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Global Peacebuilding Policy

ANALYSING LOCAL-TO-GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

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Acknowledgements

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CBC	Cross-Border Cooperation project
CPAE	Collaborative Policy Analysis and Engagement Pilot
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
HARP	Horn of Africa Regional Programme
HLPF	High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IPIP	Inclusive Peace in Practice
LPI	Life & Peace Institute
NAP	National Action Plan
PAR	Participatory Action Research
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	United National Assistance Mission in Somalia

Introduction
The Purpose of this Report

June 2020

Over the past decade, there has been growing recognition of including local perspectives in global peacebuilding policy discussions. There are a small number of emerging good practices and coalitions of peacebuilding actors seeking to develop and deliver stronger results, demonstrating the value of more meaningful approaches to inclusion across the practitioner, academic, and donor spectrum. Despite this, it appears that the peacebuilding sector is still struggling with how to translate recognition of the importance of more meaningful local-to-global engagement into changes in practice — to translate the inclusion rhetoric, frameworks on paper, and norms of engagement into peacebuilding practice.

Part of the problem seems to be a mutual misunderstanding and a somewhat limited sense of value on both sides: local actors are seen as novel and parochial; the global is viewed as impenetrable, mechanical and irrelevant in cases. There appears to be a tendency for tokenistic and one-off engagements between global policymakers and local peacebuilders. The moments in which local and global meet and engage one another, such as in major global fora, often appears shallow, unequal, and usually serving the status quo. Interactions are frequently designed and dictated on global terms, with local actors invited and messages scripted on a one-time and short-term basis; these interactions also often perpetuate current power dynamics.[1] The interactions, institutions, and interface between local and global seem to be part of the problem: effective links in the chain from local to national, regional, and global are challenged by (geo)political, financial, and infrastructural factors.[2]

Against this backdrop, a growing complexity and an identity crisis in the peacebuilding sector are becoming key areas of discussion among international peacebuilding organisations. The multilateral institutions, upon which global peacebuilding policy centres, are in a period of change due to the weakening of the liberal international order and the rise of nationalism, populism, and isolationism.[3] The militarisation of peacebuilding and a trend toward securitised responses is growing, while new dynamics associated with forced displacement, climate risks, rising inequality, demographic change, increased urbanisation, new technologies, and increasingly internationalised conflicts are introducing further complexity.[4] The global peacebuilding architecture itself — the norms and institutions that constitute it — are being questioned on the grounds that these institutions respond slowly, lack flexibility, and are largely inaccessible to local actors,

1   Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request.
2   Ibid.
3   Ibid.
4   Key informant interview with INGO 9, May 2019.

A Note on Language

The use of language — to influence, build relationships, and appear credible — is a critical element of policy processes, including when connecting local peace actors with global decision-making.

However, the language of global peacebuilding is problematic for a number of reasons. It is unnecessarily ambiguous, and relies heavily on repetitive jargon. Further, it must be learnt and spoken in order to appear credible in traditional spaces of power (such as international peacebuilding fora taking place, for instance, in New York). Worse, the language reflects relationships of power. Widely used terms such as "global" refer implicitly to those in the north, from particular geographies, social and educational backgrounds, and "local", conversely, to individuals and groups living largely in the global south, that receive support from elsewhere — have their capacities built and agency strengthened, but do not do so by themselves. Other accepted labels such as "partner", "participant" and "beneficiary", equally, are not neutral, but instead imply a provider and a recipient. However, for now, a more equitable, power-oriented language — that is inclusive of a wide range of actors from different locations and backgrounds — is lacking. For this reason, Life & Peace Institute, too, uses this imperfect set of terms — with the above caveats.

resulting in global conversations that increasingly take place in a vacuum.[5] All of this is causing a moment of urgent reflection in the global peacebuilding policy space on what peacebuilding is, who is considered to be a peacebuilder, and how to respond in an inclusive multi-stakeholder manner to the growing complexity of the crises that are seen.

The inception of this report came from a desire, on the part of LPI, to understand the global peacebuilding policy space and the actors who operate in this space, as a means of guiding its own engagement in this space. In particular, LPI was interested to gauge how actors within the global peacebuilding policy space undertake and implement efforts to connect local perspectives to global policy discussions.[6] In conducting this research, LPI engaged with both international actors in the global peacebuilding policy space and with national, sub-national, and local civil society actors to better understand their differing views of the global peacebuilding policy system, and how the inclusion of local perspectives is taken into consideration.

A primary assumption underpinning this research is that by generating mutual understanding between local peacebuilding actors and global decision makers — of their respective roles, the deficits in their current engagement, and how to improve engagement — there will be more interest to engage one another. Increased mutual understanding between these two key sets of peacebuilding actors also has the potential to advance collaboration,

5   Key sources for this section include data on: conflict data, military armament, global military expenditure, global peacebuilding spending, definition of peacebuilding expenditure, global trust levels, understanding sustaining peace, and localising the SDGs

6   See Section One on methodology for full overview of the research process.

Box 1: Key Definitions Relevant to this Analysis

A number of key terms and definitions are used in this analysis. For reference, the most important working definitions are included here. These definitions remain imperfect and are works in progress to be further refined and adapted.

Policy:
This report defines the term "policy" as the broad realm (formal and informal) in which policies are developed, amended, implemented, and evaluated. This also includes changes in the behaviours of key policy actors – across both formal and informal decision makers. The term "policy" encompasses a broad range of possibilities, not simply the formal, official statutory policies developed by a government or formal institution but also those that are linked to customary governance. In addition, this term includes blurred areas where common practice may reflect an implicit or unwritten policy that is not formalised through legislation or written policy.

Global peacebuilding policy space:
This refers to the spaces where actors come together to discuss and define issues that have relevance and applicability at regional and global levels. Typically, these discussions are hosted by a multilateral body and include multiple stakeholders.

Global policy actors:
While recognising the complexity and fluidity of this term, this analysis uses the phrase "global policy actors" to refer to representatives of multilateral organisations (such as the United Nations, European Union, World Bank, African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development), along with politicians, technocrats and policymakers within these bodies and their individual members states (such as the G8 and other groups of states such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, collectively known as the BRICS countries), international peacebuilding practitioners, global research institutions.

