

# PIN·Points

*The Processes of International Negotiation Program*

*Network Newsletter 35/2010*



# Years of PIN

Information Dilemmas • Game Theory (Battle of Sexes) • Negotiation Guidelines for CTBTO Inspectors • Power of Talk • YSSP • Ego in Negotiation



International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis  
[www.iiasa.ac.at](http://www.iiasa.ac.at)

## From the PIN Steering Committee

# Editorial

As with all transitions, there is a sense of loss with the parting of PIN from IIASA – PIN's home for over 20 years. Guy Olivier Faure's brief history of PIN under IIASA's auspices reflects just how fruitful the relationship was – the development of a network of 4,500 researchers and contributors, the biennial Roadshows on topical negotiation issues, the publication of *PINPoints*, and, of course, the publication of 20 books on a wide range of negotiation issues and topics. PIN and IIASA will now follow different developmental trajectories, and as we move to our new home at Clingendael we will continue our collaboration with the CTBTO and begin working on an array of new projects. If our aim is to prevent violent means of exchange, negotiation will continue to play an essential role in dealing with the major issues the world faces today: climate change, international financial regulation, eradication of poverty, the nuclear threat, terrorism, as well as ethnic violence and genocide. The management process will be key to the outcome of contests over content.

The scope of PIN's work is reflected in the contributions to this edition of *PINPoints*: the knowledge acquired by graduate students in IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program, the collaboration with the CTBTO, new publications by several PIN members, and certain challenges related to process management in the field.

Our new projects reflect on current developments. The global economy has undergone some seismic shifts. A meltdown in Western economies has triggered a review of financial regulations – and protest action in the streets of Greece, France, Spain, and other countries. Sadly, albeit almost inevitably, symptoms of political intolerance and xenophobia have appeared, as economic pressures increase. These, as much as the economic meltdown, threaten values of tolerance and human rights in nations that have long espoused them.

Our first project focuses on meltdowns and breakdowns. It addresses the dynamics of meltdown in traditional regimes under rapidly changing conditions, as well as the breakdowns in negotiations intended to bring about system redesign as power dynamics change. The second project considers reconciliation as a form of preventive negotiation. It is in times of scarcity that ethnic tensions resurface. If a return to the wars of the past is to be prevented, then reconciliation must also find resonance in the worst of times, not only in the best of times. Postwar Europe has stood as a beacon of reconciliation through a long period of sustained economic growth. Now it must pass the economic stress test.

Communication is key to effective negotiation – more specifically, the extent and timing of information exchanges. Information exchanges, however, do not only bring opportunity, they also bear risk. As Rudolf Schüssler asserts, even as we seek more integrative modes of communication, we give insufficient attention to problems related to information exchange. He refers to three types of information dilemma in negotiations: The *prisoner's dilemma*, the *chicken*, and the *stag hunt* game scenarios. Schüssler argues that information dilemmas are as prevalent in integrative bargaining as they are in distributive approaches. Win-win negotiation does not



*Mark Anstey, Rudolf Avenhaus, Guy Olivier Faure, Fen Osler Hampson, Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, Paul Meerts, Mordechai Melamud, Valerie Rosoux, Rudolf Schüssler, Gunnar Sjöstedt, Mikhail Troitskiy, I. William Zartman*

simply happen. Bargaining partners have to first build trust and develop a foundation of shared information before they can resolve contentious issues. As they begin to share information to resolve the problem, opportunities for exploitation – and thus risk – arise. Integrative negotiators have to deal with dilemmas of information exchange no less than advocates of a distributive approach. By explaining how the *battle of the sexes* paradigm became a dominant feature in his work, Rudolf Avenhaus offers some humorous but perceptive insights into how his years of work with PIN have taught him how to apply modeling in negotiation.

Some of these dilemmas, which are reviewed here by Mordechai Melamud, were clearly observable during the CTBTO workshop held at the Vienna International Centre in June 2010. In an inspection role-play, the parties, on the one hand, faced the dilemma of trust building and openness and the legitimate non-disclosure of specific information, on the other. The limitations to disclosure and the scope of the inspection are determined by negotiation. Both the inspection team and the nation being inspected desire credibility in the eyes of the international community. They face the challenge of jointly mapping a safe passage through the minefields of mutual suspicion, flawed information, and international scrutiny.

Hampson and Zartman present a summary of their new book *The Global Power of Talk - The Uses of Negotiation to Advance Global Security*. The significance of understanding and applying the many ways parties "talk" to one another is reflected in the summary of their work included here.

Continued on page 4

# Contents

## 4 PIN is Over 20 Years Old

A brief synopsis of the history of the Processes of International Negotiation Program

## 9 Information Dilemmas in International Negotiation

Taking account of the strategic aspect of information exchange in integrative bargaining

## 12 The Modeler's Experience

The battle of the sexes

## 14 Workshop on the Development of Negotiation Guidelines for CTBTO Inspectors

...and the PIN book on CTBT negotiations

## 18 PIN Meetings in Durham and Lviv

Negotiation and legitimacy  
Bridging policy and research

## 19 The Global Power of Talk

The uses of negotiation to advance global security

## 22 Summary of YSSP Research

Toward an agreement on climate; Explaining the impasse in fission negotiations; and Knowledge and policy making in negotiations

## 26 Young Scientists' IIASA Experience

Katrina Running, Aviv Melamud, and Igor Istomin and their summer of 2010

## 28 Egotiation

Ego as a factor in international negotiation processes

## 30 To Block the Slippery Road

New book on reducing identity conflicts and preventing genocide

## 31 The Vienna Negotiation Day

Bidding Auf Wiedersehen





## From the PIN Steering Committee (continued)

Three students from different fields recently completed IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program and offer their views and conclusions on a number of interesting topics that reflect their studies. During her time at IIASA, Katrina Running investigated attitudinal change toward environmental issues in developed, developing, and transitional economies. Aviv Melamud examined the impasse on fissban, the international treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Igor Istomin explored the need for and implications of scientific knowledge and expertise in international negotiations across a wide range of issues, but also the complexities associated with the use of scientific data – an area in which territorial struggles are no less prevalent and in which the search for truth involves contests over data and over the way it is gathered and interpreted.

Paul Meerts looks at the role of ego in negotiation – and challenges *PINPoints* readers to comment. He suggests that ego can have positive implications for negotiation, for instance, by motivating leaders to assume responsibility to reach deals where others would not. However, threats to ego are a central problem in negotiation, entrenching hard (and often irrational) positional bargaining, perhaps even more so in certain cultural settings. He considers approaches to dilute this impact by bureaucratizing negotiation processes and fostering personal relationships. And to make matters even more complex, he raises the point that ego may not only be something individuals possess, but nations as well – a collective ego!

Currently, an intensification of political and social stresses at the global level is evident – the importance of understanding the dynamics of negotiation will thus only increase for politicians, diplomats, and others tasked at various levels to resolve the international tensions that emerge in response to the economic crisis and the ongoing problems in establishing a regime for global trade, the eradication of poverty, climate change, and the containment of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, we are bringing along a great deal of work with us to Clingendael!

*The PIN Steering Committee*

## PIN is Over 20 Years Old

PIN's history has developed around negotiation concepts, an approach that could be quite relevant scientifically, because all collective endeavors are based on negotiation – in fact, our own life as a group has been an ongoing negotiation. We could summarize our existence as being a single event that successfully transformed into a regime, which is far from always the case in international agreements. In the beginning, we faced a number of obstacles which should have actually made the completion of any project unfeasible. However, we did not know at the time that it might not be possible, so we went ahead. The first obstacle we encountered was cultural differences, which in our case included no fewer than five different cultures. The second obstacle was the range of disciplines represented in our group, with no fewer than seven disciplines struggling to find a common language. The third obstacle was not about us, but about what it was we wanted to do: joint research, applied research, consulting, training, or network building. Through pragmatic initiatives, we finally managed to develop not just a common language, but shared perspectives and joint values as well.

Our activities can be described as a joint adventure under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. No need to mention that our common story as a process, resulting in a number of outcomes which demonstrated that we were actually playing a positive sum game, could fill a book. Under these circumstances, we continued working on research projects and publishing books on uncharted topics. We also turned into apostles of good news, namely, conflict resolution by peaceful means. We developed a network of several thousand scholars and practitioners, supervised nearly one entire generation of post-doctoral students and, finally, intervened as mediators on some thorny issues. Our group had a life of its own, with some of us leaving to enjoy well-deserved rest and others departing from this world to go to another one, which is said to be better. New people joined us, yet one quite unique aspect has remained in all these years: the absence of a distinct leader, director, chairperson or whatever other label is used. We realized that all of us were directors, a fine way of acquiring a high-level position and, at the same time,



*Howard Raiffa (IIASA's first director, 1973 – 1975) introduced international negotiations into IIASA's research agenda.*

ensuring that our democracy worked. The most extraordinary thing in all of this is our research topic, *international negotiation*: a new perspective (process), an increasingly characteristic activity, and a continual cornucopia of new approaches to pursue. The details of our very special journey follow below.

## The PIN Project

The PIN Program (Processes of International Negotiation), like many other projects, started with an encounter of people of good will, who were all looking in the same direction to make this world a better place to live in. Thus, with the blessing of



*The first issue of PINPoints was published in 1991 and included a contribution by H. Raiffa.*



*One of the first Roadshows in October 2000 at the Guanghua School of Management, Beijing. Left to right: Rudolf Avenhaus, Guy Olivier Faure, I. William Zartman, Paul Meerts, Franz Cede, Victor A. Kremenjuk, Gunnar Sjöstedt.*

Howard Raiffa, Director of IIASA, they came together to establish a real task force. Winfried Lang, Austrian Foreign Ministry; Jeff Rubin, Harvard University; I. William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University; Victor Kremenjuk and A. Zotov, Soviet Academy of Sciences; Gunnar Sjöstedt, Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs; Wilfried Siebe, University of Bielefeld, and Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, formed the PIN Steering Committee (SC).

Most of these "founding fathers" were from different countries, came from different disciplines and from different institutions, yet they converged around the same concerns. They turned their differences into advantages, gradually building up a unique model of organization, which, remarkably, has been effective for over 20 years.

PIN's ultimate goal is to contribute to the theory and practice of international negotiation and conflict resolution. The means to achieve this objective is an organization which consists of benevolent equals, who have no leader and no hierarchical structure, steering a network of 4,500 researchers and practitioners. The PIN Program promotes improved understanding and practices of processes of international negotiation through publications, conferences, consultations, networks, and outreach.

With regard to the research field, the objective is to deepen knowledge on a number of issues and themes relating to international negotiation that are characterized by significant gaps, such as power, multilateral negotiations, cultural differences, peace vs. justice, preventive negotiation, formal models, and escalation, to name a few. In terms of concrete issues, PIN has researched environmental negotiations, economics, the European Union, terrorism, nuclear issues, and climate change.

PIN has elaborated a unique and prolific analytical framework to organize research on negotiation theory and practice based on five analytical categories intended to cover the entire field: actors, structure, process, strategies, and outcome.

Within IIASA, PIN built partnerships with other programs, that is, scientists from other programs (water, environment, etc.) joined some of our projects, for instance, on climate change. PIN was also involved in several of IIASA's multidisciplinary projects.

Each research project is conceived as a book, not as a collection of papers. Research is carried out inductively, starting from real world cases and inferring general lessons from their analysis for both practical implementation as well as conceptualization. Twenty

books that provide academics, negotiators, and diplomats with new knowledge have been published to date.

In addition to this major task, complementary activities have been carried out, such as the biannual publication of a newsletter, *PINPoints*, which is forwarded to the entire network. With its concise articles, *PINPoints* provides up-to-date reflections on various areas of research and practice and on issues linked to current affairs.

Another important activity the Steering Committee is in charge of is the organization of several Roadshows each year in different parts of the world. The purpose of the Roadshows is to present select themes of international negotiation and conflict resolution to new audiences and thereby initiate new local networks by spreading the "good news" and to trigger more interest in the field. PIN has made presentations in numerous countries including Japan, Pakistan, China, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Iran, USA, Canada, Costa Rica, and Argentina. In Europe, PIN has conveyed its message to Norway, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, and Germany.

The PIN group has also used its expertise to educate others in international negotiation processes. At the beginning of the 1990s, Bert Spector and others organized a trainers' seminar for professors from Central European universities, the new countries that aspired to European Union membership. For years, the regular summer meetings at IIASA were used to train post-doctoral students in dealing with the complexity of the multilateral process.

PIN has also conducted second track mediating missions, for example, in the Caspian region, with the aim of enhancing dialog and cooperation (CaspLog) between the five riparian countries, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.

Finally, PIN also trains and monitors young researchers who join IIASA for a summer study program, thus contributing to the training of a new generation of negotiation researchers. Many of our graduates have gone on to hold responsible positions and conduct research on negotiation.

PIN is established as a legal entity, an NGO with a Web site, and will be hosted at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, Netherlands, as of January 2011.

## Procedure

The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) meets three to four times a year, once or twice at IIASA and once or twice at its annual Roadshow venues. Most of the work is carried out by the PIN Steering Committee group members at home on a voluntary and unpaid basis, collaborating with both researchers and policy makers from its network.

## People

The Steering Committee has been like any human organization during its 23-year existence: subject to variations, changes, and renewals. The following distinguished scholars and practitioners have been (or still are) part of the Committee:

J. Rubin, I. W. Zartman, V. A. Kremenjuk, W. Lang, G. Sjöstedt, A. Zotov, W. Siebe, G. O. Faure, R. Avenhaus, P. Meerts, F. Cede, J. Bercovitch, W. Donohue, M. Anstey, F. Hampson, V. Rosoux, R. Schüssler, M. Melamud, and M. Troitskiy.

