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International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

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## From the PIN Steering Committee

With the establishment of a new program on conflict resolution (CR), the topic is really “back” at IIASA. CR was a cornerstone of IIASA’s creation in the early 1970s. At that time, the world’s two superpowers, separated by nuclear confrontation, ideological rivalry, and the war in Vietnam (in the late 1960s and early 1970s), decided there was a need to focus on issues with the potential to develop into new international conflicts, and to cooperate in addressing them before they became a problem. Thus from the start, IIASA’s agenda included issues of concern to all that could either develop into conflicts or become spheres of cooperation.

This dichotomy is what the people engaged in conflict research consider to be one of the pillars of CR. And it is what drove IIASA’s research during the first 20 years of the Institute’s existence. With the end of this era, it was assumed that the ominous East–West component of IIASA’s activities would cease

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## Conflict Management in the 21st Century: New Challenges, Adequate Responses

*Last year IIASA signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations (UN) Peace University in Costa Rica to carry out research on the management of international conflicts in a number of specific areas such as water, pollution, food, population, etc. Both institutions have expressed their willingness to combine forces to deal with these sorts of international security issues, which until recently were ignored by the public and grossly underestimated by governments. IIASA and the UN Peace University have agreed to study this topic together, with the goal of identifying what can be done to stimulate general interest in the management of conflicts in this important area.*

Conflict management has become a necessity of the modern international system. Conflicts are monitored, controlled, and prevented from growing to destructive proportions. They are treated as a disease rather than as a sign of healthy development. Conflict control has become both a diplomatic task and a branch of military strategy.

This attitude was borne into the 21st century and may take even more radical forms if developments such as terrorism, extremism, and illegal trade in drugs and arms are not brought under firm legal control. The international community has made significant efforts to find solutions to conflicts from the past era associated with ideological struggle or national self-determination. It must now find ways to deal with new conflicts as they appear.

This review focuses on identifying, preventing, and resolving conflicts that are still in the early stages of development. These are conflicts associated both with age-old sources such as inequality, violent change, and coercion, as well as with new developments in human activity such as unequal population growth, transboundary air and water pollution, and other developments that until recently were mainly the subject of researchers’ interest but are now the subject of political action.

The subject of the study is possibilities for conflict management in

nontraditional areas where the interests of individual nations or groups may collide with those of other nations or groups. This idea has been translated into several concepts that have been adjusted in diplomatic practice and have become a part of the international political sphere. They may be roughly labeled as “conflict management,” which includes the following:

- *Conflict resolution*, which looks for models and mechanisms for solving existing conflicts
- *Conflict control*, which aims at controlling the state of conflicts, above all the level of violence
- *Conflict prevention*, which stresses the avoidance of conflicts in the future

This idea of conflict management is strongly supported by practical results from the previous period in international relations, including the following:

- The end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, their mutual efforts in strategic arms reductions, joint activities in settling some regional conflicts, and confidence-building in Europe
- The end of colonization, success in the resolution of wars of national liberation, and the accomplishments of nation-building efforts

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- The end of the North–South confrontation between the rich nations of the West and the poorer developing nations of the South, and the evolution of the World Trade Organization, one of the strongest elements of the current international system
- The end of the oil crisis of 1974, which followed a major conflict of interests between oil consumers and the producers/exporters of oil, and the development of the Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a reliable vehicle for conflict resolution through market regulation

These and similar accomplishments have played a double role. On the one hand, they have proved the validity of conflict management as a realistic goal for policy makers. On the other hand, they have proved the validity of the academic approach, which rests on the following two pillars:

- Changing attitudes (“We are no longer enemies”)
  - Problem solving (“We are partners and the problem is our adversary”)
- While “changing attitudes” is where politics and propaganda play the most important role in creating conditions for heightened conflict potential and in breaking the path toward dissolution of conflicts through confidence building, it is “problem solving” that has become the soundest and most acceptable

to bear a shadow of conflict and would instead be characterized by the spirit of cooperation.

Changes in the outside world, such as the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and other related events, have indeed changed the focus of IIASA’s work. The problems now come from another quarter. The development of a global economy and related political changes, along with new challenges to security in the form of terrorism, drugs, and illegal immigration, have shown that the world structure still has not acquired the robustness that could help it through times of economic, environmental, and distributional challenges. The problem of CR has again proved to be important.

### Why PIN?

Over its 16 years at IIASA, the PIN Program has probed the ways to settle controversies in different areas of international human activity from several different angles, including power, culture, and process. PIN has been working as part of the larger IIASA family, which has concentrated both on theoretical aspects of decision support and on practical areas where such decisions are implemented, such as in water and food supply, threats to the environment, population growth, etc. Close cooperation between the two research areas has occurred on only a few occasions. The rest of the time the realms have remained independent.

Now the situation is changing. The memorandum of understanding

signed by IIASA and the United Nations (UN) Peace University in Costa Rica on the development of CR research puts additional emphasis on both IIASA and PIN. The results of research in different areas of IIASA’s traditional agenda must be coordinated, with the ultimate goal of helping governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations look for optimal solutions to problems and giving strong arguments in their favor.

PIN is a bit closer to this task than the other projects at IIASA. It has knowledge of how to

- transfer some of the existing international issues (economic, technological, and environmental) to an agenda for negotiations,
- arrange an exchange between the interested parties to avoid conflicts and promote cooperation, and
- achieve a negotiated solution that could serve as the groundwork for a longer-term and wider-range cooperative regime (what we call a forward-looking outcome).

