

PIN • *Points*

The Processes of International Negotiation Program

Network Newsletter 29/2007



**LOOKING
EASTWARD**

Diplomacy between East and West • Nash's Bargaining Solution • Caspilog II Conference • YSSP 2007 • Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia



International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
www.iiasa.ac.at

From the PIN Steering Committee

Looking Eastward



Photo: Ajay Kt Singh (<http://www.sxc.hu/photo/876936>)

The Gate of India, New Delhi. PIN is planning a Roadshow in the Indian capital in 2008. Built in the memory of more than 90,000 Indian soldiers who lost their lives during the Afghan Wars and World War I, the India Gate is one of the most famous monuments in Delhi.

Last year India and Pakistan joined the community of states that support IIASA through their National Member Organizations—which China did five years ago. Our Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program is living up to these new challenges, as documented in the previous, the present, and probably the next PINPoints issue.

This year in February PIN Steering Committee (SC) members visited the Forman Christian College at Lahore, Pakistan. A Roadshow was organized, and discussions of aspects of international negotiations and their analyses were held with government representatives, professors, and students; we reported on this Asian enterprise in the previous PINPoints issue 28.

Last year PIN Steering Committee members, together with IIASA scientists, organized in Istanbul, Turkey, the first Caspian Dialog (Caspilog I) session among representatives of the five littoral States of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan. This new

challenge for PIN was mastered successfully. Thus, in May 2007 Caspilog II, the second round of discussions of representatives of the Caspian Sea littoral states took place, this time in Baku, Azerbaijan. It was moderated again by PIN SC members, and they were supported again by IIASA scientists who presented their research on problems of the Caspian Basin. A report about this second European–Asian enterprise is given in this PINPoints issue.

After having presented their Roadshow at Beida University in Beijing in October 2000, a description of which can be found in PINPoints 15/2000, PIN SC members visited China a second time this year in October, following an invitation by the Johns Hopkins University in Nanjing. Just to complete the picture, a visit to Delhi, India, is envisaged for November 2008. Indeed, PIN is currently looking eastward, also trying, needless to say, to address the problems of this part of the world in its genuine scientific work.

Of course, dialog with scientists working in the area of international negotiations

and communication with university students is the most important objective of these enterprises. There is, however, also an objective of disseminating knowledge about IIASA and beyond, what has recently been called “Science Diplomacy” by *Science*, the Journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).

In particular, for the participants of IIASA’s 35th Anniversary celebration in Vienna in November, who will find this PINPoints issue among their conference papers, let us repeat what has been quoted already in the last one: “Fortunately, science and diplomacy are present at IIASA, and are working together, promising a new era of Science Diplomacy” (but, AAAS concludes, we need the commitment of the science community behind it).

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Diplomacy between East and West

The changing character of international negotiations

The period immediately following World War II was characterized by the establishment of the United Nations as an overarching organization mandated to preserve international peace and security. After the horrors of the war the vision of a world in which all people and nations could live in peace was generally shared. Interestingly enough, the creation of a truly global multilateral system went hand in hand with the development of a bipolar relationship in international affairs. The antagonism between the so-called Free World led by the United States and the Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union soon after the defeat of the Third Reich became the salient feature of the international system. The rivalries of the two superpowers were such that at times the Cold War escalated to extremely dangerous levels, leading to situations that could have caused a nuclear catastrophe. Reference can be made in this connection to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (see p. 7).




Photo: NATO

The fall of the Berlin Wall, 1 November 1989, with the Brandenburg Gate in the background. The end of the Cold War suddenly eliminated the East–West context as a dominant feature of world affairs.



Photo: US National Archives and Records Administration

On 4 February 1945 the Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) convened at Yalta, on the Crimean Peninsula. The Soviets agreed to join the United Nations on the basis of a veto power being granted for permanent members of the Security Council, thus ensuring that each country could block unwanted decisions.

The international system that developed after 1945 was thus dominated by the bipolar relationship of the two superpowers. These two opposing power centers also competed on the ideological front, Moscow attempting to export the Communist system, while Washington sought to defend the values of freedom and democracy. The tensions between East and West permeated all spheres of political life. The bipolar system in which the two worlds confronted each other determined the conduct of international affairs until the collapse of Communism and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The multilateral process of negotiations within the framework of the United Nations could not escape this dichotomy. The instituting of the veto power in the United Nations Security Council, the details of which were agreed upon at the Yalta conference in 1945, is in itself a recognition of the dominant role that the United States and the Soviet Union would play, together with the other states holding the power of veto, whenever the maintenance of peace and international security was at stake. Because of the split of the political world into two opposing camps, multilateral negotiations were often conducted in the shadow of the



Photo: NASA/Scott Andrews

Space cooperation. American astronaut Edward T. Lu, NASA science officer, and Russian flight engineer for Expedition Seven, and Cosmonaut Yuri I. Malenchenko, commander, were launched onboard a Soyuz rocket from Baikonur, Kazakhstan on 26 April 2003.

bilateral relationship between the two superpowers which traversed periods of heightened tensions as well as moments of détente.

One body within the United Nations system epitomized the ups and downs of complicated East–West diplomacy—the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which, over the years, has been like a barometer in the way it indicates changes in the political weather. Irrespective of its multilateral character, COPUOS with a membership of over 50 states representing all regions of the world was under the controlling influence of the two superpowers. They had not only the most advanced space technology, which allowed them to monopolize space exploration and exploitation for many years, but also the clout to set the agenda and dominate the debates within COPUOS. The decision making was ruled by consensus which meant in practice that not even the slightest amount of progress could be made without the express consent of both superpowers. Astonishingly enough, COPUOS turned out to be a very successful body. Within its framework no fewer than five international conventions were elaborated, for example, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. In addition, a series of guidelines were adopted by COPUOS by consensus. The negotiation process in COPUOS has advanced on the unwritten understanding that progress on a particular issue could be reached whenever the United

States and the Soviet Union were ready to look for an agreement. The other members of COPUOS generally ended up accepting the solution reached by the two superpowers. The question has arisen as to how it has been possible to have this island of cooperation in the field of outer space, while in most other domains the relationship between the United States and Russia has been characterized by tensions and conflict. One of the explanations for the amazing success of COPUOS is that, in spite of the conflictual nature of their relationship, the two world powers have always wished to maintain a residual area where they could deal with each other in a cooperative spirit. Outer space belongs to those areas where both the United States and Russia have exercised a quasi monopoly for decades and where they have been able to identify a common interest.

The creation of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is another good example of diplomacy between East and West. It is to the credit of the former chancellor of Austria Bruno Kreisky that, at the beginning of the 1970s, when there was a low ebb in East–West relations, he promoted the idea of scientific cooperation among leading academics from the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, thereby establishing an institutionalized channel of dialog and cooperation among scientists representing the two opposing political camps. The discipline of “applied systems analysis” appeared to be so abstract and inoffensive that it lent itself particularly well to a very innovative program of East–West cooperation. The positive side effect for Austria was clearly the decision to establish the headquarters of IIASA at Laxenburg near Vienna, thus strengthening the role of Austria as a bridge between East and West.

A third area exemplifies the bilateral nature of key areas in international relations before the wind of change toppled the architecture of the bipolar world. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments (e.g., SALT I and SALT II) clearly show the decisive role of the United States and Russia in setting the rules for nuclear disarmament, a matter of the greatest importance on which the very survival of mankind depended.

