexistence between groups; and improved community perceptions of and interactions with local authorities. The evaluation crucially found evidence that elders were increasingly seeing the importance of women and youth participation in local peacebuilding.

However, it also found that despite progress, women and youth still face immense social and cultural barriers to be able to influence dialogues and negotiations meaningfully.

Sustainability:

The vast majority of community leaders and programme participants believe the peace agreements and peace platforms will endure without external support. A key reason given is the improved skills of key community leaders and members, with community leaders and programme participants reporting that they and members of their communities have the skills and experience required to keep the platforms operating. However, several programme participants expressed that the peace agreements and platforms will end without support as community members lack the financial means to undertake activities and attend meetings.

Efficiency:

Overall, the programme was delivered on schedule and within the agreed project budgets as LPI followed important good practices, including:

- Good working relationship with the donor;
- Effective delivery chain, with strong local partners and a community-led approach;
- Flexible and adaptive approach; and
- Effective communication with programme participants.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: LPI should consider adopting a more integrated, multi-dimensional HDP nexus approach in the design of the next programme.

Recommendation 2: LPI should consider developing ToCs per conflict system, rather than per outcome.

Recommendation 3: LPI should aim to establish an inclusive peace platform in all programme target areas, following the Kismayo model.

Recommendation 4: LPI should consider further expanding programme reach into rural areas (where possible due to security).

Recommendation 5: LPI should double down on areas of success, and explicitly capture positive unintended outcomes in its programme ToC.

Recommendation 6: LPI should consider more directly engaging local authorities as beneficiaries, e.g. providing them with training and/or supporting them to lead activities.

Recommendation 7: LPI should continue and strengthen its engagement with other programmes involved in policy making to develop a strategy for joint influencing of donors and FGS/FMS, and to coordinate/collaborate in programme implementation.

Recommendation 8: LPI should develop (or utilise an existing) tool to more regularly and consistently assess the organisational capacity of its local partners and LPI's contributions to capacity strengthening.

Recommendation 9: LPI should develop an M&E and reporting system aligned with the new, area-based ToC.

Recommendation 10: LPI should introduce quantitative surveying into its evaluations to more robustly assess changes in perceptions, attitudes, and norms.

Recommendation 11: LPI should continue to try to raise funds for the programme as a whole, not individual projects.

II. Introduction

II.a Project Background

Life & Peace Institute's (LPI) Somalia Programme 2020-2023, 'Multi-level conflict transformation in South-Central Somalia', aims to contribute to a stable and peaceful Somalia by supporting inclusive reconciliation processes that address local grievances and root causes of conflict. Specifically, the programme aims to contribute to four distinct, yet interlinked outcomes. Each outcome, and its key intended results, is detailed below:

Outcome 1 - Conflict stakeholders on community level use structured, nonviolent and collaborative ways of addressing conflict issues, thereby creating preconditions for peaceful coexistence.

- Conflict actors at community levels employ systematic, nonviolent, and collaborative approaches to conflict resolution, thereby fostering the environment for peaceful coexistence.
- Community dialogue and negotiation aids in resolving intra- and inter clan conflicts at community levels.
- New approaches to conflict resolution are made possible by long-term participation, enhanced trust, and a shared sense of urgency in addressing conflict drivers.

Outcome 2 - Increased inclusion and participation of women, youth, and other marginalised groups in peacebuilding processes.

- Women, young people and traditionally marginalised groups are provided the opportunity and space to engage with each other across clan and other dividing lines.
- Women, young people and traditionally marginalised groups collaborate to address issues driving or resulting from conflict in their communities.
- All stakeholders have increased understanding of the diversity of roles played in peace and conflict.

Outcome 3 - Local authorities proactively support peacebuilding processes.

- Local administrations in programme areas have increased understanding and skills in peacebuilding.
- Improved capacity of diverse civil society to promote positive peace in South Central Somalia.
- Developing constructive channels of communication between community peace stakeholders and municipal administrations.

Outcome 4 - Targeted policy actors on national, regional and international levels take actions to create a more conducive political/governance environment for peace.

- Policy actors at the national, regional, and international levels work to improve the political and governance environment for peace in Somalia.

- LPI and partners have inserted a peacebuilding lens into peace-relevant policy processes.

At the local level, the programme specifically targets clans in Southwest, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Jubbaland states, and in Banadir-Mogaidshu, as well as local authorities and regional state administrations. At the regional and international level (for its policy work), the programme targets donors, international organisations, and relevant national policymakers.

To date, the programme has been delivered in partnership with three Somalia-based civil society organisations: Somali Peace Line (SPL), Zamzam Foundation (ZZF), and Somali Women's Solidarity Organization (SWSO). The programme also supports inter-communal peacebuilding platforms, including women and youth platforms, in the areas of operation. At the end of 2022, LPI collaborated with a new policy-focused partner - Somalia Public Agenda (SPA) - for a new EU-funded project. The new project is titled, "*Inclusive and participatory policy engagement for peace and reconciliation in Somalia*." It aims at advancing peacebuilding and reconciliation through policy processes and policy implementation.

II.b Purpose and Scope of Evaluation

II.b.i. Purpose and Objectives

In March 2023, LPI, on behalf of its donors, contracted Bodhi Global Analysis Ltd to undertake a summative evaluation of LPI's Multi-Level Conflict Transformation Programme in Somalia from 2020 to 2023. The evaluation is utilisation-focused to enable learning about programme performance – against the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact – to generate recommendations for LPI to consider in the design of the next phase of strategic engagement in Somalia.

The evaluation team set out to achieve the following objectives:

1. Determine the extent to which the programme contributed to its overall goal and outcomes objectives, as detailed by the programme's results framework, by identifying, collecting, and analysing evidence of concrete changes in the behaviour of relevant social actors to which the programme contributed;
2. Assess the coherence of the programme design, including the validity of its theory of change as measured against outcomes achieved, using outcomes harvesting;
3. Analyse the relevance of the programme, the sustainability of its outcomes, and the lessons learnt;
4. Determine the extent to which cross cutting issues and principles (intersectional inclusion and participation and conflict sensitivity) were applied; and
5. Assess the present conflict dynamics in the programme's areas of operations, evaluate the intervention's impact on the context, and provide recommendations on further interventions needed to sustain peacebuilding gains.

II.b.ii Scope

The summative evaluation covers the timeframe from the programme's launch to the present (2020-2023), and was undertaken in Somalia, with focus on programme target areas, CSO partners, authorities and communities in the Southwest, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Jubbaland states, and in Banadir-Mogaidshu. The evaluation was utilisation-focused, as it will inform the design of LPI Somalia's next strategy period (2024-2027).

II.c Evaluation Methodology

II.c.i Evaluation Framework

To guide the evaluation, the Bodhi team developed an evaluation matrix which sets out the evaluation questions and their corresponding sub-questions, data sources, and data collection methods. The table below presents an overview of the evaluation questions per criteria - the full evaluation framework with sub-questions are provided in the attached evaluation matrix.

Table 1: Evaluation Framework

Evaluation Question	
A. Relevance:	Considering the current context, to what extent was the programme and its Theory of Change relevant to the dynamic situation in the country?
	To what extent is the programme relevant to the needs of its stakeholders, including partners, platforms, communities, and relevant authorities?
	To what extent are programme partners appropriate to deliver programme activities?
B. Effectiveness:	To what extent did the Somalia programme achieve its intended outputs and outcomes as per the indicators, milestones, and targets set out in its results framework?
	What have been critical factors contributing to or hindering the programme's contribution to expected outcomes, particularly where there are no identified changes?
	What have been policy inputs made by the programme to policy actors on national and international level?
C. Impact:	Which key actors did the programme most influence to change and in which ways?
	What behaviour changes in key actors – both negative and positive, intended and unintended – have occurred to support women and youth inclusion in clan-based peacebuilding initiatives and processes?
D. Efficiency:	To what extent did activities adhere to delivery schedules and budgets?
	How well did the programme team communicate with implementing partners, stakeholders, and programme beneficiaries on its progress?

	Were M&E systems fit for purpose?
	How did the programme adapt to changes in the context and emerging challenges during programme implementation?
E. Sustainability	To what extent did the programme make progress in promoting the sustainability of its outcomes?
	To what extent has the programme created preconditions for the sustainability of community peace agreements?
Cross-cutting	To what extent were gender equality, environmental impact, and conflict sensitivity considerations appropriately integrated into programme design and implementation?
	To what extent did the capacities of LPI and its partners contribute towards (or hinder) programme results?

II.c.ii Data Collection

To answer the research questions, Bodhi used qualitative data collection methods, including a desk review and primary data collection through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The use of different data collection methods enabled triangulation of multiple sources of data, ensuring a high level of robustness and reliability to the findings of the evaluation.

Inception Phase and Desk Review

LPI provided a set of programme documentation to be reviewed as part of the evaluation. The table below details the documentation provided.

