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Negotiating a Fragmenting World

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgment	3
Monika Wohlfeld - Introduction: A Fragmenting World - The Challenges of Negotiating Across Divides	4
I. William Zartmann - The fragmentation of the Libyan state	9
Stephen C. Calleya - Managing a Fragmented Mediterranean	13
Paul W. Meerts - Negotiation and the diplomatic system: the security crisis in Europe	17
Rudolf Schuessler - The EU and “the New Eurasian Normal”	26
Mark Anstey - How Africa is pressuring change in Europe	35
Authors	45
Seminar Agenda	48
Photo Inset	50

Acknowledgment

MEDAC has consistently advocated diplomacy and negotiations as a means for overcoming divisions, tensions and conflict in the Mediterranean region. It thus was a great pleasure for MEDAC to engage in a joint effort with the Process of International Negotiation (PIN Negotiation) Steering Committee. The German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention at MEDAC- PIN Negotiation Steering Committee Seminar on 'International Negotiations and the Mediterranean' was held in Malta on 19 October 2022 and brought together international experts on negotiations Prof. I. William Zartman, Prof. Paul Meerts, Prof. Mark Anstey, Prof. Valerie Rosoux, Prof. Rudolf Schüssler, Prof. Guy Olivier Faure, MEDAC academic staff and MEDAC's postgraduate students, many of whom are junior diplomats from their respective countries in the Mediterranean region and beyond.

With this edited publication entitled "Negotiating a Fragmenting World", MEDAC wishes to contribute to thinking about possible ways of championing negotiations as a way of moving towards more peaceful and co-operative engagement among States of the Mediterranean region and beyond. This publication includes contributions to a Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) postgraduate seminar on the same subject matter held in October 2022 and involving contributors engaging in person in Malta.

The authors of the papers presented in this special volume of the Med Agenda engaged during the seminar in a lively interaction with MEDAC students. The Seminar was made possible by funding provided by the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention project at MEDAC. The Federal Republic of Germany has been a stakeholder in MEDAC since 2009.

A Fragmenting World: The Challenges of Negotiating Across Divides

Monika Wohlfeld

Introduction

The confluence of entropic forces now confronting and dividing the world may reverberate for generations. This publication attempts to address the impact of these fragmenting forces as well as to consider how negotiating can be used to span the deep divides that they create. This volume brings together a number of contributions from negotiation experts from Europe, North America and Africa active in the Process of International Negotiation Steering Committee, who have joined the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies in the fall of 2022 in an effort to consider the impact of this fragmentation on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the implications and prospects for negotiating in this context.

In this introduction, the central concept of 'negotiating a fragmenting world' will be presented. Furthermore, the essays collected in this volume will be summarized.

The Reality of a Fragmenting World

The global trend towards entropy at social, political and geopolitical levels is felt in many different ways across the globe. Economic but also political and cultural divisions go hand in hand with the rise of nationalist and populist tendencies. People, communities and countries are increasingly divided and hostile. Violence and conflict are marking various divides. New actors, including violent non-state actors play an increasingly visible role. At the same time, the fragmenting world results in decline of multilateralism, international organizations and fora for cooperation and negotiation.

The business and financial world has long been concerned about the impact of a deglobalising or fragmenting world on the globally economy. It is telling that the 2023 Davos Forum focuses on 'Cooperation in a Fragmented World', and considers 'political, economic and social forces creating increased fragmentation on a global and national level' and their impact on economic development, resilience and a number of interconnected issues such as 'energy, climate and nature; investment, trade and infrastructure; frontier technologies and industry resilience; jobs, skills, social mobility and health; and geopolitical cooperation'¹.

Clearly, such fragmenting process also affect issues related to national and international security, peace, conflict as well as the role of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation. Thus, the

¹ [Annual Meeting Davos 2023 | World Economic Forum \(weforum.org\)](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/annual-meeting-davos-2023/)

fragmentation not only creates problems in itself, but also renders tools which could be used to overcome the divides less effective.

This phenomenon deeply affects the Europe-Mediterranean region, that is characterized by multiple conflicts and economic and social challenges, especially along the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea, but not only. Let me highlight two conflicts that are key among them. The war in Libya, which began in 2011, highlights the notion of a fragmenting world. The civil war between various factions vying for control of the country, has led to a breakdown in the political, economic and social fabric of the country. The war showcases the growing trend of fragmentation within countries. In Libya, different regions, ethnic groups, tribes and factions became increasingly divided and isolated from each other. The country as increasingly challenged in its cohesive unit., which has hindered all efforts to achieve a lasting peace. The situation in Libya also highlights the rise of violent non-state actors. The conflict involves militias, terrorist groups and proxies of foreign powers, with their agendas and interests. This affected the ability of state actors to pursue diplomacy, mediation and negotiation. The complexity of the situation has made it difficult to reach a negotiated settlement. Overall, the war in Libya is an example of the difficulties that a fragmenting world creates for effort to reach negotiated outcomes.

The ongoing war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine also has significant implications for the notion of a fragmenting world. It highlights the growing polarization and fragmentation or relations between states, but also between Russia and also China and the West. The latter are accompanied by decline in trusts, cooperation and collaboration and support for international frameworks and organizations and multilateralism. In the context of the MENA region, the war has resulted in a multitude of negative consequences of economic and political nature.

Fragmenting versus fragmented world

Different terms are used to describe the phenomenon of global entropy. As the editor, I have chosen the term of a 'fragmenting world' as part of this publication's title to describe the phenomenon all the contributing authors address. It is noteworthy that both the expressions of a 'fragmenting' and 'fragmented' world are used in literature. Arguably, some use the two expressions in an interchangeable way, and one can argue that they are similar, as they focus on the same problems. And yet, a difference between the two terms exists. While fragmenting world refers to ongoing trends that cause the world to become more divided at various levels and focuses on these processes, a fragmented world refers to a world that is divided and separated, implying an end-state of entropy. The former implies an increasingly divided world and the latter one that already divided. In that sense, the expression 'fragmenting world' is both more cautious and possibly also more optimistic. After all, a fragmenting world is one where entropy exists alongside integrating processes. And entropy processes could possibly be halted or even reversed under certain circumstances. The somewhat optimistic take on the state of the world in the title of the publication is linked to MEDAC's and PIN Steering Committee's commitment and investment into the roles of diplomacy, mediation, cooperation, cooperation frameworks and international organizations, and especially in the context of this publication, negotiation.

Fragmenting World and Negotiation techniques

As societies, countries and the international system become increasingly fragmented, cross-cultural communication, effective collaboration skills, techniques for finding compromises and common solutions and negotiating skills are needed. Yet, I. William Zartman argues that the increasing entropy is a challenge for negotiation and negotiation analysis, as concepts and practice of negotiation must be adapted to new realities. In fact Prof. Zartman calls for new concepts and practices of negotiations in international politics.² That is the central goal of the PIN Steering Committee.

PIN Steering Committee

The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program is a non-profit group of scholars and practitioners that encourages and organizes research on a broad spectrum of topics related to international negotiation seen as a process. Its objectives include the dissemination of new knowledge about negotiation and developing networks of scholars and practitioners interested in the subject, for the purpose of improving analysis and practice of negotiation worldwide.

The PIN network includes more than 4,000 scholars and practitioners of international negotiation. The organization is presided over by a Steering Committee, who organizes activities and edits the newsletter PINPoints.

German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention at MEDAC-PIN Steering Committee Seminar

MEDAC has since its origins advocated diplomacy, multilateralism, mediation and negotiations in the context of the Mediterranean region, characterized by increasingly complex and conflictual patterns of relations. In 2022, MEDAC, through the holder of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention, teamed up with the Steering Committee of The Process of International Negotiation in order to organize a joint seminar on International Negotiation and the Mediterranean (19 October 2022, St. Julian's Malta). This seminar allowed MEDAC's postgraduate students, many of whom are young diplomats from the southern Mediterranean region, to explore the promises of and challenges to negotiations. The collaboration with the PIN Steering Committee reflected a long-standing cooperation and partnership with Dr. Paul Meerts, and international negotiation specialist and author of works on diplomatic bargaining and training in national and international peer-reviewed books and journals. Dr. Paul Meerts is a valued and long-standing visiting lecturer at MEDAC.

The Seminar brought together a number of experts on negotiation. This publication consists of a number of papers written by the speakers at this seminar. A special mention must be made of Prof. I. William Zartman, the Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. Prof. Zartman is an authority on the subject of negotiation, particularly in the context of the Mediterranean region, having written numerous books and coined many concepts used today in negotiations, such as ripeness theory. Prof. Zartman not only joined

² I. William Zartman, Structuring in a Vacuum: Negotiating in the Current World Disorder, February 2020, *International Negotiation* 25(1):1-13.

the seminar and contributed a paper to this publication, but also addressed the issue of a fragmenting world in a public lecture at the University of Malta.

Content of the Publication

The authors of the contributions to this publication focus on key challenges brought about by the fragmentation processes at various levels (national, regional, international) in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Prof. I. William Zartman suggests that 'the current system of world disorder' is a result of massive infraction of international norms, with wide-reaching consequences for international order and domestic stability. This in turn makes prevalent conflicts difficult to manage and resolve. The 'world disorder' has many implications, but the most severe is state collapse, which is characterized by fragmentation of political forces and organizations, breakdown of authority, power vacuum, rise of non-state armed groups and foreign interference. It is for this reason that Prof. Zartman focuses on the fragmentation of the Libyan state. He identifies each of these aspects (fragmentation of political forces and organizations, breakdown of authority, power vacuum, rise of non-state armed groups and foreign interference) in the Libyan context and consequently addresses the question of whether there is a key to an end to the conflict and instability in Libya. His warning is a stark one: there is currently no basis for such a development. 'Nothing in the natural course of the situation promises a way out of the current fragmented vacuum; even fatigue, the often underplayed answer to many problems, only reinforces the characteristics of the collapsed state'. Prof. Zartman does consider two other possibilities: a final success of General Haftar and an active effort by all groups of interested states in order to bring the various actors in Libya together. But he also suggests that even if contenders at the top agree to work together, they will have to work on restoring or building the state.

Prof. Calleya addresses the issue of managing a fragmented Mediterranean region. Starting with the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on the Mediterranean region, Prof. Calleya highlights the vulnerability of states dependent on imports from Russia and Ukraine, including along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. These states are already coping with changed regional dynamics and more unstable and fragmented geo-political and economic Mediterranean. Prof. Calleya poses a difficult question: what would be the impact of a permanent on-going conflict, disrupting supply chains, causing a food crisis, higher energy prices and a lengthy global or regional recession on the Mediterranean region? He argues that such potential developments should result in a realignment of geo-strategic interests across the Mediterranean, and should give the EU and opportunity to adopt a more proactive stance. A more ambitious agenda and a new Euro-Mediterranean narrative is needed, focused on issues such as youth unemployment, education reform, counter radicalization and better management of migration. A Euro-Mediterranean Development and Investment Fund, modelled after the 'Marshall Plan' for the region is necessary. Such a fund should provide significant finances and support for Arab states to undertake necessary reforms, stimulating growth and job creation. As a member of the UN Security Council in 2023 and 2024, Malta is well placed to be the voice of Mediterranean security concerns in its effort to promote diplomatic initiatives.

The current security crisis in Europe, caused by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is the focus of the essay by Dr. Paul Meerts. Meerts discusses the role of diplomatic negotiation as a tool in international relations and its effectiveness in resolving conflicts. He argues that diplomatic negotiation can be a viable alternative to warfare in the European security crisis. Progress in negotiation and cooperation has been uneven on a regional scale, with the European Union an exception in this regard. Diplomatic negotiation has become an important

tool in conflict management and resolution over the centuries, but it is still an auxiliary tool in crisis situations, and the turning point where negotiation will be strong enough to make wars redundant is yet to be reached. Meerts discusses a number of ways in which negotiation can be made more viable, such as expanding the informal arena of negotiation and creating a common culture of negotiation between diplomats and civil servants through common education and international training. He also emphasizes the role of bottom-up approaches. The author argues that the current security crisis in Europe is a serious test for the fabric of diplomatic negotiation. However, diplomacy and negotiation may not be able to prevent a power-shift that would upset the European security structure or safeguard the independence of a middle power like Ukraine.

