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PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

In this issue:

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Contents

COLOPHON

PINPoints

PINPoints is the biannual publication of the Processes of International Negotiation Program (PIN)

PIN is a non-profit group of scholars and practitioners that encourages and organizes research on a broad spectrum of topics related to international negotiation seen as a process. The PIN network includes more than 4,000 scholars and practitioners of international negotiation. The organization is presided over by a Steering Committee, which organizes its many activities and edits the PINPoints.

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Rudolf Schüßler

Editorial

The most important event to occur since the publication of PINPoints 44, at least from our own parochial perspective, was PIN's transition to the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. A host transplant is never an easy affair, and thus we are happy that the warm welcome received at the GIGA made up to a considerable extent for the loss that we experienced on leaving the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. The Clingendael Institute has been dear to us, and we are confident that the GIGA will soon become a home in a different but no less seminal way. Not only did PIN move to the GIGA, but Amrita Narlikar, the GIGA's president, also became a steering committee member of PIN. Welcome, Amrita – we are overjoyed to have you on board! Needless to say, we are looking forward to contributing to the GIGA's research expertise with our own negotiation-centered perspective. A short article in this issue of PINPoints will bring you up to date on the liaison of PIN and the GIGA.

In the meantime, while we were busy with our own affairs, the world continued on its path. As usual, it spun out international conflicts, crises, and stalemates in need of being negotiated. In fact, some of the topics addressed below are sequels to already well-established stories. William Zartman and Raymond Hinnebusch's article on "UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis" deals with a seemingly endless conflict. Much happened in Syria in the last year. ISIS was crushed as a quasi-territorial state, and Bashar Asad is (for the time being) in the ascendancy again. Yet will the international community and the powers intervening in Syria (and Iraq) also crush the cancer of terrorism that still spreads from ISIS' dismembered body? Mediation and conflict resolution in Syria might be the only way to stop warring regions in Syria from serving as homelands of terror.

So far, the UN and all others have failed to effectively mediate in the Syrian conflict. Nevertheless, learning from the failures of UN mediation might be necessary, even for others, to make headway toward viable stability. Moty Cristal's article on "Negotiating in a Low-to-No Trust Environment" offers further advice in this respect. Although dealing with a lack of trust in negotiations in general, his analysis bears fitting relevance to the Syria case too. Cristal claims that in some cases not trying to diminish hate and distrust between the negotiating parties can actually facilitate conflict resolution (at least, concerning its all-important first steps). This claim seems readymade for application in Syria. It is sometimes crucial to know your enemy, and once "the other" begins to develop new emotions then uncertainty might ensue – uncertainty that harbors new conflict potential. Haters, if they are only pragmatic enough, form stable couples.

A third article in this PINPoint issue relates to conflict in the Middle East, but is mainly concerned with a great power theme. Mikhail Troitskiy analyzes United States–Russia relations, and their manifestations at the negotiation table since the end of the Cold War (that is, the end of the last Cold War before the onset of the present one). The long-standing, million-dollar question is how to understand the behavior of the two sides. What explanations do we have for the seemingly erratic ups and downs in the US–Russia relationship? In the end, Troitskiy opts … oops, we should not ruin the suspense!

From Russia we proceed to an adjacent country, Mongolia. Being squeezed in between China and Russia and courted by both, Mongolia faces some obvious geopolitical problems. In his article "Existential Negotiations: The Case of Mongolia," Paul Meerts outlines just how complex these problems are. In this respect, the mineral riches of Mongolia further complicate the system of political calculations – ones that the stakeholders in "the Mongolia question" still need to resolve. For me, Mongolia's predicament is – despite its geopolitical specificities – an example of a more general global puzzle: How can seemingly powerless states achieve a balance of power in the midst of the rapidly changing tectonic structures of great power relations?

In "Trump's USA and Climate Negotiations – Quo Vadimus," Ariel Macaspac Hernandez, former PIN administrator when it was located at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, looks at the long sequence of multilateral climate negotiations, wondering where they are bound to head after one of their principal parties, the US, took a new stance toward the substance of them. President Trump's decision to extract the US from the climate policy responsibilities it had partially accepted – and, still more, was by other parties expected to further accept in the near future – was a shock to the community of states that had signed the 2015 Paris climate accord. Yet did Trump's decision really disembowel the whole post-Kyoto process of UN climate

policy? Hernandez sows some seeds of hope by outlining how international agents, but also cities and NGOs, are about to circumvent and undercut the US president's decision. It is too early to tell who will prevail in the long run. It is safe to say, however, that climate change and the need to handle it will be around much longer than Donald Trump will.

Rudolf Schüßler touches upon issues of compromise in "Treacherous Compromises." There is a whole bestiary of types of compromise that prudent and fair negotiators will want to avoid (there are fewer to be shunned by purely self-interested negotiators, however). Rotten compromises are only the best-known example. Schüßler directs our attention toward treacherous compromises, which look good on the surface but are marred by a specific power constellation between the parties to the compromise. He claims that such a relation complicated the German "Jamaica" negotiations aiming to form a stable government coalition after the 2017 national elections. The threat of a treacherous compromise partly explains the uncommon process dynamics of these negotiations.

Last but not least, we want to say goodbye and pay our respects to Viktor Kremenyuk, a former and founding PIN member, who died on 18 September 2017 in Moscow. An obituary for Victor closes this edition of PINPoints.

■

I. William Zartman

PIN has a New Home at the GIGA in Hamburg!

PIN has a new home! As of 1 January 2018, the Processes of International Negotiation Program is located at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. After 17 years at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg and seven years at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague, PIN has moved to the foremost German research institute for the study of themes related to PIN's area of interest.

The GIGA is an independent social science research institute and a member of the Leibniz Association. Its mission is to analyze global issues as well as political, social, and economic developments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The Institute works with cross-cutting research programs on matters of accountability and participation, peace and security, growth and development, and power and ideas. GIGA stands for a global approach to scholarship, which takes into account the philosophical traditions and historical experiences of different world regions – on their own terms and also from a comparative perspective.

The GIGA is dedicated to research-based knowledge transfer. With different event series, publication formats, and media engagements it reaches out to its diverse constituencies in academia, politics, and the broad public. Policy engagement is a key part of its mandate. The Institute maintains a continuous exchange with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and offers its expertise to other relevant ministries.

A good example of impactful GIGA research is the Institute's engagement with the G20 process. The last summit took place in Hamburg in July 2017 at a time of great uncertainty and with globalization facing backlash of unprecedented magnitude. The Institute hosted a number of high-level events with prominent guests and issued a GIGA Focus series of brief analyses. Topics included inter alia Globalization, Free Trade, Climate Change, Gender Justice, Compact with Africa and many more. GIGA researchers participated actively in various G20 processes (T20 – Agenda 2030 + Forced Migration, C20). The main report of the T20 (research and think tank engagement group) with advice for key policy areas was handed over to the German Federal Chancellery. Republished as a G20 Insights Overarching Vision, GIGA President Amrita Narlikar's GIGA Focus Can the G20 Save Globalization? was part of these T20 recommendations. Her unique take on how the G20 can be instrumental in striking a new bargain for a fair globalization led to numerous interviews and contributions for leading media (TV, radio, print, and online): BBC World News Outside Source, ARD G20 special feature, Spiegel online, Süddeutsche Zeitung online, Deutschlandfunk, Die Welt, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, among others. The Hamburg summit and its results are analyzed by Amrita Narlikar in her paper The Real Power of the G20, published in the high-impact journal Foreign Affairs online in July 2017.

In the GIGA President, PIN has found its newest academic member for its Steering Committee. Professor Amrita Narlikar's research on negotiation includes New Powers: How to become one and how to manage them, Hurst Publications, London and Oxford University Press, New York, 2010; Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions (edited), Cambridge University Press 2010, Negotiating the Rise of New Powers (guest edited), International Affairs, Special Issue, 2013, and Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Mahabharata (co-authored with Aruna Narlikar), Oxford University Press 2014. We look forward to an inspiring and fruitful collaboration.

PIN carries on with it its regular active schedule at GIGA. Two books are currently in press: Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking, edited by Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey and published by Springer, and How Negotiations End: Negotiator Behavior in the Endgame, edited by I. William Zartman and published by Cambridge University Press. The new project for 2018 deals with Negotiations in Concerts of Rivals, with particular emphasis on the Middle East, and organized by Moti Cristal with a workshop planned for July at GIGA. There will be a PIN panel at the International Studies Associating meeting in San Francisco on 4–7 April; a roadshow is also planned for Prague in September, and other hosts are being examined. PIN has also expanded its activities with the launching of a training network, PIN Outreach in International Training (POINT), organized by Paul Meerts with other training programs and a group of young PIN associates.

■

I. William Zartman and Raymond Hinnebusch

UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis[1] – Part I: Kofi Annan

Thinking About Mediation

Five basic challenges confront a mediator on the pursuit of his/her efforts, corresponding to several headings emphasized in the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation (United Nations 2012) (for conceptual discussions of mediation, see Bercowitz 2009; Zartman and Touval 2017; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999; Maundi et al. 2006; Zartman 2015). These are mandate, entry, inclusivity, strategy, and leverage. The challenges will be spelled out here, and lessons of the Syrian experience in their regard will be drawn out in the conclusion.

Mission and Mandate. The goals of the mission are set by the authorizing agency (United Nations 2012: 6–7). The spectrum runs between a mandate which gives full freedom to mediate and full backing from appropriate authorities, to a very restrictive mandate that requires the mediator to return to cultivate support at each juncture. The mediator is both an intermediary between conflicting parties and also a mediator between them and the mandating agency, but the latter have a responsibility to support his work. Thus, the mandate commits the granting agency to support the designated mediator by endorsing and implementing his results, both collectively and as individual members.

Strategy. With the goal defined, the mediator has to consider how it is to be achieved, and most notably to weigh the relation between the procedural requirement of ending violence (conflict management, CM) and the need for a substantive formula for handling the conflict issues (conflict resolution, CR). Specifically, does the mediator manage the conflict with a ceasefire and disengagement first and perhaps later turn to seek a settlement, or does the mediator work on a resolving agreement which would give a reason for ceasing violence, and then or in the process install a ceasefire.

Each has its logic: Ceasefire and disengagement before resolution argues that the parties need to have fully abstained from violence before they can talk peace. Examples are Northern Ireland, the Liberian civil war, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and Darfur. The problem is that early ceasefires rarely hold and are an if-and-on process so that a requirement of total abstinence may prevent peace talks (Mahieu 2007). Ceasefires between Israel and Hamas in 2008, 2012, and 2014, mediated by Egypt, were their own end; some, including Hamas, have regretted the fact that they did not proceed on toward elements of CR.

On the other hand, agreement on an outcome or procedure to resolution can be required before violence is ended, so that a ceasefire does not come fully into effect until the peace agreement is signed or close to it. Examples are the 2013–2015 Colombian talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the 1989–1992 Salvadoran talks with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) or the 1990–1994 Mozambican talks with the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) or the 1980–1988 South Africa, Cuban, and Angolan talks over South West Africa (a.k.a. Namibia). The advantage is that the parties see what they are ceasing the violence for; the danger is that the violence may simply overwhelm the peace process.

Source: Flickr from United States Mission Geneva

Entry and Consent. A third basic question concerns the matter of entry or consent (United Nations 2012: 8–9). The parties may be looking for a mediator to help them out of the con-

flict, but, if not, the mediator will have to convince them of the need for mediation. In the first case, both parties would be convinced of the impossibility of a one-sided victory and would be looking to emerge from a painful situation under the best terms. Both the US and Iran were willing to look for a solution to the hostage-and-sanctions situation in 1979 and felt the need for Algeria to serve as a mediator to work out an agreement. In such cases there is no victory to be had; both sides are in a costly stalemate and feel it, and they look for a way out.

On the other hand, when the conflicting parties do not realize their impasse and the burden that continued conflict imposes, the mediator must first ripen their perception of the situation. The mediator does this either by developing an awareness of the costly impasse or by presenting an alternative so attractive in comparison with the present impasse that it catches their attention (Zartman and de Soto 2010). But the mediator can push only so far, lest he loses the entry completely. It took the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) behind those of UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (SESG) Jamal Benomar, backed by threats from the UNSC, to convince the two sides in Yemen of their need for mediation and to bring them to an agreement on Ali Saleh's departure from the presidency (in exchange for amnesty) in 2012. Much of Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker's time for six years in the Namibian conflict 1980–1986 was spent in convincing South Africa and Angola that they were not winning and their lack of success was costly. A turn of events in the field brought home Crocker's point.