All these qualities may explain why PIN was chosen to serve as a “motor” for the CR Program at IIASA. At the same time, its selection presents two major tasks for PIN as a whole:

- First, to develop closer relationships with other IIASA projects, especially those that can make important contributions to the CR Program, such as the projects on Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies; Transitions to New Technologies; Transboundary Air Pollution; Population; Radiation Safety of the Biosphere; Land Use Change;

Economic Transition and Integration; European Rural Development; Risk, Modeling and Society; and so forth.

- Second, to foster closer cooperation between IIASA as a whole (not just the PIN Network, as in the past) and the UN Peace University. This will be a good test of PIN’s diplomatic and organizational skills.

In no way does this mean that PIN will reduce its regular activities. As of the last PIN Steering Committee meeting, in January 2002, PIN had eight new projects at different stages of readiness: five manuscripts to be published in 2002—the second edition of *International Negotiation* (V. Kremenyuk, ed.); *Containing the Atom* (R. Avenhaus, V. Kremenyuk, G. Sjöstedt, eds); *Negotiation Stories* (G.O. Faure, ed.); *Professional Cultures in International Negotiations* (W. Lang and G. Sjöstedt, eds); and *Negotiation and Escalation* (G.O. Faure and I.W. Zartman, eds)—and three in the editing stage—*Risk Negotiations* (R. Avenhaus and G. Sjöstedt, eds); *Forward-Looking Outcomes* (V. Kremenyuk and I.W. Zartman, eds); and a new project on negotiations in the European Union (F. Cede and P. Meerts, eds). Some of these are discussed in greater detail in this issue of *PINPoints*.

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concept for dealing with conflicts in the eyes of rational policy makers, including the scientific community.

Problem solving may include technical approaches such as computer modeling, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) model used for the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations.

### Perspectives on New Conflicts in the International System: Problems of Identification

The end of the Cold War and other related events have contributed to the further development of the international system and to its chances for survival, and to finding solutions to residual conflicts. These chances are magnified by such favorable developments as the continuation of integrative processes (e.g., the World Trade Organization, the European Union, etc.), the introduction of conflict management mechanisms at the UN and G-8 (e.g., the Miyazaki Initiatives), coalition building in the effort to fight terrorism, etc.

Yet the international system continues to experience pressure from a number of "subversive" developments:

- Residues of unsettled local and regional conflicts from both the Cold War and decolonization eras. Until such conflicts are settled, they will continue to contribute to heightened tensions and the continuation of violence and illegal activities (arms trade, mercenaries, coups, etc.). Very often military interventions are needed to fight these conflicts.
- Continuing arms races in some regions, including attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Contrary to the hopes of 10 to 15 years ago, the proliferation of arms continues in almost all areas of the world.
- A growing disparity in the economic and social capabilities of nations, leading to state collapse, to government failure, or to economic "shocks" that bring the situation to the verge of social conflict. All this develops as a negative outcome of globalization, which in general plays

an outstanding role in forging a global human compact.

- Uneven results of technological change in different countries owing to both geographical factors and socioeconomic developments.
- It is against these developments that new areas of potential conflicts may and should be approached. They include the following:

- *Wars over resources*: conflicts over the distribution and use of natural and man-made resources such as energy, water, and raw and processed materials. This area is not completely new, as the history of OPEC and attempts to regulate trade in important commodities testify. But it is certain that the problem of fair distribution of scarce resources, especially in poverty-stricken areas, will be one of the most important areas of potential conflict in the future.
- *Environmental wars*: conflicts over anthropogenic degradation of future living conditions. Attempts by the international community to introduce rules of conduct in this area (including the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1993) have indicated both a growing understanding of the importance of avoiding conflicts in this area as well as the high level of difficulties in achieving a durable solution even when some important agreements have already been signed (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol). The risk of further conflicts in this area is high. To date, the mechanisms for identifying possible lines of conflict and for envisioning possible means to avoid them or to put them under firm control are far from successful.
- *Population wars*: conflicts following from different aspects of the population growth in some areas of the world (accompanied by problems such as unemployment and inadequate housing, social security, health services, etc.) and the growing deficit of labor in other parts of the world. Disparities in population growth and their consequences—such as illegal immigration and racial and inter-community problems—as well as

inadequate attention to population problems on the part of international organizations and individual governments may lead to domestic and international conflicts that could be averted and kept under control if relevant mechanisms are worked out.

- *Food wars*: conflicts originating from unequal food production and distribution in different areas of the world and the inadequacy of existing mechanisms for transferring available food from the areas where it is grown to the areas where it is needed. Neither current intergovernmental mechanisms nor commercial mechanisms can adequately address these problems. It is even more difficult to identify future problems associated with possible advances in food production in agricultural areas like Africa and with existing producers in Europe and North America.

With respect to the experience in the area of conflict resolution to date, these are not insoluble issues. The conflicts can be reduced provided they are appropriately identified, relevant remedies are prescribed, and effective mechanisms are suggested. This will be the essence of the new research program.

