


# PIN•Points

*The Processes of International Negotiation Program*      *Network Newsletter 31/2008*

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## Multilateralism

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CaspiLog 3 • Negotiations between Russia and USA • Labor Movements •  
Theorists Meet Practitioners • YSSP Research • CTBTO Negotiations • EU-NATO



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## From the PIN Steering Committee Negotiation in Conditions of Multilateralism

There is a relationship between international relations and the state of the negotiation process. Negotiations carry traces of the prevalent international system, whether this be symmetrical or asymmetrical, unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, or whether it is based on the principles of justice or on the diktat of one power. Negotiations are not simply a product of the international relations system but reflect its very core: the types and the processes of decision making.

The upsurge in negotiation studies and research in the 1980s and early 1990s was conditioned by the desire of the two superpowers of the time, the USA and the USSR, to enter the "era of negotiations," a term formulated by the U.S. side as part of the Nixon Doctrine (1970–1973) and immediately supported by the Soviet side. The works of F. Charles Ikle, R. Fisher and W. Ury, I. William Zartman, H. Raiffa, and others followed, paralleled by research efforts at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The real conditions of the time, the bipolar nature of the system, the rough equality of both superpowers, at least in their destructive capabilities, their sincere desire to reduce the risks of war and devastation, and their belief in the power of agreement, moved them toward the creation of a sys-



The PIN Steering Committee: Mark Anstey, Rudolf Avenhaus, Franz Cede, Guy Olivier Faure, Victor Kremenjuk, Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, Paul Meerts, Gunnar Sjöstedt, and I. William Zartman.

tem of international negotiations based on the principles of equal security and joint problem solving. It also explains the beginning of the consultations between U.S. and Soviet experts at IIASA in 1983–1984 which led to the establishment of the Processes of International Negotiations Project/Program in 1988.

The efforts of the two superpowers appeared highly productive and brought enormous success: the Cold War ended. The two powers looked ahead with enthusiasm and counted on the continuation of the negotiation process within the framework of the "new world order" proclaimed by U.S. President George Bush, Sr. in 1989. But what then followed in reality was totally different and, to the majority of policymakers, unexpected: the Soviet Union collapsed under the burden of its unsolved problems and the international system became unipolar overnight.

In the area of the theory and practice of international relations, this produced one important result, the policy of unilateralism—the attempts by one power, the USA, to assume the role of pivot of the universe. A gross asymmetry has appeared in relations between the only superpower and the rest of the world, both allies and non-allies of the United States, and that, in turn, has led to a significant change in the style and conduct of international negotiations, which have become more and more oriented in favor of the interests and decisions of one side. The background to the war in Iraq and the results of it are the best demonstration of this.

It seems that with a change of command in the White House this situation will undergo a few corrections—not only of the legitimate doubts of U.S. allies regarding the real capabilities of their leader or the desire of the "newcomers" Brazil, China, India, Russia, and others, to feel more able to make independent decisions, but also because of the changing world environment, the growth of the new centers of influence, and the growth of challenges to the global community that simply cannot be met by any single country and require joint action to be taken.

Multilateralism is the new word to describe the changes in global decision mak-

ing and the necessity for new centers to be incorporated into existing procedures and into the scope of existing commitments. Several new areas of international negotiations can be identified. First, the conditions under which the new players will join the current developed world and its institutions: the UN Security Council (in the capacity of permanent members), the G8, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Some negotiations are already happening (China–WTO and also Russia–WTO); some are scheduled but delayed (the reform of UN institutions); but in fact all of these "status" negotiations are only in the beginning phase. They will multiply and progress and acquire specific importance.

Second will be the group of negotiations on the state of global issues, like climate, environment, development, state of water supply, land use, etc. Next will come issues of security both in the traditional sense (defense of territories and institutions) and in nontraditional, new understanding (health, education, research, human rights, preservation of cultural heritage). Finally, a cycle of negotiations on the perspectives of global decision making can be forecast.

Also very important for negotiation research and analysis are the changing conditions of the process of negotiation, with the traditional sources of power having their impact limited and being forced to coexist with the other negotiation cultures and traditions, described at least in a preliminary fashion in *How People Negotiate* (G.O. Faure, editor).

If multilateralism prevails, it is easy to foresee a situation in negotiation research and analysis, where such important things as negotiations under conditions of symmetry, in a multicultural environment, on global issues (which do not come within the category of national sovereignty) start becoming associated with a high level of scientific sophistication as the norm and as a day-to-day routine. That may mean a new research agenda for the specialists in negotiation analysis as well as for experts in international relations in general.

Victor Kremenjuk

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
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The magnificent presidential palace in Almaty where the CaspiLog talks took place.

## Caspian Dialog

### Bridge Building in the Caspian Sea

#### CaspiLog 3 Takes Place in Kazakhstan.

When the Tehran Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (Tehran Convention) was signed in 2003, a spokesman for the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised the message it sent to the region's people and to the world that "multilateral cooperation for sustainable development is not only essential but possible."

At the signing, Iran's Special Envoy for Caspian Sea Affairs, Mehdi Safari, announced that the Tehran Convention would prepare ground for cooperation between the Caspian Sea littoral states in various fields: a tall order, given the contentious nature of political relations between some of the five states that existed at the time. Privately, however, Iranian scientists and government officials were consulting with members of IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Steering Group—then in Tehran to conduct a PIN Roadshow—about ways of effecting such a rapprochement.

The Tehran Convention requires the five countries—Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan—to prevent and cut pollution, restore the environment, use resources sustainably, and cooperate more to protect the environment. Putting together talks between the Caspian neighbors on these issues was a delicate diplomatic balancing act, but PIN managed to do this through the Caspian Dialog (CaspiLog), the third session of which took place on 3–4 October 2008 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and was organized by PIN and the Institute for World Economy and Politics (IWEP).

Altogether, 80 delegates from the five countries came together in the magnificent setting of the Presidential Palace in Almaty to discuss fisheries, land use, energy, terrorism, and security. It is a measure of the success of the two previous CaspiLog meetings (in 2006 in Istanbul, shortly before the entry into force of the Tehran Convention, and in 2007 in Baku) that this mixed grouping of state officials, environmentalists, academics, and nongovernmental organizations in Almaty was able to reach consensus on a resolution: their very first as a body. The resolution, which draws attention to imminent environmental threats to the region and calls for greater cooperation in the wake of political tensions, has since been forwarded to the relevant government ministries in the five countries.

So what has been PIN's role in the CaspiLog series and how has PIN members' negotiation expertise helped representatives of the five Caspian Sea states reach consensus at only their third meeting? Crucially, PIN invited IIASA scientists working on fisheries, water, air pollution, and other Caspian-related issues, to make presentations and provide expertise at each CaspiLog. It was a "back-to-basics" approach. There was no point in beginning discussions before the objective facts of the issues affecting the shared environment were known: substance was needed. The shared knowledge could then be built up over time, encouraging a problem-solving approach, and thus, ultimately, the formulation of consensual decisions.

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of CaspiLog 3 was its symbolism, in the sense that it represented the point at which those involved in the Dialog began to take ownership of it. Around 50 percent of the experts invited to advise the discussants were local, with PIN's Kazakh partners inviting many of their own scientists and experts. This was a very important development as, from the beginning, the organizers had stressed the importance of "Cooperation—Partnership—Ownership."

As I. William Zartman of the PIN steering group states: "Problems related to security, energy, terrorism, forestry, and water management affect all states in the

region and can be best addressed through cooperation and partnership. The problems faced in the Caspian Region, require sound science. Using this science to help people agree on how they want to resolve an issue, has proved very beneficial. IIASA's role in CaspiLog is to help create an environment where all parties can be heard, and their views understood."

Kazakhstan's coming chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009 was seen by delegates to CaspiLog 3 as a chance to address environmental issues and put the Caspian Sea on the international agenda.

The next CaspiLog—CaspiLog 4—will focus on transportation, migration, and energy. It will be held either in Astrakhan, Russia, or in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan. The PIN network is looking for possible co-organizers, preferably local institutions.

*Ariel Macaspac Penetrante  
Coordinator of the Process of International  
Negotiation (PIN) Program*



Discussions at CaspiLog 3.

### The CaspiLog 3 Resolution

The CaspiLog 3 Resolution calls for the establishment of a joint international commission of technical experts from each of the five countries to oversee the management of pollution, radioactive waste, crude oil contamination, endangered biodiversity, desertification, rising sea level, and the near extinction of sturgeon species, which are prized for Beluga caviar. The commission, which would coordinate its activities outside the contentious political realm, would conduct independent fact-finding missions on fisheries, coastal development, and aquatic and bio-resources. Notably, delegates called for a reduction in fishing within the sturgeon fisheries in the Caspian Sea until a multilateral stock assessment and management framework has been established and implemented, and they also wanted better enforcement of the ban on fishing in the sea itself.

It was also vital, the resolution stated, to integrate all the industrial aspects of Caspian regional development with measures on the protection of Caspian biodiversity and natural resources (rare species of sturgeon, seals and birds). The Caspian Basin itself, delegates said, should be demilitarized to promote security and stability in the region and enable confidence-building measures to be pursued. Moreover, a Caspian Fund should be established to support humanitarian projects in the five states.





## CaspiLog 3: Bridging Gaps through Cooperation and Partnership

The third session of the PIN-led Caspian Dialog (CaspiLog) was held in the First Kazakhstan President Foundation, President Residence 2, in Almaty on 3–4 October. The Dialog was cosponsored by the Institute for World Economy and Politics (IWEP) of Kazakhstan, under the title of "Bridging Gaps through Cooperation and Partnership." Representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan were in attendance.

The meeting ended with a formal resolution.

CaspiLog is a project of the PIN Program, operating along a vertical and horizontal dimension. Cooperating with the PIN Program are other IIASA Programs on Land Use Change (LUC) and on Fisheries (Evolution and Ecology Program). Speakers from the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, Clingendael, and the International Ocean Institute also participated, as well as speakers from a number of Kazakh institutes and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The primary purpose of CaspiLog is to encourage cooperation among the five littoral states of the Sea/Lake to address common issues and problems that, embroiled as they are in their border and security disputes, they would be too busy to discuss otherwise. To that end, it is built around presentations by IIASA scientists and

others about the latest research on such issues—fishing, pollution, maritime accidents, terrorism, energy, migrant labor, and ultimately international regimes—and invites participants to discuss the possibilities of cooperation. At the same time, it serves as the initiation of a civil society network in support of the 2007 Tehran Convention on the Caspian Environment sponsored by UNDP.

The first meeting was held in Istanbul in the newly established Hollings Center in May 2006, and involved two representatives from each country (except Turkmenistan, which declined). The second was held in the area in question, in Baku, Azerbaijan, in May 2007, and it added a new dimension through the participation of a number of representatives of NGOs, universities, and other private as well as government and international organizations, meeting under the cosponsorship of the Caspian Partnership for the Future. The third meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, continues to broaden the participation with involvement of the littoral states in the program, official cosponsorship, and attendance of a larger audience in the deliberations. CaspiLog 4 is planned for September 2009, in Astrakhan, Russia, or Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan. The 2008 Conference Program follows:

*I William Zartman*

### Conference Program

October 3, 2008	
09:00–09:30	<b>Plenary Session</b>
	Welcoming address: <i>Bektas Mukhamedzhanov</i> , Executive Director of the First Kazakhstan President Foundation Welcoming address: <i>Franz Cede</i> , Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austria Welcoming address: <i>Zeinulla Sarsembayev</i> , Vice-Minister of Environment Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan Introductory speech: <i>Akmaral Arystanbekova</i> , Ambassador at large, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan Presentation of "CaspiLog": <i>William Zartman</i> , Emeritus Professor, John Hopkins University
09:30–10:30	<b>Session 1</b> THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION Chair: <i>Marat Shaikhutdinov</i>
	<i>Marat Shaikhutdinov</i> , Director of IWEP "Caspian region in the new system of contemporary geopolitical coordinates: Issues of security and cooperation" <i>Edwin Bakker</i> , Department Head, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, the Hague "Terrorism" Discussion: <i>Askar Nursha</i> , Chief of the Center for International Studies, IWEP
10:30–10:45	Coffee break