Leverage. The fourth challenge concerns the leverage, or means of power or persuasion, available to the mediator. Although in the common understanding, leverage refers to hard power or "muscle"; yet, in reality the mediator has little of this type. He depends on the wisdom and appeal of his arguments. In the context of negotiation as "giving something to get something," the mediator is a demandeur and thus in a weak position. He rarely has the means to threaten or promise anything substantive and can only warn and predict consequences beyond his control. Conflicts tend to come in stacked layers or circles (in Lakhdar Brahimi's language): first among the parties themselves, second among their regional patrons, and third among the powers of the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). All three levels – parties, patrons and powers – offer terrain on which the mediator can operate in search of leverage over other levels.

Inclusivity. The fifth challenge involves the inclusivity concerning the interests of the parties on all three levels of the conflict (United Nations 2012: 11–12, 18–19). The parties in the conflict must be parties to the negotiation of a solution as much as possible; if they persist as spoilers and refuse to be part of the solution, they can be excluded only if they are not strong enough to upset the agreement among others.

These five challenges frame the practice of mediation and can be used to analyze the techniques, styles and strategies of Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi[2] in their mediating missions in the Syrian conflict.

The Unfavorable Mediation Context

The conflict in Syria is particularly resistant to mediation (Lynch 2013). The regime, made up of hardened Machiavellians, has been prepared to do whatever necessary to survive, whatever the cost to the country. Constituted along neo-patrimonial lines, it would find it very hard to share power or to remove the president without risk of collapse; more than believing it would win, it was convinced that it dare not lose. The opposition contributed to the intractability of the conflict thorough its maximalist demands for the fall of the regime, its rush to confrontation when the regime still retained significant support (Mandour 2013), and its unwillingness, whether in the name of a democratic or Islamist state, to accept a political compromise. The opposition also lacked credible leaders who could deliver its consent to any negotiated settlement. The opposition is divided between a fractious exiled opposition with little legitimacy inside the country and those inside Syria who were increasingly fragmented into multiple localized factions and dominated by intransigent and often warring jihadist factions.

A mediation's first window of opportunity comes before violence becomes too deep and closes as it intensifies mutual hostility, but this requires that the parties look ahead and see that the present course is increasingly costly and leads to stalemate at best (Grieg 2013). In the Syrian case, the last obvi-

ous opportunity while violence was still somewhat contained was Kofi Annan's mediation in April–May 2012. This had, by July 2012, failed and, as the opposition was militarized, violence was sharply increasing with casualties reaching to 5,000 in August 2012 from June. A de facto partition soon emerged, with the front lines fairly stabilized where the turf won and defended compensated for the damage inflicted by the conflict from the point of view of rival warlords.

The next window of opportunity for a political settlement could only open when both sides simultaneously recognized the impossibility of military victory. Objectively, such a "hurting stalemate" was reached by at least the third year of the conflict as it became apparent that neither side could defeat the other, particularly after the battle lines between regime and opposition became hardened, with only incremental gains thereafter made on both sides. Statistical research (Grieg 2013: 53) suggests that a hurting stalemate is most often reached 130 months and 33,000 battle deaths into a conflict; in Syria battle deaths exceeded this number in less than half the time (220,000 by January 2015 according to UN figures). External intervention fueling the conflict also contributed to this number. Each side believed that, if only its external patrons provided it with more resources or increased their intervention on its behalf, the balance of power would shift, allowing it victory. In the event, four years later, Asad was right. External players had continued to provide their clients with enough support to keep fighting and avoid defeat but not enough to defeat their opponent (Lundgren 2015; Beck 2013). In 2016, under the cover of fighting ISIs, Russia threw in the lot and provided a victory for the Syrian government

Kofi Annan's Mediation Mission

Unpromising Circumstances

Kofi Annan took up his mandate in February 2012 amidst many indications the conflict was not ripe for a negotiated settlement. A previous effort by the Arab League had already failed (Shaikh 2012). Asad warned: "No political dialogue or political activity can succeed while there are armed terrorist groups operating and spreading chaos and instability" (BBC 11 March 2012). As for the opposition, it had declared that Asad's departure was non-negotiable, but, lacking the means to force it, was counting on Western intervention and would only embrace UN mediation if it served the purposes of regime change.

Furthermore, the international context was not favorable. The Western powers had de-legitimized Asad, called for him to go, and had recognized the exiled Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Yet, the West showed no appetite for military intervention but rather viewed UN diplomacy as a way to get Asad's departure by non-military means (Hill 2015a: 34). On the other side, it was already clear that Asad's great power backers were not prepared to abandon him. On 12 May, 10 June, 11 October 2011 and 4 February 2012, Russia (and China) blocked

Source: flickr.com

Western drafts condemning the Syrian government's repression of protestors on the grounds that it would not condemn external arming of and violence by the opposition either. The Chinese and Russian argument was that "unbalanced" resolutions encouraged the opposition to avoid a political compromise. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "It is not in the interests of anyone to send messages to the opposition in Syria or elsewhere that if you reject all reasonable offers we will come and help you as we did in Libya." Annan's appointment was a compromise to get beyond this stalemate but the powers agree to it for contrary reasons: Russia to allow the Syrian regime to survive and the West to remove it (Aaronson 2012; Gowan 2012; Karon 2012).

Annan's Strategy: Reduce the Violence First

In Annan's view, the mission was well worth the attempt since the alternatives were so bleak. The spillover effects of the crisis threatened to de-stabilize the whole region, and alternative options were so limited because Western intervention was not in the cards (Hill 2015a: 10–12). Annan proposed a 6-point peace plan on 16 March, under which the Syrian government should do the following: immediately cease troop movements and the use of heavy weapons; begin a pullback of military concentrations in population centers; permit access and timely provision of humanitarian assistance; release prisoners; and respect freedom of expression and assembly. He delivered the plan to Asad, but the Syrian government asked for clarifications and wanted to re-negotiate the plan, despite minor adjustments already made in response to Syrian concerns. Annan aimed to present the regime with two bad choices – accepting or rejecting – in the expectation it would choose the least bad. However, while it may not have liked the six points plan, it did not feel it could publically reject them. Annan submitted the plan to the UNSC, which endorsed it on 21 March. Annan then successfully enlisted Russia to pressure Asad into acceptance of the plan on 27 March. He announced the Syrian government's acceptance before it had done so in order to maneuver it into committing to a fait accompli.

Ceasefire: Pincer Move

Next, Annan proposed a ceasefire. Again the Syrian government demurred, on the grounds that the opposition was being armed externally, but Russia successfully pressured Asad to accept the ceasefire. The ceasefire required the government make the first withdrawals with a 10 April deadline, while the Free Syrian Army (FSA) would follow, with a 12 April deadline. The regime agreed to start withdrawing its heavy weapons but qualified this by asserting that the security forces would not withdraw from cities until "normal life" had been restored. It also asserted that "a crystal clear commitment" from the U.S. France, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to stop aiding rebel fighters was "an integral part of the understanding" with Annan On 21 April, UNSC 2042 was passed unanimously, providing for a UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to deploy 300 unarmed soldiers to observe compliance with the ceasefire.

In Annan's thinking, the ceasefire would change the psychology of escalation that was driving the conflict and open the door to political negotiations (Hill 2015a). He aimed to catch the regime in a pincer movement combining international and, especially, Russian pressure from above and renewed mass protest from below. A watershed moment was the contested massacre at Hula on 26 May for which UNSMIS blamed the pro-Asad forces. The UNSC was unable to agree on a response because of Russia's refusal to blame the Syrian government. In May, believing its flank protected by Russia and that the international consensus against its use of violence had been broken, the Asad regime returned to use of heavy weapons.

Action Group on Syria: Creating a Transitional Government

In response, with the aim of increasing the pressure on the regime, Annan convened the Action Group on Syria (AGS), centered on UNSC members and excluding the Syrian government and its patron, Iran, which was vetoed by the US. This Action Group issued the Geneva Communiqué on 30 June. It called for inclusive national dialogue, with all parties represented, on a political transition. The shape of a future Syrian state was sketched, including constitutional reform and a multi-party system. To reassure the government, the AGS supported the continuity of government institutions, including the military and security forces, albeit sub-

mitted to a transitional government. The regime was bund to regard the reference to political transition and transitional justice, including accountability for crimes, as threatening. At Russia's insistence, the communiqué did not explicitly call for Asad to go, either before or during negotiation, as the opposition insisted.

The Geneva Communiqué was not implemented – indeed it was not even adopted by the UNSC for another two years. As violence continued to increase, the observer mission ceased its activities on 16 June. On 19 July, Russia and China vetoed a strong resolution that would have put non-military sanctions under the U.N. Charter Chapter Seven on the regime if it did not end the use of heavy weapons, withdraw troops from towns and cities, and implement Annan's peace plan. This was the last straw for Annan who resigned as mediator on 2 August 2012.

What Went Wrong?

Annan blamed the Syrian government's refusal to implement the six-point plan; the escalating military campaign of the Syrian opposition; and the lack of unity in the UNSC.

Few Regime Incentives to Buy into the Plan

The main weakness was that the plan relied so heavily on external pressure on the Asad regime, while giving it little incentive to comply. For the regime, this meant conceding something in negotiations that the opposition could not extract on the ground. Some argue that Annan conceded too much in assurances to Assad – that the aim was not to overthrow the regime, but instead to convey the threat that failure to comply would bring intervention. Moreover, those around Asad had to be brought to understand that Assad's continued tenure would jeopardize their interests (Gowan 2013; Mousavizedeh 2012). As long as the mediation had life, the West could not intervene against him, so Asad had an interest in temporarily going along with it. Annan banked on this interest entangling the regime in commitments by which it would be constrained and could not readily withdraw. Asad appeared indecisive and his close associates were probably split over the mediation.

Limits of Outreach to the Regime

Engagement with the regime could, in principle, have shifted its calculations toward compliance. Annan had deliberately framed his initiative as a "Syrian-led political process," to avoid raising a regime defensive reaction against encroachment on its sovereignty. Yet, the initial engagement with the regime was not sufficiently followed up, and certainly no mediation with the opposition took place. To more fully incentivize the regime to cooperate it might have been allowed more input into the shaping of the six point plan. Part of the Annan plan envisioned the regime appointing an interlocutor to negotiate the precise nature of the transitional executive to which full powers were to be transferred under the plan (although Annan himself was such an interlocutor). However, the discussions that Annan planned as his next step were aborted by the Houla massacre. The Syrian government could have been invited to Geneva I. Yet, not having been

Source: kremlin.ru

invited, Asad was not invested in the outcome; he told Annan, "It's not my thing, I was not there."

Incentives for the Regime to Stick Together

While Annan had hoped the momentum built up by his pincer movement would lead elites around Asad to turn against him to save themselves, the effect was actually the reverse. The communiqué called those to account who had committed crimes, and it suggested that the regime insiders would rapidly end up in the International Criminal Court. They might have been tempted by a compromise deal if their vital interests

could have been guaranteed, through amnesties and the lifting of sanctions – as in the Latin American "transition pact".

No Strategy for Addressing Opposition Intransigence

Annan had no strategy for dealing with the opposition since he saw the regime as the problem. Had Asad been brought to compromise, the opposition could doubtless be brought to meet halfway. Had the opposition been brought to compromise, Asad would have remained an obdurate spoiler. Reportedly, the FSA was convinced by the Libyan precedent and anti-Asad Western rhetoric that NATO was going to intervene on its behalf – a situation that confirmed Russia's reasons for holding out.

No Pressure on Regional Powers to Stop Opposition Financing

Behind the parties' intransigence was that of the regional powers backing them, which gave them the resources and encouragement to continue the fight. Annan vainly tried to get the Saudis and Qataris invested in his plan; Turkey, although invited to the Geneva I conclave, urged its clients in the Syrian National Council to reject the communiqué.

Overreliance on Russian Leverage

As a result, Annan put much effort on the "outer ring" of players (the US and Russia) and was relying on Russian pressure on the regime to deliver its acquiescence. Annan believed that the Russians saw Asad's course as unsustainable and sought to convince them that if Russia became co-manager of a peaceful power transition under the Annan plan, it could preserve the Syrian state and the Russian influence in it Borger and Inzaurralde 2015). Annan arguably overestimated Russian leverage over the Asad regime; while Asad would acquiesce in Russian pressure to engage with the mediator, he was impervious to influence insofar as the plan put his vital interests at risk.