Prof. Rudolf Schuessler in his essay suggests that as a consequence of the state of world disorder, the West will play a less dominant role globally. He highlights two developments: the rise of Asia and what he terms the return to the 'New Eurasian Normal'. These developments mark the end of the Eurocentric power system of the 19th and 20th centuries. The key players in the new order will come from the Eurasian continent, with the United States being an exception to this trend. The author also discusses the implication of the 'New Eurasian Normal' for the European Union and for the United States. The world is moving towards a new bipolarity, with China and the US as main superpowers, competing in economic and military terms. This bipolarity is however affected by internal partisan disorder in the US. Schuessler also highlights the importance of 'middle powers' in shaping this new world order. These powers will seek best trade options with China and the US. The EU should acknowledge the new reality and avoid attempts to impose its own ideals. It should focus on the concept of 'non-domination', in order to protect its citizens from arbitrary domination by powerful states, domestically and internationally, as this concept is more compatible with power balancing than idealistic approaches.

Prof. Mark Anstey discusses in his essay the politics and instability in Africa and how it affects Europe. Africa's problems of poverty, famine, instability and civil wars are drivers of migration to Europe, which in turn changes the European political landscape. The article focuses on the political and economic challenges in North Africa following the Arab Spring and in sub-Saharan Africa. The author then suggests that these problems reduce the human rights leverage of Europe, as non-Western countries offer assistance with no strings attached. The development before democracy approach will continue to have significance impact on Europe's politics. Anstey continues to discuss the political and social impact of African migration on Europe. He notes concerns over numbers, the impact on economies and resistance to migrants from other cultures in European countries, with Europe struggling with realities of multi-cultural societies, which is a factor in the retreat from liberal democracy and the rise of populism. The West also faces a future of reparation claims based on past genocide, slavery, colonialism, repressive occupation and consequences of industrialization. These raise a number of complex issues regarding inter alia fact finding, claim legitimacy and the roles of governments and affected groups. The author also discusses identity tensions relating to integration of migrants in European countries. He focuses on the impact on countries along the northern rim of the Mediterranean and concludes by asking a number of questions, such as: Is a sustainable coherence of values and democratic design possible amongst EU member states in response to modern pressures? What proposals for managing 'irregular migration' would best reflect European values of humanitarianism and cultural tolerance? What controls can be exerted to maintain balance and objectivity in assessing the impact of immigration and to prevent a narrative of fear and hate based on misperceptions and media hysteria taking root across the EU?

The fragmentation of the Libyan state

I. William Zartman

The current system of world disorder that has pushed the world order of the past 80 years deeply into entropy has resulted from infraction of accepted international norms - against territorial encroachment, genocide and ethnic cleansing, nuclear threatening, civilian targeting, contract breaching - with tremendous destabilizing effects on interstate relations. But it has also affected intrastate order and exacerbated domestic instability. The 'upper level of relations' has erupted in systemic warfare including hybrid aspects; the internal breakdown has been above all a matter of hybrid conflict. These conditions - both domestic and international - render prevalent conflicts most difficult to manage and impossible to resolve.

While the breakdown of the system of world order has implication at many level of domestic politics, the most severe is in the fostering of state collapse. Many conditions of contemporary relations - economic, social, and political - pose challenges to governance even in established states but rarely to the point of debilitating government itself or calling the existence of the state in question. Usually the supportive elements of the state - sense of national identity, basic economic rules, and notions of social contract - continue to hold together even a weak and ineffective structure. But in some cases, all of these elements are gone, in connection with an internal, internationalized conflict, itself hybridized. The open violent conflict is the final cap n the collapsing process but the state structure has been hollowed and fragilized before the culminating and continuing warfare. Thus, collapse is a process (Zartman 1995). It is a matter of arbitrary labeling to say when it began but a challenge for careful analysis to determine when it has become irreversible.

In these conditions state collapse has a number of characteristics. *Fragmentation* of political forces and organizations occurs because there is no structure, issue or identity left to hold them together, and so they fall back on their prime concern which is self-preservation. *Leadership* breaks down because there is no authority to recognize primacy and no convenable base to provide promoting support, leaving no field for personal competition. *Power vacuum* means that authority - usually as the result of the collapse of a strongman regime with narrow support - devolves to the lowest existing level such as tribe or village, open to challenge by ad hoc groups or militias, also with no broader basis for coalitions. *Non-state armed groups* (NSAGs) arise as independent security organizations, not necessarily in allegiance to any local authority and often tapping on diverse manpower from the fragmented sources, including foreign personnel. *Foreign interference* derives directly from the world disorder condition, as

states of the upper and middle levels fish in the power vacuum to support NSAGs. These are conditions that are characteristic of current collapsed states, such as Yemen, Lebanon, Somalia, Central African Republic and Libya.

The Libyan state, such as it was, was destroyed by Moammar Qadhafi, who came to power in a Khaldunian move in 1969 to overthrow the shadow state under King Idriss. Qadhafi's reign was based on groups and individuals bought into support for it, revolutionary support groups and militia, and tribal groups cultivated for support (Martinez 2006). The Arab Spring in turn destroyed Qadhafi's rule, splitting society into pro-Qadhafi and pro-resistance groups (Mezran and Alunni 2015), the beginning of the *fragmentation* process. Groups not only split on the political choice but also on the blood revenge against killings in the ensuing conflict. The original uprising of 2011 crystallized on the local level into groups that sought immediate advantage in the chaos and others that maneuvered in the pre-democratic period before the 2012 elections, and split again on government policies including the lustration laws. The following year civil war broke out, further splitting groups; NSAGs arose, independent of tribal and local structures. The war ended in 2015 but was unable to meet any agreement to manage or end the conflict; divergent positions on the issue added to divergent grievance from the war; the two presumptive leaders of the competing governments come from the same town, Misrata. Local dispute among the fragments persisted over local issues, further splitting the countryside (Vericat and Hobrara 2018). War reemerged again in 2019 in a drive from the east to take over Tripoli, but it failed bloodily, involving Turkish troops and Russian mercenaries. The result by the beginning of the following decade was a society composed of many little groups with no cause about which to coalesce and with defense of local interest as the prime mover of their actions, a true sandbox of a society with many small pieces; local militias developed without any coincidence with local social and community organization (Lacher 2020).

Ambitious individuals continually arose, seeing a *leadership* vacuum and seeking a momentary benefit, but they had no roots in society, so they made unsubstantiated claims of support behind their candidacy, building castles of the sand. They were picked up in foreign reports seeking something to identify as a political structure. The UN missions to Libya on behalf of the Secretary-General dealt with these individuals as if they were real leaders of a grassroots following. Some of these individuals were elected to the General National Congress (GNC) in 2012 and the House of Representatives (HOR) in 2014 but with no support that transcends their locality, since the largest number ran as independents. The GNC sits in Tripoli, the official capital, supported by the UN, and the HOR in Tobruk in the east and more recently in Sirte on the central Mediterranean coast (former site of the Islamic State), declaring each other illegal in late 2022. Each appoints a prime minister from time to time (in late 2022: Abdelhamid Debeiba in Tripoli and Fathi Bashagha in Tobruk), but neither has an effective government alongside him. The most legitimizing agency, also operating at the individual level with no claim to popular support, is the UN mission, which has worked with the GNC group that it calls official and that enjoys general, but not total, international recognition.

The resulting *power vacuum* leaves Libya without a functioning government. Not only are its agencies ineffective but their territorial writ is not widespread. The collapse of government services reinforces further contributes to the devolution of power to the local level and the fragmentation of authority. The void in authority leaves it open for grabs, outside the purported organizations that vie for legitimacy, and invites a strongman, who claims an authority on his own, above the constituted bodies. Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a former general in Qadhafi's army, has arisen in the east "with its dearth of cohesive local political and military forces" (Lacher

2020, 197) and has amassed a conglomerate army of various local groups, using strong-arm tactics and local repression. In the 2019 civil war, he launched an attack on Tripoli but it met resistance from larger organized militias from Zintar and Misrata and defections from its own midst before it could reach its target. Haftar continues to claim control over the eastern and southern parts of the country, but his claims are only as solid as the fragmentation will allow.

The one institution that functions is the National Oil Company (NOC), which continues to lift oil and export it. It was for a while taken over by Haftar who then left. The NOC officially supports the government budget but there are two governments. It is the one activity that international and domestic pressures have combined to keep working to some degree.

The country is rife with militias. These NSAGs exist alongside but are generally independent of local authorities and communities and may cross community lines, wherever they find support. Some are purely personal attempts to be active, others seek to protect the community fragment where they are located. Generally they do not aspire to anything higher than their local following, without national or regional ambitions. Generally too they have no issue to sell or defend. These characteristics make alliances unlikely, temporary engagements easy and fragile, and broad or lasting coalescence absent. NSAGs are dependent on money and may be bought, although again not for any lasting loyalty.

Much of these characteristics provide a socket where *foreign interference* can plug in (Gazzini 2022). The very vacuum in power and authority provides an opportunity for large and middle states to go fishing for various benefits - temporary allies, raw materials, retrieved history, preemptive presence. They may have no direct interest other than that Libya has a strategic location and open borders with little encumbrance and it has no ambitions of its own, no interests or issues, either as a government policy or inherently. It is an open sandbox for playing. Even if there is no positive interest in interference for an outside power, there may well be a negative interest in preventing a potential competitor from doing so.

Following the NATO bombing of 2011, France and Italy remained actively interested - France for strategic reasons and Italy for location, economic ties and colonial memories. The US has kept its geostrategic interest and desire to keep out Russia, which is interested for the reverse reasons. Egypt and Türkiye have deep historic interests in retrieving their imperial connections, again on opposite sides, and the Gulf states maintain an interest in Arab relations. As the two capitals faced off at the end of 2022, some flexibility began to appear among foreign supporters. Russia alone recognizes the HoR government and Bachagha, and militarily supports Haftar; Egypt and UAE, once Tobruk supporters, have moved to join US and France seeking relations with both sides while recognizing the UN-supported Tripoli government, along with Türkiye, Qatar, UAR, England, Italy and Germany (Gazzini 2022). For some of these, it is a small but significant proxy war: Türkiye has sent in its own armed forces, as once did the UAE, while the Russian Wagner Group had some 2000 militia forces, later reduced by half by their need in Ukraine.

Thus, the characteristics of state collapse fit together and reinforce each other, providing a gap between the notable individuals who make the news but have no roots and the local customary, community and militia structures, with no ladders of interest or organization between the two levels. This means that the opposing political forces are free to hold out, benefitting from foreign support and grappling for rental income, unhampered by any base obligations or sources in their conflicts and agreements.

Is there a key to an end to the conflict and instability? Growing out of these conditions, no. There is no basis or interest in effective coalitions, either meaningfully competing with

popular support behind them or uniting to bridge personal differences and engage the public. A decade after the first elections of 2012 and 2014, elections were scheduled by common agreement by the end of 2022 but were canceled in infighting over candidatures and constitutional foundations. Nothing in the natural course of the situation promises a way out of the current fragmented vacuum; even fatigue, the often underplayed answer to many problems, only reinforces the characteristics of the collapsed state.

Two other possibilities need to be considered. One is the final success of Haftar in taking over Tripoli. It would indeed require deep fatigue and exhaustion of the two sides and their international supporters as well. A slim chance is hard to analyze but it may take the rising fortune of the putative strongman to bring the two sides into a working agreement for elections in 2023 as originally planned.

The other evolution would be an active effort by all groups of interested states to weigh in on the two governments to come together. The US has proposed an escrow arrangement for the oil revenues (called the Mechanism for Short-Term Financial, Economic and Energy Dependability – with the acronym MSTFEED; *mustafeed* in Arabic that means “beneficiary”), that will put pressure on the parties to work together. Haftar with Russia behind him provides a reason for the others to unite.

Once the other outside states convince them to do so, elections will come next, which will continue to reflect the fragmentation at the base. Even if the contenders at the top agree to work together, they will need to tend their roots and work on deeper tasks such as cultivating national identity, representativeness and social contract, all necessary to restoring or building the state.

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Managing A Fragmented Mediterranean

Stephen C. Calleya

An analysis of our post-Cold War world highlights the tumultuous times we are experiencing. The Covid-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine in February 2022 have resulted in a sea-change in international relations that makes contingency planning a much more complex endeavour than ever before.

While the Russia-Ukraine war has sent shock waves through the international system of states and called into question the resilience of post-Cold War European security, the impact of the war is being felt by every state at both a global and regional level.