Table 2: Documentation reviewed

Document type	Document
Proposals	● Somalia Programme Proposal ● LPI's Somalia Programme Annexes ● LPI's Programme strategies 2020-23
Plans	● Annual Plan 2020 ● Annual Plan 2021 ● Annual Plan 2021 (excel) ● Somalia Programme 2022 Activity Plan ● Somalia Programme 2023 Activity Plan
Reports	● Peace Financing Case Study, V3 ● Key Activities Jan-Dec 2020 ● Key Activities Jan-Dec 2022 ● NBS MTR Report Final ● Somalia Annual Programme Report 2020 ● Somalia Annual Programme Report 2021

	● Somali Annual Programme Report 2022 ● Final Evaluation Report: LPI - MTR Final Report- Pioneer ● LPI-ZZF Emergency Intervention Report ● 392538_TPME II Report_Role of women youth_LPI (002). ● Annex 5 End of Project Evaluation Report for Participatory Peacebuilding and Development in Somalia: The Role of Women and Youth ● Annex 13 LPI - MTR Final Report_Pioneer (2)

Key informant interviews (KIIs)

Interviews were held with individuals most relevant to answering the evaluation questions. Interviews took the form of semi-structured discussions against a discussion guide. Discussion guides were based on a core guide for the respondent type, but tailored to the specific respondent based on their role in the programme. The team conducted 31 interviews (7 women, 24 men) both remotely and in-person with donors, programme staff, private sector partners, community stakeholders and government institutions, as allocated per the table below.

Table 3: KII list

Location	Stakeholder type	Details
Kenya	Donor (Sida)	● Programme Manager – Gender Specialist/Women Peace & Security
Sweden (Uppsala)	LPI	● LPI Executive Director
Somalia (Mogadishu)	LPI	● Country Director ● Senior Programme Advisor ● Programme Advisor
Kenya (Nairobi)	LPI	**Management team** ● Team Leader, Africa Country Programmes ● Director of Programmes **Programme team** ● LPI MEL Process Leader ● Senior Global Policy Advisor (IPIP Focal Person)
IP management and project staff		
Jubbaland (Kismayo)	SWSO	● Executive Director ● Programme Manager
Mogadishu	Somali Peace Line (SPL)	● Programme Manager ● Project Manager
Mogadishu	Zamzam Foundation (ZZF)	● Executive Director ● Project Manager
Government and Community Stakeholders		
Kismayo	Government stakeholders	● 1 x Member of Parliament and Deputy Minister

Kismayo	Community elders	• 1 x Elder
Southwest (Baidoa town)	Government stakeholders	• 1 x Head Of Youth And Administration, Baidoa Municipality
Baidoa town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Balambale town)	Local Authorities	• 1 x Local Authority
Balambale town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Herale town)	Local Authorities	• 1 x Local Authority
Herale town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Abudwak town)	Local Authorities	• 1 x Local Authority
Abudwak town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Guriel town)	Local Authorities	• 1 x Local Authority
Guriel town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Hirshabelle - Hiran Region (Mataban town)	Local Administration	• 1 x Local Authority
Mataban town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder
Middle Shabelle region (Jowhar town)	Local Administration	• 1 x Local Authority
Jowhar town	Community elders	• 1 x Community elder

Focus group discussions

To supplement and triangulate the data collected through KIIs, Bodhi also collected views from programme participants through 24 FGDs. They were conducted across nine programme locations, involving 164 participants (54 percent men, 46 percent women), including youth, elders, and persons with disabilities. Please see the table below for details.

Table 4: FGD list

Location	Stakeholder type (FGD)	Demographics	No. of participants	No. of FGDs per location
Kismayo - Jubbaland	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	5	1 FGD
		Female	2	
	Youth	Male	5	1 FGD

		Female	3	
	Female Community Members	Female	8	1 FGD
Southwest (Baidoa town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	3	1 FGD
		Female	3	
	Youth	Male	3	1 FGD
		Female	4	
	Female Community Members	Female	6	1 FGD
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Balambale town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	5	1 FGD
		Female	1	
	Youth	Male	6	1 FGD
		Female	-	
	Female Community Members	Female	6	1 FGD
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Herale town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	6	1 FGD
		Female	2	
	Youth	Male	6	1 FGD
		Female	-	
	Female Community Members	Female	6	1 FGD
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Abudwak town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	5	1 FGD
		Female	3	
	Youth	Male	3	1 FGD
		Female	3	
	Female Community Members	Female	9	1 FGD
Galmudug - Galgadud region (Guriel town)	Community Stakeholders	Male	6	1 FGD
		Female	-	
Hirshabelle - Hiran Region (Bergadid town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	7	1 FGD
		Female	3	
	Youth	Male	8	1 FGD

		Female	-	
Hirshabelle - Hiran Region (Mataban town)	Community Stakeholders	Male	8	1 FGD
		Female	-	
	Youth	Male	6	1 FGD
		Female	-	
	Female Community Members	Female	6	1 FGD
Middle Shabelle region (Jowhar town)	Mixed Community Stakeholders	Male	4	1 FGD
		Female	2	
	Youth	Male	3	1 FGD
		Female	2	
	Female Community Members	Female	6	1 FGD
		Total	**164 (75 women, 89 men)**	**24 FGDs**

Fieldwork

Following the finalisation of the inception report, which was reviewed and approved by LPI, data collection began on 18 April 2023 through remote KIIs with the donor and programme staff and technical consultants. The local data collection team was trained on the evaluation objectives, approach, methodology, and tools on 26-27 April 2023. Primary data collection in Somalia then took place between 30 April and 6 May 2023, led by Bodhi's national research partner, Alma Research, based in Mogadishu.

II.c.iii Analysis and Reporting

The evaluation matrix served as the framework for data analysis. The evaluation team conducted qualitative analysis, mapping key themes and content onto a findings, conclusions and recommendations matrix. Data analysis utilised triangulation throughout, to verify consistency of findings across different respondent types, as well as with the desk review. Findings from individual evaluation questions and sub-questions were synthesised into larger thematic 'baskets' for the conclusions, which then informed the recommendations.

Following completion of data collection and analysis, the team conducted a consultation workshop with the LPI team on 18 May 2023 to present key findings and recommendations and collect their feedback.

II.c.iv Limitations

It is important to note that the evaluation faced several limitations, which should be considered when reading the findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this report.

- **Data gaps** – LPI provided the evaluation team with the list of respondents to be interviewed as part of the evaluation. The list did not include any key informants from the Ministry of Interior or the Prime Minister's Office, which limited the depth of information and triangulation on the programme's national-level policy work.
- **Positive bias among respondents** – As with all qualitative data collection for evaluative purposes, respondents for the evaluation were selected based on their interaction and relevance to the programme. The evaluation team aimed to speak with all key programme staff and relevant local government authorities, and whilst they took care to ensure representation of different groups, those who were willing to attend interviews and FGDs were more likely to have a positive relationship with the programme, and may have had a positive bias in their views. Bodhi has mitigated this limitation by not overstating trends, and by triangulating with other sources.
- **Response bias** - Informants may have formed their responses based on personal motivation rather than the most accurate information. This is often the case as respondents might feel that giving positive feedback would help the programme to continue. Extra care was made to probe appropriately and to encourage respondents to respond openly. Findings are also triangulated with other sources.

II.d Programme Logic

To assess the programme's relevance and effectiveness, the evaluation adopted a theory-based approach, which aimed to determine the extent to which the programme's theory (of how its activities would achieve the desired results) was fit-for-purpose, and assess progress against its Theory of Change. This section, then, presents the programme's overarching and outcome-level Theories of Change (ToC), against which progress was assessed. Together, these ToCs are meant to contribute to the overall programme goal, which is "to contribute to a stable and peaceful Somalia by supporting inclusive reconciliation processes that address local grievances and root causes of conflict."

The **overall programme ToC** is that:

By supporting the transformation of targeted protracted local conflicts through inclusive engagement driven by the affected communities, and by engaging local, state and federal policy actors and policies to create an enabling environment for those processes, the programme has the potential to contribute to long-term peace and stability at the community level in selected conflict systems.

Each of the programme's four outcome-level ToCs are presented below:

Outcome 1: Conflict stakeholders on community level use structured, nonviolent and collaborative ways of addressing conflict issues, thereby creating preconditions for peaceful coexistence.

This particular outcome area is based on the underlying theory of change that follows:

If…

- Key actors are engaged in dialogue and negotiation on substantive conflict issues over time;
- Peacebuilding platforms (or similar collective actors) work together in preventive action and crisis response, innovating new ways of dealing with and transforming conflict issues;
- Gains in key actor dialogue and negotiation are shared, discussed, and rooted in broader clan communities, including those actors usually marginalised;

Then…

- Clan groups – key people and more people – will increase mutual understanding;
- Long-standing narratives that highlight divisions can be reframed to positive, future-oriented understandings;
- Nonviolent strategies for addressing conflict can be identified and employed – now and in the future;
- Decision-making on peace and conflict issues will be more inclusive and responsive to a broader set of actors in clan communities;

Because…

- Dialogue allows for the identification of different perspectives as well as shared grievances and concerns.
- The process includes, and is driven by, key people with the mandate to enter into agreements. In addition, deepened community engagement anchors dialogue and negotiation as the new norm for handling conflict.
- Through sustained processes, a routine norm of dialogue will take shape.
- Through dialogue, combined with research and analysis, more accurate information – rather than rumours and disinformation – is available to clan groups, allowing more comprehensive agreements to be developed.
- Sustained engagement over time, increased trust, and a shared sense of urgency to address conflict drivers allow for experimentation and innovation leading to new ways of dealing with conflict.[1]

Outcome 2: Increased inclusion and participation of women, youth, and other marginalised groups in peacebuilding processes.

If…

- Women, young people, and traditionally marginalised groups are provided the opportunity and space to engage with each other across clans and other dividing lines;

[1] Document shared by LPI - LPI Somalia Programme Strategy 2020-23. p. 18.