Diverging Aims of US and Russia

Russia's priority, moreover, was its determination to reverse the Western interventionism that threatened Moscow's view of a multi-polar sovereignty–centric world order. Annan understood that the Russians were determined to prevent a repeat of the West's manipulation of the UNSC humanitarian resolution over Libya for purposes of military intervention and regime change. Hence, he tried to reassure the Russians that his plan was a genuine diplomatic alternative. "One of my biggest disappointments," Annan recalled, "was on the 30th of June. We had a difficult but a constructive meeting in Geneva, to discuss a political transition. They agreed on a communiqué, but on the 19th of July, when the council eventually acted, the resolution was vetoed by Russia and China" (National Public Radio Interview 2012).

This was a result of the US insistence that the resolution had to be "given teeth" under UN chapter seven. Annan believed chapter six would suffice and that Moscow would have accepted it (Hill 2015b). UNSC unity foundered on the opposite expectations held by the West and Russia for the outcome of mediation: change of the Syrian regime for the West, or its preservation (albeit reformed) for Russia.

The Geneva communiqué, based on Annan's six point plan, remains the ideal and internationally accepted template for a political settlement in Syria. It could still be activated if the parties come to believe a negotiated settlement is in their interests However, Annan's plan reflected a phase when it was still potentially possible to roll back the damage done by the conflict and constitute a pluralist settlement within a working state.

■

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ENDNOTES

1 For a full text and references, see Hinnebusch and Zartman (2016), from which this article is drawn. Republished with permission.

2 Brahimi's mission will be the subject of part II of the analysis, appearing in the next issue of PINPoints.

Moty Cristal

Negotiating in a Low-to-No Trust Environment

We all want trust. We all need trust. We would all like to be trusted. In negotiation, in particular, we all want a trustworthy partner. Trust has come to gain a significant role in social science research and is the subject of comprehensive ongoing investigation in the fields of negotiation processes, international negotiation, and mediation.[1] One of the most common – and prevailing – arguments in this field is that "when profit, security, or peace depend upon the motives and actions of another party, trust becomes essential" (Malhotra 2004).

Negotiations are conducted within one of two possible setups: deal making, or within the context of a given conflict. While in deal-making negotiations one can most likely choose her negotiating partner, in conflict negotiations such a choice does not exist. In the latter, you are forced to negotiate with your political rival, former business partner, brutal hostage taker, or angry spouse. My main argument is that success in these negotiations – defined as an outcome that addresses your interests, and that is better than any valid alternative (Thompson 1990) – does not depend on establishing trust, but rather on finding an alternative paradigm that will allow you to reach a sustainable, satisfactory agreement – even with a person with whom you would prefer not to deal at all. My own years of professional experience, coupled with simple conceptual frameworks, indicate that mediating a deal between a hostile divorcing couple, splitting up clients between former business partners, negotiating with terrorists or cybercriminals, or getting a deal signed with political enemies are possible even when there is no trust between the negotiating parties – or in what we call a "low-to-no trust environment."

Low-To-No-Trust Environment: A Definition

"Low-to-no trust" represents a reality where a party has no alternate counterpart to negotiating with the one whom he or she does not trust. It represents a reality when the other side is someone you know well and with whom you have shared past adverse experiences. Negotiating in a low-to-no trust situation means with someone who hurt you, damaged you, or with whom you have already declared war. A low-to-no trust environment represents a reality that is not just defined by the absence of trust, but rather by the existence of a strong, solid, and deep-rooted distrust.

A low-to-no trust environment, be it in the domestic, business, public, or international arena, is a reality where two or more parties are negotiating in order to come to an agreement, either because they were forced to by a third party (court decision or political power) or because they face a "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman 2000). Consequently, both sides can see no other alternative that satisfies their own interests other than negotiating an agreement.

Furthermore, negotiating in a low-to-no trust environment can be defined as a "Negosystem" that exhibits a complex interaction of three dimensions (past, present, and future) – across different levels of the conflict (personal, structural, and procedural) – that bring it to an extreme state of untrustworthiness.

Past is represented by grievances, mutual damages caused by the negotiating counterparties, and their constant need to articulate these, refer to them, seek compensation, and most important allow these past events to dictate not only their current behavior but also their individual or collective identity.

> *"When profit, security, or peace depend upon the motives and actions of another party, trust becomes essential."*

Present is represented by a series of behaviors that "stir the Negosystem," primarily through impasse, reluctance to come to the negotiating table, inflammatory statements, coalition building with third parties in order to elevate one's bargaining power, long ranting sessions once sitting at the negotiation table, and adopting "all-or-nothing" negotiation strategies.

Future is represented by the simple fact that the well-being of the negotiating parties is tied together. A family court judge once said to me, "One can always divorce his wife, but can never divorce his ex-wife." Their future lives or quality of life, and often those of other individuals, organizations, or societies, depend on the negotiated outcome – meaning the outcome that they will achieve with someone they do not trust.

Therefore, negotiating in a low-to-no trust state means negotiating in a human dynamic system that resides in a permanent state of mutual untrustwor-

thiness. It has its roots in past hurtful conflicts, it is manifested in belligerent behaviors across the negotiation table. And yet, both parties need to reach an agreement due to the fact that the cost of no deal is far higher for both parties.

Negotiating in a Low-To-No-Trust Environment: An Alternative Paradigm

If not trust, then what? If parties' pasts and presents do not allow establishing trust, what can the negotiation process be built upon?

The alternative paradigm that is offered here includes three elements that constantly intertwine. First, allowing for the emotional component of "freedom to hate." Second, replacing *Trust* with *Respect*, a significantly different value structure, and, third, building trust in the process, rather than inherently trusting the other side. This involves trust in a process that both parties, either directly or with a mediator's assistance, *jointly* build.

Freedom to Hate

Empathy, together with assertiveness, is essential in order to figure out and acknowledge the interests of the other side, to allow a smoother process and, mainly in deal-making negotiations, to strengthen rapport. However, psychological research shows the strong need of individuals, not to mention of groups, to define their own selves through distinguishing themselves from others, and they tend to identify the "other" as an enemy. Demonizing the other is a strong catalyst for building personal as well as group (national or organizational) identity, (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and Pliskin 2015). Complex conflict negotiations constantly encounter the gap between the fundamental psychological need to demonize the other and the traditional call to show empathy to your untrustworthy counterpart.

The conceptual, let alone the operational, challenge is whether one can separate her rational (perspective-taking) behavior from her emotional behavior, in particular in a low-to-no trust environment. Experience shows that people in conflict negotiations are flooded with emotions. They can hardly "talk logically," and most of the time they will reject any attempt to show empathy. Therefore they ought to be allowed to "hate" the other side: meaning to maintain their negative emotions toward the other party. This is not as an obstacle, in fact quite the opposite – an enabling mechanism for parallel "rational" thinking.

Legitimizing the "freedom to hate" is essential in conflict management-oriented negotiations, as distinguished from conflict resolution-oriented ones. The distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution is a well-established paradigm in the negotiation literature (Genicot and Skaperdas 2002). While conflict management deals with the symptoms, conflict resolution addresses the root causes. The need to differentiate between these outcomes is imperative when addressing conflicts, since this distinction directs the process manager or the mediator toward different process designs.

Source: SarahRichterArt/Pixabay

By its nature negotiation in a low-to-no trust environment seeks conflict management, rather than resolution. The deep level of mutual distrust does not allow true resolution; but if the process is led in the right direction, stable conflict management might eventually be achieved. Under these circumstances, "allowing" parties to hate each other and maintain their reciprocal negative feelings toward the other side will allow them to keep the emotional level still in their "conflict comfort zone." This while, on the rational level, agreeing to certain tangible and feasible steps – such as the cessation of hostilities, the mutually agreed withdrawal of lawsuits, or visitation rights for their kids.

Source: kremlin.ru

By doing so, namely legitimizing the parties' negative emotions toward the other side, the process manager or mediator assists them to overcome the existing dissonance between "How can I make peace with the person who hurt me so much?" and the rational understanding that this fight must ultimately be stopped. By emphasizing to the conflicting parties that they are not seeking "peace," that they are not engaged in a process of turning their enemy into a friend, that they need neither forget nor forgive, the process manager reconciles their internal emotional and psychological dissonance. Thereby, the likelihood increases of the parties accepting logical arguments regarding the high cost of no deal.

Allowing the parties to continue feeling strongly about the other side, while taking steps toward reducing violence or minimizing other unconstructive behaviors, is – as practice shows – an essential element in any conflict management process. It can lead to a workable agreement, even without completing a reconciliatory process.

Moving from Trust to Respect

Can you trust someone you do not respect? Can you respect someone you do not trust? Despite the fact that answering these questions always depends on the context, the fact that they can even be asked at all indicates that "trust" and "respect" are indeed different concepts. The alternative paradigm of negotiating in a low-to-no trust state calls for replacing trust with respect as a foundation for these kinds of negotiation. When respecting the other side, it is not just that you see your counterpart as an end, rather than a means, but that the *responsibility* for respecting her lies on your shoulders. When trusting your negotiating partner, by contrast, there is an imaginary "shift" in responsibility from you to the other side. When one trusts the other, the latter is now put in a position to prove that she is indeed trustworthy. When one respects the other, she does this independently. Such respect has nothing to do with the actions, behaviors, or attitudes of the other side. It has nothing to do with the level of risk in the negotiation. When you choose to respect your counterpart, then that is your own, independent, moral, as well as instrumental decision. It is, in short, your own responsibility. No shift, no forwarding of responsibility, no blaming the other side. Respect the other, however, and you will, quite likely, be respected in turn. Trust the other – well, that does not mean, necessarily, that now you yourself will become trustworthy, or be trusted for that matter.

Trust is a culturally dependent concept, as extensive research shows. On a practical level, many are familiar with the famous Russian proverb *"Доверяй, но проверяй"* ("trust, but verify") as used extensively by United States

President Ronald Reagan during his meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Russians, according to both my own practical experience and others' research, see trust significantly different than Westerners do (Ariño et al. 1997). Respect, on the other hand, is typically defined as a universal moral value, and is a less culturally sensitive concept (Aslani et al. 2013; Pely 2011).

Trust in the Process, Rather than Trusting the Other Side

The third component is replacing "trusting the other side" with instead trusting the negotiation process that both sides have built together. Since negotiating in a low-to-no trust environment is mostly a distributive process, and, in particular, one that uses the strategy of concession exchange, one can look into crisis negotiations in order to better understand the concept of "trusting the process." Concession exchange strategy, in its simplest intuitive quid pro quo version, is probably the "official" strategy of crisis negotiation. A reality of low-to-no trust is the daily routine of hostage negotiators. When a police officer or counterterrorism negotiator faces a barricade or a hostage taker, they enter into a delicate though structured negotiation process. Despite the fact that some hostage negotiator colleagues call for "establishing trust" with the hostage taker, others – as well as our own practical experience – suggest that trust can be established but not with your counterpart; rather, in the process.

The difference between trusting your counterpart and trusting the process is a significant one. Trusting an individual, in hostage as well as in political negotiations, embodies all of the difficulties mentioned above. However when you carefully build a quid pro quo process, even with your most despised adversary, both sides feel that they own it. The two sides, despite the fact that they do not trust each other, still care about the process that was jointly built: the respected "rules of the game," the invested time, the efforts, credits, and commitments made (and, so far, kept). Therefore, since they usually do not have a good "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA), they will likely stick to the process until it yields an agreement.

"Respect the other, however, and you will, quite likely, be respected in turn."

Moreover relying on or trusting the process, rather than the individuals involved in it, puts the negotiation process itself in the focus of that low-to-no trust environment. Both enemies – as they are now on track to reach an agreement – start to care for the process, and begin to protect it from potential spoilers. Putting the process at the center of attention, and referring to it as a joint achievement, provides another opportunity to overcome the absence of trust. Focusing on the process allows attention to be diverted from individuals to negotiating teams, and in turn to broader reference groups such as management teams or political parties. Once the process stirs up these dynamics, "personal relations" carry less weight. Meanwhile more emphasis is given to the wider contact and context between the hostage takers and the police team, or the management's representatives negotiating with union people.

As a matter of practice, these were the dynamics that we created as an Israeli negotiation team seeking a peaceful outcome with 250 barricaded in Palestinians in 2002, ending the 39-day siege of the Church of the Nativity (Cristal 2003). The same logic of trusting the process and relying on third-party involvement was adopted by the Israeli negotiation team facilitating a prisoner exchange deal with Hamas (2009–2011) too (Schweitzer 2012).

