PIN·*Points*

The Processes of International Negotiation Program *Network Newsletter 28/2007*

DEMONIZATION and Negotiation

PIN in Pakistan • Uncertainty • Game Theory and Iran's Nuclear Program • OSCE • Problem Solving • IIASA and PIN

IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis www.iiasa.ac.at

From the PIN Steering Committee

"A New Era of Science Diplomacy"

In a recent issue, *Science*, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, ran a policy statement, saying it was "time for a new era of science diplomacy" (Lord and Turekian, 2007). The thrust of the article was that scientists, in the course of their work across boundaries, make good unofficial ambassadors and should be aware of the opportunities and need for diplomacy. IIASA was cited in the very first paragraph for its role in the field.

Unfortunately, the citation referred to IIASA's role in bridging Cold War adversaries in the last century. "Unfortunately," because of course IIASA is just as actively engaged in scientific diplomacy as it was in its first quarter-century across the East–West divide. Its current Director has been exceptionally active in bridging the North–South divide with new memberships, and new and existing projects have conducted research involving scientists from around the world for the benefit of countries around the world. A recent visit by a negotiation expert from Japan working on regional cooperation brought out his project's interest in seeing a new Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation (RAINS) model for East Asia, and IIASA scientists from the Land Use Change and Agriculture, Evolution and Ecology, and Energy programs at IIASA are directly involved in the CaspiLog (Caspian Dialog) Project.

PIN Group Ambassadors: Victor Kremenyuk (front) and, directly behind him, Rudolf Avenhaus, at CaspiLog I in Istanbul in June 2006 with IIASA scientists, David Wiberg (left) and Jaroslav Minullin (right), who spoke about the challenges of water and energy security, respectively, in the Caspian Sea littoral states.

IIASA's current Director has been exceptionally active in bridging the North–South divide.

Toward the end of the Cold War, diplomacy and science (or the science of diplomacy) were combined at IIASA with the creation of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program. Since then IIASA has been a leader worthy of citation for its parallel work in both areas. CaspiLog is only the most recent venture along those lines. PIN's second book was on environmental negotiations, followed by two more, and a fourth is due out next year on overcoming obstacles to climate change. Another work treats negotiations on civilian and military uses of atomic energy. Still other works promote IIASA's name by conducting systemic analyses on escalation, power, and prevention, and a book that will appear at the same time as this magazine evaluates formal models.

Negotiation, however, is not advocacy. Like any branch of science, when it becomes partisan it loses its analytical quality. Basically, it shows that one cannot (and should not) win unilaterally at negotiation (unless the other party is asleep or cannot speak) because negotiation is a positive-sum game; if it were not, the two sides would not agree to change the status quo together. Negotiation is giving something to get something, and the other party needs to gain something too, so that both sides have an interest in holding to the agreement. Thus, a deeper study and better understanding of negotiation help reveal the realistic paths—that is, directions and limits—to the broader acceptance and implementation of the solutions that other scientists identify.

Bill Zartman takes on a particularly tough negotiating counterpart during PIN's recent Roadshow in Pakistan. PIN Roadshows always provide a good opportunity to present the work of both PIN and IIASA.

Negotiation involves not only ways of combining divergent positions into a common agreement once negotiators are at the table. It also involves ways of changing the parties' appreciation of the status quo—their security points. In environmental negotiations, for example, this means crafting a coalition of interest and ideology (Greed and Greens, one might be tempted to say!), as pointed out in PIN's first book on environmental negotiations. That is what brought about the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer and what may be slowly working on climate change. As global warming hits Foggy Bottom, with the warmest Washington summer ever last year, even government may be beginning to feel the heat!

Fortunately, science and diplomacy are present at IIASA, and are working together, promising "a new era of science diplomacy, but," the *Science* article concludes, "we need the commitment of the science community behind it."

Rudolf Avenhaus, Franz Cede, Guy Olivier Faure, Victor Kremenyuk, Paul Meerts, Gunnar Sjöstedt, and I. William Zartman

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Lord, K.M. and Turekian, V.C., 2007. "Time for a New Era of Science Diplomacy." *Science* 315: 769–770 (9 February).

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Cover by Riber Hansson

PIN in Pakistan

The latest PIN Group Roadshow was in mid-February in Pakistan, which, together with India, joined IIASA in January 2007.

The Group was invited to Pakistan by President Peter Armacost and Dr Imtiaz Bokhari of the Political Science Department at Forman Christian College at Lahore, the alma mater of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and many other leaders. PIN Roadshows are intended to propagate the latest research and thinking about negotiation. The aim is to encourage improved research and practice and to stimulate local interest, including academic programs, in the subject, an aim that was fully accomplished at Lahore. Following opening presentations, the program began with an address by the retired governor of Punjab Province, Shahid Hamid, on practical lessons drawn from his negotiating experiences. PIN members then spoke as follows:

Guy Olivier Faure discussed the demonization of the representation of the counterpart in negotiation-related situations. In some cases, conspiracy theory also adds its own effects to those of demonization, feeding and thus aggravating it. An escalation process may be observed within the construction of demonized images. This distorts the conflict of interests and transforms it into an identity issue, making it extremely difficult to solve. Demonization has two types of consequences: it either presents a major obstacle to a negotiation attempt or it leads to a deadlock, to such an extent that the classical measures for overcoming deadlocks become totally ineffective (see page 7).

Paul Meerts discussed the linkages between warfare and negotiation. If warfare is politics by other means, then negotiation is warfare by other means as well. While warfare was the preferred tool in conflict resolution up to the nineteenth century, negotiation has gained importance as an effective conflict management device ever since the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, even though it did not prevent major conflicts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Countries did, however, learn from these crisis by creating new regimes on a global (League of Nations, United Nations) and regional (European Union, African Union) scale. After his presentation Paul Meerts held a workshop on negotiation processes for the rectorate, staff, and students of Forman College.

Victor Kremenyuk spoke on negotiations which, though ending military confrontations, fall short of being direct wars: those of the Cold War type. He explained that under conditions of intensive military



competition, the issue of security changes profoundly—from the expectation of a direct attack to the fear of an inadvertent war. And that prepares a new agenda for the talks between the adversaries—on prevention of unwanted conflict and avoidance of the risk of a nuclear war. Thus a basis for the new security strategy appears and becomes a matter of common concern, namely, to put a process of confrontation under firm bilateral control, which is the subject for the second round of talks. In the event of a successful outcome, the partners have a chance to prolong their negotiation strategies through the joint effort of inspections and monitoring, which becomes the subject for the third round of talks.

I. William Zartman presented ideas on negotiating with terrorists. He categorized terrorists into "total absolutes," who use violent means for unlimited ends and with whom there is nothing to negotiate for or about, and "conditionals," such as kidnappers, who only seek negotiations. Governments can reduce or change the terrorists' terms, as in any negotiation, but they negotiate with terrorists when they have to, when there is a mutually hurting stalemate, when mediators lead the way, and/or when they see that negotiation will promote moderation.

Rudolf Avenhaus applied formal model analysis to the issue of Iranian nuclear development (see page 13)

Imtiaz Bokhari compared Indian and Pakistani negotiating styles. He found a more distributive approach among the Indians. Pakistanis are the demandeurs and hence revisionists, torn between a militant approach and a petitioners' approach, while insisting on the equality of the parties.