10:45–12:30	<i>David Griffiths</i> , Senior Research Fellow, International Ocean Institute, Canada "Governance of landlocked seas: The Great Lakes experience" <i>Konstantin Syroezhkin</i> , Chief Research Fellow, IWEP "Georgia–Ossetian crisis and its impact on security in the Caspian and Central Asia" Expert comments : <i>John Roberts</i> , Energy Security Specialist, Platts, UK <i>Rustam Burnashev</i> , Professor, Kazakh–German University
12:30–14:00	Lunch
14:00–16:00	<b>Session 2</b> NATIONAL PLANS ON CASPIAN ISSUES Chair: <i>Franz Cede</i>
	Azerbaijan: <i>Rustam Mammadov</i> , President of Caspian Partnership for the Future, University of Baku Kazakhstan: <i>Murat Laumulin</i> , Chief Research Fellow, IWEP Russian Federation: <i>Mikhail Troitskiy</i> , Russian Academy of Sciences
16:00–16:30	Coffee break
16:30–18:30	<b>Session 3</b> COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ENERGY, TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS Chair: <i>Paul Meerts</i>
	<i>Mehdi Parvizi Ahmedi</i> , Professor, University of Amsterdam/The Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael, The Hague "Geopolitical significance of energy in the Caspian and Central Asia" <i>Kanat Berentayev</i> , Chief Research Fellow, IWEP "Investment climate in Kazakhstan: Trends and changes" <i>Chingiz Ismayilov</i> , Director, Caspian Research and Information Center, Baku State University "Development of oil industry and the changes of geopolitical situation in the Caspian Region" <i>Anar Rakhimzhanova</i> , Chief, Economic Studies Division, Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies "The main areas of transport-logistics potential development of Caspian Region" Expert comments: <i>Maria Belova</i> , Institute for Energy and Finance Foundation, Moscow <i>William Frew</i> , HSSE Manager, Shell Kazakhstan Development B.V.
20:00	Reception
October 4, 2008	
09:00–10:30	<b>Session 4</b> BIORESOURCES AND CASPIAN ENVIRONMENT Chair: <i>Mark Anstey</i>
	<i>Rebecca Whitlock</i> , Research Fellow, Evolution and Ecology Program, IIASA "Ecology and Fishing" <i>Serik Akhmetov</i> , SAP Implementation Coordinator, UNDP Caspian Environment Project "Problems of environment in Caspian region and ways of tackling them" <i>David Wiberg</i> , Research Fellow, Land Use Change Program, IIASA "Water management"
10:30–12:30	Coffee break
10:45–12:30	<i>Mels Yeleusizov</i> , Chairman, "Tabigat" Ecological Union of Associations and Enterprises of Kazakhstan "The role of oil production in Caspian Sea shelf diversification destruction" <i>Nariman Amirgaliev</i> , Head of Laboratory of Hydroanalytics, SPC of Fishery Industry "KazAgroInnovation" "The state of Caspian bioresources and environmental activities" <i>Hamid Ghaffarzadeh</i> , Expert, UNDP Caspian Environment Project "Caspian Environment Convention"
12:30–14:00	Lunch
14:00–15:30	<b>Session 5</b> CURRENT TRENDS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN REGION: CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS Chair: <i>William Zartman</i> (Free discussion)
15:30–16:00	Conclusion. End of the Conference



## "Caspian Dialog 3" International Conference Resolution

The Third Session of the "Caspian Dialog" International Conference

*Adopts the following resolution:*

*We*, the participants of the "Caspian Dialog" International Conference organized by the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (Austria) and the Institute of World Economy and Politics under the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Foundation (Kazakhstan) have gathered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from 3 to 4 October 2008 for the third session of the Conference.

*We express* our deep appreciation to the host institutions in Kazakhstan for their support and hospitality;

*We express* our support for the Tehran Convention on the Caspian Environment, calling upon the signatories to complete cooperation in developing environmental policies and then enforcing them for the sake of the long-term sustainability of the

Caspian Sea (in terms of environment, eco-systems, economics, tourism, recreation, fishing, water supply);

*We confirm* commitment to the principles of enhancing the confidence-building measures in the Caspian Sea region and the conditions for the settlement of all present regional issues and disputes;

*We express* deep concern, that during the last years, despite the positive trends of interaction and dialog of Caspian states on the wide range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation issues that have emerged, the most crucial problem issue of the Caspian reality today is the absence of a single universal convention defining all the important aspects that the states of region are facing, such as the legal status of the sea, seafloor delimitation, navigation, hydrocarbon resources development, management of environmental protection activities, fisheries, etc. The October 16th 2007 Caspian Sea States Summit in Tehran laid a good foundation for further interaction of the sides on this issue settlement. Promoting the summit decisions, "Caspian Dialog 3" International Conference participants have discussed the possible ways for the Caspian states to make positional adjustments.

In this connection, the need to invite the leading international and regional experts in this field for discussions and to study the leading international experience was emphasized;

*We stress* that the important economic and political significance for modern regional development and realization each of the five Caspian states' economic potential is to assign regulations on landlocked Caspian states' right to free transit of nonmilitary transport facilities and access to the Great Oceans, which was specified in a range of international treaties;

*In recognizing* the development challenges confronting the Caspian region within complicated geostrategic and geo-economic conditions, we urge the demilitarization of the Caspian Basin in order to promote the security and stability of the region and the maintenance of the Caspian Sea as an area of peace and cooperation, free of military threats and conflicts, which requires mutual trust among the states and peoples of the region. All the Caspian states and out-of-region actors, engaged in Caspian region development, should focus their attention on taking practical measures to achieve the main strategic goals: regional cooperation development and enhancement of legal instruments in combating extremism, terrorism, arms and drugs smuggling, illegal migration, poaching, etc. Hence, the strengthening of cooperation in the energy sector is of a strategic significance for the region. The development of hydrocarbon resources in the region should be maintained by safe, secure, and cost-beneficial transit routes to the world markets;

*We are convinced* that nowadays, in the course of the hydrocarbon resource development and extraction process, the issues of ecology and environment are usually only in the background for the transnational companies working there. This leads to large risks for natural ecosystems and endangers the unique diversity of the water life of the Basin, which has to be saved for present and future generations. The Conference underlines the importance of concordance of all industrial aspects of Caspian region development within measures on Caspian biodiversity and natural resources protection (rare species of sturgeons, seals, birds);

*Being aware* that the current state of Caspian bioresources and measures of environmental sanitation have to take a sig-

nificant place in Caspian states' policy and international projects on regional development support, the conference participants encourage the strengthening of measures of environmental control in the Caspian and acceleration of the process of implementation of new technological innovations in the field of oil and gas production, refinement, and raw materials transportation, to minimize the negative impact on the ecology;

*We acknowledge* that one of the important factors of current development in the Caspian region is the issue of social responsibility policy of Caspian states and transnational companies. Without creating the necessary conditions such as a proper transport network structure, residential community, communications, etc., the prospects for regional development and emergence of coastline area as a socially attractive territory are unclear. The existing economic projects should be concentrated on development of investment conditions in the region, leading to economic and humanitarian progress in its states;

*Recognizing* that the last conference indicated growing interest from the governmental structures, expert community, and public of the states of the region in solving the problems the Caspian region is facing today,

1. *We are determined* to invite all interested parties to accelerate the efforts on remaining dispute settlement in the Caspian and the elaboration of the necessary international law and internal law regulations, promoting the strengthening of peace and security in the region and the prosperity of the coastline states and their people;
2. *We call* for the reduction of fishing efforts in the sturgeon fisheries until a multilateral stock assessment and management framework has been established and implemented, and for strengthened enforcement of the ban on fishing at sea
3. *We call* on Caspian states' civil society and nongovernmental organizations to develop greater knowledge of Caspian conditions and on governments to increase cooperative measures to deal with common problems of the Caspian Basin;
4. *We call* for the establishment of a forum of appropriate scholars from all five coastal states to conduct an in-depth study of options for governance of the Caspian Sea, to seek consensus on a credible and politically desirable mechanism, and propose that mechanism to policymakers;
5. *We call* for littoral states' agreement to:

- i. Improve Caspian water quality;
  - ii. Develop common environmental regulations governing industrial (fishing, energy, agriculture, tourism, and other) practices and allowable pollutant loads;
  - iii. Establish a regime for the enforcement of Caspian environmental regulations, such that regulations can be enforced by authorities from any of the littoral states or a joint environmental enforcement agency;
  - iv. Set limits to pollutant concentrations entering the Caspian Sea from rivers;
  - v. Create stakeholder organizations within river basins flowing into the Caspian to ensure all interests are heard, and improve water quality and equity among water uses
  - vi. Negotiate allowable pollution limits to improve the quality of water.
6. *We therefore decide* to meet again in 2009 in the region, to follow up on the provisions of this resolution.

*We do believe*, that the above-mentioned recommendations of "Caspian Dialog 3" Conference can significantly contribute to the agenda of forthcoming Caspian Sea States Summit, which is to be held in fall 2008, as a concentrated expert evaluation of existing problems and cooperation priorities in Caspian region.

## The Caspian Crisis

The Caspian is the largest inland body of water in the world, with a surface area of 384,400 km<sup>2</sup> and a coastline nearly 7,000 km long. The Caspian is known for two key natural resources: oil and natural gas reserves, and caviar-producing sturgeons.

The conflicts in the Caspian region are intertwined in the sense that political, legal, economic, and environmental considerations cannot always be separated from each other. The recent developments in Georgia have strained relations between the Caspian littoral states, further reducing their capability and willingness to address common problems in the region. Moreover, the Caspian Sea littoral states are involved in several conflicts not only among themselves but also with other neighboring countries such as Turkey, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. Continuing uncertainty over the status of Iran's nuclear capability only adds to the tensions.

Environmental problems are causing internal conflicts, with the rising sea level forcing the resettlement of populations from 50 small cities and settlements, as well as hundreds of small villages, away from the Caspian shores—and this in Azerbaijan alone. Over 10,000 houses in the coastal cities of Iran have been damaged and destroyed as a result of rising sea levels. If the sea levels rise by 0.25 m, Russia will lose 16,500 km<sup>2</sup> of land and will be forced to evacuate 100,000 people.

More than 1,400 oil wells and industrial areas are currently contaminating Caspian waters. The rising sea level threatens to flood hundreds more, as well industrial areas, causing further contamination. Biodiversity in the Caspian Sea is decreasing, as indicated by the near extinction of several sturgeon species and other species that support human needs.

As mistrust allows only limited space for interaction, these tensions and the instability in the region are at the root of the failure to comprehensively address the imminent environmental collapse threatening the Caspian Sea and the Caspian region in general.



*Delegation to the Caspian Dialog 3 at the end of the Conference.*



## Negotiations between Russia and USA: A New Agenda

On 6 April 2008 at Sochi, Russia, President Bush of the United States (USA) and President Putin of Russia issued a Declaration setting forth a framework for strategic cooperation between the two countries. The Declaration outlines key elements of ongoing and new strategic initiatives between the two countries, including steps to promote security in the face of new and emerging threats; prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction; combat global terrorism; and advance economic cooperation. The Strategic Framework Declaration, while acknowledging differences between the two countries, agrees to discuss these differences in a forthright manner without allowing them to prevent cooperation in other important areas.

The process of negotiations between the Soviet Union (USSR)/Russia and the United States has frequently been associated with IIASA. In the late 1960s to early 1970s, the USA and USSR were among those who successfully negotiated IIASA into existence. Later, after the establishment of IIASA, they also agreed on the IIASA research agenda with its global issues of a "nonpolitical" nature, namely, food, population, and

environment. The IIASA Council and the National Member Organizations (NMOs) were then expected to take independent decisions regarding the research plan, future decision making, and who should be invited on board. The exciting but controversial issues of arms control and military balance were, of course, excluded from the IIASA agenda.

The post-Cold War period has not been very conducive to improved relations between the two powers. No more USSR, no more powerful Soviet Academy, the shifting of the sympathies and affiliations of former allies in Eastern Europe to the former enemy.... For a time, it seemed as if the paths of Russia and the USA had reached a crossroads, then moved off in completely different directions.

This impression was wrong. Even though the Russian science research agenda has shifted significantly from military-oriented issues toward the economy and natural resources, there are, on both sides, significant groups of people who continue to believe that the Cold War never ended, who still suspect the other side of evil intentions, and who simply cannot think in constructive terms and live in peace. For them conflict is normal, even preferable. And that kind of mindset surrounds any possibilities for cooperation, even among scientific research communities, with something of a negative aura. Fortunately, however, there is a simple human desire to overcome the differences, as well as a certain "karma"—what Marxists would call an "objective need"—that makes cooperation not only an unavoidable necessity but—through identification and defense of the collective interest—almost the only way of defending national interests.

In the last three to five years, several extremely important global developments have posed a threat to almost all members of the international community. The need for energy resources has grown significantly and unexpectedly quickly. The dangerous trend toward global warming has become a continuous preoccupation for some governments. The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has given headaches to experts and governments alike. The price of food has gone up. The drinking



Source: White House photo by Chris Greenberg

*The new agreement between the USA and Russia is an opportunity to address global change.*

water deficit in some areas (Middle East, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa) has reached critical proportions. The instability of the financial markets has become a source of turmoil.