*Victor A. Kremenyuk*

### Road Shows in the Middle East

The PIN Road Show planned for January 2002 was postponed as a result of the events of September 11. The same program is rescheduled for mid-January 2003, when the PIN Steering Committee will conduct seminars on aspects of negotiation at Tehran University, al-Zahra University, Shahid Beheshti University, Iran's Ministry of Commerce, and the School of International Relations at Iran's Foreign Ministry, and will conduct a general seminar on international negotiation on the Caspian Sea.

*I. William Zartman*



## Concepts in Negotiation: Resolving the Toughness Dilemma

In the first full-length treatment of negotiation, François de Callières (1716/2000:31) expressed his admiration of Monseigneur d'Ossat for being "firm as a rock when necessity demands [and] supple as a willow at another moment." Unfortunately, the cardinal never revealed how he knew when necessity demanded firmness and when suppleness was allowed, and so the question has remained unanswered ever since. At the base of the negotiation process lies this conundrum, which has prevented any conclusive effort to provide a simple theory of negotiation. Referred to as the Toughness or Negotiator's Dilemma, the question asks, Should one be tough, increasing the chances of a favorable agreement but decreasing the chances of any agreement at all, or soft, increasing the chances of agreement but decreasing the chances of its being favorable?

Since this is a dilemma, there is no solution to the problem as formulated (Bartos, 1974; Snyder and Diesing, 1977:212; Lax and Sebenius, 1986:38-41; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 1997:516). To allow for a solution, either the problem must be reformulated or additional information must be introduced as an analytical variable. In the second case, the answer to the dilemma is, "It depends," and the independent variable specifies on what it depends. Different approaches to the analysis of negotiation have introduced different variables (Zartman, 1989; Kremenyuk, 2001), some reinforcing and others contradicting each other.

In structural analysis, there are two types of power distributions among the parties: symmetrical (equal power) and asymmetrical (unequal power). Two basic propositions derive from this analysis, contradictory in their findings:

- Prop. 1 *In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act tough if it is strong and soft if it is weak* (Thucydides, 414/1960:V89 [2673]).
- Prop. 1a *In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act soft if it is strong and tough if it is weak.*

The two can be refined by carrying through the underlying power relation assumption:

- Prop. 1b *In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act soft if the other party acts tough and tough if the other party acts soft, whereas in a symmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act tough if the other acts tough and soft if the other acts soft.*

In the analysis of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in game theory, when winning exceeds injury, both owner and intruder will hang tough (escalate), and as the chance of net benefit rises, the larger party, whether owner or intruder, will/should either act tough or soft (Hammerstein, 1981: 198-199):

- Prop. 1c *In an asymmetrical negotiation, the party will and should act tough if it is strong (measured both by size and by net cost of injury), and soft if it is weak, except where ownership is exercised.*

In a further development, the introduction of a second (domestic) level of power shifts the analysis of structure to each party's two levels (international or interparty, and domestic or intraparty): "(1) strength at Level I and weakness at Level II will predict a hard-line strategy...; (2) weakness at both levels will also predict a hard line...; (3) strength at both levels will produce mixed [strategies] depending on the costs of non-agreement; and (4) weakness at Level I and strength at Level II will predict concessions..." (Lehman and McCoy, 1992: 609-610). Setting aside situation (3) because of its indeterminacy and its dependence on a different variable, one can say the following:

- Prop. 2 *A party should and will act tough if it is weak at the domestic level and soft if it is strong at the domestic level.*

In behavioral analysis, the hard-liner expects toughness to lead to softness and softness to lead to toughness (Nicolson, 1939/1964; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Bartos, 1987; Goldstein and

Pevehouse, 1997:527; Zartman and Rubin, 2000), whereas the soft-liner expects toughness to lead to toughness and softness to lead to softness, and therefore open soft, seeking agreement:

- Prop. 3 *A party will open and continue tough in negotiations if it has a hard-line worldview, and soft if it has a soft-line worldview.*
- Prop. 4 *A party will open and continue tough (but productively) in negotiations if it is a competitive IQ type, and soft if it is a cooperative IQ type.*

In the strategic approach, in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) the result merely reinforces the Toughness Dilemma, since both parties will act tough (neither concede nor cooperate) and deadlock will result, but a repeated game provides a way out of the Dilemma (Axelrod, 1980). Other situations are less determinate. A Chicken Dilemma Game (CDG) has no predictable outcome and merely leaves the parties considering their appropriate moves out of the Toughness Dilemma. Other asymmetrical situations produce similar results (Snyder and Diesing, 1977):

- Prop. 5 *A party will and should be tough to open and soft to reward if its opponent sees itself in a CDG situation, and soft to open and tough to punish if its opponent sees itself in a PDG situation.*

In a process analysis, a number of economics approaches to negotiation can be used to analyze the results in terms of the process used to establish them, focusing particularly on the calculations that underlie concession making. The central analytical variable in these calculations is the parties' security point, or the value of the situation without an agreement, referring specifically in most cases to the cost of a strike. Various theories indicate that a party concedes if its strike cost is greater than its opponent's (Zeuthen, 1930/1975:135; Harsanyi, 1975:257), or than its concession (Harsanyi, 1975:263; cf. Zeuthen, 1930/1975:150), or than an acceptability level (Pen, 1975:136), or if its time costs are greater than its opponent's

(Cross, 1969). Security point evaluations, like structural analyses, indicate that the weaker party should and will act soft to the point where symmetry is established, but they give a move-by-move analysis and allow for a shift in the stronger/weaker role from party to party:

- Prop. 6 *In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party will and should act soft if its security point is lower than a given reference point and tough if it is higher.*

A more complex calculation is based on a comparison of the differences between the security point and the result of the other's unilateral concession, and between the first party's and the other's unilateral concession (Snyder and Diesing, 1977), in which the party with the highest critical risk factor, so calculated, concedes until the critical risks are equalized, leaving the parties to split the difference to arrive at a Pareto-optimal outcome. Like other security point statements, critical risk is also a measure of asymmetry, and it too indicates that the weaker party should and will act soft, turn by turn:

- Prop. 7 *In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party will and should act soft if its security point, measured as a critical risk factor, is lower than the other's and tough if it is higher.*

A different type of process analysis describes and prescribes optimal behavior according to the stage of the negotiation:

- Prop. 8 *Parties will and should act tough if they are in the diagnosis or detailing phase of negotiation, and soft if they are in the formulation phase in between the two.*

A different staged process approach divides negotiation into two phases, before and after the establishment of a bargaining zone (where in turn the previous three-phased analysis might fit). This analysis disaggregates the Toughness Dilemma into two parts, in which the first phase focuses on establishing the possibility of an agreement and the second relativizes that possibility into a favorable agreement:

- Prop. 9 *Parties will and should act soft in order to establish a bargaining zone and tough in order to reach an agreement within that zone.*

As analysis moves closer to reality, it recognizes the fact that while some parties may remain hung on the horns of Manichean behavior, others will try to escape the Toughness Dilemma using a little bit of both behaviors. A refined mixture of toughness and softness does not answer the problem of when to blink, but it does cover much of the more detailed bargaining between regular partners. Such an approach has been termed firm flexibility or flexible rigidity (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Rubin *et al.*, 1994; Pruitt, 1995). In this approach the independent variable is less explicit, but in general appears to be the ability to conduct the opposite sort of behavior as compensation. The analysis meets squarely both the spirit and the letter of the Toughness Dilemma by using its blessed-if-you-do-and-blessed-if-you-don't nature to overcome its damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't side, indicating that parties should be both tough and soft at the same time:

- Prop. 10 *A party can and should remain tough on its important issues/interests if it can compensate with softness on less important issues/interests or new approaches.*

Since, by Homans' (1961:62) theorem, "the more the items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other and goods valued more by the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of a successful outcome (cf. Nash, 1950), the tactical approach to the Toughness Dilemma seizes on the basic nature of negotiations to seek to create a positive-sum outcome. The proposition is completely prescriptive, however, and in no way predicts what a party will do.

I. William Zartman

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## Negotiating with Terrorists

Transgressing basic universal values has been an ongoing temptation for people who want to achieve a lot with little means. Generating distress, terror, or panic is a powerful means to increase one's leverage and create a new situation. Terrorism is the word most commonly used to describe this action, but in reality it is just a situation in which an unethical tool is used for what the perpetrators believe to be ethical ends. Now, if we consider the September 11 tragedy, it is by no means a negotiation but a fait accompli for the time being and a threat for the future. Punishing the culprits is certainly a necessary initiative, but preventing such events from occurring again is also a basic requirement. Negotiation is among the various tools that can be used, even if terrorists can be categorized as the most unlikely negotiators. Research has already contributed to shedding light on some aspects of what can be viewed as a highly uncertain and complex activity (Waugh, 1982; Baldwin, 1986; Faure, 1988; Hayes, 1991).

Negotiating with terrorists is an extremely difficult task, as one can imagine. On some occasions it means putting one's own life at risk. In all cases it means accepting interaction with counterparts whose methods and values are totally rejected. It can be viewed as a situation that usually requires resorting to negotiation, or at least establishing a kind of discussion in order to save the lives of hostages.

### Freeing Hostages

A hostage-taker is someone who appropriates the lives of others by violent means, intending to use them as a currency of exchange. Such a situation carries very specific attributes:

- Dramatic stakes to manage; namely, human lives
- Positions on both sides of an abyss reflecting the values opposing both parties

- The impossibility of recognizing the hostage-taker as a legitimate counterpart (states still have to negotiate, but do so "unofficially")
- Trust as a mechanism that has no place in such a setting and cannot be built up and implemented
- The issue of the safety of the negotiators themselves when they must work within a hostile context
- The importance of third-party intervention such as from the media, families of the hostages, etc.

These various elements make it extremely difficult to conceive of the negotiation as a win-win game. The formal structure of the problem is much more adequately represented by a concave curve describing the zone of possible agreements rather than the usual convex curve setting the stage for a Pareto-optimal result. Consequently, it becomes very unlikely that a situation will be built up in which everyone meets his or her own needs.

The crushing responsibility that falls on the shoulders of the negotiators introduces an unusual level of stress. Hostage-takers play a lot with this aspect by pointing out that the lives of the "guests" are in the hands of their counterparts, and that if anything dramatic happens it will be their fault.

This type of negotiation normally entails complex management of publicly disclosed information. Formally there is no negotiation because no state can stoop so low as to enter into discussions with a terrorist group. However, one has to do something to protect the lives of the hostages, and there is a moral legitimacy to "interacting" with the hostage-takers if not to negotiating with them. The double language that is thus produced can be applied to a great variety of issues. Usually no concessions are made officially and the final deal is not made public because often the country involved must make concessions that, if known, would create problems for it with other countries or with its own

public. Here, more than in any other situation, the iceberg principle applies.