An outing to Lahore's famous Badshahi Mosque, built in 1673 by the Mughal Emperor Aurenzeb, provided an opportunity for the PIN members to get to know staff and students at Forman Christian College.



Ambassador Franz Cede and Dr. Gunnar Sjöstedt of the PIN Group were unable to attend.

Following the presentations, there was a lively discussion with the audience. Forman Christian College plans to publish the presentations for a wider Pakistani audience. In addition, the College is in the process of establishing a Policy Studies Institute, and as a result of the Roadshow will include courses on negotiation in its curriculum. In the two days following the Roadshow, the Steering Committee conducted its own internal business, planning future projects and events.

Tanja Huber

New Steering Committee Membership Category

Following discussions in the PIN Steering Committee and with IIASA's Evaluation Committee, it has been decided to rejuvenate and broaden the ranks of the PIN Group by bringing in associate members of the Steering Committee. Each project of the Program will bring in an outside scholar or practitioner as an associate member to help edit the new work. The new member will participate fully in the regular meetings of the Steering Committee during the life of the project. The new associate members are Dr Jacob Bercovitch of the Political Science Department at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, for the Sage Conflict Management Project; and Dr William Donohue, of the Department of Communication at Michigan State University, for the Negotiating with Terrorists Project.



Source: The Royal Society of New Zealand

Dr. Jacob Bercovitch is Professor of International Relations at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand and is widely regarded as the leading international scholar on international mediation. Professor Bercovitch was Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 2002, Vice-President of the International Studies Association from 2003–2005, and is spending 2007 as a Senior Fellow at the Department of Government at Georgetown University. He received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He is the author or editor of 10 books and over 100 articles and chapters. Recent publications include: "Managing Ethnic Civil Wars: Assessing the Determinants of Successful Mediation," 2005, (with K. DeRouen), *Civil Wars,* 7:84–100; "On Bridging the Gap: The Relevance of Theory to the Practice of Conflict Resolution," (with K. Clements and D. Druckman), *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 59:133–141; "A Regional Guide to Conflict Resolution: 1945–2003," 2004, (with J. Fretter). Washington, D.*C.: Congressional Quarterly.*

Dr. William A. Donohue is Distinguished Professor of Communication at Michigan State University. Professor Donohue's work lies primarily in the areas of mediation and crisis negotiation. He has worked extensively with several state and federal agencies in both training and research activities related to violence prevention and hostage negotiation. He has over 70 publications dealing with various communication and conflict issues and has won several awards for his scholarship from national and international professional associations; he is an active member of the International Association for Conflict Management. Professor Donohue also maintains an extensive professional practice in conflict and communication training and intervention. He has performed several conflict interventions for organizations, and has trained mediators on a variety of communication and negotiation topics based on his research. He received his Ph.D. in 1976 in Communication from The Ohio State University. Recent publications include: "Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations," 2003, (with P. Taylor and J. Paul), *International Negotiation,* 8(3): 527–547(21); "Critical Moments as 'Flow' in Negotiation," 2004, *Negotiation Journal,* 20(2): 147–151; "Read My Lips: Code Switching In Negotiation," 2004, *Ivey Business Journal.* Available online at: http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/view_article.asp?intArticle_ID=500

I.William Zartman

Zartman Radio Interview on Iran

For U.S. President Bush, the decision over possible air strikes against Iran is easy: there must be no other choice. But how high is this probability? William Zartman, conflict researcher at John Hopkins University in Washington says: "The aircraft carriers are in the Gulf to apply pressure on Iran, not for a military strike, which would destroy any pro-American sentiment among the Iranian people and unite them behind President Ahmedinejad."

Diplomatic deficit

Since the Islamic revolution and the 1979 Tehran hostage-taking, Iran and the USA have been at each other's throats. Diplomatic relations, broken off at the time, were not restored. So how can this conflict be solved?

Says Zartman: "The way Iran behaved is unacceptable in conventional diplomacy terms, and the absence of diplomatic relations is problematic for the USA and Iran. Toward the end of the Clinton administration, Foreign Minister Albright tried to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, but Iran refused." Last December the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iran. Zartman believes that these can stop the Iranian atomic program: "It's a question of the carrot and the stick. If Iran started behaving normally, sanctions would be waived."

No-one wants to use the atomic bomb

The West considers nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran dangerous. But even in Iran there are political control mechanisms. If Iran had an atom bomb, would the threat of nuclear retaliation hold Iran in check?

Says Zartman: "There are several states with an atom bomb, keeping it "on the shelf," for if they need it. No-one wants to use it, especially to be the first. Using an atom bomb in the Near East, where the people live very close together, would also be very dangerous for the users. There would be enormous atomic fallout, with the Palestinians, whom the Iranians want to protect, being affected."

Zartman adds: "I am more concerned over uncontrolled escalation, like we saw before the First World War. Someone takes the path of no return, and that's what's dangerous. Iran has not yet shown that it has left that kind of politics behind."

Abridged from http://oe1.orf.at/inforadio/73421.html (German and English versions).

Demonization and Negotiation

Negotiation deals mainly with concrete exchanges between parties, but qualitative factors may also play an important role, especially as far as the representation of the counterpart is concerned. There is thus a rationale in negotiation that is not merely concerned with trade-offs and numbers and the subsequent making of concessions—negotiation also deals with images. The way a counterpart is represented conditions negotiation and is also a product of negotiation, contributing to its own construction, management, or destruction. This is a crucial factor in the negotiation process because people act on the basis not of reality, but of what they perceive reality to be. Perceptions and their associated evaluations relate to values and judgments that influence behavior, and also to strategic choices.

Although demonization of the other party has been observed in a number of situations, it is an extreme case. In some cases, a conspiracy theory can come into play, fueling the effects of demonization, feeding it, and becoming an aggravating factor.

There may be an escalation process within the construction of demonized images, which distorts the conflict of interests and transforms it into an issue of identity, making a solution extremely difficult to find. Finally, demonization fulfills two functions: it either presents a major obstacle to a negotiation attempt, or it leads to a deadlock—to such an extent that the classical measures for overcoming deadlocks become totally ineffective.

The negotiation process

A number of conditions must be met so that negotiations may begin. Among them, there must be a minimum of trust, without which no offer or suggestion from the other side can be properly received and no information can be accepted as credible.

Recognizing the other party as a legitimate counterpart is a precondition for involving oneself in negotiations. If the other party is not accepted as such, this de facto disqualification will be an insurmountable obstacle, unless one agrees to stop negotiating on the substance of the problem and to negotiate instead on the identity of the party concerned, an exercise in which very few counterparts are happy to indulge.



Source: Riber Hansson

Nuclear Kim

"Kim Jong Il is personally depicted as a 'bizarre' dictator with a 'bad haircut and a funny jacket,' taking on the role of a paranoid neo-Stalinist."

Labeling the other party a "terrorist" will mean that the party designated as such is unlikely to be willing to negotiate. They may feel insulted and refuse to enter into relations with the opposing party. On the other hand, a state, for example, cannot formally negotiate with a terrorist counterpart. A government must thus resort to a whole range of subterfuges and, for instance, claim that only "discussions" are being conducted, not negotiations, and that the outcome cannot be considered in terms of concessions. Labeling a country a "rogue state" can likewise only lead to a higher level of tension, while rejecting any effort to open a dialog is viewed as an offensive act, an obvious attempt to damage the counterpart's reputation.