Everywhere, global governance has again shown itself to be a critical issue in the area of basic human needs (security, human rights, food and water, housing, transportation) and economic and social development (cheap energy, environment, health and education, safe technology). Linked to this are other problems: the inadequacy of the existing mechanisms of international decision making; the need to modernize these mechanisms or create new institutions; and how best to implement this interdependence. We—especially the countries rich in natural resources—are now in the process of deciding whether to tackle these issues individually, or whether to work out a multilateral strategy of collective action.

Although integrative mechanisms already exist, like the European Union, NATO,

interests of all nations, made the concessions necessary to bring about détente.

The Sochi Agreement on a strategic framework of Russian-U.S. relations, signed on 6 April 2008 by presidents Bush and Putin was a joint vision by the two presidents of the relations between their two nations for at least a decade ahead.

• • • • •  
 "We have been motivated by our sincere willingness to strengthen our partnership and to strengthen mutual understanding between our two nations. We have sought to find new horizons for our cooperation" (Vladimir Putin, speaking at Sochi, after signing the new Agreement).

• • • • •  
 Their list of concerns comprised traditional subjects, like military balance via arms control and crisis stability. They essentially agreed to continue the dialog on further reductions of the level of strategic weapons (but this time with the understanding that the other nuclear powers must be engaged in the process: China, France, India, Pakistan, United Kingdom). They expressed their common understanding of the need to come back to the subject of conventional forces in Europe, with which Russia is currently unhappy, and to proceed with the idea of an anti-missile defense system in Europe.

They paid particular attention to the issues of nonproliferation, the arms trade, and cooperation in the area of defense technologies. The problem of nonproliferation, highlighted by developments in Iran and North Korea, has taken on a much more complicated nature. Because of growing energy prices, the number of nations interested in nuclear power will also grow. New developments in nuclear technology may make production of weapons-grade fuel much simpler and thus hard to detect (as is happening now with the Iranian nuclear program). The problem is thus how to help nations develop their own nuclear facilities and, in parallel, avoid the threat of unlimited proliferation of military-oriented production.

The issue of nonproliferation serves as a kind of bridge to the other part of the Rus-

sian-U.S. declaration: the global issues. The agreement mentions global climate, energy security, global terrorism, economic cooperation (financial markets, currencies, U.S. government bonds), and investment. In short, the declaration indicated the willingness of both sides to spread their bilateral relationship to areas where it stops being purely bilateral and becomes an element of global governance. The ability and desire to take responsibility for solving some of these issues has put the two powers in the position of caretakers of world stability as a whole, as well as of the G8 in particular.

It is natural in such circumstances for attention to shift back to IIASA. The Institute was created by the two powers (Russia being a legal successor to the Soviet Union). It also has highly advanced competence in terms of research into global problems. Russia and the USA have impressive research communities, as well as experience in space and ocean research, climate and energy studies, and the analysis of energy, population, food supply, and the environment. IIASA could act as a repository of the joint research of the two nations and of the knowledge accumulated on the situation in other parts of the world. In recent years IIASA has outreached its activities into the



Source: White House photo by Eric Draper

*A walk in the woods at Bocharov Ruchey, President Putin's summer Presidential retreat in Sochi, Russia.*



Source: The White House

*"There are people on both sides who believe that the Cold War never ended."*





Source: The White House

*Russia and the USA both have impressive research communities that could work together to tackle problems like air pollution and climate change.*

former Third World and can bring together the necessary independent and qualified expertise on most issues.

Should this happen, Russia and the USA would understandably face the possibility of a long-term negotiation process, perhaps even—if one were to compare a task of this kind with that undertaken at the end of the Cold War—a whole system of negotiations. At that time the notion of the “system of negotiations” was created by this author to describe the intensive international negotiations around the tightly connected issues of security and cooperation that formed part of the efforts to put an end to the senseless confrontation of the Cold War (Mautner-Markhoff, 1989). This time around, it may describe the formation of a new cycle of negotiations whose purpose will be to solve urgent international problems and to establish a quasi-alliance between Russia and the USA.

The Sochi Declaration indicates the willingness and ability of the two powers to search for and negotiate solutions to major international problems. This means, first of all, readiness to contribute to solving urgent issues and to take the necessary

responsibility for those solutions. Some solutions may be unilateral or bilateral, as the other actors involved may be incapable of a comparable effort or not have enough political will to move on them. From experience, however, we know that such a high level of responsibility can only be taken on the basis of expertise that is of unquestionable reliability.

The joint decision of Russia and USA to make a heavy commitment of both their resources and their reputations to find solutions to the problems mentioned means that meticulous planning is required. First of all, there is the obvious need to formulate a general agreement on priorities, as neither side will be able to accomplish all their goals at once. Even in the days of intensive negotiations on the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s

this was impossible because of the shortage of qualified personnel. Second, the participation of other nations needs to be identified: the Russian–U.S. agreements will work only if others follow them. Third, the structure of individual negotiations and the links among them must be established. Fourth, an arsenal of verification and monitoring procedures has to be established.

All in all, the Russian–U.S. Declaration of 6 April 2008 opens up the realistic possibility of a return to the days when negotiating the issues of global governance was a major means of solving humanity’s troubles. And if so, it will also open a new and exciting perspective for international research and development. For IIASA it could present several opportunities. One would be to establish how the results of the research could be upgraded to the level of negotiable issues, as well as to identify what issues could be negotiated, how, and with whom, what type of results would be desirable, and what would be realistic. Second would be how to formulate these results in terms of collective interactive decision making. Third would be how to make the results of the research and negotiation agenda building a part of global governance.

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Victor A. Kremenyuk



Source: White House photo by Chris Greenberg

*Air Force One departs Sochi Airport carrying President G.W. Bush back to Washington, D.C.*

## Labor Movements in Societies in Transition

### The Changing Shape of International Labor Relations Systems

Labor relations systems (structures and processes) are the product of strategic choices that key social actors (owners of capital and their representatives; employees and their representatives; and the government through agencies of the state) make in relation to each other and to their changing environments in pursuit of their interests over time. They are subsystems of larger societal systems, and they are generally played out within a three-actor, three-tier frame (i.e., social policymaking, industry/sector and enterprise levels of society). The ideologies, goals, and capacity of business, labor, and governments actively shape and are shaped by the societies within which they operate. Within such an analytic framework, power relations among the actors are understood as being in constant flux.

By the 1970s a large variety of labor systems had emerged internationally, each subject to internal change through time: decentralized pluralism in the United States; voluntarism in Britain; Germany’s two-tier system of codetermination and sectoral bargaining; social corporatism in Austria; Japan’s mix of concertation and enterprise bargaining; single social interest systems in defunct Communist systems, where the state assumed ownership of capital for a long period and unions assumed a “transmission belt” role for state planning; and then various state-dominated systems in the weak (and largely authoritarian) economies of the developing world. Since the mid-1970s all these have been profoundly affected by new forces for change: the new shape of the global economy; a technology revolution facilitating new systems of work organization that is revolutionizing how work is done and organizations are designed; the global political order has been shaken by the collapse of Communism, the emergence of multiple nation states, a democratization wave, and the so-called war on terror following 9/11.

The most salient features of the current wave of change in international labor systems have been the modernization and migration strategies of owners of capital and

the decline of trade unions, both in numbers and influence. The nature of work has changed, and, as a consequence, so have the shape of employment and employment contracts and processes of collective negotiations and agreements achieved through such processes.

### The First Transition

Early trade unions took root in the mass production/mass employment conditions of the industrial revolution in the 1870s, across Europe and the United States. Conditions in the mining, clothing and textile, auto and engineering industries gave impetus to union membership. As workers recognized their individual impotence on the new mass production lines, so they saw hope through collective action. Everywhere, early trade unions met with resistance from employers and governments. Quite quickly however “national bargains” were struck as the actors realized that their joint and divergent interests might be better served through accommodation rather than confrontation. Although these took different shape across Europe and the United States, they were founded on a common set of principles: employers recognized the legitimacy of trade unions and their right to bargain collectively on behalf of their members in respect of wages and conditions of employment, and to represent them in mat-

ters of workplace justice; trade unions accepted the legitimacy of the market system and committed to peace clauses limiting use of the strike to periodic rounds of collective negotiation regulated by procedural arrangements with clear dispute resolution mechanisms. Conflict was regulated through systems of rules constraining both managerial unilateralism and disruption of production through worker militance. Governments in various ways acted to smooth markets, to offer security to those displaced by periodic organizational restructuring, and to regulate tensions through the passage of laws regulating conditions of work and the expression of conflict in industry. Within these systems social pacting and collective bargaining became the vehicle through which private capital and independent trade unions managed their relations within the frame of larger democratic dispensations. The efficacy of these systems was sustained through the long period of political stability, economic growth, and rising incomes experienced in Western economies after World War II.

Most of the world however did not operate on this basis—different power realities prevailed and in the context of weak private sectors and state-dominated economies, different systems of labor relations developed. In the single social interest systems of Communist countries, private ownership disappeared, with the state assuming



Source: © International Labour Organization

*Trade unions demonstrate unity at a march in Annecy (France).*





Textile industry worker at Topnew Knitting Group Co., Beijing, China.

a central role in command economies, and trade unions assuming a transmission belt role within state production and welfare plans. Developing nations were characterized largely by weak private sectors with low employment, and large state sectors which played a central role in their economies as both policymakers and employers.

Labor relations systems developed quite differently across nations in relation to the political and economic conditions which prevailed in each, and the ideologies, goals, capacity, and choices made by governments, private capital, and organized labor in relation to these.

## Labor Relations in Transition in a Global Economy

All social systems evolve through periods of order and disorder. From the 1970s a confluence of forces produced profound change within the world's labor relations systems. Toyota's lean production system outpaced the mass production methods of traditionally dominant U.S. and European auto manufacturers who, in the context of saturated markets, found themselves uncompetitive in terms of quality, productivity, and pricing. In their efforts to regain or retain competitive advantage, employers and governments in many Western nations identified the carefully crafted weave of national bargains suddenly as a threat, and

directly and indirectly initiated a great unraveling of several generations of collective bargaining.

To compete, employers *modernized*, introducing waves of new technology, new work methods, and new forms of work organization; and they *migrated* in search of new markets, closer proximity to resources, and cheaper workforces in less regulated environments. The modernization process saw the introduction of flatter organizations, multi-skilling, and flexible use of people in workplaces, which undermined the detailed rate for the job, seniority-based, rigid rule-based systems negotiated into collective agreements by trade unions over decades. With an eye to their "core business" companies outsourced a variety of functions, eroding and fragmenting union strength. Greater use was made of part-time, contractual, and temporary employees at lower cost to payrolls, undermining collective contracts. Then in search of new markets and in the face of high and rising payroll costs employers migrated, not only nationally to non-union areas but internationally to low labor cost areas with weak legal dispensations. New plants were installed as lean production facilities to achieve advantage in terms of productivity and cheap labor. Manufacturing jobs (the traditional base for unionization) have migrated to developing nations. For example, clothing and textile manufacturing is now largely located in Asia, and automobile and other manufacturers have not only sharply reduced their workforces but dispersed them globally. In 2006 China overtook Germany as the world's third-largest auto-producing nation—much of its production being by U.S. and European transnational companies. Critically, capital became globally mobile in a manner governments and labor (barring the highly skilled) could not.

Employers now no longer simply engage with governments and workforces in their home countries. As transnationals, they have many partners and many options in terms of shaping employee relations. In a world hungry for jobs—it is estimated that about the number of under- and unemployed globally is now about one billion and that 40 percent of the world's population lives in poverty—they have no shortage of suitors.


The economies of the developed world have been in transition now for several decades, with aging populations, shifts from manufacturing to service economies, and

changes in the nature and shape of work and employment contracts. After decades of rising wages and improving benefits, trade unions suddenly found themselves in retreat, negotiating to limit workforce reductions, bargaining wage concessions to secure jobs, having to become partners in workplace redesign that they balked at in the past. Across North America and most of Europe they have gone into decline in membership and influence. The exceptions are the Nordic countries where the social pact is apparently so culturally embedded that trade unions remain the means of negotiating change and labor has retained a membership strength not evident in other nations. In addition, some labor movements have been quite successful in building international structures to exert pressure on transnational companies: the metalworking industries being a case in point.