The end of the Cold War suddenly eliminated the East–West context as a dominant feature of world affairs. However, while the collapse of the Soviet empire removed the danger of a major military confrontation between Russia and “the West,” new security risks emerged, as the world could no longer be explained in the simple terms of the previous bipolar superpower relationship.




Photo: NATO

NATO member states and Russia regularly consult on current security issues and are developing practical cooperation in a wide range of areas of common interest. Here President Putin of Russia and Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, address the press.

Political analysts have described the new situation as a multipolar world in which new power centers (e.g., China and India) asserted themselves. At the same time they observed with great concern the complexities of the new "asymmetric" security threats like international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the destructive forces of political and religious extremism. In addition to these threats the world is faced with the likelihood of the dramatic consequences expected from ongoing climate change.

Obviously, the changing international environment constitutes an enormous challenge for the political leadership of all nations. At a time when the contours of a new diplomacy which would fully take account of the current realities are still difficult to determine, some trends do, however, appear visible. In Europe the phenomenon of economic and political integration continues to make headway within the framework of the European Union. At the global level the idea of an "efficient multilateralism" seems to have replaced the concept, now demised, of a bipolar world system. A third development is the growing influence of non-state actors in international affairs. In the economic area the market economy appears to win over all regions of the world.

Whereas in the previous world order the contrast between capitalism and a planned state economy clearly had an ideological fundament, the end of Communism and its failure as a successful economic system also terminated the confrontation of two opposite socio-economic regimes.

What influence will these changes exert on international negotiations? Generally speaking, one may conclude that the focus of attention has shifted away from an exclusive East–West context to the more complex realities of a world in which more than two power centers can be identified. Regional groupings (European Union, G8 group) have become more powerful institutions in which the international agenda is discussed.

As the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century call for truly global cooperation and can no longer be dealt with in the outdated East–West scheme the awareness is growing that new approaches to the negotiation process itself are needed to make international negotiations more responsive to the current international environment.

Franz Cede

CONFERENCE ON RISK AND NEGOTIATION

Research and applications
13–15 November 2007, Paris.

An international conference is being organized in Paris from 13 to 15 November 2007 by the French PIN and NEGOCIA, a French business school belonging to the Paris Chamber of Commerce. It is supported by well-known journals such as *International Negotiation*, *Group Decision and Negotiation*, *La revue Négociations*, *PINPoints*, and *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*.

Drawing from various fields such as business, diplomacy, social, intercultural, environmental, the theme of risk will be explored in different ways, such as:

- How diplomats deal with high-risks situations
- Back channel negotiations; hidden diplomacy
- Risk assessment in negotiating
- Mediation effectiveness: neutral and biased interventions
- Mediation and international peace making
- Is risk a culture-free component of negotiation?
- How emotions and risk relate
- Power asymmetry and risk
- Negotiating with identity at risk
- Risk perception in environmental issues
- Is negotiation war by other means?
- Negotiating on highly risky situations
- Dealing with terrorists

The focus of the conference will be on research and its applications. It will take into account the risks implied in negotiation, whether they be "external" (the consequence of an unstable environment) or "internal" (reflecting on the participants and their behavior). What is the role of risk in negotiation strategies, and to what extent should it be taken into account?

One of the objectives of this Biennale is to promote an exchange of ideas between researchers and professionals in order to encourage a dialog between specialists in



theory and those skilled in practical applications. Hence the first day will be devoted to research and the second day will examine the results of theory in practice.

There will be many different ways of exchanging ideas: plenary conferences, workshop debates, symposiums, round-table exchanges, and a diversity of opportunities to meet other participants. In all, there will be around 40 hours of exchanges, over 250 participants, more than 65 presentations, and over 20 countries represented.

A large variety of resource materials will be available. There will be a number of information stands, a section devoted to film presentations and role-plays, an exhibition of posters, and extensive simultaneous translation facilities.

The conference will be held in English and French with simultaneous interpretation in the main auditorium.

Useful information can be obtained and registration made at the following website: <http://www.negocia-evenementiel.com>

Guy Olivier Faure



Nash's Bargaining Solution

In the game-theoretic literature Nash's bargaining solution has played and plays a very important role: its assumptions have been analyzed carefully; some of them have been replaced by others; and the concept has been generalized to more than two players. In contrast, to date there have been surprisingly few applications, even in the field of international relations. It is the purpose of this contribution to explain the solution, to apply it to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and to invite readers to use the solution for their study of those international conflicts which fit into the scheme provided by Nash. However, we first present an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the help of a *non-cooperative approach* which follows Brams (1985 and 1990).

Probably the most dangerous confrontation between major powers ever to occur was that between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962. This confrontation, in what has come to be known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, was precipitated by a Soviet attempt to install in Cuba medium-range and intermediate-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of hitting a large area of the United States.

After the presence of such missiles was confirmed on 14 October, the United States Central Intelligence Agency estimated that they would be operational in about ten days. A so-called Executive Committee of high-level officials was convened to decide on a course of action for the United States, and the Committee met in secret for six days. Several alternatives were considered, which were eventually narrowed down to the two that will be discussed here.

The most common conception of this crisis is that the two superpowers were on a collision course. The game of chicken, which derives its name from a kind of mad sport in which two drivers race toward each other on a narrow road, would at first sight seem an appropriate model of this conflict. Under this interpretation, each player has the choice between swerving and avoiding a head-on

		SU	
		Withdrawal	Maintenance
US	With- drawal	3	* 4
	Main- tenance	* 2	1

Figure 1. Graphical representation of the normal form game describing the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. US: United States. SU: Soviet Union.

collision or continuing on the collision course. As applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the United States and the Soviet Union, the two players, the alternative courses of action, and a ranking of the players' outcomes in terms of the game of chicken are shown in Figure 1. It is a non-cooperative 2 2, two- person game in normal form.

The goal of the United States was immediate removal of the Soviet missiles, and United States policymakers seriously considered two alternative courses of action to achieve this end. First, a naval blockade, or quarantine as it was euphemistically called, to prevent shipment of further missiles, possibly followed by stronger action to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw those missiles already installed. Second, a surgical strike to wipe out the missiles already installed, followed perhaps—insofar as this would be possible—by an invasion of the island. The choices open to Soviet policymakers were withdrawal of their missiles or maintaining their missiles in situ.

Needless to say, the strategy choices and probable outcomes as presented in Figure 1 provide only a skeletal picture of the crisis as it developed over a period of 13 days. Both sides considered more than the two alternatives listed above, as well as several variations on each. The Soviets, for example, demanded withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey as a quid pro quo for withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba, a demand publicly ignored by the United States. Furthermore, there is no way to verify that the outcomes given in Figure 1 were probable, or valued in a manner consistent with the game of chicken. For example, if the Soviet Union had viewed an air strike on their missiles as jeopardizing their vital national interests, the crisis may well have ended in nuclear war between the two sides. Still another simplification relates to the assumption that the players chose their actions simultaneously, when in fact a continuous exchange in both words and deeds occurred over those fateful days in October 1962.



Photo: United Nations

Exhibits of photographs and maps set up on two easels at the back of the UN Security Council Chamber. The display was set up by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson (second from right, at table) of the United States, which he said showed installations of ballistic missile sites in Cuba.