- Women, young people, and traditionally marginalised groups experience personal transformation in their attitudes towards other groups and their skills and confidence are reinforced;
- Women, young people, and traditionally marginalised groups collaborate to address issues driving or resulting from conflict in their communities;
- All stakeholders have an increased understanding of the diversity of roles played in peace and conflict;

Then…

- Participating women, young people, and traditionally marginalised groups will strengthen understanding and relationships, as well as their motivation for engagement;
- Public perception of actual and potential roles taken by those groups will start to change, creating openness for more meaningful participation;
- Otherwise unheard perspectives on what drives conflict or builds peace can become visible;

Because…

- Engagement in safe peace-building spaces allows an increase in understanding (of oneself, others, and issues at hand) without fear of repercussions or normative pressure.
- Women, young people, and traditionally marginalised groups have unique knowledge to bring to the processes, and their input to – and support of – peace agreements and action plans are needed to ensure that the progress toward peace through dialogue and action is sustainable.
- Experience shows there is openness for more diverse people's engagement[2]

Outcome 3: Local authorities proactively support peacebuilding processes.

If…

- Local authorities, both district- and FMS-level, are engaged through tailored capacity development, relationship-building, and evidence-sharing by LPI, partners, and peace-building platforms;
- Peace-building platforms – or key people mobilised by them – carefully assist in resolving structural tensions when feasible, for example in relation to parallel administrations;

Then…

- Local authorities deepen their experience of nonviolent conflict management, and may with time develop proactive strategies to address conflict (as opposed to reactive), focus on the long-term (rather than short-term political gains), consider all clans in the area (rather than promoting one clan's agenda), and become open to inclusivity (rather than resisting it);
- The effects of political competition on clan reconciliation efforts are reduced;

[2] Document shared by LPI - LPI Somalia Programme Strategy 2020-23. p. 21.

Because…

- The capacity enhancement will respond to self-identified expressed needs and allow for changing mindsets in a safe learning environment. With capacity, proactivity will develop. As more stakeholders experience that new, nonviolent techniques give better results, generating more political will.
- Local authorities have an enhanced understanding of community perspectives, understanding the long-term benefits of inclusive community engagement with their objectives.
- Clan leaders, working together in platforms, can exert harmonised influence on administrations from different sides.[3]

Outcome 4: Targeted policy actors on national, regional and international levels take actions to create a more conducive political/governance environment for peace.

If…

- LPI and partners have pooled their expertise and capacity in peace-building advocacy, have jointly mapped principles, issues, access, and current processes for policy engagement (Policy Engagement Strategy/ies);
- Concrete, longer-term influencing effort(s) make use of policy windows, build and share a meaningful body of evidence, and create collaborative relations with civil society, academic allies, and champions in policy actors;

Then…

- Existing or new policy responses can be more responsive to peacebuilding needs and processes in the community setting, while also utilising enhanced legitimacy created through a broader consultative process;

Because…

- Evidence-generation can function as a strategy to enhance understanding, create alternative policy options, and build collaborative relations.[4]
- Collaborative relations create trust and let shared interest emerge, which contribute to political will for responsive actions

III. Findings and Conclusions

This section presents the key findings and conclusions of the evaluation, structured in line with the evaluation's OECD-DAC criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Efficiency, and Sustainability.[5] This section will be followed by section IV 'Conclusions' and V 'Recommendations'.

[3] Document shared by LPI - LPI Somalia Programme Strategy 2020-23. p. 24.
[4] Document shared by LPI - LPI Somalia Programme Strategy 2020-23. pp. 25-26.
[5] The 'coherence' criterion was not included in the evaluation's Terms of Reference.

III.a Relevance

The first section looks at the extent to which the programme is relevant to the context and meets the needs of programme participants and their broader communities..

EQ1 | To what extent was the programme - and its underlying Theory of Change - relevant to the dynamic conflict context in its target areas?

The programme was found to be relevant in Somalia's complex and dynamic conflict system – it is delivering interventions that are well suited to achieve its objectives in the local context. LPI followed best practice to design the programme. The programme was developed in line with a collaborative update of the 2016 conflict analysis (in April 2019), internal lessons jointly identified by LPI and its local partners, and the findings of two independent evaluative exercises conducted in January-June 2019 of the previous phase of the programme.[6]

The programme also benefited from the in-depth understanding that LPI's partners have in the areas in which they operate, as well as their community-based approach to programme design. Zamzam Foundation (ZZF) has been in operation since 1992, and has been engaged in conflict transformation programming through its partnership with LPI since 2011. The Somali Women's Solidarity Organization (SWSO) was founded in 2006 and has been partnering with LPI since 2016. Both partners consulted local communities (elders, women, and youth) and local authorities in the design of their respective projects, which were continuations of projects under the previous phase of the programme. Primary data collection with programme participants confirmed they were generally satisfied with the level of consultation and engagement, and that they felt they were able to understand and provide views into the programme design. This ensured that the design of the projects under the programme, and therefore the programme as a whole, were well tailored to the local contexts and dynamics in which they were delivered.

Consequently, the programme's programme- and outcome-level Theories of Change (ToC) are logically coherent and appropriate for achieving programme objectives in the Somali context, in line with existing evidence. Somali Peace Line (SPL), which has been operating since 1995 and has worked with LPI since 2008, designed two new projects *after* the ToC was developed (as its previous projects concluded in 2020). But as they also consulted local communities extensively, and since the projects were effectively a continuation and expansion of the previous projects, they were squarely aligned with the ToCs.

Detailed below are the assessments of the relevance of programme interventions under each outcome area.

1.1 Intra- and inter-clan dialogues and peacebuilding platforms

The programme's focus on supporting intra- and inter-clan dialogues and peacebuilding platforms is highly relevant given the centrality of clan-based conflict to local-level violence in the Somali conflict system. It is also relevant due to the erosion of traditional dispute resolution in South Central Somalia since 1991 due to civil war, humanitarian crises, the conflict against al-Shabaab, and the divisive state building process. It is also in line with evidence from a number of

[6] This includes a Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)-funded Mid-Term Review and a summative evaluation of the 'CRM Phase II: Community-led local peacebuilding to strengthen state-building in Somalia' project.

conflict-affected contexts, which suggests that programmes that support increased leadership capacity in dispute resolution alongside collaborative contact between conflicting groups can contribute to increased intra- and inter-group trust, and can increase people's willingness to participate in social or political processes.[7] There is also evidence that interventions that strengthen local-level peace infrastructures and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of intra- and inter-community conflict can contribute to violence reduction.[8]

In addition to the global evidence base, the programme is also aligned with evidence from Somalia itself, as captured in the evaluation of the programme's previous phase. The Mid-Term Review of the programme's previous phase found evidence that the formation of the peacebuilding platforms had transformed target communities attitudes towards conflict resolution and had resulted in peace agreements that reduced violence.[9]

1.2 Women and youth platforms

The programme's central focus on increasing the inclusion of women in intra- and inter-clan conflict resolution and transformation processes is highly relevant in the Somali context. In Somalia, women are largely excluded from meaningful participation in peace processes at all levels despite evidence that they are active and important conflict actors, and can be crucial to peacebuilding.[10] There is a strong empirical connection between peace agreements signed by female delegates and more durable peace settlements. Agreements which meaningfully include women show a significantly higher number of peace agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and higher implementation rates for provisions.[11] There is further evidence that collaboration and knowledge sharing between women from different groups contributes to more equitable and durable peace agreements and higher implementation rates.[12] Together, this body of evidence justifies and validates the programme's focus on women's inclusion, and its approach to build connections and collaboration between women across clan lines.

Activities to strengthen the inclusion of youth – both men and women – are also deeply relevant due to their critical and multiple roles in clan-based conflict. Evidence has shown that when youth are excluded from and have little influence over political processes, they can be pushed and pulled to support violence as a means of having their voice heard.[13] Research from Somalia shows that perceptions of exclusion – coupled with grievances related to insecurity and government failures – are a central factor in pushing youth to join armed groups, including al-Shabaab. In Somalia, young men are central to conflict dynamics, acting as 'foot soldiers' for clan-based armed groups as well

[7] Sonnenfeld, A. et al. (2021). Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik (2019). Violence Reduction Subsector Review & Evidence Evaluation. Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC). Available at: Link.
[8] Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik (2019). Violence Reduction Subsector Review & Evidence Evaluation. Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC). Available at: Link.
[9] IDC (2019). Mid-Term Review: Nabadeynta Beelaha Somaliya Programme. Life & Peace Institute.
[10] Koshin, S.A. (2018). Women in Peacebuilding in Somalia. In: War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab. Edited by Michael Keating and Waldman Matt, Oxford University Press; Jama, F. (2010). Somali women and peacebuilding, *Accord, Issue 21.* Available at: Link; LPI (2017). Learning from Kismayo. Life & Peace Institute, Peace Direct, and SWSO. Available at: Link.
[11] Krause, J., Krause, W., Bränfors, P. (2018). Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace. *International Interactions, 44:6*, 985-1016. Available at: Link.
[12] Krause, J., Krause, W., Bränfors, P. (2018). Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace. *International Interactions, 44:6*, 985-1016. Available at: Link.
[13] Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik (2019). Violence Reduction Subsector Review & Evidence Evaluation. Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium (PEC). Available at: Link.

as contributing to fundraising. Further, there are also tensions between rural youth and elders, and as youth (especially armed youth) challenge elder authority. Young women, too, play an important role as supporters and instigators of young men engaging in violence. Due to their role in conflict, it is essential that young men and women be included in conflict transformation processes as well.[14]

1.3 Engagement of local authorities

Strengthening the capacity and level of engagement of local authorities is essential to ensure community-led dialogue processes are sustainable, and their outcomes can be implemented. As mentioned above, the evidence is clear that building leadership capability to support peace processes is critical to the success of local peacebuilding. In Somalia, given the role that the state-building processes plays in driving conflict and supporting peace, this takes on greater emphasis. Local authorities are the link between emerging state structures and local communities. Strengthening their role is fundamental, as they can act as guarantors of local peace agreements and help create conditions in the legal and political framework conducive to peaceful collaboration between clans.