## Political Transitions

Business forces were not the only ones in play, however. Running parallel to the economic transitions of developed market economies was another great wave of change: the unraveling of European colonialism after World War II and the collapse of Communism during the 1980s gave rise to a surge of new nation states. In addition, from the mid-1970s, over 90 countries were involved in a democratization wave that by 1998 saw over half the world's population living under elected governments. In many of these, labor movements played key roles in breaking the grip of authoritarian regimes, mobilizing in the engine rooms of economies to create space and impetus for political negotiations into a new democracy. Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, and Spain stand as examples. In these countries, trade union membership surged at these times, assuming in some the character of a social movement to push for and stabilize change processes, both before and beyond elections, thus enabling consolidation of new political orders. Democracies are hard to achieve, but even harder to sustain. Many fledgling democracies are currently under threat, struggling to consolidate stable governments and economies.

While trade unions have played important mobilization roles in democratic transitions, the choices they make within new democracies have an important bearing on their identity and sustainability. In some, political struggle groups, as they secure



Polish labor leader and politician, Lech Walesa. "At the moment of democracy the labor movement took a different trajectory from that of Poland's Solidarity."

power, abandon labor alliances formed during mobilization periods, especially if a transition is threatened (as in Chile, Uruguay, and Portugal). In Poland a different scenario unfolded. Worker and political agendas became inseparable within Solidarity. At the *moment critique*, the political agenda prevailed: the labor movement declared itself a political party, its leader morphed from a worker activist into a president with liberal market leanings, and worker issues were quite quickly relegated to a backburner. Solidarity's membership had exploded to 80 percent of the workforce at the peak of its resistance in 1989, but has now collapsed to 2 percent.

The South African labor movement made a different decision. The negotiated transition (profound as it was) moved through clear phases over a 15-year period: from political and labor repression (pre-1979), through a period of labor reform in the context of political struggle (1979–1990), then through a precarious period of political negotiation in the context of political and civil society openness (1990–1994) before democratic elections in 1994. Labor reforms in 1979 provided social space for trade unions representing black workers a decade before formal political talks started. It was in the workplace that black workers experienced their first opportunity to vote for a leadership, negotiate their conditions of service through a collectivity, and operate under a

constitution. The labor courts offered a first experience of the judicial system as a vehicle of protection rather than repression. By 1990 sufficient trust had been achieved at a civil society level for business, labor, and the churches to broker a national peace accord to underpin political change and to give energy to its national implementation. Business, organized labor, the government, and the government-in-waiting embarked on some early social and economic pacting to stabilize the political change process. At the moment of democracy the labor movement took a different trajectory from that of Poland's Solidarity. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) decided it would not become a political party but would instead enter a strategic alliance with the governing party the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) (giving it an inside track on policymaking at a national level). It would thus, as an independent labor organization, be able to participate in the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) with organized business and the state (giving it external influence over social and economic policymaking), while continuing its efforts as a trade union movement at the industry and workplace levels. COSATU remains a powerful political actor—it has been one of the key actors in bringing President Mbeki's leadership of the Party and the country to an end, and it is bringing pressure to bear for more socially oriented economic policy on the political leadership in waiting.

## Some Concluding Thoughts

Labor has been considerably weakened as a social partner within the global economy, despite some isolated surges. New technology and forms of work organization and capital mobility have in some instances seen organized labor in Western economies reduced to concessionary bargaining, relinquishing the gains of several decades of negotiation in an effort to retain jobs and memberships. They are partly the victims of their own success—comfortable working conditions in wealthy economies are in no small part the consequence of their struggles. Trade unions, as with many other organizations, need forward momentum—causes, rights to fight for, wages to be won—and at least a prospect of victory. With diminishing returns, and in the context of hostile economic conditions, mass unemployment in the global economy, nervous governments, and elusive business partners, it will be hard to regain the momentum lost. The new global labor agreements and international arrangements evident in some transnationals will not reverse the overall trends. There will be some who see the decline of labor as some sort of victory, but this is to ignore their importance in the civil society weave of modern democracies. The weakness or absence of a trade union movement does not imply the absence of social discontent, only that an important vehicle for its expression and regulation is at risk.

Mark Anstey



Employee in a Cape Province restaurant.



# Theorists Meet Practitioners

## Introduction

The impressive wealth of literature on international negotiation research testifies to the ever-growing interest in and relevance of international negotiation theory as a field of academic study. It is gratifying to note that IIASA's PIN Program has made a significant contribution to knowledge building in the area of negotiation analysis. The books that the PIN Program has published since 1988 addressing important topics of international negotiations are ample evidence of its central position in negotiation research.

While the value of academic research in the field of international negotiations has never been in doubt, its practical usefulness for operational diplomatic activities is sometimes questioned by practitioners, who either ignore the basics of negotiation theory or flatly discard them as not relevant to real-life situations. The PIN Steering Committee has already alluded to this state of affairs, recognizing that in an age of globalization, the new negotiators "are likely to be more receptive to communications from the research community concerning the conditions, mechanisms, and functions of international negotiations" [1]. Against this background it appeared timely and appropriate to confront some of the theorists' key concepts, developed in a number of PIN books, with diplomats' practical experience in relevant areas of international negotiations.

On 20 June 2008, PIN Steering Committee members and colleagues met for one day at IIASA with eminent practitioners with proven experience in international negotiations in particular areas. More than 50 participants including 10 ambassadors, military officials, NGO representatives, university professors, and students from all over the world attended the workshop. Ambassador Franz Cede from the PIN Steering Committee opened the workshop and explained its objectives. Thereafter, in four panels, theoretical concepts were presented by a theoretician and subsequently discussed by a practitioner. A general discussion rounded off each panel. Dialog took place not only during the formal sessions but also during the breaks.

## First Panel: Formal Models

The relevance of formal models for real-life negotiations was examined by Professor Rudolf Avenhaus with the help of a game theoretic



Rudolf Avenhaus, PIN Steering Committee, and Gregor L. Schulte, U.S. Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna.



I. William Zartman, PIN Steering Committee, and Wolfgang Petritsch, Former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina

cal model of the current conflict between the international community and Iran about the latter's nuclear program [2].

Professor Avenhaus presented a classification of formal models developed in a 2007 PIN book, namely, that formal models of international negotiations are abstract mathematical theories that present solutions to bargaining problems, but do not really describe negotiation processes, instead providing advice on how to agree immediately. Formal models for international negotiations are used to combine the preferences of the parties into optimal outcomes.

Technically speaking, the game theoretical model of the conflict over Iran's nuclear program is a noncooperative two-person game with vector-valued payoffs in normal form. The pure strategies of Iran are five combinations of i) remaining party to the NPT or not; ii) if remaining party, then fulfilling the treaty obligations or not; and iii) if so, enriching uranium or not. The pure strategies of the international community are i) using military force to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities; ii) accepting Iran as a nuclear power; iii) flexible sanctions; and iv) a grand bargain.

The payoffs to both parties are given in terms of a vector with three components, the values of which express for Iran: i) independent nuclear power supply; ii) national security; and iii) the status of a dominant regional power; and for the international community: i) preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power; ii) maintenance of regional stability; and iii) continuing supply of oil and gas from the region.

This game has two Nash equilibria, namely, not remaining party to the NPT (military force) and remaining party to the NPT with fulfillment of its obligations and enrichment (grand bargain). Moreover, the first equilibrium is payoff-dominated by the second one.

Professor Avenhaus closed his presentation with remarks about the insight gained with the help of this model and about the limitations necessary for its tractability.

The United States Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna, Gregor L. Schulte, opened his contribution by reminding the audience of important international negotiations held in Vienna like the Vienna Congress in 1814 and the meeting between J.F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in 1960. Referring to these examples he observed: "Diplomacy is human. We make mistakes." "But how," he asked, "can formal models take care of this?"

Ambassador Schulte then dealt with the assumptions of the Iran model. Having studied the model a year ago, and in view of its limitations, he raised the question as to whether it could still provide useful information. In particular, he discussed the assumption that the international community was just one player—even though he found the level of consensus among the states remarkable and even in Iran opinions differing from the official line could be heard. The opinions of nongovernmental organizations, he said, also have to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, he concluded, "I appreciate what I have learned from you here today."

The general discussion centered on the two major aspects raised by Ambassador Schulte. Professor I. William Zartman considered formal models to be the bones on which practice puts the flesh. Professor Avenhaus added some information on the relevance of the assumptions about Iran's strategies and the conclusions drawn. Ambassador Schulte emphasized the necessity of taking into account uncertainties (e.g., about adversaries' intentions).

## Second Panel: Escalation

The dramatic negotiations with the Yugoslav regime prior to the NATO air campaign in 1999 are a textbook case of escalation. Here, all the elements of the structures of escalation and negotiations can and have been identified, as demonstrated in a PIN project on escalation, the purpose of which was "whether negotiation is the possible sequel to escalation; that is, not whether stalemates must take place before negotiation, but whether negotiation can take place after escalation" [4].

For the theorists Professor Zartman pointed out that escalation can go on forever, but it results in or creates a situation where both sides feel that they are stuck, can go no further, and are hurt by it. The concept of negotiation is that, together, the sides start to craft a common outcome that will be a mutually hurting stalemate leading to the opening of negotiation.

He then developed these concepts with respect to the Kosovo case, and discussed why the 1999 Rambouillet negotiations on Kosovo failed. One mediation position identified interim autonomy but was not worked out between parties. Thus the mediation did not bring about negotiation; it did not make the stalemate felt or hurt; and it did not bring the parties to produce an outcome. Was the theory wrong? No, the theory was perfectly correct, Professor Zartman maintained. It indicated conditions that, if they existed, would lead to particular results. But the conditions did not exist and the parties who were working to implement them did not succeed. The value of the theory in cases like that, Professor Zartman concluded, is to point out what had to be done even though it was difficult to do.

Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, an eminent practitioner who was the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and who took part in the negotiations in Rambouillet, had agreed to test PIN's theoretical findings with his long years of practical experience in the Balkans. He confirmed that practitioners should avoid simplification, saying that his presentation would mirror the complexity not just of the Kosovo issue but also of its environment [5].

He began with the Dayton Agreement of 1995 where the decision was taken to fully focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina and leave all the other trouble spots in the former Yugoslavia aside for methodological, political, and other reasons. But the consequence for Kosovo of doing this was that it changed the situation there



Guy Olivier Faure, PIN Steering Committee, and Gregor Obenaus, Private Office of the Prince of Liechtenstein.

forever—it was the turning point. Ambassador Petritsch then described in detail the escalation that finally led to the unsuccessful negotiations in Rambouillet.

One major issue in the general discussion was the role of the mediator. A mediator is not party to negotiation, it was decided, but as someone who is interested in there being an outcome, may become very engaged or very manipulative.

## Third Panel: Symmetry versus Asymmetry

In his introductory statement Professor Guy Olivier Faure drew attention to the case of Andorra to illustrate a typical situation in which the relationship between actors in the political process is characterized by asymmetry [6]. In fact, this case study exemplifies asymmetry in its extreme form, that is, interaction of a micro-state (Andorra) with much larger entities (France, Spain, European Union) which are able to exert a great deal of power over the small entity. It was shown that such an asymmetric relationship does not necessarily lead to the complete submission of the mini-entity to the larger ones. Professor Faure demonstrated how a small state, by a coincidence of happy circumstances (e.g., lack of interest in it by France) may increase its room for manoeuvre considerably. Another successful strategy for a weaker party, Professor Faure explained, is to put its destiny in the hands of a third party. The conclusion to be drawn from the case of Andorra was that negotiations between parties in an asymmetric system need not be a lost cause for the weaker party and, to some degree, the imbalance between the actors can be evened out by clever strategies or fortunate circumstances.

Dr. Gregor Obenaus, from the private office of the Prince of Liechtenstein, then presented the case of Liechtenstein as seen from the vantage point of practice. He was also able to show how in real life the slogan "small is beautiful" applies to this tiny principality which has successfully survived as an independent subject of international law. Dr. Obenaus put the focus of his exposé on the experience of Liechtenstein within the framework of international organizations where, according to the rules of the game, each member, great or small, enjoys the same formal status. Through its membership of a number of intergovernmental organizations, Liechtenstein is able to make its voice heard at the international level. Formal rights are thus another factor which flattens out, at least to some extent, the





Kristine Höglund, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Gijs de Vries, Former EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator

power disparities in the international system. In the course of the discussion Professor Faure stressed the fact that there is no such thing as a completely symmetric relationship between actors. Ambassador Lichem added another interesting aspect of "symmetry versus asymmetry" in today's world by referring to the capacity of the representatives of small states to influence the global agenda. He mentioned cases where in recent years the key agenda of global negotiations has been shaped by small states rather than by the big powers.