Nevertheless, most observers of this crisis believe the two superpowers were on a



Photo: United Nations

NASA image shows close proximity of Cuba to mainland USA (Florida).

collision course. They also agree that neither side was eager to take any irreversible step, such as the driver in a game of chicken might do by defiantly ripping off his steering wheel in full view of his adversary, thereby preempting his alternative of swerving.

The game given in *Figure 1* has two Nash equilibria¹ in pure strategies (Nash 1953), as can be seen immediately by use of the method of preference directions. In fact there is a third equilibrium in so-called mixed strategies which is not given here. This is the lesson to be learned from this model: because of the existence of several equilibria, each of which was very bad for at least one of the players, the situation was very dangerous.

Although in one sense the United States won by getting the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, Premier Khrushchev at the same time extracted from President Kennedy a promise not to invade Cuba, which seems to indicate that the eventual outcome was a compro-

1 A Nash equilibrium strategy of a non-cooperative game—the other great contribution of the Nobel laureate to game theory, not to be confused with his bargaining solution! —is a pair of strategies with the property that any unilateral deviation from that strategy does not improve the deviator's payoff.

mise solution of sorts. These results render it plausible to describe the outcome of the crisis in terms of a *Nash bargaining solution* (Nash 1950) which, surprisingly enough, to our best knowledge has never been discussed in the literature.

In order to discuss Nash's concept, we present first the area of expected payoffs to both players, with the United States as player 1 and Soviet Union as player 2 (see *Figure 2*).

According to *Figure 1*, if the United States choose its first strategy with probability p and its second with $1-p$, while the Soviet Union chooses its first strategy with probability q and its second with $1-q$, the expected outcomes are

$$I_1 = p(3q + 2(1-q)) + (1-p)(4q + 1-q)$$

$$I_2 = q(3p + 2(1-p)) + (1-q)(4p + 1-p).$$

If we now take all possible pairs (p, q) , with values of p and q between zero and one, we get the shaded area in *Figure 2*, which represents the area of expected payoff pairs (I_1, I_2) to both players. For the sake of illustration, the pairs of payoffs for the four combinations of pure strategies are explicitly marked. Of special importance is the upper right border of the area: along this border, which is called the Pareto frontier, none of the two players can improve his expected payoff without decreasing that of the other one.

Now let us describe Nash's concept. He assumes that both sides do talk to each other—which means that we now enter the domain of *cooperative game theory*—and agree on the following six principles on a negotiated outcome of the bargain.

- N1. Both players get at least as much as they got if they did not talk to each other.
- N2. The outcomes are feasible (i.e., they can in fact be obtained under the circumstances given).
- N3. The outcomes fall on the Pareto frontier
- N4. If the solution lies in a subset of the area of possible solutions, then it is also a solution in the original set of possible solutions (independence of irrelevant alternatives).
- N5. The solution is independent of positive linear transformations of the payoffs.
- N6. If the area of possible outcomes is symmetric, then the solution is symmetric.




Figure 2. Area of expected payoffs to the United States (I_1) and to the Soviet Union (I_2). $(2,2)$ are the guaranteed payoffs, $(3,3)$ is the Nash bargaining solution.




Photo: The National Security Archive, George Washington University

Graphic from Military History Quarterly of the US invasion plan of Cuba, 1962.

Given these six assumptions, Nash showed that the bargaining solution is determined by maximizing the product of the two players' expected payoffs minus their guaranteed ones (i.e., those payoffs that the players obtained if they did not cooperate).

Now let us come back to our case. As the area of possible expected payoffs as given by Figure 2 is convex, it will not be enlarged by the possibility of cooperation. It should be mentioned in passing that this is a special case; in other cases like the famous *Battle of the Sexes* (see e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1954) this is not the case for the non-cooperative game, and the first step of the cooperation is to consider an extension of the area of expected payoffs such that it becomes a convex set. As can be seen immediately by looking at Figure 1, the guaranteed payoff to both players should they not cooperate, is two. Therefore, we have to look for the maximum of the product $(I_1 - 2)(I_2 - 2)$ on the Pareto frontier. The result is, as can again be seen easily, the payoff three to both players, and this is just the pair (blockade, withdrawal) of pure strategies of the non-cooperative game, which is not an equilibrium of that game.

To sum up, at the beginning of the crisis the situation may, in a very simple way, be described as a chicken-type model, which illustrates the danger that the world experienced during those days. Later on, however, the two statesmen talked to each other: In responding to a letter from Kruchchev, Kennedy wrote: "if you would agree to remove

these weapons systems from Cuba...we, on our part, would agree ... (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." Thus, an application of Nash's bargaining concept seems to describe the situation at a later stage of the crisis, of course in a very simplified way, quite well.

Let us conclude by repeating our invitation: international conflicts that look at first sight irreconcilable are frequently described in terms of some non-cooperative approach. They should, however, be studied with the help of Nash's bargaining solution or some of its modifications and generalizations as, contrary to the assumption of the non-cooperative theory, parties in those conflicts are expected to negotiate with each other.

Rudolf Avenhaus

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Photo: The National Security Archive, George Washington University

29 October 1962: Low-level photography reveals Soviet removal of missile erectors and transporters at San Cristobal, Cuba.

A Brief History of PIN

The Processes of International Negotiation wish IIASA a happy 35th anniversary and a successful Conference at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna on 14–15 November 2007.

With the waning of the Cold War era, the opportunity arose to both develop and apply better knowledge about negotiation. This challenge was particularly appropriate for IIASA, an organization created to foster scientific cooperation.

IIASA's first director, Howard Raiffa, believed that international negotiations should be a major element of IIASA's research agenda. He saw the importance of negotiation in seeking solutions to international disputes and the possibility that IIASA, a multicultural and multidisciplinary institution bringing together East and West, could play a role in leveling differences in the negotiating styles and habits of major negotiating partners in international relations.

Raiffa's interest in international negotiation was shared by others, and in early 1980, IIASA's National Member Organizations (NMOs), including those of the United States and the Soviet Union, agreed that a project for analyzing the patterns and systems of negotiation should be established. After several years of drafting proposals and seeking funds (which at that time came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York), the PIN Project was born.

The new PIN Project began with a conference organized to take stock of the scope of issues falling within the framework of negotiation analysis and the audience for

such research. A major international conference was held in 1987 that attracted participants from the diplomatic, academic, and business communities. The results of the conference, presented in *Processes of International Negotiation*, the first publication of the PIN Project, revealed a vast space relevant for research both at IIASA and beyond. The following year, a Steering Committee was appointed to run the PIN Project.

The flagship publication of the PIN Network, *International Negotiation: Approaches, Analysis, Issues*, a thematic state-of-the-art presentation of international negotiation, was the result of a second conference organized in 1989. The volume has frequently been adopted as a textbook, and its revised second edition was awarded a prize by a major dispute settlement organization in 2002.

Working from its initial publications, PIN's research strategy has been to organize international teams to examine and build on the latest research on topics chosen by the Steering Committee, which meets three times a year and serves as a headquarters for negotiation research, planning new research activities and administering ongoing projects. Around this core are the members of the international working groups engaged in the individual research projects.


In addition to its planning responsibilities and its role coordinating research, the Steering Committee also serves as a liaison between IIASA and the wide audience of people engaged in negotiation research all over the world. One of its activities is to organize "Road Shows"—one-day conferences on negotiation which serve to encourage interest in negotiation research, stimulate the formation of PIN networks and the involvement of individuals in PIN workshops, and promote an interest in IIASA among new constituencies.