A second circle of regular companions has also contributed substantially to PIN's achievements throughout the years. They include:

H. Raiffa, B. Spector, T. Hopmann, C. Dupont, C. Jönsson, D. Pruitt, D. Druckman, A. Underdal, C. Albin, K. Aggestam, C. Goerzig, K. Höglund, O. Elgström, S. Y. Kim, J. C. Beltramino, and J. Salacuse.

PIN has produced quite a few “offspring” such as national nodes and local roundtables including the French PIN, the Dutch PIN, the German PIN, the Washington WIN group, and the Swedish PIN. PIN has also contributed to the establishment of anchoring points for negotiation research in five continents through Roadshows and individual initiatives.

## Timeline

1986

Funding from Carnegie Corporation, New York

1987

July: PIN Conference at IIASA: *Processes of International Negotiation*

Howard Raiffa (IIASA's first director, 1973 – 1975) introduces international negotiations into IIASA's research agenda. Chairman of the IIASA Council, Jermen Gvishiani, originally proposed the inclusion of joint East-West research on energy, food, population, and the environment

1988

IIASA Director Robert Pry meets with W. Lang, Austrian Foreign Ministry, J. Rubin, Harvard University, G. Sjöstedt, Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs, I. W. Zartman, Johns Hopkins University, V. A. Kremenyuk and A. Zotov, Soviet Academy of Sciences, W. Siebe, University of Bielefeld, and G. O. Faure, Sorbonne University, who subsequently form the PIN Steering Committee (SC)

1989

Publication: *Processes of International Negotiations* (F. Mautner-Markoff), Westview Press

Conference on *International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, publication (V. A. Kremenyuk), Jossey Bass (1991)

New PIN staff members Lynne Kraus and Ulrike Neudeck

1990

Conference on *Environmental Issues*, publication (G. Sjöstedt), Sage (1993)

Bert Spector joins PIN as a coordinator (1990-1993)

1991

Conference on *Culture and Negotiations* with financial support from UNESCO, publication (G. O. Faure and J. Rubin), Sage (1993)

The first *PINPoints* newsletter is published with a contribution by H. Raiffa on the origins of PIN at IIASA. Since then, two newsletters have been published annually

1992

Conference on *Power and Negotiation*, publication (I. W. Zartman and J. Rubin), University Michigan Press (2000)

1993

Publication: *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* (G. O. Faure & J. Z. Rubin), Sage

Publication: *International Environmental Negotiations* (G. Sjöstedt), Sage

Conference on *Multilateral Negotiations*, publication (I. W. Zartman), Jossey-Bass (1994)

Conference on *International Regimes*, publication (B. Spector, G. Sjöstedt & I. W. Zartman), Kluwer (1994)

Training program for Eastern European professors/trainers with P. Meerts, W. Mastenbroek, J. Freymond, and T. Hopmann

Funding from Hewlett Foundation

1994

Publication: *Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)*, (B. Spector, G. Sjöstedt & I. W. Zartman), Graham & Trotman Limited

1995

J. Rubin dies tragically while climbing his 100th mountain

First Roadshow at the Argentine Council for International Relations, Buenos Aires

1996

W. Siebe leaves the SC. Rudolf Avenhaus, a statistician and game theorist from Germany, joins the SC after having organized the German node of the PIN network for several years

Roadshows at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, and Harvard University Project on Negotiation (PON)

1997

Workshop on *Preventive Diplomacy* in Stockholm

1998

Roadshow at the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs - Clingendael

1999

W. Lang dies after a painful disease

Memorial lecture for W. Lang at IIASA on 25 February 2000



*CaspiLog II* (left) was hosted by Baku, Azerbaijan, 7–9 May, 2007; *CaspiLog III* (right) took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, 3–4 October 2008.



Franz Cede, Austrian Foreign Ministry, lawyer, and Paul Meerts, Clingendael, The Netherlands, a political scientist and trainer, join the SC Roadshows at University Hassan II, Casablanca, Morocco; the Center for Conflict Resolution, Haifa, Israel; and the Foundation for Scientific Research, Stockholm, Sweden

#### 2000

Publication: *Power and Negotiation* (I. W. Zartman & J. Z. Rubin), The University of Michigan Press

Publication: *International Economic Negotiation. Models versus Reality* (V. A. Kremenyuk & G. Sjöstedt), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited

Roadshows at the School of Economics, University of Helsinki, Finland, and Guanghua School of Management, Beijing University, China

#### 2001

Publication: *Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation* (I. W. Zartman), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. with the Carnegie Council for Preventing Deadly Conflict

Roadshows at the Catholic University Louvain, Belgium, and the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria

Roadshow for the Directors of Diplomatic Academies at the 29th Meeting of Directors and Deans of Diplomatic Academies and Institutes of International Relations

#### 2002

Publication: *Containing the Atom: International Negotiation on Nuclear Security and Safety* (R. Avenhaus, V. A. Kremenyuk & G. Sjöstedt), Lexington Books

Publication (2nd edition): *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues* (V. A. Kremenyuk), Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers

Roadshow at Pepperdine University, Malibu, USA

#### 2003

Publication: *How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different Cultures* (G. O. Faure), Kluwer Academic Publishers

Publication: *Getting it Done: Post-Agreement Negotiations and International Regimes* (B. Spector & I. W. Zartman), United States Institute of Peace Press

Publication: *Professional Cultures in International Negotiation: Bridge or Rift?* (G. Sjöstedt), Lexington Books

Tanja Huber joins PIN as an administrative coordinator

Roadshows at the School of International Relations, Iranian Foreign Ministry, Tehran; Mannheim University, Germany; and Négocia, Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Paris

#### 2004

Publication: *Negotiating European Union* (P. Meerts & F. Cede), Palgrave-Macmillan

Roadshows at Cairo University, Egypt, and University of Peace, Costa Rica

PIN side event at COP10 in Buenos Aires

#### 2005

Publication: *Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts* (G. O. Faure & I. W. Zartman), Cambridge University Press

Publication: *Peace versus Justice, Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes* (I. W. Zartman & V. A. Kremenyuk), Rowman and Littlefield

Roadshows at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), Norway; Bayreuth University, Germany; and Négocia, Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Paris

Workshop on *Systems Analysis* at IIASA

PIN at the AAAS Annual Conference

Workshop on *Climate Negotiations*

#### 2006

First Caspian Dialog Session, Hollings Center, Istanbul

Roadshow at The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy

#### 2007

Jacob Bercovitch, a political scientist from New Zealand, joins the SC as a project associate member

William Donohue, a psychologist from USA, joins the SC as a project associate member



PIN in Lahore, Pakistan (top), Nanjing, China (center), and Ottawa, Canada (bottom).

Publication: *Diplomacy Games* (R. Avenhaus & I. W. Zartman), Springer

Roadshows at Négocia, Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Paris; the Nanjing-Hopkins Center, Nanjing, China; and at Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan

Second CaspiLog (CaspiLog) Session, University of Baku, Azerbaijan

Workshop on *Negotiating with Terrorists*

Workshop on *Conflict Resolution Handbook*

### 2008

Ariel Mascapac from the Philippines joins PIN as an administrative coordinator

Conference: *Theorists Meet Practitioners* (organized by R. Avenhaus and F. Cede)

Mark Anstey, a social scientist/labor-community mediator from South Africa, currently at Michigan State University in Dubai, joins the SC in January 2008

Fen Osler Hampson, a political scientist from the University of Carleton, Ottawa, Canada, joins the SC at the same time

Third CaspiLog Session, Institute for World Economy and Politics, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Roadshow at the Geneva Center for Strategy and Policy, Switzerland

Workshop on *External Interventions in Identity Conflicts* (ExIn)

Roadshow at the University of Warsaw, Poland

Publication: *The Art of International Negotiations* (A. Aleksy-Szuchich), (University of Warsaw Institute of International Relations, Zurawia Paper, 2009)

### 2009

Publication: *The Sage Handbook on Conflict Resolution* (J. Bercovitch, V. A. Kremenyuk & I. W. Zartman), Sage

Publication: *Negotiated Risks - International Talks on Hazardous Issues* (R. Avenhaus & G. Sjöstedt)

Valérie Rosoux, a political scientist and philosopher from the Catholic University at Louvain La Neuve, Belgium, joins the SC

Moti Melamud, a physicist from Israel and practical arms control negotiator and negotiation trainer at CTBTO, joins the SC

Mikhail Troitskiy, a Russian political scientist of the MacArthur Foundation, Moscow, and Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) also joins the SC

Roadshows at Carleton University and St Paul University, Ottawa, Canada

Conference: *Evaluating the Process of the CTBT Negotiations*

### 2010

Publication: *Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategies, Tactics and Politics* (G. O. Faure & I. W. Zartman), Routledge

Publication: *Engaging Extremists* (I. W. Zartman & G. O. Faure) (forthcoming), USIP

Publication: *Facilitating the Climate Talks* (G. Sjöstedt & A. Macaspac Penetrante) (forthcoming), Earthscan

Publication: *To Block the Slippery Slope: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Genocide*, (forthcoming), Oxford

Publication: *Unfinished Business: Saving International Negotiations from Failure* (G.O. Faure and F. Cede) (forthcoming), Georgia University Press


Rudolf Schüssler, a political philosopher from the University of Bayreuth, Germany, joins the SC

Christophe Dupont from the second circle of PIN and a constant companion passes away

CTBT negotiation workshop at the CTBTO, United Nations, Vienna  
Conference: *Negotiation Day* at the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna  
Roadshows at the University of Durham, England, and Négocia, Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Paris

PIN is leaving IIASA and will be temporarily hosted at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, Netherlands, during 2011.

Guy Olivier FAURE



Selected PIN publications, 1993–2010.



# Information Dilemmas in Negotiation

The exchange of information lies at the heart of negotiations. It also creates veritable dilemmas. Although negotiators are keen to obtain valuable information, they are often reluctant to offer it for free or share information that might be used to their disadvantage. Strategic dilemmas are likely to arise when two or more parties in a negotiation adopt this mode of thought. We are well aware of this consequence, yet its many ramifications are neither a strong focus of research nor always well understood in practice.

We first turn our attention to the bargaining style in which information dilemmas are most likely to thrive (Section 1). Information dilemmas are much more a scourge of integrative than of distributive bargaining. The first negotiation style mentioned is more confrontational and is often considered as being describable in game theoretical terms. The second negotiation style depends on an open exchange of information and is thus more vulnerable to dilemmas arising from distrust or informational uncertainty. Yet there is no such thing as *the* information dilemma (Section 2), not even within integrative bargaining. Contrary to widely held beliefs, the famous Prisoner's Dilemma is not the universal response to the strategic problems of information exchange. Depending on context, a variety of strategically discernible information dilemmas may arise; identifying these information dilemmas correctly may be a prerequisite for resolving them. This is pretty much how far we will go with game theory here, because solutions to strategic dilemmas which are feasible in practice depend on more than the rationality of game theory alone. Such solutions must take common notions of prudence and emotional responses to dilemmas into account and therefore call for empirical investigations that go beyond the scope of this paper. Some considerations concerning the impact of norms of justice were part of my presentation at the Vienna PIN workshop, but because of limitation of space, we will focus on strategic problems here.

## 1. Distributive and Integrative Bargaining

The distinction between distributive and integrative bargaining styles is a basic element of negotiation analysis. *Table 1* sums up the well-known characteristics of both negotiation styles:

Table 1: Bargaining Styles

Distributive	Integrative
pure competition zero-sum game irreconcilable objectives fixed interests confrontational behavior struggling for positions	cooperation win-win oriented creation of new opportunities "enlarging the cake" adjustment of interests joint problem solving

It is important to understand that the conceptual antagonism between distributive and integrative bargaining reflects their role as opposing ideal types of bargaining. This implies that in reality most bargaining occurs in a mixed zone between the two polar extremes. In other words, real life bargaining exhibits facets of both distributive and integrative bargaining that may vary from context to context. Moreover, and more problematically, these two ideal types can be understood in different ways. Both bargaining styles



Source: Ettore Paulovics | Dreamstime.com

*The Prisoner's Dilemma: to cooperate or not to cooperate, that is the question.*

can, for example, be distinguished within a game theoretical framework. The distributive bargaining style is characterized by zero-sum or more generally by "I win, you lose" transactions on the Pareto frontier of an opportunity set. Integrative bargaining, on the other hand, represents the movement from the interior of an opportunity set to the Pareto frontier. However, much of the literature on integrative bargaining presupposes a break with the game theoretical framework. In integrative bargaining, preferences and interests are not treated as a given but as being open to modification (or clarification) in the negotiation process. The movement toward a win-win-solution is not merely regarded as a Pareto improvement, but as a remodeling of the agents' perceptions. Ideally, new opportunities are created in the negotiation process that had not been envisaged by the parties before.