The devastation and atrocities witnessed in Ukraine are of course the most horrific development so far in this conflict. If diplomacy does not succeed in bringing the two warring parties to a cessation of hostilities it is clear that a war of attrition is likely to emerge and result in permanent human suffering in Ukraine.

The Russia-Ukraine war does not only re-confirm that the post-Cold War end of history perspective that Francis Fukuyama proposed is a fallacy but also that our multilateral international security system remains a fragile one where no one can take their stability for granted.

While the international community has sought to mitigate the impact of the war on neighbouring states and beyond it is clear that another casualty of the war, at least in the short term, is the credibility of international organisations that have been the bedrock of cooperative security since the end of World War II. In addition to not preventing the invasion of Ukraine, international organisations have also demonstrated an inability to manage the surge in volatility in global trade and finance. The Ukraine war has triggered a major wave of inflation of basic foodstuffs and energy that is exposing the vulnerability of all states that are dependent on imports in general and those from Ukraine and Russia in particular including the majority of states located along the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

Since the start of the millennium the Euro-Mediterranean region has witnessed an untold number of new realities that have changed regional dynamics significantly. Across the Maghreb and Mashreq the Arab revolutions have resulted in a more unstable and fragmented geo-political and economic Mediterranean. The trend that has emerged is one of constant civil upheavals playing out in several MENA countries as economic prospects continue to deteriorate.

As we witness a year of warfare between Russia and Ukraine it is very clear that this conflict is undermining the economic security of the majority of states in the Euro-Mediterranean area due to their dependency on Ukraine and Russia for so many essential commodities.

In such dire circumstances the strategic question that must be asked is what will happen if the Russia-Ukraine war becomes a permanent on-going conflict that results in a continuous disruption of supply chains. Will a food crisis coupled with an increase in higher energy prices result in a lengthy global or at least a Mediterranean regional recession? Could there be an outbreak of riots or even civil wars in some states if inflation results in food shortages and both malnourishment and famine become a reality?

The United Nations International Fund for Agricultural Development has already indicated that an increase in food prices and crop shortages is impacting negatively on the MENA region. Apart from Lebanon, countries such as Tunisia, Libya, and Syria import most of their wheat from Ukraine. Egypt, the world's largest importer of wheat, relies on more than 80 per cent of its wheat supplies from Ukraine and Russia. While governments are seeking to buffer their citizens from the adverse economic effects of this decline of supplies by subsidizing prices and rationing resources in some instances, it is clear that a prolonged war in Ukraine will undermine political and economic stability across the MENA region. In fact, grain and energy importers such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have seen their budget deficits continue to balloon as they seek to manage this crisis and other sources of instability.

Across the Euro-Mediterranean region grains and vegetable oil from Ukraine and Russia are part of national diets. Lebanon imports more than 70 per cent of its wheat imports from Ukraine.

The changing geo-strategic calculus that has emerged as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war should be a major factor moving European and Mediterranean states closer together given the mutual security interests they share. A common Euro-Mediterranean political, economic and cultural perspective should form the basis of any eventual security dialogue if stability is to be sustainable long-term.

Given the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean and the transitory times that are resulting in a realignment of geo-strategic interests across the Mediterranean, the EU has an opportunity to adopt a more proactive stance when it comes to influencing the international relations of the Mediterranean area.

Geographical proximity and increasing instability in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean dictates that the EU needs to try and influence more effectively regional dynamics in its adjacent eastern and southern regions than has been the case during the past decade. Such an approach is necessary if the Euro-Neighbourhood Policy which encompasses the Union for the Mediterranean is to remain a relevant one.

The time has come to implement a more ambitious agenda for the Mediterranean. The European Union should conceptualise and communicate a new Euro-Mediterranean declaration to build upon the co-operative perspective that was put forward in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. A new Euro-Mediterranean narrative that focuses on a common Euro-Mediterranean agenda must address real time urgent issues that are undermining the fabric of every country across the Mediterranean. Priority issues should include youth unemployment, education reform, counter radicalization and better management of the migration phenomenon. A new Euro-Mediterranean declaration must also consist of a Marshall Plan type model of development that provides economic support to each developing country across the southern shore of the Mediterranean carrying out such reforms.

Since the so-called 'Arab Spring' in 2011, when a number of countries in the Arab world, including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya experienced revolutions that saw the removal of regimes that had been in power for decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have become politically and economically more unstable. This has resulted in the emergence of a bleak economic outlook in all of the countries with very high unemployment registered throughout. In fact, in the past decade unemployment has increased among the youth (18 years old to 30 years old) in every Arab country in the MENA region.

If the goal of fostering economic development is to take place across the MENA region then attracting foreign direct investment is essential. A Euro-Mediterranean Development and Investment Fund which will require tens of billions of dollars to be effective should be established and could be financed by the G20 countries and include the rich Gulf States. Such a Development and Investment Fund would be geared towards restoring ailing Arab economies over a period of five to ten years.

Moreover, such a Development and Investment Fund would provide vital support for Arab states to undertake the necessary reforms in a socially sustainable manner and ultimately help in stimulating economic growth and job creation. Development of the hinterland vis-à-vis the coast in all of the Arab countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean is essential as the living conditions will become more unbearable due to inflation by 2025.

It is imperative to develop the hinterland of all societies by upgrading the infrastructure in general, building schools, hospitals and housing for millions of people every year. Funds would be allocated only to those countries that sign up to a rigorous process of international monitoring that ensures transparency and accountability in all reform projects undertaken. One country that has taken significant strides since 2011 to reform its public and private sectors and should be considered as a primary candidate in such an endeavour is Tunisia.

As Malta has consistently advocated, the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean, dictates that the EU should adopt a more proactive stance when it comes to influencing and managing the international relations of the Mediterranean area if it wants to successfully project stability in the area. While the intensity of political and economic relations across Europe has resulted in it becoming one of the most advanced regionally integrated areas of the world, the Mediterranean remains one of the least integrated.

Malta's geographical proximity to the Middle East and North Africa and Malta's foreign policy track record as a promoter of peace and stability in the Mediterranean as witnessed through such historical milestones as the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, positions Malta well to be an active partner in any future political, economic and cultural relationship between the international community and the MENA region. As a member of the United Nations Security Council in 2023 and 2024 Malta is in an ideal position to be the voice of Mediterranean security concerns as part of a concerted effort to promote diplomatic initiatives that seek conflict resolution and the promotion of economic prosperity in the region.

The Mediterranean remains host to some of the longest on-going conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Three conflicts have dominated regional and international relations, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Cyprus conflict and the Sahara conflict. Numerous diplomatic initiatives have taken place in an attempt to broker a peaceful resolution to each of these international inter-state disputes but to date there has been no successful outcome in any of these conflicts.

In actual fact the geo-strategic situation across the Mediterranean has today become even more volatile because decades long hostilities have now been supplemented by a series of new conflicts that have emerged in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Only a renewed multilateral approach to mediation and negotiation in the Mediterranean will provide possible avenues of cooperation that prevent inter-state and sub-regional divisions from becoming permanent features of our twenty-first century Mediterranean.

We are living in a new world disorder where constant uncertainty and insecurity are a daily occurrence. It is thus imperative that we plan and propose strategic contingencies that enable us to manage more effectively the ever changing situation. If current trends of insecurity continue unabated then quality of life in the Mediterranean will deteriorate rapidly and result in an even more fragmented Mediterranean system of states.

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Space for Diplomatic Negotiation in the European Security Crisis

Paul W. Meerts

Europe¹ has been bedevilled by security crises ever since it came into being as a more or less interconnected system of multinational and national states. Attempts were made to substitute weapons by words. This started with the 1648 Westphalia negotiations, followed by Pan-European peace and security arrangements like the game changing treaties and agreements of Utrecht (1713), Vienna (1815), Versailles (1919), Helsinki (1975), etc. Given the diplomatic successes and failures in the past three-and-a-half centuries, what will be the diplomatic options for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine? Has diplomatic negotiation a role to play?

Diplomatic negotiation, defined as *an exchange of concessions and compensations in a framework of international order accepted by sovereign entities* (Meerts 2019), is sandwiched between cooperation and competition. It is vital for the future to enhance the cooperative element in negotiation and to diminish the competitive side. However, politics are characterized by strife and competition - this is not only there to stay, but it also has the healthy function of avoiding monopolization. Looking at diplomatic negotiation as a global system, as a pathway to govern the world and its inhabitants, it seems sensible to strengthen it. Striving for balance between context and process through further regime-building, while keeping the arteries of the process as open as possible, might be of help in providing the world with reasonably good state and inter-state governance.

The proposition of this contribution is that international/diplomatic negotiation can only be a viable alternative for warfare if countries can exercise a certain amount of *control over their internal and external opponents through regime-building*. Outside and between these regimes (Spector 2003), violence remains a problem. There is no negotiation monopoly because of the relative weakness of global institutions like the United Nations Security Council, although negotiation has become a more important tool in conflict management and resolution over the centuries. On a regional scale, the progress of cooperation - and thereby of negotiation - has been uneven. There has been a growing hope for regional institutions to compensate for the lack of decisiveness on a global scale. For the moment, however, the European Union seems to be an enigma - an exception to the rule that regional organizations are hardly more effective than more encompassing regimes.

¹ This contribution is an abridged and updated version of: Paul Meerts (2020), Diplomatic Negotiation at the Crossroads? *International Negotiation*, 25.1, 18-30.

States remain the domain of negotiation, although they are enhancing their capacity for international negotiation as an alternative to warfare, because of growing economic interdependency, diplomatic institutionalization and the progress in international public law. The fabric of international cooperation, however, remains vulnerable and dependent on ripeness situations, as international regimes are often still too weak to create negotiated ripeness (Zartman 1989). Negotiation has become a viable instrument of decision-making, but in crisis situations it is still often more of an auxiliary instrument. The turning point where diplomatic negotiation will be strong enough to make wars redundant is still to be reached and might never come, notwithstanding the growing strength of diplomatic negotiation over the centuries.

Diplomatic negotiations start with the actors who initiate the process. *Actors* have three choices: to do nothing; to pull back; or to push forward. In other words, to freeze, to flee, or to fight. These movements are mainly determined by the factors inside and outside the context in which the actors operate. Inside or outside, three main *factors* play a role in the decision of actors to act: interests, values and power. There are also three main phases in the negotiation *process* itself, as a consequence of these actions and factors: exploration, selection and decision. These phases are embedded in pre- and post-negotiation processes. As diplomatic negotiation is an instrument in managing international relations in such a way that problems can be solved in peaceful ways, it will have to be effective as a tool in international governance and conflict resolution. By effectiveness, we mean managing actors, factors and processes in such a way that outcomes can be reached at the lowest possible costs. Managing sovereign countries is problematic, unless – as has been stated above – there is a certain measure of *control*. This control can be exerted through over-arching international regimes.

The role of institutions and countries in diplomatic negotiation

The real problem of extra-institutional negotiation often lies in the pre- and post-negotiation phases: how to get the actors around the table and how to ensure compliance and enforcement. To pressure negotiators to come to the negotiation table remains the main problem. Context change is often needed, but it might only be the disaster that one wishes to avoid which can force parties to start the process. Mediators can be of great value, especially if they can be the source of a peaceful change of context through threats or diplomacy. As a consequence of insecurity and uncertainty, the exploration phase might become very time-consuming, while the selection and decision phases might be realized in a relatively speedy way.

An example of the role of control can be found in the problems a chair will face in controlling negotiators in a meeting. Too much control will undermine the chair's position, as the participants might revolt. Not enough control will hinder the chair in the task of coming to closure in a meaningful way.

Control over diplomatic negotiations with other parties is the nucleus of inter-state negotiations, as it determines their outcomes. No control means unassured outcomes. Even if an outcome will be reached, its implementation is insecure. Incentives for using negotiation as a tool in conflict management will thereby be weak. This enhances the chances for warfare as an alternative to a peaceful process of conflict resolution. The difficulty of reaching assured outcomes and implementation was one of the reasons for strengthening inter-state regimes during the last four centuries. Through these regimes, which culminated in international organizations in the twentieth century and supranational constructions today, sovereign states are managing their relations in such a way that less costly (that is, negotiated) solutions

will become a viable instrument in international relations. This opens opportunities for more international governance through negotiation in the future, with a growing importance for negotiation and how it will be conducted. Negotiation will therefore, in this vision, become an increasingly essential part of the conduct of internal and external negotiations.