Other circles of activity are the national PIN groups in a number of countries, including France, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands, among others, and the nearly 3,500 recipients of the newsletter PINPoints, published twice a year to report on PIN activities, including new publications and new ideas and applications related to negotiation research. PINPoints also brings IIASA to the attention of different audiences abroad.



Howard Raiffa, IIASA's first Director, who encouraged setting up the PIN network.



CaspiLog II Conference: Establishing Dialog among the Caspian Countries



Group photo of delegates at CaspiLog II

From 7–9 May inclusive, IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Network brought together over 40 academics, policymakers, and NGO representatives from the Caspian Sea area and around the world to discuss issues facing the Caspian Sea/Lake.

The CaspiLog II Conference comprised academic and country-specific presentations, as well as moderated discussions, that generated dialog on issues of common concern, such as water management, maritime emergency management, fisheries, and energy transport in the Caspian. Through the CaspiLog series of conferences, PIN hopes to help the Caspian countries build cooperative relationships, develop regional forums for resolving conflicts peacefully, and bring all of the relevant stakeholders into the debate.

The CaspiLog II Conference was hosted by PIN together with the Caspian Partnership for the Future Public Union (CPF) and the Association for Civil Society Development in Azerbaijan (ACSDA). Its aim was to focus on these issues of common concern as a way of setting aside the "hot-button" legal issues surrounding the Caspian Sea/Lake and to begin building a platform for future forms of cooperation. In these areas of focus, scientists from IIASA and other organizations provided rigorous and

dispassionate analysis, while government and non-government representatives from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia, presented and explained the economic and political implications of their countries' policies.

Regarding water management, expert participants from the five littoral states and other countries discussed issues such as the sources of water pollution in the Caspian Basin, the causes of the Sea/Lake's rapidly rising water level, and the impact of climate change. Water management is-

issues were a central concern and primary motivator for the participants to attend CaspiLog II— from the threat of oil spills in the northern Caspian or the anomalous algae bloom (AAB) that covers 400 sq. km in its southern waters. While presentations by IIASA expert Dr. David Wiberg and Dr. Hamid Ghaffarzadeh of the Caspian Environmental Program of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped participants establish a common scientific understanding, it was clear that the political orientation of the participants hindered their ability to arrive at a scientific consensus on water management issues. That said, the CaspiLog II participants were quite diligent in identifying the political and economic obstacles to effective water management and offered one another advice on dealing with these challenges.

In terms of sustainable fishing, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia all expressed deep concern at the threat that overfishing and caviar collection pose to the Caspian's six species of sturgeon. While it is well known that Caspian sturgeon populations have plummeted to 80–90 percent of their original levels, IIASA analyst Rebecca Whitlock also demonstrated to CaspiLog II participants that overfishing also potentially has severe evolutionary implications for sturgeon, including decreased size of sturgeon at maturity, lower average ages, lower average ages for spawning individuals, a change



PIN Steering Committee Members during the talks, which were broadcast on regional television.



After the Dialog, delegates had a chance to mix informally.



in the sex ratio, and a scarcity of breeding females. The participants also recognized that current bans and fishing quotas have proved to be sorely inadequate and that illegal poaching is 7–11 times higher than the legally permitted catch. The CaspiLog II participants identified the black market for sturgeon and caviar, a lack of alternative economic opportunities for fishermen, and high levels of corruption as major factors preventing an effective response to this ongoing crisis.

Another issue addressed at the CaspiLog II conference was maritime emergency management. Currently, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, despite their status as signatories to the Search and Rescue Convention, do little to cooperate with each other on maritime emergency management. David Griffiths of the International Centre for Emergency Management Studies at Cape Breton University, Canada, presented convincing examples of how emergency management cooperation between India and Pakistan and between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries had served as a way of reducing conflict, addressing national interests, and delivering on humanitarian goals. After Mr. Griffiths's presentation, the

CaspiLog II representatives from Azerbaijan expressed interest in hosting a Caspian maritime emergency management meeting as a way of bringing professionals from the five littoral states together in dialog.

The CaspiLog II Conference's unique combination of governmental/non-governmental, international/local, and systemic/granular approaches allowed all participants to come to a better understanding of the challenges facing the Caspian Sea/Lake and the opportunities for cooperation. As a direct result of these presentations and discussions, the participants in CaspiLog II expressed a renewed sense of urgency in wishing to address the complex issues of sturgeon population decline, water usage, and maritime disasters. Furthermore, by hosting the CaspiLog II in Baku-Novkhani,

PIN engaged a larger cross-section of Azerbaijani civil society and, hopefully, spurred a national dialog on these important issues. Going forward, the participants from the Caspian countries and IIASA are following up on a number of action items that will help them prepare for CaspiLog III and communicate their findings to government officials and the wider public.

For additional information on CaspiLog II, please see <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN/docs/caspilog-report-draft.pdf>.

Chris Wendell

Chris Wendell has an M.A. in Conflict Management from The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., USA.



Baku, Azerbaijan, hosted the Dialog.

YSSP 2007

Another successful YSSP Summer came to a close on 31 August 2007. Twenty-four women and 27 men were selected out of 182 completed applications.

The PIN program selected two students this year: Joshua Smilovitz from the USA and Maiko Sakamoto from Japan. As in previous years, PIN's wide range of research between social and natural sciences was reflected perfectly in its summer students. Both were asked to apply their research to two current PIN projects.

Joshua who graduated from Eugene Lang College at the New School University in New York City is specializing in the field of mediation. He received his M.A. in International Science and Diplomacy at Leiden University and Clingendael in the Netherlands. As PIN is currently planning a book project on internal/external conflicts, Josh has been asked to contribute a chapter on the topic of mediation from the psychological perspective. He agreed to do so, but also wanted to continue work on the perception of mediator emotions. Luckily, Josh had no problem fitting the two projects into his summer at Laxenburg, and fellow YSSPers as well as other IIASA staff were able to enjoy the success story of both of his tasks at the YSSP Late Summer Workshop at the end of August 2007. Among the audience



Maiko Sakamoto

sat journalist Stefan Löffler from the Austrian newspaper *Der Standard*. Löffler's article, published on 29 August, dedicated the concluding paragraph to Joshua and his project on mediator emotions.

Maiko holds a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering Systems from Kyoto University. Her main fields of interest include conflict analysis and management of water resources. It didn't take long for the PIN group to ask her to apply her research to the ongoing Caspian Dialog project. Maiko who had intentionally planned to work on game models in international river basins even-



Joshua Smilovitz

tually agreed to focus on the Caspian Sea area and developed a model evaluating the various possible payoffs of the five littoral Caspian states depending on various player constellations. PIN is planning to hold its third Caspian Dialog session in Kazakhstan and hopes to be able to bring Maiko's results to the discussion table.

For further information on IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) and eligibility criteria please visit <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/YSP/index.html>

Tanja Huber



Scenes from YSSP 2007. Bottom left: Tanja Huber, Coordinator of PIN and YSSP, and the YSSP Administrator Barbara Hauser, share a bottle of mineral water.

Modeling the Caspian

PIN YSSP participant, Maiko Sakamoto, spent summer 2007 researching the topic: “Coalition and Information Relationship in a Hierarchical System of Caspian Security.”