The closer the integrative bargaining is linked with this open mode of joint opportunity creation, the greater and more complex the role of information exchange will be. Information exchange does not really assume any significance in a game theoretical framework. Agents are presumed to already be fully informed when they enter the bargaining process. They know their own utility functions as well as those of their opponents, all threat points and differences in bargaining power. Thus richly endowed, they do not actually have to negotiate, but can instead focus their idealized intellectual ability on calculating a bargaining solution. Any exchange of information would be redundant and, as economists call it, merely "cheap talk." So-called problems of coordination represent the main exception to this "rule," where information about others' behavioral plans helps determine one's own rational plan. Nevertheless, bargaining problems are usually not conceived as coordination problems, a point that we will return to later in this paper when we realize that some information dilemmas are in fact coordination problems of some sort. In the meantime, we mainly come across informa-



Source: Augusto Correia | Dreamstime.com

*Bargaining parties are reluctant to lay their cards on the table to prevent the other party from using the information against them.*

tion dilemmas when we leave the game theoretical framework. Consequently, information problems suddenly loom large. The key aims of integrative bargaining, such as the mutual shaping of perceptions and the creation of new opportunities, heavily depend on the open exchange of information between the parties. To find out what could be a new entry point for you and me, we both have to learn more about each other than we already know. We need to exchange information about our immediate interests, overall aims, the advantages and drawbacks of certain plans, and the limitations we face. We sometimes also have to talk about who we are and about the network of human relations we are embedded in. The more information is exchanged on these issues, the higher the likelihood for intelligent bargaining partners to arrive at a solution that suits all involved. This is the good news about integrative bargaining and the foundation for opening up to and trusting our bargaining partners. As we all know, only trust engenders trust. As we also all know, the mouse that is too trusting is caught by the cat.

Manuals of integrative bargaining are often reluctant to discuss the problematic side of information exchange in integrative bargaining. The very need to open up and share valuable and new information with an opponent engenders peculiar risks of exploitation and misuse. In many real life settings the information that contributes to a win-win solution is also the information that could be used against its provider. The reluctance of bargaining parties to lay their cards on the table is therefore usually just rational, given their limited willingness to bear the risk of being exploited. Means and methods to build trust exist, of course, and often make sense in long-term relationships. However, it would be naive to expect that openness in integrative bargaining is a wise move under all and any conditions. It is also very questionable whether openness as a general default strategy is advisable (i.e., a procedure we ought to employ at all times except when we actually smell something rotten). Even advocates of integrative bargaining recant some of their praise for openness when asked about the risks involved and admit: "Well, you do not have to show all your cards at once."

A reasonable decision about what information to reveal and what to conceal, even beyond the relatively narrow confines of "rational choice," depends considerably on the assumed opportunities and

risks of information sharing. In other words, the perceived strategic structure of information exchange in a given context is relevant for integrative bargaining and its success. Let us therefore look at the strategic structures of some information dilemmas that can arise in integrative bargaining.

## 2. A Bundle of Information Dilemmas

In any exchange of valuable information in bargaining contexts, the participants have some idea, however rudimentary, of the benefits they expect to gain from the exchange as well as of the risks involved. Sensible agents will develop and elaborate their views to the point at which they feel confident that they have not made any serious blunders or omitted information that was readily available. Usually, the parties in a bargaining context recognize that the other side may also incur benefits and risks from sharing information. These assumptions are much weaker than the God-like state of information of standard rational choice theories, but they suffice to cause strategic dilemmas.

In the first setting, an agent may consider the provision of information as potentially beneficial for achieving a win-win outcome, but he/she may also perceive it to be extremely risky. The information provided could be used by a ruthless opponent to gain a considerable advantage over its provider, who would consequently suffer significant losses. Such risks of exploitation gain additional weight when both sides are competitors who have come together to test the waters for a mutually profitable opportunity to cooperate. A joint venture of competing business firms may serve as an example or disarmament talks between hostile powers. Under the stated conditions, information exchange will probably take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD):

	cooperate	exploit
cooperate	3.3	1.4
exploit	4.1	2.2

Our PD matrix depicts the agents' preferences with regard to outcome. Each considers it best to exploit while the other side cooperates. Mutual cooperation is, nevertheless, better than mutual attempts to exploit, and so on, until the familiar pattern of an (ordinal) PD emerges. We will not offer details on how PD-type information dilemmas can be resolved, as a rich literature on PD problems already exists. Suffice it to mention that the extent of profits from exploitation relative to the cooperative payoff is a relevant measure for the temptation to exploit, and that the occurrence (not merely the exogenous probability!) of repeated interaction raises the chances of cooperation. Despite the mostly reassuring findings in the PD literature, a word of warning seems appropriate here. The results of information exchanges are often opaque. It is often a matter of interpretation whether a certain piece of information actually led to an agent's action or whether the action had been planned either way on other grounds. Because of such uncertainties, an additional incentive to exploit may be created if one of the PD players believes that the misuse of any information obtained can be successfully veiled. The other side's defense, therefore, largely depends on its power to retaliate or at least to limit its losses through repeated interactions. Unless such assurances exist, it may simply be rational to withhold information in PD-type information dilemmas.

A second information dilemma type arises from a different constellation of benefits and risks relating to information exchange. Let us assume that one side could profit more from the full exploitation of information rather than from cooperation. However, the information we provide can or will not very likely be used to harm us. In other words, the other side has an incentive to use our information in ways that may not have been agreed on, but that are nonetheless innocuous to us. Many agents will probably not consider this a problem and especially not a dilemma in this setting. Significant benefits from cooperation may induce them to relinquish any possible extra payoffs they could have gained from the other side. Nevertheless, a greater appreciation of the strategic situation raises second thoughts. What would happen if the other side assumed that we have a similar incentive to seek additional innocuous profits? In this case the state of simultaneous strife for extra profits becomes crucial. No problem ensues if both sides can gain extra profits at the same time. In some cases, however, this will not be possible. Imagine that each side could use the pooled information to successfully develop a new field of business, yet if both enter this new field as competitors, there will not be enough air to breathe. The resulting strategic structure is a so-called Chicken game, albeit with an unconventional payoff structure:

	cooperate	seek extra profit
cooperate	2.2	2.3
seek extra profit	3.2	1.1

Unless precautions against two-sided, extra profiting are taken, this structure may lead to even worse results than a PD, a fact that may easily be missed by the agents. In a PD, the worst outcome is being an exploited cooperator, a risk the agents can avoid by employing their dominant strategy. In our Chicken variant, two-sided attempts at extra profiting will result in the worst case scenario for both sides. This worst case can easily be avoided by using pooled information for the agreed cooperative purposes only. In this case, however, we seem to forgo innocuous extra profits for no good reason. One side may not have precluded that the other side will make such a move because it does not directly harm anyone, and it may actually secretly plan to employ such a move against the other side as well. Nevertheless, both sides will approach their worst case if they heavily invest in side ventures at the same time.

The worst case can, of course, be avoided if the parties talk about the risks and opportunities of seeking extra profits early on. Chicken games are a (non-standard) species of coordination problems, and coordination problems can be resolved through communication. In fact, rational, risk-averse agents will engage in talks about profit sharing with reference to side ventures rather than secretly hope they are unrivalled in detecting or trying to exploit such opportunities. Information should therefore only be provided on condition that extra profits are shared. Still, it is conceivable that agents waver between reducing the risk of simultaneous extra ventures and the secret hope of unrivalled extra profits. Therefore, the (deformed) Chicken can turn into a veritable information dilemma.

A third strategic setting derives from information that could be used to significantly harm the other side, albeit to nobody's profit. The agents will, however, be better off if they are not the only ones

who are harmed. Under such conditions a strategic structure emerges which resembles the "Stag Hunt" game:

	cooperate	exploit
cooperate	4.4	1.3
exploit	3.1	2.2

Although cooperation is the best outcome for both – and, moreover, a stable one – risk-averse agents may prefer to exploit pooled information to the detriment of the other side, but only to avoid their worst case scenario. Such an expectation may, of course, preempt the pooling of information in the first place. To counter this possibility, assurances would have to be given to risk-averse players that their information will not be used to their detriment. Otherwise it could be dangerous for an agent to focus too much on the lure of profitable cooperation at the expense of asking how risk-averse the other agent might be. Once trust is built, however, this dilemma is much easier to deal with than a PD because there is no incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome.

### 3. Conclusion

We have only provided a first brief outline of how information dilemmas can influence integrative bargaining. Nevertheless, participants in integrative bargaining should pay attention to the strategic aspect of information exchange. It is by no means sufficient to become vaguely aware of a dilemma and employ the usual tactics to overcome PD-like problems. Two of the three information dilemmas described are not PDs and require different hedging tactics. Hence, integrative bargaining should go hand in hand with a conscious attempt to understand the benefits and risks of information exchange – and their strategic implications.

Rudolf Schüssler



*Information pooling. Cooperation is the best outcome but what if one side decides to exploit pooled information to the other side's detriment?*



## The Modeler's Experience

During my long years of work in the PIN Program, I served as something of an expert on formal models of international negotiations. In this capacity I learned that – *grossomodo*, of course – basically two types of modeling exist. On the one hand, we try to describe an international conflict and the negotiations related to it as precisely as possible in quantitative terms. I did this together with others, and the result was sometimes complex models which could fortunately still be explored analytically and which provided some useful insights. Examples include our models for the international negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999, the Greek-Turkish conflict over the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the ongoing conflict on Iran's nuclear program, and others which are discussed in our book *Diplomacy Games* [1].

On the other hand, we try to understand very unique and concrete situations, the outcomes of which are often unclear or even paradoxical. We did this as well, and the result was usually a variant of one of the well-known paradigms of non-cooperative game theory like Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken or Battle of the Sexes. It was this last paradigm that became something like a recurring theme in my work with PIN. Not by chance, of course, since this paradigm deals with negotiation. In the following, I present some examples of that experience, and thereby only consider the second type of modeling.

The first PIN Roadshow I participated in took place in Casablanca, Morocco, in 1997. After a short introduction to game theory, I presented the Battle of the Sexes game to students and colleagues of the Hassan II University in its most simple form [2] (*Figure 1*).

A couple cannot agree on how to spend the forthcoming evening. He wants to go to a boxing match while she wants to go to a ballet performance. Both, however, would like to spend the evening together. *Figure 1* illustrates the normal form of this game, presenting both players' choices and payoffs based on their preferences. The game's Nash equilibria<sup>1</sup> are determined with the



Source: Photosbyte | Dreamstime.com



Source: Witold Krasowski | Dreamstime.com

*The battle of the sexes?*

help of arrows indicating the preference directions, and are also shown in the figure. As a result, two equilibria indicated in the figure by stars are reached, namely to either attend the boxing match together or the ballet. There is also a third equilibrium in so-called mixed strategies.

		$q_1$	
		Boxing	Ballet
$p_1$	M	2, *	-1
	W	-1	1, *
		$1 - q_1$	
		Boxing	Ballet
		-1	1
		1	-1
		-1	2, *

*Figure 1.* Normal form of the battle of sexes game. The arrows indicate the preference directions. There are two equilibria in pure strategies and one in mixed strategies:

$$p_1^* = \frac{3}{5}, q_1^* = \frac{2}{5}, M_1^* = W_1^* = \frac{1}{5}$$

After my presentation, my friend Guy Olivier criticized me. He said that men in Islamic countries considered the game an insult and that I'd better not do something like this again. I took his criticism very seriously. Let me add that I have always taken what he said to me very seriously. In fact, I even took it very seriously when he told me not to always take things so seriously.<sup>2</sup>

Also, let me add that I later presented the game – not within the scope of PIN – to students of the Technical University of Vilnius, Lithuania. I had, however, become cautious. So I told them that this was my

first time in their country and that I wasn't sure whether or not this game would be perceived as an insult by Lithuanian men, or women, for that matter. The students listened silently and politely, yet I still have no idea whether I offended anyone in Lithuania.

So much about the game itself. A few years later, Guy Olivier told us the story of a meeting of French and German cultural delegations in Paris [3]. On the morning of the first meeting which was scheduled for 9 a.m., the French delegation entered the meeting room at 9 sharp while the members of the German delegation only arrived at 9:15. The next day, the same thing happened again. Apparently, both delegations wanted to demonstrate their respect toward the other. The French, assuming that Germans always arrive on time, did not want to let them wait. Conversely, the Germans, assuming that the French are always late, did not want to put them on the spot by arriving early. Needless to say, if both sides had argued around another corner, the French, assuming what the Germans assumed, would have indeed come at 9:15 and the Germans would have arrived at 9 sharp for the same reason, and so on. Thus, if both sides argued around the same number of corners, they would never arrive at the same time.

The game theoretical interpretation of that strange situation is illustrated in *Figure 2*. Although both players prefer to arrive at the same time rather than at different times, the French have a proclivity for coming late and the Germans for coming early. Again there are two equilibria in pure strategies and a third in mixed strategies.

This is the theorist's explanation of what happened in Paris. Since the two delegations did not talk to each other about the

1 A Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative, two-person game is defined as a pair of strategies with the property that any unilateral deviation from that pair of strategies does not improve the deviator's payoff.

2 Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) would have perhaps liked this statement.

	←	
	G	
	Early	Late
↑	F	
	Early	Late
	1	-2
	*	2
	-1	2
	Late	*
	-1	1
	→	

Figure 2. Normal form of the French-German meeting game.

exact arrival time, they entered into a non-cooperative game with several equilibria and had no chance of selecting one of them. In other words, they entered into a game without a solution, thus, a joint arrival time could not be the expected outcome.<sup>3</sup> However, what is more important in this regard is that this game is nothing more than a variant of the Battle of the Sexes paradigm! Their mathematical structures are identical, and I certainly would have presented this variant in Casablanca, had I already possessed my later knowledge.

A third and final case: Three years ago, one of our students from the Young Scientists Summer Program, Josh Smilovitz from the United States, worked on the conflict between Northern Sudan, which is dominated by Arabs and Muslims, and Southern Sudan which is mainly comprised of black Africans of Animist or Christian faith and who control indigenous oil resources [5].

We discussed the possibility of describing this conflict with the help of a non-cooperative normal-form game with four clear possible choices for both parties, namely (1) no autonomy and Khartoum controlling the oil; (2) shared control of the oil and autonomy; (3) the South controlling the oil and autonomy; and (4) independence. Northern Sudan's preferences were assumed to be (1)>(2)>(3)>(4) as opposed to Southern Sudan's preferences (1)<(2)<(3)<(4). However, we were not successful, even though we tried really hard. The reason we were unsuccessful was that we always kept ending up with completely unreasonable strategy combinations. I looked at this problem again later, reduced it, and to my surprise again arrived at a variant of the Battle of the Sexes paradigm.