1.4 Policy engagement and influencing

Engagement with the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) was highly relevant given its central role as a national-level policy framework for inclusive peace and reconciliation. The NRF is currently the most relevant national-level framework for peacebuilding in Somalia. The NRF provides a blueprint for a more inclusive approach to reconciliation at all levels in Somalia, and crucially involving women and youth. It was developed and received crucial support from the President, acting as the primary mechanism for the international community to engage with and support peace processes and initiatives in Somalia. Whilst the new government has decided to review the NRF – to determine its future director – it will remain the primary peacebuilding policy framework, validating LPI's continued engagement with the NRF process.

The lack of public awareness of the NRF also justifies LPI's focus on acting as a bridge between communities and policy-makers, raising community awareness of the NRF process and feeding community views into the NRF process. Federalism in Somalia is premised on the understanding that local dynamics different across the country, so ensuring that the NRF remains grounded in local realities will be crucial to its effectiveness as a policy framework.

EQ2 | To what extent is the programme relevant to the needs of its stakeholders, including partners, platforms, communities, and relevant authorities?

2.1 Overall peace and security needs

The vast majority of respondents reported that the programme effectively addressed community peace and security needs, but some highlighted key needs which were not addressed. Community respondents predominantly articulated their primary needs as: security, intra- and inter-clan trust and dialogue, and greater community awareness of peacebuilding/nonviolent approaches. Out of the 17 community leaders interviewed for the evaluation, 14 said the programme met all needs. There was a general consensus among respondents that the programme has met target communities' peace and security needs.

[14] World Bank (2018). Youth as Agents of Peace Somalia. World Bank, UN Somalia, and UN Habitat. Available at: Link.

However, there were a few notable exceptions, where respondents raised security needs that were not met. Community elders in Jowhar raised the issue that the programme did not sufficiently address the issue of drugs and drug related crime, which they expressed is the most pressing issue they are dealing with. And in Jowhar, women complained that the programme did not address key issues such as domestic violence, gender-based violence, and child protection, the issues that most affect women.

2.2 Women and youth empowerment and inclusion needs

Women's and youth empowerment and inclusion was not often articulated as a central need of the community - and when it was mentioned, it was solely by women and youth respondents. Women and youth in Jowhar, Baidoa, Bergadid, and Kismayo underlined that the programme addressed the need for increasing women's participation in peacebuilding, stating that now more women are involved now than before. In Kismayo, women articulated women's participation needs as being not just about their ability to contribute to the community's security, but also about enhancing women's self-confidence and skills to engage in public life.

Youth inclusion and participation was more consistently mentioned as a need than women's inclusion. Youth and women respondents in Baidoa, Kismayo, Bergadid, Jowhar, and Abduwak cited that the programme contributed to meeting the need for greater youth participation. Interestingly, in Abduwak this was articulated in terms of youth education, where they saw the programme's main benefit as it education of youth to become better at public outreach and engagement more broadly.

Women's and youth inclusion was rarely mentioned by elders or in mixed FGDs, where there were both men and women. This could be because the question was not posed in a way that would sufficiently elicit replies on this need. The question asked about community needs at large, and not specifically about women and youth needs - but the fact that elders and men rarely mentioned inclusion unprompted could be an indicator of prevailing patriarchal gender norms.

Among respondents who highlighted women and youth inclusion and participation as a need that was addressed by the programme, some identified key shortcomings. Youth in Abudwak expressed that there was a need to build and strengthen relationships between clan elders and local authorities, and their relationship with the youth and women in the community. Another group of respondents in Abduwak raised a related issue, stating that it is not sufficient for the programme to only engage youth, but that they should also engage other members of the community, including elders, scholars, and mothers - who should have also received conflict management skills training from the programme as well. As the programme did indeed organise a number of dialogues between SD youth members and elders in Abduwak, these views may be a reflection of a desire for scaling up these activities.. It may also reflect youth's desire to move beyond engaging with elders to more meaningful participation in decision-making.

2.3 Socio-economic issues

Whilst most respondents felt the programme addressed their direct peace and security needs, they also highlighted a number of conflict-related socio-economic needs which fell outside the programme's scope. Women in Abduwak highlighted that the main shortcoming of the programme was that it did not address the economic dimension of conflict, including the lack of jobs and other economic opportunities, although the programme did provide space for them to engage in dialogue on these issues with local authorities. In Jowhar, respondents underlined that what is most needed

is to support youth with jobs and sports. In Baidoa, women respondents emphasised that youth need to be supported to become entrepreneurs by setting up small businesses. And in Herale and Kismayo, women and youth respondents expressed that whilst job creation is required for "idle youth", it must be accompanied by education support as well.

Further, respondents in Abduwak cited that whilst poverty, exacerbated by drought, were major drivers of conflict, the programme did not address them. In fact drought was a major challenge raised by many respondents in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, who pointed to the fact that drought drove new conflicts by decreasing the availability of water points and grazing, which led to greater competition between communities, undermining the programme's objectives. The District Security Chief in Herale specifically highlighted the need for digging more boreholes to reduce conflicts at water points and increase access to water, which has become more scarce due to drought.

Despite these views from respondents, it is important to note that the evidence linking poverty and unemployment to violence is complex, with 'jobs for peace' programming showing mixed evidence of success. However, where socio-economic issues hamper communities' ability to participate in peacebuilding, or undermine peacebuilding gains, it is indeed imperative to integrate efforts to address these.

The programme's drought response was highly needed but short-lived, highlighting that the next phase should consider an integrated humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus approach. Recognising the dire humanitarian needs caused by drought, and its impact on the programme's conflict transformation objectives, Sida approved a December 2021 concept note submitted by LPI for the programme to undertake emergency drought response activities, in line with a similar response by LPI and ZZF in 2017, with Sida funding. With the additional funding, LPI and ZZF delivered a three-month integrated humanitarian and peacebuilding intervention in Balambale, Bergadid, Guriel, Herale, and Mataban. The intervention supported 4,175 households by providing drinking water (through water-trucking) and cash transfers (one per month) to help them cope with the impact of the drought. This was combined with inter-community meetings and awareness raising between host and displaced/migrating communities on the need for (short-term) sharing of scarce resources and nonviolent responses to emerging conflicts over resources.

Without a counterfactual control group the evaluation was unable to verify the direct peace-related impact of the emergency intervention, however, By reducing the requirement for communities to travel to seek water, the intervention also minimised the risk of violence over competition over access to water sources. This raises the imperative, in line with evidence from other conflict affected contexts, that in Somalia, especially in areas affected by drought, conflict transformation requires interventions that are multi-dimensional and that also address the socio-economic factors that are central to driving and triggering violent behaviour. This requires adopting an HDP nexus approach. What this type of approach looks like will vary between local contexts and the actors involved. But it does not mean that peacebuilders should be expected to undertake humanitarian or livelihood interventions. Rather, it requires close cooperation and collaboration with humanitarian and development actors to plan and deliver activities across the HDP nexus, which are mutually-supportive and enhance results in all three areas. Given ZZF's led on this project and significant experience in the humanitarian space, future programming with ZZF should be designed to maximise complementarity between its non-LPI-funded humanitarian programming and its LPI-funded peacebuilding work.

EQ3 | To what extent are programme partners appropriate to deliver programme activities?

LPI's programme partners have the required experience, access, and networks to deliver in their respective areas, but it is unclear to what extent the programme has built their internal capacities. LPI's programme strategy for 2020-2023 states that "strengthening CSOs as peacebuilding leaders remains a foundational strategy" of the programme, recognising that civil society actors can play a key role in supporting structured, multi-stakeholder peacebuilding processes. The evaluation found that the programme works in true partnership with its local partners, recognising their agency and role as local experts, and has provided them with important capacity building support on proposal writing, budget, and the SD methodology.

However, no formal and systematic framework was put in place to measure the extent to which the programme has indeed strengthened their institutional capacities overall. Whilst LPI is not its local partners' sole international partner, it has worked with some – such as ZZF and SPL – for over a decade, so adopting a more structured way of measuring how it has contributed to these partners' capacity improvements would help LPI to assess the sustainability of its impacts on these CSOs – including their capacity to fundraise and deliver programmes.

III.b Effectiveness

This section assesses the extent to which the programme achieved intended results. It also identifies best practices that helped attain these results and the opportunities LPI can leverage to increase effectiveness in future programming.

EQ4 | To what extent did the programme achieve its intended outputs and outcomes as per the indicators, milestones, and targets set out in its results framework?

4.1 Outcome 1 - Conflict stakeholders on community level use structured, nonviolent and collaborative ways of addressing conflict issues, creating preconditions for peaceful coexistence

Overall, the programme made considerable progress towards achieving this outcome, with significant evidence that target communities are cooperating to manage and reduce conflict. Between January 2020 and December 2022, the programme supported communities to reach 14 inter-clan and three intra-clan agreements, all of which had held for over five months.[15] The peace agreements were reached, and have been sustained, through regular intra- and inter-clan dialogues, and other awareness-raising and peace actions undertaken by the programme's inter-clan peace platforms. These activities and their outcomes are important indicators that, under the programme, communities have made notable progress towards adopting a more collaborative, intra- and inter-clan approach to managing conflict, addressing conflict drivers, and building social cohesion.