Source: Gratisography

Working to create trust in the process, rather than building trust and

confidence with an other whom you will never ultimately trust, requires reliance on effective mediation. In a nutshell, an effective mediator – one who could replace, with her skills and talent, the nonexistent trust between the conflict parties – should be able to competently act on all three levels of mediation: communicator, facilitator, and manipulator (Zartman and Touval 1985).

Conclusion

The 2009 mini-deal between Hamas and Israel involved the release of 20 female terrorists in exchange for a two-minute proof-of-life video of kidnapped Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit. Awaiting impatiently for the deal's implementation, one of Israel's security officers whispered: "I doubt that they [Hamas] will implement the deal. I never trusted them. We are enemies, therefore bound to fight. Not to implement mediated deals." I smiled and said: "Today, they are not only our enemies; they are mainly our negotiating partners." Needless to say, not only was that mini-deal implemented to the full but in turn a comprehensive prisoner exchange deal eventually later took place too.

You *can* negotiate, and you *can* reach an agreement with people whom you consider to be your enemies or adversaries. That could be a frustrated employee who was fired last week; a cybercriminal who tries to extort money so as not to publish your embarrassing data; an angry husband in a painful divorce; a political rival; or, an aggressive union leader.

Unlike the common thesis in the world of negotiation that calls for establishing trust, and the extensive research on the importance of being trustworthy, I argue that trust is overrated in the operation and practice of high-tension negotiation processes. Relying on trust, at least in the settings described here, could and should be replaced by three other elements:
(1) legitimizing hostile feelings, or even hatred, toward the negotiating partner;
(2) respecting him or her despite this, as a human being, and,
(3) building a carefully designed process that both sides will own.

■

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ENDNOTE

1 This article is an abstract of a chapter under this name in Honeyman and Scheider 2017.

Mikhail Troitskiy

A Quarter-Century of Post-Cold War United States–Russia Negotiations: The Role of Balance of Power, Domestic Inertias, and Leadership Worldviews

Twenty-six years after the moment when Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and George H. W. Bush of the United States of America declared an end to their Cold War confrontation and a "new era of friendship and partnership" (Wines 1992) such a prospect still seems a far cry. The US–Russia relationship has been developing only in fits and starts, reaching previously unseen lows by mid-2018. Washington and Moscow conducted many rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the issues of mutual concern – from the ways to deal with the civil war in Bosnia in the early 1990s, to NATO enlargement and US missile defense deployments from the mid-1990s, to the fate of eastern Ukraine since 2014. Despite numerous phases of high expectations, most of these negotiations did not result in sustainable agreements – so that the controversies remained in place and indeed continued to poison the relationship. The reasons for these failures has become the subject of heated debate among policy analysts and academics, many of whom have used the empirical material from developments between the US and Russia as evidence to support theories in the fields of Political Science and International Relations as well as to make generalizations about the two countries' relations.

Three popular arguments have been advanced to account for the lack of sustainable progress in the relationship. The first approach emphasizes the power disparities between the two sides: while the US has never relinquished its status of being the only global superpower, Russia was hit hard by the economic crisis in the 1990s and later suffered from corruption, inefficiency, and whimsical foreign policy decision making. Such a disparity, one could argue, made the US reluctant to make bargains with Russia because Washington always expected its best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs) to improve with time – and Russia's only to deteriorate (see, for example Mearsheimer 2014). Russia in turn was hit hard with resentment, and tried to strike back as soon as its powerbase increased – making its own BATNAs more acceptable.

"The diehard negative dynamic in the relationship was perpetuated by the lack of adequate negotiation formats and the unwillingness to engage on the issues of mutual interest."

The second popular approach stresses identity politics (Clunan 2014) and/or Russia's unmet aspirations for status in the post-Cold War environment (Troitskiy 2017). From such a perspective, Moscow's opposition to Washington's moves and policies since the end of the Cold War has been rooted in the identity that Russia picked for itself as a result of a brief public debate in the early 1990s. While Moscow decided not to break with the foreign policy heritage of the USSR and to largely position itself on the world stage as the successor state to the Soviet Union, Washington saw itself as the indisputable winner of the Cold War and the only remaining global beacon of morality – especially for the "defeated" post-communist countries. In turn, Russia aspired to an acknowledgment of its role as a co-victor, the party deserving credit for dismantling the mortally dangerous bipolar world and turning instead toward cooperation. However, those status aspirations were not honored by the US and most of its allies – at least until the mid-2010s, when Russia began to feature prominently as a major security threat in the foreign policy doctrines of NATO states.

A third school of thought argues that the main challenge to US–Russia relations has to do mainly with the personal convictions and parochial political agendas of the respective individual leaders (Stent 2018; McFaul and Stoner 2015). From such a perspective, foreign policies have been mutually hostage to domestic politics, personal grandstanding, and the need to keep a hold on power or to mobilize political elites in the respective countries. While each of these approaches is grounded in thorough research and based on solid evidence, they ultimately come across as deterministic – seeking to explain presumably inevitable outcomes or patterns of interaction between Washington and Moscow. The metatheories largely gloss over the process of US–Russia negotiations, however. A look at that process can provide a more nuanced perspective on the lessons to be learnt and the real options for the relationship that have existed in the past – and that may come back to the table in future.

Negotiation Inertias

The first lesson to be learnt from US–Russia relations concerns the nonlinear, self-reinforcing dynamic of conflict

and cooperation. Vicious as well as virtuous circles were more powerful than they are usually presented as being by the deterministic concepts. Positive inertias were generated by the staying power of negotiations, as a key form of engagement between two international actors. Negotiation formats and forums turned out to be difficult to dismantle overnight, because they carried value for their participants in the form of status, useful insights into the counterpart's intentions, and simple positions created within bureaucracies in charge of negotiating in those formats.

The diehard negative dynamic in the relationship was perpetuated by the lack of adequate negotiation formats and the unwillingness – usually for domestic political reasons – to engage on the issues of mutual interest. A plausible approach to the domestic political origins of the negotiation inertia is provided by the fashionable theory "New Behaviorism," which suggests that there is a bias among people with "more intense national attachments to attribute malign intentions to countries that they dislike and attribute benign intentions to the countries that they like" if the behavior of these two types of states is the same (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017).

As a result, it was difficult to turn the ship of confrontation toward a thaw in the relationship and vice versa. Both "resets" and "cold wars" proved surprisingly resilient, and it required consistent effort to shift from one state of affairs to the other. For example, the post-9/11 cooperative push in US–Russia relations, that originated from the shared goal of rolling back the Taliban in Afghanistan, outlived its initial rationale and did not fade away completely at least until President Putin's acrimonious anti-US speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 – and even then made a spectacular comeback a few years later. Negotiations on Afghanistan and the facilitation of US access to the transit infrastructure in Russia and Central Asia gained momentum at various levels of the two governments, and served as the basis for the reset that took off soon after a major bout of tension over Russia's conflict with Georgia in August 2008.

In a similar vein, the fallout from NATO enlargement was kept under control because of the multilevel negotiations between Russian and NATO civilian and military representatives that were conducted between 1995 and 2014. While those negotiations did not allow the matter to be resolved in principle, the different sides valued their engagement so much that they were actually prepared to put fundamental disagreements on the backburner – effectively pushing the can down the road (Istomin 2017). Conversely, the lack – or sudden collapse – of negotiation forums in the mid-1990s and then again in the mid-2010s led to protracted periods of conflict between the two sides, and essentially required a change of leadership in both countries to overcome these.

Source: State Department

On the domestic front, once it was explained to the Russians – both policymakers and the general public – by their leadership as well as mainstream media that the US could be a friend, as happened in the aftermath of 9/11 and then again during the reset of 2009–2011, they began supporting more cooperation with that country. The same largely applied to and for the US public as well. Only when the tide of mutual attitudes turned once more in 2012 – apparently because of personal issues between Presidents Putin and Obama,

Source: kremlin.ru

and because of electoral politics in Russia – did the relationship eventually head toward a new round of conflict. Mutual demonization among the respective publics ruined the chances for substantive negotiation, and for the prevention of further conflict.

The Role of Balance of Power

Over the last quarter century, both Russian and US foreign policy makers have frequently claimed that, when defining their mutual stances, they had to focus primarily on the counterpart's potentials – military, technological, economic, and otherwise – as opposed to their declarations of intent. Intentions can easily change, but the capabilities remain. Indeed, a popular official narrative in Russia argues that it was the balance of power logic that kept changing Washington's approach in its relations with Moscow. When Russia was weak, that narrative claims, the US did not worry about Russia and dismissed Moscow's declared interests and aspirations straight out of hand. When Russia resurged on the world stage in the 2000s meanwhile, the US, according to that same narrative, became obstructionist and set out to fight a covert war against Russia so as to change its regime. A review of the negotiation processes in US–Russia relations shows, however, that despite those declarations, the balance of power only played in fact a limited role in US and Russian stances and strategies vis-à-vis each other. While the US has always had an edge in power resources over Russia since the end of the Cold War, the latter neither consistently balanced the US nor bandwagoned with it either.

Indeed, by 1996 Moscow formulated a lodestar strategic concept to guide its foreign policy: "multipolarity." That term comes across as a clear antithesis to "unipolarity" – meaning the perceived global domination of the US. The doctrinal part of multipolarity clearly implied a balancing position vis-à-vis the US. However, in practice, periods of balancing US power in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the late 1990s gave way to bandwagoning in the early 2000s – that is, at the peak of US influence in the world.

Moscow also took a break from its attempts to balance Washington's in-

fluence in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond soon after the Russia–Georgia war in 2008, allowing for another round of bandwagoning from 2009–2011. During that period, Russia, for example, opened the door to the removal of the Qaddafi regime in Libya by abstaining in March of 2011 on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Moscow and Washington continued to negotiate in good faith on the transit of US military equipment to and then from Afghanistan. In a major feat of accomplishment for their relationship, the two sides completed several rounds of difficult negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty – the New START – and then successfully convinced their domestic constituencies to ratify it. Concurrently, an overarching institution was established to oversee the multitude of cooperative projects undertaken during the latest US–Russian reset – the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). In turn, the BPC created significant negotiation inertia – but also kept the sides from direct confrontation for about two years after their relations began to sour once more. From 2012 on, Moscow began voicing concerns about alleged efforts by the US to subvert not only the Russian government but also those in post-Soviet Eurasia that favored cooperation with Moscow. Russia thereafter gradually wound down most of the negotiating with the US that had flourished under the most recent reset.

The US also treated Russia differently during the periods of that country's both supposed weakness and strength. For example, the US was far less dismissive of Russia's concerns in the mid-1990s than it could have been given the latter's weakness at the time. For example, US President Bill Clinton was careful not to undermine Russian President Yeltsin's domestic standing or to reduce the latter's chances of re-election in 1996 by expanding NATO ruthlessly and without visible concern for Russia's reaction. Clinton therefore favored conducting negotiations with Moscow on a legal and institutional framework to underpin relations between Russia and NATO. That negotiation ushered in, by May 1997, the Founding Act on NATO–Russia Relations, which among other accomplishments promised that NATO would not deploy substantial armed contingents on the territory of its new members. Clinton also undertook a good-faith effort to resolve the missile defense controversy – a long-standing and major source of security concern for Russia – by signing with Yeltsin in 1997 protocols differentiating between strategic and non-strategic missile defense systems.

"In a major feat of accomplishment for their relationship, the two sides completed several rounds of difficult negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty."

In stark contrast, after Moscow declared an end to the era of Russia's "strategic softness" and moved decisively to engage the US in the conflicts around Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Washington showed readiness to contain Moscow both in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere and even to accept Russia's brinkmanship challenge – despite the latter openly featuring as a resurgent and confident actor (see the leaked version: United States Department of Defense 2018). Bilateral negotiation has stalled on almost all fronts, while the US has displayed few signs of willingly accommodating Russia's increased clout in world affairs. Whether Russia's net power vis-à-vis the US and the rest of the international community besides, as well as Moscow's leverage in negotiations with Washington, lately increased in comparison to earlier periods of US–Russia interaction is highly debatable.

A more plausible explanation for the evolution of reciprocal policies might be provided by mutual perceptions of threat to the status quo considered favorable by the opposing side. Indeed, policy biases in favor of the status quo constitute another important takeaway from the now-fashionable New Behaviorism.

Since the end of the Cold War the US has behaved at times in such a way that it has been perceived as a paragon of unfavorable change to the status quo that Russia has championed, and vice-versa. Moscow considered US missile defense initiatives as an assault on Russia's parity with its counterpart in strategic nuclear deterrence, and US support for revolutionary change of governments in post-Soviet Eurasia to be a wave of externally orchestrated coups ultimately directed against Russia. In turn, Washington has always feared the new challenge to US global leadership that may seemingly be mounted by Moscow at any point – and has taken Russia's attempts to unite its neighboring countries in trade and de-

fense blocs, to influence US domestic politics, and to drive a wedge between the transatlantic allies as manifestations of that country's immutable opposition to US global leadership.