I came to IIASA as one of 51 participants in the 2007 Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP). I had intended to study game theoretical analysis with regard to the Nepal–India–Bangladesh dispute over the waters of the River Ganges, but the PIN Steering Committee suggested that I work on the problems relating to the Caspian Sea. Disputes over mineral resources, fishing, and access to international waters are ongoing concerns in the Caspian. However, PIN has initiated a dialog with and among the five littoral countries, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, to discuss matters of a non-contentious nature (see PINPoints 27/2006 on the CaspiLog Dialog). As I had been studying theoretical approaches to third-party conflict management—essentially, how a third party can improve a conflict situation—this study represented a good opportunity for me to develop my work.

Legal Problems

The Caspian problem is a very interesting case with specific physical features, a long history, and an extreme historical event in the form of the disintegration of the USSR. The five littoral countries have been discussing how to divide the Caspian, but neither lake law nor the law of the sea can be applied in this case because the Caspian does not technically satisfy the definition of either. The five littoral countries need to agree on some legal regulation: they need three agreements, one on surface water, one on the sub-seabed, and one on the seabed, but the countries have different stakes, depending on what sort of regulation may be involved.

Third-Party Approach

My problem has always been that, in a model, I can show an idealized third party who can successfully guide the conflicting parties



Oil is one of the most contentious issues underpinning talks among the Caspian littoral states. This photograph was taken by a PIN Group member on a visit to an Azerbaijan oilfield during CaspiLog II in Baku, May 2007.

to a better solution. Ask me, however, who that third party might be, and I’m usually at a loss; all I can say is that a third party is needed if the stakeholders really wish to improve the conflict situation. Here, therefore, was a good opportunity to observe the interaction process of model work and the real implementation of negotiation with third-party involvement—the PIN Steering Committee being my idealized third party.

Hierarchy and Asymmetry

The most fundamental issue of the Caspian problem is negotiation of the security issue.

My work aimed to clarify at an early stage the structure of the issues and to specify the process of decision-making regulating the final outcome—perhaps even a bad outcome for all parties would be indicated. The problem is modeled in a non-cooperative game theoretical way, where hierarchical structures and asymmetric information are considered at the same time. Those two components contribute greatly to the path dependency of the decision-making process.

In the Caspian problem, just as in other conflicts, the littoral countries are in an obviously hierarchical system. Compare the Ganges situation, for example, where the hierarchy is a natural one, with Nepal is situated upstream, India in the middle, and Bangladesh downstream. Moreover, although asymmetric information is well studied in the context of game theory, there is no real focus on power structure because once we assume the power structure in a conflict, the equilibrium seems to be obvious.

Based on this framing of the situation, the analysis I carried out shows the various possible outcomes evolving as equilibria of a non-cooperative game model. It is gratifying that this research could be a future component of the interaction process between PIN and the Caspian Sea states and among the states themselves.

Research Freedom

Professor Gunnar Sjöstedt and Professor Rudolf Avenhaus the PIN group’s water/ environment and game theory specialists, respectively, supervised my work. They were not on site at IIASA, and this may be a disadvantage for PIN YSSPers as my colleagues in other programs had the opportunity to discuss their research with their supervisors over and over again. On the other hand, PIN YSSPers have more freedom to study and are given the chance to work on topics that are very relevant to the core activities of the PIN Program, for example, participation in the CaspiLog project and contribution to an upcoming PIN book project.

SAGE Handbook

In June, the PIN Steering Committee held a workshop to edit the SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution which I attended. I was impressed by the way the participants (more than 50 re-



Maiko Sakamoto (left) enjoys an evening out with other YSSPers at a local Heuriger. Pictured with her is Naomi Aoki who researched Aging and Vulnerability in Cambodia with the World Population Program.

searchers from all over the world) managed to fulfill this multidisciplinary work. Sometimes the requirement for multidisciplinary work in the field of applied science receives a superficial mention, but at this workshop the participants were conducting multidisciplinary work quite easily and naturally.

Research Attitudes

I was also very impressed by the attitude of the PIN Steering Committee members toward research. Their approach is empirical, taking things one by one. They would suddenly ask me a quite fundamental question which I could not easily answer. I respect this way of doing research, and it gave me the impression not so much that I was being supervised but that I was carrying out research alongside them.

The summer of 2007 was greatly meaningful for me. I appreciate the YSSP staff and other IIASA staff who gave me the opportunity to be here, to manage my environment, and to keep up my morale. Other young and talented YSSPers also contributed a great deal to my stay, in particular, helping to motivate me to work hard and also enjoy the daily life during the summer.

Maiko Sakamoto

Maiko received her Ph.D. in Civil Engineering Systems from Kyoto University, Japan in 2005. She is currently working at the Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University as an assistant professor. Her Ph.D. thesis is on conflict management in water resources development. Her main fields of scientific interest include conflict analysis and management on water resources.

Researching Mediation

As an interdisciplinary research institute focused on issues related to the environment, economy, technology, and society, IIASA is at the forefront of much scientific discovery. This summer I took part in YSSP and worked with the institute's Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program. YSSP is an incredible opportunity to interact with a variety of scientists across multiple fields that encompass a wide range of cultures. PIN's efforts exemplify the cross-cutting and innovative work conducted at IIASA—work that involves a diverse set of issues and topics related to the study and practice of international negotiation.

Using the knowledge and expertise available to me this summer I completed two research papers, both of a multidisciplinary nature. First, I examined how disputants to international mediation perceive and understand mediator emotions, and second, I looked at how mediation can successfully resolve internal identity-based conflicts.

In most studies of international mediation the focus is on the tangible or political characteristics of the conflict and overlooks the emotional or psychological aspects. This research attempts, in part, to fill that void by answering some crucial questions. How important is a disputant's perception of mediator emotions to the process of international mediation? Which are more prevalent, positive or negative mediator emotions? What is the relative significance of mediator body language or verbal displays of emotion?

For this study, twelve specific emotions were examined, six negative (fear, anger, sadness, disgust, worry, and irritation) and six positive (hopeful, content, happy, excited, relieved, and thrilled). Using a primarily quantitative questionnaire, 12 negotiators, ambassadors, and diplomats with extensive mediation experience were interviewed, including former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and US Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky.

The results of this research indicate that a mediator's emotions are observed by disputants and play a significant role in a disputant's understanding of mediator behavior. For positive and negative emotions, the results were conclusive, with certain types of emotions (hope, content, happy, irritation, and worry) more prevalent and typical



Photo: United Nations



Photo: China Daily

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and US Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky were among those interviewed for this study.

than others. Body language and verbal displays of emotion were both determined to have a similarly noteworthy impact on disputant perception. This work blended the literature surrounding international mediation, political science, and psychology. The study of emotions within the framework of international mediation is important and, in my opinion, merits further study.

The second paper was of a more theoretical bent and sought to answer the critical question, What is required to successfully mediate internal identity based conflicts? Identity-based conflicts are intractable and difficult to solve as they involve many social, ethnic, and religious features. As a socially constructed idea, identity has many layers

and meanings for the individual or group. Identity informs a person who he or she is, informs others who that person is, and informs an individual who other people are (Hopf 1998). One result of identity is the distinction between us and them, which can result in an in-group preference and out-group bias.

I examined three primary theoretical methods of studying international mediation: the structuralist, the social-psychological, and the contingency approaches. While all of these theoretical approaches provide useful insights into the mediation of internal identity-based conflicts, none of them efficiently explain the requirements and necessities for an effective approach to this type of mediation effort.