Intermediaries:
This refers to a group of international non-governmental organisations, think tanks, research and policy institutions that work to connect local actors to global policy discussions.

Local actors:
While recognising the complexity and fluidity of this term, this analysis uses the term "local actors" to refer to national and sub-national civil society organisations, individual informal peacebuilders, community-based organisations, faith-based organisations, grassroots movements, and communities.

promote shared interests, and ultimately catalyse better policy responses. It may also serve to create greater respect and a more equal balance of power between the two. Looking at the current state of affairs from both the local and global perspectives, this report aims to highlight what methods and approaches are used by global actors to connect local actors to the global policy space, what opportunities there are for local actors to further engage with the global peacebuilding architecture, and what needs to shift in order to create greater inclusion and more meaningful participation for local peacebuilders.

Importantly, this analysis is not a study of actors, organisations, institutions, or policy frameworks per se, nor is it a comprehensive overview of the entire peace and security space. Rather, it is focused specifically on the global peacebuilding policy arena, and the engagements and practices used broadly by global actors to connect local actors to this space.

Structure of the Report

This report, and the research upon which it is based, focuses on the global peacebuilding policy space – the international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that operate at this level, along with the global policymakers and decision makers who occupy this space. The report is divided into four sections.

Section One
This section includes relevant background information specifically highlighting the methodology used in this analysis.

Section Two
This section examines the global peacebuilding policy space and how those operating in this space work to bridge the local–global gap in substantive ways, with a focus on common approaches and barriers to these approaches.

Section Three
This section shifts focus to local actors, including their perspectives on the global peacebuilding policy space and how they view efforts on the part of global actors to enable local inclusion and participation.

Section Four
This section presents some of the main insights gained through this research and concluding thoughts on what meaningful participation looks like, why it is important, and how global actors can work toward supporting more meaningful participation of local actors in global discussions.

Section One
Methodology

The process of developing this report has been multifaceted. It used a mixed methods approach that included both primary and secondary data collection over a period of 15 months.

Secondary data collection took place through a desk review and analysis of the global peacebuilding policy space. The actors analysed within this space were identified as being actively engaged in and influencing peacebuilding policy and advocacy at the global level, specifically connected to the three frameworks examined, with each having an active presence in a global policy capital.

The desk review involved analysis of official websites, along with internal and external reports related to their coverage of specific thematic/global frameworks deemed relevant to the global peacebuilding policy space:

1) Sustainable Development Goal 16+;

2) the Sustaining Peace Agenda (United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 2282, 2018 UNSG report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace);

3) the Inclusive Peace Agenda (UNSCR 1325 + 9, UNSCR 2250 and 2419);

4) the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and State-building, or the New Deal; and

5) global peacebuilding funding and financing.

To assist in harmonising the data collected from the organisations over these diverse themes, the Advocacy and Policy Change Composite Logic Model[7] and the Pathways for Change[8] frameworks were used as a guide to categorise and classify advocacy activities, outcomes, goals, and theories of change. The data was then analysed quantitatively and qualitatively to provide, where possible, an overview of peacebuilding advocacy trends, including thematic focus, theories of change, channels, targets, and expected outcomes.

As a result of this analysis of key themes and global frameworks, three were determined to be the most relevant to the global peacebuilding policy space:

1) Sustainable Development Goal 16+;

2) the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda of the UN Secretary-General; and

7 J. Coffman, H Astrid, B Masters, J Kaye, and T Kelly, *Advocacy & Policy Change Composite Logic Model and associated materials*, 2007, Available online at http://www.pointk.org/resources/node/87. This is a collaborative work by more than 50 advocates, grant makers, and evaluators that offers a way to improve communication in the advocacy evaluation field by articulating common goals, outcomes, and indicators.

8 Organizational Research Services, *Brief: Pathways for Change: 6 Theories about How Policy Change Happens*, 2009, Available online at https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/316071/Resources/Article/Pathways%20for%20change%206%20theories%20about%20how%20policy%20change%20happens.pdf. This document highlights six theories grounded in diverse social science disciplines and worldviews that have relevance to advocacy and policy change efforts.

3) the Inclusive Peace Agenda, which consists of the Women Peace and Security Agenda (United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 1325+9) and the Youth Peace and Security Agenda (UNSCR 2250, and UNSCR 2419).

These are the focus of this report.

In terms of primary research, 13 in-person interviews[9] were held to gather more in-depth information about practitioner perspectives on the dynamics of peacebuilding as a sector, working to build a fuller picture of how global actors engage in the global peacebuilding policy space, engage with one another, and work to connect local perspectives to the global policy space. In addition, LPI engaged in the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) in New York City in July 2019 through participation in the official delegation from Sweden and through its UN independent observer status as a means to deepen its understanding of the current state of play in multilateral global peacebuilding policy fora.[10]

A key component of primary research was also to connect with and better understand the perspectives of national and sub-national organisations working on the ground. To this end, LPI held a series of workshops with its partners and programmatic teams in four locations.[11] These workshops principally sought to glean how civil society actors perceive the state of higher level or global processes, particularly their observations concerning the accessibility, effectiveness, and relevance of these processes for their own work and the communities with which they engage.

Additional primary data was also collected on LPI experiences of the global peacebuilding policy space, given that the organisation is part of the same system subject to analysis in this report. In particular, LPI undertook a reflective exercise focused on organisational efforts to use various approaches to participatory policy engagement. This reflective exercise further considered the ways in which peacebuilding principles were embedded in these efforts. As part of this, LPI initiated a process to distil lessons and challenges across the most significant experiences the organisation has had to date in supporting bottom–up processes for policy engagement. This included an examination of what is meant by bottom–up, and indeed, whether LPI operates within this definition. During this reflective exercise, participants focused on three specific policy processes in key LPI programmes: Horn of Africa Regional Programme (HARP) experience with the Collaborative Policy Analysis and Engagement (CPAE)

9   Key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from of 13 peer organisations, including: Conciliation Resources, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), International Alert, Saferworld, Peace Direct, Christian Aid, European Commission Peace and Stability Unit, Center for International Cooperation (CIC), World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO). LPI recognises that this is not an exhaustive list of all organisations involved in global peacebuilding policy and advocacy, but serves as a snapshot of the sector.