3 Later, Th. Krieger and I offered a more subtle explanation [4].

Let us consider this game again in more detail to better explain this (see Figure 1 again). As already mentioned, there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies which implies that the man chooses to go see the boxing match with probability  $p$  and the ballet performance with probability  $1-p$ , and the woman decides to go to the boxing match with probability  $q$  and to the ballet performance with probability  $1-q$ . Their expected payoffs are consequently the same, unlike in the other two equilibria. Now if the two players agree on the mixed equilibrium, they have to choose their strategies independently using a random experiment. However, it could then happen that both independently choose the option they do not like.<sup>4</sup> The man thus ends up going to the ballet performance and his wife to the boxing match, which is totally unrealistic, even absurd. Nevertheless, this might happen in certain situations, just as our French-German example showed.




Figure 3. Extensive form of the two-step battle of sexes game. The mixed equilibrium is depicted as:

$$p_2^* = \frac{9}{19}, q_2^* = \frac{10}{19}, M_2^* = W_2^* = \frac{11}{19}$$

The probability of reaching the absurd strategy combination is:

$$q_1^* \cdot (1 - p_1^*) \cdot q_2^* \cdot (1 - p_2^*) = \left(\frac{2}{5}\right)^2 \cdot \left(\frac{10}{19}\right)^2 = 0.044$$

Here, a simple remedy is proposed. Let both players agree on the mixed equilibrium and let them agree that the game will be repeated if the result of the game is an absurd outcome. This game is represented in detail in Figure 3. The man makes his choice, the woman makes hers, and if their choices happen to result in the ab-

4 It would be more reasonable for the payoffs of this strategy combination to be worse than for the strategy in which both the man and woman attend their preferred event on their own, but I wanted to maintain the original version described in [2].

surd strategy combination, they repeat the game. We see that the probability of the game resulting in the absurd outcome after the second round is only 0.044.

One could stop here, but the theorist is

	←	
	W	
	Bo	Ba
↑	M	
	Bo	Ba
	2	-1
	1	-1
	W <sub>n-1</sub> *	2
	M <sub>n-1</sub> *	1
	→	

Figure 4. Recursive form of the n step battle of sexes game. The mixed equilibrium is depicted by:

$$p_n^* = \frac{2 - W_{n-1}^*}{4 - W_{n-1}^*}, q_n^* = \frac{2}{4 - M_{n-1}^*}, n = 1, 2, \dots$$

$$M_n^* = \frac{2 + M_{n-1}^*}{4 - M_{n-1}^*} = W_n^*, n = 1, 2, \dots, M_0^* = -1$$

now interested in the mathematical structure of the game. We see that the second step game is a subgame of the total game, which implies that we can determine the equilibrium recursively. In fact, we can consider more steps – albeit not interesting from a practical point of view – and represent the game in a reduced normal form (see Figure 4). We can determine the equilibrium payoffs for the n-step game with the help of recursive relations, which can then fortunately be resolved with the help of appropriate analytical methods. We can also determine the probability distribution of the run length (i.e., the number of steps of the repeated game until their end and their points in time), expected run length, variance, and so on [4].

The combination of a model which is a bit closer to reality and a new and interesting mathematical structure represents one of the rare pleasures of the modeler. Since he/she deals with real life, disappointment follows immediately. The lesson we can draw for more realistic and, consequently, more complicated conflicts is the following: If we start out representing a complex conflict in a normal form, and if unreasonable strategy combinations have to be considered, we should model this conflict with the help of a sequential game, i.e., a game over time similarly to how it is described

above. Such a game, however, generally requires much more information than is usually available.

This was the case in our Sudan conflict exercise; because of our lack of knowledge, we were unable to adequately model the sequential game. A small consolation is that we now know why we couldn't do it. In other words, the lesson we learned is that there are conflicts which cannot be realistically described with the help of formal models.

In sum, these are some of the lessons I learned during my fruitful PIN years:

- Modelers should pay attention to their clients' sensitivities and be careful when using examples.
- Complex models of complicated conflicts and negotiations may provide certain insights. Paradigms may explain strange or paradoxical situations.
- Not all conflicts are suited to successful formal modeling.
- Occasionally, modelers actually enjoy their job.

## References

- [1] R. Avenhaus and I. W. Zartman (eds.), *Diplomacy Games – Formal Models and International Negotiations*. Springer, Heidelberg and Berlin, 2007.
- [2] D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions*. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957.
- [3] R. Avenhaus, French-German Official Meeting. *PINPoints* 26, 2006.
- [4] R. Avenhaus and T. Krieger, A Fresh Look on the Battle of Sexes Paradigm. *International Conference on Operations Research Munich*, 2010.
- [5] J. Smilovitz, Identity and Mediation. In: *Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Genocide* by M. Anstey, P. Meertz and I. W. Zartman (eds.), forthcoming.

*Rudolf Avenhaus*

## Workshop on the Development of Negotiation Guidelines for CTBTO Inspectors



A joint CTBTO-PIN/IIASA workshop was held from 15–17 June 2010 at the Vienna International Centre (VIC) with the aim of collecting ideas and suggestions for the development of a handbook on negotiations for the CTBTO On-Site Inspection (OSI) team. Participants in the meeting included PIN group members, as well as other negotiation experts and on-site inspection experts from the PTS.

This meeting followed previous discussions on negotiations expertise for use by CTBTO inspectors in the future, owing to the special situation and modalities of the OSI under with the CTBT.

In the opening talk, Moti Melamud pointed out that while the OSI regime was being developed, it became evident that inspectors might face many situations that require negotiation skills. As a newly established inspection regime, it would be useful to study it systematically to provide CTBTO inspectors with negotiation tools and training methods relevant for their specific task. Clearly, the Inspection Team Leader needs to be a capable negotiator, but he/she will necessarily rely on the scientific expertise of his/her team members and will have to delegate some of the negotiation process to the team members by engaging them in technical discussions with the ISP experts to find alternatives and thus facilitate the continued inspection activities stipulated in the Treaty provisions. Nonetheless, the inspectors have to understand that their highest priority is gathering relevant data and not spending time on unproductive legal negotiations with the ISP; their only option if they are not satisfied with the ISP response is to record it in the inspection report. Cultural differences and the need for interpretation may strongly affect com-

munication within the Inspection Team (IT) itself and between the IT and the Inspected State Party (ISP) teams; this may create misunderstandings and, consequently, this aspect needs to be studied and considered as part of the inspection plan prepared for the IT prior to its departure for inspection. The internal negotiations between team members were also discussed. As this is a comparably large team of up to 40 experts from many different scientific disciplines, which may be competing for priority, as well as from different countries with varied cultural backgrounds, this is considered an unavoidable process. It was agreed that this process needs to be minimized to avoid an undermining of the inspection team leader's authority. One suggestion was to more clearly define this process as an internal dialog.

Hence, the need to provide the inspection team, especially IT management, with generic, structured negotiation guidelines was recognized, as well as the need to model the different possible negotiation contexts and situations which the team may have to adapt to in each case. A detailed analysis and study of the specific parameters for the CTBT-OSI negotiation regime is necessary to draw conclusions on the principles and create guidelines for the IT that can be used for the training of inspectors and for conducting actual inspections.

An overview of the training cycle for inspectors was presented (Andrea Milic, CTBTO) with the aim of identifying where negotiation training is considered part of the course curriculum. The rest of the first meeting day was mainly dedicated to presentations by CTBTO experts about their experiences in the negotiations conducted during the major OSI field exercise in 2008 (IFE08), in which an on-site inspection – including all its phases – was simulated. The presentations provided different perspectives: The inspection team perspective (Matjaz Prah, CTBTO, member of the inspection team in IFE08), the inspected state perspective (Li Hua, China, member of the inspected state in IFE08), critical behaviors in IFE08 from the ISP role perspec-



tive (Peter Tansey, UK), and an external observer perspective (Ariel Macaspac and Gunnar Sjöstedt). These presentations initiated discussions on most of the relevant issues presented later in the meeting in more detail. The day concluded with a brief initial discussion on the need for and possible content of a negotiations handbook for the inspection team. These included the issues of personalities (push/pull) and the role of cultural backgrounds in the different situations the inspection team might encounter during an inspection. It was emphasized that the team is on its own with practically only one backchannel, namely, contact with the Director General of the Secretariat at the headquarters in Vienna, while the representative of the inspected state has the backup of all state agencies and ministries. An optional backchannel was identified in cases in which an observer of the state that requested the inspection is present. This observer is allowed to communicate with his/her state and can thus exert pressure at international level. A pull style negotiation process is preferred, since the inspection team's objective is to help the inspected state prove its compliance with the Treaty. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that this might not work in cases in which the inspected state is actually trying to cover up a violation of the Treaty.

It was further suggested that it might be helpful to divide the negotiation handbook into two parts: General basic skills (part 1), and OSI aspects including managed access, point of entry situations, etc. (part 2). The handbook should provide a general background for all, presenting situations in which negotiations generally would and could take place. It was agreed that the handbook will be accessible to all, including all states and any state that may potentially be inspected in the future. Therefore, it cannot be a strategy handbook for the inspection team but rather a collection of guidelines.

The second day of the meeting began with a presentation by I. William Zartman on the power distribution in negotiations and the characteristics that define the strong and weak partner in the negotiation process. Possible tools for the side that would normally be described as the weaker one (based on standard characteristics) were discussed with a special focus on the CTBT inspection team. It was stressed here that unlike common diplomatic negotiations, the inspection team's main task is

the collection of data to the furthest extent possible. Instead of delving into a long process of negotiation, the team has the option to include a comment in its report to the Executive Council about the restrictions the inspected state set.

During the first half of the second day, a simulation (tabletop exercise) was conducted involving a managed access scenario that may occur during an inspection. The participants were divided into two teams playing the roles of the inspected state party and the inspection team, respectively. Each team received background material and instructions from the control team regarding its tasks and behavior. The control team nominated the team leaders. The ISP's team leader was Terrence Hopmann from Johns Hopkins University, an experienced negotiations expert with extensive experience in treaty development negotiation. The team leader for the inspection team was Mark Anstey from Michigan State University in Dubai, an experienced negotiations mediator from South Africa. Both teams included negotiation experts as well as OSI technical experts. The ISP team's main task was to keep the inspection team out of a certain area for national security reasons that had no relation to a nuclear explosion. The inspection team was required to insist on gaining access to this particular area to collect information about the types of activity conducted there and to clarify whether a nuclear explosion had been conducted in violation of the Treaty. For the IT the reasons behind the ISP's refusal to provide access were not clear and it could therefore not ignore the assumption that one possible reason may be an attempt by the ISP to cover up a violation of the Treaty. The ISP was in an awkward position; while being innocent (according to the scenario, only known to the ISP), it could not meet with the IT's request for first-hand evidence by granting it a visit. It was a short exer-

cise during which the IT tried to inch closer to understanding the ISP's reasons and to some agreement with the ISP, which, in turn, was in a difficult position (on account of the control team's instructions). As these were mostly composed of negotiation experts, it was interesting to note that the process of negotiation was structured, but dealt very little with actual technical details or possible alternatives to the inspection team's full access. At a certain stage of the negotiations for access to the restricted site, the inspected state representatives demonstrated some unease (based on their leg movements and nervous playing with pencils). This was understandable as it was difficult for them to explain the access restrictions (on account of national security considerations which they could not specify clearly) contradicted by their claim of being innocent (not violating the Treaty). We must always be cautious, of course, when interpreting body language, but it was quite interesting to witness the ISP team's behavior at that particular moment. The exercise was cut short before the situation was resolved.

We should appreciate that this was not a complete simulation. Such an incident is dealt with within a more intricate situation during an actual inspection. The value of the simulation, albeit that it was short, was evident throughout the rest of the meeting, with many references being made to and examples drawn from this simulation. As part of the discussion on the simulation play, Paul Meerts presented an analysis of the personal characteristics of each team based on questionnaires which had been filled out by participants earlier. Meerts commented on each team's behavior based on the balance of specific characteristics in the teams and pointed out a correlation between them.

The afternoon session began with a presentation by Mark Anstey on mediation



*Tabletop exercise at IIASA (left) and strategic discussions of the on-site inspection team during the Integrated Field Exercise IFE08 in Kazakhstan (right).*

and the win-win prerogative. He asserted that the distinction between win-win and positional bargaining is blurred in practice. In the OSI case, this is a result of having a wide range of available techniques to implement and it is therefore possible to avoid being locked in and to shift negotiation from the “whether” to the “how.” The importance of mediation was described as contributing to a win-win-win (including the mediator) situation, and examples of this from different international situations were provided. The question of who can be the mediator during the OSI was discussed. It was clarified that the Treaty provisions do not provide for a third party to intervene as a mediator, and that only backstage mediation may be provided through the Director General. Mediation as a possibility is actually mentioned in the Treaty and is to take place during the process of consultation and clarification, which must precede the request for an OSI. In such a case, it is either the Director General or the Executive Council that function as a mediator. If this process was not successful in resolving the situation, an OSI may be launched for which no mediation process has been defined. With regard to internal inspection team negotiations, the inspection team leader can assign mediator functions to one of the inspectors.