Demonization

Demonization is the characterization of people as evil or subhuman for purposes such as denying any possibility of entering into discussions with them, or even to justify an attack. Demonizing an individual generally involves a suspension of the normal considerations of human behavior and respect. Any means of "self-defense" is considered to be legitimate in relation to the magnitude of the threat. For instance, demonizing Saddam Hussein creates conditions for taking military action to destroy him, instead of striving for an agreement that would keep him at the head of his country.

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The demonization process may result in an escalation of the image of the counterpart (Zartman and Faure, 2005). This is a complex process that addresses first the psychological dimension, by building up anxiety, and then the strategic dimension, by disqualifying the other party in order to allow any type of action against him.

Some governments, especially Western ones, practice demonization by, for instance, expressing a Manichean world view, according to which Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are defined as an "axis of evil."

The demonization of Islam and the vilification of Muslims through their association with terrorism are prevalent in some Western media. Fundamentalists and radical Muslims are labeled "Islamo-fascists." Muslim activist groups are redefined as "barbarian, monstrous, merciless, and inhuman." Muslims are perceived as "bigots

Source: Riber Hansson

"Unnamed U.S. psychiatrists diagnosed Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav leader—from afar—as having a 'malignant narcissistic personality.'"

and psychopaths." American leaders characterize the members of the current government of Iran as "mad mullahs" and "congenital terrorists," "wild-eyed and irrational." The influence of the ayatollahs is described as being like the "tentacles of an octopus, seeking to enfold the whole Muslim world into their bloodthirsty bosom of unreformed, fundamentalist, Western-abhorring, Israeli-hating brand of Islam."

North Koreans have joined Islamic fundamentalists as villains. North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il has constantly been the target of demonization campaigns. Kim and his country are described as "irrational, unpredictable, secretive, reclusive, and militaristic." President Bush referred to the North Korean leader as a "tyrant," a statement which spoiled the atmosphere for negotiations, undoing all efforts to persuade North Korea that the United States would bargain in good faith. Dealing with Kim Jong Il is presented as being like negotiating with a man who holds millions of hostages, a "genocidal maniac." North Korea is described as a "vast and grim concentration camp," where an evil-minded and abstruse dictator brainwashes ordinary North Koreans into supporting his malefic designs on the world. Kim Jong Il is personally depicted as a "bizarre" dictator with a "bad haircut and a funny jacket," taking on the role of a paranoid neo-Stalinist.

On the side of the terrorist groups there is no love lost, and the designated enemy is also demonized in totally irrational ways. America is defined as the "number one rogue state," and the neoconservative clan in the White House is labeled a "group of fanatics." The United States has constantly been called the "Great Satan" by Iran or "the head of the snake" by Al-Qaeda. Westerners are labeled "Judeo-Crusaders" whose basic purpose is to slaughter as many Muslims as possible. The Pope is addressed as "the worshipper of the cross." Heads of moderate Arab countries such as Egypt or Jordan are named "apostates." Israel is not recognized as a country and is labeled "the Zionist entity."

It seems not to be enough to have a conflict of interests turn into a hostile personal relationship and to go as far as making the other party an enemy. It seems, in some circumstances, necessary to demonize that party. One such case is that of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, who was persistently vilified in Western media and presented in a highly emotive way as a "Nazi-like thug." At best he was described as "moody, reclusive, and given to mulish fatalism." References are made to "U.S. psychiatrists" who studied Milosevic "closely". In this case, by "closely" they still mean from afar, as no U.S. psychiatrist ever treated Milosevic. These unnamed psychiatrists diagnosed the Yugoslav leader as having a "malignant narcissistic personality, which paved the way to self-deception."

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As if it were necessary to add more weight to such a harsh portrait, he was described as having been under the disastrous influence of his wife, Mirjana Markovic, "the real power behind the throne." Nicknamed "Lady Macbeth," she was depicted as being completely insane, indulging in uncontrollable tempers. She was also suspected of suffering from schizophrenia and of having only a tenuous grasp on reality. Of mousy appearance, she was a "dreamy and traumatized personality." She and her husband shared the same "autistic relationship with the world." When perceptions of this kind occur, it is clearly useless to consider negotiation as a means of solving problems. There is no basis for the slightest amount of trust and thus no way of accepting such people as counterparts.

Conspiracy theories

The demonization process may occasionally be legitimized and strengthened by another process stemming from the conspiracy theory domain. Conspiracy theories arise from the belief that many events can be explained by the existence of some plot by a covert alliance of powerful people manipulating matters behind the scenes. Such beliefs tend to develop to meet people's need to find meaning. Individuals naturally respond to events that produce a strong emotional reaction in them by trying to make sense of those events in what they believe to be rational terms. This general phenomenon has produced a surprising number of rumors, such as Americans having never landed on the moon, or that the Mafia murdered John F. Kennedy and later his brother Robert. Conspiracy theories insinuate themselves into interpretations of dramatic events, for instance, the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, that of actress Grace Kelly, Princess of Monaco, or the killing of John Lennon, an assassination attributed to the FBI. Many famous recent works of fiction are based on conspiracy theories, such as the popular television show "The X-Files," or the bestselling novel *The Da Vinci Code* which deals with a supposed conspiracy on the part of the Catholic Church to erase certain "facts" about the life of Jesus from history.

A conspiracy theory is based on assumptions that may on occasion feed the demonization process, such as the idea that events do

not happen by chance, but rather serve a hidden agenda. Some of the most famous dramatic events have been explained as conspiracy theories, for instance, the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese in 1941, of which the U.S. government supposedly had prior knowledge and which it allowed to go ahead in order to provide an excuse for America's entry into World War II—compare that with the theories surrounding the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The need for a scapegoat thus comes to the fore. Moreover, the "real reason" behind any attack on the common good is always kept secret for the very best motives.

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are widely considered to be the beginning of contemporary conspiracy theory literature. The Protocols represent an anti-Semitic literary forgery that purports to describe a Jewish plot to achieve world domination. The *Protocols* take the form of an instruction manual to a new member of the "Elders," describing how they want to run the world through control of the media and finance and replace the traditional social order with one based on mass manipulation. *The Protocols* are still a bestseller in several countries. Since their appearance, many other cabals have taken the floor with the same objective of establishing a new world order. Among them are the Trilateral Commission, the Club of Rome, the Rosicrucians, and the Bilderberg Group. It has also been widely assumed that the Great Seal of the United States is a Masonic symbol.

Conspiracy theories have great appeal and are widely believed. They capture the public imagination and fulfill a sociological function. They can be understood as a narrative form of scapegoating, in that they frame demonized enemies as part of an insidious plot. The scapegoater is then considered a hero, revealing the truth and sounding the alarm. Assigning a scapegoat is the most effective modus operandi imaginable for mobilizing the energy of one's own people and giving it a focus.



The Great Seal of the United States: Was Masonic imagery covertly incorporated into the design?

The escalation process

Escalation is an expression of conflict in its dynamic form. It can be framed as a move from parties having incompatible static views to having dynamically incompatible views. Escalation expresses a clear increase in conflict that can impact the qualitative dimension of the interaction. It has been defined as a mutually coercive mechanism.

A paranoid attitude on the part of the producer of these demonized representations may help to feed the whole escalation process. A similarly paranoid stance may be elicited from the side of the demonized party.

There are many different types of escalation, and these are not limited to means and ends. The escalation of images is a common expression of a qualitative increase in conflict. The other party may first be considered an obstacle, then an opponent, then an enemy, then a force of evil.