10   At the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, LPI was part of the Voices of SDG16+ campaign. This campaign solicited video submissions from local peacebuilders prior to the forum and invited 11 selected individuals from a variety of contexts (including Afghanistan, Canada, Guatemala, Kenya, Nepal, the Philippines, Somaliland, Uganda, and Yemen) to the forum to present their work and engage in discussions. In addition, LPI convened two small gatherings—a New Table—on the sideline of the forum to collect more in-depth perspectives and experiences of the global peacebuilding policy space.

11   Eight workshops were held between December 2018 and March 2019 in Addis Ababa, Kismayo, Nairobi and Uppsala with LPI staff and partners. The report from these sessions is available upon request.

12 In 2018, the CPAE Pilot, a joint initiative between Intergovernmental Authority on Government Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD CEWARN), Inter Africa Group, Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, and LPI (together known as the Quartet) was initiated. The Quartet identified the informal cross-border trade – cross-border security governance nexus as a critical policy dilemma in the IGAD region and has been working to build support for a regional policy framework and participatory policy development process throughout the IGAD region. In 2019, the policy framework was adopted by IGAD member states. LPI experience from the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) project also factors into analysis. The CBC is a major civil society-led initiative launched in March 2017. In addition to its own partners, LPI engages with 26 local civil society organisations (CSOs) in 4 countries and 5 border areas (Moyale, Ethiopia; Moyale, Kenya; Busia, Uganda; Busia, Kenya; and Kassala, Sudan) to increase the participation and contribution of civil society on regional and continental cross-border policies that affect communities at the borders, such as the Niamey Convention. For more information, see: https://life-peace.org/our-work/horn-of-africa

13 The 2018 LPI publication, *Increasing Women's Participation and Inclusion in Jubbaland Peace Processes: Learning from Kismayo*, examines the gendered dynamics of inter-clan conflict in Kismayo, Somalia, and in particular the role of women in processes of violence and peace. The study report forms an exciting contribution to understanding the ways in which violence in Somalia is constructed and promoted, and prompts questions around long-held assumptions on the position of women in relation to this violence. The findings also highlight pathways for practical action to promote greater participation by women in peace processes, both in Somalia and in conflict-affected states more broadly. For more information, see https://life-peace.org/resource/learning-from-kismayo

14 PAR is an iterative process in which groups of people come together to grapple with a serious social issue that affects them in their daily lives. In principle, participants design the process, define the action-research questions and goal, choose the methods, interpret the results, and draw conclusions about the implications of what they have learnt.

Pilot process (2014–2018);[12] Somalia Programme experience on the Kismayo research (2016–2018)[13] and the locally driven policy recommendations development exercise currently being undertaken as part of a broader women-to-women dialogue process; and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Programme experience with bottom–up (or bottom–bottom) policy engagement around land management in the framework of Participatory Action Research (PAR) processes.[14]

The analysis in this report hopes to provide a snapshot of the state of local-to-global engagement in the global peacebuilding policy space, as this is seen from the perspectives of different actors. It is not meant as a critique of either actions or actors. Rather, this analysis hopes to provoke thinking on what global actors should be more aware of when working in the global peacebuilding policy space to connect local actors with international policy decision-making, as a means of encouraging all actors in the peacebuilding sector, LPI included, to be more considered in approaches to inclusive peacebuilding policy work.

Section Two
The Global Peacebuilding Policy Space: Bridging the Local-to-Global Gap

The desk review, which looked at secondary data largely derived from intermediary actors working within the global peacebuilding policy field, shows that a majority of these actors primarily focus on both policy engagement work and practical peacebuilding programming on the ground, versus only policy and advocacy-oriented work, or only research-oriented work.

In undertaking work to engage the global peacebuilding policy space, desk study findings indicate that three main methods are used by intermediary actors:

1) *a combination of top–down and bottom–up approaches, meaning they endeavour to link their work with communities to their policy work at the global leadership level;*
2) *a top–down approach, concentrating their efforts on senior leadership at the global level; and*
3) *a local community-based approach, focusing work at the community level only.*

In terms of bridging the local-to-global gap, desk study findings identify the top four primary activities and approaches used by intermediary actors.[15] These include:

1) *direct engagement and convening;*
2) *evidence generation;*
3) *coalition and network building; and*
4) *working through existing policy frameworks to provide local perspectives and input.*

The remainder of this section takes a closer look at these top four methods, discussing the details of engagement and examining both the challenges and innovations that accompany these approaches. While it is understood that there are many other methods and means of engaging in the local-to-global space, these are the four prominent methods that emerge from the research process.

2.1 Direct Engagement and Convening
The term "direct engagement" is defined here as a situation in which local actors are brought into the global peacebuilding policy space for direct

15 These categories overlap (e.g. policymaker, education, and briefings/presentations, as well as policy recommendations), but they have been disaggregated simply to demonstrate the types of common activities.

interaction with decision makers. It also refers to situations in which global policymakers come to meet with local actors in country contexts. Direct engagement is commonly seen by global peacebuilding actors as an effective means to influence policy processes. It works by creating space to share local experiences and reflections with global decision makers who otherwise would not hear this information.[16] This form of engagement can be used at a variety of stages in the policy process, including agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and assessment, or evaluation of policies.[17]

While direct engagement is often seen as offering information to global actors, it holds both benefits and challenges for local actors themselves. Direct engagement with global actors can have an alienating effect on local participants, with perceptions of selling out or becoming a high-flyer, thus reducing the legitimacy of a local participant to engage on behalf of the broader community she or he represents. Conversely, direct engagement can offer a degree of legitimacy and power to the local actors who participate in such global fora, when returning to the areas in which they work. In many cases, this experience translates downward as an increased legitimacy for local actors to engage in their country contexts.[18]

A challenge that follows direct engagement is that inclusion and participation in global peacebuilding policy processes often still means being invited to participate in a system of power and adapting to it, rather than transforming the system. It could be argued, however, that the very fact of inviting local actors to participate in the global peacebuilding policy space is transforming the system away from an elite-only club towards a more inclusive space. Nonetheless, most civil society engagement with UN agenda setting occurs through invited spaces, where the terms of discussion are largely pre-determined by global policy actors.[19] Much of these engagements take place in one-off, ad hoc, shallow, and tokenistic engagements that involve bringing local peacebuilders up from where they are to speak directly with policymakers in places such as New York.[20] These spaces are also often accompanied by bureaucratic hurdles, formality, and specific language and terminology that make it both difficult to engage and potentially intimidating for local actors.[21]

These realities surrounding where engagement takes place further divide global spaces and local realities. Both the geography of discussions and the terms of the spaces in which they take place are decided by those who live outside conflict environments. There are a variety of reasons for this. On the one hand, this is linked to the entrenched power of particular countries

16 Life & Peace Institute, *Global Peacebuilding Policy and Advocacy Mapping*, March 2019; key informant interview with INGO 1, August 2019.