In the meantime, Russia has seemed paradoxically unfazed by China's rapidly growing military capabilities – possibly because Beijing's policies are not seen by Moscow as a challenge, at least in the short term, to the status quo in their areas of mutual interest.

The implications of the above for policy could be that the two counterparts may have benefitted from trying to dispel the notion of being committed to change in the status quo merely for the sake of it. However such mutual understanding would have been difficult to achieve given the diverging perspectives on change, with the US largely viewing its political forms as a sine qua non of social and economic progress – and Russia as surreptitious attempts to further undermine its own post-Cold War status.

Overall, the US–Russia relationship was hardly driven by a balance of power or by other "systemic" immutable forces. Much more, it was influenced by domestic politics and pressure groups, personal chemistry between the three dyads of leaders, and often by these leaders' emotions and quests for personal vindication. By implication we should, therefore, in the final reckoning remain skeptical of any accounts of US–Russia relations advanced by metatheories seeking to explain the whole two and a half decades and counting of this extremely complex relationship.

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Paul Meerts

Existential Negotiations: The Case of Mongolia

What can Mongolia do to remain a de jure and de facto independent state? The country tries to develop its own resources and to balance its international political and economic relations by seeking cooperation with China, Russia, the United States, Japan, the Koreas, Kazakhstan, India, Iran, Australia, Canada, the European Union, etc. But its economy is already dominated by China (Reeves 2012: 598), with part of the political Mongolian elite having a huge stake in Chinese trade with and investments in Mongolia. While Mongolia might be a relatively democratic country, it is also a highly corrupt one too (Campi 2014a). China uses corruption as an instrument to make Mongolia more and more dependent on the Middle Empire, and this creates a huge imbalance with the other political and trading partners of the State of Mongolia.

China exports its agricultural, pastoral, and industrial environmental problems to Mongolia, which creates additional challenges to the wellbeing of the country. Using pesticides, stimulating overgrazing and hunting endangered species, polluting ground water, rivers and the air: Chinese-driven modernization has its downsides adding to those of globalization in general. Furthermore, divisions among the Mongolian ruling elite about how to handle relations with its southern neighbor might well threaten the relative stability of the country. Those who profit from Chinese investments are inclined to applaud Chinese support in developing Mongolia. Those who are distrustful of China's long-term political intentions want to limit Chinese economic input. Outside the elite – among "ordinary" Mongolians – this distrust comes close to hatred.

How can the Mongolians negotiate a way out of this dilemma? Mongolia is poorer than its formidable mineral wealth suggests, and further development is unthinkable without integration with the Chinese economy. The process of remaining as independent as possible from its two neighbors – China and Russia – has become known as Mongolia's "Third Neighbor" policy. In addition to its big neighbors, China and Russia, the Mongolians envision a virtual Third Neighbor, encompassing any country with which it has no border. The Third Neighbor policy also strives to promote Mongolia's bids to join various international organizations and to find other multilateral partners.

Mongolians are pragmatic negotiators (Meerts 2000, 2002) with a long tradition of using the Third Neighbor niche and membership in organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as tools in their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to remain independent and advance the country's interests. This contribution[1] to *PINpoints* analyzes Mongolian approaches to international negotiation, relying on interviews with Mongolian negotiators in order to understand the prospects for the country's role in Eurasia and beyond. I look at the role of negotiation in enhancing Mongolia's security, and thereby its sovereignty. My analysis is largely based on circumstantial evidence, as it is usually difficult to gain knowledge of specific details of the process of negotiation – including the conduct and style of particular negotiators. This is a typical problem faced when confronted with the secrecy of diplomatic negotiation (Meerts 2015: 22–24).

Source: kremlin.ru

Negotiating with China

As a prominent student of Mongolia once observed, "China has traditionally viewed its relations with the Mongols to its north with much seriousness. Chinese policymakers in the 21st century are fully aware of the historical record of devastating invasions of the Chinese heartland from the Mongolian

plateau, and such memories are still significant when developing policy" (Campi 2005: 1).

This is an amazing statement, if one is to compare the Chinese population of 1.2 billion to the 2.1 million people living in independent Mongolia and the 6 million inhabitants of Inner Mongolia within China. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders place Mongolia relatively high on their agenda. Chinese premier Li Peng's visit in 1994 to Mongolia resulted in the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation," which envisaged formal mutual recognition by Mongolia and China. Chinese Party Chairman Hu Jintao went to Mongolia on his first foreign trip in 2003. One might reasonably wonder what the Chinese have to fear. A ghost from the past? This view is widespread among analysts. "Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government has attached a great amount of importance to its relations with Mongolia, despite the relatively small role Mongolia plays in regional and international affairs" (Reeves 2013: 175).

In Russian terms, one might look at Mongolia as part of China's "Near Abroad" – a piece of the empire that China lost as a result of the so-called "Unequal Treaties" of the nineteenth century between Manchu China and colonial powers like Japan, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. While the Chinese preach respect for sovereignty, noninterference, nonaggression, mutually beneficial relations, and peaceful coexistence, Mongolia is becoming increasingly dependent on China. More than half of foreign direct investment comes into Mongolia from China, and more than 80 percent of Mongolia's exports go to that country – which in turn provides over 30 percent of Mongolia's imports. Unsurprisingly, but tellingly, China is Mongolia's primary lender (Reeves 2013: 178–179). China is also a very important player in the booming Mongolian mining sector, which has a huge impact on Mongolia's political elite. Many of Mongolia's most influential, well-connected businessmen make their money through ownership of mines that are heavily dependent for their existence on Chinese investment. While there is still a strong historical anti-Chinese sentiment to be found among the Mongolian population (Reeves 2014: 157), the business and political elites are increasingly sliding into the Chinese "sphere of influence."

"While the Chinese preach respect for sovereignty, noninterference, nonaggression, mutually beneficial relations, and peaceful coexistence, Mongolia is becoming increasingly dependent on China."

This does not imply that Mongolia will pay tribute to China under all circumstances. Whenever Mongolia has had the opportunity to test its overwhelmingly powerful neighbor, it has indeed done so. One clear example of this is the two visits by the Dalai Lama (the spiritual leader of Mongolian Buddhists) to Mongolia. These visits occurred in 2011 (with secret help from the Japanese government) and in 2016 respectively. Mongolian Buddhism is a major pillar of national identity, alongside the country's glorious history, culture, and territory. Moreover, there is the possibility that the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama might be found among "genetically Tibetan-blooded Mongols in the country's Gobi provinces" (Campi 2012: 2). If this occurs, the Chinese will lose control over naming the next Dalai Lama – which may also weaken its hold over Tibet. But apart from this, China will remain dependent on Mongolia's natural resources.

Notwithstanding the differences of opinion with the Mongolian government, China has launched new overtures toward Mongolia. On the whole it is in the interest of the Mongolian government not to irritate its constituencies by revealing new Sino–Mongolian agreements, while the Chinese use these opportunities to drive a wedge between the Mongolian government and parliament. An agreement on coal deliveries in 2014 was quite far reaching: strengthening high-level exchanges, deepening practical cooperation, expanding people-to-people and cultural connections, and holding "joint commemorative activities of the 70th anniversary of the victory of World War II" (Campi 2014b: 3).

It is obvious that Japan was unhappy with this commemoration, so Mongolia's agreement to the memorandum was surprising as the country nurtures its ties with Japan as much as possible. Nevertheless in 2014 Mongolia and China upgraded the level of their engagement to what was called a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," whereby the two countries committed to developing broad cooperation – with

concrete plans for long- and mid-term collaboration programs. Mongolia has also promised not to interfere in China's internal affairs, such as the problems with non-Han minorities in the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Negotiating with Russia

Within ten years of the end of Soviet domination of Mongolia, Russia had slowly but surely returned to being an important partner. However it was not until the celebration in 2012 of the centenary of the Russo–Mongolian "Agreement of Friendship" that their bilateral relationship was normalized. The bilateral agreements between Russia and Mongolia have mostly focused on military matters, such as joint Russo–Mongolian exercises and the training of Mongolian military officers by the Russian Federation: "More than 60 percent of Mongolians performing military training abroad today are in the Russian Federation" (Campi 2013a: 2). Given the security threats from China and the security support from Russia it is understandable that Mongolia goes the extra mile in avoiding any political clashes with its northern neighbor. An example of that is the strategy of Mongolia avoiding the question of the Russian occupation of Crimea. In an attempt to nurture Russo–Mongolian relations, Mongolia "abstained from the March 27, 2014 United Nations General Assembly resolution vote condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea [and] Mongolia has continued its public silence regarding Russian actions in Ukraine" (Campi 2014c: 1).

Although there have been attempts to broaden the relationship with Russia to include transportation and mining assistance, these should mainly be seen as efforts to reduce Mongolia's dependence on China and assuage the domestic public's related concerns. Expanding the railway connection with Russia could provide access to distant parts of Eurasia, but Mongolian exports still predominantly go through the Chinese ports of Tianjin, Dalian, and others. Furthermore, there is some regional cooperation – for example the Greater Altai Project – in which the Mongolian, Russian, Chinese, and Kazakhstani governments are attempting to enhance the economy around the Altai Mountains (Pinnick 2005). A multilateral agreement like this is politically important as it draws in several actors at the same time, thereby preventing one of them from dominating in the cooperation. It neutralizes the hegemonic aspirations of countries like China and Russia by involving both of them at the same time, while drawing in Kazakhstan as a balancer in the Greater Altai Project. In short, the goal here is the setting up of regional projects so as to moderate the relationship with Mongolia's closest neighbors.

An example of a bilateral agreement with a balancer outside the direct Mongolian geographic sphere are the deals made with Russia's ally Belarus. The Mongolians hosted and honored the prime minister of Belarus in 2013. During his visit, Belarus and Mongolia signed an "Agreement on Military–Technical Cooperation" and held consultations on bilateral cooperation in trade, economics, investment, and construction (Campi 2013b: 3). In such ways Mongolia tries to diminish its dependence on its large neighbors by involving them multilaterally or by connecting with less powerful third parties.

Negotiating with the United States

Mongolia's foreign policy concept stipulates, as noted, first and foremost the development of good and balanced relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia, followed by with its "third neighbors." Indeed, Mongolia had high hopes of the US becoming an important distant third neighbor. The relationship with the US is clearly of great importance to Mongolia, but it is of no significance to the US itself. Such an asymmetry of needs and priorities does not lead to a viable sustainable partnership. This does not mean that the US is not interested in Mongolia at all. President George W. Bush and several secretaries of state have all visited Mongolia. Secretary of State James Baker had the privilege of being awarded the title of "Honorary Doctor" (this was later balanced by bestowing the same title on Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov). The US provides some military support in the form of weaponry and training. A number of Mongolian military officers study defense policy planning at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Turbat 2007).

In return for this military support, Mongolia has attempted to court the US by sending Mongolian peacekeepers to Afghanistan and Iraq. For the first time since the Ilkhanate Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Mongols entered Baghdad. Furthermore there are joint Mongolian–US mil-

Source: Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

Source: Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

itary exercises conducted in Mongolia itself. The US is one of the participants in the annual Khaan Quest multilateral peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia, in which 22 other countries – including China – participate. These Mongolian attempts to forge closer security links with the US have not been very successful, however. While Presidents Xi and Putin came to Ulaanbaatar for serious talks, the US secretary of state stayed for only two hours (Campi 2014d: 2). "Indeed, the US has largely stood by while Mongolia deliberately integrated its faltering economy closer with its two neighbors, China and Russia" (Campi 2015: 1).

Negotiating with Japan

In 1991 Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu was the first head of government of an industrialized country to visit the new and now – not only de jure but also de facto – independent Mongolia. Mongolia's ties with Japan are synergetic, in the sense that both countries are looking for closer cooperation in order to counterbalance the rise of China as the dominant power in East Asia. While Japan has the technological knowhow, Mongolia can provide the raw materials that the Japanese economy needs. As an American observer of Mongolian affairs noted, "Japan was Mongolia's fourth-largest trade partner in 2012 and continues its two-decade tradition of being its largest aid donor" (Campi 2013c: 2).

This donor–recipient relationship was transformed in 2014 after Mongolia technically became a middle-income country.