[15] Inter-clan: 1 in Kismayo (between the Galjecel and Ajuran), 2 in Galgadud (1 between the Dir and Habargidir clans, and 1 between the Hawadle and Habargidir clans), 1 in the Abudwak-Adaado area in Galmudug (between the Wagardhac and Saleban sub-clans), and 1 in Hiran. Intra-clan: 1 in Middle Shabelle (between two Galjel sub-clans).

The peace platforms have been central to building communities' support for adopting collaborative and nonviolent inter-clan conflict management approaches. In the previous phase of the programme (2017-2019), LPI established 11 peacebuilding platforms: elder-led platforms in Hiran and Middle Shabelle (Hirshabelle) and Galgadud (Galmudug); and women platforms in Dhobley, Garbaharey, Kismayo and Dollow (Jubbaland). In this phase, the programme established youth platforms in Abduwak and Jowhar (Hirshabelle), and Baidoa (Southwest); an umbrella women's platform at the Jubbaland state level (with representatives from the four district level ones); and an inclusive community platform in Kismayo, composed of elders, women, and youth.

Many community respondents provided concrete examples of the activities of the platforms which demonstrate that communities have been working together across intra- and inter-clan conflict lines to implement peace actions,such as facilitating negotiations to open roads (Herale, Balambale) and advocating for the successful installation of street lights to improve security at night (Kismayo). Respondents also provided a number of examples of peace platforms taking quick emergency action to intervene in escalating conflicts in Galgadud, Hiran, and Middle Shabelle. For example, in Kismayo, there was a case where a police captain was killed by one of his officers over a land dispute, which led to their respective clans mobilising for violence. In response, the peace platforms in Kismayo convened representatives from both clans separately to urge them to demobilise. They then organised a meeting between clan elders, with participation from the local authorities to reach a peaceful solution. Another example is the efforts by the Middle Shabelle platform to prevent violence related to the 2022 federal elections by convening a meeting of local community members including youth, women, peace platforms, police, and local administration to share information and increase communication between rural clan elders and local authorities to avoid miscommunication leading to violence.

The peace platforms' community outreach and awareness-raising work has been central to shifting community attitudes towards intra- and inter-clan peace collaboration. Community respondents, particularly women and youth, from across all programme areas, overwhelmingly reported how much they appreciated the platforms' awareness raising activities. Elders in all communities corroborated this, stating how central awareness raising was to deliver messages of peace which built community support for peaceful approaches to resolving and addressing conflict. Outreach to rural areas was particularly highlighted due to respondents' claims that these are the areas where conflicts usually begin, and therefore are central to peacebuilding. Respondents from Baidoa underlined how outreach activities were key to reach important constituencies not directly involved in the programme such as Islamic religious leaders. And in Kismayo, respondents expressed their belief that outreach activities in schools were deeply important to build support for peace among the children of the next generation.

Despite the progress made, many community respondents highlighted limitations in the programme's reach. The programme delivered many outreach activities in rural areas, which was appreciated by many respondents. However, a traditional elder in Balambale raised the issue of the programme's geographic reach, stating that the programme should be focusing even more on rural areas, rather than urban areas, as conflicts usually begin in remote areas and then spread to villages and towns. The Chief Security Office in Herale raised the same point, as did many respondents and elders from across programme areas in Galmudug (Herale, Balambale, Jowhar, and Abduwak) and Jubbaland. They view the focus on urban areas as limiting and feel that many of the most

conflict-affected communities in rural areas were not reached. This was particularly the case in Abduwak, where there was consensus on this issue among respondents in all three FGDs. Youth respondents there specifically underlined that the programme reached a small number of youth compared to the total number of youth in the area. Overall, respondents urged the programme to increase the number of areas in which it works and the total number of beneficiaries, however, this will always be limited by the programme's budget, which declined in 2022, relative to 2020-21.

4.2 Outcome 2 - Increased inclusion and participation of women, youth, and other marginalised groups in peacebuilding processes.

The programme has contributed to increased women's and youth participation in local peace processes and initiatives, particularly in Kismayo. The involvement and engagement of women and youth platforms in community outreach, awareness-raising, and crisis intervention activities is itself an indicator that women and youth are more active in the peace space. In 2021 and 2022, the Kismayo women platforms conducted a total of six peace actions and awareness-raising activities. This is corroborated by programme beneficiaries themselves, who have largely reported important gains in women and youth participation. Respondents in Baidoa, Jowhar, Abudwak, Bergadid, and Kismayo noted that the most important achievement of the programme was that it gave women a space to participate in peace activities.

In Baidoa, they additionally expressed how important the training given to women in the women and youth platforms was to build their peacebuilding skills and self-confidence to participate in peacebuilding activities. In Jowhar a respondent highlighted how before the programme, few women were able to participate in peacebuilding, but that now the number of women participating had significantly increased. And the mayor of Jowhar reported that women are now *the* most active peacemakers in the town. In Baidoa respondents reported that women and youth were now 'peace ambassadors' and 'peacemakers' in their communities thanks to the programme. And in Guriel, community respondents underscored how women were not only playing a bigger role, but adding value, helping elders to find solutions better than they did before.

Youth participation in peacebuilding notably increased in 2021 and 2022, with many elders and youth participants attributing their activities to the training received under the programme. In 2021, the programme ramped up its focus on youth inclusion. In February and March, the programme provided training on strategic thinking, advocacy, and negotiation skills to 90 youth in Baidoa, Jowhar, and Abudwak, who were then supported to establish youth platforms in those communities. The youth platforms quickly became active, engaging in dialogue sessions using the 'Sustained Dialogue' methodology, developing peace action plans and delivering peace actions, and engaging with community elders and local/national authorities to advocate for greater youth participation in peace processes. In 2022, the programme established one additional youth platform, in Kismayo. Like in the area programme areas, the youth received training and delivered in awareness raising and advocacy campaigns, including in close collaboration with the Kismayo women's platform.

Despite the increase in youth participation, respondents raised the need for the programme to increase youth and women's engagement with elders. Community elders in Baidoa, Jowhar, Abudwak, and Kismayo highlighted the importance of the training received under the programme for

giving youth the skills and self-confidence to advocate for youth issues, reach out to youth in rural areas, and engage in peace initiatives in their communities. Youth respondents in all four areas expressed the same level of satisfaction with the programme training, particularly citing how it gave them the skills to engage in peacebuilding. The election of youth participants to the Baidoa parliament and as Mayor of Jowhar were cited as examples of how the programme equipped youth to participate in public life and become leaders in their communities.

However, youth in Abduwak and Baidoa also highlighted that one of the biggest issues with the programme was that it kept women and youth platforms separate from the elder-led community platforms, and requested that the programme increase this level of interaction. This reflects a sense of frustration among youth who have been given more space to engage in peace-related activities, but feel like they are still not being able to meaningfully participate in the main peacebuilding 'track' in their communities, which remain at the level of community elders. However, the evaluation team recognises that given longstanding socio-cultural norms, the process of integration takes time, requiring sustained and rigorous engagement to change attitudes and behaviours.

The inclusive peace committee in Kismayo stands out as a model for other areas in the programme. In August 2022, LPI and SWSO established an inclusive peace committee in Kismayo, composed of members of the women and youth platforms, and elders from the Jubbaland Council of Elders. It is the first platform of its kind and the result of sustained engagement for a long period of time. Only months after its creation it demonstrated how effective it can be. It was the inclusive platform in Kismayo that stepped in and took action to de-escalate conflict in the example cited above regarding the killing of a police officer in the city. This platform demonstrates that women, youth, and elders can indeed work together to mobilise communities for peace, harnessing their respective comparative advantages and added value. In fact, youth in Abduwak specifically raised that one of the biggest issues with the programme was that it kept women and youth platforms separate from the elder-led community platforms. Lessons from the Kismayo model could help inform the establishment of similar inclusive platforms in the other programme areas.

Whilst the programme made great strides in including youth and women, there is still limited representation from more marginalised groups. Some community respondents from the Kismayo, Balambale, and Baidoa women and youth platforms raised that, in their view, the programme's greatest shortcoming was that it did not sufficiently integrate individuals from marginalised communities. This includes representatives from minority clans in those areas as well as individuals with disabilities. Solutions put forward by the respondents included creating specific platforms for marginalised groups and putting in place a quota for marginalised group representatives in the existing platforms - the latter suggestion was also put forward by representatives from SPL.

4.3 Outcome 3 - Local authorities proactively support peacebuilding processes

There has been a marked increase in local authorities' engagement with and support for peacebuilding activities in all programme target areas. LPI reporting and interviews with its partners indicated that local authorities participated in and were crucial to a number of peace activities under the programme, including the dialogues organised by the Middle Shabelle platform to address the emerging conflict between two Galjel sub-clans in May 2022, and the dialogue organised by the Galgadud platform between the neighbouring clans of Dir and Habargidir in July

2022. In both cases, local authority participation provided a level of legitimacy to the process and integrated them into agreements reached as guarantors of the agreements' provisions.