One distinct feature of identity-related conflict is the interrelation between tangible and intangible issues. It is incumbent on the mediator to correctly identify how various intangible identity-related aspects of the conflict influence disputant reaction and perception of certain tangible elements. Within any mediation effort a range of tangible and intangible issues are at play. From a strictly substantive perspective, tangible issues such as land or resources can be divided and parceled out between disputants. But, certain tangible issues, like territory, can take on intangible features, for instance, when land is sacred to a particular ethnic or religious group. This interrelation between the tangible and intangible, with one set bleeding into the next, requires the mediator to navigate a tricky course.

I have developed a conceptual model that explains the requirements for successful mediation of internal identity-based conflicts. The first stage involves the selection of a particular individual to mediate the dispute. It is crucial that the mediator be acceptable to both sides of the conflict, whether the mediator is viewed as partial or neutral. The second stage involves the mediator's assessment of the actual substantive concerns of the parties. The mediator must recognize in which way the unique, key, and relevant tangible and intangible issues are contributing to the conflict and how they relate to identity. The third stage involves identifying who will be involved in the mediation process. As much as possible, the mediator must help to ensure that constructive participants and actors represent all sides. The fourth stage is the meat of the mediation effort, where the media-



Photo: United Nations



Photo: United Nations

The presidents of Qatar and the USA address the Security Council Meeting on Africa. Body language and verbal displays of emotion were both determined in Smilovitz's study to have a noteworthy impact on the perception of negotiators.

tor must decide how to actually engage the parties. The mediator must choose contextually appropriate strategies, methods, and tactics to make sure that the relevant tangible and intangible issues are dealt with concurrently or separately, as determined by the mediator. Last, once an agreement is reached, the mediator or some other third party must verify that each side is fulfilling their agreements, and if necessary, provide some sort of enforcement of the agreed-upon resolution. Identity conflicts are some of the most difficult conflicts to resolve. Mediation is a useful and effective method of settling this type of conflict.

Each of us negotiates on a daily basis. Scientists must be able to utilize the tools of negotiation to foster change and dialog between and within key decision makers and the general population. By conducting research on the theory and application of

negotiation and developing networks of interested scholars and practitioners, PIN is fostering the study of this crucially important and all-encompassing field.

On many levels, my time at IIASA has been a most exciting and productive experience. YSSP allowed me to explore, develop and investigate two aspects of international mediation that are often overlooked. I had the chance to interact with some of the world's leading scientists from a variety of backgrounds in an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural environment that encouraged the sharing and exploration of scientific knowledge

Joshua Smilovitz

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Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Obstacles to and options for an inclusive approach to security

Northeast Asia faces multiple serious security issues that could not only destabilize the region itself, but also cause global destabilization. As Chung-In Moon—the former chairman of the South Korean Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity—correctly notes, the security issues are of such a nature that “not a single country in the region can escape from the latent security dilemma” [6: 6]. Yet, for the security cooperation to be effective, not only the littoral states—China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, and South Korea (and perhaps in the distant future, Taiwan)—but also the United States (USA) need to be included in any negotiation process. As has been aptly phrased by the president of South Korea, Moo-Hyun Roh, the USA has “historically had wide-ranging interests in Northeast Asia and a strong feeling of attachment to the region” (2007: 13). Forward military deployment of United States army personnel and equipment in Japan and South Korea naturally only further increase US security interests in the region.

The bloody history of the region and the vast economic interdependence of its countries eliminate warfare as a viable tool for conflict resolution, leaving negotiation processes as an obvious alternative. What, therefore, are the obstacles to and options for negotiation as a tool in managing Northeast Asian common security concerns?

Security Threats in the Northeast Asian region

The most immediate security threat in and to the region is posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program, epitomized by its ballistic missile test on 5 July 2006 and subsequent nuclear test on 9 October of the same year. The various United Nations Security Council resolutions on the issue explicitly show the international consensus that North Korea cannot be (fully) integrated into international society as long as it pursues its nuclear program [3: 49]. Hence, North Korea can only come out of the quagmire as a winner if it gives up its nuclear program and allows IAEA inspections, while accepting economic aid and (economic and political) integra-

tion in return—the North Korean regime is heavily dependent on these for survival. Quite promisingly, recent bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States have resulted in an assurance from North Korea that it will close all its nuclear facilities by the end of 2007 in exchange for “political and economic measures for compensation, delisting the DPRK as a terrorism sponsor, and lifting all sanctions that have been applied according to the Trading with the Enemy Act.” Details of the agreement are to be worked out in the Six-Party Talks, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

A second security issue closely related to the North Korean nuclear quagmire concerns the absence of a Korean peace regime. Technically, North Korea is still at war with South Korea and the United States, as the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement has not been followed up by the creation of a permanent peace regime. As the former president of South Korea and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dae-Jung Kim has said: “Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean Peninsula are very important conditions for achieving an East Asian Community and bringing peace



Photo: Kirstie Hansen/IAEA

A close-up view of the broken seals salvaged from DPRK facilities in 2003. Safeguards inspectors use metal seals to tag safeguarded equipment, at nuclear facilities.

to Asia” [2: 11]. According to Yu-Hwan Ko, “North Korea appears to be considering a three-party summit involving the two Koreas and the U.S., aimed at setting up a permanent peace regime” [3: 59]. The United States in turn has shown willingness to declare an end to the Korean War, but it has made this conditional on North Korea abandoning its nuclear program. It is clear that South Korea, considering its relatively good relations with both countries and its clear stake in a positive and comprehensive solution, could play a pivotal role as a facilitator in the negotiation process [3: 60].



Photo: US State Department

Top envoys representing their respective countries join hands before a dinner together on the eve of the resumption of the six-party talks aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program, December 2006. Talks resumed this year.



Photo: US Army

Technically, North Korea is still at war with South Korea and the United States, as the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement has not been followed up by the creation of a permanent peace regime.

Security concerns in the region are further aggravated by several unresolved territorial disputes and disputes about maritime economic zones between Japan and Russia as well as between China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. These conflicts are difficult to settle in the short or medium term, without first improving bilateral relations in Northeast Asia: 1) by dealing decisively with the aforementioned destabilizing factors on the Korean Peninsula; and 2) by creating a regional multilateral organization or conference in which these disputes can be addressed in a comprehensive manner (involving package deals that could easily result in gains—if only those resulting from stability—for all parties involved). Although the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty remains a potential security threat to the region, any short-term breakthrough seems highly unlikely, even when all other disputes are resolved.

As Chung-In Moon correctly notes, realignment of United States foreign policy following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, China's rise as the potential regional (as well as a global) superpower, and Japan's prospective remilitarization all "further complicate the strategic uncertainty of the security landscape in Northeast Asia" [6: 6]. Regional dialog and coopera-

tion are called for to reduce this uncertainty. South Korean president Roh has forcefully reiterated that "the destructive and tragic history of Northeast Asia should never be repeated. It is for this reason that a regional community, anchored by institutionalized cooperation and integration, is urgently needed in Northeast Asia" [9:12].

Lastly, numerous transnational security concerns, such as human trafficking, money laundering, drug trade, refugee flows, and terrorism, should also be properly addressed through institutionalized cooperation. Perhaps the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can serve as a model here, as it has been very effective in addressing, and building consensus on, these issues in Europe.