### Basic Types of Negotiation

One of the most significant criteria to distinguish among subcategories of negotiations with terrorists is the nature of the context. Hostage-takers may act in either a friendly context or a hostile context. Negotiators who must deal with them usually adopt totally different strategies and sometimes even very contrasted goals. In the case of a context friendly to the terrorists, the pressure is on the negotiators intervening to free the hostages because they have little room to maneuver, as they do not control the negotiation environment. They can be subjected to harassment, attrition, threats, or other coercive tactics. They may even fear for their own lives. Cases can end tragically for the negotiators if they are not officially protected or if the other side does not care about the possible punishment. As soon as one side has absolutely nothing to lose, it becomes extremely difficult to keep some power balance in the negotiation process.

In the case of hostage-takers operating in a hostile environment, the fishbowl theory applies. The means of action that can be used by the hostage-takers are much more limited. They face a much higher risk and usually put much more pressure on the hostages. They also often resort to the media to amplify their claims, using them as a megaphone for their propaganda. To show their commitment, they may also, for instance, kill a hostage. If we consider the overall situation and the way in which these cases are usually handled, negotiation becomes only one of the various means used to free the hostages. Negotiators maintain continuous communication with the hostage-takers to collect information on them, their resources, and their external allies, thus depriving the terrorists of sleep and exhausting them in order to reduce their ability to analyze any new



events occurring and to lower their level of vigilance. Sometimes they find ways to sow dissension among the hostage-takers, or at least to lower their expectations. The final goal in that case may be an armed intervention that does not exclude the killing of the terrorists.

### Analytical Dimensions

Such a complex, uncertain, and dramatic type of negotiation combines three different types of rationality: structural, cultural, and psychological. At the *strategic level*, there is a relative incompatibility between objectives and means. Parties to the conflict are caught in a lose-lose game in which the only satisfaction becomes to inflict more suffering or casualties on the other side than one must suffer oneself. Within such a situation, hidden or overt violence prevails at the negotiation table and it appears impossible to apply the bicycle theory to the process. The means used are not the most suitable for reaching an agreement; rather, they are more appropriate to making war than to establishing some kind of (even extremely limited) cooperation.

For the negotiators working to free the hostages, two constraints conflict with each other: getting the hostages free and deterring other terrorists from taking more hostages. There is no way to free hostages without giving something to the hostage-takers. At the same time, such an action works as an incentive for more acts of this type. Thus a second dimension—time—is introduced. Clearly, measures taken to deal with short-term issues contradict initiatives dealing with longer-term goals. One should not reward the taking of hostages, but at the same time, if the prisoners are slaughtered by the terrorists, the negotiators may be held responsible.

At the *intercultural level*, many elements make it very difficult to reach any agreement. National cultures undoubtedly play a role, especially North/South views, but usually the terrorist group has developed a culture of its own that in many ways is incompatible with any national or global culture.

Often such a culture has been established as a fortress to defend the group and justify its actions, and does not allow any room for dialogue or even listening. What is at stake are the highly conflicting visions of the world by both parties and the set of values on which they base their attitudes and justify their behaviors. Very often identity problems arise on the terrorist side, making communication impossible. Channels of communication that have been established to help the negotiation process are simply used as means of verbal war.

The *psychological level* makes hostage negotiations dramatically different from any other type of negotiation, even the most competitive ones. Psychotic trends may prevail, such as megalomaniacal attitudes, paranoid behavior, or suicide-oriented actions. Megalomaniacal constructs arise in the terrorist group from the impression that they are discussing directly with a government and that they may be able to make a country submit to their demands. This type of situation gives an overwhelming sense of power and increases the self-image to such an extent that it becomes a hopeless task to bring the hostage-takers back to reality. Paranoid attitudes result from a Manichean vision of the world, with good and evil caught in a fight to the death. Their approach leaves no room for a compromise in such a setting, as it would mean betraying the mission they believe they must accomplish. Suicide-oriented conduct is implemented with the idea of either accomplishing an altruistic sacrifice or playing out the great “scenario of the end” on a smaller scale. The altruistic sacrifice shows an extremely strong identification of the member with his or her group or a pathological weakening of the personality as such. Orchestrating the “scenario of the end” is a way to implement, on a smaller scale, the prophecy of the end of the world. This is usually done or attempted in closed places, such as a house or an airplane, in which humankind is punished and redeemed by the fire of hell.

### Concluding Comments

With its psychological aspects, negotiation with terrorists is one of the most unusual and at the same time probably the most difficult types of negotiation. The dramatic issues at stake make it quite a unique if not an enviable job, and put their mark on the negotiator forever. One of the major difficulties arises from the fact that there is most often an absolute incompatibility of the goals and values put forward by both parties. This incompatibility is accentuated because the situation makes it impossible to forget about values because they stand as ethical pillars for a party who has to work in an extreme situation. At the same time it seems to be quite necessary to keep them to the side if one wants to move on.

The complexity of the task comes from the multidimensional aspect of this type of negotiation. One has to play several instruments at the same time with no ready-made sheet music available. However, dealing with terrorists is only a limited action. Terrorism is no more than a traumatic tool. One has to solve the problem that is at its roots and the fundamental issues that lie behind it have to be addressed at some point. Unfortunately for humanity, if not for research, negotiation with terrorists is an expanding activity that has been promised a great future despite the wise silence of the media on most of the cases occurring in this world.