Community representatives from all target areas corroborated this, citing an improvement in the participation of local authorities in programme activities. In Baidoa, for example, two community elders reported that the local authorities in the area actively participated in community outreach and awareness-raising activities, helping to educate the population about peace. In Kismayo, Fatima Ali Abdi, the MP and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Youth and Sports noted that the local authorities there had become much more invested in peacebuilding, engaging with the peace platforms there and giving platform members the opportunity to ask questions from and share recommendations with them. In Matabaan, women respondents identified that the programme was successful because it supported local authorities and community representatives to collaborate for peace.

In Jowhar, youth engaged with local police by organising a meeting in June 2022 to discuss security issues and the role of the police in the community. The police agreed to form a committee with police and youth participants to jointly address security issues, and they set up a Whatsapp group. This demonstrates how local authorities, including security actors, have been willing to proactively engage in and support peacebuilding activities supported by the programme and its participants.

4.4 Outcome 4 - Targeted policy actors on national, regional, and international levels take actions to create a more conducive environment for peace

LPI and its partners have engaged and built relationships with key local and national level policy actors; however, given the long-term nature of this outcome, it is still too soon to determine whether these have translated into policy changes. LPI sits on the NRF advisory board and in 2020 and 2021 regularly participated in NRF meetings and meetings on the NRF with other peacebuilding organisations and donors. Through its role in the advisory board, LPI was able to share views with the Somali Federal government on peacebuilding and reconciliation policy. To inform this work and make it more effective, in 2021, LPI Somalia, in collaboration with LPI's Inclusive Peace in Practice (IPIP) team and its local partners, undertook a study to understand how inclusive the process is. This included a power-analysis workshop where IPIP trained LPI Somalia staff and partners on how to engage and influence power to influence the inclusive implementation of the NRF.

In line with the findings of the LPI Somalia-IPIP analysis and training, the programme stepped up efforts to link national-level policy processes with its community-initiatives. In 2021, the LPI Somalia team held two meetings with the Director of Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution of the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR), and meetings the Peace Coordination Unit of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the Director of the Jubbaland Ministry and Interior, and Gedo politicians on issues of Gedo region. In addition, SPL organised and facilitated youth participants in the programme to hold advocacy meetings with MoIFAR and OPM Peace Coordination Unit on youth inclusion in the NRF processes.

In May 2022, a new president was elected, with a new set of policy priorities. As a result the MoIFAR launched a process to review and relaunch the NRF. LPI was invited to the strategic meeting organised by MoIFAR in September 2022 to relaunch the NRF, which indicates LPI's continued relevance as a policy actor. Nevertheless, due to the hiatus in the NRF, there was limited national level policy work in 2022. However, engagement at the state and local level continued at pace. In

Jubbaland, LPI and its partners engaged and worked with the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Women, Family Affairs, and Human Rights to hold a community dialogue session to raise awareness of the role of women in the formation of the Kismayo District Council and in peace in Jubbaland. Similarly, the Galgadud platform, with support from SPL, engaged with the Ministry of Interior on the formation of the Balambale District Council to support community reconciliation.

Recognising the need for more effective national-level policy engagement, LPI has encouragingly already committed to make this a central focus of its programming from 2023. The evaluation team was unable to interview any national level interlocutors involved in the NRF process and was therefore not able to assess the extent to which the programme influenced policy making. However, recognising the programme's limited progress under this outcome, in 2022, LPI Somalia created a partnership with a new research and policy-oriented local partner, Somali Public Agenda (SPA), and secured funding from the European Union co-funded by Sida) for a new three-year project aimed at strengthening the capacity of local civil society organisations in Somalia to establish a network of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and policy-focused civil society organisations (CSOs) to support community advocacy for better coordination and implementation of the NRF in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and South West – and Mogadishu.

At the same time, LPI invested in building local capacities for policy engagement, and engaged internationally to advocate for the localisation agenda, drawing on its Somalia experience. In collaboration with LPI's Horn of Africa Programme (HARP), LPI Somalia selected four Somali civil society representatives and one LPI Somalia programme staff (one woman and four men) to receive training on the African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) virtually and in Addis Ababa. The training was part of an initiative aimed at enhancing bottom-up, civil society-led transitional justice and reconciliation action in the Horn of Africa.

Further, in 2022 LPI Somalia team collaborated with IPIP team, the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, and Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) to produce policy papers to advocate for more UN financing to local peacebuilding actors. LPI also wrote a paper with the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) on financing local CSOs to support youth and women-led peacebuilding, which was shared with UNPBF country offices and headquarters. The evaluation was not able to establish whether these activities contributed to the outcome.

III.c Impact

This section focuses on the wider impact of the programme, namely changes to stakeholders' and beneficiaries' attitudes and behaviours, particularly in terms of inclusion.

EQ5 | To what extent did the programme contribute to increased peace and security in its areas of operation?

Community leaders and the vast majority of community respondents reported that the programme has contributed to reducing inter-clan violence and increasing security in their communities. There is considerable evidence from community interviews that the programme has had a positive impact, particularly through dialogues, peace agreements, and the activities of the platforms. In fact, the

central role of the peace platforms was ubiquitously cited, and respondents provided concrete examples of their activities, including facilitating negotiations to open roads (Herale, Balambale), intervening to stop conflict from escalating (Galgadud) and revenge killings (Matabaan), and advocating for the successful installation of street lights to improve security at night (Kismayo).

A few respondents made notable claims about the programme's impact. Youth in Bergadid claimed that the programme contributed to "the eradication of rape and sexual assault." A paramount chief (Ughaz) in Kismayo went further, asserting that "the programme contributed to a process of healing and reconciliation". And an elder in Mataban said that "no single conflict has happened in these areas for a long time" because of the programme.

Despite the largely positive data collected, there were a few dissenting voices in Balambale. Women respondents in Balambale, Galmudug, reported that the programme did not bring peace and security to their community, underlining that the programme failed to bring more security forces into the community, as they had expected - although this was never within the programme's scope. A traditional elder in Balambale similarly expressed that the programme had not *yet* achieved its aim to bring peace to the area, but unlike the women, stated that security has indeed improved since the start of the programme due to the peace platforms and inter-clan dialogues. However, these views do not reflect an appreciation of the long-term nature of peacebuilding.

The evaluation team assesses that these views likely reflect the tense relationship between communities in the Balambale-Guriel axis given the evidence of strong improvements in the relationship between Balambale and Herale. In fact, the evaluation team in Galmudug was unable to travel from Balambale to Guriel due to perceived insecurity, requiring the team from Hirshabelle to do so. This is itself a strong indicator of the situation there. The proximity to the Ethiopian border likely means the situation is affected by cross-border dynamics, which should be better understood to develop an appropriate strategy for conflict transformation. In addition, these views may also suggest the need for better expectation management by the programme to ensure programme participants understand the complex and long-term nature of the programme's objectives.

EQ6 | To what extent did the programme change communities' perceptions and behaviours in ways that support peace coexistence between different groups ?

6.1 Changes in intercommunal perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours

The programme has contributed to improving peaceful interactions and coexistence between groups that had previously mistrusted each other, including clans and subclans and youth. Respondents from across the programme target areas provided examples of how relations between clans had positively changed due to the activities of the programme. The Herale District Security Chief reported that residents in the town are now collecting water from the same well and feel safe travelling on roads between different clan areas due to the improved relations built by the programme. In Guriel, elders and youth (men and women) respondents reported that their relationship with their neighbouring community to the north had improved and that this has increased business and trade between the two communities.

In Mataban, youth respondents reported that youth from different clans now play football together - something which was rare to see a few years ago. Similarly, a local government official in Abduwak

stated that young people who used to play separately are now playing in the same field, and the girls are going to the university together. Also in Abduwak, Galmudug, youth and elders cited an example where 120 young men and women from six different sub-clans and clans, who were part of and participated in activities of the youth platform there, worked together to collect donations to build the wall at the District Police Station. And in Baidoa, youth respondents expressed that the programme had enabled them to engage with religious leaders, something which was only possible due to their membership of the youth platform there.

6.2 Changes in communities' attitudes and behaviour towards local authorities

Elders and community respondents from all programme target areas have reported that their views of, and interactions with, local authorities had improved as a result of the programme. Remarkably, all 17 community leaders interviewed reported improved relationships between their communities and local authorities. The Mayor of Jowhar claimed that in his view "the most significant achievement [of the programme] is that it has increased collaboration between the people and the local authority." He claimed that the local authorities are now taking more leadership and ownership of addressing conflict issues, in collaboration with community elders, and that as a result his community has more confidence now in the rule of law, in dialogue, and has become more mindful of others and their rights.

A local government official in Guriel expressed that because of their increased interactions, the community and local authorities "understand each other now" whilst an elder in Mataban underscored that there has been a change in the behaviour of the local administration, which is now based in more equitable treatment of different groups in the area. He reported that previously, one or two groups controlled the administration, but now it is more inclusive. In Baidoa, an elder stated that the programme changed the behaviour of local authorities to be more inclusive and engaging, citing that it is now much easier to get an appointment with local administration officials. Youth from Baidoa corroborated this, citing increased cooperation between their community and the local administration due to the programme's awareness raising and community outreach activities.

Lastly, in Kismayo, Fatima Ali Abdi, the MP and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Youth and Sports noted that the programme helped increase the confidence between communities and local authorities in the city. Also in Kismayo, an Ugaas reported that the programme helped create a strong bond between different communities and local authorities, who are now working together, unlike before.

EQ7 | To what extent did the programme contribute to changes in key peace actors' attitudes and behaviour towards the inclusion of women and youth in peace mechanisms and processes?