This relationship of Mongolian dependency on Japanese willingness to support it economically came to an end with the Japan–Mongolia Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) of June 2016. This agreement was the first of its kind between Mongolia and another country. It is expected to promote liberalization and facilitate trade and investment between the two countries, and to deepen their mutually beneficial economic partnership across a wide range of fields.

Negotiating with the Koreas

South Korea has also agreed to pursue a bilateral EPA, and the two sides have organized several meetings of a joint working group that is studying the possibility of establishing an economic partnership agreement between the two countries. Mongolia feels connected with the two Koreas because of their communality in background, both in an ethnic and a linguistic sense. This might be one of the reasons why Mongolia is on an equal footing with both South and North Korea. It is one of the few countries in the world that does not take sides in the conflict between the two, which gives it a potential role as a mediator.

Mongolia, then, has a surprisingly steady relationship with North Korea (Bayasakh 2014). Mongolia is investing in North Korea's Rason City Special Economic Zone, and aspires to join in the Six-Party Talks on that country's nuclear program. Additionally, Mongolia plays the role of broker in negotiations over Japanese citizens who have

been abducted to North Korea. Mongolia is also one of the transit zones for North Koreans fleeing to South Korea through China (Halbertsma 2014).

The country has made some efforts – for example through the ongoing Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security, first convened in 2014 – to become a trusted and neutral intermediary for those wishing to engage with or meet North Korean officials in Ulaanbaatar. Mongolians do not seem very concerned with the challenges posed by North Korea. In a survey among ordinary citizens in 20 stakeholder countries, the Americans had strongest concerns about the North Korea nuclear program while the Mongolians were the least worried (Onderco and Wagner 2012). This relaxed attitude gives Mongolia a unique chance to play a mediating role in one of Eurasia's and indeed the world's most imminent threats to peace and security (Halbertsma 2014).

Negotiating with the World

Mongolian politicians and diplomats negotiate in many diplomatic forums, including the UN and its subsidiaries, the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace program, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Regional Forum, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Mongolia is also an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and European Bank for Regional Development, while it has also taken the initiative to create an Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Security in Northeast Asia. Pardo and Reeves (2014) compared Mongolia and North Korea across eight dimensions, and found that the former did relatively better in its negotiations with more powerful countries. On those dimensions of bilateral and multilateral bargaining, coalition building and balancing power, Mongolia was found to be a more effective negotiator. North Korea only did better on coercive deficiency, because of its nuclear arsenal.

Recently, the president of Mongolia suggested that his country should aim for permanent neutrality. Such a stance, however, would not enhance Mongolia's bargaining position as it would limit its flexibility and pragmatism, the most important advantages of its negotiation style: "The most logical and pragmatic way to survive in this complicated and rapidly changing landscape, and balance multiple political and economic aims, is to not freeze the country's pragmatic foreign policy via permanent neutrality, but instead strengthen its links to global, regional, and bilateral structures" (Jargalsaikhan 2015).

Conclusion

Mongolia is a small country in terms of population and economic output; however, it plays a major role in regional politics because of its geographic location. The powers around it see the country as strategically important because of its buffer status and abundant natural resources. Mongolia will continue to enjoy sufficient room to manoeuver in security negotiations so long as long as neither of its two large neighbors allows its counterpart to dominate Mongolian territory. The idea of appealing to other countries further afield as alternative "third neighbors" seems to be losing credibility in the wake of Mongolia's declaration of permanent neutrality, which will limit its flexibility going forward.

Third Neighbors in East Asia, notably Japan and the two Koreas, have shown interest in Mongolia but do not have the power or the motive to really make a difference should China and/or Russia decide to encroach on Mongolia's sovereignty. Preoccupied with domestic challenges, the West – the US and the European Union – appear to be losing interest in Mongolia entirely. Australia, Canada, Turkey, and India could still make a difference as relative outsiders with a stake in Mongolia's stability, but they also could not offset concerted influence on Mongolia by either Russia or China. International organizations of which Mongolia is a member or an observer also wield little influence in this part of Eurasia.

What can be expected in the coming decades? To begin with, there will be a transition of Mongolia from a Russian buffer state to a transit one instead: a country that links China to Russia, and vice versa. Rather than separating the two, Mongolia is becoming a bridge between them, using that opportunity to export its raw materials to both – as well as onward to the rest of Asia, and indeed the wider world. However we might also see China strengthening its hold on Mongolia, both for economic and strategic reasons. China is in need of Mongolia's natural resources, and it does not want other countries to use it as a client state. Moreover Beijing is continuously working to limit Mongo-

lia's engagement with the Dalai Lama.

In the background, China's drive to restore its role as the regional hegemon might imply looking at Mongolia as a "junior partner." China's border policies and Beijing's approach to dealing with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are indications of this ideological direction. The current policy of coopting important parts of the Mongolian elite into the Chinese economic realm by giving them economic stakes in Chinese investments in their country could lead to conflict between the Mongolian population and their leadership. As mentioned, anti-Chinese feeling remains widespread among Mongolians. Such developments will limit Mongolia's potential for effective security negotiations, foster strong internal divisions and strife, and threaten its very existence as a sovereign and independent state.

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ENDNOTE

1 This contribution to PINpoints 45 is an abridged version of Chapter 4 "Negotiating on Horseback: Mongolia in Eurasian Security Negotiations," in: Mikhail Troitskiy and Fen Hampson (eds) (2017), Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia, Waterloo, ON, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 69–83. This chapter has been coauthored by Tjalling Halbertsma from Groningen University and Bayasakh Namsran from the Mongolian National University in Ulaanbaatar. An abridged variant has been published as: Meerts, P. W. (2017), Khazaria: Lessons Learned for Mongolia?, in: Pax Mongolica, 3, 3, 3–17.

Ariel Macaspac Hernandez

Trump's USA and Climate Negotiations – Quo Vadimus?

After the election of President Trump, several experts and the media were quick in predicting "system rupture" (see Chu 2017; Kelleher 2017). The significant budget cuts on diplomacy, foreign assistance and contribution as well as the United States' withdrawal from UNESCO and the Paris Climate Agreement are symptoms of the "America First" narrative as the United States withdraws from its global leadership role as it pursues national protectionism and isolationism (Hardt and Mezzada 2016). While the current US government thinks that it increases its power leverage through this change of foreign policy, it is paving way for the emergence of new global leaders as the international order becomes more polycentric due to increased relevance of fractal global decision-making. The vacuum created by the shift of U.S. foreign policy encouraged the conceptualization of new foreign policies of other countries such as the so-called "Gestaltungsmacht" (shaping power) of Germany and the "The Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) of China.

The analysis of the ramifications of the "America First" for global climate negotiations needs to be integrated on one hand and strategic on the other. Integrated means that climate policy-making needs to be understood as fractal and that the U.S. federal government, though an important fractal is not the only relevant one. Fractal policy-making refers to self-similarity or patterns for instance of U.S. climate policies independent of the political party affiliation of the current U.S. president. These patterns reflect existing lock-ins, which limit the scope of policy trajectory. This can explain why previous liberal administrations were limited in pursuing more ambitious climate policies. Without the support of state and local governments, the non-state profit- and non-profit organizations and other social movements, the extent of the influence of the U.S. federal government was limited. Interestingly, these lock-ins can be paradoxically limiting the influence of the Trump administration, because lock-ins have evolved and have become increasingly aligned with the principles of sustainability, as new standards have emerged from the private sector in the past few years. In addition, the analysis needs to be strategic in the sense that behind the disruptive behavior of the federal government, there have been silver linings that when strategically embedded can enhance the effectiveness of long-term climate policies. In addition, the analysis needs to be strategic in the sense that behind the disruptive behavior of the federal government, there have been silver linings that when strategically embedded can enhance the effectiveness of long-term climate policies.

"America First" – Silver Linings for Climate Policies

On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, which was followed by the formal communication to the United Nations of its intent to withdraw. This announcement aimed to fulfill an electoral promise of President Trump to eliminate "burdensome" regulations on the energy industry in the country and to revive the coal industry, which he concretized in his "America First Energy Plan." Originally, the United States would have had to implement both the Clean Power Plan and the Climate Action Plan, which was forged by the administration of President Obama, for the United States to meet its 2025 Paris Agreement commitment or its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), which means a reduction of emissions by 26–28 per cent below 2005 levels including Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). With pre-Trump climate policies still in place, including the Clean Power Plan, emissions would only have reduced emissions to 10 per cent below 2005 levels by 2025, which was still not enough to reduce by 26–28 per cent below 2005 levels (Climate Action Tracker 2017). With the suspension of the Clean Power Plan, emissions in 2025 are likely to be higher, at 7 per cent below 2005 levels. Although, legally, the NDC remains in place as it is until at least 2019, the Trump administration has already stopped implementation of the NDC at the federal level (Climate Action Tracker 2017).

The election of President Trump and the withdrawal of U.S. federal government from its various global and national competencies in climate and environmental protection and sustainable development have mobilized social movements and the private sector in the United States. Months after the 2016 elections in the United States, the new term "rage donations" has emerged describing an increase of contributions to non-profit and civil society groups (Pfeiffer 2016) particularly civil rights and environmental groups.

For example, contributions to the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts have increased by 500 per cent. The environmental group Sierra Club added 11,000 new monthly donors, while the Environmental Defense Fund raised USD 250,000 in the week after the election (Eckhouse 2016). Donations to EarthShare Washington and Forterra increased by 40 per cent and 57 per cent respectively (Ryan 2017).

In addition, to the improvement of the capacity of non-profits and civil society groups, the 2016 election of President Trump has led major corporations and business groups to take a clearer position on supporting climate protection and environmental integrity. On 10 May 2017, after the announcement of withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement through President Trump, CEOs of 30 major companies, including Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, bought full-page ads in major US newspapers to argue that remaining in the Paris Agreement is in their best interests. Elon Musk, founder of Tesla and SpaceX, and Robert A. Iger, CEO of Disney, left the economic advisory council for President Trump (Victor 2017). Jeff Immelt, CEO of General Electric expressed his disappointment and called for the industry to lead and not depend on the government (Victor 2017).

In addition, several U.S. cities and states have announced that they will adhere to the climate agreement by looking at ways to reduce emissions, including negotiating contracts with local utilities to supply more renewable energy, building rapid transit programs and other infrastructure projects like improved wastewater treatment. For example, the mayor of Salt Lake City, Jackie Biskupski, announced that her administration had recently brokered an agreement with the local utility to power the city with 100 per cent renewable energy by 2032 (Tabuchi and Fountain 2017).

Multiple Entry Points to Climate Change Mitigation in the United States

The resurgence of social movements in the United States can be a major entry point to climate mitigation and sustainable development goals. Since decades and especially after the 2016 US elections, coalitions and alliances between social movements have led to the process of knitting together horizontal relationships, expansion of political consciousness and interests between groups, not only between groups within the United States, but also movements from other countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America with their U.S. counterparts. For example, the “inextricable” linkage between addressing climate change and defending indigenous rights have placed current environmental policies of President Trump in conflict against indigenous communities (Hardt and Mezzada 2016). Racial justice, as sought by “Black Lives Matter” protests is linked with gender, sexuality and economic justice, which cover several elements of sustainable development.

Source: RyanMcGuire/Pixabay

A major reason for the failure or limitation of environmental agenda reaching the majority of the US population is attributed to the historical development of environmental movements, where environmental movements are traditionally rather concentrating and

most visible in national politics. After the election of President Trump, there has been a shift of centers of environmental activism: from the federal capital Washington D.C. to cities and local communities (Ryan 2017; Tabuchi and Fountain 2017). Compared to environmental groups, nonprofits have rather focused on local issues. With this shift of environmental advocacy, the interlinking of interests between different nonprofits can be more successful. Particularly because some cities are now opting for a "stronger" environmental profile, new partnerships between environmental groups and other nonprofits are most likely to occur. As more "smart cities" and "smart enclaves" are emerging in the United States, climate mitigation in the context of a federal government under President Trump will most likely evolve around urban economic development that is highly dependent on social movements and local business and industry sectors. Cities in the United States have already assumed the lead role in designing and implementing innovative policies to achieve sustainability (Portney 2013). Before the election of President Trump, the US domestic climate policies have focused on state policies and federal incentives such as subsidies for renewable energy. On the day President Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, the governors of California, New York, and Washington announced the forming of the United States Climate Alliance, which is a coalition of states committed to meeting the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. After many months, this coalition has now 14 states and Puerto Rico and it also includes several states with Republican governors (Rogers 2017).