Guy Olivier Faure

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## The Negotiating Power of Small States in a Globalizing World: Options for Mongolia

The phenomenon of clashes between civilizations is not new. Cultures with more advanced technologies have always clashed with those that lagged behind in certain areas. The success of the Mongols in history was largely due to their new organizational technology, which allowed them to triumph over surrounding tribes and states. The other states might have been more culturally refined, but they lacked the new mobile management of armed forces—forces that had fought against one another until Chinggis Khan arrived as a medieval chief executive officer.

The Mongolians see Chinggis Khan as a national hero, but his victims might have had a less positive view of him. One culture's hero can be the wrath of God to another. Thanks to the highly successful organization of their "company," the Mongols managed to dominate the Chinese, Persians, and Russians. Why they were not successful with the Egyptians and Japanese is another matter. It probably had to do with overstretching: the technology works, but has its limits. At the end of the day, the Mongols were unable to protect themselves against the Ming dynasty in Mongolia itself.

In more recent times, the United States, having learned from the war in Vietnam and from the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, has been careful not to overstretch in its "management" of the Taliban government, working closely with the Northern Alliance and other internal and external allies. It is interesting to note that it asked its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies to invoke Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, but never used the opportunities NATO might have provided them.

Cooperation and confrontation have always been the buzzwords in relations between states. International relations are just that: trying to cooperate despite—or better, because of—opposing interests and values. International politics is about the convergence of interests and about the

handling of emotions. Let us not forget that even the state has its emotions, as embedded in its national symbols and heroes. This emotional side has often been overlooked by Western cultures, but it is a central feature in Eastern cultures. Consequently, the relations between the representatives of states from West and East have often been damaged by a lack of respect for the integrity of the other state, or the honorable representative of that state.

Confrontation can materialize in many ways, but tackling the combination of confrontation and cooperation through the lens of cooperation can only be managed in a few—mainly peaceful—ways. Humans have always used negotiation as a tool in settling conflicts. Adam and Eve negotiated on the apple but found that negotiations with the Supreme Being were not effective in reaching a mutually satisfactory solution on the question of Paradise. International negotiation is the rule in conflict management today, and the use of violence is seen as an exception to that rule (however, before the 19th century, war was the rule and negotiation the exception in settling problems between states).

International negotiation is one of the most effective tools for problem solving for small countries like Mongolia and the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup> Certainly there are differences between the two countries. While Mongolia has to handle two big neighbors, the Netherlands has to handle three. On the one hand, it is easier to play two countries off each other than it is to play three against one another; on the other hand, two countries have more opportunities to ally against a third. In other words, while there is a short-term tactical advantage in dealing with two stronger opponents, it is strategically much more difficult to sustain this tactical advantage over the long term.

Apart from other factors, this might explain why the Netherlands is seeking

long-term alliances with its powerful friends (if you have such friends you no longer need enemies) in the form of the negotiation network called the European Union, whereas Mongolia tends to enter into ad hoc coalitions. The Netherlands tries to limit the powerful by drawing as many small powers into the network as possible. Maybe this could be an option in the Asian heartland as well. It would mean drawing in Central and East Asian states, most notably the republics of Kazakhstan and Korea. This fits more or less into the "third neighbor theory," as these countries are not too far away geographically or too different ethnically and linguistically.<sup>2</sup>

As globalization progresses and world interdependencies grow, as cooperation becomes of ever greater importance and conflicts become more likely, international negotiation becomes an ever more valuable tool for small states in their confrontations with more powerful ones. Stable negotiation networks are in the interest of the less powerful. After all, using military land or sea forces is no longer an option for Mongolia and the Netherlands. This leaves international negotiation as the main tool in the seemingly unavoidable process of regionalization and globalization.<sup>3</sup>

Happily, the application of this device is more effective for small powers than for large ones. A recent study by the PIN Steering Committee shows that negotiations between unequal powers are likely to produce more relative benefits for the smaller states. The lesser power gets more out of the process than one would expect on the basis of a comparison between the power resources of the contending parties. In other words, the situational power of the small state is often of more relevance than the structural power of the larger state.

Salacuse (2000) draws some lessons for practice on the basis of nine case studies. He has 10 lessons for "the weak":<sup>4</sup>



1. To increase your power, build relationships with appropriate third parties.
2. The importance of power in negotiation may not be so much the reality of it as the perception of it.
3. Aggregate (overall) power is not as important as issue-specific (situational) power in a given negotiation.
4. Getting the stronger side's attention at the highest level is often the first step to increasing power.
5. The stronger side's size and complexity offer opportunities for increasing power in the negotiation.
6. Positions taken by the stronger party in other arenas can sometimes be used to increase power in a given negotiation.
7. The power value of a specific resource changes over time, so waiting for the appropriate moment to act can increase power.
8. Power can be augmented by taking initiatives in negotiation.
9. Power can be increased by understanding and exploiting the international context in which the negotiation is taking place.
10. Power can be increased to the extent that an increased commitment to a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be fostered in the leadership of the stronger side.