The evaluation found strong evidence that the programme has contributed to changing women's and youths' attitude towards their own roles in peacebuilding in their communities. The evaluation of the SPL-implemented 'Participatory Peacebuilding and Development in Somalia: The Role of Women and Youth' project, which ran from January 2018 to September 2020 in Baidoa and Jowhar towns, found that the project had a significant impact on women and youth attitudes towards their own roles in local peace and political processes. Of the respondents surveyed, 98 percent (of which 22 percent were women, 74 percent were youth, and 2 percent were adult men) reported that they believed their confidence to influence positive change in their community was enhanced by the project. Data collected for this evaluation confirms these findings. For example, women interviewed

in Baidoa and Jowhar reported that the programme changed women's attitude and hope that they can contribute to peace in their communities. In Abduwak, women respondents claimed that women's role had advanced due to the programme, and that women now have the skills and confidence to engage in peace campaigns.

The evaluation also found some, albeit limited, evidence that the programme has contributed to shifting elders' and, more broadly, men's attitudes towards women's participation in peacebuilding. The evaluation of the 2018-2020 project in Baidoa and Jowhar also found that approximately 86 percent (of which 20 percent were women, 64 percent were youth, and 2 percent were adult men) of project participants claimed to have formally and informally engaged in peacebuilding in the previous two years. And 97 percent (of which 22 percent were women, 74 percent were youth, and 2 percent were adult men) of project participants expressed confidence that the decision-makers at the local level were receptive to their specific experiences, roles, interests and needs. These findings are corroborated by the evidence collected by this evaluation.

An elder from Jowhar, for example, reported that women in the community have been able to influence elders, and that this demonstrates a change in their view of women in the community. He also reported that because of the programme men more broadly now also listen to women when it comes to addressing conflict issues. The Mayor of Jowhar confirmed this view, underlining how the elders now listen to women, and contrasted this with the youth, whom the elders take less seriously than the women. In Abduwak and Herale too, elders reported that women were now active in the peacebuilding space, which wasn't the case before. In Jowhar, women respondents optimistically reported that whilst there are cultural barriers to women's participation, elders' views were changing.

Despite these positive indicators, it is clear that women and youth still face deep barriers in being able to play a more active and meaningful role in conflict transformation in their communities. The evidence presented above was relatively limited and inconsistent across programme target areas. Whilst some of the women interviewed, particularly in Kismayo, seem optimistic, others underlined how many women still cannot or will not participate in the programme because they fear community rejection and family disputes, as women are expected to only play a role in the home, and not in the community. Women respondents in Jowhar and youth in Mataban (men and women) also raised the issue of Somali culture not allowing women to play a role in the public domain, and that often it was a matter of honour for women's families.

Youth were also reported to face obstacles. Youth respondents in Jowhar reported that in Somalia, a man must be married and have a beard to be able to sit around the table. They added that elders now increasingly don't take youths seriously due to stigmas associated with drugs - they associate youths with drugs.

Whilst the evaluation found positive evidence, this should be treated as indicative, and not definitive or generalisable. The data collected for the evaluation seems broadly positive when it comes to changes in attitudes and, possibly, broader social norms around women's and youth participation. However, it is difficult to determine a change in attitudes without a more robust, randomised controlled trial approach to evaluation, which collects both quantitative and qualitative data from representative treatment and control groups in multiple programme target areas.

EQ8 | Were there any unintended consequences from the programme?

8.1 Positive unintended consequences

Programme participants reported a number of positive unintended outcomes from the programme, including participants getting elected to public office and improvement in relations with the police. Community leaders and community respondents in Abduwak, Baidoa, Kismayo, and Jowhar frequently listed among the programme's main achievements the the election of women and youth to key leadership positions. Specifically, they referred to Fatima Ali Abdi, who became an MP and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Jubbaland Minister of Women, Human Rights and Family Affairs, the Mayor of Jowhar, and a member of Parliament in Baidoa. The Mayor of Baidoa reported the training he received under the programme – which included engagement with elders and local authorities – as the reason why he gained the interest and confidence to run for office.

In Abudwak, programme participants reported that a former member of the platform was successfully elected to the district commissioner's office. Whilst he was in this role for a short time, they reported that he used his position during that time to advocate for the establishment of the district council which was still pending. The council was then formed and elders on the council invited members of the youth platform to join the council.

Youth in Baidoa expressed that the programme had increased cooperation between communities and local authorities, including the police. In Guriel and Kismayo, too, youth respondents highlighted how the programme has improved youth confidence in and collaboration with the police, citing that they now share information on suspicious behaviour and work together to prevent violence whereas before they feared the police and never engaged with them.

III.d Efficiency

This section presents an assessment of how the programme was able to convert inputs into outputs and outcomes by examining in its management practices and Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) system.

EQ9 | To what extent did activities adhere to delivery schedules and budgets?

Overall, the programme was delivered on schedule and within the agreed project budgets. There were some delays at the start of the programme due to the COVID-19 pandemic and restrictions imposed by the Somali federal government. But the programme was quick to adapt, for example, by undertaking activities online and temporarily minimising travel to and from Mogadishu. By 2021, delivery was back on track.

LPI followed important good practices which contributed to the programme's efficiency. These included:

- **Good working relationship with the donor** – LPI and donor respondents agreed that communication channels were effective, with regular meetings and quick engagement when risks were identified. There was trust between Sida and LPI, which allowed for pivots and necessary programme changes to be approved. Buy-in from MOYS partners opened up a whole network of connections and resources.

- **Effective delivery chain, with strong local partners** – As the programme leader, LPI is responsible for overall programme strategy, technical direction, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL). Its partners are responsible for delivering programme activities, and building relationships with key stakeholders to enable that delivery. These partners' long-standing experience in their areas and their key relationships have enabled the programme to be delivered effectively and efficiently, in line with local contextual norms and ways of working. According to its implementing partners, their relationship with LPI is very positive, with regular and frank communication, collaborative planning, and joint problem solving, which has been key to the programme's success.
- **Flexible and adaptive approach** – The programme has demonstrated its ability to adapt to a changing context and to new evidence. In 2021 it shifted its focus to youth after recognising the centrality of youth for long-term peacebuilding in key programme target areas. Similarly, in response to the impacts of drought, LPI was able to quickly work with ZZF to develop a proposal and secure emergency response funding from Sida. LPI's good working relationship with the donor and the quality of its partners was a central enabler to this.
- **Effective communication with programme participants** – LPI partners and programme participants reported that they were very satisfied with the level of communication under the programme. Again, this links to LPI's strong and long-standing relationship with its partners, and its partners' strong networks with the communities in which they work. Community leaders and programme participants expressed satisfaction with the level of consultation throughout programme delivery, not just at the design phase.

Despite these good practices, the programme's efficiency is hampered by its 'projectisation', a challenge which LPI has been seeking to manage. Whilst the programme has a singular overarching ToC and a set of overarching ToCs per outcome, its actual implementation is 'projectised', with a number of projects delivering results against the programme in different areas and with different timelines. Whilst this is understandable in light of the donor landscape, it does create a burden on the programme to manage individual projects separately, and to have to fundraise during the programme lifetime. Further, whilst the ToC allows projects, whilst separate, to still be 'slotted in' under one of the programme's outcomes, the different geographic scope of different projects (and project partners) limits the natural synergy and complementarity of a singular, unitary programme. This creates an additional burden on LPI to have to seek and seize opportunities for cross-project engagement and collaboration. LPI recognises this and has been trying to address the challenge by bringing in new donors.

EQ10 | Were M&E systems fit for purpose?

LPI has put in place a robust MEL system, which has enabled the programme to learn and adapt. The programme's MEL system is multi-layered, with programme partners overseeing and regularly reporting on programme activities, and LPI providing ongoing monitoring using partner reports, site visits, and engagements with programme participants. Importantly, LPI has prioritised learning under the programme, primarily through annual reflection meetings with its partners and mid-term reviews and evaluations (of individual projects and the programme as a whole). The reflection meetings are a particularly good practice, which the programme should continue to in future

iterations, as it enables not only a harvesting of outcomes, but cross-project and cross-partner sharing and learning.

The programme's reporting, however, is not fit-for-purpose, limiting readers' understanding of programme progress across multiple years and within each target area. The annual reports produced under the programme are structured in line with outcomes, as is its results framework. It is easy to understand the rationale behind this. Whilst structuring the reports and results framework by outcome *seems* the right approach to garner cumulative progress towards programme outcomes across all programme areas, the actual contexts and progress in each area are too different from each other to allow for this. To exacerbate the issue, the separation between outcomes 1 and 2 also makes for confusing reporting as some of the activities undertaken by women and youth platforms are reported across both outcomes.

Ultimately, progress over time would best be measured differently in each area, based on the context of that area – and reporting should be structured accordingly. Lastly, each annual report only reports on the year to-date, without data on the baseline at the start of that year. This limits readers' ability to understand the programme's cumulative progress to-date, across multiple years.

III.e Sustainability

EQ11 | To what extent are the programme's achievements likely to last beyond the programme?

11.1 Sustainability of peace agreements and peace platforms

The vast majority of community leaders and programme participants believe the peace agreements and peace platforms will endure without external support. Most community leaders reported that they believe their communities have seen the value of the peace platforms and peace agreements reached, and will therefore continue to engage in them even without support. They point to the fact that community members and leaders have participated voluntarily to-date and that many initiatives were taken without external support and by initiative of the platforms themselves. Community participants broadly shared this view, with respondents in Kismayo, Baidoa, and Matabaan highlighting that communities now see the value of peace and that the platforms are of benefit to the communities, so they will sustain them.