As a downside, there is the danger of gridlock and deadlock (Narlikar 2010). While states are in need of increasing control over internal and external negotiation processes, they need more and more bureaucracy to exert control. Bureaucracy and control tend to enhance inflexibility, which in turn hampers the negotiation process and thereby its effectiveness as an instrument. Bureaucratic barriers will slow down the process, as we already see in the European Union. However, gridlock can be tempered by expanding the informal arena of EU negotiation. It has been noted before that progress in negotiations is often to be found 'in the corridors'. In that sense, more informal talks will not only guarantee some freedom from institutional obstacles, but will also enhance the chances for successful closure of the negotiation processes. There is the importance of informality in reaching deals: too much formality leads to mechanical processes, while negotiation is not only about procedures, but very much about creativity. Nevertheless, a strong link with the formal side of the process has to remain, as control will otherwise be lost and formalization of the outcomes will not be realized, thus making them redundant.

There are also other trends diminishing the impact of negotiation on desired outcomes. As well as the growing role of the often 'egotiating' (Meerts and Vukovic 2015) politicians like Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, Berlusconi and perhaps Johnson and Macron, though President Biden seems to be unhindered by his ego, at least until now. There are multitudes of national and international civil servants, lobbyists and other non-governmental negotiators who are slowly but surely pushing aside the diplomat as an agent in negotiation. This obstructs the process in two ways: the sheer growth of actors creates more complexity; and although complexity might open new options, it also serves to suffocate the processes. More complexity means more formal rules to manage it, and more time to come to closure.

The future role of the diplomat as a diplomatic negotiator in competition with negotiators of other governmental and non-governmental agencies is undermined by globalisation. The distinction between diplomatic and non-diplomatic negotiators will probably wither away, foremost in strong regimes like the European Union. This is an interesting paradox: *while the regimes allow for successful diplomatic negotiation processes, they will at the same time diminish the role and the importance of the diplomatic negotiators.*

As a result, miscommunication will also be on the rise because of the erosion of diplomatic culture, as fewer and fewer diplomats are allowed to conduct international negotiation processes. Professional cultures are bridges between societal cultures. It could thus indeed be helpful if negotiators from specialized ministries sit around the table, as they do understand each other, which would allow for a smoother negotiation process, but they will have to be hacked together for a final and balanced overall outcome. With a weakened role for the diplomatic services, whether EU or national, such harmonization will become increasingly difficult (Smith 2016).

In sum, there are two trends for the future that will, depending on the situation, work against each other or strengthen each other. On the one hand, there is a growing *institutionalization* of the negotiation process, underpinned by a multitude of negotiators facilitating these processes and thereby enhancing the chances for effective outcomes. This institutionalization will result, on the other hand, in growing *complexity, formality and transparency*, thereby

creating *inflexibility* in the negotiation process, which will obstruct it from reaching viable outcomes, as it is further complicated by complexities stemming from *the nationalization of international negotiations and the internationalization of national negotiations*. The processes will be more time-consuming, while in the modern world, timely closure is of the essence.

The other trend is the atomization of world politics by individual countries, that is those countries in the world which are able to follow hegemonic policies, notably the United States under Trump and China under Xi. Though China pays lip service to the multilateral system, it seems to be its intention to use the system in order to promote its own interests, rather than the intrinsic value of multilateralism. For the moment a multilateral world is useful as a protection against the other powers as long as the Peoples Republic of China will not be able to be the true Middle Kingdom, the centre of the world. However, as soon as China is strong enough to dominate the globe, it will try to undercut multilateral diplomacy to the level at which it will no longer be an obstacle to Chinese power projection. We saw an example of this after the downfall of the Soviet Union. While the United States needed multilateral diplomacy to contain the USSR before the end of the eighties, the system became a hinderance in the exploit of US power after the Soviet Empire crashed at the beginning of the nineties of the last century. The present free-rider's policies of the United States administration, severely undermining the effectiveness of the international organizations and systems, seems to be more of a temporary nature as a consequence of the reasoning of the former President, Donald Trump. Atomization has the advantage of flexibility and the disadvantage of unpredictability. It enhances the chances of distributive bargaining and undermines the application of integrative bargaining.

It is, of course, difficult to predict how much these two trends in diplomatic negotiation will collide or neutralize each other. However, as warfare is so damaging in our globalizing world – illustrated by the attack of the Russian Federation on sovereign Ukraine - there seems to be no realistic alternative to negotiation as a global tool in governance and conflict resolution. Negotiation is an essential component of the fabric of global governance. It is therefore of vital importance to manage the positive and negative trends in the effectiveness of negotiation processes in such a way that the positive trend will maintain the upper hand. In a world in which two powers China and the US are going to be dominant, the process of negotiation might be less complex than in a multipolar world. However, it will limit the space for other powers like the European Union, India and Japan, to exploit their potential to influence the world by diplomatic means -let alone for the lesser powers of the globe. Diplomatic negotiation as a vehicle to tell others what they should do, comes close to having no real negotiation process at all. A 'dictat' is not a negotiation.

Diplomatic negotiation as a political tool

In order to strengthen diplomatic negotiation as an instrument in international relations, a few recommendations might be of value. Diplomats and civil servants should continue to play different roles, whereby the diplomats' role would have the helicopter's view while specializing in certain niches such as conflict management. However, the formal difference between diplomats and other civil servants working internationally should be diminished and – if possible – disappear. It would be helpful to give both roles the same status and – more importantly – to forge a common culture. One of the tools to create such a common international negotiation culture is to provide diplomats and other civil servants with common education. With the teaching of international relations studies – whether political, legal,

economical or otherwise – at universities all around the world, using English as the *lingua franca* in both education and negotiation, there seems to be no serious obstacle to the rise of an overarching new diplomatic culture in negotiation.

This trend can be further stimulated through early and mid-career training of international negotiators through diplomatic academies (Meerts 1992). Since the 1970s, and for Europe since the 1990s, diplomatic academies and schools of foreign service have met to discuss enhanced cooperation. However, notwithstanding several attempts to do better, little progress in cooperation has been made. The crux is the reform of the organization and the programme of these institutions themselves, which can only be done, of course, by their respective governments. Little investment is needed to make this materialize.

The organization of the forums facilitating negotiation processes could be made more efficient. Again, this would not demand serious investments in money and people, but there are serious constraints of a political nature. As long as countries feel that it is in their interests to cooperate, but that such cooperation diminishes their options to opt out, thereby reducing defence of their vital national interests, such reorganization and streamlining will remain a Utopia, at least as far as top-level negotiations like in the United Nations Security Council are concerned. It is questionable, however, as to what extent these top institutions really count.

Perhaps the underlying negotiation platforms are of much more importance. International negotiations will seldom start at the top. Day-to-day bargaining processes by low-ranking and middle-ranking negotiators will prepare the basis for negotiations at the higher bureaucratic and political levels. Without this preparatory work, the bureaucratic and political leaders would not be able to conclude their treaties. While it is difficult to reform the structures – and even more so the negotiation culture – at the highest levels, it seems to be possible at the working levels.

Finally, the issue of internal negotiation processes should not be overlooked, as internal processes are often more important and more difficult to manage than external. Just as international politics is the reflection of national politics, it might be said that international negotiation is the projection of the national negotiation processes on regional and world politics. In order to enhance the effectiveness of negotiation as an instrument in international politics, internal reforms are needed. On the one hand, this is easier than with external reforms, as there is more control over internal processes; on the other hand, however, these reforms will immediately affect the positions and interests of the bureaucracies and the political systems of a country or an international organization. Enhancing the efficiency of negotiation internally is therefore problematic.

As in the international arena, the bottom-up approach might create more chances for success than a top-down approximation. The problem remains, however, that the decisions to reform the institutions that facilitate the negotiation processes will have to be taken at the top, but they might be influenced in a positive way from the bottom. As crises are often helpful in changing a context, the current shortage of financial means might invoke more streamlining of – and cooperation between – the institutions of the state or international organization. This might in turn help to simplify the negotiation process in order to keep it manageable.

Diplomatic negotiation will remain a country's main instrument, both inside and outside international organizations, for representing its interests and dealing with the problems that it encounters. Diplomatic negotiation will become more important as globalization enhances interdependency and provokes regional and global conflicts. Interdependency is vital for negotiation. Without it, diplomatic negotiation processes could not function.

Government representatives navigate these processes in order to strengthen national interests and/or to manage and solve conflictual situations. Whether chosen or self-appointed, the negotiators and their superiors manage the power that is mandated to them. In that sense they are elite, which automatically distances them from those they represent.

Diplomatic negotiation is therefore an elitist affair and it is not easy for those who are represented to be heard. As negotiation is about compromise and compensation, the interests of the constituency cannot, by definition, be fully materialized. Moreover, the representatives will push for their own interests, being those of their government, their international organization, or themselves and their caucus or clique.

Democratizing diplomatic negotiation is therefore hardly possible. Diplomatic negotiation is ultimately about an oligarchy deciding for those that it represents: about them (Michels 1966), but only insufficiently on behalf of them. The negotiators are a '*negocharchy*' of mutual understanding, with a more or less common '*negoculture*', as they could not be effective otherwise. By definition, their constituency will be unhappy with the processes and outcomes of diplomatic negotiation, while their governments might be suspicious of them in cases where they represent international regimes.

As a consequence, governments will keep the international regimes as weak as possible, while these regimes are needed to substitute trust for control in order to protect the diplomatic negotiation processes and their outcomes. The more diplomatic negotiation processes abound, the more complexity arises, the more regimes are needed to enhance their effectiveness, and the more governments will attempt to restrict the power of the regimes.

This is the *Diplomatic Negotiation Loop*, which will restrain mankind's efforts to solve its problems in a peaceful way at a time when conflicts are multiplying and the use of force is inadequate and harmful for international society. Construction and destruction go hand in hand. Diplomatic negotiation remains the most useful tool for dealing with it. Increasing our understanding of diplomatic negotiation processes will only serve to decrease misunderstandings and increase our effectiveness in settling future disputes successfully.

Diplomatic negotiation as 'war by peaceful means' evolved from bilateral negotiation through unilateral negotiation – that is negotiation between a limited number of the most powerful states – to multilateral conferences and institutions. In recent years politicians like Donald Trump attempted to undermine multilateralism with some measure of success. However, multilateralism is much needed in the intertwined world of today and tomorrow, that it is unlikely to wither away. Bilateralism and unilateralism – inside and outside multilateral systems – might become more prominent, but they cannot fully replace encompassing regimes like the United Nations. Multilateral, unilateral and bilateral negotiations are all needed to settle disputes in a peaceful manner. Depending on the situation, one of them – or a mix of the three of them – will be used to mitigate conflicts and to arrive at collective policy making.

Diplomatic negotiation in today's security crisis in Europe

At the beginning of 2022, the first major crisis between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), Ukraine and the Russian Federation in thirty years is a serious test for the fabric of diplomatic negotiation in Europe. Will diplomacy, will negotiation, be able to put an end to this war before Ukraine will be subdued to the Russian Federation? Will it be able to safeguard the independence of a middle power like Ukraine? What can be expected? If negotiation is war by peaceful means, then the present situation in and around

Ukraine can be described as negotiation by warlike means. The negotiation fabric of Europe is hardly adequate in preventing a power-shift that would upset the European security structure created after World War II and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Let alone to survive a nuclear war.

In order to understand the positions of the parties it might be useful to briefly look into the interests of the concerned parties. Before the Russian invasion Ukraine has been more or less ignored by the other powers to a point that it could hardly to be considered to be at the table, but rather to be 'on the menu'. This is a very uncomfortable situation being reminiscent of Poland before its partitioning by the surrounding powers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to be driven by incapacity to accept the loss of so much Soviet territory in 1991, regions that were part of Tsarist Russia for centuries, apart from Western Ukraine which has been under Russian rule for only half a century. Decolonization is difficult to swallow, as we saw in Great Britain and France. Even if the Russian moves are conscious attempts to regain parts of the lost lands, at least by bringing them under its influence again, it might well be that the process started by President Putin will overwhelm him and drag him into entrapment. It will be difficult to stop, but it seems to be in his interest to do so. Putin still has the steering wheel, but things can change dramatically and lead to his downfall.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has only a small window of opportunity: driving the Russians out of Ukrainian territory and if this doesn't work, to keep them where they are now. He can probably stick to this strategy for a long time if NATO and the EU will sustain his position. And that is what they do indeed. NATO countries, even Germany, are now sending modern weaponry that will stop Russian advances and might help the Ukrainians to stay put and perhaps to regain some lost regions. But with the present destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure, houses and its military basis it is questionable how long Zelensky can sustain his position. Russia's resources are enormous, but the will of the Ukrainian people to continue fighting is very substantial as well.