#### Fourth Panel: International Terrorism

The presenter of this panel Dr. Kristine Höglund, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, discussed the principal problems and challenges involved in negotiations with terrorists or organizations deemed as terrorist [7]. She identified the difficulty of finding an area in which the minimum acceptable positions of all actors overlap. This area is also referred to as "zone of possible agreement" (ZOPA). She then dealt with the distinction between "absolute" and "contingent" terrorists, meaning those who are not disposed toward negotiations and others who use terrorist acts for instrumental purposes, respectively. Only in the latter case can a ZOPA can be looked for. Thirdly, the presenter stressed the importance of influencing the support base of terrorists to make them realize the infeasibility of absolute demands and extreme positions. Dr. Höglund went on to underline the problem of recognition as a key factor in negotiations with terrorists. Without some sort of recognition, meaningful negotiations with terrorists cannot really begin. Thirdly, she touched on the problems of commitment, meaning the difficulties of both sides to commit themselves to a settlement in a credible manner.

Mr. Gijs de Vries, the next panellist, brought with him the experience of being the former EU counter-terrorism coordinator. He informed the participants about the policies of the EU in fighting international terrorism. These valuable insights, drawn from practice, contributed to a comprehensive discussion. Mr. de Vries spoke at some length about the issue of listing a group as a terrorist organization. Some speakers stressed the importance of preventive measures to combat terrorism effectively. The discussions about this controversial topic sometimes became contentious themselves. They

showed that negotiation theory could not offer simple recipes for dealing with terrorists in practice.

#### Conclusions

Formal conclusions were not drawn at the end of this very rich one-day workshop, but a few observations can be made now, although they probably tend to reflect the impressions of the theorists.

Two issues recurring in all four panels were the human factor in negotiations and the complexity of the problems to be negotiated. All practitioners raised doubts about theorists being able cope with these two issues in a way that might help in real negotiations.

The answer of the theorists went in two directions. First, in general, theorists are trying to find underlying laws, like those determining wind and weather, yet they can never predict the form that the next day's clouds will take. Thus, negotiation theorists develop concepts like the prisoners' dilemma or the chicken game, or hurting stalemate and ripeness, but they cannot model, for example, the chemistry between two chief negotiators. Second, there may be very specific situations where practical advice can indeed be given, in particular if quantifiable problems are at stake. Examples like the support to the Law of the Sea negotiations or IIASA's Rains model for European environmental negotiations were mentioned.

It was known beforehand that the workshop's objective was not simple, and this turned out to be true: theorists tend to talk about their theories, and practitioners about their experience. Both sides listened carefully and in an interested fashion to what the other side had to say, especially with regard to what was new to them. But only in a few situations did a dialog really develop in the sense that both sides were learning for their own benefit—theorists to improve their theories, and practitioners with a view to using theoretical findings in negotiations to come.

Of course nobody expected anything else in a one-day workshop. It was a first attempt at creating a healthy dialog, and this does not necessarily aim at substance but rather at a form of interaction. Thus, and this was widely accepted, this kind of enterprise should be continued, with specific topics, and next time perhaps organized by a practitioner, so that with time a joint body of knowledge develops that can be used by both theorists and practitioners for better international negotiation outcomes. Healthy dialogs must go on!

Rudolf Avenhaus  
Franz Cede  
Ariel Macaspac-Penetrante

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## The Case of Arcania

### The CTBTO 2008 International Integrated Exercise in Kazakhstan

As mentioned in the article "Call for Papers" (page 22) a new analytical undertaking, International Scientific Negotiation Studies (SNS), will be conducted in 2009 by PIN in tandem with a similar study by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). SNS will analyze the negotiation process leading to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its Organization, and also CTBTO's inspections procedures. The aim is to evaluate the adequacy of those negotiations in terms of creating a viable international regime.

To mark the start of the PIN/CTBTO collaboration, the PIN Coordinator participated as an observer in the Point of Entry (POE) negotiations of the CTBTO international integrated exercise, hosted by the Republic of Kazakhstan. The exercise itself is a large-scale "real-life" simulation of the on-site inspection organized to prepare CTBTO inspectors to carry out future inspection missions. In the simulation, Kazakhstan took the role of the inspected state party, Arcania.



Kazakhstan and its real-life neighbors: the snowy mountains form a border between Western China, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, while the two large lakes in the east lie just inside Easternmost Uzbekistan. The southern portion of Kazakhstan can be seen at the very top of the image.

Simulations are a constructive way of conceptualizing possible future negotiation mechanisms, identifying opportunities that might otherwise be missed, and drafting effective strategies for future negotiations.

Each negotiation context is unique, and there are several different concepts such as negotiation, power, terms of trade, and bargaining system that need to be adapted in each case. The analysis starts with the formulation of questions. These function as tools to determine the directions the analysis will take, identify the terms of trade in a specific bargaining system, and ascertain the possible outcomes of the negotiation: Does the POE negotiation imply a zero-sum or positive-sum bargaining situation? What are the sources of power for the inspection team and for the inspected state party? How is power generated and distributed? To what extent does power asymmetry influence the terms of trade in the bargaining system? How should power be defined in this context? Is a reconceptualization of power necessary? What strategies were applied by the actors during the simulation and did those strategies affect the outcomes of the negotiation? And what strategies are waiting to be applied?

Strategies can be formulated once the whole system is analyzed and understood. The analysis must go beyond cause-effect relations and consider interdependencies, self-driving dynamics (*Eigendynamik*), paradoxes and dilemmas, the impact of frameworks, structures and contexts, and the human dimension of the system. Understanding the outcomes "empowers" negotiators to adapt their tactical actions, to formulate counterstrategies, and to recognize the early warning signs of any possible counterproductive implications of the tactical actions they have chosen.

### The Scenario: Arcania versus the International Community

The neutral state Arcania (capital, Utopium) finances its modernization by exporting uranium ore. The neighboring country Fiducia is involved in the international monitoring system (IMS), and has had a radionuclide detection station (RN81) constructed on its territory to advance the objectives of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Fiducia claims to have detected an "event" located in the Barrier Zone (BZ) where Arcania conducted its previous nuclear tests and near to which it continues to conduct military training and exercises. Furthermore, Fiducia's National Technical Means (NTM) claims to have detected the movement of numerous heavy vehicles in several parts of the BZ. This indication, among others, has prompted a request on the part of Fiducia for an On-Site Inspection (OSI). Arcania claims that it has not violated its obligations under the CTBT and that the triggering event was a shallow natural earthquake. Nevertheless, Arcania states that it will comply fully with all its obligations under the CTBT and accepts the Inspection Team (IT) at the Point of Entry in Utopium on 1 September 2008.

### The Point of Entry (POE) Negotiation

Upon the arrival of the inspection team at the POE negotiation, the originals of the inspection mandate are handed over to the representatives of the Inspected State Party (ISP) by the Inspection Team Leader (ITL). The mandate is a document giving a description of the inspection area—its location, size, the types of inspection activities



to be carried out, duration of inspection, size of team, inspection equipment, and names of IT members and their passport numbers. Basic arrangements on cooperation are negotiated at the POE and lodged as formal requests by the IT to support its activities: these include provision of logistical support, arrangement of facilities for the IT, establishment of the constraints and limitations of the inspection, such as managed access (e.g., no-fly zones, or low-fly zones, and national safety regulations) to the inspection area. The ISP is expected to provide for communication means, interpreting, in-country/field transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care. From the handover of the mandate, the clock starts to tick. After four days, the inspection must commence; if it does not, the mission will be aborted. This is an ISP right under the treaty itself.

The POE negotiation is a joint decision-making mechanism at which the terms of trade of each party are established in the context of the treaty's "agreed" norms and values. Although the treaty contains ambiguity which, in turn, causes interpretation gaps, the outcome may not cross the normative boundaries set by the treaty. The challenge lies in the question as to which interpretation of whose actor will be implemented, particularly in the first POE negotiations where the precedents established



CTBTO in Kazakhstan: integrated on-site inspection exercise; primary seismic station; and integrated field exercise.

will dictate the course of future negotiations. Each of the two or more sides attempts to obtain what it wants through the "exchange of interpretation" in the form of providing meanings to ambiguities.

Furthermore, refining how power is conceptualized is inevitable if the concept is to be relevant in the analysis of the POE negotiation. In this context, power is not to be understood in terms of force but rather as the possession of "negative" power, which is the capacity to freeze, delay, or even veto the process to stop it reaching a given objective (Hardy, 1985). The possible failure of the negotiation is not really a disadvantage to the inspected state party because negotiation failures often remain a preferred option in terms of allowing the ISP to get out of the inspection while remaining within the framework of the treaty. The "material" power sources, such as weapons and economic status, are not considered as sources of coercion. The power source remains in the principles, norms, and values institutionalized by the treaty, although it is possible for the ISP to instrumentalize these principles, values, and norms to pursue national interests. The gaps on treaty interpretation, such as national security, safety, and health can delay the negotiation process, thus serving as a tool for the inspected state party.

In this POE negotiation, the perception of power was not really clear to the inspection team as it had no real coercive strategies to hand. At least until the middle of the negotiation, the inspection team seems to have perceived itself to be in a better position than the inspected state party because of its possession of a "legitimate" power source: international law based on the CTBT. At the beginning of the POE negotiation, the inspection team leader, who functioned as chief negotiator, was in a position of dominance, indicated by the number of demands he raised, pinpointing the obligations the inspected state party must fulfil. This perception and role of "demandeur" changed and shifted in the middle of the negotiation when the inspected team leader gradually lost dominance. After this point of transition, he began calling for more "breaks" to consult with his subteam leaders, further delaying the negotiation process.

The inspected state party was effective in delaying the process by imposing several "unjustified" restraints to the access of the inspectors, due to national security issues

and health and safety regulations. For example, no-fly zones and low-fly zones were introduced by the inspected state party which were interpreted as valid constraints under the treaty. Moreover, the inspection team leader seems to have given up at the end of the negotiation, as indicated by the frequency of talks now dominated by the ISP chief negotiator who dictated the direction of the negotiation.

During the internal briefings during breaks (breaks were held more often in the last quarter of the POE negotiation), the ISP chief negotiator warned that they should not compromise early, but wait until the end, as time was on their side, thus anticipating the opportunity provided by the time constraints on the inspection team side. The ISP recognized the position of strength that the time restraints had given it. The inspection team leader recognized that it would lose more if the POE negotiation were not concluded on that day because, according to the treaty, inspections must be started at the latest four days after the handover of the inspection mandate. The inspection team leader noted that at least two days were needed to get to the inspection area and to install all the necessary equipment and that the failure to start the inspection within the given time would mean the cancellation of the entire on-site inspection. The inspection team leader reiterated this time constraint 14 times during the whole POE negotiation.

In return, the inspected state party always answered that there was enough time. One member of the inspection team said that because of the time constraint, "there was no room for creativity," and the inspection team ended up meeting all the demands of the inspected state party so as to be able to actually start the on-site inspection. For example, the overflight plan in the inspection area was revised to meet Arcania's no-fly zone and low-fly zone regulations, which formed a significant part of the inspection area; limitations were also set on fact-finding activities, for example, "no photographs and videos, only observation, not even binoculars"; there was to be no unauthorized contact with the media, eliminating a possible coercive "name-and-shame" strategy; access to parts of the inspection area were limited because of "security and confidentiality, and health and safety regulations"—local escorts would decide if access to a specific place were possible or not which would probably cause

more delays during the on-site inspection; and the sovereignty of the ISP with regard to use of data. For example, where no specific criteria existed determining what was confidential or not, the decision regarding taking photographs on the ground—if the photograph was really relevant and whether it undermined national security—lay absolutely in the hands of the ISP.

At the end, the negotiation was biased in favor of the party initially perceived as weaker (power based on principles). The inspection team leader relied on the coercive strategy "justify your constraints to us," which was regularly countered by the other party saying that it didn't have to justify anything as long as it served Arcania's national security interests which was its right under the treaty. Such an assertion of rights could not be perceived as a hostile act as it lay within the treaty framework and was thus guaranteed. The complexity of the interrelation between (national) interests and rights became clear, namely, rights are understood as a standardized manifestation of interests; pointing out these rights serves an instrument to pursue interests leading the transformation of the bargaining process from an interest-based to a rights-based process, thereby reducing a positive-sum situation to a zero-sum game (Bühling-Uhle, 1996, p. 220).