The next presentation by Guy Olivier Faure addressed the role of culture in negotiations providing many examples. Cultural influence was defined as affecting negotiations on four levels: behavior/tactics; beliefs; cognition (ritual); and identity. During the discussion the need to train inspectors on the history and culture of people was mentioned, which may account for the population’s vivid memory (humiliation, decades of colonization, etc.) and spawn resistance against inspection. The Secretariat of the CTBTO and the inspection team naturally follow the local laws of the CTBTO in Vienna, which might, however, not be accepted by the officials of the inspected state.

The next presentation by Rudolf Schüssler dealt with lies, deception, and ethics of negotiations. He pointed out that immoral behavior is not morally regulated and appropriate tools need to therefore be applied. Empirical studies were described to determine whether it can be a good negotiation strategy to tell someone that he/she is lying and whether it was at all help-

ful. This led us back to the issue of negotiation approach. Comment was made on the importance of interpreting body language which may help identify possible deception attempts. It was noted that the verification regime of the CTBTO is established based on the assumption that the inspected state may attempt to deceive the inspection team, as there otherwise is no use for the verification regime. Inspection teams expect the inspected state to demonstrate that it is not lying, but rather that it is withholding information (not linked to a violation of the Treaty, but for national security purposes).

The presentation by Gunnar Sjöstedt and Ariel Macaspac focused on professional cultures and the minding of boundaries between stereotypes and culture. Examples included military, scientific, legal, and other cultures. The impact of these stereotypes was explained as deriving from factors such as personal style, formality, time sensibility, the agreement-building method, risk taking or team organization. The issue of whether professional cultures in negotiation present a bridge or rift and the effect of the presence of experts with different professional backgrounds and cultures in negotiations might enhance or obstruct the process was also discussed. Usually, when negotiations are being discussed, speakers refer to political negotiations, which, however, is not the case in the mainly technical OSI negotiations. The TTE conducted earlier clearly demonstrated this to participants and thus made this particular presentation all the more relevant. The importance of cross training to enhance cooperation between inspection team experts with different professional backgrounds and cultures was highlighted during the discussion as well.

The next presentation by Philip T. Hopmann (SAIS) addressed those specific issues in negotiation theory that are relevant to the OSI case. In this particular case, the formula is set in advance and the negotiations cover the implementation of details, whereas in international negotiations such as treaty negotiations, the discussion shifts back and forth. This is not possible during the OSI in general as the OSI process takes place in a series of stages. Normally, we do not arrive at an agreement until the end and the negotiations go back and forth until we agree. Here, there is a need to agree on a stage-by-stage basis with each stage outcome influencing what is possible in the



Source: www.ctbto.org

*The work of the CTBTO OSI team is performed with the help of monitoring stations, visual observation, infrasound stations, radar, communication systems, magnetic field measurements, as well as other equipment.*

next stage. The way negotiation is dealt with in the previous stage affects the level of cooperation in the subsequent stage. It is therefore important to match tools with circumstances; using wall tactics in early stages, for example, may result in disaster. As indicated earlier, pull rather than push tactics could be a lot more useful. It must be recognized that the team is limited to soft power and that it cannot fall back on any coercive power. Any deterrence power will be affected by the other states' parties that are watching the progress of the inspection team's negotiations.

In the ensuing discussion, the issue of what literature inspectors ought to read during training was raised. It was agreed that a list of resource material should be compiled including cultural and regional impacts and nonverbal clues training. The "good cop, bad cop" tactic was mentioned, but designated as being a dangerous one. It was stressed that trustworthiness plays a more important role for the team. As for training on negotiation, it was agreed that simulations (tabletop exercises) are a useful method and should be based on scenarios close to reality.

The last session of the workshop focused on a possible handbook for inspectors on negotiation. The significance of such a tool was emphasized and is to include the subtitle "guidelines." Since there is no one specific way to conduct OSI negotiations, it was concluded that it should not become a checklist of what to do or not to do, but rather include several scenarios, the roles of the two sides, and how these might play out in actual situations, descriptive paragraphs, the nature of given situations, and challenges that may be encountered. It was, in particular, stated that the handbook ought to describe the dilemma of a compliant inspected state that has to prove that it is not lying, yet at the same time has to conceal certain information. The resource book has to be a guide to good practice for all parties, taking into account that the inspected state representative will most likely use it as well. In addition to all negotiation aspects highlighted and principles presented during this meeting, the handbook should include crucial issues related to OSI-specific situations which may require negotiation, a review of strategies, how to deal with deadlock, and case studies.

*Mordechai Melamud*

## PIN Book on CTBT Negotiations

This book is due to be published at the beginning of 2011 and will present the proceedings and results of the 2009 PIN (IIASA) seminar, which analyzed the negotiation process associated with the establishment of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), its Organization (CTBTO), and its verification regime in order to evaluate the adequacy of these negotiations for the purpose of creating a viable international regime.

The chapters in this book cover issues relating to past, present, and future aspects of negotiation with reference to the establishment of the Treaty and its verification regime. The first part addresses the 1996 regime-building negotiations to create the CTBT system and its governing Organization. The ongoing regime-adjustment negotiations, principally within the Preparatory Commission, for the effective implementation of the Treaty are discussed in the second part; and the third focuses on the issue of field negotiations which enable specific on-site inspections, namely how inspectors negotiate to conduct verification.

The first part of the book, which covers past negotiations, includes papers that place the CTBT in a larger historical context and as part of international efforts to pursue arms control, especially nuclear non-proliferation. Other papers explore the impact of the wide variety of participants at the domestic and international levels who have become actors in international negotiation processes on disarmament and security, such as those outside the formal organizations of government, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). An account of the actual negotiations conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva during 1995-1996 to establish the CTBT is also provided.

Several chapters analyze the general formulas which governed the negotiations and agreement on the CTBT. These included discussions on specific national formulas and possible patterns of those formulas based on a number of dimensions with a spectrum of differences. Special attention is given to the debate over the CTBT in the USA, India's change in approach from support to repudiation, and the history of the Soviet Union and Russian approach to the CTBT.

Possible contradictions between political and technical requirements in structuring and negotiating a treaty are presented. It is pointed out that a treaty text developed through a political negotiation process results in a vague and sometimes ambiguous text, which cannot support a technical verification regime that requires clear and accurate processes in order to be defined.

The second part of the book focuses on present negotiations. First, an overview of the ongoing process in the policymaking organs of the CTBTO is provided. Another chapter discusses the legal aspects of the present CTBTO which continues to operate on a provisional basis pending the entry into force of the CTBT, with a view to seeking ways and means to enhance the CTBTO's authority. A specific example is described regarding a technical issue related to the CTBT monitoring system, which requires political negotiation and agreement among the member states in the policymaking organs on a trade-off between the perceived neutrality of reporting to the Secretariat and the ability of states that lack the possible complex analysis tools to obtain an independent analysis of the IMS measurement data.

The publication's third part covers future practical negotiations during the actual implementation of the Treaty's verification regime following its entry into force. On the level of the policymaking organs, an analysis of the potential decision making process in the future Executive Council is presented with regard to the approval of conducting an on-site inspection, the probability of error in that process, and the consequences of committing these errors in quantitative terms.

The future issue of the negotiations during an OSI between the inspection team and the inspected state are discussed in the last three chapters. Actual negotiation aspects during the conduct of an on-site inspection (OSI) are presented based on simulations of the process in different exercises. The special modalities of the CTBTO OSI, which make CTBTO negotiations an important tool for the inspectors, are explained and the tabletop exercise as a tool for training inspectors in utilizing the negotiation technique is presented. A detailed example stresses the significance of this role-playing tool in light of the fact that the CTBTO does not have routine inspections, and exercises are therefore the best and virtually only source of experience for inspectors and the organization. The annexes include material of a mini tabletop exercise that was conducted during the meeting in June 2009 to provide an example of a negotiation scenario during the initial stages of an OSI.

*Mordechai Melamud*



## Negotiation and Legitimacy – Engaging Extremists to Talk

The School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA) of Durham University hosted the Annual Conference of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program on 8 October 2010. Durham, considered the birthplace of British scholarship, has been a leading center of scholarship for over 1,000 years.

Bringing together more than 50 policymakers, NGO representatives, academics, and students, PIN initiated a discussion on negotiating with extremists. While the official line is that public authorities do not negotiate with terrorists, governments frequently end up negotiating with hostage takers, kidnappers, and other political groups classified as terrorists. The annual conference in Durham evaluated legitimacy issues, concepts, and policies.

The speakers considered the issue of legitimacy in asymmetric negotiations from numerous angles and offered invaluable insights both for those in positions of authority, who have to decide how, when, and with whom to negotiate, and those interested in the study of the interplay between legitimacy and negotiations:

- I William Zartman (John Hopkins University): Engaging Extremists
- Rudolf Schüssler (University of Bayreuth): Asymmetric Conflicts and Moral Symmetry
- Ariel Macaspac Penetrante (IIASA): Dealing with Patronage States – The Case of the Philippines
- Oliver Ramsbotham (Bradford University): Managing Radical Disagreement in Asymmetric Negotiation
- Mikhail Troitskiy (McArthur Foundation, Moscow): Negotiating with Equals
- Mordechai Melamud (CTBTO): Asymmetries in Inspection Negotiations
- Sophie Haspeslagh (Conciliation Resources/Accord): Engaging Armed Groups
- Alexander Ramsbotham (Conciliation Resources/Accord): Cross-Border Dynamics

*Ariel Macaspac Penetrante*



## Bridging Policy and Research: The Lviv Negotiation Day

The Processes of International Negotiation Program collaborated with IIASA's Forestry Program, the Lviv Polytechnic National University, and the Systems Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences to organize the 3rd International Workshop on Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Inventories.

The three-day workshop was held at the Polytechnic National University in Lviv, Ukraine and brought together more than 40 scholars to discuss the implications of uncertainty in greenhouse gas inventories on the decision-making process. Policymakers' decisions, for instance, depend on how uncertainties are to be structured and how accountability becomes clear. Decision makers need to understand the effects of signing an agreement to mitigate climate change.

PIN organized the workshop's negotiation day and simulated COP15. Scholars assumed the roles of diplomats to experience the decision-making process. The main goal of the simulation was to formulate a section of the resolution which is intended to replace the Kyoto Protocol. The participants learned that negotiation as an instrument and as a framework for reaching decisions in itself contributes to the complexity of negotiating:

- The multilateral setting of the negotiation on climate change necessitates an understanding of coalition building and procedural justice.
- The necessity for negotiators to acquire scientific and technical expertise points to the problems of knowledge asymmetries, particularly between developed and developing countries.
- The very dynamic nature of climate change involves new technologies which affect the conduct of negotiations.
- The participation of NGOs and academic communities in the decision-making process increases the complexity of decision making.
- Human factors such as emotions and trust as well as personal communication skills may influence the way decisions are framed.

*Ariel Macaspac Penetrante*



# The Global Power of Talk

## The Uses of Negotiation to Advance Global Security

International negotiation or “Talk Power”<sup>1</sup> is a vital but underutilized tool of statecraft in the post-9/11 world. It should be a key instrument for promoting global security in an era where there are obvious limits to the use of military power in dealing with the multiple problems of terrorism, “rogue states,” failed states, intractable conflicts, and nuclear proliferation. Under the Bush administration, however, military power trumped diplomacy to the detriment of global security and US interests. Even the Clinton administration was not as adept as it could have been in exploiting the full potential of “Talk Power” to address the world’s conflicts.

As this book will argue, the challenge for US policymakers and whoever occupies the White House is to use “Talk Power” to secure vital US interests and promote global security. “Talk Power” has even more general relevance for those countries that want to work alongside the remaining superpower in securing a more peaceful and prosperous world order. In a world in which Gross National Power is in imbalance, diplomacy offers opportunities to smaller states, but it also enables the hegemon to exercise leadership and achieve its goals inoffensively.

This book argues that there is an extraordinarily rich variety of negotiating strategies or “Talk Power” tools that can be deployed to address global security challenges. The challenge for US foreign policy is to *combine* these different negotiating tools and instruments in ways that advance American interests and promote global security. So, too, is the importance of presidential leadership and engagement in negotiations. As President Kennedy wisely said: “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”

A sound strategy also means casting off neoconservative or hard power and liberal or soft power ways of thinking that underestimate the real power of negotiation to manage and resolve international conflicts. Absolute (not relative) gains, enlightened (not narrow) self interests, and creative (not timid) engagement are conceptual elements that accompany this approach.

**The Neoconservative Fallacy** – Gun Power trumps diplomacy and the need to negotiate security in an age of US hegemony; the hammer-nail problem, which can be characterized broadly as a failure of strategy, but also the failure to think creatively about the use of other tools of statecraft, and the tendency to equate negotiation with concession and appeasement.

**The Soft Power Fallacy** – Global influence and stability emerge automatically from the United States’ ability to project its democratic ideals, values, and institutions and the inherent appeal of those values to others. Soft power champions fail to think strategically about the uses of different negotiating strategies to advance key American values and interests.

This book will argue that the United States has, on many occasions, used and championed “Talk Power” to secure US interests, defuse global tensions, and effectively manage a succession of international crises. But it has also neglected its potential for creative leadership along these very lines. This book will examine both situations and show how we can learn from this rich legacy



Source: wikipedia.org

*Triple Talk. Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat during the Oslo Accords on 13 September 1993.*

and exploit the full uses of “Talk Power” to address today’s major global security challenges.

Talk Power is not just about the power and utility of international negotiation. It is also about exercising leadership and knowing when and how to select and combine different negotiating strategies and tactics, including the threat to use military power, into a coherent diplomatic strategy. In the modern age, it also means harnessing the negotiating assets of different international institutions and a wide range of non-state actors who can serve as vital negotiating partners in the resolution of international conflicts.