Toward Negotiated Regional Solutions

Several regional discussion forums have set out to deal with the aforementioned security threats in the region, most notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3 (ASEAN (+China, Japan, and South Korea)), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Summit (EAS), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). Although some commentators argue that the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has the potential to facilitate a solution of the conflicts, current membership is more focused on Central Asia than Northeast Asia (of the Northeast Asian countries, only China and Russia are members of SCO).

The ASEAN+3, ARF, EAS, and APEC formats are all characterized by large and diverse membership, making it exceedingly difficult to come to a comprehensive consensus that is more than a "less than adequate compromise" [8:7]. For example, instead of furthering constructive dialog and cooperation, the 2005 EAS summit has brought to light historical rivalries and conflicting geopolitical interests that, in the case of Northeast Asian security, unnecessarily complicate the negotiation processes [4]. In addition to these concerns regarding the effectiveness of the negotiation process, all of the aforementioned forums, except for the ARF, exclude at least one of the main stakeholders in the Northeast Asian security environment, most notably North Korea (all). In his comprehensive evaluation of security cooperation initiatives in East Asia, Michael Paramor believes it appropriate to focus on the potential of the ARF as the future truly effective regional security mechanism, as "ASEAN [even in its +3 format] has a largely South East Asian focus and...APEC is an economic development based grouping" [8: 8]. Nevertheless, while the ARF is the only body with both the membership and the scope to deal comprehensively with Northeast Asian security concerns, it is also severely hampered by rivalry for leadership and widely varying negotiating positions, tactics, and interests.

The Six-Party Talks between China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States have the potential to facilitate a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear quagmire. Yet, many scholarly commentators and politicians, particularly from South Korea, believe that the process should not stop there and that the Six-Party Talks should be institutionalized "into a permanent multilateral organization for the promotion of peace...in East Asia" [2: 12]. South Korea has already underscored that is willing to act as a bridge builder in negotiations to institutionalize the Six-Party Talks into a more comprehensive dialog. The main advantages of such an organization would be its inclusiveness (as regards membership) and small size, which would remove some of the difficulties inherent

in the negotiations in the forums mentioned above. The inclusive, consultative, and consensus-based approach to security, as successfully applied by the OSCE, could provide valuable lessons for such an organization, as is already enthusiastically accepted by the South Korean government [9:12]. Nevertheless, in the light of (part of) the region's colonial past it is unlikely that the "European" model (a Northeast Asian Security and Cooperation Organisation or NEASCO) will be accepted as the basis for the organization. Still, a "common security" approach in which all countries are stakeholders could bring together diverse topics, views, interests, as well as tactics, into a comprehensive consultative process. As Willem van Kemenade has said: "For the benefit of stability, the region needs a security community, similar to the OSCE" [1: 10].

Factors Complicating The Negotiation Process

North Korea's brinkmanship diplomacy, in combination with the United States' rigid policy on the North Korean nuclear issue, has proved to be a serious impediment to successful negotiations [6: 13]. Although China and South Korea readily recognized (but were far from approving of) the pragmatic nature of North Korea's brinkmanship, the United States refused to give North Korea the bilateral attention it was trying to obtain and further aggravated matters by blacklisting the country. Harsh language and recriminations from both sides further contributed to the hostile atmosphere for negotiations. As Moon has noted, "the rigid policy stance by both North Korea and the United States has led nowhere, and such confrontation prevented the international community from assisting North Korea" [6:18].

Now that the United States has adjusted its policy toward North Korea and is taking a more pragmatic stance, while North Korea seems to have understood that another failed negotiation could lead to the "collapse of negotiated settlement," all parties involved have an opportunity to work constructively and creatively in a less hostile environment. In the light of the bilateral (North Korea–United States) normalization talks in March 2007 and the September 2007 agreement by North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program within a clear timeframe, one could draw the cautious conclusion that the recent United States' tit-for-tat strategy of pledge for pledge and action for action is starting to bear fruit [3: 53].

Additionally, unlike in previous years, all six countries involved seem to agree that the Six-Party Talks are the most appropriate forum for any further detailed negotiations. One cannot reiterate enough that a successful conclusion to the Six-Party Talks would potentially open up immense possibilities for the institutionalization of security dialog and cooperation in Northeast Asia that should not be wasted. With the return to the Six-Party Talks by all parties, we can clearly discern the unequivocal acceptance that there is nothing fundamentally flawed about the negotiation process, but that it was the countries' hard-line positions and language that obstructed the process.

Parochial nationalism and mutual distrust need to be tackled before truly effective regional security cooperation can be achieved as these sentiments result in "cognitive barriers" to regional cooperation [7: 34] [6: 7]. China, Japan and the two Koreas in particular are still—to varying degrees—in the grip of their past, which prevents them from looking objectively at their joint future. The China-centered tributary system, the Japanese imperial order, and the United

States hegemonic order after World War II have resulted in a situation in which "no country in the region has escaped the memory of domination and subjugation" [7: 39]. In recent years, nationalist sentiments have been on the rise in China, Japan, and South Korea. Problematically, this rise in each country is reinforced by the perception of this rise in nationalism in one of the other countries.

Although nationalism is evident in Chinese society, the government has always managed to curb it—or manipulate it for its own purposes. Nevertheless, according to Yuan Weishi, Chinese nationalism is not so much the cause as the symptom of the poor state of international relations in the regions: nationalist expressions in China are reactions to ill-advised statements and actions such as Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine [11: 25].

According to Masaru Tamamoto, Japan is, worryingly, experiencing "a wave of resurgent nationalism from above," along with its—very widespread—popular nationalism [10: 16]. As a result, "neo nationalism has become a major driving force behind [its] foreign and domestic policy" and foreign policy makers have limited leeway in their policy choices, severely hampering regional cooperation [7: 41].

Even though South Korean nationalism is in large part focused on resistance to globalization, regionalization, and foreign domination, it is more than just a negative force, whose potential should not be underestimated. It has, in fact, "become a unifying force that seems to transcend even the ideological confrontation between left and right in North and South Korea" [2: 28].

Opportunities for Negotiation

The aforementioned cognitive barriers need to be breached to remove mutual distrust in the region. This is a long and difficult process, but regional cooperation would be a positive factor in this process, just as when the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) facilitated the building of confidence and trust between enemies during the Cold War. Another—necessary—step in coming to terms with the past is to find commonly acceptable historical truths, preferably through a transnational "historical truth-finding commission." However, as not only the general population but also, in many cases, the intellectuals in all three countries accept a different historical truth, the government will have a hard



Photo: China Daily

Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine angered the Chinese

time promoting the founding, let alone the findings, of such a commission. The leaders of democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea, in particular, will find that they cannot be as pragmatic as they would like to be in endorsing the founding of such a commission. As it is, the South Korean initiative, the "Northeast Asia History Foundation," may be the best chance yet of reaching commonly acceptable historical truths [6: 25]. Because of its firm control over the political process, the Chinese government can be much more pragmatic than Japan and set the right example by endorsing the findings of this South Korean initiative [6: 47].