17 Life & Peace Institute, *Participatory Policy Engagement: A Learning Paper*, forthcoming 2020.

18 Life & Peace Institute, *Validation Workshop in Somalia*, October 2019; LPI Validation Workshop in Kenya, October 2019.

19 Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request. An example of this is the UN–Civil Society Workshop Group. This group is made up of UN agencies and three civil society organisations, and is working to develop system-wide guidelines for UN community engagement practices. Having civil society invited into the room with UN actors to work as equal partners on a traditionally internal UN process is a positive step forward in terms of hybrid spaces for meaningful engagement.

20 Key informant interview with INGO 7, September 2019.

21 Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request. Key informant interview with INGO 7, September 2019.

(largely in the global north), legacies associated with former colonial powers, established infrastructure, and the normalisation of specific locations as policy capitals where discussions with global applicability take place. On the other, this pertains to more practical, logistical, and security-related considerations that prevent peace-related conversations taking place in conflict-affected environments.

Compounded with administrative and logistical challenges, including visa requirements and issuance of security advisories or clearances, the global peacebuilding policy space is becoming much more exclusionary. Visa approval can be random or arbitrary, based on bank balances or previous passport stamps, for instance. In some cases, once a local peacebuilder is rejected, she or he cannot apply again for visa. Applications take time and limit travel while being processed.[22]

A further challenge linked to direct engagement as a method of connecting local-to-global in a meaningful way is that it is difficult to gauge the lasting impact of this form of engagement for local actors. If a local peacebuilder is brought to the table in a global space but nothing changes as a result, the (international) organisation that brought in the local peacebuilder often improves its standing in the eyes of the global (e.g. by appearing more locally connected), rather than building the positionality of the local peacebuilder in question.[23]

As a means of overcoming some of these barriers to direct engagement, the peacebuilding sector is increasingly using created and creative spaces for engagement in the global peacebuilding policy arena. The increased use of virtual reality and video links is an innovative approach to facilitating the participation of local actors in more direct engagement with policymakers. [24] For example, in July 2019 on the sidelines of the High-Level Political Forum in New York, a coalition of organisations (including LPI) came together to use video as a means of sharing more local perspectives in the global policy discussions around Sustainable Development Goal 16. The videos showcase the work of local peacebuilders, and the individuals implementing the work were themselves invited to New York to explain their approaches, aspirations, and challenges to global policymakers. The events hosted around this campaign added a human element to discussions – providing testimonies that connect the thematic jargon of global decision-making to the realities of peacebuilding in difficult, conflict-affected environments.

22 Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request. Key informant interview with INGO 7, September 2019; key informant interview with INGO 10, September 2019.

23 Life & Peace Institute, *Validation Workshop Learning Summary Note*, October 2019.

24 Life & Peace Institute, *Kenya Validation Workshop*, October 2019.

Figure 1. Graphic recording of the Voices of SDG16+ campaign event, in which local peacebuilders were given space to present their work and the challenges they face.

There also is an increasing focus on working and preparing for engagement both by local peacebuilding actors and global decision makers. Termed "preparing for voice", this approach works with local peacebuilding actors to prepare them for their engagement with decision makers through a range of actions designed to build their confidence and momentum, and create clear messages and statements to convey to global policymakers. Included in this process are more frequent horizontal exchanges, coalition building, and mentoring programmes that aim to both enhance the capacity of local actors and create new opportunities for engagement. For the local actors who will participate in the exchange, this entails offering them the assistance they often need to be ready and able to express their thoughts, reflections, and experiences in ways that provide the best chance they will be heard and have an impact, as defined by actors already engaged in the global space — the ones doing the inviting.[25]

There is, however, disproportionately more time spent on preparing local actors to engage in the global policy space than on cultivating the appetite and resonance among the policymakers in those global fora to listen. While working with and supporting local actors is essential, in order to more sustainably shift how local actors are perceived, create an openness

25 Life & Peace Institute, *Participatory Policy Engagement: A Learning Paper*, forthcoming 2020.

to new forms of evidence and experiences, and see and understand these inputs as valuable to policy discussions, it is also necessary to step up engagement with global policymakers to ensure that they are ready to hear and engage in a sensitive manner with the local actors with whom they will be interacting.

As a means of overcoming the increasingly restricted nature of the invited global spaces, efforts are being made to create new spaces for direct engagement. This often entails organisations either creating or claiming parallel spaces where more open discussions between global and local actors can be held and their views can be shared. These are also sites in which there is both less competition for space (for instance, with those who may hold more social power than other participants) and fewer restrictions, thus creating a more level playing field between local and global actors, as well as removing the political restrictions and sensitivities that come with formal spaces.[26]

An example of this is the use of dinner parties, where global and local actors come together around a dinner table set in a unique environment, outside the usual day-to-day operating space of either set of actors. The aim of this format for direct engagement is to create an intimate and more equal space where global and local actors, who otherwise may not engage with one another, can come together to share and exchange ideas on a topic without the formality and pressure that is often found in formal spaces.

2.2 Bringing Evidence

The call for evidence of what is working in peacebuilding and what is needed to best continue and support this work is increasingly heard in the global peacebuilding policy space. In many cases, this evidence is focused on looking at what local actors are doing to implement peace and how policies connect to this or what role global actors can play to support this local work. Research to gather relevant evidence is being conducted by academics, research institutions, think tanks, and civil society organisations all over the world. This is seen as a way of connecting peacebuilding practices at the local level with policy discussions at the global level. Rarely, however, are local actors given the power to direct the research, analysis, and its uses — despite having the capabilities and knowledge to do so.