This study stakes out new conceptual ground by examining the historical record and applying the lessons of negotiation analysis to current policy and events. It builds on the recent contributions of John Ikenberry, Joseph Nye, and Dennis Ross, but has its own focus, with broader coverage and a more comprehensive development of the motions of “Talk Power.”



Source: wikipedia.org

*Happy Talk. President Jimmy Carter welcomes Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the White House, shortly after the Camp David Accords went into effect, 8 April 1980.*

<sup>1</sup> Or “Word Power,” the term still undecided.

**Chapter 1: Introduction.** This chapter introduces some of the key themes of the book. It begins by comparing how two American presidents, John F. Kennedy (Cuban Missile Crisis) and George Bush (Georgia), reacted in major international crises and compares their leadership and negotiating skills under extreme pressure. [This chapter will be revised to discuss in greater depth the qualities of leadership that are necessary to be an effective international negotiator and why some presidents have been much better negotiators than others on the international stage.]

**Chapter 2: How We Lost Our Way: Iraq and the Failure to Use Talk Power.** This chapter discusses the failures of diplomacy and negotiation that led to the outbreak of the first Gulf War (a failure of the right application of “Talk Power”) and the failure of the US to use “Talk Power” to further its own peace process between Israel and the Palestinians in the decade and half after the Oslo Agreement. As a result, the US installed Gun Power as the means to handle Middle East conflicts and lost terrain. [This chapter will be redrafted to provide a more fulsome account of the negotiations that are discussed here. The leadership issue – and the qualities of negotiation that go with it – will be picked up from the introduction and amplified in the revised chapter.]

**Chapter 3: Talk Power Tools.** The “tools” of Talk Power are varied. There are key questions associated with the use of these tools, contrasted with a few cases of neglect. This chapter will discuss in greater depth the different Talk Power “tools” available to America’s leaders.

- **Tough Talk** – In the tough world of international relations, great powers often have to talk tough and back up diplomacy with different kinds of threats or sanctions in order to achieve their objectives. What are the appropriate uses of Hard Talk? When does it pay for mediators to use Hard Talk to secure a political agreement?
- **Straight Talk** – Telling it like it is, particularly in regard to real alternatives, is often necessary to move away from position bargaining and outbidding. Straight Talk is sober and honest discussion about what the present course bodes and what must be done to rectify a bad situation.
- **Sweet Talk** – Sometimes negotiators have to offer various kinds of inducements or side payments to move negotiations forward and sweeten the prospect of concluding a settlement. This process is referred to as “Sweet Talk.” When is it appropriate to resort to a sweet talk strategy? How does one combine Hard Talk with Sweet Talk in a mediation context?
- **Happy Talk** – Negotiations have to head for a better future, building castles on the horizon for the parties to share. It is the kind of talk that tries to persuade parties of the possibilities of making a better world for themselves and their constituents.
- **Small Talk** – Once the formula for an agreement is in place the talk turns to the details, where the devil is said to reside. Negotiators must know how to get the small pieces right and in place, while remaining true to the principles that set up the agreement.
- **Trash Talk** – Sometimes it pays to heap scorn and diminish rivals in the diplomatic arena. When is such a bargaining strategy warranted? How does one change the tone of these conversations where rhetoric is clearly out of control and harms one’s ability to launch a more constructive dialog?
- **Sticky Talk** – The challenge in many conflict situations in today’s world is to get the parties to engage in an *ongoing* or *recurring* process of dialog and negotiation so that the peace process de-



Source: White House photo by Eric Draper

*Straight Talk. Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush take a leisurely walk in the woods at Bocharov Ruchey after the signing of the Sochi Agreement on a strategic framework on Russian–US relations, 6 April 2008.*

velops real momentum. Third parties can promote “Sticky Talk” through their interventions and by exerting various kinds of pressures on the parties so that they “stick” to the negotiation process and to their negotiated commitments.

- **Safe Talk** – It is sometimes useful to begin a dialog in a safe negotiating channel that is out of the political spotlight. When does it make sense to pre-negotiate with other parties in this way? How does one begin a safe conversation which can build relationships and develop trust? What role do secret or “safe” negotiations play in advancing core interests and building momentum for more formal negotiations?
- **Timely Talk** – It is not only the content of appropriate talk that matters; it is also its timing. Timely Talk comes at or before the ripe moment, and seizes the opportunities that determine the relevance of its argument. The most timely talk of all serves to prevent violent conflict rather than react to it, and, after all, that is what most diplomacy does.
- **Triple Talk** – Direct talk between the conflicting parties is often not possible because of obstacles of communication, formulation or stakes and status. Mediators are frequently required because parties in conflict need help.
- **Street Talk** – Successful peace processes, especially in an intrastate conflict situation, must involve the public and the proverbial man and woman on the street, who have borne the brunt of violence and the trauma of civil war. Street Talk or “circum-negotiation” processes can be used to promote social learning and help transform identities and interests by engaging ordinary citizens. Street Talk is also important for promoting democracy and mobilizing public support for newly formed democratic institutions.
- **Team Talk** – The United States (and other countries) increasingly have to build effective international coalitions not just with like-minded states, but also with adversaries to form “teams of rivals” that can work together on common security challenges. What kinds of negotiating strategies are required to build such teams and make them work effectively?
- **Stop! Talk** – Sometimes it is just necessary to let the parties or other party go home and think about what the situation would be like if talking ended. Such interruptions often provide turning points where blunt calculations have to be made, allowing the talk to resume with new commitments.



This chapter will also stress that it is not simply a matter of knowing what the different Talk Power tools are, but that knowing when and how to use them is a key issue for US leadership. The chapter will also discuss the relationship between the means and ends (or purposes) of international negotiation.

**Chapter 4: The Proven Success of “Talk Power”: Lessons From the Middle East.** This chapter will discuss the successful use of Talk Power by American presidents focusing on the Middle East (especially Nixon/Kissinger, Carter) picking up on the discussion in Chapter 2. A key point to be made here is that successful Talk Power involves the use of more than one set of negotiating strategies and tactics. But it also requires special qualities of engagement and presidential leadership. Chapter 4 will explore the factors that contributed to Carter’s mediation success at Camp David as well as Nixon/Kissinger’s earlier successes in helping to negotiate the Sinai Accords between Egypt and Israel. (The focus in this chapter will be on the successful uses of Hard Talk, Sweet Talk, and Sticky Talk by American negotiators). The chapter will conclude with a discussion about how the US can successfully promote the Middle East peace process under the next American president, drawing on lessons from the past.

**Chapter 5: Talking to Un-Engageables.** Engaging as opposed to isolation is a current tactic that is designed to open communications, soften world tensions, improve understanding, induce creativity, and lead to conflict de-escalation. It also has its disadvantages, as moderate forces are undercut, hostile parties are slow to react, major goals are bypassed, and relations may deteriorate further. Persistence, patience, and solid follow-up from talk to action are required if the policy is to bear fruit.

**Chapter 6: Taming Intractable Conflicts.** This chapter will focus on lessons from the problems that have arisen over attempts to resolve long-lasting, obdurate regional conflicts in the 21st century, after some notable successes at the end of the previous century. Much may have to do with the end of the Cold War, but other lessons have emerged as well.

**Chapter 7: Building a Team of Rivals.** This chapter will discuss how the US can make constructive teams out of its adversaries and strategic rivals in zones of conflict (N. Korea, Iran, Russia, China). It will draw on some of the key lessons of negotiations with China, ASEAN (South-East Asian countries), and Europe on the Cambodian Problem as the Cold War ended.

**Chapter 8: The Uses of “Talk Power” in Preventing Violent Conflict.** Discussion in greater detail of a few cases where Talk Power should have been used but was not, with catastrophic results, including the failure to use hard and other types of talk to stop genocide and violent conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, and Darfur, and the Balkans prior to and during the early years of the conflict in that region. It will also highlight some of the successful uses of Talk Power (or STOP! Talk) to prevent the eruption of violent conflict in Macedonia, the Baltics, Russia-Ukraine, Macedonia, and North Korea (under Carter). The chapter will conclude with a discussion on how Talk Power can be used to avert violent conflict in cases where state failure and/or collapse are imminent possibilities.

**Chapter 9: Talking with Terrorists.** When is it appropriate to use Talk Power to advance US interests in dealing with terrorists? This chapter will discuss the uses of and limitations to Talk Power in dealing with insurgents and various non-state actors who use terrorist acts to advance their goals. The discussion will draw on cases

such as the British experience in Northern Ireland, the Israeli experience in the Middle East, the Sinhalese-led government’s experience in Sri Lanka, and the dilemmas faced by US forces in Iraq and NATO forces in Afghanistan in dealing with insurgents. The chapter will focus especially on the uses of Safe Talk and the varieties of informal or track II diplomacy in initiating dialog with insurgents and their constituents to advance peace processes.

**Chapter 10: Talking with Friends and Allies.** Cooperative disputes concern conflicts over public goods of various types. Such disputes arise between providers and consumers, over externalities or between equally preferred alternatives (termed coordination disputes), as well as over distributional issues. While these have frequently been presented as conflicts requiring distributive or win/lose bargaining, when they occur with friends and allies, they call rather for Straight Talk and Small Talk instead of Tough Talk.

**Chapter 11: Talking Horizontally on New Governance Challenges.** Much negotiation takes place between two parties; some say that even multilateral negotiation is merely a gaggle of bilateral negotiations. Yet a considerable amount of constructive, productive talk in our times is conducted in multilateral forums. Here the procedures and structures are different than in the other venues discussed above. “Parliamentary Diplomacy,” as it was termed long ago, has its own rules, outcomes, winners, and losers.

**Chapter 12: How the US Can Best Use and Strengthen its “Talk Power” Capabilities.** A discussion of a foreign policy for the future, the role of Talk Power in that policy, and the special role of presidential leadership in advancing US interests via Talk Power.

*Fen Osler Hampson and I. William Zartman*



Source: Ludmila Bek | Dreamstime.com

*The failure of diplomacy and negotiation can lead to war.*

## Summary of YSSP Research

Three young researchers participating in IIASA's 2010 Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) carried out research under the supervision of PIN. Their brief reports reflect an interesting range of topics under the broad heading of negotiation studies. Katrina Running conducted research on pro-environmental attitudes in developed, transitioning, and developing countries; Aviv Melamud examined the factors that are causing an impasse in fissban negotiations; and Igor Istomin looked at problems related to the use of scientific knowledge in policymaking.

### Toward an Agreement on Climate: Understanding Pro-Environmental Attitudes in Developed, Transitioning, and Developing Countries

*Katrina Running*

University of Arizona  
Tucson  
United States

Social scientific research on climate negotiations suggests that global inequality underpins many of the disputes currently standing in the way of cooperative international agreements. This may be attributable to the fact that the key components of any proposed plan are based on measures to strengthen either environmental protection or economic growth. Gauging international concern about global warming and understanding the conditions under which people prioritize environmental protection is important for creating consensus and for targeted action on climate change. However, we must first determine how the current disparate levels of economic development affect concern for the environment.

This study analyzed who supports pro-environmental policy priorities in economically diverse countries, and why. First, the factors that play a role in the belief that global warming is a serious problem were examined, as was the question whether these factors differ in countries with unequal levels of economic development. Based on findings from past research and current theories of environmental concern,

social demographic characteristics such as age, sex, income, and level of education, as well as social psychological measures of post-materialism and political ideological orientation were explored. Second, in order to evaluate the potential for individuals to support action on climate if it requires an economic sacrifice, the question whether and how these predictors of pro-environmental attitudes change was addressed when the competing goals of environmental protection and economic growth are explicitly compared.

Using data from the 2005–2008 Wave of the World Values Survey and country-specific measures of climate risk in 46 countries, a series of logistic regression models were estimated to answer these questions in three types of countries: Developed, transitioning, and developing countries. Overall, substantial evidence was found that the assessment of the seriousness of global warming depends on economic status – both at personal as well as at country

level. In developed countries, the strongest predictors for considering global warming a serious environmental problem are a leftist political orientation, higher levels of education, a post-materialist value perspective, and being female. In transitioning countries, opinions on global warming appear to be conditional on general access to information, with education and the frequent consumption of various sources of information being the strongest predictors for deeming global warming a serious problem. Among the respondents in developing countries, the two factors that were positively correlated with the notion that global warming poses a serious problem were level of education and climate risk.

However, these results differ in the models in which the degree of environmental concern is based on prioritizing between the environment and the economy. In these models, subjective values associated with a post-materialist orientation increase the odds of placing environmental protection



Source: utthavit Wiangya | Dreamsstime.com

*Katrina Running researched pro-environmental attitudes.*



above economic growth in all three country categories. In addition, vulnerability to the potentially deleterious effects of climate change appears to play a role: In the transitioning and developing countries, country-level climate risk is positively correlated with prioritizing the environment, and personal economic vulnerability measured by household income is also associated with prioritizing the environment in all three country types.

A comparison of the findings of these models suggests that although climate change is likely to require trade-offs between environmental protection and economic growth, the two issues largely remain unrelated in the minds of many individuals. The factors that determine whether global warming is considered a serious problem are not the same as those that lead to a prioritization of the environment over the economy. Notable differences among individuals from developed, transitioning, and developing countries also exist with reference to which factors are associated with concern for the environment. Ultimately, to achieve collective cooperation on climate change, the model results imply that appealing to subjective justice values and the importance of protecting nature for its own sake is likely to be effective in convincing individuals from developed countries to care about the environment, while improving access to information and increasing the level of education are the strategies that will most likely increase the number of those in transitioning and developing countries who value environmental protection.