While these states, which emit 21 per cent of U.S. carbon emissions (Rogers 2017), cannot make significant difference in terms of global emissions, this coalition can act as bandwagon, where, as the path dependence theory will argue, it will be more expensive for non-members not to join, especially for Republican states like Iowa and Texas, which have a large wind industry. If leaders of non-member states can "frame" the issue as supporting renewable energy rather than climate change, which is a more loaded political term, the coalition expects to gain more political support and bipartisan endorsement in the state level. However, as past U.S. climate policies have heavily depended on federal subsidies, new actors are needed to compensate the absence of these federal incentives for renewable energy. Nevertheless, as many proponents of "free market" would argue, government subsidies can inhibit innovation as these for example may send wrong signals to the market (see Brodwin 2013; Wallsten 2000).

Another important entry to climate mitigation in the absence of federal support is the private and business sector. In a report published by Apex Clean Energy and the GreenBiz Group (see Abraham 2017), the survey among 153 major public and private U.S. corporations concludes that 84 per cent of these companies are still "actively pursuing or considering purchasing renewable energy over the next 5 to 10 years." In addition, 43 per cent of these companies intend to be more ambitious in their pursuit of renewable energy in the next two years. According to 87 per cent of those actively pursuing renewable energy purchases, the election of President Trump had no impact on their decision, while 11 per cent were more inclined to purchase renewable energy after the election. The major reason behind this preference is rather not political, but economical. Diversifying energy portfolio in terms of energy sources and geography through the inclusion of renewable energies is an important instrument against rising and variable costs of fossil fuels. The surge of renewables is therefore something that is only a matter of time.

Strategic Outlook for Climate Negotiations

The implications of the election of President Trump to global climate protection can be analyzed through two perspectives – the implications 1) to the global order in general and 2) to global climate protection as a process.

Without the intention of the current US federal government, it is creating new opportunities for advancing global climate negotiations. Unlike in other global issues such as security and trade, the United States was not an active leader in climate negotiations due to domestic pressure (see Verolme 2012; Sjöstedt 1993; Sjöstedt and Penetrante 2013). There was a vacuum in the climate negotiations, which European countries were trying to fill up. With difficult domestic conditions, the United States under President Obama was very careful in using "political re-

sources" that were needed to pursue healthcare reforms. Nevertheless, with the absence of the country that until recently emits the most, European states are limited in pursuing an ambitious mitigation regime, because they do not possess all relevant resources and "moral power" to persuade and coerce other states, particularly those with emerging economies to support a mitigation regime that corresponds to climate integrity as proposed by epistemic communities (see Falkner 2007; Gupta and Grubb 2000; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). New major emitters such as China and India are reluctant to commit, because they calculate that for them the utility of committing is less than doing nothing (business-as-usual) (see Gupta 1997; Jakob et al. 2014; Najam 2010). However, this utility changes as the United States' withdraw not only from climate negotiations, but also from other global regimes such as the UNESCO and TTIP, which may bring positive surprises

The withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Deal is symptomatic, as it vindicates a bigger picture of a global hegemon showing gradual resignation from this role. This resignation is however seen as an opportunity for other states with the ambition of replacing the United States as hegemon and profit from "hegemonic benefits" such as forging global narratives and setting standards relevant for coordination and collaboration games. The US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Deal as well as President Trump's reversal of almost all domestic climate policies forged not only by former President Obama, but also by earlier administrations (including from President Bush Jr.) sealed off any potential U.S. role in shaping future global climate regimes and institutions. New lock-ins and standards are being formalized after the Paris Climate Deal and the United States is placed in a disadvantageous position, as these new standards may hamper future access of the United States and U.S. companies to innovative technologies and markets, which will be likely aligned to these new standards. In addition, because of the linkages of climate protection with other issues such as sustainable development and energy security, this resignation from the climate regime will also mean less "Gestaltungsmacht" (shaping power) in other global regimes.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of global climate protection as a process, there are now new opportunities for advancing climate protection goals under the current US administration, which were not viable prior to the 2016 elections of President Trump. However, adequate and strategic planning is needed to mobilize the needed resources for these opportunities to materialize. As described above, the mobilization of social movements, the private sector, state and local governments towards fulfilling the Paris Climate Deal is unprecedented, and if strategically used, can further advance climate protection as a process. However, embedding these actors into a global climate policy framework will need the resolution of several coordination and collaboration problems. It will for example require modifications of the norms and practices in global negotiations. For example, under which framework can the Federal Government of Germany negotiate with the City of Seattle without involving the US Federal Government? In this case, which frameworks are available for the city of Düsseldorf to directly collaborate and coordinate with the City of Seattle? If local governments cannot be signatories of international treaties, what alternative arrangements are available that can be further supported? Should intra-city collaborations be the focal points of global climate negotiations?

Source: Max Pixel

Nevertheless, realpolitik will still remain a major factor in global functional, institutional, persuasion and bargaining interactions. With the resignation

of the United States from substantial global climate policies, the international community was quick in accepting this and has easily shifted its focus on emerging questions such as how climate protection goals can be strategically aligned with the vested interests of China as a new leader not only in climate protection, but also in other domains. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Deal, the Chinese government took a clear position in support of the Paris Climate Deal (The Guardian 2016). The Chinese government sees opportunities through this leadership in global climate policies, on one hand, to strengthen the mandate of the Chinese "One Road, One Belt Initiative," and, on the other hand, to gradually re-define its economic competitiveness and shift from a factor-and investment driven into innovation driven following signs of a slowing pace of Chinese GDP growth (He 2016). Nevertheless, the opportunities of a global Chinese leadership in climate protection can only be materialized after understanding the "Angst" of mostly European states towards this new "Chinese eco-civilization" that overshadows this momentum and therefore define reluctance to join the "Chinese" band-wagon.

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Rudolf Schüßler

Treacherous Compromises

Successful negotiations usually end in compromises. This seems natural, given that a compromise is defined as an agreement in which both sides make concessions (see Golding 1979: 3 and Wikipedia on compromise and concessions, and Benjamin 1990, Pennock and Chapman 1979 on compromises in general). Success in negotiations depends on making the right concessions and rejecting the wrong ones. Yet how do we determine what kinds of compromises are reasonable and constructive, and which ones are not? In the (growing) literature on compromises, warnings have been voiced against making rotten ones. Avishai Margalit, who has written a renowned book on rotten compromises, mentions other kinds that we should avoid: shabby, shoddy, and shady compromises (Margalit 2010: 3; see also the review of Margalit's book by Menkel-Meadow 2010). I will add here another to the bestiary of bad compromises: treacherous ones. Let us see then what distinguishes these from the other beasts, and how we can avoid them.

A Bestiary of Bad Compromises

It seems obvious why shabby, shoddy, shady, and rotten compromises should be avoided. Compromises that deserve such names cannot be good. However it is helpful already at this stage of our discussion to distinguish between "moral goodness" and "profitability." A shabby compromise, according to Margalit, is an exploitative one that takes unfair advantage of the opponent's vulnerability (for the following characterization of compromises, see Margalit 2010: 3). By its very definition, such a compromise is morally bad (for simplicity's sake, I will not distinguish here between moral goodness/badness and rightness/wrongness). It might, nevertheless, be very profitable for the exploiter, so that hardnosed business persons or political realists might see no reason to shun shabby compromises. Many agents would not hesitate to employ shabby means, if they were to become rich and powerful in the event. To avoid a moralistic tone, I will simply indicate the moral status of a compromise and its self-serving profitability independently of each other – and thus leave it to the reader to decide whether either motive suffices for him or her to accept a particular compromise.

Shabbiness is, of course, not an easily ascribable property of compromises. There can be widely conflicting views even among reasonable and well-informed observers as to whether a given compromise is shabby or not. This is no less true of other kinds of compromise. At first glance, the vagueness implied by any distinction of different kinds of compromise might seem a reason to consider their analysis moot, but blurry boundaries of concepts are generally endemic in Political Science and Applied Ethics. If the study of compromises was discarded because of its vagueness, it would only be logical to refrain from studying real-world political phenomena altogether. We should instead bite the bullet and see what the distinction between different kinds of compromise has to offer.

Shoddy compromises are ranked second on Margalit's list. A compromise is shoddy if it exchanges value for the valueless. Again, this is – at least in most cases – a moral fault that need not preoccupy rational self-serving agents, especially if they get value in exchange for the valueless. Moreover, different theories of justice disagree about the form of injustice involved. Aristotelian commutative justice demands (approximate) equality in exchanges of value (Englard 2009). Both sides should roughly get half of the exchanged or jointly produced value. By contrast, some modern theories of justice regard exchanges of value for no value as rational and fair if they lead to Pareto superior outcomes. From their perspective, only extracting value in exchange for disvalue would appear problematic. Getting something for nothing is, of course, an extreme case. The more likely one of incurring benefits from a deal that offers very little to the other side is not shoddy according to Margalit's definition. Nevertheless, many ethicists criticize modern economics for legitimizing such exchanges.

Shady compromises, moreover, involve "suspicious motives" on at least one side of the agreement. By suspicious motives, I take Margalit to refer to devious and morally problematic – if not outright evil – ones. The condemnation of such compromises depends on a morality that focuses on good and bad intentions. Otherwise, suspicious motives merely hint at a compromise's presumable instability, which can be bad from a moral as well as from an egocentric perspective.

According to Margalit neither of the aforementioned kinds of compromise

are morally illicit, come what may. Dire economic or political necessity can render all of them necessary, at least provisionally, until better compromises appear on the horizon. Moral agents should, of course, be ready to renegotiate shabby, shoddy, and shady compromises whenever a morally better agreement seems feasible. However, such provisional acceptability does not extend to rotten compromises. A rotten compromise, in Margalit's words, involves "an agreement to establish or maintain an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation" (Margalit 2010: 2, 89). Typical rotten compromises in this sense were the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement with Hitler, post-World War II agreements on Eastern Europe with Stalin, but also the political agreements that upheld slavery prior to the United States Civil War.

"A 'treacherous compromise,' in the present meaning of the term, is one that looks good on the surface but proves dangerous in practice for the interests of at least one of the agents."

This is a very narrow conception of rotten compromises. Margalit's focus on rotten compromises with political agents who commit massive crimes against humanity renders it prima facie plausible that they should be determinedly avoided, or at least only made under economic or military duress. Agents who engage in such compromises become deeply complicit with evil (on complicity, see: Kutz 2000; Lepora and Goodin 2013). Yet intuitively, rotten compromises seem on a par with shabby, shoddy, or shady compromises; that is, it should be possible that they occur in contexts of daily life. Ordinary economic and political agents should be able to conclude rotten compromises, even if they are not dealing with the most evil political leaders of their times. Let us therefore adapt Margalit's concept of rotten compromises to ordinary contexts. We all, from time to time, probably find ourselves in a situation in which we might compromise with recognizably evil-doing persons or organizations. Buying products from a firm that not only fails to pay fair wages in poor countries but also uses modern slavery in its supply chain could be a case in point. Another might involve political dealings with a party that seeks to subvert the democratic order. In all compromises with evil parties, agents should be aware that they might help the dark side maintain or enhance its power. Margalit distinguishes between compromises that benefit evil partners but do not crucially help them remain in power, and compromises that uphold the power of an otherwise faltering evil agent. In my view, this distinction is exceedingly difficult to apply. Any win-win deal will strengthen an evil partner, and there is a continuum of degrees to which a compromise might allow an evil agent to retain or attain power. However, avoidance can also be calibrated gradually. Allowing a firm that relies on modern types of slavery to survive is worse and should be more urgently avoided than merely making a win-win agreement with such a firm. For the rest, we can generally define rotten compromises as ones that keep evildoers in business, without adopting Margalit's reference to high-powered political cases and crimes against humanity.

Surveying the outlined bestiary of (morally) bad compromises, one important beast is missing: treacherous compromises. A "treacherous compromise," in the present meaning of the term, is one that looks good on the surface but proves dangerous in practice for the interests of at least one of the agents. Moreover, I want to focus here on a specific subclass of treacherous compromises: those in which considerable (unforeseen) dangers for at least one of the sides result from a process of joint activity or from a future relationship. When we discuss treacherous compromises in the following, this process- or relationship-oriented perspective will always stand in the foreground.