This analysis of the types of evidence gathered and the role this evidence plays finds that there are three predominant forms of evidence:

26 LPI is currently pioneering an approach to dinner table engagements with a diverse group of stakeholders. The first instance of this format of convening was alongside the participation in the July 2019 HLPF, where LPI developed and tested a concept for taking the conversations out of the grand halls of the United Nations to informal dinner gatherings in Harlem, one of New York's historically marginalised communities. In collaboration with Vincenzo Cavallo of Nairobi-based production company Cultural Video Productions/the NRB Bus, the two facilitated small dinners were filmed in order to share the conversations with a broader audience. The final format has been finalised as a web series of key issues from the conversations. They will be translated and sub-titled to reach diverse audiences. LPI is planning to release and promote the series on social media (with shorter clips) on various non-profit, UN and Swedish government handles and through screening at key global events in the autumn of 2020.

1) technical, quantitative, social science-driven data;
2) technical, qualitative, social-science driven data; and
3) experiential, lived, story-based data.

Among these three types, there is a hierarchy of evidence that is seen as useful and relevant for policy discussions. In the main, technical, quantitative and social-science driven data (the first type) is preferred over the other two forms. Evidence that is measurable and technical gets priority and is largely associated with professionalism, analytical gravitas, and applicability to policy discussions.[27]

In contrast to this, this analysis also finds that experiential, lived, story-based data (the third type) is often perceived as a novelty rather adding substance to global discussions. In general, this type of data is not seen by global policymakers or intermediaries as able to influence decisions. Testimonies and expositions on local experiences of conflict become lip service and are used for public relations. In global fora, local peacebuilders are often asked to speak from the heart and tell stories, with their presentations perceived as touching or moving, which further diminishes the value of their input and their role in shaping policy discussions. Local peacebuilders also (erroneously) tend to be referred to as a homogenous group, sharing emotive stories to contextualise discussions but without impact on decision-making processes, which further perpetuates the distance and inequality between local and global actors.[28]

An intrinsic challenge revealed by this analysis is that discussions about generating evidence appear to revolve around issues related to the kinds of expertise that are prioritised and who is actually considered an expert on a given topic. The impact of this is commonly seen in whose voice is heard in sharing research, both verbally and in written form. There is an inherent bias toward those researchers and analysts who demonstrate analytical rigour and can contextualise the issues in a paradigm, translate this into policy talk, and speak objectively as the experts on the issues; those who have lived the issues and have stories of how they have felt about these experiences are of far lesser importance to the global policy space.[29]

A further challenge is that the peacebuilding sector suffers from insufficient methodological approaches that both shift perceptions of experiential data and elevate this beyond secondary evidence so that this type of evidence sits alongside primary quantitative data and academic research. If efforts can be made to shift the perceptions of policy actors so that it is not only academic research or quantitative data that they see as relevant, then there is likely to be greater parity of the different types

27 Key informant interview with INGO 5, May 2019.
28 Life & Peace Institute, *Inclusive Peace in Practice Report*, April 2019.
29 Life & Peace Institute, *Discourse Analysis Report*, forthcoming 2020.

of evidence that are taken into account in framing policy content. In this regard, evidence and data based on the lived experiences of people then becomes centralised and legitimised, rather than being seen as simply a few supplementary anecdotes, stories, and supporting testimonials.[30]

2.3 Working in Coalitions

Forming and working in alliances and coalitions is emerging as a core approach on the part of intermediaries to engage in the global peacebuilding policy space. This is a means of joining forces on issues, reducing competition, and increasing both knowledge and access to policymakers. In analysing this trend in the global peacebuilding policy space, research findings indicate that collaboration between organisations and broader multi-organisation coalitions are commonly seen as a method of working together to support local engagement in the global peacebuilding policy space. Analysis of the 20 projects operating in the global peacebuilding policy space reveals 7 distinct forms of coalition. The most common form is multi-level collaboration,[31] followed by multi-level coalitions.[32] Interestingly, this analysis also indicates that only 8% of the total projects involve a direct partnership with local actors. There are no coalitions exclusively or predominantly with local actors. What this indicates is that there is much more interest in working together informally on an issue area for a specified period of time than in formalising a long-term coalition.

30 Life & Peace Institute, *Participatory Policy Engagement: A Learning Paper*, forthcoming 2020. LPI is currently pioneering a project using this form of research approach the LPI resilience research initiative. This approach to research and evidence generation focuses on empowering the individuals providing the evidence, rather than those asking for it. It allows members of the communities being researched to define research priorities, questions and ethics, and hands power over to respondents by giving them control over the modalities, location, and duration of data collection processes. Further, community members participate in data analysis processes and in making sense of the findings, while the final research products are launched in the sites in which the data was gathered.

31 Collaboration is defined as a partnership with one or more other organisations in this context, whereby there are a limited number of actors working formally or informally toward a common mutually beneficial and specific goal over a limited time frame.

32 A coalition is defined as a formal alliance of a larger number of organisations working toward a broader common goal, whereby individual members might not pursue every initiative of the coalition, but still work toward the broader common goal.

Figure 2. Analysis of forms of partnership in the global peacebuilding policy space

- Multi-level collaboration
- Multi-level coalitions
- Collaboration with regional and global actors
- Coalitions with regional and global actors
- Collaboration with local-global actors
- Projects consisiting of solo ventures
- Unclear in how they worked with other actors

42%
19%
16%
9%
8%
4%
2%

Increasingly, it is observed that organisations decide it is beneficial to work together to coordinate capacity on an issue. This method is also seen as a more effective means to engage policymakers than approaching them on an individual (organisational) basis. In addition, collaborations offer opportunities to be more explicit and strategic in coming together, to be more open with one another, and to build trusted relationships and links across sectors.[33] Given the degree of fragmentation in the peacebuilding policy space, policymakers appreciate it when key messaging on issues is both shared and coherent. Collaborations also offer opportunities to work toward common goals, and to pool resources and capacities.[34] Donors, too, increasingly recognise the value of consortia and coalitions that work across sectoral and organisational divides.