The United States and NATO, which in the Russian eyes are identical twins, are not only concerned about the Ukrainian crisis for its own sake, but even more for the danger of spreading the crisis to NATO countries with sizable Russian minorities like Latvia and Estonia. If NATO would allow for the Ukrainian precedence to lead to secession of Russian territories in Eastern Latvia and even Riga, as well as in Eastern Estonia (Narva), NATO as well as the US would lose all their credibility and thereby their negotiation position. Or worse, NATO might implode, leaving other Eastern European member states and non-member states (Finland) at the mercy of Russia and thereby of authoritarian and foreign rule. At the other end of the equation there has to be reckoned with a Ukrainian scenario in Central Asia as well. Kazakhstan's Northern regions have a vast majority of Russian populous. It is not a coincidence that President Nazerbajev moved the capital up-North.

All this would have an even more severe impact on the European Union. The EU could then be blackmailed like the Federal Republic of Germany has (to some extent) been taken hostage by the German Democratic Republic and now by its dependence on Russian energy resources. In turn, the EU would lose its negotiation position as well and more than that. Although the EU is careful not to provoke Russia too much because of its fear of further escalation of the war and of course as of its dependency on Russian gas, the member states seem to be rather determined to stick together in a common position. In a way the outside threat is Godsend for the EU (and for NATO) at a time where civil society has doubts about the usefulness of these organizations, fearing too much centralization and too many expenditures.

Outside threats create internal unity. This is both true for the Russian Federation, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In a way this strengthens their negotiation positions in the Ukrainian crisis. We noticed already that this threat has an adverse effect on Ukraine itself, but is also very detrimental to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. OSCE contains all actors mentioned above, thus theoretically it should be the negotiation organization that could bridge the gaps and bring the parties together. However, it can only deal with those issues that the main powers and the most powerful international organizations allow for.

It is telling that, although Russia is an integral partner of the OSCE and actually the power that took the initiative of the creation of its predecessor (CSCE, Helsinki Final Act 1975), it did not prevent OSCE monitors from being taken hostage in Eastern Ukraine. OSCE, the pan-European negotiation framework to deal with these kinds of crisis situations, is powerless. It proves again that negotiation will only be effective if major powers decide to move in the same direction and this will only happen if their interests converge. This convergence can, in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, only materialize if these powers foresee or experience so much damage to their interests that they will stop the present developments.

Negotiation remains an essential ingredient in managing today's crisis. Nevertheless, it will be a difficult bargaining process. It is well known that to negotiate with the Russians is tough, as has been analysed in PINpoints # 36/2011. This analysis also showed, however, that in the end the Russians will balance their advantages and disadvantages in the present crisis. The question then remains to what extent today's events are an ad hoc hick-up or a structural problem. It seems that Vladimir Putin will accept the disadvantages in order to get what he wants: reunification of East-Slavic orthodoxy within one state composed of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

It might therefore be a structural problem. Looking back over the centuries, we see Russia throwing itself into Central Europe (1813, 1945) and outside Central Europe (1917, 1991) in a kind of regular tide. But this time the tide would be extremely short as Russia – and more importantly its political and business elite – have so many vested interests in a reasonable relationship with the rest of Europe, North-America and Central and East-Asia. This means, however, that changing the internal situation in Post-Putin Russia into a more democratic one cannot be expected for the moment. Some will say this will never happen anyway. In short: negotiation is after all a two level-game and in this crisis more than ever. Let's hope that the diplomatic negotiators will be able to let words prevail over weapons, foremost nuclear weapons.

However, authors like Mark Leonard foresee a world of 'unpeace', meaning that we live in a world of permanent tension as a consequence of rising frictions, born out of an evermore connected world. He calls this the curse of connectivity. On the one hand we need connectedness for our well-being, on the other hand it can be misused by those who seek to dominate others (Leonard (2022)).

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The EU and the "New Eurasian Normal"

Rudolf Schuessler

That the world is in a state of international disorder is a constant lament these days. Many members of the American-led community of states fear that this disorder marks the transition to a new world order in which the West will play a far less dominant role than anytime in the last two centuries. This essay is a variation on this theme in three movements. I will first highlight two current developments (out of many more). Then I will argue that the first, the rise of Asia, leads to "the New Eurasian Normal", that is, a power distribution on the Eurasian continent which once again resembles the conditions that prevailed for many centuries before European powers attained an exceptional superiority in the nineteenth century. Moreover, as I will conjecture, a key set of players in the new world order will again come from the Eurasian continent. No African or South American power seems poised to become a major power player in the new order in the next decades (so much for BRICS). An important exception to "the New Eurasian Normal" is the United States. On the one hand, as a former settler colony, whose elites were exclusively of European origin, they might be regarded as a European power in all but geographical location. On the other hand, the U.S. are not just another European power but a global superpower and still the protector of Europe as a whole, something no European power ever achieved. When I discuss the implications of "the New Eurasian Normal" for the EU in my third movement (in two parts), changes in the role of the U.S. will therefore need to be considered.

China and the rise of Asia.

What I expound below as return to the Eurasian Normal marks the end of the Eurocentric power system of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cold War and American prevalence after 1945 are presumably the last transmutation of this system. The system has been challenged early in the twentieth century by the rise of Japan as an industrial power and its ability to militarily defeat Russia, one of Europe's five great powers (Connaughton 1988, on extra-European perception, see Mishra 2012). Japan went on to challenge the Eurocentric power system but was in WWII defeated by the United States, at the same time the protector of European cultural attitudes and economic practices, and the heir of European power. The next blow to Western hegemony was less the formation of the Peoples Republic of China than its ability to build nuclear weapons (1964). Add to this the subsequent construction of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan. The Asian continent now counts more nuclear powers than Europe. Decolonization, by contrast, marked the end of old-style European but not of Western hegemony, because this transition was regarded by the United States to be

in its own best economic interest. Insofar, the economic success of East Asian economic 'tiger states' (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) did not challenge the prevailing system in principle, although a shift in relative economic power towards Asia became ostensible. The most important next step was the economic rise of China since the late 1970s (Fenby 2019; Mühlhahn 2019). By 2001, when China entered the WTO, an economic colossus had arisen, which proceeded on its way to challenge the United States in sheer production power. What is more, China caught up technologically with the Western powers, as had other Asian countries before. This inevitably has consequences for the military balance, which are still in the process of unfolding.

It is a disputed question whether China is by now the equal of the United States in economic power. In the military dimension, China still appears to be significantly inferior to the U.S. (Heginbotham et al. 2015). But the United States did not win its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and therefore this advantage might rather be moot. China may not be able to win a war in Taiwan against American opposition, but already in the 1950s and 60s, the United States were not able to win wars in Korea and Vietnam against Chinese opposition. More pertinent might be the fact that the US-led world still leads with respect to some key future technologies which China can not produce on its own. However, it is not clear how long this advantage will last. Most likely, the age of Western superiority is over. The process which started in Meiji Japan in 1868 is approaching completion.

Except if one thing happens... If the West sustainedly manages to increase its technological lead in the ongoing technological embargo war against China, it may regain hegemony (Lee 2018). Western hegemony is therefore not done with, but the path to its preservation is narrow, steep, and uncertain. However, success is only impending if the key innovations come from Western countries and can be prevented from spreading by anti-globalist economic policies of a long-abandoned mercantilist bent. If India, for instance, would excel in cutting edge chip production, the strategic scenario changes considerably. Nobody knows the future, but if we want to correct for cultural bias, we should not expect that the West will inevitably retain a lead in technologies for which all vie.

The uncertain role of the United States.

During the Cold War and the unipolar 1990s, the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon for its allies (see, e.g., Lundestad 2003). It excelled as paragon liberal democratic power, even for observers ready to depict its warts and all (racism, 'our sons of a bitch', etc.), setting an example which its allies aspired to emulate. The historically first big democracy remained the lighthouse of democracy for two hundred years after its foundation. Beyond this, the United States acted as a global public goods provider. With its military power and economic clout, it established a global regime of free markets and resource flow, from which allies profited without having to pay a proportionate share for protecting common resources. With a few exceptions in the 1970s, the unimpeded flow of oil, the key energy resource of Western economies, was safeguarded by the United States. The strategic deal of the Western alliance was therefore 'allegiance in exchange for public good provision' no less than 'allegiance in exchange for military protection'. For the United States, this deal was profitable because geopolitically and economically it could not afford to lose Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union, the rival superpower. Moreover, since the Soviet Union was no serious economic competitor to the United States, provision of free markets and military protection went hand in hand with hegemony on world markets.

For a while now, the outlined Western security formula has lost its appeal for the United States. Not only has the Soviet Union and its empire disappeared but China and other Asian states have arisen as competitors with economic clout. Protection of global markets does not unequivocally result anymore in filling the pockets of the United States. NATO partners, which profit from the protection of global economic institutions and markets, are therefore naturally called up to contribute more to the provision of the public goods from which they profit. The ongoing war in Ukraine underlines this message. The 'Russian bear' being on the prowl, the 'European sheep' are flocking back to the American fold, where they expect to be protected.

Yet, whether this signals a happy end to NATO's woes is not so clear. First, it is much more doubtful than ever in the post-WW II era that the United States can control the flow of crucial resources and raw products to the European economies on top of securing them for itself. A certain independence-mindedness in the Arabian Gulf is a sign that relations of dominance have changed, and some crucial raw materials come, of all places, from China. Europeans may expect only to be served after the US economy has had its meal, and thus a period of potential scarcity replaces an era of (only scarcely interrupted) global resource affluence.

Given the specter of 'America first', internal developments in the United States appear utterly disquieting. Since the beginning of the 21st century, party competition in the United States has become so acerbic that it begins to matter to other nations much more than before which party is in power. If you had asked a European politician in 1960, 1970, or 1980 whether the United States will still be a democracy in ten years, the answer would have been 'yes, beyond doubt', and the question would have been considered strange. Since 6 January 2021, this is no longer the case. It is no longer beyond doubt that the United States will remain a democracy as we know it in the West. Such uncertainties must alter the view of the United States' allies on their hegemon and protector.

"The New Eurasian Normal".

If we sum up the developments described above, they might be described as a return to a bipolar global order. In a way, this new bipolarity is compounded by an internal partisan bipolar disorder of the United States, the premier super-power. Other superpowers besides the US and China do not yet, or no longer exist. Russia may be counted as a semi-superpower, because of its enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons. It surely lacks the economic clout which in the present international system is necessary to form a full superpower. Only economic strength can keep superpowers abreast of each other in their competition for new technologies and advanced arms production. No superpower can keep a significant number of allies in line by military threats alone. However, we should not forget the 'middle powers' which are very important for shaping the outlook of a new world order if, as likely, a return to a rigid two bloc model akin to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cold War proves elusive. Since the competition between the U.S. and China is at least as much economic as military, middle powers *ceteris paribus* are incentivized to seek the best of trade with both giants. It is therefore likely that they will not meticulously toe the lines of a mercantilist and self-protective Western bloc. This in turn indicates that the concept of a new bipolarity is dangerously misleading, besides the fact that bipolarity has always in a sense been a too narrow concept. The concept of Cold War bipolarity neglects the non-aligned states, among which China and India were the strongest. The new bipolarity between the United States and China is too narrow in a different way. One might think that the Global South which filled the ranks of the non-aligned movement

is still there to complement the new bipolarity between the United States and the formerly non-aligned China. But the new middle powers do not seek strength in numbers as the non-aligned states did. They bid for power on their own, hedging their bid by seeking support from a few other middle powers. In this, they act like traditional great powers. Moreover, many of the more successful rising middle powers have once been great powers or 'gun powder' empires - the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires in the 18th and 20th centuries (see, e.g., Lorge 2008; Pines, Biran, and Rüpke 2021).

This is from where the idea of a New Eurasian Normal arises. The idea differs from the New Concert of Powers promoted by Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan (Haass and Kupchan 2021). The New Concert has six members (U.S., EU, Russia, China, India, and Japan). Interestingly, all of them are from Eurasia, too. Yet, from the perspective of a New Eurasian Normal, reliance on six powers is too limited for adequate power balancing. Moreover, Japan was an internationally passive player for the most time of Eurasian power interactions and it probably will remain passive as long as its current non-aggressive foreign policy continues. Thus, we better look at Eurasian power relations a bit more broadly.