The escalation of images may be triggered and fed by cognitive problems, poor information, or distorted data. Much of the literature on escalation insists on the leading role of judgmental and perceptual biases. Cognitive dissonance can produce escalation because once a course of action has been established, negative feedback is kept away and the party then escalates, thinking that such a step is necessary to strengthen his position and maintain the consistency of his perceptions.

Once the demonization process takes place, it may also escalate by taking on a life of its own. The escalation of images and portrayals leads to more and more negative images, resulting in a challenge to the counterpart's very identity—an attack on the self. It is thus that the most sensitive layer of the cultural dimension of negotiation is reached.

A paranoid attitude on the part of the producer of these demonized representations may help to feed the whole escalation process. A similarly paranoid stance may be elicited from the side of the demonized party. Each party may be seen by the other as an enemy. A kind of obsessional focus is put on the enemy, with every problem attributed to him. A paranoid person suffers from permanent anxiety. He develops an imaginary vision of, say, someone trying to destroy his life. He experiences this as a perpetual threat, as a result of which he has to resort to strong self-defense measures. Furthermore, the paranoid person seeks to protect himself against any intrusion into his cognitive mapping. As he feels vulnerable, he reacts by building a protective barrier, which results in an increase in the rigidity of his view. He demonizes the enemy by constructing mental models of the thought processes of the other party in order to read his enemy's hidden intentions and to predict his future behavior. Thus, he has no way of finding peace with himself

Source: http://www/sxc.hu

The twin towers of the World Trade Center, obliterated from the New York landscape on September 11, 2001. Conspiracy theories regarding responsibility for the destruction and its possible motives abound.

unless he destroys his enemy. He has to act radically to clean up the situation. Such a phenomenon touches upon the essence of terrorism.

Demonization and negotiation

As the demonizing process unfolds, two types of case may occur in the context of negotiations. If the negotiations have not yet started, the ongoing demonization will mean that there is very little chance of them doing so. The demonizing party will certainly not risk sitting at the same table as the devil.

If the negotiations have not yet started, the ongoing demonization will mean that there is very little chance of them doing so.

If negotiations have already started, a demonization process, possibly combined with some conspiracy theories and aggravated by escalation dynamics, will simply destroy the negotiation process. The counterpart will be disqualified as such and—both politically and ethically—it will be impossible to carry on with the negotiations.

Thus, only two options will be left: (i) a standstill, which could result in a situation in which no more negotiation attempts can be carried out, with the problem—the crisis, even— continuing to exist with no solution; or (ii) the situation could be interpreted as a good excuse for going as far as attacking the other party. In the case of the latter, war becomes the continuation of politics by other means. The situation thus turns into another classic: that of strategic conduct in open confrontation.

Guy Olivier Faure

Bibliography

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IIASA would like to thank Riber Hansson, one of the leading contemporary Swedish cartoonists dealing with political satire, for allowing us to reproduce two of his cartoons in PINPoints. Riber produces cartoons for a number of Swedish and international daily newspapers. His work is represented in several museums, including the National Museum of Art in Stockholm, the Swedish Library of Parliament, Newseum in Arlington, USA, the International Museum of Cartoon Art, Boca Raton, Florida, the Museo della Satira e della Caricatura in Italy, and the Musée d'histoire contemporaine in Paris. He has also illustrated several textbooks and published three books.

Regarding his caricatures, Riber says: "I'm not actually trying to demonize anyone with my drawings, like the racist stereotypes often used in anti-Semitic drawings, but I'm also aware that when I publish my drawings, they are open to all kinds of interpretation."

More of Riber's work can be seen—and enjoyed—on his Web site, http://www.riber.net.

3rd Biennale on Negotiation

The 3rd International Biennale on Negotiation will be held in Paris, at NEGOCIA, on 14–15 November 2007. This conference is jointly organized by NEGOCIA, a French business school belonging to the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the French PIN Group with the support of the following journals: *Group Decision and Negotiation*, *International Negotiation, PINPoints*, *la Revue Négociations*, and *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. The main theme of the 3rd Biennale is: Negotiation Strategies and Risks: Research and Applications.



Source: www.Eurotrekken.com

NEGOCIA in Paris where the 3rd International Biennale on Negotiation will be held in November.

Numerous additions to this Biennale will include:

- A special segment to give doctorate students the opportunity to present their research results;
- A NEGOCIA prize to be presented by I. William Zartman rewarding the research work of the successful doctorate/post-doctorate submission.

More than 250 researchers and practitioners from around 15 different countries will attend the conference. A publication in French and English comprising the most significant contributions will follow.

Your contact at NEGOCIA is Dorothée Tokic at transnego@negocia.fr.

Uncertainty, Science, and Negotiation Analysis

Some international negotiations among states are handled exclusively by diplomats backed by a support organization within their respective foreign ministry. However, in many negotiations the diplomats at the table need advice from other ministries or national agencies with an interest in the agenda of the international talks. In still other cases, because of the complexity of the issues being negotiated, the negotiators—as well as the policymakers in the capital cities—need expert information and knowledge from the scientific community. For example, most international negotiations on environmental issues have required a large input of scientific information. Although ozone depletion in the stratosphere is generally understood as "holes in the ozone layer," this image is vague unless it is described in terms of scientific measurements. The results obtained using the scientific model, Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation (RAINS), which was developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), were key to making progress and achieving success in the negotiations on long-range air pollution in Europe. Moreover, the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows how critically important scientific knowledge is to the conduct of the international climate talks.

In a general sense it is easy to understand why scientific knowledge is so useful in the climate talks, as well as in many other international negotiations that address issues and cope with problems which a layperson may find difficult to understand. Policymakers and diplomats cannot define and describe complex issues without information from scientific reports and advice from scientists. They are not sure themselves what instruments and methods are the most cost-effective, or even effective at all, when it comes to negotiating about such issues.

Policymakers and diplomats cannot define and describe complex issues without information from scientific reports and advice from scientists.

Nevertheless, it is not obvious how best to communicate scientific knowledge and information when it is needed in international negotiations. This problem area has thus attracted the attention of a growing number of social scientists, including negotiations analysts. It is research that has a high policy relevance. Contributing scientific knowledge to a negotiation is not straightforward communication from a *Sender* (a scientist) to a *Receiver* (a policymaker or a diplomat). Exchanges between these two sides are sometimes clouded by the circumstances, for example, the different professional training of each side.[1] People whose professional backgrounds are dissimilar may frame and understand the same issue in a somewhat different way which, in turn, may complicate their discussions.

Ongoing future analysis in this area should also include general topics such as, for example, how to optimize the participation of the international scientific community in international negotiation and the best way for international institutions, for instance, the IPCC, to support negotiations in the climate talks. However, focus is also needed on narrower themes that represent specific complications in the relationship between science and international negotiation. One such specific theme that must be urgently addressed in negotiation analysis is the management of issue-related uncertainty. This problem is a good illustration of how professional cultural differences may contribute to causing, or sustaining, obstacles in complex international negotiations.

Source: European Community, 2007

Source: European Community, 2007

A European Union family takes visible precautions against traffic pollution. Thanks to negotiations based on scientific results from IIASA's RAINS model, negotiators can work toward making scenes like this a thing of the past.