## Explaining the Impasse in Fissban Negotiations

Aviv Melamud

Johns Hopkins, School of Advanced International Studies – Conflict Management  
Lehavim  
Israel

The next major multilateral treaty to be negotiated within the scope of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the fissban, an international treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Since the mid-1990s and the conclusion of the last major multilateral treaty regime, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the fissban has been under consideration for negotiation at the Con-



Source: Sandorrr | Dreamstime.com

*Aviv Melamud analyzed the impasse in the fissban negotiations.*

ference on Disarmament (CD). However, a stalemate at the CD has not allowed talks to mature from the pre-negotiation phase to substantive negotiations on the treaty and its application.

This research analyzed the impasse on the fissban, taking the context in which this treaty is being negotiated – the nuclear non-proliferation regime – and its influence on the process into account. The fissban process is one round of negotiations in a progression of agreements and arrangements that make up the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Beyond the complexity inherent in the nature and potential of the fissban, the process is further complicated by a rift between the two major coalitions in the regime – the Non-Aligned Movement (through their grouping at the CD as G-21) and the nuclear weapon states. This schism has intensified over the four decades of the regime's operation and is the underlying cause of the current impasse at the CD.

The multilateral negotiations within the framework of the non-proliferation regime can be described as having evolved from stable cooperation to erosion, which is manifested in disagreement over the notion of *justice* that governs arrangements in the context of the regime, in the *perceptions* of the regime, and how it should progress. The non-aligned states, which are harboring a growing resentment toward the discriminatory nature of the regime, no longer accept equity-based, outcome-related fairness underlying the regime and arrangements therein, and object to the lack of

sufficient progress by nuclear weapon states in advancing nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapon states, on their part, reject non-aligned calls to hasten disarmament as unrealistic. They perceive the regime to be suffering from non-compliance and proliferation, which prevents disarmament and requires a stronger emphasis on non-proliferation measures. Non-aligned states have a different perception, as they consider non-compliance and proliferation to be caused by the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. These incompatibilities in perception and the disagreement over justice has led to a divergence regarding the way forward in advancing the regime, i.e., to a different expected outcome for the fissban.

The fissban has the unique potential to serve as an instrument of disarmament and, therefore, to be the first measure in the regime which actually alters the status quo. While all measures within the framework of the regime are aimed at advancing nuclear disarmament, they are in fact status quo-preserving – major multilateral treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty are non-proliferation mechanisms that practically do not alter the nuclear status quo (US-Russian bilateral nuclear arms reductions are likewise status quo-preserving). The fissban, however, has the potential to be status quo-altering. It is commonly referred to as a fissile material *cut-off* treaty, which implies a future halt in the production of fissile material; this is the



position supported by the nuclear weapon states. Considering that these states have produced all the fissile material they need and have actually declared a self-moratorium on production (except China), a future halt in production would again be status quo-preserving and would only freeze the current nuclear situation. However, if the treaty were to also account for existing stockpiles of fissile material previously produced, it would ensure that no new nuclear weapons are being fueled from existing stocks and that weapons reductions are irreversible. With the inclusion of existing stocks the fissban would be more than simply a non-proliferation measure and would serve to support nuclear disarmament in practice as well.

Nuclear weapon states adamantly oppose the inclusion of existing stocks in the fissban, while non-aligned states refuse to agree to a treaty that is a mere non-proliferation measure. This wide gap in perception regarding treaty outcome could, perhaps, be bridged if negotiations were to begin. Yet the impasse at the CD does not allow for negotiations to begin, as issue linkages with other agenda items are blocking the possibility of reaching agreement on a work program for the CD. The major coalitional divisions in the CD have largely remained the same for over a decade, with no progress being made toward a joint formula for negotiations which could substantially address contentious treaty aspects.

Multilateral negotiations are inherently complex and uncertain because of the large number of actors involved and the issues being discussed. In such negotiations, coalitions represent the practical means by which complexity is reduced and through which the reaching of an agreement becomes possible. Yet in the case of the fissban negotiations, it seems that coalitions cannot effectively manage the complexities of the process, and instead complexity is preventing coalitions from coming together to establish a coherent formula and proceed with negotiations. This complexity derives from the multilateral process itself and is also projected by the non-proliferation regime. Nuclear non-proliferation negotiations are not detached from each other and none of these negotiations result in stand-alone agreements; their underlying negotiation processes consist of a set of recursive negotiations whose outcomes are a web which constitute the non-prolif-



Source: Nilanjana Bhattacharya | Dreamstime.com

*Igor Istomin reveals the limitations of human intellect. Like clay, it can be soft and malleable to start with, then harden and become difficult to change. Policymakers need to remain open and receptive to all sources of information.*

eration regime, and they are therefore all interconnected. The fissban process cannot be separated from its greater context which for several decades has been shaped by considerations, interests, and a process of learning.

## Breaking Through to The Other Side: Knowledge and Policy Making in Negotiations

*Igor Istomin*

MGIMO-University - Applied Analysis of International Problems  
Moscow  
Russia

International negotiations have developed into multi-issue, multi-level bargaining systems. They have become the principal tool through which to strengthen global governance. International regulation covers an increasing number of spheres, including the financial sector, through the IMF and World Bank, trade through the WTO, climate through UNFCCC structures, and nuclear non-proliferation through the NPT Conference and IAEA. As regulation becomes more specific, it involves more technical issues. Thus, the international com-

munity faces the challenge nation states once faced, as ascertained by Max Weber. General wisdom and common sense do not suffice for efficient governance – it needs to be enlightened by scientific knowledge and expertise (Sjöstedt and Spector, 1993, 306).

Scientific evidence is used as a major source of justification in public discourse. A growing amount of literature, including works on consensual knowledge (Sjöstedt, 1994), focuses on the role of scientific information in negotiation processes. Yet, as desirable as knowledge-based foreign policy may be, an important question to ask is whether it is achievable. And in this respect, it is useful for scholars who study negotiations to look at the developments in other fields of political science.

The crucial point when conducting research in policymaking is understanding that it is not always rational and that even when it is, various foundations for this rationality may exist (Alison, 1971; Zartman, 1982). Apart from solving problems, policies – or in the case of negotiations positions, formulas, and eventually agreements – also serve the multiple personal and organizational goals of those who elaborate, adopt, and implement them. National delegations are direct participants in international negotiations, but the guidelines and negotiating formulas they rely on reflect

the complexities of internal discussions which involve numerous private interests. Thus, experts who provide knowledge are only one among many sources that have the potential to impact the process.

Moreover, human intellect sets its own limitations. Cognitive processes can be compared with the processing of clay. Just as clay is soft at first, but then turns hard, actors' ability to process information changes over time. As an issue emerges, the minds of policymakers and others may be open and receptive to all sources of information, but once their view of the issue has been consolidated, it is extremely difficult to change their views. Contradictory information is filtered out, often regardless of its credibility (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988, 134).

On the other hand, the scientific aspect is also not without flaws. Experts speak about probabilities, stochastic distribution, and reducing uncertainty. Social sciences are accustomed to accusations of imprecision and unscientific analysis. Their natural science counterparts are better positioned to formulate general laws in laboratory conditions, but when it comes to applying these laws to real issues, such as climate change processes, for example, their conclusions are also often ambiguous. Thus, science rarely provides clear guidance for policymaking, but rather attempts to find some approximation to truth.

Meanwhile, just as expertise has become essential for policymaking, politics has infiltrated expertise as well. There should be no recall for tricksters who first identify what politicians want to hear and then provide the relevant justifications. The more elegant way would be to simply organize a research agenda which is supportive of certain actions. This is the approach in the work of some think tanks (Wiedenbaum, 2009, 57), but is not only common to them.

Given all these factors, the current literature on expertise in policymaking identifies two distinctive functions of expertise in negotiations, namely, enlightenment and justification, and views them as mutually exclusive.<sup>1</sup> Enlightenment is considered more virtuous, as it relates to real influence and rational decision making. On the other hand, justification is deemed to be used purely for advocacy purposes by

<sup>1</sup> For an overview of the discussion, see (Jasanoff, 1990, 5-9)

those holding power to achieve their real objectives. This collision tends to distract researchers from concentrating on both functions. The result is criticism of negotiations and other forms of policymaking for replacing the resolution of real problems, as identified by scientists, with political bargaining for power interests.

Scientific evidence, as well as gaps in knowledge, may be exploited by malign actors to derail negotiation processes and prevent a search for and achievement of a solution. However, it is more productive to view the two functions as interrelated and interdependent. Such an approach places greater emphasis on the conditions for the inclusion of expertise in policymaking. A systemic approach could explain the prevalence of either of the two functions based on the structure of the given political situation, as well as the shape of knowledge and the expert community. The obvious benefit of this approach to studying negotiations is the in-depth picture gained of the causal relations between expert input and policy output.

## References

- Alison, G. (1971). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Toronto: Harper Collins.
- Jasanoff, S. (1990). *The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policy Makers*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Jenkins-Smith, S. P. (1988). An Advocacy Coalition Model of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein. *Policy Sciences*, 21:129-168.
- Sjöstedt, G. (1994). Issue Clarification and the Role of Consensual Knowledge in the UNCED Process. G. S. Bertram I. Spector, *Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*. London: Graham & Trotman Ltd.
- Sjöstedt, G. (1993). Conclusion. Gunnar Sjöstedt, *International Environmental Negotiations*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Wiedenbaum, M. L. (2009). *The Competition of Ideas: The World of Washington Think Tanks*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Zartman, I. W. (1982). *The Practical Negotiator*. Yale: Yale University Press.

PIN  
YSSP  
2010

## Young Scientists' IIASA Experience



### Katrina Running

I have great enthusiasm for IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program. The opportunity to meet and work with such a diverse group of scholars was both personally and professionally rewarding. In some ways I would say the main benefits of the program are indirect. While I very much appreciated the advice I received from supervisors on my research and the resources that IIASA has to offer, the most important thing I take away from my participation in the program is a greater depth and breadth of knowledge about the types of research currently being done to inform policymaking and global problems, and the types of questions researchers in a variety of disciplines find interesting and timely. From my peers in the program I was also made aware of additional funding opportunities that I intend to pursue. Thus, somewhat indirectly, being at IIASA for the summer has affected my research agenda and my confidence that once it is completed, it will have an audience.

In terms of my impression of the program's overall organization, as I have (hopefully) already expressed on multiple occasions prior, I found the energy and commitment of the YSSP staff and coordinators to be exceptional. While discussing the program just before its end, myself and another YSSPer agreed that we have never felt so appreciated by an institution for which we have worked in our lives. Now that I am back home and have resumed work at my home institution, I feel even more strongly about this. So once again, I would like to thank IIASA and everyone involved in administering the YSSP for facilitating a truly memorable and inspiring experience.



### Aviv Melamud

During the summer of 2010, I wandered extensively through the *Innere Stadt* with an American in search of a hidden fresco from the 17th century, allegorically depicting a cow playing backgammon with a wolf. I spent long hours talking with an Iranian about the Bible and the Qur'an and comparing religious bride price traditions. I partied at a karaoke bar with a Pakistani and a Filipino, enjoyed a jazz concert with a South African and a Canadian, and had dinner at an Indian restaurant for a Senegalese's birthday. In Vienna.

It was not a typical summer for an Israeli, needless to say.

Nor does one, regardless of nationality, often have the opportunity to meet and draw from such a varied array of personalities, disciplines, and expertise. It never ceased to amaze me how much I could learn from talking about my work with a Swede who analyzed the optimal localization of biofuel production in Europe. No matter how unrelated our topics of research may have initially seemed, all of us realized there was much to be learned from one another, and what we have learned, even if it does not manifest itself explicitly in our papers, has impacted us.

My colleagues from the PIN group at the institute were of particular influence (American, Russian, and Filipino, for the nationality count), and in times of need always gave a word of support, put forward suggestions, lent advice, shared their experience as well as a good time. The PIN group's inspiring Steering Committee members offered guidance and counsel on our projects, but gave us much more than that – their work



The PIN Workshop was one of the major scientific events during the summer of 2010



over so many years served as our theoretical and analytical background, and through it they accompanied us in our research and are thus discernible in every aspect of our papers. Particularly the encouragement and enthusiasm of Dr. Zartman, my supervisor, gave me the support and confidence I needed to complete the project; and this will always continue to motivate me in my future research.

Working and socializing in such a culturally, intellectually, and academically diverse environment is stimulating, overwhelming, and inspiring. So many topics were covered over lunch, during an evening visit to a *Heuriger*, a walk through the *Schlosspark* or around Vienna; topics as diverse as the group of people brought together for the summer. Hopefully, I'll have more opportunities in my life to enjoy such diversity and curiosity-inducing experiences.

Well, now that we have all dispersed back to our countries of origin, I at least know that I have a YSSPer in every port. World, here I come!



## Igor Istomin

The best thing about IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program is that the most valuable contributions derive from sources you'd never expect to come across in the first place. Although you are there to study some aspect of international negotiations, you occasionally realize how much you benefit from seminars on economic optimization, from discussions with fellow YSSP engineers or professors in forestry. The sudden synergies which kept emerging here and there certainly puzzle you from time to time. Yet as soon as you get used to maintaining high intellectual awareness at all times, the YSSP becomes an outstanding experience. My days at IIASA not only reminded me, but made me tangibly understand the idea once formulated by Karl Popper that borders between disciplines only exist in our minds, while the world is synthetic. Synthesis is generally a crucial concept for the Institute (though I never heard anyone pronounce this during my stay there), as it considers the world to be complex, yet still a single system. So you have to learn how to keep an open mind at all times, otherwise you probably won't understand what IIASA is all about.