The interests raised by the inspection team leader were reduced to an "appeal" and could not be transformed into a demand. There were no real equal terms of trade because of the practical dependence of the inspection team on the "goodwill" of Arcania. The definition of power as an action by one party intending to produce movement by another (Zartman and Rubin, 2000, p. 8) seems not to be applicable, as the inspected state party was able to successfully delay or prevent any movement by the inspection team, effectively nailing them down through the structure legally defined by the treaty. Actor A prevented Actor B from pursuing any tactical action by well calculated "negative" tactics in the form of veto. The power interdependence and dynamics in the POE negotiation can be understood through a "concrete system of action" (Friedberg, 1995, p. 3) involving strategic interactions in the bargaining field.

What possible strategies are available for the inspection team in such on-site inspection contexts? What were the missed

opportunities during the simulated POE negotiation? Can veto mechanisms be integrated into the zero-sum/positive-sum schemata? Actor A (inspection team) can get X only when Actor B (ISP) permits. There is no hurting stalemate for the inspected state party, nor any loss when the negotiation collapses. Sources of power such as military means are off the negotiation table in such a context. The party initially perceived as weaker (Arcania) found a way of empowering itself; paradoxically, this was unintentionally laid on the table for it by the inspection team ("we need to start within four days" being mentioned 14 times). The weaker party successfully borrowed power from the context to level the playing field or even turn the negotiation around to the point where it found itself in the position of a stronger party dictating the proceedings (Zartman and Rubin 2000, p.278).

## The Two-Level Negotiation Process for the Inspection Team: "Divided Attention"

Immediately after the approval of the inspection mandate, subteams representing the different technologies had to coordinate at the CTBTO's Vienna headquarters to ensure that the various technologies would effectively fulfill their on-site inspection mandate. This "internal" negotiation was conducted for almost a week in Vienna before the inspection team was able to fly to Utopium (Almaty), which was the point of entry.

The power distribution among the subteams can be seen as equal because of their dependence on one another. This involves a completely different negotiation mechanism than that taking place between the inspected team party negotiator and inspection team leader. Furthermore, this internal subteam negotiation will probably continue on into the on-site inspection, depending on the outcomes of the POE negotiation and of later negotiations. The internal negotiation depends on access to information and on provisions agreed during the POE negotiation. Every time the POE negotiations change the planned inspection activities before the flight to the point of entry, further negotiation are needed between the subteams to reflect the new "status."

## Conclusion: Challenges for CTBTO

The CTBTO faces several challenges in the implementation of on-site inspections in the future because of the complexity of the negotiation process. The conceptualization of significant factors in these challenges through greater understanding of the negotiation mechanisms involved will enable the CTBTO to 1) formulate more effective tactics; 2) develop early warning systems to limit the counterproductive implications of the tactical actions chosen, 3) not miss out on opportunities; and 4) maximize the resources it has to reach the intended objectives. The complexity of the power structure within the bargaining system in this context must be thoroughly considered and also integrated into the decision-making process. Furthermore, the continuous internal negotiation process between the subteams under time pressure and limited resources implies a potential source of conflict.

Ariel Macaspac Penetrante

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The CTBTO's International Monitoring System (IMS) is located at Seibersdorf laboratory in Lower Austria.



## CALL FOR PAPERS – Negotiation on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In the mid-1990s, the scientific community played a major role in the negotiation of the global verification regime built to monitor implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The community of negotiation analysts is now invited to participate in a new analytical endeavor, International Scientific Negotiation Studies (SNS), the objective of which is to carry out scientific study assessments to address and evaluate the adequacy of negotiations to establish and implement the verification regime in an international coordination effort. This study, the 2009 Project of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), is conducted in cooperation with a similar study by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) to evaluate eight different technical aspects of the CTBT (system performance, seismology, hydro-acoustics, infrasound, radionuclide observations, atmospheric transport modeling, data mining, and on-site inspecting). It analyzes the negotiation process associated with the establishment of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its Organization and its inspection efforts in order to evaluate the adequacy of these negotiations for the purpose of creating a viable international regime.

The project workshops for both sets of studies will take place at IIASA in June 2009, well coordinated with each other. The results of the studies will be submitted to the CTBTO and concerned states, to be used as a basis for policy considerations. The PIN study represents the kind of project we feel best exemplifies PIN's role in IIASA-related projects, namely, as a study that analyzes and evaluates the negotiation mechanisms that an international system and the technical studies associated with it need in order to make their impact on the real/political world. The PIN editing committee is composed of Franz Cede, Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts, and William Zartman, with Ola Dahlman and Moty Melamud.

Three levels of regime negotiations are open to study and will form the framework for the project:

1. The 1996 regime-building negotiations to create the CTBT system and its governing organization;
2. The subsequent regime-adjustment negotiations, principally within the Preparatory Technical Commission for the effective implementation of the Treaty, in particular, by establishing its regime, but possibly also any adjustment negotiations, including provisions and trade-offs required to accommodate universal membership; and
3. The individual field negotiations enabling specific on-site inspections, namely, how inspectors negotiate their way in to conduct verification.

A fourth level of purely political negotiations continues for the purpose of convincing the Reluctant Nine states not currently members of the Organization to join; these will not be addressed specifically, although the preceding three levels are relevant to this aspect.


In preparation for the June 2009 workshop, we are calling for proposals on presentations, eventually chapters, for each of the three levels of negotiation. The negotiation process of CTBT regime can be analyzed in terms of the following elements, among others:

1. Political versus technical demands, with the understanding that the political is a technical area in itself;
2. Increasing technical knowledge and uncertainty;
3. Institutional versus ad hoc (i.e., inspection-related) negotiations;
4. Formulas for an agreement: what general formulas governed negotiations and agreement and what alternative formulas were available but neglected;
5. ZOPAs (Zones of Possible Agreement) on specific issues between the Nine and the rest. Are they impossible or were they overlooked in initial and subsequent negotiations?
6. Regime negotiations in general: is CTBT sui generis among arms control negotiations and are arms control negotiations sui generis among negotiations in general?
7. National security secrets versus comprehensive monitoring;

8. Issue-inclusion matters (e.g., testing levels) versus party-inclusion matters (e.g., threshold states);
9. Monitoring access guidelines: how standard can such guidelines be and how much can legitimately be left to on-site negotiations?
10. Trade-offs: were trade-offs made to the point where traded issues were reduced to the lowest common denominator and lost their effectiveness, neglecting other more viable trade-offs?
11. Training and operational manuals for negotiating levels 2 and 3.

We would be pleased to entertain other lines of analysis. The purpose is not to propose alternatives but, in stopping just short of that point, to analyze and evaluate the adequacy of current and past practices of CTBT negotiation and alternatives/not practiced.

This is a call for proposals, to be sent to Ariel Macaspac, Program Administrator, PIN Program, IIASA: [macaspac@iiasa.ac.at](mailto:macaspac@iiasa.ac.at) by 1 January 2009; accepted proposals will be notified immediately, and draft papers are due on 15 May 2009, for presentation at a workshop at IIASA/CTBTO later in June 2009. The results of the workshop will be submitted to the CTBTO in September and the papers revised for publication will be due on 1 October 2009.



Source: Wikipedia

Types of nuclear testing: 1. atmospheric, 2. underground, 3. upper-atmosphere, 4. underwater.

## Boundary Bargaining

### Boundaries Are a Prerequisite for Effective Bargaining

In the process of international negotiations, a boundary represents both an obstacle and an opportunity. Obstacles, though restricting the freedom and flexibility of the negotiators, can also be a way of pushing things forward. What are the positive and negative consequences of these limitations? In this contribution we limit ourselves to one of the most important barriers in boundary bargaining: borders between states.

There are two classical ways in which negotiations on geographical borders have been conducted: compromise and compensation. Compromise in the sense of a negotiation attempting to change the course of a border is called micro-border bargaining (in the sense that diplomats focus on a border and bargain over changing it). Macro-border bargaining is the swapping of whole territories and people from one rule to another, as the loss of one territory is compensated for by the acquisition of another.

One example would be the loss of Swedish Finland to Russia in 1815, the Swedes being compensated by gaining Norway which had been seized by Napoleon's ally Denmark. Another would be the King of the Netherlands gaining Belgium and Luxembourg in exchange for losing the lands of his ancestors in Germany. World War II put an end to macro-border bargaining, Yalta essentially being the last negotiations where country-swapping was practiced.

From a negotiation standpoint, this has limited the range of options available to diplomats and those who instruct them. It has taken away opportunities for integrative win/win bargaining and strengthened the tendency to see border negotiations as distributive, win/lose, or even lose/lose processes, as in the former Yugoslavia. Perhaps it is no coincidence that at the turn of the century The Hague Peace Conference took place, creating the International Court of Arbitration and paving the way for the

present-day International Court of Justice. Diminishing negotiation options had to be compensated for by adjudication tools.

The border question involves sovereignty and suzerainty; the autonomy of the people within the delimitations of their territory implies fixed units: states. It was the transition of societies of hunters to cattle herders, farmers, craftsmen, and then traders in and among larger settlements like cities, that laid down the fundamentals of states. In the process, "fixed borders" emerged, demarcating the "absolute" power of the rulers over people and palatines. Within those "borders to be bargained," (semi-) sovereign blocs came to flourish. Negotiations between these blocs became extremely tough. Unlike negotiations on internal matters, where the ruler or one of his grand viziers could always force an outcome if internal haggling came to a grinding halt, negotiators were much less in control of external affairs. If anything distinguishes national from international negotiations, it is the degree of control that



Source: European Commission

EU Conference in Brussels, 2008. "Geographic limits can be an obstacle to cooperation."



exists over each process. While internal bargaining has more assured outcomes, bargaining across borders is characterized by less-assured agreements, both in terms of an effective process being created and of implementation of the promises made to the other party being secured.

Regime building as an alternative to trust building is, to a large extent, the answer to improving control in cross-boundary bargaining. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the growth of multilateral international organizations in the twentieth century went hand in hand with the loss of opportunities for boundary changing and the growth of package dealing. Package dealing is a hallmark of multilateralism. Dispensing with the tool of territorial swaps and compensation for territorial losses narrows the opportunities for negotiated solutions. Package dealing in a multilateral setting is a possible way out. Countries can now swap issues instead of land. Rising interdependency implies a loss of sovereignty, both inside and outside international regimes. Geographic, and therefore political, boundaries are losing their significance in global governance. In the very long run bargaining on border problem could just wither away.

However, geographic and sovereignty borders also had a positive impact on the negotiation process. Mandating diplomats used to be a fairly transparent process. Am-



Source: Wikipedia

*King William I of the Netherlands (reigned 1813–1840) lost his ancestral lands at the Congress of Vienna, but gained Belgium and Luxembourg as a "sweetener."*

bassadors were instructed by the prince to negotiate on the external dimension to his rule. The process is becoming less transparent as, with the merging of the national and international spheres, a horde of ministries, parliaments, companies, trade unions, and other pressure groups become involved in the mandating process. This is particularly so in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands where the distinction between the executive and legislative arm has been waning. Dutch negotiators have the additional problem of difficult internal coordination in preparing for EU bargaining. Mandates are often unclear, as they are usually a compromise in themselves. Add to that progress in the means of communication and the impact of specialized ministries coming on to the external bargaining platforms, and a loss of autonomy on the part of diplomatic negotiators becomes apparent. This, in turn, can have a negative impact on their ability to be creative in the negotiation process and to act in a situational manner. As negotiation is context-driven, and thus, by definition, situational, the phasing out of geographic and political borders can make navigating the negotiation process less flexible. This can diminish the effectiveness of negotiators and thus of bargaining as a tool in conflict resolution at the global governance level.

Geographic borders, however, are not the only borders in international negotiation processes, and the evolution of other limiting factors also have consequences for bargaining. Other limitations include the strength of states and international organizations and of the people representing them who have to work within a certain time frame and according to certain procedures. These limitations both pose problems and produce effectiveness, and their interplay creates the very complex multidimensional riverbed in which international negotiation processes flow.

Some positive and negative effects of one major delimitation have been dealt with, but this contribution has identified only some aspects of process and context connectedness, and more thorough research is needed. Suffice to say that without boundaries, there can be no effective bargaining. Bargaining processes flourish in a world of carved-up in states, structured by systems, squeezed between common and opposing interests on the basis of human and other resources, regulated by law and mores, operating under variable time

constraints. This is the positive side of the coin, and without this the process will not work.

Of course, boundaries also pose problems. Geographic limits can be an obstacle to effective cooperation, which is why we try to get rid of geographic and other boundaries in the European Union. Systems can exclude potential partners. Radically opposing interests create intractability. Humans are often unwilling to negotiate because of their past and present and their vision of the future. Regulations can strangle creativity. Bargaining takes time; if insufficient time is allowed for the process then it will falter or at least produce suboptimal outcomes. But these are the negative situational effects of a structural ingredient that we defined as a necessity for bargaining processes, namely, boundaries.