1 The significance of this factor was highlighted in a PIN project: Sjöstedt, G. (2003), (editor). *Professional Cultures in International Negotiation. Bridge or Rift?* New York: Lexington Books

The uncertainty problems confronting not only scientists but also policymakers and negotiators in climate change negotiations represent a stark illustration of this type of stumbling block in international talks. The uncertainty predicament is extremely complex because climate change, as a negotiated issue, has several different, although interdependent, layers of uncertainty: How great will the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere be in 20, 50, or 100 years? How will atmospheric temperature be affected by greenhouse gas concentrations, both on average and in particular regions? What will the negative consequences of climate warming be, both on average and in particular regions? What will the effects of current mitigation efforts be in 20, 50, or 100 years?

Complex uncertainty negatively affects the climate talks in several different and important ways. In general, it contributes to making the negotiation process more cumbersome and protracted. It holds back commitments by negotiating parties to undertaking costly measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. It makes the verification system built into the climate regime a less-effective instrument in terms of facilitating costly commitments.

Efforts to cope with the uncertainty problem are ongoing. Scientists work to reduce uncertainties by increasing their knowledge about the causes, signs, and consequences of climate warming so as to better estimate uncertainty about the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of climate changes. It is expected that scientific progress regarding uncertainty will favorably affect international climate change negotiation, with both policymakers and negotiators becoming more confident about taking costly mitigation measures once uncertainties are more closely estimated and reduction measures are better targeted.

However, a complication is that policymakers and negotiators tend to have a different approach to dealing with uncertainty than scientists do. Usually, when they make costly commitments that are highlighted in the media and thus visible to their constituents, policymakers prefer to say, "We have to make this economic sacrifice because it will reduce climate change," instead of justifying the economic sacrifice with reference merely to a higher possibility that a given abatement measure will lead to satisfactory positive effects on climate change.

It is the job of IIASA and other scientific research organizations to find ways of better estimating and thus reducing uncertainty that will then have a knock-on effect in international negotiations on climate warming and other complex issues. In fact, this task falls within the regular scientific activities in these institutions. It is also important, however, to study in more detail what kinds of problems are caused by issue-related uncertainties in international negotiations and what remedies are available to cope with these difficulties. This kind of research is also a task for a scientific organization like IIASA. However, these projects should engage not only natural scientists such as, for example, climate researchers, but also negotiation specialists from the social sciences arena who can supply relevant process knowledge regarding the uncertainty problem. Such joint projects of natural and social scientists have the potential to become highly productive. They must, however, be designed with care because there is a risk that they will generate inter-professional problems similar to those that have appeared between scientists and policymakers/diplomats in actual international negotiations on complex issues, for example, in the environmental area.

Source: European Community, 2007

Source: http://www.sxc.hu

Scientists work to reduce uncertainties by increasing their knowledge about the causes, signs, and consequences of climate warming so as to better estimate uncertainty about the magnitude, timing, and regional distribution of climate changes.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

A Game-Theoretical Analysis of the Conflict about Iran's Nuclear Program

In a simplified manner, the very nature of the ongoing conflict between Iran and the International Community (IC) on Iran's nuclear program may be captured in terms of a game between two parties, each of which attempts to maximize the values it associates with the outcome of the game defined in terms of the payoff from its moves, given the moves of the opposing party. This describes what in Game Theory is called a non-cooperative two-person game with vector valued payoffs in normal form.

It is assumed that the essence of the moves of Iran can be described in terms of three optional actions—whether or not it:

- Remains a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT);
- Fulfills its treaty obligations of not developing nuclear weapons; and
- Enriches uranium.

Thus, there are essentially five pure strategies that Iran may pursue as shown in *Figure 1*.

The four pure strategies that are available to the IC vis-à-vis Iran have been analyzed in detail in a separate paper (Avenhaus and Huber, 2007). They include:

- Using military force to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities;
- Accepting Iran as a nuclear power;
- Robust diplomatic engagement with Iran in combination with flexible sanctions; and
- Negotiations with Iran aimed at regional stability (Grand Bargain).

The payoffs to both parties are expressed in terms of a vector with three components, the values of which express 1) for Iran the prospects of securing:

- Steady income from the export of gas and oil in the long term by developing an independent nuclear power supply, including the full nuclear fuel cycle;
- National security through either appropriate guarantees by the IC or a national nuclear deterrent capability; and
- The status of dominant regional power;

and 2) for the IC the chances that:

- Iran will not become a nuclear weapons state;
- Regional stability is maintained; and
- Supply of oil and gas from the region is assured.

The payoff is measured on a nominal scale featuring five classes which, for ease of comparison, are assigned numerical values indicating the payoff as being either *very negative (-2), negative (-1), neutral or status quo (0), positive (+1), or very positive (+2)*.

Figure 1 presents the payoff matrix for the normal form of the game between Iran and the IC.

Each field of the matrix describes a specific combination of the opponents' strategies. The payoff vectors resulting from each strategy combination are listed in the lower left corner of each field for the IC, and in the upper right corner for Iran.

By comparing the payoff vectors of each party it will be realized that the second and third strategy of the IC is dominated[1] by the fourth. For Iran, the first strategy is dominated by the second, and the third and fourth by the fifth. Thus, by eliminating the

IC \ Iran	Adherence to NPT; Fulfillment of obligations; No enrichment	Adherence to NPT; Fulfillment of obligations; Enrichment	Adherence to NPT: No fulfillment of obligations; No enrichment	Adherence to NPT; No fulfillment of obligations; Enrichment	Termination of NPT
Military force	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$
Acceptance of Iran's nuclear armament	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\+2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\0\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\0\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$
Robust diplomacy and flexible sanctions	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\+2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\0\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+1\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-1\\-1\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$
Grand Bargain	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+2\\0\\+2\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}+2\\+2\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}+2\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\0\\0\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-2\\+2\\-1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\0\\-1\end{pmatrix}$	$\begin{pmatrix}-1\\+2\\+1\end{pmatrix}$ $\begin{pmatrix}-2\\-2\\-2\end{pmatrix}$

Figure 1: Normal form of the two-person game between Iran and the International Community (IC) (Red: Dominated strategies of Iran. Blue: Dominated strategies of IC)



Figure 2: Reduced form of the normal form game given in Figure 1 (The arrows indicate the preference directions, the asterisks the equilibria)

1 Dominance means that, all other component values being equal, at least one component of the payoff vector of the dominating strategy is assigned a higher value than the components of the dominated vector, regardless of what strategy the opponent uses.

Source: Dave Gostisha (www.sxc.hu)

dominated strategies of both sides, the five by four normal form game shown in *Figure 1* is reduced to the two by two reduced game shown in *Figure 2*.

Of course, each single value attributed to the elements of the payoff vectors may be subject to debate. It should be mentioned, however, that the purpose of this exercise is not primarily to determine equilibrium strategies and realistic payoffs. Rather, we want to demonstrate a method that permits us, based on plausible value judgements, to gain some first insights from a deliberately simplified model of the conflict between Iran and the IC. Nevertheless, a few remarks seem appropriate to explain the value judgement of the authors.

The qualitative analysis presented in Avenhaus and Huber (2007) justifies the assessment, shown in the first row of the matrix, that the use of military force by the IC would very likely result in the worst payoff to Iran in each of the components of its payoff vector, regardless of the strategy option it chooses. This would also be true for the second and third component of the IC's payoff vector because of the forceful response to an IC attack that must be expected from Iran and its supporters. However, as expressed by the values of the first component of IC's payoff vector, the prospects of Iran not becoming a nuclear power are considered to be good, at least in the short run, regardless of its strategy. For the first two of the Iranian strategy options, it is assumed that the IC would use military force preemptively; for the other three, in response to Iran not fulfilling the obligations of an NPT signatory state or terminating NPT membership. In the latter cases Iran can be assumed to have had sufficient time to harden and hide some of its nuclear facilities so that a later resumption of the nuclear program cannot definitely be excluded.