The other figure who comes to mind in relation to my summer experience ironically is the American writer, Jack Kerouac, who praises those "who are mad to live, mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones who

never yawn or say a commonplace thing, but burn, burn, burn, like fabulous yellow Roman candles exploding like spiders across the stars"<sup>1</sup>. Of course, IIASA is first and foremost about people who come together from so many different cultures, both national and professional, with a clear priority to learn something, but also to share their knowledge. That's what made summer at IIASA both so challenging and fascinating and, at the end of the day, so short.

All people, both the staff and YSSPers, were amazing, but there was simply no time to fully assess this during the process, because we were doing things all the time. We couldn't stop studying, discussing, traveling, and gaming, doing all kinds of absolutely amazing things and engaging anyone who passed by in our activities. Those were wonderful examples of "soft power," by the way (as political scientists would frame it). Networking hard, but working twice as hard, that should be the YSSP's motto. It was really surprising to find the Institute already full when arriving in Laxenburg early on the weekend, not because anyone was forced to be there, but because that was what they enjoyed doing.

This could only happen, I think, on account of a combination of the idealistic desire to make a difference with the realistic assessment of how to approach things, as well as a hilarious sense of humor. I still think I need some time to fully comprehend the experience we had, yet I am pretty certain about one thing: it was great.

<sup>1</sup> Kerouac, J. 1957. *On the Road*. NY: Viking Press. 9



*The Farewell Dinner and Award Ceremony was one of the major social events during the YSSP summer.*

## Egotiation

Ego as a factor in international negotiation processes is very much overlooked<sup>1</sup>. My contribution to the last *PINPoints* under IIASA flag analyzes the impact of the negotiator's ego, while also touching on the more controversial notion of collective ego. In particular, the question is raised whether the state has an ego and if so, what the consequence of this is for the process of interstate and diplomatic bargaining. I postulate that ego, in general, has a negative effect on negotiation processes. First, on the process itself, as ego tends to push it in the direction of intractability. Second, because it hampers the negotiator from arriving at a solution that is favorable for his/her country. However, notwithstanding the dominant negative currents, ego has some positive consequences as well.

The point is that ego raises emotions – and big egos raise big emotions. Emotions are problematic in rational choice. Politicians and high-level officials tend to have big egos. As they dominate the scene, so does emotion caused by ego problems. This is not just a question of personal style or perhaps of character. Culture also plays a role, which complicates matters tremendously. National culture, professional culture, political culture, as well as bureaucratic culture might all strengthen the role of ego in negotiation processes, making the topic of this contribution to *PINPoints* even more complex. Nevertheless, I will make an attempt to discuss this issue and invite *PINPoints* readers to comment.

At the personal level, we observe that ego does not really pose any problems in negotiations between negotiators of low- and mid-level rank. The problems start when their bosses intervene in the process. They are the ones who have to decide, after all. The institutionalization of negotiation processes in the course of human history has led to the creation of hierarchies, attributing a greater role to the higher political echelons in the outcome of interstate bargaining. Given that the most powerful have a lot to gain and a lot to lose and that they are often driven by their ego, their egocentrism might pose some problems.

1 One of the few exceptions: *Psychological Processes in International Negotiations*, Francesco Aquilar and Mauro Gallucio, Springer 2008.



Source: Km2008 | Dreamstime.com

*Countries have cultures, memories (history), national pride symbolized by flags and national anthems, and heroes to be proud of.*

This is all the more so in crisis situations which are characterized by stress and tension. When people's positions are jeopardized, their reflex tends to be the defense of their positions, even if this contradicts rational choice. Escalation in the final stages of negotiation has a negative effect on the defense of the parties' interests. In the midst of a serious crisis, which is often the case in the final stage of a negotiation process, parties tend to modify their interests to punish the opponent.

Moreover, if the parties have experienced serious grievances in the past, these experiences seem amplified. In issue 34 of *PINPoints*, Valérie Rosoux discussed the shadow of the past in her contribution "Memory and International Negotiations." The impact of the so-called "sins of the fathers." Attacks on positions are seen as attacks on the individual negotiator, his pride, his national honor. The consequence is often positional bargaining, and

positional bargaining is an obstacle for the give-and-take phase of negotiations. Why should we give something to someone who we perceive as our enemy? In some cultures,<sup>2</sup> conceding may be perceived as weakness, triggering tough responses instead of collaboration. If high power distance is the norm in these cultures, the ego problem will intensify the competitive profile of the negotiation process – both internally and externally. After all, losing will not only affect the ego, but legitimacy as well and consequently, the power of the actor.

Ego thus often has a distributive impact on negotiation processes. If mutual gains are the optimal approach to interstate negotiation, the ego problem will have to be tackled. One way to do this is to neutralize the individual impact of the negotiators' personality and culture by drawing on the

2 *Negotiating with the Russian Bear: Lessons for the EU?* Paul Meerts (ed.), College of Europe EU Diplomacy Papers, August 2009

available organizational structures. That is, "bureaucratizing" the process in the sense of giving preferential treatment to objective factors in the national interest of the countries involved. That is what the European Union tries to do. We clearly see the negative consequences of the main players' egos as they compete for power. Not only because of their conflicting interests, but even more so because of their personal pride. This combination of factors leads to disastrous outcomes like the non-role of the Union in the final phase of the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change.

Another way to neutralize ego is fostering personal relationships. After all, who wants to hurt a friend, let alone a family member? The EU seeks to assuage the ego problem through institutionalized, informal meetings of leaders. We see this approach in other contexts as well, like in the Pacific, the G8, and G20. It is also possible to limit the impact of personal ego through reframing. If "egos" are the common stakeholders of a given issue, they will be proud of their success and their ego may thus steer the process away from disaster. If leaders realize that victory is not possible or that in fact defeat is looming on the horizon, they might opt for joint victory through cooperation. Finally, their ego might actually be comforted by a positive outcome. If we invest energy into a process, we want to see a positive outcome. For our own sake and, if need be, for the sake of all.


Yet we should not disregard the positive side of ego. Ego might induce leaders to assume a great deal of responsibility where others back down. After all, *somebody* has to do the job. We need leaders, and good leaders are essential for good governance. In that sense, the ego question might have more positive than negative effects on negotiation processes. It all depends on the leaders' motivation for wanting to be the leader. Is it out of resentment because of discrimination in the past? Out of idealism to help the country? Out of a personal and maybe even narcissistic drive to strive for self-actualization for the common good or at the expense of others? In itself, ego is a neutral characteristic. Character, experience, and context define its positive or negative impact on the process of international negotiation. How much empathy does the powerful negotiator have? What happened in the past? How tolerant is his/her environment during the negotiation process?

Do countries have egos? We presume they do. Countries have cultures, memories (history), national pride symbolized by flags and national anthems, and heroes to be proud of. Memory can be positive and negative. Should we reformulate the notion of "country" by saying that national authorities tend to emphasize specific memories and that "the people" take these "for granted"? Country representatives with a strong identity, quite often with a heroic past, tend to be quite assertive. This does not necessarily lead to ego-related problematic behavior. Small countries or countries with identity problems often compensate for this weakness by being quite egocentric and very touchy on issues like independence and sovereignty. But a collective ego is, of course, different from personal ego. First and foremost, the state is a composite. There are always people who show behavior that diverges from the so-called presupposed "national character," if this phenomenon exists at all. And we take it that politicians are not schizophrenic. Nevertheless, the picture we have of them from the outside is rarely congruent with the perceptions of their subordinates or family members.

To conclude, although ego may contribute to positive negotiation processes as well, I believe that its main impact is negative. On the one hand, ego distorts an objective view of the negotiators' interests, and, on the other, "hardens" the negotiations and contributes to the loss of flexibility – flexibility that is needed to enter the give-and-take phase in negotiations. Are people from a "negotiation culture" more successful in diplomatic negotiations because they are used to haggling in the souk? Not necessarily, as ego in the context of the market place does not feature as prominently as it does in interstate relations, where state identity, the past, and power differences between the countries involved plays a role. Identity and ego are closely connected. The state's ego derives from the identity of the country and its people. We observe that countries with a glorious past often have a stronger sense of identity which, in turn, strengthens their ego. Giving in to other states is difficult when we see ourselves as being superior to them. This hampers the give-and-take stage and, consequently, the process of international negotiation. The same is true in cases of significant power difference. If a stronger country gives in to a weaker one,

it might be perceived as actually being less powerful than it had been regarded as being up to that point. By others and by itself. It is therefore likely that the stronger country will do whatever it takes to prevent its status – and therefore its ego – from being damaged and weakened. The key issue is: why is the ego what it is and what does its role explain about the direction of a negotiation process?

Paul Meerts



## PIN•Points

The Processes of International Negotiation Program    Network Newsletter 35/2010

Copyright © 2010  
International Institute for  
Applied Systems Analysis  
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria  
Telephone: +43 2236 807 575  
Telefax: +43 2236 71313  
E-mail: [pin@iiasa.ac.at](mailto:pin@iiasa.ac.at)  
<http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN/>

Issue Editor: Mark Anstey

IIASA is a nongovernmental, international research institution sponsored by scientific organizations from 17 countries.

IIASA has member organizations in Austria, China, Egypt, Finland, Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland (observer), Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, United States of America.

Registration number: ZVR 524808900



# To Block the Slippery Slope: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Genocide

Mark Anstey, Michigan State at Dubai, Paul Meerts, Clingendael,  
& I William Zartman, Johns Hopkins (eds.)

## Preface Francis Deng, UN US-G for Prevention of Genocide

### I.1. Introduction: The Problem: Preventing Identity Conflicts and Genocide

*Mark Anstey, Michigan State at Dubai, & I William Zartman, Johns Hopkins*

2. The Roots and Prevention of Genocide and Related Mass Violence  
*Ervin Staub, University of Massachusetts*

### II: Internal Dynamics: The Parties

3. The Identity Trap: Managing Paradox in Crisis Bargaining  
*William Donohue, Michigan State University*
4. The Identity Narratives  
*Jésus Romero-Utrillo, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Sant'Egidio*
5. Negotiating Memories and Justice in the Philippines  
*Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, University of Vienna and IIASA*
6. Diasporas and the Politics of Identity in International Negotiations  
*Fen Osler Hampson, Carleton University*
7. Outbidding and the Decision to Negotiate  
*Jannie Lilja, Uppsala University*
8. The Insides of Identity and Intragroup Conflict  
*Jay Rothman, The ARIA Group*
9. Handling Spoilers and the Prospect of Violence  
*Marie-Joëlle Zahar, University of Montreal*

### III. Intervention Dynamics: The Mediator

10. Mediation and Identity Conflicts  
*Joshua Smilovitz*
11. The Challenge of Partnerism  
*Moty Cristal, NEST Consulting and London School of Economics*
12. Conditions for Internal Conflict Resolution Through External Intervention  
*Frank Pfetsch, Heidelberg University*
13. Who Gets What in Peace Agreements  
*David Cunningham, Iowa State University*
14. Evolving International Law of Intervention and Prevention  
*Franz Cede, University of Budapest*
15. The International Community Response  
*Peter Wallensteen & Frida Möller, Uppsala*
16. OSCE HCNM: Strategies of the Legitimate Intervener in Internal Identity Conflicts  
*Fedor Meerts and Tassos Coulaloglou, Clingendael*
17. Negotiating Out of Conflict: External Interventions in Africa  
*Mark Anstey, Michigan State University at Dubai*

### IV. Conclusions

18. Lessons for Theory  
*I William Zartman and Mark Anstey*
19. Lessons for Practice  
*Mark Anstey and Paul Meerts*

# The Vienna Negotiation Day – Bidding Auf Wiedersehen

The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program said farewell to the diplomatic community in Vienna by organizing the Vienna Negotiation Day on 18 June 2010 at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. PIN collaborated with the Webster University Vienna Campus, the Austrian Institute for International Politics, the International Institute for Peace, and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna to bring together more than 40 diplomats, scholars, and students in an intimate workshop.

**Welcome Remarks:** Ambassador Dr. Hans Winkler, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

## Introduction:

Prof. Dr. Arthur Hirsh, President of Webster University Vienna Campus

Prof. Dr. Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, France / International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)

## PANEL 1

**Moderator:** Prof. Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. I William Zartman, The John Hopkins University, USA

*The “Who” beyond the “What” and “When” of Negotiation*

**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Markus Kornprobst, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus, University of the Federal Armed Forces, Germany

*The Modeler’s Experience*

**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, France

## PANEL 2

**Moderator:** Prof. Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus, University of the Federal Armed Forces, Germany

**Presenter:** Dr. Karin Kneissl, Webster University Vienna Campus

*Borders and Pipelines: Historic Case Study - The San Remo Agreement 1920*

**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Gunnar Sjöstedt, Swedish Institute of International Relations

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, France

*Hostage Negotiations*

**Discussant:** Dr. Georgios Kolliarakis, EXC, Goethe University of Frankfurt

**Presenter:** Dr. Mordechai Melamud, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

*The Negotiating Inspector*

**Discussant:** Dr. Paul Meerts, Netherlands Institute of International Relations

## PANEL 3

**Moderator:** Prof. Dr. I William Zartman, The John Hopkins University, USA

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schüssler, University of Bayreuth, Germany

*Information and the Ethics of Negotiation*

**Discussant:** Mag. Katrina Marie Running, University of Arizona

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. Valerie Rosoux, University of Louvain, Belgium

*Is Reconciliation Negotiable?*

**Discussant:** Dr. Gregory Weeks, Webster University Vienna Campus

**Presenter:** Prof. Dr. Mark Anstey, Michigan State University, Dubai, UAE

*Identity and Conflict*

**Discussant:** Mag. Peter Stania, Director, International Institute for Peace (IIP)

## PANEL 4

**Presenter:** Dr. Paul Meerts, Netherlands Institute for International Relations

*Training in Diplomatic Negotiation*

*Ariel Macaspac Penetrante*