In other words: without delimitations there can be no negotiations, although their negative effects need to be undone. Without nerves no happiness in life, but those same nerves can cause pain we would like to avoid. It is not the barrier itself, but the way we use it, that determines its contribution to successful negotiation.

Paul Meerts

## PIN•Points

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## The EU–NATO Relationship: A Difficult Negotiation Experience

The purpose of this presentation is to offer a brief general view of the EU–NATO relationship focusing on the process of negotiation between the two organizations. Several factors help to explain the complex relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Following some introductory remarks, five features characterizing the present state of EU–NATO relations will be examined: 1) asymmetry of the two organizations; 2) conceptual differences; 3) duplication; 4) competition; 5) different strategic choices.

### Introductory Observations

The EU and NATO give the impression that although they have members who share and pursue similar goals, as organizations they are far from being able to cooperate smoothly on defense, as the strategic partnership proclaimed by the two organizations would have us believe. The mainstay of their relationship seems to be competition and rivalry rather than cooperation. Defense experts remember the difficult negotiations that, in March 2003, led to the so-called Berlin plus arrangements which allow the EU to draw on NATO capacities and resources when the EU carries out its own crisis management missions in which NATO is not involved. The Berlin plus arrangements also enable the EU to use NATO planning and command structures in such operations. Even though Berlin plus was meant to be the practical expression of the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU this scheme of cooperation soon turned out, irrespective of its advantages, to have serious drawbacks. On the positive side it helps the EU draw on NATO resources and thereby overcome its notorious deficits, especially in the field of strategic airlift and satellite communications. On the other hand Berlin plus has become a political straitjacket that prevents comprehensive consultations across the EU–NATO security agenda. The reasons for this state of affairs are well known to security experts. After the last round of EU enlargement, when Malta and Cyprus joined the European club together with eight Central and Eastern Eu-

ropean countries, Turkey started blocking all attempts to expand EU–NATO cooperation beyond the scope of Berlin plus. Turkey put forward the argument that Cyprus and Malta had not concluded a security agreement with NATO and thus could not be given access to classified NATO documents. Based on this argument the two states are in fact barred from participating in any formal meetings between the EU and NATO on matters other than those falling within the purview of Berlin plus. As, at the present time, only one EU operation, namely, the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia, works under the Berlin plus formula, there is nothing left outside this mission that can be formally discussed in political consultations between the EU and NATO. It is clear to everyone that the current stalemate has much to do with the still unresolved Cyprus issue. However, it would be too simplistic to explain the strained relationship between the two organizations solely by pointing to the Turkish blockade. The situation is much more complicated, and the stumbling block of the Cyprus question is only the tip of the iceberg. It is therefore worth looking at the five structural factors mentioned above which shed light on some of the deeper reasons for the current dilemma.

### Asymmetry of the Two Organizations

While the core function of NATO is to provide security to its members primarily in the military sense, the EU represents a much broader and more comprehensive project of integration. The goal of the EU is to create an ever closer political and economic union of its member states which have already given up a considerable amount of their sovereignty to Brussels. There is no equivalent of the wide spectrum of competencies and the very advanced institutional framework of the EU in NATO which, in spite of all its recent changes and transformations, continues to be a



*The EU is trying to find a modus vivendi with NATO.*

classical intergovernmental organization primarily serving the security interests of its members on the basis of collective defense and mutual assistance, as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Put aside these structural differences which make the two organizations asymmetric and thus hard to compare, and it is true that the EU is gradually developing its own role as an important actor on the world scene by expanding its capacities in the area of foreign policy, security, and defense. By further developing its security dimension the EU has become both a partner and a competitor of the most powerful defense organization in the world (i.e., NATO). The asymmetry between NATO and the EU is further evidenced by the banal remark that membership of the first organization bridges the Atlantic with the USA as the leading member, whereas the EU is a truly European organization in which the USA has no right to membership. Given the weight of the USA in world affairs and its unique military might, the structural imbalance between the EU and NATO is striking. As an illustration one often hears that the defense expenditure of the USA alone exceeds that of all EU member states combined. The asymmetry of the EU and NATO as described



*EU–NATO cooperation. Left and right: EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.*





Source: österreichisches Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (Austrian Ministry of Defence)

Austrian soldiers serve with EUFOR in Bosnia.

is compounded by the imbalance in the weight and military clout of the USA, which is the elephant among the smaller animals in the NATO zoo. A third inconsistency of the U.S. role in the context of transatlantic and European security affairs pertains to the fact that U.S. military engagement, with substantial troop levels and navy and air force bases on the European continent, makes the USA an essentially European military power. Given the fact that the USA assumes an important responsibility for European security and is embedded in the European security landscape, it is virtually impossible to disconnect the USA from any discourse on European security.

### Conceptual Differences

A second reason for the patent tensions between NATO and the European Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy (ESDP) has to do with the old debate about the very concept of European security. This debate has had its more turbulent periods and quieter moments. There is no need to rehash the whole story of the ESDP and its impact on EU-NATO relations. Suffice to say that the matter always boils down to the question of if and to what extent the EU can and should develop its own defense capacity independently of and separate from the North Atlantic Alliance. Usually, it was France that promoted the idea of the EU growing into a more robust defense institution, independent of NATO, while Britain

sought to preserve and strengthen NATO. As long as the ambitions of the EU to push forward a security and defense policy of its own were declaratory rather than real this debate could easily be put on the back burner of the transatlantic security agenda. But now the EU is making serious efforts to get its act together and engage more actively in EU crisis management operations. Therefore, the issue of military concepts has popped up again, as practical cooperation with NATO in concrete missions has become more relevant. This again raises the major question as to which organization should do what and where. Berlin plus can provide only limited answers to these questions. The lack of conceptual clarity about the precise role of NATO, and the EU and the division of labor between the two security organizations in any given operation, presents a confusing picture. One gets the impression that the cooperation of the two security organizations is often driven by the necessities of the situation in an individual operation rather than by a well coordinated concept shared and jointly implemented by NATO and the EU.

### Duplication

Examples of duplication abound: for instance, when Germany agreed to command the EU military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Germans first proposed cooperating with NATO and using SHAPE, based in Mons, Belgium, as the

planning headquarters for the operation. But the French President Chirac at the time insisted that the EU command the mission alone from Potsdam, one of the operations headquarters at the disposal of the EU. Previous attempts by France to establish a single operational headquarters for the EU were opposed by Britain which argued that the existence of such a headquarters would drive a wedge between NATO and the EU, undermining SHAPE, to which the EU has access. The NATO Response Force (NRF) concept can be cited as another case-book example of duplication in relation to the EU scheme for a similar rapid reaction force, the so-called battle group concept. At the same time the member states of NATO and the EU assert that they only have a single set of defense forces to be used both for EU and NATO purposes.

### Competition

It cannot be denied that there is a great deal of rivalry going on between the EU and NATO, leading to unnecessary overlaps and competition. Because of the lack of co-operation and coordination, the proclaimed partnership of the two organizations is often strained. This can be illustrated in the case of Sudan where both NATO and the EU have become active in support of African Unity. Was it really necessary for NATO and the EU to organize separate airlifts to transport troops and equipment to Sudan? In Afghanistan too the deficit of coordination between the NATO-led ISAF operation and the EU is striking. On the other hand it is fair to say that on the ground practical cooperation between the representatives of the two organizations works rather well. The blame for the unsatisfactory situation is often put on "the capitals" or on "headquarters." The fact remains that NATO and the EU do not always proceed in perfect harmony at all levels and this in spite of the fact that the majority of their member states are represented in both institutions.

### Different Strategic Choices

NATO is often portrayed as an instrument to advance the U.S. foreign policy agenda. This perception became apparent in the wake of September 11 when NATO started its first "out-of-area" mission in Afghanistan or when, upon the insistence of the

USA, NATO took on a training mission in Iraq, the latter being seen by many European allies as a fig leaf to hide the lack of any further NATO commitment in this trouble spot. The differing strategic approaches to conflict resolution can also be demonstrated in Afghanistan where some allies place the focus of their engagement on the soft aspects of security while others stress the robust combat tasks. The famous comparison between Venus and Mars comes to mind, the USA representing the god of war, while most Europeans prefer the goddess of love. It is true that the EU has acquired considerable expertise in the field of peace building, implementing the soft instruments of security, whereas NATO remains first and foremost a military institution whose primary mission in a crisis management operation is to provide security by fighting the enemy.

### Concluding Remarks

Given the fundamental structural and political problems described above it appears unrealistic to assume that the interaction of the two security institutions will ever be without friction. The differences between NATO and the EU will continue and even grow as the EU further develops its activities in the area of security and defense. It is hard to see that this competitive relationship will ever be done away with completely. However, what can be achieved to improve the strained relations are more transparency and a better coordination at all levels of the negotiating process. Informal and more frequent contacts between the upper echelons of the staff of both organizations and of the representatives of member states of both organizations should be encouraged. The impasse of formal EU-NATO contacts on matters outside the scope of application of the Berlin plus agreement should not prevent the responsible actors from conducting informal consultations on all matters of common interest whenever necessary. NATO and the EU have no alternative but to address jointly the security challenges of the 21st century. In this perspective both organizations are bound to cooperate. In view of the shared membership of many states in both institutions and of the overriding interest of the transatlantic partnership and interdependence, the urge to work together will ultimately prevail.

Franz Cede

## From Zero Sum to Positive Sum: Scenario Interviews with Hamas and Lessons for Mediating Identity Conflicts

I used my time at the IIASA Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) as an opportunity to research a topic related to my thesis, and yet different. While in my doctoral analysis I investigate negotiating with terrorists, at IIASA I worked on mediating identity, with a special focus on the case of Hamas. I complemented my paper with scenario interviews with Hamas members in Damascus, Syria, which I had the opportunity to visit for two weeks during my research summer.

My YSSP paper aims to derive lessons for mediating identity conflicts from interviews conducted with the Hamas leadership and members in Syria. Initially, establishing contacts with Hamas members in Syria was difficult. In fact, a member of the Syrian security service joined the first interview, making sure the questions asked were of an academic and not journalistic or even intelligence-gathering nature. Hamas members were also initially suspicious of the purpose of the interview. But when it was emphasized that the research goal was to depict their viewpoint, members of the

movement were eager to talk and facilitated further contacts.

Scenario interviews are a method of asking hypothetical questions, in this context about possible solutions to the conflict with Israel. Typical examples include: What would make you recognize Israel? What would make a major change in the situation possible? or: How can mediation attempts be improved? In fact the most direct result of the scenario interviews was that Hamas members simply cannot see or even imagine a peaceful solution. When asked to brainstorm ideas for conflict resolution, one Hamas member replied, "It is good to be immovable if one has good goals, and I appreciate your constancy for seeing world peace, although it is an ideal perspective. Sister, it is not our fault."

Does this resignation mean we should give up on peaceful approaches altogether? No, on the contrary, this is what makes mediation necessary. External intervention in the form of mediation is a complex undertaking. It is also most productive if it follows a holistic approach and manages



Damascus, 2008, where YSSP participant Carolin Görzig talked with Hamas.





Damascus, showing various forms of Hamas publicity.

to tackle political reforms and perceptions on an equal footing. It thus responds to a reality in which the policy and perceptions are mutually reinforcing. And it responds to a process in which policies and perceptions work together to identify with the in-group through identification against the out-group: a process of radicalization where multiple identities are lost. Where identities are lost and subordinated under one overarching identity of resistance and hate, the challenge for mediation lies in reestablishing complex relations—multiple identities. Mediation is thus not only complex in itself, but also encourages complexity through the following of a holistic approach.

"The leaders of Hamas are examples of how a person should be. They put their own sons on the front lines of the resistance movement for the sake of jihad. I have eleven children and will do everything I can to help them join the movement," said one Hamas member.

Recently, Jimmy Carter's talk with Hamas was greatly criticized by those who pointed out that choosing a more radical partner for mediation implies giving recognition. And, in fact, Hamas members emphasize how beneficial his visit was to the movement because "he saw that we are moderate, that we appeal to broad audiences." Reassuringly, the group wants to appeal to broad audiences and, more importantly, to appear moderate. Giving recognition to small radical factions might indeed undermine the work of more moderate movements. Yet, after winning the elections, Hamas can no longer be ignored. And, pointed out above, not giving recognition but applying pressure instead, can play directly into the hands of those who support a violent approach. In other words pressure and nonrecognition can be neatly turned into instruments to oppose any peace attempts:

Mediating the Middle East conflict remains an international challenge. Hamas told me:

"The election was pushed by the USA, Europe, Russia... but the result was the opposite of what they expected and wanted, so they refused it, imposed sanctions, and even stopped humanitarian support. Where is the democracy, and where is the mediation?"