If the IC pursues a Grand Bargain and Iran continues enrichment while fulfilling its NPT obligations, including submission to a rigorous verification regime in exchange for security guarantees by the IC, the possibility of Iran eventually becoming a nuclear weapons state can be considered as highly unlikely (+2), and the status quo would be preserved with regard to both stability in the region (0) and oil and gas supplies from the region (0). For Iran, all components of the payoff vector would be positive in this case, albeit somewhat less for the third component related to its status as a dominant regional power.



Source: D. Calma/IAEA

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei tells reporters that the Report on Iran's Nuclear Program has been sent to UN Security Council.

The qualitative analysis presented in Avenhaus and Huber (2007) justifies the assessment, shown in the first row of the matrix, that the use of military force by the International Community would very likely result in the worst payoff to Iran in each of the components of its payoff vector, regardless of the strategy option it chooses.

If Iran were to terminate NPT membership while the IC pursues negotiations in good faith to eventually reach a Grand Bargain, the consequences would be highly undesirable for the IC in terms of Iran reaching a nuclear military capability and, because of the reactions to be expected from other states in the region, of both regional stability and the flow of oil and gas from the region. For Iran, the deterrence capability that comes with nuclear power status implies a high degree of national security (+2), while ensuing sanctions by the IC would reduce the income generated from oil and gas exports significantly (-1) and diminish, at least temporarily, Iran's chances of becoming the dominant power in the region (+1).

The implications of the reduced form of the game shown in *Figure 2* may be analyzed by using the method of preference directions which identifies, by means of directed arrows, which of its two strategies one side prefers, given the strategy of the opponent. It will be realized that IC prefers the Grand Bargain over the use of military force if Iran remains a member of the NPT and fulfills its obligations, including submission to a rigorous verification regime in exchange for security guarantees by the

IC: (+2, 0, 0) > (+2, -2, -2). The opposite is true if Iran were to terminate NPT membership: (+1, -2, -2) > (-2 -2, -2). If, on the other hand, the IC uses military force, both of Iran's strategy options are equivalent: (-2, -2, -2) ~ (-2, -2, -2). If the IC pursues a Grand Bargain, Iran would prefer not terminate the NPT and to be allowed to enrich uranium under IC control: (+2, +2, +1) > (-1, +2, +1).

If Iran were to terminate NPT membership while the International Community pursues negotiations in good faith to eventually reach a Grand Bargain, the consequences would be highly undesirable for the IC in terms of Iran reaching a nuclear military capability

It will be noted that the reduced form game has two Nash equilibria[2] denoted in *Figure 2* by asterisks: the first one is the strategy combination in the upper-right-hand field of the matrix (Military Force, Termination of NPT); the second one in lower left hand field (Grand Bargain, Adherence to NPT, Fulfillment of Obligations and Enrichment). The second equilibrium is payoff-dominant because, for both parties, the payoff vectors are preferable to those of the first equilibrium. Thus, provided the payoff vectors reflect a realistic assessment, both sides should have a strong incentive to adopt strategies, the implementation of which does, however, require a good deal of subsequent cooperation between Iran and the IC, which our non-cooperative game model does not address.

It must also be pointed out that the payoff dominance of the second equilibrium depends on whether the IC can muster the military capability to successfully deny Iran reaching its objectives as expressed by the payoff vector (-2, -2, -2). Thus, the question arises as to how the credibility of the IC's military capability would affect the outcome of the game. Theoretically, not much should happen, even if the IC had no military capability at all because eliminating the first row in the normal form matrix of *Figure 1* would not affect any of the observed dominance relationships among the strategies of both sides. Therefore, the reduced form of the game shown in *Figure 2* would leave the IC with only the "Grand Bargain" strategy and the one by two reduced game with one equilibrium that is identical to the payoff-dominant equilibrium in the previous two by two game.

However, from a practical point of view it seems by no means certain that Iran would adopt the equilibrium strategy in this case. If one takes a closer look at the payoff vectors in the second row of the reduced matrix in *Figure 2*, it will be realized that choosing to terminate NPT membership rather than the equilibrium strategy would cost Iran only a relatively small loss in payoff compared to the IC. While the IC may react to Iran's termination of NPT membership by implementing an embargo, thus temporarily delaying Iran's nuclear program, the IC would end up with the worst possible situation with regard to reaching its strategic objectives, as expressed by the payoff vector (-2, -2, -2).

In interpreting these results, one may conclude that part of a robust diplomacy, and ensuing negotiations with Iran, aimed at eventually concluding a "Grand Bargain," must be the visible build-up of a credible deterrent in the form of a military capability to effectively threaten Iran's nuclear program and cope with the aftermath of an eventual attack. Currently, a sufficient capability of that kind is not available to the IC.

In conclusion, two remarks on the limitations of the foregoing analysis will be added. First, as negotiations between two parties such as Iran and the IC will be accompanied by sequential moves by both sides, it would seem more appropriate to describe the conflict by a game in extensive form. In particular, a Grand Bargain strategy on the part of the IC would require such a description. On the other hand, additional assumptions would have to be made in this case which may themselves be questionable. Second, for the sake of simplicity we have limited the payoff vector to three components for each side. However, in reality there may be more objectives that need to be taken into account. As a consequence, more than two equilibria might be obtained, making an interpretation of the results of a game analysis more difficult.

Rudolf Avenhaus and Reiner K. Huber

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Source: United Nations

Security Council Meeting on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Iran. Members of the Security Council unanimously adopt a resolution to tighten sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, at UN Headquarters in New York. United Nations, New York, 24 March 2007.

2 A Nash equilibrium is defined as a pair of strategies with the property that any unilateral deviation does not improve the deviator's payoff.

Source: OSCE/Milhail Evstafiev

An OSCE flag in front of the Organization's Secretariat in Vienna.

Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe. Inclusive or Exclusive Negotiation Processes?

An inclusive negotiation process, in theory

In theory, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (and its predecessor the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]) are a classic example of an all-encompassing international negotiations body. In theory. Confronted with a lack of bridges between East and West, the powers in Europe and North America ("from Vancouver to Vladivostok") decided to accept a Soviet proposal to start an actor- and issue-inclusive negotiation processes on the politico-military, economic/environmental, and human aspects of security. "Baskets" in the terminology of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975), nowadays labeled as "dimensions." The aim was to create a regime to channel negotiation processes so as to stabilize the situation in Europe through a major package deal: the USSR received the assurance that borders would not be changed through violence and, in exchange, promised to respect human rights and to accept the legitimacy of external criticism of human rights violations.

The strength and the weakness of the OSCE negotiation process lie in its all-encompassing nature. Multi-actor/multi-issue processes provide many opportunities for trade-offs and procrastination. And context is of great importance. The OSCE is an instrument that not only influences its political environment but is also its own first victim. If relationships between East and West cool down, the process becomes a painful one, as in the period 1975–1990. If there is a thaw, substantial business can be done (1990–2005). Though even in that time span deep-frozen conflicts like Karabagh and Abchazia could not be transformed into negotiable ones. If things start to freeze again, the bridges will crumble and alternative negotiation regimes will gain strength. Organizations stronger than the OSCE will take over. This is not to say that we would be confronted with another cold war, but gradual "climate change" was indicated in President Putin's speech to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007.