Before the nineteenth century, a variety of non-European states rivaled or even exceeded Western/European states in power. Think of China, Japan, various Indian principalities (e.g., the Moghul Empire), Iran, and the Ottoman Empire. This set of great powers was a constant on the Eurasian continent since at least the fifteenth or sixteenth century, that is, since the threat of wide-roaming, non-sedentary invaders on horseback became negligible. All of the mentioned powers emerged on the Eurasian continent, understood here as a geographical concept that merges Europe and Asia. Of course, other non-European great powers might be added, some on and others not on the Eurasian continent. Arabian societies for instance, were central to the spread of Islam and they became oil powers in the twentieth century. But only the above-mentioned great powers remained powerful throughout the early modern era, in particular between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries (i.e., a 'long' early modern era).

Moreover, Eurasian great powers stood in complex relations of competition and cooperation with each other. They fought each other, or intended to, and used coalitions and pacts with other great powers to project their own power. Each of the non-European powers cooperated or fought with European great powers, not least because the European maritime expansion or Russian expansion in Siberia brought them into contact. Japan is the one power which closed itself almost completely to European influences, but only after adopting European technologies for its 1592–1598 invasion of Korea, which was meant as a step towards the conquest of China. It is well possible that Toyotomi Hideyoshi conceived his imperialist plans with the early modern Western expansion in mind (Totman 1995; Hawley 2008).

It might seem unfair, in the present context, to neglect African powers and to surmise that all non-European great powers of the early modern era were Eurasian. Ethiopia was arguably also a great power throughout most of the period, and it also stood in contact with Europe. The same might be said of Morocco. In South America, there were no indigenous empires after the destruction of the Inca, but the Iroquois federation in North America is sometimes called an empire (Barr 2006). Hence, we should take care not to claim that there were no great powers in the early modern period outside Eurasia. When reference is made to a New Eurasian Normal, the point is rather to emphasize the reemergence of the classic Asian powers (all of them early modern 'gunpowder' empires). China, Japan, India and Pakistan, Iran, Turkey (as successor to the Ottoman empire) are, with the probable exception of Japan, again aspiring to great power status with economic and/or military clout.

It also deserves to be emphasized that the concept of a New Eurasian Normal is not linked to a mythical or ideological Eurasianism. Eurasianism as an ideology flourished in the early twentieth century, distancing itself from Europeanism (Bassin and Pozo 2017; Conrad and Sachsenmaier 2007). The latter builds on Western Christian or enlightenment values and celebrates Western civilization. Orthodox Russian thinkers, who felt excluded or repelled by Europeanism, answered with a turn to Asia and a celebration of the Russian World. This sort of Eurasianism has recently been revived in Russia and became a potent element in the mix of ideologemes fostering Russia's invasion of Ukraine. By contrast, Eurasia is merely used here as a geographical concept bereft of spiritual meaning. It is also employed without backing by traditional geopolitics, with its concept of a Eurasian 'heartland', or the claim that whoever rules Eurasia will rule the world (Flint 2006).

So, why use an ideology- and history-laden concept such as Eurasia, which invites misunderstandings, instead of just referring to old-new Asian great powers? The point is that the Asian powers always stood in a power balance with European powers. Throughout the early modern period, Eurasian powers played an important role for the European balance of power, so that we need a concept that is able to express this interlocked state of affairs. The Ottoman Empire and France conspired against the Habsburgs. Diplomatic and economic overtures were made to Iran to fight the Ottomans in their east and thus to help defend Europe. In fact, the Ottomans were effectively kept out of the Thirty Years War by such policies. The Mughals were wooed by the French and English, who both looked for Indian allies in their wars. China did not engage in European wars, but Catholic and Protestant missionary activities in China and Asia did potentially affect the balance of power in Europe, as might best be learned from projects that did not come to fruition. With Japan in view, as indicated, Jesuits developed plans of a joint Japanese-Spanish seaborne operation against China, which was never carried out (Hosne 2015). Hence, we might speak of a vast network of Eurasian power balances that affected each other. There never existed a European balance of power in isolation from its larger Eurasian parent. By contrast, overseas balancing with other regions was more incidental and less intimately integrated in the European balance of power. In the eighteenth century, North American indigenous powers began to affect the European balance, most notably by helping spark the Seven Years War (Schumann and Schweizer 2012). However, the respective indigenous powers had not much influence on the European balance before or after.

Finally, the concept of a New Eurasian Normal seems well-suited to challenge current views on international relations which are fashionable in the EU. This is a further reason to adopt the concept for analytical reasons.

The EU.

The EU is one of the international actors whose future role in a new world order is among the most difficult to predict for the simple reason that the future of the EU is generally very difficult to predict even in roughest outline. There is no guarantee that the EU will survive the next three decades in its present shape and form of organization. It seems, in my view, quite probable that the EU will look rather different in thirty years. It will either be much more integrated, or it will break apart into smaller units which, however, remain connected in various ways to each other. The idea of a Europe of different speeds and propensities of integration seems highly plausible as an answer to sclerosis, mutual blockade, and economic sluggishness in the present EU. The architecture of the EU has largely been designed to

thwart the domination of member states by other member states. A complex and intricate network of regulations, checks, and balances ensures that no member state of the EU can become a hegemon with respect to other member states. Before 2015, there had been talk of Germany as a hegemonic power in the EU, simply because Germany is the economic hub of the Eurozone and the Single European Market. Some politicians may even have begun to believe this narrative. Yet, the events of 2015 and the inability of the German chancellor Angela Merkel to compel various other EU members to adopt her most favored solution to the virulent refugee problem shows that any talk of German political hegemony in the EU is rather vacuous. The EU is set up as an anti-hegemonic enterprise, which is good news given the level of conflict that hegemonic aspirations historically have caused in Europe.

One of the EU's key problems, however, results from the downside of its anti-hegemonic institutions and norms. As a consequence of this outlook, too many policy approaches can be blocked too easily, and it is too difficult to implement policies of economic dynamization or programs which turn the EU into a power to be globally reckoned with. How a compromise might be struck between, on the one hand, security against internal hegemonic aspirations and, on the other hand, economic growth and external power projection is 'the million Euro question' for the EU.

So far, the EU has had just one successful instrument of power projection, and this is offering outside states EU membership. The limited reach of this instrument is obvious. It is largely limited to the EU's geographical neighborhood, and it compounds the internal problems of an already large EU. For the rest, the EU hopes to conduct a coherent and at the same time powerful foreign policy by means of moral suasion and the spread of liberal democratic values (Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Mayer and Vogt 2006). Lacking hard power, the EU tries to make the best of its soft power aspiring to become a veritable 'normative power' on a global scale (Manners 2002; Moravcsik 2004). A test case for this approach is the EU's neighborhood policy (ENP) aimed at creating a ring of likeminded friends around the EU (Schumacher and Marchetti 2018). In fact, however, the success of the ENP is rather limited. Although many observers will deny that it is the fault of ENP policies, several countries in the EU neighborhood have become more autocratic. Few became more democratic and less corrupt, and wars in the region proliferated. Success looks different. Maybe this is a reason to reconsider the high-minded missionary approach of EU foreign policies, following the adage that well-meant is often the opposite of well-done.

At this point we should again ponder "the New Eurasian Normal". If the set of powers on the Eurasian continent (plus or minus some) is to resemble the traditional premodern power constellation, ideas of power balancing regain their importance. By contrast, modern institutional theories of international order, to which the EU missionary vision is wedded, want to drop the concept of a power balance, which they regard as anachronistic. Judgments of anachronism, however, presuppose that their author knows the course of history. A firm belief in a predictable course of history is, indeed, reflected by many political statements of the promoters of democracy building abroad. They see themselves as the vanguard of history and do not doubt that opponents and skeptics will be overtaken by history's course. Unfortunately, history has a habit of disappointing observers who all too confidently believe to know its path. We may well face a future in which balances of power are again as inevitable for avoiding conflict (which is not to say that they will always be successful) as they were before the U.S. emerged as predominant global power. The EU should therefore prepare itself for dealing with a New Eurasian Normal despite its historicist convictions. This is, of course, only part of the larger picture. An emerging new world order may generally require

different responses from the EU than an order in which protection was provided more or less for free by the U.S.. If a morally imperialist EU should choose to back its idealistic normative aspirations with hard military force, it will very likely experience a series of wars some of which might end with crushing defeats in various theaters of intervention. Acknowledging a New Eurasian Normal might help to prevent such bloody experiments. The EU ought to remember that the rise of Asian powers raises a traditional specter of repercussions for Europe's internal balance. As indicated, a European balance of power did never exist before the nineteenth century independently of a larger Eurasian balance. In the same way, it is difficult to conceive of an internal European balance between EU member states independently of relations to Russia and Türkiye. These will in turn be influenced by Iran and India. We may add Israel and the Arab Gulf States, just to signal that "the New Eurasian Normal" forms only the core of a Eurasian order. In any case, the chain of power balances on the Eurasian continent remains a concern. The balances of India and Russia will traditionally be influenced by China, but there is also the new role of China as second global superpower to be accounted for. Of course, we might envisage a focus on a geographically more diverse spectrum of EU foreign relations, without special emphasis on Eurasian balances. However, it is one of the main theses of this essay that the Eurasian balance will probably stand head and shoulders above other multilateral concerns of the EU, except for its dealings with the United States.

Non-domination.

What can the EU do to prepare for history taking another course than liberal democrats' most favored one? One answer which I find interesting involves a modification of the EU's normative framework but not the abandonment of democratic values. There are democratic values which are better compatible with power balancing than the present idealistic approach. For a few decades now, political philosophers and theorists of democracy have discussed the value of non-domination as core value of the Western democratic tradition (Pettit 1997; Gädeke 2017; Bellamy 2019). Non-domination signifies that the citizens of democratic states should live under the rule of law and be protected from arbitrary domination by the mighty at home or abroad. It should be emphasized that the value of non-domination is mainly promoted by theorists who defend democratic freedoms, which they understand as freedom from domination. Nevertheless, the value of non-domination is easily combined with the idea of striking a balance. This is most immediately the case with respect to the balance between internal non-domination in a state and the external non-domination of states. Citizens may consciously and consistently prefer less internal freedom if this helps to reduce the external domination of their community by powerful other states. Liberal democratic theory is ill-suited to deal with this kind of tradeoff, which may well become important in the context of balances of power. In contrast to non-domination, human rights only pertain to individuals and are never the rights of states. Theories of non-domination may therefore offer a normative framework which helps Western democracies to cope with a new world order, especially if the latter should not fit their ideals.

This is not to say that theories of non-domination fail to distinguish between autocratic and democratic states as international partners. They can conceptualize a limited tradeoff between internal and external non-domination but cannot accept the amount of internal arbitrary domination characteristic of autocracies. However, allowing for an extension of normatively legitimate partnerships in the international arena (as already envisaged by John Rawls in the *Law of Peoples*) beyond one's own image and likeness is an important step, especially if the idealistic and moralistic alternative should prove unrealistic. It makes a difference whether

EU diplomats and negotiators are mandated to lecture their hosts about how they should behave, or to recognize that non-domination does not only extend to citizens but also to the non-domination of foreign states by the EU. With this balance in mind, EU diplomats and negotiators might find it easier to become less overbearing and more insightful dialogue partners, not least if they must engage in haphazard balancing of power. Traditional power balancing has to a considerable extent been guided by the aim of not wanting to be dominated by other states. Of course, EU diplomats might find it natural anyway to switch to a more realistic stance if their high-minded moral mission proves elusive. It might nevertheless be helpful and more credible to be able to do so without stark hypocrisy. Hence, it makes sense to reflect not only on a realistic alternative to high idealistic aspirations, but also on a normative alternative which offers coherence to a more realistic approach without sacrifice of a core value like non-domination.

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Africa's problems and Europe's politics

Mark Anstey

Introduction

We live now in a fragmenting world order in which three superpowers are aggressively testing spheres of influence, liberal democracies are being rolled back and the institutions intended to be guardians of world peace are divided and in disarray. We are certainly not at Fukuyama's (1992) 'end of history'. Identity tensions are ubiquitous. Incompatible groups find themselves uncomfortably clustered within boundaries designed by foreign powers in past eras; some groups are without a state; 65 states are building walls to keep alien others out (Marshall 2018), others use firewalls to keep out unwanted news or ideas. Groups such as the Rohingyas are being pushed out by hostile states; many others (at least 60) are seeking to break out in the face of state resistance (Faraz). The forces that brought us closer together (globalism, the internet), are also those driving us apart (Leonard 2022).