In other words, it is important for a small state such as Mongolia to take the initiative (lesson 8) in establishing (lessons 1, 4, and 10) something like a durable Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia along the lines of the OSCE in Europe (which also involves the United States and Canada), thereby creating a cooperative spirit in the Asian heartland, which is of the utmost importance to Asia as a whole (lesson 9). Creating such an organization is an old issue in Asia because of North American involvement, but it might be worthwhile to explore a revival of the subject. Of course, there is still the option of pressing for membership in the OSCE itself, but the Asian heartland seems to be too far

from Europe to make the OSCE an effective option for the Mongolian state.

A much more valuable alternative is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At present it is still a superficial cooperative agreement between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadjikistan dealing with border and some economic issues. It is well known that the Mongolians have reservations about joining this new setup. But the organization has great opportunities for growth as a regional security and economic entity. For Mongolia to exclude itself would be a major mistake, as the country would become unnecessarily isolated from its natural small-state allies and its natural big-state "brothers" (if you have brothers and sisters like this, you don't need any other family). There is a saying: "If you can't beat them, join them." Can anybody imagine what damage the Netherlands would have inflicted on itself had it remained outside the European Union because of its negative experiences with the Germans?

One might say that this is the multilateral framework to be cocreated and used by the Mongolian state to secure and develop its own position in Asia and in the world. However, to be successful in this, Mongolia's diplomats will have to be trained to be effective in their behavior and in their written and oral communication to deal with procedures, processes, parties, and positions.<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion, Mongolia must strengthen its capacity for training its diplomats and other civil servants working with the outside world. It should use existing resources, both within Mongolia itself—for example, the School of Foreign Service and the School of Management—as well as abroad—such as the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and the Clingendael Institute. But what is even more important is Mongolia's willingness to follow a policy of further integration into the political, security, and economic networks and organizations of Eurasia, notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Both multilaterally and bilaterally, planning is important for diagnosing Mongolia's strengths and weaknesses in the international arena, as well as those of the other party in a given situation (lesson 3). It is also important for studying an opponent's overall policy (lessons 5 and 6), as well as for identifying the appropriate moment to start negotiations (lesson 7). The perception of strength is a point where Mongolia has a natural advantage. Thanks to Chinggis Khan and his crew, some nations still perceive Mongolia as being quite powerful (lesson 2). This is what we could call the "long shadow of the empire" power. Indeed, states that were once an empire are often more assertive than one would expect based on their rank order today (e.g., the Ethiopians, Iranians, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French).

One should always keep in mind that small countries have some advantages over big ones. For example, they are often non-threatening (power of innocence), which might foster a good atmosphere (relational power) and therefore a willingness on the part of the bigger country to concede more than necessary (the ability to make the bigger power feel guilty because of its size). The lines of communication within the small country are shorter (coordinative power) and the number of issues at hand might be smaller (transparency power) than in the big country. This will enhance the effectiveness of the smaller party. The smaller party might be willing to invest more, especially if a central priority is at stake, and could therefore be more successful in the end (mosquito power).

These issues should be analyzed thoroughly. It can be argued that a good way to begin such an analysis is by enlarging the Planning Department of the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs beyond its current modest setup, as well as by supporting the creation of an independent think tank on international relations that should work in close cooperation with established institutions in Mongolia and abroad.

*Paul Meerts*

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein (2001) gives data on Mongolia and the Netherlands compared with the other 192 states of the world. On population Mongolia ranks 133, the Netherlands, 57; on territory Mongolia ranks 18, the Netherlands, 132; on gross national product Mongolia ranks 145, the Netherlands, 14. In other words, a country is “small” because of a mixture of several factors; it can still be large in certain separate areas—such as Mongolia in terms of territory and the Netherlands in economic terms. Bayasakh (2000) states that “Mongolia is still geopolitically important, for both Russia and China as a buffer and for the rest of the world as a SOMP [states other than major powers] country.”

<sup>2</sup>Bayarkhuu (1999) asserts that Mongolia will avoid the pitfall of depending on a single power, although it should be added that this has happened in the past, when Mongolia had no alternative pathway. Now, however, the two-partner option seems to be the most obvious choice; but, as has been said before, it is much safer to have at least one extra option, if not more. See Bayarkhuu (2001b) for research on the Central Asian (“Turanian”) option. See Bayarkhuu (2001a) for analysis of other, wider Asian options for Mongolia.

<sup>3</sup>Barkman (1999) discusses the sometimes opposing and sometimes converging trends

of regionalization and globalization and their effects on Mongolia’s internal situation and its external position.

<sup>4</sup>See also Zartman and Rubin (2000) for conclusions on symmetry and asymmetry in international negotiations. Their lessons are as follows: (1) equal power does not lead to more effective negotiation than unequal power; (2) parties do not function more effectively when there is a small, rather than a large, total amount of power in the system; (3) stronger parties typically attempt to dominate the exchange with their less powerful counterparts; (4) weaker parties respond not by acting submissively, but by adopting appropriate counter-strategies of their own; and (5) negotiating parties are effective to the extent that they adjust their behavior to the relative power of the other side. In lesson (4) they describe 16 tactics used by weaker states: appeals to common interests, solutions to common problems, pairing positions, appeals to relationships, use of rules, appeals to higher authority, use of intermediaries, appeals to principle, co-option of external forces, efforts to seize opportune moments, attention to details, coalitions with other parties, links to internal factions, joining one’s enemy’s enemy, use of public opinion, and resorting to unconventional violence (insurgency and terrorism).

<sup>5</sup>Meerts (2000) analyzes specific policies that would create a more favorable international position for Mongolia in general.