It is well known that the United Kingdom and the United States have grave difficulties in accepting Kazakhstan as President of the OSCE.

Let us focus on the December 2006 Ministerial Council of the Vienna-based OSCE, held in Brussels because of the Belgian Presidency, to draw some conclusions concerning the connection between inclusiveness in OSCE negotiation processes and their outcomes.

The Brussels meeting

Although, as a whole, the output of the 2006 Brussels Ministerial Council (MC) was rather disappointing, there were several noteworthy decisions as well as non-decisions. Yet, the fact that the overall outcome was far from optimal makes the insight into the negotiation processes all the more interesting. Progress in the reform of the OSCE institutions was largely limited to amending staff and financial regulations and rules as well as "improving the effectiveness and efficiency of human resources of the OSCE" (MC.DEC/19/06). The Office

Dimensions of the OSCE

Human dimension

The commitments made by OSCE participating States in the human dimension aim to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to abide by the rule of law; to promote the principles of democracy by building, strengthening and protecting democratic institutions; and to promote tolerance throughout the OSCE region.

Politico-military dimension

The OSCE takes a comprehensive approach to the politico-military dimension of security, which includes a number of commitments by participating States and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. The Organization also seeks to enhance military security by promoting greater openness, transparency and co-operation.

Economic and environmental dimension

Activities in the economic and environmental dimension include the monitoring of developments in this area among participating States, with the aim of alerting them to any threat of conflict; and assisting in the creation of economic and environmental policies and related initiatives to promote security in the OSCE region.

www.osce.org/

for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has not yet received a concrete mandate to implement the recommendations of its self-assessment report. The Ministerial Council did, however, welcome the report and task the Permanent Council (PC) of Permanent Representatives in Vienna to "address the implementation challenges in the areas outlined in the report" (MC.DEC/19/06). Some progress was made on the question of legal status for the OSCE. During the Spanish chairmanship in 2007 the drafting of a convention will be considered (even though the Russian Federation's ultimate goal seems to be a charter). Overall, however, no substantive comprehensive reforms have been agreed upon. And things seem even more gloomy if one looks at the procrastination concerning the—in itself not very ambitious—Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons.

Source: OSCE/Claus Neukirch

Music lovers congregate at the "Vadul-lui-Woodstock" festival on 12 August 2006. Sponsored by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the event united bands and fans from Tiraspol and Chisinau under the slogan "Rebuilding bridges."

Source: OSCE/Greg Cook

"Frozen conflict" in Transnistria. Tension rises as the Moldovan head of the district administration, Grigore Policinschi (center), forces open a barrier at a checkpoint blocking Moldovan farmers from reaching their lands, 6 April 2005.

Source: OSCE/Agnes Montanari

"Frozen conflict" in South Ossetia. *A patient in a run-down hospital in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, 18 March 2007. The hospital will be reconstructed under an international programme for the economic rehabilitation of the Georgian–Ossetian conflict zone.*

The decision on the proposal by Kazakhstan to assume the mantle of the OSCE chairmanship for 2009 was postponed for one year, even though, as the Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 8 states, a decision on future chairmanship is to be taken "as a rule two years before the Chairmanship's term of office starts." The Ministerial Council of 2007 under Spanish chairmanship will most likely be the forum for this decision. In a formal sense there is nothing wrong with this; the OSCE can easily decide on the issue at the end of 2007. However, it is well known that the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA) have grave difficulties in accepting Kazakhstan as President of the OSCE, while the Russians and the Central Asians are very much in favor of this move. They argue that it would create a more balanced OSCE if one of the countries "East of Vienna" *finally* has the Presidency of the organization.

Additionally, for the fourth consecutive year no consensus could be reached about a Ministerial Declaration, mainly because of disagreement on the Russian Federation's (non-)fulfillment of its "Istanbul Commitments." Furthermore, no progress was made on the defrosting of the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, even though Belgium had made progress in the "frozen conflicts" a top priority of its chairmanship.

Broad heterogeneous participation and consensus building

The broad-based participation in the OSCE has various consequences for the negotiation process. Use of the OSCE as a forum for discussion guarantees the involvement of both the Russian Federation and the United States in the process. Exclusion of some affected actors is a serious shortcoming of forums such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Yet, the OSCE's inclusiveness—in combination with the consensus requirement for OSCE decisions—can also lead to unworkable cleavages and the subsequent inertness of the organization. The 2006 MC featured the, by now well-known, divide between "East" and "West" of Vienna, often accompanied by strong rhetoric from both sides. The "Eastern" camp consists of the Russian Federation and the Soviet successor states that are still under (semi-)authoritarian rule, like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The "Western" camp shifts depending on the issue, but as a rule consists of the United Kingdom, the United States, and various mainland European states. An interesting point to notice here is that EU member states did act in quite a harmonized fashion during the 2006 MC, with the exception of the Kazakhstan

Source: OSCE/Mikhail Evstafiev

Ambassador William H. Hill (left), the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, after talks with Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov in Tiraspol, 1 June 2006.

issue. There were common positions, but coordination was limited to opening and closing speeches. The position in the EU of the United Kingdom especially appears to have been important here. During the negotiation process, the United Kingdom was often (seen as) an American "Trojan horse" inside the EU camp. We should also note, however, that there are more cross-cutting cleavages than meet the eye. On many issues member states from East and West converge on certain issue areas, while others from their regions unite as opponents. However, there are options for negotiation hidden under the seemingly overriding rifts. These opportunities are of great interest to negotiation analysts looking for incentives to speed up the workings of the OSCE.

Regarding reforms of the OSCE and its institutions, the Russian Federation and the United States took opposing stances. The Russian Federation proposed drastic reforms that would, for example, bring ODIHR under the political control of the Permanent Council and the OSCE field presences under the control of the respective host countries. The United States, on the other hand, was in favor of the status quo, under which ODIHR is largely autonomous (this suits U.S. purposes well, as Washington is really only interested in the human dimension and the way in which this could serve the U.S. "freedom agenda"). Additionally, the Russian Federation is seeking to strike a better balance between the various dimensions of the OSCE (although this would have to come at the expense of the human dimension and, in fact, put an end to its domination). An alternative would be for countries to decide to abolish the politico-military and economic/environmental dimensions altogether and concentrate solely on the human dimension; but this would constitute a completely different kind of organization. Should this last option be chosen, every state would decide for itself whether it wishes to join this (new) organization or not (the implication is that Russia would not be interested). The United States, again, is in favor of the status quo. Finally, although all participating states agree that the OSCE needs legal status in order to function in the international environment, positions are divided as to what form this status would take. The Russian Federation is aiming for a Charter (which would contain many strong obligations, among them one governing the relationship between the Permanent Council and ODIHR), while the United States and the majority of EU member states do not wish to go further than a Convention.