The challenge is, however, that consortia and coalitions can be driven by funding imperatives, rather than by movement building, collective impact, or principles. In large part, this is due to reliance on donor funding, as well as the changing nature of funding in the INGO sector. The limited number of donors and available funds often appears to promote competition and mistrust among organisations rather than collaboration toward common goals – though some funding requirements do stipulate applying and/or working in a coalitions or collaborative projects in their guidelines. In many cases, however, only a limited number of (international) NGOs are able to meet the requirements to apply for these funds.

The financial survival of an INGO is a consideration that also feeds into the positions the organisation takes publicly, its willingness to work with others, and the priorities and practices it follows. At times, the funding infrastructure is seen to conflict with organisational values and practices; however, contracts cannot be rejected. Transparency also becomes challenging because organisational niches must be carved out in order to secure income.[35] This can foster competition or even give rise to conflict within peacebuilding organisations.

When looking at the prominence of informal collaboration over formal coalitions, these trends make sense in the context of differing motivations guiding collaboration among management (potentially prioritising institutional considerations), and individual staff members (whose concern may be more closely associated with individual programmatic or policy goals). Individuals engaging at the programme level may find more scope, interest, and capacity to work with others on a specific issue than to secure buy in from the management of their organisations for formal coalitions.[36] Management bears the burden of responsibility for competitiveness,

33 Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request.

34 Key informant interview with INGO 4, July 2019.

35 Life & Peace Institute, *Participatory Policy Engagement: A Learning Paper*, forthcoming 2020.

36 Key informant interview with INGO 4, July 2019.

and must also meet requirements to be attentive to cost recovery and institutional financial sustainability; corporate identity often conflicts with the need to set aside an individual identity to join a coalition.[37]

2.4 Using Frameworks

The term "frameworks" is used to refer to a mix of documents, policies, and agendas developed at the global level to identify priorities, catalyse conversations, allocate financing, and guide action in conflict contexts. Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of multilateral initiatives, frameworks, and resolutions created to address the drivers of conflict and guide work to build long-term sustainable peace, with a focus on supporting local peacebuilding. Most notably, UN member states unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (also known as the 17 SDGs, or the Global Goals) in September 2015.

Following adoption of the SDGs, the UN Secretary-General issued the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace Agenda. This agenda emerged as a result of an expert advisory group independent review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in 2015, which was formalised in the 2016 twin security council and general assembly resolutions (S/RES/2282 and A/RES/70/262). Running simultaneously, the Inclusive Peace Agenda is gaining global momentum with UNSCR 1325 and the nine subsequent resolutions that make up the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda[38] and the more recent Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda (UNSCRs 2250 and 2419), which highlights the agency of young people and their capacity to contribute to peace processes.[39]

In looking at how global peacebuilding actors use and engage with these various frameworks, both the Inclusive Peace Agenda and the Sustaining Peace Agenda appear to be used more as frameworks guiding work for peacebuilding organisations than SDG 16+ (on peacebuilding). The reasons for these preferences on the part of INGOs are likely complex, involving broader issues related to the accessibility and availability of donor funding streams, as well as their own organisational mandates. This may also be exacerbated by the silos that have been created within the UN system, whereby there is development work, on the one hand, and peace and security work, on the other. In terms of engagement, there are number of stages in the policy cycle that actors can and do engage: agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, monitoring and assessment, and the evaluation of policies. Each of these stages more or less offers entry points to engage. Overall, this analysis finds that global peacebuilding actors view these frameworks as a way to both champion

37 Life & Peace Institute, *Power Analysis Workshop Report*, March 2019. Report available upon request.

38 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 (2009); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2106 (2013); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2122 (2013); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019); United Nations Security Council Resolution 2493 (2019).

39 Life & Peace Institute, *Global Mapping Report*, May 2019.

issues and ensure local perspectives are heard at each stage in the policy cycle.

In studying these frameworks, this analysis finds that most are developed and defined at the global level, often with limited input from local actors. In some cases, there has been civil society pressure for particular frameworks; for instance, the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda (UNSCR 1325) or SDG 16+, which remain frameworks with very strong civil society engagement.[40] Usually, this leads to civil society providing forms of technical support to the development of frameworks through advice, language checks, provision of evidence to support positions, and other inputs — often from within the existing global policy system, with civil society actors both operating firmly within the existing policy domain, and replicating its terminology and discourse.[41]

A central element and focus of these frameworks is the process of national-level implementation and monitoring processes, commonly known as "localisation".[42] With the realisation that many of these frameworks lack meaning and relevance at the local and national levels, localisation has shifted to put increasing emphasis on contextualising internationally agreed goals and norms to the local level and finding ways to apply them formally at the level of domestic governments, communities, households, and individuals.[43] The challenge is, however, that the process of localisation is often prescribed and implemented by global policymakers. This involves training local actors in the frameworks, translating policy frameworks into local languages, socialising local actors to the concepts, terms, and processes of identifying relevant peacebuilding activities, and formulating ways of showing progress in achieving goals and indicators.[44]

Policy frameworks and their localisation have the potential to shift how meaningful participation is understood and implemented. In particular, policy frameworks can encourage new forms of engagement and interaction between local and global actors. For example, government, civil society, and multilateral actors can collaborate on frameworks. They frequently have targets attached to them (or outline broader aspirations), progress toward which is regularly assessed and discussed. Some are legally binding, while others are rhetorical commitments.[45] There is an opportunity to use the policy windows that are created via particular frameworks as openings to advance positions and principles on peacebuilding, and to put local perspectives to the forefront. Giving input into the development, implementation, evaluation, and revision of these frameworks can influence the processes associated with these activities.

40 Key informant interview with INGO 7, September 2019.

41 Ibid.

42 For UNSCR 1325, this domestication or localisation process primarily took place through National Action Plans (NAPs). A total of 79 (39%) UN member states have developed NAPs as of September 2018. Despite this relative progress, NAPs have been critiqued for not touching local realities on the ground, and for largely remaining a tick box exercise with no transformative potential.