To create a framework for medium- and long-term cooperation it is vital to deal with the traumas of the past, as the relationships will otherwise remain bedeviled by the past and spoilers will use the "sins of the fathers" to sabotage rapprochement. In the short term a successful forward-looking outcome to the Six-Party Talks can be the nucleus for Northeast Asian cooperation, provided that Russia and the United States support the Asian countries in this. This presupposes preparedness on the part of the Americans and Russians not to fall into a Cold Peace themselves. It is up to the European Union to work on the Russians, and up to NATO to put pressure on the Americans. No one wants another international crisis like the one we are witnessing in the Middle East, and, without doubt, a major crisis in Northeast Asia will have an even more negative impact on international relations than the disastrous conflicts in West Asia. Of course, it is mainly up to the Asian countries themselves to avail themselves of the opportunities to create a multilateral regional organization or dialog. China, at least, has prioritized on peaceful economic growth, and this might help the others to follow the peaceful way of conflict resolution. In the long term, this economic orientation could eventually help mainland China and Taiwan to settle their differences and come closer to a serious dialog. Japan will have to deal with the Chinese dragon in such a way that it will continue to enjoy comparative advantages from their relationship, otherwise Japan's economic interests will be severely damaged. Finally, it is of course in the interests of both the Koreans to promote Japanese–Chinese negotiated conflict resolution. In short, there seems little alternative to a negotiated process and the process can flourish only if it is in-

stitutionalized through regimes. As in the case of European integration, the economic incentive is present. Yet, considering the state of bilateral relations in the region and the current obstacles to negotiated settlement, it will be even more difficult than in the European case to forge not only an economic, but also a political dialog—and perhaps, eventually, union.



Photo: Andreas Meyer/Dreamstime.com

Japan must find a way to deal with the Chinese dragon for its own economic best interests.

Conclusion

For the moment an inclusive, consultative, and consensus-based regional organization like the OSCE seems to be the most feasible negotiation regime for security negotiations in Northeast Asia, perhaps with a weak first dimension on security, a strong one on economic relations, and a rudimentary humanitarian basket. The connections between the three dimensions of Helsinki are too feeble and the baskets are too uneven to hope for an encompassing system, as the OSCE is also not as encompassing as it seems to be [5: 20].

There appear to be three preconditions for effective inter-Northeast Asian negotiations. First, further economic interdependency. Second, as there is no outside security threat to the region acting as a federator: a joint Russian–American initiative for a Northeast Asian Security Agreement. Third, as there are deep-rooted mutual suspicions among Northeast Asian countries: a vast human interchange to create empathy and common understanding. This psycho-cultural condition will be the most

difficult to accomplish. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, the common heritage of the peoples of Northeast Asia, demonization is a vast problem in the region. The proposal for a joint historical commission is an excellent one, as it will be the start of the process, which might be more important to common understanding than the actual outcome. However, the key lies in "simple" things like the exchange of scientists, students, artists, and professionals.

As has been said, a Northeast Asian region without regional cooperation is a serious liability for the world community, especially as it houses one-third of the world's population. The issues are economics, safety, and, above all, people. The first two can stimulate new negotiation processes in the short term. The last is the long-term, and most important, stabilizer. Without ripeness of the human dimension, long-term equilibrium and harmonization will remain a *fata morgana*.

Fedor Meerts and Paul Meerts

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Negotiating Internal Conflicts over Identity

PIN 2008 Project: Call for Proposals

Negotiations on internal conflicts over identity are a major challenge for policy and analysis in the current era. On the policy side, they pose the crucial question of acceptable outcomes. To the “needs” school and identity extremists, the only acceptable outcome is full national self-determination and self-realization through independence. To governments and the state legitimacy school, the only acceptable solution is a return to established international order and normal politics. In between, split-the-difference, half-a-loaf, and compromise solutions are salient but are not a priori satisfactory to either side. What “should” be a coordination problem or Chicken’s Dilemma Game (CDG) is a collaboration problem or Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), perpetuated in a bloody, protracted conflict. As such, it eludes any characteristic of ripeness, for it contains neither a mutually hurting stalemate nor a single way out and instead turns into a S^5 situation—a soft, stable, self-serving stalemate—from which neither party has any incentive to move—the hallmark of intractable conflict. The role of a mediator becomes singularly unattractive for a third party, no matter how strong its interests are in ending the conflict.

On the analytical side, the conflict poses a major challenge to the entire body of literature to date on negotiation. This literature is essentially based on the assumption of defined (even if pluralistic) parties arriving at a single, mutually satisfactory outcome. In internal, identity conflicts, on the other hand, there are as many parties as one chooses to make, and the process of negotiating and mediating can well produce—intentionally or unintentionally—even more. Indeed, the conflict may turn internal to one or both sides over the very issue of negotiation and its terms. The challenge is not merely over the analysis of multiparty/multilateral negotiations, but over the additional fact that the sides are not constituted, corporate parties, frequently leaderless and disorganized, unprepared for and hostile to negotiations. Thus, the first task in any such negotiations and mediations is

to identify and crystallize viable partners, while clarifying issues (which may disintegrate partnerships at the same time).

The focus of 2008 PIN project is the role of the external mediator in this situation, based on the assumption that the parties are unable to break the stalemate by themselves (and see no pressing need to do so). How does an external party bring parties in an internal identity-based conflict to negotiation and bring the conflict to an end?

Chapters will focus on the interface between the two noted aspects, investigating new and appropriate ways of analyzing negotiation and evaluating mediation strategies to overcome characteristic problems as required by the subject. The approach to the internal/identity topic reflects an evolution and sophistication in PIN study methodology. Whereas earlier studies were built around collections of salient case studies, with a conceptual setting in the introduction and inductive chapters on lessons for theory and lessons for practice in the conclusion, recent PIN works have followed the conceptual setting with concept-based chapters that cite multiple cases as an empirical resource, leading deductively to the same twin type of lessons. When can negotiations occur in conflict life cycles? What parties should be included and excluded? How can internecine conflicts (conflicts within conflicts) be handled? When is autonomy a sufficient substitute for secession, a stable end-stage rather than a step to secession? How can ethnic cleansing be prevented and arrested? Since there are several correct answers to all these questions, these issues must be analyzed as “Which when why?” matters in order to provide useful answers.

A number of topics have already been spoken for by project leaders: Zartman—exclusion/inclusion; Kremenyuk—territorial self-determination;

PIN•Points

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
Meerts—OSCE High Commission for National Minorities (HCNM).

We would like to see a 1–2 page proposal by 1 January; the paper would be due on 1 June 2008 for a workshop in June–July at Laxenburg. The project is supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation.

I. William Zartman



Bill Zartman pictured at the recent Caspian Dialog in Baku, as he is interviewed for regional television.



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Processes of International Negotiations

Steering Committee Members



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Paul W. Meerts, M.A., studied political science and international relations at the Universities of Amsterdam and Leiden. He has been research fellow in Dutch Political History at the Universities of Leiden and Groningen, as well as coordinator of diplomatic training at the Netherlands Society of International Affairs and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations at Clingendael. He is currently serving as Deputy Director of the Clingendael Institute and is a consultant in diplomatic training.



Gunnar Sjöstedt is senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and also associate professor of political science at the University of Stockholm. His research work is concerned with processes of international cooperation and consultations in which negotiations represent an important element. He is the editor of *International Environmental Negotiations* and the co-editor of *Negotiating International Regimes*, the second and fourth books, respectively, in the PIN series.




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Recent PIN Books



Diplomacy Games Formal Models and International Negotiations

Edited by
Rudolf Avenhaus and
I. William Zartman

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested

in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems?

Contributing Authors

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
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
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
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