A key reason given for their sustainability is the improved skills of key community leaders and members. Community leaders in Abduwak, Guriel, and Herale underscored that the main reason that the platforms will endure is that they and members of their communities have the skills and experience required to keep the platforms operating. Community members, particularly women, in those locations as well as Matabaan, Baidoa, and Kismayo reiterated this point, highlighting that they have the conflict management and community outreach skills to keep the platforms alive.

Despite the majority of views on sustainability being positive, several of programme participants expressed that the peace agreements and platforms will end without support. Community leaders and participants were not aligned on the issue of sustainability. Of the 17 community leaders interviewed, only one (in Jowhar) expressed that the peace platform for his community will end without continued support. However, a large number of community respondents – in Balambale,

Mataban, Jowhar, Guriel, Baidoa, and Kismayo – raised the same concern. Their primary reason was financial, stating that individuals need financial support to be able to reach the platforms and that the platforms need funding to plan and engage in activities. Others, in Bergadid and Baidoa, coined it in terms of motivation/incentives, suggesting that without external support, communities will be less motivated to engage in and with the platforms.

11.2 Sustainability of changes in attitudes and perceptions

There is consensus among community leaders that women and youth will continue to participate because communities see the value in this – but that continued funding is required to help them. Community leaders overwhelmingly agree that women and youth will continue to be able to play an active role in the peace platforms and peacebuilding in their communities. The primary reason cited was that the communities, and elders, saw the value that their participation brings to help social cohesion and long-term peace. However, leaders in Kismayo, Jowhar, and Abduwak suggested that gains could be lost should the programme not continue, and that there was in fact a need to expand the programme and increase its public outreach and awareness work to get more communities to accept the role of women and youth as peacebuilders.

IV. Recommendations

This final section presents recommendations to LPI on how it can improve the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of its future programmes in Somalia.

Recommendation 1: LPI should consider adopting a more integrated, multi-dimensional approach in the design of the next programme.

Evidence shows that to address complex conflict systems, preventing violence and minimising risks, requires a cross-sector, multi-dimensional approach. In Somalia, this specifically requires adopting an approach that considers the HDP 'triple nexus' and the gender-climate-security nexus.

1.1 - The HDP 'triple nexus' - As the programme's own experience demonstrates, in Somalia, humanitarian needs and underdevelopment can undermine peacebuilding gains. To minimise that risk, LPI should adopt a HDP approach, identifying needs and designing interventions across the triple nexus. This does not mean that LPI needs to itself become a humanitarian and development actor – but rather that the programme should consider either closely collaborating and coordinating interventions with humanitarian and development programmes in the same area (for example, by leveraging ZZF's experience and other humanitarian work), or establishing a consortium with humanitarian and development actors, all delivering interventions within their own mandate in the same areas, towards the same outcomes.

1.2 - The Gender-Climate-Security nexus - LPI and its partners have a strong understanding of conflict in the target locations, and the role of natural resources, climate change, and gender in driving conflict. However, it is clear from the programme that climate change hazards such as drought and flooding are central to conflict dynamics, and that their impact on conflict is highly gendered. Adopting a triple nexus approach in Somalia requires deepening LPI's understanding of these complex relationships.

The Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers' (CGIAR) **Gender-Climate-Security nexus** sets out a comprehensive theoretical framing of how the impacts of climate change interact with gender and social inequalities to affect conflict and human security.[16] Recognising that climate change and its associated impact on conflict drivers and human security risks is not gender-neutral, the gender-climate-security nexus is an appropriate framework for guiding analysis on the gender differentiated drivers and impacts of climate change and conflict – and their interaction. LPI should consider using this framework to guide the analysis that will inform the design of the next phase of the programme.

Recommendation 2: LPI should consider developing ToCs per conflict system, rather than per outcome. Each programme target area is a unique conflict system characterised by locally-specific circumstances and dynamics. Also, each location has achieved different levels of progress under the programme, further underlining the requirement for an **area-based approach**. For each target area, LPI should therefore develop a specific, locally-determined ToC, based on local conditions and assumptions. This will ensure that the types, sequence, and approach to activities is tailored to each local conflict system's unique dynamics. The benefit of this area-based approach is that it enables a needs-based approach – programming is based on an understanding of what is needed to achieve programme outcomes within each target location, regardless of sector.

Recommendation 3: LPI should aim to establish an inclusive peace platform in all programme target areas, following the Kismayo model. Recognising that each target location should have its own ToC, the programme should identify good practice across areas and, where feasible, seek to replicate those in other areas (albeit through approaches tailored to each local context). The Kismayo integrated peace committee is one such example of a good practice that should be emulated elsewhere. By bringing together all three tracks (elders, women, and youth) into one inclusive platform it addresses the latent need for women and youth to feel that they are more meaningfully involved in and shaping the primary decision makers in their communities.

Recommendation 4: LPI should consider further expanding programme reach into rural areas (where possible due to security). It is understandable that the programme has focused primarily on urban areas, due to the security situation, and the concentration of populations there. However, as respondents in the evaluation highlighted, most violence is triggered in rural areas, so efforts to prevent violence should be centred on those areas, with a more deliberate and concerted effort to include rural youth into the programme's activities, not just through outreach and awareness raising, but also through its 'H' and 'D' interventions (or those of its collaborating partner programmes/organisations).

Recommendation 5: LPI should double down on areas of success, and explicitly capture positive unintended outcomes in its programme ToC. The programme's training and awareness raising activities were highly welcomed by communities – particularly due to their role in driving a key

[16] Caroli, G. et al (2022). The Gender-ClimateSecurity Nexus: Conceptual Framework, CGIAR Portfolio Review, and Recommendations towards an Agenda for One CGIAR. *Position Paper No. 2022/1*. CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. Available at: Link.

unintended programme outcome: the election of programme participants in public office. Those elected can now be allies for the programme and conflict transformation in Somalia more broadly, given their governance and policy making roles. The programme should explicitly integrate this into the ToC and more deliberately track how the outcome of training provided under the programme (skills, self-confidence) has broader governance benefits.

Recommendation 6: LPI should consider more directly engaging local authorities as beneficiaries, e.g. providing them with training and/or supporting them to lead activities. The improved engagement of local authorities in programme activities has notably improved their relationships with local communities, and the latter's perceptions of local authorities including the police. More concerted and tailored interventions aimed at building local authorities' capacities for conflict management, community engagement, and awareness raising could help deepen and consolidate these gains.

Recommendation 7: LPI should continue and strengthen its engagement with other programmes involved in policy making to develop a strategy for joint influencing of donors and FGS/FMS, and to coordinate/collaborate in programme implementation. In contexts like Somalia, peacebuilding organisations lack robust mechanisms for coordination and collaboration like the humanitarians'. LPI can multiply its policy influence by harnessing a more collective approach, which includes both implementers and donors in the developing of joint influence strategies, and which can facilitate learning between programmes – and between programmes and donors.

7.1 - LPI Somalia and IPIP, in collaboration with SPA, should update its study of policy space in Somalia to reflect current gaps, opportunities, and an up-to-date understanding of the political economy at the FGS and FMS level since the election of the new President.

Recommendation 8: LPI should develop (or utilise an existing) tool to more regularly and consistently assess the organisational capacity of its local partners and LPI's contributions to capacity-strengthening. Whilst there is anecdotal evidence that LPI has helped build the capacity of its CSO partners, the evaluation found no formal documentation of these capacity gains. LPI should consider developing or adapting existing CSO capacity assessment tools (e.g. GIZ's or USAID's) and use it to set standards and collect data over time of improvements in their partners' capacity. Given the centrality of CSOs to peacebuilding, and the sustainability of LPI's programming, this line of work should be explicitly integrated into the ToC.

Recommendation 9: LPI should develop an M&E and reporting system aligned with the new, area-based ToC. LPI's current M&E system is robust, but is not fit-for-purpose for an area-based approach. Adapting its M&E system and its reporting approach and templates will be essential to help assess programme performance in each target area against the corresponding ToC. Whilst LPI should still aim to set targets per outcome – aggregating progress across programme areas – milestones should be set per location, and reporting should be adjusted accordingly.

Recommendation 10: LPI should introduce quantitative surveying into its evaluations to more robustly assess changes in perceptions, attitudes, and norms. LPI's programming in Somalia ultimately aims to change communities and policy makers behaviours, which in turn may require changes in perceptions and attitudes. Measuring these changes requires adopting a more robust, quantitative evaluative approach, which collects longitudinal data from programme participants over time. This will complement the important qualitative data collected through the programme's outcome harvesting.

Recommendation 11: LPI should continue to try to raise funds for the programme as a whole, not individual projects. For the next phase of the programme, LPI should seek to secure funding from one single source, rather than have different funding streams and sources for different projects under the programme. This will reduce the fundraising burden throughout implementation, and will support a more coherent set of interventions across programme areas.

Doing so may not seem within LPI's control, but lessons could be drawn from good practice in other similar contexts. For example, LPI could engage Sida, its main and most long-standing donor, to propose an approach where Sida champions this cause, in turn engaging other donors to pool their funding together into one single pot, which Sida could administer.

V. Annexes

V.a Evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR)

ToRs LPI Somalia Programme Summative Evaluation_2023 Final.pdf

V.b Qualitative tools

KII/FGD Guide.docx