The Mediterranean has long been understood as the epicentre of modern western civilizations – a point at which continents meet, from where great religions and systems of law and government emanate – and of course, as a region of great conflicts. Around the shores of the Mediterranean are 7 democracies, 7 partly free and 7 not free states (Freedom House 2022). It is a neighbourhood of uncertainty and conflict. To the north Europe is in a period of political revision in terms of the shape of its democracies, its regional coherence, its influence and direct and indirect involvement with the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and responses to the flow of millions of migrants and refugees now pushing into its territories. To the East and to the South lie the problems, violent conflicts and political instability of the Middle East and North Africa. The embers of the Arab Spring flare up in dreadful unfinished wars in Syria and Yemen; the long conflict between Israel and Palestine remains unresolved. This short paper considers the impact of African realities on the Mediterranean region.

Africa

Africa's problems of poverty, famine, political instability, clan and sectarian violence, and civil wars are not likely to diminish into the future. They are the drivers of regular and irregular emigration from Africa into Europe – and in a systemically linked world are changing the shape of European politics.

North Africa

The collapse of regimes across North Africa during the so-called Arab Spring has rolled out into now twelve years of political instability, bloody civil wars, coups and repressive governments in tribal and sectarian struggles for dominance. *Tunisia's* democratic promise after the upheavals of 2011 is in abeyance. In July 2021, following popular protests President Kais Saied dismissed the prime minister, suspended parliament, and appointed Najla Bouden as Prime Minister tasked with forming a government. It now comprises unelected officials and an uncertain return to a democracy with elections planned for December 2022. *Egypt's* post-Mubarak experience of an elected government in 2011 was brief, collapsing in a military coup after bitter constitutional contests between Islamic and liberal elements erupted into violence. The stability of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's Presidency since 2014 is premised on military power. Fundamental incompatibilities between Islamists and secularists raise questions as to Egypt's prospects of ever finding stability through democratic means. To Egypt's south Omar Bashir was eventually toppled from *Sudan's* Presidency after 26 years in power, but the military (after an internal purge) has pushed out the civilian element in the country's transitional government. *Libya's* civil war since 2011 did not end with the ousting of Qaddafi, with warring factions collapsing various attempts to establish a stable government. Refusing to accept secular dominance, Islamist lawmakers denied the legitimacy of an elected House of Representatives (HoR), and drove it out of Tripoli to Tobruk. UN supported peace-making efforts between the Tripoli and Tobruk factions through 2015 saw progress in getting parties to agree to the creation of an inclusive democratic state, with a rule of law and separation of powers. A fragile but UN recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) emerged but came under attack in April 2019 by forces under General Khalifa Haftar's National Liberation Army supported by UAE, Egypt, Sudan and Russia. A permanent ceasefire signed to end the war on 23 October 2020 has failed, and the parliament fell into factionalism and was burned down by protestors on 2 July 2022. Tribal leaders have shut down the country's largest oil field. *Algeria's* struggles against colonialism and for independence (1954-1962), saw great loss of life followed by military government. Wars between Islamic fundamentalists and secularists were eventually settled in a ceasefire October 1997 that allowed elections in 1999 bringing Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the Presidency – but he then resisted leaving office until 2019 when he submitted to pressure, and Abdelmadjid Tebboune assumed the presidency. *Morocco's* constitutional monarchy has evolved since independence in 1956 but conflict with Western Sahara remains unresolved and protests for further reforms continue despite constitutional changes following protest actions in the 2011-12 period.

Sub-Saharan Africa

In Diamond's theory of differential development the massive natural barrier of the Sahara saw inter-civilizational progress restricted over a long period to east-west-north trajectories – the south was left behind (Diamond 2006). Comprising 46 of the continent's 54 states sub-Saharan Africa is a region of severe economic problems, thousands of clans and continuing political instability. While the proportion of the world's population living in absolute poverty declined to 10% in 2015, in Africa it has remained at a stubborn 40% (416 million). The region comprises 27 of the world's 28 poorest nations. Average incomes are 10% of those of the developed world; life spans are twenty years shorter; the average child spends only 6 years in school against 12 in the developed world. The region's population estimated at 118m in 1900 has risen to 1,3bn and is projected to reach 2,5bn in 2050 – from 6,5%, to 16% and 25% of the world population. Economic optimists declare this makes the region a future of

high potential consumerism, and investment. But this seems unlikely – the sub-continent is development needy but not development ready. Population growth continuously exceeds GDP and productivity growth nullifying prosperity; the population lacks education, those with higher education often migrate, capital bases are weak, infrastructure is lacking, the region is aid dependent. Critics argue that the USD 1,4trillion received across sub-Saharan Africa since 1956 has had little impact.

Since independence the continent has experienced over 200 coup attempts, half of them successful... and it is not a trend that is disappearing. Since 2010 the continent has experienced 46 attempted coups, with successes in Niger (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Central African Republic, Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2015, 2022, 2022), Zimbabwe (2017), Sudan (2019, 2021), Mali (2012, 2020, 2021), Guinea (2021). There has of course been progress in many cases with a rise also in the number of elected governments, but democracies across the continent are fragile in the context of poverty, cultural cleavages and beliefs, and identity tensions.

Across the Sahel states struggle with Afro-Islamic tensions and criminal actions by powerful extremist groups. In many cases boundaries have poor fit with clan and tribal loyalties eroding capacity to build coherent national identities and undertake long-term nation building projects. Liberal democracies only really took root in the West over the last century following a very long history of bloodshed, very particular shapes of political compromise through time and in the context of economic growth. It advocates liberal democratic values in developing countries with very different cultures and contexts. Packages of *democracy* and *development* seem obvious for long-term stability but in the short and medium term are conflict-generative. Development of course is essential if Africa is to be lifted out of the quagmire of poverty and conflict in which it currently exists - but it is inherently disruptive of traditional social, political and economic systems, seeing new powerholders, technologies of control and urbanization. Democracy too can result in floundering political stability and hinder the implementation of long-term development planning.

How Africa's problems are reshaping European politics

Reduced leverage on human rights advocacy

The United Nations is failing in its role as a global guardian of peace and human rights with Security Council members deeply divided over such wars as those in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, but also actively fuelling them even as they despatch envoys to mediate some of them. Offers of 'no strings' assistance for economic development by Russia, China and various Arab states are more attractive to many struggling leaders in Africa than those on offer from the West. Packages premised on a development before democracy (if ever) logic ... indirectly buy support (votes against western positions or abstentions) in international institutions. China's emergence as a superpower is reflected in the leverage it has achieved across African states. The UN's Human Rights Council recently voted not to even debate its outgoing Commissioner Bachelet's detailed report of human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims in China¹ (abstentions and 'against' votes included 12 African states). The composition of the

¹ 17 voted in favour of a debate, 19 against, 11 abstained. **In favour** (17): Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, Paraguay, Poland, Republic of Korea, Somalia, United Kingdom and United States. **Against** (19): Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Eritrea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Senegal, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. **Abstentions** (11): Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Brazil, Gambia, India, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico and Ukraine.

Human Rights Council of course is strange comprising many states that do not respect human rights.

African migration

Political instability, violent conflict, climate change, desertification, famine, economic mismanagement, and have seen a global displacement of 100m people (30m since 2019), of which 35m are refugees. Climate change that has already forcibly displaced 21,5m people could see 1,2bn displaced by 2050. About a third of the world's IDPs and refugees (30 million) are from Africa, mostly from DRC, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia and Nigeria (UNHCR 2022). North Africa accounts for the majority of documented migrants to Europe, with 5m of 11m from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (OCHA 2022).

Europe of course is more open to those migrants most needed in Africa: those with wealth and education. African development is hindered by a flight of capital (up to 40% of African wealth is estimated to lie offshore), and the migration of its educated and professional classes (up to 70000 each year). But numbers are swollen by those running away from poverty and war – at risk at home and unwanted where they want to go. The central Mediterranean route saw a surge of +82% in 2021: only 470 into Malta, but over 41000 arrivals into Italy (mostly from Libya and Tunisia). The western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes have seen 25852 arrivals in Spain (mostly from Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal). The EU humanitarian and development budget directed at helping forcibly displaced people (EU 2021:17 & 19) is unlikely to stem the flow of people seeking refuge in Europe.

Who are 'we'? Europe and the politics of immigration

Immigration has become a core element in the reshaping of European politics. Firstly, there is concern over numbers and the impact of 'irregular' migrants on economies in terms of welfare and other costs. Malta for instance finds itself as the fourth most densely populated country on earth also carrying duties of care as a first country of arrival in the case of many migrants. Secondly, there is rising resistance to migrants from 'other cultures', and particularly Muslims. European nations around and in the Mediterranean are the 'meat in the sandwich' on the issue of migration, caught between a push from the south and the east and resistance from the north.

European response to immigration pressures

Tolerance of other cultures is one thing 'over there', another altogether when it 'is right here'. Murray foresees the end of Europe as we know it, suggesting an erosion of traditional identities that will not be recovered. *"The world is coming to Europe at precisely the moment that Europe has lost sight of what it is. And while the movement of people from other cultures into a strong and assertive culture might have worked, the movement of millions of people into a guilty, jaded and dying culture cannot ... If Europe is going to become a home for the world it must search for a definition of itself that is wide enough to encompass the world ... (meaning) ... that our values become so wide as to become meaninglessly shallow."* (Murray, 2018:7) His argument is essentially that Europe is attractive to Muslims because it offers space to be Muslim (tolerance), but it is offering space to many who have no interest in integration. Where in

the past European identity lay in a very specific history and set of beliefs, values, philosophy, approaches to government and the rule of law today it has become about tolerance, respect and diversity ... to the extent of self-denial. The concerns expressed by Murray cannot simply be dismissed – he articulates the fears and resentments of millions across Europe as rapidly rising numbers of displaced people seek refuge in Europe. And they are the fears that inform sharp changes in political sentiment across Europe.

Europe is struggling with itself on the issue of migrants – particularly ‘irregular’ migrants – and the realities of multi-cultural societies. It has been a significant factor in the retreat from liberal democracy, and the rise of populism across Western states consequent to a pushback by sections of society against a political and economic elite who they fear no longer listens to them as voters ‘at home’. Rising numbers of people feel somehow disenfranchised despite their votes, and want not less but more democracy in the form of referendums (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018: xxi). Researchers conclude that many fear the impact of globalism, the effects of rates of immigration on traditional cultures and identity, and resentment over perceptions of rising inequality. This has given rise to *distrust* of politicians who seem no longer to listen to voters; fears of *destruction* of a sense of national identity; perceptions of relative *deprivation* in the context of rising inequalities of income and wealth; and to *dealignment* with traditional political parties. These are the drivers that have seen a rise in populism from both left and right of the political spectrum. Chua (2018; 2019) argues that a dangerous disintegration is underway in Western societies with a wide spectrum of special interest (tribal) groups all making claims against one another and claiming discrimination.

The roll back in liberal democracy over the last fifteen years (Freedom House) is now powerfully in evidence across Europe and in the USA. In *Italy*, Giorgia Meloni has become the country’s first female prime minister as leader of the largest party in a coalition, but also its most conservative, championing curbs on immigration, LGBTQ+ and abortion rights. The Sweden Democrats, a party with early roots in neo-Nazism won the second largest share of seats in a general election displacing the Social Democrats to lead government in *Sweden* (CNN 2022). *Hungary* under Viktor Orban (1998-2002; 2010-) advocates an ‘illiberal democracy’. *Poland* under the Presidency of Andrzej Duda refuses any Muslim immigration but has opened its doors to millions of Ukrainians. Marine le Pen lost *France’s* Presidential contest to Emmanuel Macron but won 41% of votes in doing so reflecting a strong rightist surge. A broad spectrum of European voters is demanding the right to roll back aspects of human rights law, globalism and immigration – and particularly Muslim immigration (Table 1).