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## The Petersberg Conference on Afghanistan as a Negotiating Experience

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 triggered a robust response by the United States and its allies, who joined forces in a new coalition against international terrorism. In a swift and stunning military operation, US and Northern Alliance forces were able to dislodge the Taliban from their position of power in Kabul and to dismantle the terrorist network of the al Qaeda organization of Osama bin Laden. The military strikes were preceded by intensive diplomatic efforts by the United States in order to obtain the support of key states in Central Asia, which accepted the use of their territory by the military forces of the US-led coalition in the war against terrorism on Afghani soil. In their own right, the negotiations, hastily conducted on various continents to prepare

the ground for the subsequent military operation, deserve a thorough study from the point of view of negotiation theory. Historians and political scientists alike are called upon to analyze this part of the story once the dust has settled over the debris of the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan.

Another challenge of no less interest to the advancement of the theory of international negotiation in this context is the Petersberg Conference on Afghanistan, which was convened immediately following the Taliban’s ouster from Kabul. The Conference, held on the Petersberg near Bonn, was successfully concluded on 5 December 2001 by an agreement that laid the groundwork for the post-Taliban political future of Afghanistan.

Viewed from the angle of negotiation theory, the successful Petersberg Conference is noteworthy for many reasons:

- The framework of the negotiations itself presents some parallels to other recent political settlements (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor) whereby the interested “big powers” (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia) used the United Nations (UN) as an instrument, but kept their decisive influence over the conference’s course and outcome. In a way the big powers played the roles of both midwife and godfather to the Petersberg agreement.
- The Afghani participants at the conference, carefully chosen by the interested big powers as politically

relevant, were put in a junior position. The representatives of the political factions supplanting the Taliban regime were allowed to quarrel vociferously among themselves. However, at the end of the day, given the political and economic pressure from the United States, they had no choice but to accept the concept of the accord imposed on them by the international community (i.e., the big powers plus the UN).

- The UN and its special representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, were given a catalyst role in the whole exercise. Once the situation on the ground had developed to a point the United States determined was ripe for a

political settlement, the contribution of the UN was welcomed to “legitimize” the agreement. In this way the UN, as the worldwide organization encompassing the totality of the international community of nations, participated in the decisive stages of the diplomatic marathon.

- The Petersberg agreement, as the historic landmark in the unfolding of the Afghanistan conflict, must be viewed as a dynamic rather than a static settlement. Setting the basis for a new political beginning in Afghanistan, the agreement provides mechanisms for the establishment of a new Afghani government, for the elaboration of an Afghani

constitution, and for the preparation of parliamentary elections to be held within two years. Although the negotiating process on the reestablishment of political life in Afghanistan is gradually shifting from the international to the domestic level, there is no doubt that for some time to come concurrent international efforts will be needed to support the democratic development of this war-torn country.

The interaction of domestic political players in Afghanistan with their international counterparts thus continues to be a challenging subject for the theory and practice of international negotiations.

*Franz Cede*

## Call for Proposals: A New PIN Project on Quantitative Approaches to International Negotiations Analyses

**W**hy does almost all the research on international negotiations over the past 20 years make no use of formal theory, despite statements like that of Young (1999) that “the principal tool for analyzing negotiations is the theory of games”? Indeed, a large amount of formal (although sometimes mathematically demanding) analysis of negotiation in general is available, centered on some paradigmatic models like Nash’s bargaining scheme (1950) or Stahl’s (1972) and Rubinstein’s (1981) sequential models. Yet case studies of important international negotiations use only the most elementary game theory concepts (called proto-game-theory models by O’Neill [1994]), which means that concepts but no formal derivations have been used so far.

The state of the art was characterized three years ago by the controversy surrounding the role of formal models—notably rational choice models—in political science in general that was published in the journal *International Security* in 1999. On the one hand were

political scientists like Walt who claimed that formal models have contributed little to the progress of political theory as a whole; on the other hand were exponents of formal theory such as Buena de Mesquita, Morrow, Zagare, and others who vigorously defended their points of view. The length of this discussion—more than 100 printed pages centering on the three criteria for scientific work (logical consistency and precision, degree of originality and creativity, and empirical validity)—indicates that there are problems indeed.

Our project will deal only with that section of political science defined by PIN’s mission. We seek insights into the questions formulated by Howard Raiffa as early as 1991, as well as proposals for their solution:

- How can rational choice theorists be induced to make greater efforts to render their abstract concepts and results more understandable and plausible—or “user-friendly”—to political and social scientists not well trained to work with formal models?

- What can be done to encourage social scientists to use quantitative approaches—not only elementary approaches, but mathematically more advanced ones as well—in their analyses of real-world negotiations problems?
- How can practitioners such as politicians and diplomats be made interested in and subsequently be taught to apply formal models of their more important problems, or at least to have formal models developed and studied by their experts?

We, the two editors of the proposed project, representing our communities of scientists using the full range of quantitative and non-quantitative methods, are looking for approximately 12 academics and practitioners willing to write a substantial chapter of 20 to 30 pages dealing with the questions raised above from the point of view of specific models.

We invite proposals for contributions before September 2002, although this call for proposals will remain open until the agenda is filled. The proposals



will be discussed by the PIN Steering Committee at its October meeting. Authors will receive more detailed information thereafter and will be asked to submit their chapters before June 2003 and to present their chapters at the PIN summer conference.

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
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