43 Key informant interview with INGO 13, September 2019.

44 Key informant interview with INGO 13, September 2019.

45 Life & Peace Institute, *Global Peacebuilding Policy and Advocacy Mapping Report*, March 2019.

Using frameworks is about finding the entry points and seizing or creating opportunities to shift discussions, while recognising that it takes a long time for global policy institutions to change.

Once adopted, frameworks offer a means to hold UN member states accountable to implementing what they have endorsed. The twin sustaining peace resolutions (in 2016 and 2018), for example, have inclusion at their core. This is a landmark move to which all member states (not just security council members) are signatories. There is power behind this fact and it is critical for civil society actors globally to use that power.[46] Frameworks also have the potential to act as levers to hold governments accountable, and offer entry points to engage governments on topics that previously may have been off limits. They also define a set of pathways for accountability at both country and global level, through which government and multilateral actors can be held responsible for fulfilling these commitments.

At the same time, these frameworks also create new required knowledge, and an ever-expanding set of jargon to be learnt in order to be seen as a legitimate or official peacebuilder by the global architecture, and therefore be well placed to receive financing. Despite being designed in global spaces, accountability for the success of these frameworks often primarily remains with local actors and civil society.

Section Three
National, Sub-National, and Local Civil Society Reflections on the Global Peacebuilding Policy Space

While there is often an assumption that the global peacebuilding policy space and its associated frameworks are either unknown or irrelevant to actors working in country contexts, the research process undertaken as part of this report begins to tell a different story. This section shifts the focus of analysis away from perspectives of global actors to the perceptions of local actors. It examines views among local actors of the global peacebuilding policy space, asking whether there is interest to engage, and identifies the challenges experienced when trying to engage with the global space.

3.1 Perceptions of the Global Peacebuilding Policy Space

The initial exploration for this report began by asking 109 national and sub-national civil society actors with whom LPI works in four locations — Addis Ababa, Kismayo, Nairobi and Uppsala[47] — about their interest in and knowledge of the global peacebuilding policy space and the various peacebuilding agendas within it. An initial finding indicates that a majority of those who participated in these discussions see their own value in the global peacebuilding policy space and have an appreciation for engagement. At the same time, these respondents express a need for support and direction on how to practically engage with this space, including how to access the entry points to these global processes and how to prepare so their perspectives will be heard at this level.[48]

Figure 4. Perceptions of local actors on engaging with the global peacebuilding policy space

34% With some support, I know I can contribite to discussions and fora.

26% I would like to contibute, but do not think I would be heard.

24% I am not interested in engaging in global peacebuilding policy discussions.

16% I see the relevance of engaging, but do not know how to get involved.

47 Reports are available from these workshops upon request.
48 Life & Peace Institute, *Mid-Year Report*, June 2019.

More than half of those sampled are unsure of exactly how many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) there are. More than one-third are also unaware of the other nine UN security council resolutions relating to women — beyond knowing of UNSCR 1325. Nearly half are unclear on the core theme of UNSCR 2250 (Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda).

While the sample size is relatively small, and analysis of a larger set of actors is needed, these research findings raise two key points. Firstly, policy content information is not trickling down to those engaged in peacebuilding practices. Secondly, decisions being taken in global policy fora are not particularly consultative. As the current policy process typically operates, once a given policy framework has been officially adopted, there are usually efforts to localise that policy, with local peacebuilding actors expected to adapt to and implement these agendas. The evidence that emerges from this research suggests, however, that this is not always the case in reality. Rather, the research seems to suggest that there is a large-scale chasm developing between the global platforms created for policy generation and local peacebuilding practice.[49]

A more in-depth analysis of where the LPI participants are based reveals that more respondents based in Kismayo, Somalia feel resonance with the global peacebuilding policy space than those participants from the other three locations. In analysing this further, and considering the long-term presence of the international community in Somalia — the role of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and now United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), as well as the impact of the international donor community — a hypothesis can be formulated about exposure to, levels of interest in, and potential understanding of the role (both positive and negative) that the global community can play.[50] That is, the more exposure LPI participants have to the international community, the more interest and understanding they show in the global peacebuilding policy space.

By contrast, Kenya-based respondents with whom LPI engaged as part of this report process are, broadly, more critical of the global peacebuilding policy space, approaching it with larger degree of distrust and scepticism. These actors LPI engaged with in Kenya, including many of their partners, have more limited engagement with the international community in the work being done. Global decision-making on peacebuilding is viewed as both difficult to access and monopolised by particular actors. It is also seen as an exclusionary space, detached from the issues discussed, and inherently biased towards global interests. Respondents in Kenya assert

49 Life & Peace Institute, *Mid-year Report*, June 2019.
50 Life & Peace Institute, *Inclusive Peace in Practice Report*, April 2019

that the physical experience of a particular geographical location should inform where policy processes take place.[51]

3.2 Perceptions of Local-to-Global Engagement

When asking this same set of actors about their reflections on local-to-global engagements in terms of how, when, and to what degree local actors are brought into the policy and agenda setting processes, there are both negative and positive perceptions of the role global actors. Several reflections clearly emerged during this research process.

Firstly, a number of respondents reflect that they are not engaged as equal participants in the system. They often see that their communities are utilised as raw material or data for policy decisions: either they are used as evidence or as a means to sway discussions. Participants further observe that most global panels lack adequate representation of women, young people, and minority groups. Largely, it is noted that there is little ethnic or cultural diversity in discussions held in the global peacebuilding policy space.[52]

Secondly, respondents reflect that it is often the case that when invited into the global peacebuilding policy space, policymakers and intermediaries tend to refer to local peacebuilders as a homogenous group; for instance, they refer to the voices of youth, the voices of women, or the voices of marginalised groups. Further, in gatherings in global space, such as the High-Level Political Forum in New York City in July 2019, there is a tendency to refer to local peacebuilders by their first name, instead of using a more formal form of address, which is often reserved for global actors, thus further diminishing the input and role of local actors in the global peacebuilding policy space.[53]

Numerous respondents also highlight that there is a tokenistic selection process involved in identifying who to invite to participate in the global space. Frequently, members of a diaspora community or intellectuals who have academic qualifications and theoretical perspectives join discussions as experts. Crucially, however, these interlocutors do not always have practical experiences of the issues at hand nor do they necessarily know much about realities on the ground. This selection process indicates an inherent bias toward those who demonstrate analytical rigour and can contextualise the issues in a paradigm, translate this into policy talk, and speak objectively as experts on the issues versus those who have lived the issues.[54] According to the national, sub-national, and local civil society actors consulted for this research, many of these experts are actually

51 Life & Peace Institute, *Kenya Validation Workshop*, October 2019.
52 Key informant interview with INGO 10, September 2019.
53 Ibid.
54 Life & Peace Institute, *Discourse Analysis Report*, forthcoming 2020.

perceived as disconnected from grassroots realities or the particular issue to which a given engagement is designed to respond.