From a preliminary assessment, it is not immediately obvious why treacherous compromises should be morally bad. Since a treacherous compromise ultimately entails bad consequences, the parties might be blamed for succumbing to an alluring surface or a spurious win-win outlook. This, however, is only morally objectionable if the parties should have shown more epistemic due diligence, which usually includes not taking information at face value. Lack of due diligence in evaluating information is, of course, not only morally objectionable, but also wrong from an egocentric rational-choice perspective. In fact, the badness of treacherous compromises from a perspective of self-interest distinguishes

them from shabby, shoddy, shady, and rotten ones, which primarily are morally bad. It is usually bad for a party to not foresee potential risks that lurk submerged beneath the shiny surface of an apparently good compromise. Even worse, having entered into an agreement, an agent might no longer be able to ward off emerging harm – even though harm may have previously been averted before the agreement. Let us look at a recent political negotiation to add flesh to the conceptual bones of our discussion.

The Case of the German "Jamaica" Negotiations

The German parliamentary elections of autumn 2017 resulted in a set of complicated coalition negotiations on a scale hitherto unheard of in Germany. Somewhat unsettlingly for a country used to a high level of political stability, it took roughly half a year to form a new coalition government. One of the reasons for this impasse was the arrival in strength of a right-wing party (AfD) in the Bundestag (German parliament), with whom no other party wants to cooperate. Part of the problem is also the culture of compromise in German politics, which has backfired in the shape of voter reactions to the parties that engaged in it. In the eye of the storm stands Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, who elevated making compromises to an art form that helped her stay in power for three parliamentary periods. Her various coalition partners, by comparison, did not thrive as a result of the compromises they made with Merkel and her party, the Christian Democrats (CDU). The Social Democrats (SPD), her coalition partner from 2005–2009 and again from 2013–2017, were punished twice at the ballot box for collaborating with Merkel (Egle and Zohlnhöfer 2010; Zohlnhöfer and Saalfeld 2015). The Free Democrats (FDP) ruled with Merkel from 2009–2013 and subsequently dropped out of parliament, not being able to surpass the necessary 5 percent threshold for a party to enter the Bundestag in the 2013 elections (Jun 2015).

Source: pixabay.com

Naturally, the narratives about why Merkel's partners failed dismally after forming the respective coalitions differ considerably. As is generally the case in politics, political analysts do not agree on the causes of success or failure. However, be it because of Merkel's strength or her partners' blunders and weaknesses, a conspicuous pattern has emerged: those who enter into a coalition with Merkel eventually suffer. It therefore is understandable that two of her possible coalition partners, the SPD and FDP, demanded strong reassurances that history will not repeat itself in future elections. Both parties cannot afford another resounding defeat in national elections. In other words, the SPD and FDP were apprehensive about making another treacherous compromise with Merkel.

This was the setting when three parties began negotiations on forming a new coalition government, after the SPD (for quite some time at that) refused to consider another grand coalition with the CDU following the 2017 parliamentary elections. The three parties were the Greens (Die GRÜNEN), the CDU, and the FDP. Based on the three parties' political colors green, black, and yellow, which are also the colors of Jamaica's national flag, the possible coalition between these parties was referred to as the "Jamaica coalition." There is a significant overlap of the political program and history of the centrist (formerly center-right) CDU and of both

of the smaller parties' (Die GRÜNEN and FDP). The CDU under Merkel has established an ecological profile that appeals to the Greens. On the other hand, many CDU representatives view themselves as protectors of Germany's economic strength and are thus traditionally close to the FDP, whose profile is largely built on economic liberalism. Hence, it was a rather safe bet that the CDU would compromise with both potential coalition partners. It would be more difficult for the Greens and the FDP, who had usually been at loggerheads in the past, to arrive at a compromise. The potential conflict between the two smaller parties was exacerbated by a rift over Merkel's high-profile migration and refugee policies, which the Greens applauded despite being in opposition and which the FDP criticized in its own election campaign. Consequently, more than a few political pundits were skeptical about the odds of building a Jamaica coalition (Rothenberg 2017). A considerable number of observers, however, believed that Merkel's outstanding abilities to weave adversaries together would succeed yet again (Stalinski 2017).

In the end, the skeptics were right. The FDP withdrew from coalition talks after prolonged negotiations, while Merkel and the Greens claimed that the negotiations – which in their eyes had come close to success – were called off for no good reason by the FDP. Again, the narratives of the participants and observers as to why the coalition talks failed differ widely. For our purposes, it is important however that the FDP was apparently terrified of entering into a treacherous compromise. FDP leaders Lindner and Kubicki stated that they did not trust Merkel to treat the interests of the Greens and those of the FDP evenhandedly (see Beitzer 2017). They suspected Merkel of wanting to foster a green Merkelist agenda with her "darling" partner while simultaneously using the FDP only to obtain the required majority. In short, they expected a classical ménage à trois involving two lovers and a third partner who provides the means of living. In the background of these expectations lurked the FDP's traumatic experiences with the 2009–2013 coalition in which, from their perspective, Merkel very effectively promoted Merkelist positions without any regard for her coalition partner's own political fallout therefrom. The Greens, by the way, did not voice such concerns – but they have never previously been in a coalition with Merkel as chancellor. From a rather unflattering perspective, they were the sole remaining "fresh blood" (within the boundaries of the acceptable political spectrum, not too far to the left or to the right) that Merkel could form a coalition with.

I will not comment on how realistic the FDP's perceptions concerning the risks of a Jamaica coalition were. It suffices to rely on perceptions, because they alone elucidate the problems associated with a treacherous compromise. Agents who are concerned about making such compromises are particularly sensitive about control over processes or ongoing relationships. They expect that any asymmetry in control options over those processes or relationships will be exploited to their detriment. How then can negotiating parties, who are anxious about such an outcome, develop assurances that a compromise will actually be beneficial for them?

Dealing with Treacherous Compromises

Two natural options come to mind on how to forestall treacherous compromises. The first consists in enhanced access to the management of processes or relationships that a party fears will be turned against her. This is possible in joint ventures between business firms, for instance, by insisting that all partners have a veto power in crucial business decisions. The price for this control option is often (or usually?) stagnation and deadlock. Many joint ventures in which the collaborating partners have too much influence on strategic or tactical decisions fail, because they cannot get past disagreement over ongoing decisions. One prominent remedy is to offer a governing board a large stake in the success of a joint venture, and to only grant intervention to major shareholders when things go palpably wrong. It takes a lot of trust between new partners to make such agreements. A noted history of a CEO to exploit partners in a joint venture is therefore deadly for the pacification of concerns about treacherous compromises. In any case, the model of joint business ventures is difficult to translate into politics. There is no distributable gain for coalition partners of good governance to hope for, apart from what separately accrues to them at the ballot box. Nevertheless, the allocation of key ministries to smaller coalition partners can be a means of securing some control over

administrative and political processes, especially in a system like the German one. The number of key ministries is of course limited, so that it becomes difficult to insure all partners against treacherous compromises. Reallocating control over areas of policy between ministries can help resolve this problem, and to arrive at a balance of assurances for all parties concerned (such considerations played a role in the aforementioned German Jamaica negotiations, but seemingly the task of retailoring ministerial control was not successfully accomplished).

Another option for seeking assurances against treacherous compromises in the political sphere is to not meddle too much with process control, but to seek compensation by consolidating a considerable number of one's political positions in the compromise. That is, in the example of the Jamaica negotiations, a coalition partner could have consented to a traditional assignment of ministries and tried to achieve a particularly advantageous outcome with respect to the policies that the coalition sets out to implement. Not trusting Merkel to be evenhanded in implementation, the FDP could have (and many think, did), for instance, attempted to consolidate more of their positions (and to a higher degree) in the written statement of the coalition agenda than is warranted in a situation of trust. However, the strategy of frontend gains to compensate for lack of process control is dangerous. In many contexts, process control is highly relevant and not fully substitutable by frontend material gains. In political competition, frontend gains in prestige and perceived achievement of positions occur at the beginning of a legislative period, whereas process control is important for the results that matter in the next elections. Human beings generally prefer present over future gains, but political prudence entails keeping in mind the end of the legislative period. It therefore seems reasonable to warn negotiators of a "frontend fallacy" in avoiding treacherous compromises. Attempts to compensate for lacking process control through success in distributive negotiations on the establishment of a joint venture, coalition, or relationship is – other things being equal – a bad idea. In the economic sphere, fixed payoff ratios of partners for the gains of a joint venture might mitigate the risk of a frontend fallacy. In politics, however, the electorate decides on the gains and losses of parties, and there is no way of proportioning gains in advance.

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Obituary
Viktor Kremenyuk

Viktor Kremenyuk was born in Odessa in 1940. His parents died in the Second World War, and he was raised as an orphan in the war-torn USSR. He was admitted to the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations where he received undergraduate and graduate training in international politics and Oriental studies. In 1963-68 he served in the Soviet armed forces, and in 1970 Kremenyuk joined the research staff of the newly formed Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Soviet/Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) where he pursued post-graduate work. His initial focus was on the United States policy towards international and internal conflicts in the developing world. With time, he became the prime Soviet specialist in conflict resolution and negotiation. Since 1989 he served as deputy director at ISKRAN and since 2000 taught at the undergraduate School of World Politics based in his research institute. His last book published in 2015 was titled “Lessons of the Cold War.” Viktor Kremenyuk was a member of the PIN Steering Committee during its years at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria.

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Policy Advice Based On Cutting-Edge Research

The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies is an independent social science research institute funded by the Hamburg Ministry of Science, Research, and Equalities, and the German Federal Foreign Office. Its mission is to analyse political, social, and economic developments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as global issues. The GIGA is committed to a global approach to scholarship, which works with perspectives, concepts, and experiences of these different world regions. As a member of the Leibniz Association, the Institute is dedicated to the principle of "theoria cum praxi": science for the benefit of society. Research-based policy advice forms a key part of the GIGA's mandate.

GIGA President Prof. Amrita Narlikar is member of the PIN Steering Committee. Since 2018 the GIGA hosts the secretariat of PIN.

Amrita Narlikar

"Because They Matter": Recognise Diversity—Globalise Research

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Western scholars and practitioners rarely anticipate the moves of their interlocutors in the "South" leading to serious policy failures. They tend to "flatten" the world into coherent homogeneity. A global approach may help us overcome the problem by engaging with theoretical and empirical content from the regions on its own terms. It would no longer allow the marginalisation of the regions outside of the developed world's liberal core from the mainstream debate in research and policy. Keywords are inclusiveness and pluralism, the toolkit includes interdisciplinarity, multi-level analysis, and Comparative Area Studies.

Valerie Rosoux and Mark Anstey (eds)

Negotiating Reconciliation in Peacemaking. Quandaries of Relationship Building

Springer 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-62673-4, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-62674-1



This book argues that reconciliation should not be simply accepted as an "agreed-upon norm" within peacemaking processes, but should rather receive serious attention from aggressors and peacebrokers seeking to end violent conflicts through negotiation. The book explores the different meanings that the term "reconciliation" might hold for parties in conflict—the end of overt hostilities, a transformation in the relations between warring groups, a vehicle for the accountability and punishment of human rights abusers or the means through which they might somehow acquire amnesty, as well as a type of atonement and of material reparation. The various chapters consider what gives energy to the idea of reconciliation in a conflict situation—why do aggressors become interested in settling their differences, and in changing their attitudes toward one another? Using a range of case studies and thematic discussion, the chapters of this book seek to tackle these tough questions from a multidisciplinary perspective.

The various contributions reveal some of the complexities of national and international reconciliation projects, but also particularly diverse understandings of reconciliation—and of how to achieve it. All conflicts reflect unique dynamics, aspirations, and power realities. It is precisely because conflict parties differ in their expectations of reconciliation outcomes that its processes should indeed be negotiated. This book is a valuable resource for both scholars and practitioners engaged in resolving conflicts, and those working to transform fractured relations in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Fen Osler Hampson and Mikhail Troitskiy (eds)

Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia

Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, ISBN 9781928096580, 236 pp.

Conflicts in Eurasia have been receiving significant attention in the last few years from political scientists and International Relations scholars. The geographic area of Eurasia lies at the intersection of global and regional conflicts and coordination games. On the one hand, regional controversies in Eurasia often affect relations among the great powers on a global scale. On the other, global rivalries can either exacerbate tensions or facilitate negotiated solutions across Eurasia – mostly as a result of competitive behavior among major powers during the course of conflict mediation. This volume examines negotiations that continue after the "hot phase" of a conflict has ended, and wherewith the focus becomes on the search for lasting security solutions. Tug of War brings together conflict and security experts from Russia, Eurasia, and the West to tackle the following overarching question: How useful has the process of negotiation been in resolving or mitigating different conflicts and coordination problems in Eurasia?

BOOK PREVIEW

Journal Preview

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Guest editors:
Arne Niemann, University of Mainz
Richard G. Whitman, University of Kent
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