Table 1: Resistance to Muslim immigration across Europe

Country	Number Muslims (2016)	% (2016) **	Projected % in 2050 **	% opposed to all further Muslim immigration *
Poland	n/a	0,1%	0,2%	71%
Austria	,60m	6,9%	10,6%	65%
Hungary	n/a	0,4%	1,3%	64%
Belgium	,87m	7,6%	15,1%	64%

France	5,72m	8,8%	17,4%	61%
Germany	4,95m	6,1%	10,8%	53%
Greece	,62m	5,7%	8,1%	58%
Italy	2,8m	4,8%	12,4%	51%
UK	4,13m	6,3%	16,7%	47%
Spain	1,18m	2,6%	6,8%	41%
Netherlands	1,21m	7,1%	12,5%	n/a
Malta	n/a	2,6%	9,3%	n/a
		4,9% of Europe's population	11,2-14%	
Average				55%

*% response to 2017 Chatham House survey **Pew Research Centre 2016

Some numbers

The demographics of Africa and Europe reflect two emerging crises: in Africa the rapidly increasing young hungry billions; in Europe the declining, aging millions (Sunter). European member states reflect a total population of 447m with only 23,7m (5,3%) being non-EU citizens, and only 37,5m (8,4%) being born outside the EU². The EU labour market reflects 8,6m non-EU citizens employed out of a total of 188,6m (only 4,6%), largely populating the hospitality, administrative, domestic, care and construction sectors. As of mid-2021 fewer than 10% of the world's refugees lived in the EU. Refugees account for only 0,6% of Europe's population³. Most refugees from Africa and Asia do not come to Europe – they go to neighbouring states. Only about 5% of Europe's population is Muslim, projected to rise to 11-14% by 2050.

Unfounded fears?

Sections of the media – and social media – foster narratives of immigrants as criminals and terrorists. There can be no denying the size of destruction consequent to acts by extremists who commit acts of terror ... and these incidents fulfil a purpose when they evoke widespread fear of the 'other'. An argument has been led that rising levels of non-Europeans is associated with rising levels of crime – and there have been a number of high-profile acts of terror committed by some (carefully catalogued by Douglas 2018). There is research that indicates that extremists – perpetrators of acts of terror – are less driven by religious fundamentalism or some psychological pathology than by a crisis of marginality. They are often the children of parents who migrated for economic or security reasons to give their children a better chance in life. They did not emigrate with the intention of changing their religion or culture which

² Compare this to the USA (15%), Australia (30%), New Zealand (28%), Iceland (19%), Norway (16%).

³ Compare this to Jordan (6,3%), Uganda (3,4%), Turkey (4,4%).

they wish to adhere to. The children find themselves in schools espousing different values to those at home, they integrate poorly, some fall into petty crime and find themselves jailed. There they are picked up and groomed by fundamentalists into a more radical analysis of society while being offered acceptance and belonging (Rahimullah et al 2013; Schmid 2013). But these tend to be acts by a few. Overall, what is the picture? Professor Duffy (2019) concludes that surveys of the UK British people reveal hugely exaggerated perceptions of actual levels of immigration, particularly refugees and asylum-seekers; and exaggerated perceptions of their involvement in crime and impact on the NHS. These misperceptions are fuelled by sections of the media, and they are not balanced by reports on the contribution of many immigrants to key services in the economy (or acts of violence by 'our identity group').

Intergenerational claims

The West now also faces a future of reparation claims based on pasts of genocide (Namibia against Germany), slavery (Caribbean), colonialism (across Africa, South America and Asia), repressive occupation (Poland against Germany) and consequences of industrialisation (Pakistan argues that first world use of fossil fuels and emissions is the cause of catastrophic floods and droughts in the rest of the world). This presents peacemakers with complex issues of fact finding, claim legitimacy, costing, representation and roles of governments and affected groups ... and laws which are usually designed to enable litigation between current claimants and defendants rather than those of centuries past concerning descendants. For modern Europeans these claims raise very difficult and emotionally heated questions over intergenerational liability, and the personal and national economic impact of potential claims.

Identity tensions and problems relating to integration

Samuel Huntington (1998: 21) argued that "*we know who we are, only when we know who we are not, and often only when we know whom we are against*". Murray (2018) argues that Europe's new values of diversity and tolerance have led to a loss of its sense of identity. But there is now a clear widespread grassroots political pushback against identity groups perceived as a threat to European identity and ways of life. But is this really a rollback of what and who Europe really wanted to become after WW2?

The logic of democracy is founded in the right of citizens within a nation state to make decisions about how they would like to be governed, the rules that should apply in a society and how they should be enforced. A tension has emerged between concepts of universal human rights and humanitarianism, and citizen rights within states. Citizens may hold strong liberal values in respect of their existing society but also demand the right to control who enters that society. Important unresolved questions then have emerged around the language of integration, diversity, multicultural tolerance, and democracy in Europe.

Three basic approaches to identity tensions exist: assimilation (fruit blend approach), accommodation (fruit salad approach), and partition (separate fruits approach). *Assimilation* is a process in which members of an identity group willingly let go of some of their cultural identity either to be absorbed into another, or to form a new identity with like-minded others from other groups. It is a two-way process – it requires an openness to assimilating 'others' by an identity group and a willingness to be assimilated by the other – it cannot be forced. *Accommodation* is a process in which identity groups retain their core beliefs and values and rituals but design social and political systems that enable a 'unity in diversity' – systems of

mutual tolerance. In here lie a variety of forms of political design based on a logic of federalism and a shared willingness to live and let live within a system of defined freedoms and rights. *Partition* is an option when identity groups declare themselves so incompatible as to be unable to consider either assimilation or accommodation as options (Sudan and South Sudan for example). From a democratic and practical perspective partition is best sought through negotiation and agreement rather than imposed (as in apartheid South Africa). The problem facing assimilationists is that they in effect create a new tribe – they are seen by the groups from which emanate as having left or even betrayed their roots. And they may even become intolerant of others less tolerant than themselves – as with cancel culture advocates!

There is a powerful pushback now against immigrants, expressed in part in 'humanitarian' packages. The EU pays Turkey to keep refugees within its borders; the UK wants to pay Rwanda to receive its irregular' entrants. In March 2016 the EU and Turkey entered a deal in which Turkey would actively try to prevent irregular travellers to Greek islands, would accept any who arrived there through irregular means and in which for every Syrian refugee returned the EU would accept one Syrian refugee who had waited in Turkey. Turkish citizens would be offered visa free travel in Europe. Almost 1m refugees arrived in Europe in 2015, with 3500 dying in the process. 75% of these were from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq. The deal has seen only 2140 returned and 32742 Syrian refugees resettled in EU member states and has cost 6bn euro (IRC 2022).

Conclusions and questions

Pressures of climate change, poverty and war will see rising numbers of migrants seeking refuge and opportunity in Europe. They will put pressure on EU economies, and perceptions of migrants (whether objectively accurate or not) will influence social and political relations. The Mediterranean has inevitably become a transit zone for people from Africa seeking a future in Europe. Membership of the EU and Schengen arrangements requires members to uphold the Dublin Regulation which obliges processing of all claims by those seeking asylum in the EU who enter EU territory for the first time. This has put extraordinary pressure on states surrounding the sea – and contributed to major shifts in their politics. Tensions can arise not only between existing citizens of a country and migrants, but sometimes between migrant identity groups themselves if they import unresolved tribal and belief systems from their regions of origin.

The EU's members are divided in their responses to many of the big questions the region now faces. Is a sustainable coherence of values and democratic design possible amongst member states in response to modern pressures? Is such a coherence premised on a lurch to the right – a rollback of freedoms and rights associated with liberal democracy, brakes on multiculturalism and diminished humanitarianism?

In the mix of guiding values and workable practices what is the correct policy balance in terms of integration (assimilation, accommodation); exclusion; and humanitarianism? If the 'pay Turkey' and 'send to Rwanda' options are unacceptable ... what proposals for managing 'irregular migration' would best reflect European values of humanitarianism and cultural tolerance?

How much flexibility is possible for individual member states if the EU is to hold itself together in the face of migration pressures and diverse social and political responses to expanding multiculturalism? What controls can be exerted to maintain balance and objectivity in

assessing the impact of immigration and to prevent a narrative of fear and hate based on misperceptions and media hysteria taking root across the EU? Is it acceptable for citizens to vote within a liberal democratic system to close out people in need on the basis of perceptions of the risk they might impose on internal stability? What if rising numbers of migrants want the safety, cultural space and economic opportunities of a liberal society but do not want to become integrated in western society – its value for them lies in the space it offers for diverse cultures to co-exist rather than integrate.

In short what defines Europeans as Europeans – is it a loose cooperative identity driven by regionally shared economic and security interests or is there a deeper set of beliefs, values and norms that bind its members? Several layers of coherence are important: are the circles of inclusion and integration to be drawn nationally, regionally or more widely? And what kinds of narrative and leadership will be required at these levels to achieve desired objectives?

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
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German Chair - PIN Negotiation Steering Committee Postgraduate Seminar

'International Negotiations and the Mediterranean' - DRAFT

19 October 2022, Cavalieri Hotel, St. Julian's, Malta

09.30-09.50 Arrival of participants

09.50-10.00 **Dr. Derek Lutterbeck**, Deputy Director, MEDAC and **Prof. Paul Meerts**, PIN Negotiation Steering Committee; Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs (The Hague) & Faculty of Social Sciences/The Netherlands - Opening remarks

10.00-11.15 Panel 1 including Q&A

Chair: Dr. Monika Wohlfeld, Holder of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention, MEDAC

Prof. I. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C./United States - Libya

Prof. Mark Anstey, Emeritus Professor, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Gqeberha/South Africa - Africa and the Mediterranean

Prof. Valerie Rosoux, Research Director, Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research and Lecturer in International Relations, University of Louvain, Louvain/Belgium - The Impact of the Past

11.15-11.45 Coffee Break

11.45-13.00 Panel 2 including Q&A

Chair: Ms. Lourdes Pullicino, Lecturer, MEDAC

Prof. Rudolf Schüssler, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bayreuth/Germany - The EU and the Mediterranean

Prof. Guy Olivier Faure, Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, Paris V, Paris/France - China and the Mediterranean

Prof. Paul Meerts, Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs (The Hague) & Faculty of Social Sciences/The Netherlands – Negotiation and the diplomatic system

13.00-14.00 Lunch buffet

14.00-15.30 Workshops

Workshop I: Prof. I. William Zartman, Prof. Valerie Rosoux and Prof. Guy Olivier Faure

Workshop II: Prof. Rudolf Schüssler, Prof. Mark Anstey and Prof. Paul Meerts

15.40-15.50 **Dr. Monika Wohlfeld**, Holder of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention, MEDA – Concluding Remarks



Prof. I. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, addressing University of Malta students and academics during his lecture on “What Role for Negotiation in the Present World Order?”, 18 October 2022.



Left to right: Opening session of the seminar - Dr. Monika Wohlfeld, Holder of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention, MEDAC; Dr. Derek Lutterbeck, Deputy Director, MEDAC and Prof. Paul Meerts, PIN Negotiation Steering Committee, Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs & Faculty of Social Sciences.



Left to right: Panel 1 - Dr. Monika Wohlfeld, Holder of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention, MEDAC; Prof. I. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University; Prof. Mark Anstey, Emeritus Professor, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University; Prof. Valerie Rosoux, Research Director, Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research and Lecturer in International Relations, University of Louvain.



Left to right: Panel 2 - Ms. Lourdes Pullicino, Lecturer, MEDAC; Prof. Rudolf Schuessler, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bayreuth; Prof. Guy Olivier Faure, Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, Paris V; Prof. Paul Meerts, Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs & Faculty of Social Sciences.



Q&A Session with MEDAC students.



Working Groups with MEDAC students.



Working Groups with MEDAC students.



Seminar Group Photo.

About MEDAC



The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC)

is an institution of higher learning at the University of Malta offering advanced degrees in diplomacy and conflict resolution with a focus on Mediterranean issues.

MEDAC was established in 1990 pursuant to an agreement between the governments of Malta and Switzerland. The Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID) was among MEDAC's first foreign partners. In 2009, MEDAC concluded an agreement with the German Federal Foreign Office and established a German Chair in Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention. More recently, MEDAC established a partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Regional Programme Political Dialogue and Regional Integration in the Southern Mediterranean, providing scholarships for students and young diplomats from the MENA region.

In academic year 2019/2020 MEDAC celebrated its 30th anniversary. Since its inception, MEDAC has acquired a solid reputation both as an academic institution and as a practical training platform. We are fortunate to count over 850 alumni from 63 different countries who have completed successfully the post-graduate courses offered by the Academy.

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