Lastly, respondents observe that the physical location of these local–global engagements at the global level are often far removed from the geography, community, or issue being discussed. As respondents indicate, this gap creates the potential for a disconnect between policy conversations and the reality on the ground, as well as an emotional and motivational disconnect from the issues, which together potentially hampers the effectiveness of any policy developed in global policy spaces.[55]

55 Life & Peace Institute, *Somalia Validation Workshop Report*, October 2019.

Section Four
Conclusion

4.1 Concluding Insights

This report provides a snapshot of the current state of local-to-global engagement within the global peacebuilding policy space from the perspective of both local and global actors, with focused attention on how inclusion and participation of local perspectives is undertaken. It highlights what methods and approaches are used by global actors to connect local actors to the global peacebuilding policy space, as well as presents some of the views national, sub-national, and local civil society peacebuilding actors have and the challenges they define regarding the global peacebuilding policy space.

Based on the discussions and engagement processes conducted for this research, this report offers eight considerations that aim to challenge and promote deeper thinking on meaningful local-to-global engagement.

1. *Assumptions:*
   Local and global stakeholders appear to hold (potentially unfounded, and often unhelpful) assumptions about one another. Even if implicit, global decision makers tend to view local peacebuilding actors as parochial, informal, and novel in their views. Equally, local actors articulate a global space that is disconnected, lacking in applicable knowledge, and slow-moving. They clearly indicate that they are not adequately represented by or in this space.

2. *The sector:*
   According to the individuals and organisations consulted for this report, the international peacebuilding sector is approaching a crossroads, with multiple potential trajectories: increased professionalisation, bureaucracy, formality, and entry into the mainstream; risk of capture by military and security interests, with norms and principles of peacebuilding taken up by agendas that advance national interests over peacebuilding outcomes; or becoming increasingly cautious, sensitive, and quiet, but politically savvy.

3. *Speaking and listening:*
   Much more is known about how to build the capacity of local peacebuilding actors to engage in global fora than on cultivating the appetite and resonance of global actors to listen

to them at the global for a they organise. Gradually, however, a realisation is beginning to emerge on need to prepare policymakers to value the evidence and perspectives that local peacebuilders bring to global discussions (and subsequently take action based on this).

4. *Coalitions:*

Disagreements exist among intermediary actors (INGOs, think tanks, research institutes) on both the form and function of multi-organisational coalitions. While these actors often work together, based on a variety of funding imperatives and policy objectives, the findings of this research indicate that members of coalitions, based on these findings, often have different views, hold (self-defined) contrasting identities, and in some cases are actively distrustful of one another.

5. *Power through language:*

The terms used by the global peacebuilding architecture (the authors of this study are not an exception) reflect dated structures of power, including those that peacebuilding INGOs have spent significant time and effort dismantling. For instance, and however unintentionally, the term "global" continues to refer to those in the global north and in western capitals, as well as former colonial powers. Conversely, the term "local" continues to refer to those civil society actors in the global south who operate in conflict-affected areas, have their capacity built, and are often cast in language that evokes victimhood.

6. *Access:*

The ability of local peacebuilding actors to reach and participate in global discussions is limited by practical obstacles — the need for visas, passports, literacy, and use of the English language. Participation is also limited by geographic barriers, with major decisions being deliberated in places that are expensive, remote, and closed in a regulatory and legal sense — Brussels, Geneva, London, and New York, among others. Further, requirements of a more technical nature also block access — the need for local peacebuilding actors to represent a particular group, be affiliated with an (often formal) civil society entity, and have existing relationships with intermediary INGOs. As a result, only a

particular type of individual, who is seen at the global level to speak for local peacebuilding, is able to participate – from specific socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, and by whom a large number of other local peacebuilding actors may not feel represented.

7. Accountability:

The direction of accountability in the global peacebuilding architecture continues to flow upward, toward global policymakers and donors, rather than downward, toward local peacebuilding actors and outcomes in local conflict environments. Subsequently, the rules, regulations, compliance standards, and ways of working are also passed from global to local. This risks transforming local peacebuilders into grant managers and project officers, with the requirements of these roles set elsewhere, outside areas experiencing conflict on a day-to-day basis.

8. Momentum:

The qualitative evidence-based data collected for this study (through formal interviews, informal conversations, workshops, and collaborative analyses carried out as part of IPIP to date) indicates that despite the challenges above, it is clear that there is momentum to shift these trends. The vast majority of the individuals and organisations consulted for this study recognise these flaws — tokenism, power imbalances, superficial approaches to participation — and experience profound frustration in response to them. Translating this recognition into long-term changes in practice, however, remains challenging.

4.2 Epilogue: What Does This Mean for LPI?

Developing this report has been challenging, providing learning that has helped us understand a few of the underlying principles mediating the global peacebuilding policy space, and forcing us to reflect on our positionality within it. We recognise that having the opportunity to step back, observe, reflect, and analyse in this way is rare. It has allowed us to identify emerging practices, understand trends, think through root causes of power imbalances, and unpack our own assumptions around local-to-global engagement.

In writing this report, it became clear that Life & Peace Institute unintentionally reproduces many of the tensions and issues outlined above. We often use complex, exclusive language, operate on the basis of a wide variety of assumptions about the capacities and positions of local and global actors, and continue to grapple with the means to interrogate the power we hold — as well as implications of this power on our work. We are still looking to identify the means to hold ourselves accountable to the lessons emerging through this report.

Further, we are keen to engage with others, as peers and partners, in working together to learn from and challenge one another about how we promote more considered, power-informed local-to-global engagement, and more specifically, inclusive, equitable participation in the global peacebuilding policy space.