Hamas enjoys a large amount of support among the Palestinian people. Palestinian refugee camps are full of posters, graffiti, and

other symbols of support for Hamas. And because the population is becoming more and more resistant in terms of facing coercion and shortages of goods and freedom, Hamas cannot cede any ground to Israel: "If we give up our homeland, our children and the generations to come will not forgive us." A movement that sits at the same table with those who are responsible for coercion and shortages cannot be perceived as legitimate by its supporters and is, in fact, seen as corruptible. As a case in point, Fatah has paid the price for selling out the cause: a price that is too high for Hamas. The challenge for Hamas is to use mediation as a tool to improve the conditions for Palestinians while simultaneously decoupling this from recognition of Israel.

Carolyn Görzig

### Carolyn Görzig, Impressions of the YSSP 2008

For me summer 2008 will always be the summer I spent at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Maria Theresia's summer castle in Laxenburg, Austria. It will be—just as the name of the institute indicates—the summer of encouraging discussions about possible interdisciplinary endeavors, the summer of courageous attempts at complex systems analysis and the summer of applying my knowledge to date to an analysis of a conflict of international dimensions. But it will also be—just as the location indicates—the summer of making choices between swimming pool, mini golf or tennis; the summer of sharing the Euro Championship among a team of almost 50 young scientists from around the world and the summer of organized and spontaneous get-togethers – be it the Asia Day, potluck dinners, or adventurous hiking trips. Looking back at these three months therefore leaves me with the strong impression of a great summer with immense opportunities for networking, learning, and further developing individual research. Clearly, learning the institute's name might seem a challenge at first. However, it keeps what it promises. It is international, applied, systemic, and analytical. I am grateful I had the chance to use this opportunity of learning from and implementing the Institute's attributes in my summer work.

## Is the European Union a Healthy Negotiator?

In summer 2008 I participated in IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) within the PIN Program. During my stay at IIASA I conducted a case study on the relationship between the unity of the European Union (EU) in external representation and its negotiating performance in the World Health Organization (WHO).

The case study forms part of my doctoral thesis on the EU's negotiating performance in international organizations. It addresses the theoretical question as to whether the sum of EU member states is greater than its parts in terms of reaching objectives in international organizations. In the study, EU unity in external representation is held to result from European Community (EC) competence (i.e., the legal rules regarding joint external representation), preference homogeneity, and the processes of socialization among EU member states' representatives. To analyze these concepts and the extent to which the EU, or a majority of its member states (in case there is no common position), reached its objectives in negotiations, I made a detailed study of documents and media sources and interviewed about 20 people involved in WHO negotiations in Geneva, Brussels, and by phone.

The project compares the negotiations on two global strategies adopted by WHO: the 2004 strategy on diet, physical activity, and health (DPAS) and the 2008 strategy on public health, innovation, and intel-

lectual property (PHI). Both negotiations addressed topical issues: combating the rise of obesity and stimulating the development of medical treatment for diseases primarily affecting the poor in developing countries. DPAS addressed which policies could be recommended to reduce obesity and its health-related risks. The debate focused on the scientific basis of the relationship between food ingredients and obesity, the use of fiscal instruments to discourage unhealthy eating patterns, and the interface with the international trade regime (in particular, with the so-called Codex Alimentarius Committee in which global food standards are decided upon and which are the point of reference for the World Trade Organization [WTO]). EU member states operated primarily on the basis of national submissions, and were not very visible in the negotiations. Germany and Italy were successful in claiming that the scientific underpinning suggested by WHO in a draft version of the strategy was not strong enough to be incorporated. However, the main opponent to the inclusion of a reference to specific scientific evidence was the USA. It has been claimed that it was mainly because of opposition by the USA that the scientific evidence was removed. Other EU member states were more supportive of the original version of the strategy, as presented by WHO.



Europe may be too keen to protect its own commercial interests in negotiations.

In the negotiations on the PHI strategy on innovation, intellectual property rights, and access to health, the EU member states operated on the basis of a coordinated position brought forward by the EU presidency and the European Commission. During several sessions of a so-called inter-governmental working group (IGWG), an extensive process of EU coordination took place in which member states, on the basis of a matrix document, agreed upon a common position and negotiating strategy. The performance of the EU depended to a large extent on the qualities of the presidency and on how much time was available for the EU to discuss and coordinate its position (including the amount of time needed to develop national instructions in the capital). The beginning of the process was dominated by unexpected events and uncertainty about the scope and remit of the process. EU member states' representatives did not have national positions to work to, and they were suspicious about the Commission claiming the right to take authority over external representation on trade-related issues. The IGWG was characterized by involvement of both health and trade experts who had different views on the content and form of the negotiations. Trade experts were keener to protect the intellectual property rights system and skeptical about the remit of the WHO as compared with the more trade-oriented bodies, the WTO and the World Intellectual



Combating obesity is a strategy of both the European Union and the World Health Organization.





Source: European Commission

*United? How easy is it for the European Union to operate from a common position?*

Property Organization (WIPO). They were more familiar with process of EU coordination and considered it advantageous to operate from a common position, represented by the European Commission, particularly on trade-related issues. The health experts considered it important to discuss the relationship between diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries, innovative research into new medicines to treat these diseases, and intellectual property rights protection within the WHO. They advocated a strong role for the member states in the external representation of the EU, as they considered that the Commission was keener to protect the commercial interests of the EU's pharmaceutical industry. Internal squabbling diluted the EU's performance during 2007, and this was also hampered by the fact that the Portuguese presidency was not sufficiently specialized in negotiating in the IGWG and in managing EU coordination. Nevertheless, over time a common ground emerged among the member states, and under the Slovenian presidency (first half of 2008), the EU succeeded in being a constructive actor, able to take up a mediating role in the negotiations between the USA and a group of developing countries, led by Brazil.

In both cases the EU (or a majority of EU member states) was moderately successful in obtaining its objectives in the negotiations. More unity in external representation originated from the Commission claiming EC competence, a proactive EU presidency, and a process of intensive EU coordination becoming gradually institutionalized. Member states' representatives also identified economies of scale in conducting a unified external representation, although their initial preferences were rather different. A drawback was the time investment needed to arrive at a coordinated position and the EU's inability to react swiftly to unexpected developments in the negotiations. Moreover, the cross-border character of the issues being discussed led to continuous debate on which agenda items the Commission would handle in terms of external representation and on which the EU presidency would take the lead. Tensions were aggravated by a lack of trust in the Commission's intentions and the EU being an unusual entity within an international organization where membership is a prerogative of states. This in general is illustrative for numerous other international negotiations that touch upon issues where competence is only partially transferred to the European Community, and therefore require involvement by both the European Commission and the EU member states.

*Louise van Schaik*

*Fellow at the Clingendael Institute at The Hague and  
Ph.D. candidate at the Catholic University of Leuven*

## PIN Summer Workshop

The PIN summer workshop on the 2008 project, External Efforts to Promote Negotiation and Prevent Genocide in Internal Identity Conflicts, was held at IIASA on 21–22 June to hear and discuss the draft chapters of the new work. Authors have been revising their chapters, which are being collected this fall in preparation for final editing and submission to a publisher.

At the same time, the project team will be working with the Assistant Secretariat of the United Nations for the Prevention of Genocide to prepare a full report on the subject based on the presentations, and this will be directed by I. William Zartman of the PIN Group. Thus, the project will not only contribute to PIN's list of publications but will also directly enter the international policy stream at the highest level. (PIN has already published two handbooks, on ripeness and on terrorist negotiations, for the UN Mediation Support Unit).

The following papers were presented at the workshop, beginning with a thematic introductory piece on "Challenges in Negotiation and Identity Conflicts" by Mark Anstey and I. William Zartman, project organizers along with Paul Meerts.

"Identity and Mediation," by Joshua Smilovitz;  
"Conditions for Internal Conflict Resolution through External Intervention," by "Frank Pfetsch, Heidelberg University;  
"Negotiating Out of Conflict: External Interventions in Africa," by Mark Anstey, Michigan State University at Dubai;  
"OSCE HCNM," by Paul Meerts and Tassos Coulaloglu of Clingendael;  
"Track 2 and Civil Society in Identity Conflict Negotiations," by Jonathan Cohen, Conciliation Resources;  
"The Diaspora Dimension in Identity Negotiations," by Fen Osler Hampson, Carleton University;  
"Territorial Self-Determination," by Victor Kremenyuk, Russian Academy of Sciences; "Evolving International Law of Intervention," by Franz Cede, Budapest University; "Breaking the Attributional Dilemma," by Jay Rothman;  
"Challenge of Partnerism," by Moty Cristal, London School of Economics;  
"Handling Spoilers," by Marie-Joëlle Zahar, University of Montreal;  
"Identity through Socioeconomic Status—Negotiating Social (In)justice," by Ariel Macaspac, IIASA;  
"The Identity Trap: Managing Paradox in Crisis Bargaining," by William Donohue, Michigan State University;  
"Outbidding and the Decision to Negotiate," by Jannie Liljia, University of Uppsala;  
"Who Gets What in Peace Agreements," by David Cunningham, University of Iowa.



## New PIN Book

### Negotiating with Terrorists

**Edited by Guy Olivier Faure & I William Zartman, with William Donohue**

**Introduction G.O. Faure & I William Zartman**

#### I Preventive Negotiations: Introduction: I.W. Zartman

- 1 Zartman & Maha Khan SAIS, 1, "Negotiation in the Life Cycle of Terrorists"
- 2 Robert Lambert, 2, U Exeter, "Terrorist Recruitment in London"
- 3 Deborah Goodwin, 1, Sandhurst, "Training for Engagement"
- 4 Carolin Görzig, 2, LSE, "Change through Debate: Gama'a Islamiya"

#### II Practical/Tactical: Introduction: G.O. Faure

- 5 Laurent Combalbert, 2, GEOS
- 6 Alex Schmid, 1, St Andrews, "Kidnapping & Hostage Negotiations"
- 7 Adam Dolnik, 1, U of Wollongong, "Beslan and beyond"
- 8 Victor Kremenyuk, 1, Iskan, Russian Acad., "Visible and Hidden Agendas"
- 9 P Sahadevan, 1, Jawaharlal Nehru, "The Grand Swap—Khandegar"



#### III Strategic/Political: Introduction: I.W. Zartman

- 10 William Donohue, 2, MSU, "Negotiation in the Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations"
- 11 Camille Pecastaing, 2, SAIS-JHU, "Reaching the Terrorist"
- 12 Kristine Höglund, 1, Uppsala, "Tactics in Negotiations with Terrorists"
- 13 Karen Feste, 1, Denver, "The Lebanese Experience"
- 14 Stacie Pettyjohn, 2, "Making Policy toward Terrorist Organizations"

#### IV Conclusions

- 15 Faure & Zartman, "Lessons for Practice (UN-MSU Handbook)"
- 16 Zartman & Faure, "Lessons for Theory?"

## Further Reading



## Members of the PIN Steering Committee



Mark Anstey



Rudolf Avenhaus



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Guy Olivier Faure



Victor Kremenyuk



Ariel Macaspac Penetrante



Paul Meerts



Gunnar Sjöstedt



I. William Zartman



BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

NUCLEAR WASTE

## NEW PIN BOOK TO BE PUBLISHED BY SPRINGER EARLY 2009

NEGOTIATED RISKS  
INTERNATIONAL TALKS ON HAZARDOUS ISSUES

A new book, edited by Rudolf Avenhaus and Gunnar Sjöstedt of IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Group, is to be published shortly by Springer. The book, *Negotiated Risks: International Talks on Hazardous Issues* fills a major gap in risk literature, as it brings together two research strands: risks, to which IIASA's research programs have contributed significantly over the years, culminating in the establishment of the Risk and Vulnerability Program; and international negotiations, on which there is an abundance of published work, much of it resulting from the PIN Group's work.

Throughout the book, it is pointed out that there are actor-driven risks, namely, those posed by international negotiations themselves, and issue-driven risks which are caused by large-scale human activities. In fact, *Negotiated Risks* deals with some of the most serious risks facing humanity: climate change, nuclear activities, and weapons of mass destruction.

The volume contains both scientific analyses on the nature of internationally negotiated risks and analyses of concrete risks, both of which are of immense practical relevance in the larger context of international negotiations.

**Keep an eye on the IIASA Web site for more details as they become available.**

TRUST

ENTRAPMENT

JOINT VENTURES

COLD WAR

CLIMATE CHANGE

PERFECT THEORY

TALK

INCURABLE RISKS

PREVENTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

$p = 1 \cdot p + 0 \cdot (1 - p) = p$