Reforms were not the only issue where the broadness of the organization negatively influenced consensus. The "East–West" divide played out very strongly in Kazakhstan's bid for the 2009 chairmanship, as Kazakhstan is an active member of the "Eastern" bloc. Participating states from the "Eastern bloc" strongly supported Kazakhstan's bid. It is interesting to note that although the Russian Federation was very vocal in its support and Kazakhstan was clearly in the lead, when Kazakhstan decided to accept the postponement of the decision to 2007, the Russian Federation agreed. The "Western" camp was strongly divided on the issue (there was no real common EU position). The United States stuck to its position that 2009 would be too early for a Kazakhstan chairmanship and that 2011 would be a better timeframe so that Kazakhstan could first improve its internal political situation (political reform, democratization, and human rights situation). Only then could Kazakhstan serve as chair, as exemplified by the norms and values of the organization as a whole.

In the case of the reform issues that were meant to dominate the 2006 MC, the strong cleavages within the OSCE led to an outcome that was less than optimal—especially as many EU countries wanted the OSCE reforms to go further than the few limited follow-up tasks for 2007 and, as mentioned, the Russian Federation envisioned far more drastic reforms. It could be argued that the United States is the country most likely to be content with the outcome, as no substantial reforms have been agreed upon. The result seems acceptable to the EU member states only because a crisis between the "West" and the "East" was avoided (in fact, a sigh of relief and satisfaction with the outcome of the MC was heard in a number of EU member states). The Russian Federation was able to accept the outcome because some of its demands were met and reform was merely postponed, not permanently frustrated.

In conclusion, the strong cleavages within the OSCE lead either to inertia in terms of postponing critical decisions, reforms, and the Kazakhstan candidature, or ultimately to actual crisis itself. As a result, there is progress in OSCE activity, but in less controversial—niche—topics, such as combating intolerance and discrimination and promoting mutual respect and understanding. Perhaps the need to produce at least some results and to show at least some deliverables is a good incentive for OSCE participant states to focus on these niche decisions (all the more because though there is no real need or wish to focus on these issues.)

Source: OSCE/Lubomir Kotek

Participants at the OECD's Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, 10 October 2006.

Inclusive approach encompassing three dimensions of security

The inclusive approach to security, including the politico-military, economic/environmental, and human dimension issues leads to opportunities as well as compartmentalization. As the OSCE deals with a wide range of topics, it is in a perfect position to fill niches left open by other—stronger—regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The negotiations around the 2006 MC seem to confirm this argument. As noted, many decisions were made on niche topics such as "Combating the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Air" and "Further Measures to Prevent the Criminal Use of Lost/Stolen Passports and Other Travel Documents." At the same time, the OSCE lost its quite unique role as an encompassing organization. In the past the OSCE had a kind of monopoly on encompassment, nowadays other organizations like NATO with its "Diplomacy, Defense, and Development" approach assume a role on terrains traditionally seen as OSCE hunting grounds. This hampers OSCE operations in areas where they might create added value.

Nowadays other organizations like NATO assume a role on terrains traditionally seen as OSCE hunting grounds.

The inclusive approach creates room for extensive package deals, in which issues from different dimensions are traded out and a "win–win" situation can occur. Yet, the broad scope of the OSCE does not seem to lead to package deals, but to compartmentalization. Ideally, specific topics are discussed in informal groups and in specialized working groups, after which they are moved on to the PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) and subsequently the Permanent Council. Which should consider the broader picture. However, because the institution of working groups compartmentalizes the process, many possible negotiation outcomes are already crossed out by the time the issues are looked at in a comprehensive manner. Hence options for package dealing are scarce.

Institutional factors and reform

The rotating chairmanship of the OSCE gives an impetus to the negotiation process in the sense that certain subjects get more attention than others. Under the Belgian chairmanship tolerance and nondiscrimination as well as frozen conflicts—being issues of concern to all presidencies—were given explicit attention. However, there is often only so much the chair can achieve and, in the end, the outcome depends more on the political will of participating states than on the initiative of the chairmanship. In relation to frozen conflicts the Belgians had rather ambitious goals (like, e.g., the Netherlands in 2003!), but in reality the conflicts proved too deeply frozen for them to thaw significantly (which resulted in the disappointment on the part of the Belgian chairmanship, expressed in its closing statement). Even though the chair can put certain issues on top of the OSCE agenda, the focus of OSCE negotiations is always on more or less the same topics (reform, tolerance, and nondiscrimination etc.). The autonomy of the OSCE institutions such as ODIHR might also contribute greatly to a continuity of focus. But the views of countries differ widely on these issues.

The authors interviewed OSCE diplomats in Brussels, The Hague, and Vienna on the question of willingness to reform, the direction any such reforms might take, and the future of the organization. The Russians are of the opinion that the OSCE is too much a Western affair. Their feeling is that they have been too soft on the "West" in the nineties. There is also a wish to formalize the OSCE—a mere political body that still has elements of the (CSCE) process it once was—into an organization in accordance with international law. Furthermore, attention should shift from monitoring elections and protecting minorities to issues like fighting terrorism and also arms control and other politico-military issues (closer to what they see as Russian interests).

The Americans, and with them the British, are extremely hesitant to give in to these demands, while the majority of EU member states are not unwilling to create a more balanced regime (although not at the expense of the Human Dimension). The EU would like to have a more substantial negotiation processes resulting in more assured outcomes. Other countries, like Albania, would like to strengthen the position of the OSCE Secretary-General. Both the United States and the Russian Federation desire an organization that serves their own national purposes, not an influential regime channeling negotiation processes which result in agreements that bind their hands too much. Of course, the EU has its restraints as well, but it does place a higher value on the ability and capability of the OSCE to create and assure peace and stability in Europe and the European neighborhood plus Central Asia. In particular, the OSCE's Mediterranean partners (and in some aspects the Asian partners as well) could dovetail well with other EU initiatives toward or with these partners. But trust and transparency remain the major problems. The USA and Russia don't trust each other; they negotiate the main issues via back channels and keep the old Europeans (and thus the

Source: OSCE/Saulius Smaly

Some 20,000 trees will be planted in Tajikistan's southern region of Khatlon as part of an environmental project by the OSCE Center in Dushanbe that began in March 2006.

Source: OSCE/Lubomir Kotek

OSCE ballot for municipal elections in Kosovo on 28 October 2000.

EU) out. This constitutes a vicious circle, where, although the OSCE as a platform is supposed to contribute to building trust and transparency, its lack of them now seems to produce stagnation within its own portals. Bilateralism often works here at the expense of effective multilateralism. The Russians play this game: it is easier for them to deal bilaterally with Berlin, London, or Paris than with the EU; or try to force issues directly with, for example, Chisinau, instead of working through the agreed OSCE negotiating framework on Transnistria. The Americans do the same, working through the British and/or with the "new European states," like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, or Romania.

A non-inclusive negotiation process, in practice

Though we do have an encompassing negotiation process in OSCE, this is more theory than practice. Yes, there is a very broad range of issues in the negotiation process. But while these issues are objects of more substantive negotiations in regional organizations like the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot do anything substantive on issues that are under scrutiny in less-encompassing regimes. However, in areas like election monitoring, the protection of minorities, and illegal trafficking, the OSCE does play a very useful role. Looking at substance we can conclude that the OSCE process is non-encompassing in daily practice. It is a niche market. And because of this de facto non-inclusiveness it does play a useful role on the Eurasian continent. As we have seen, there is also de facto non-inclusiveness as far as actors are concerned. In practice, Russia and the USA negotiate the organization's destiny via back channels. If they do not take opposing positions, like in the early nineties, the OSCE can flourish. But those were special circumstances, as, at the time, Russia desperately wanted to belong to the West. If they bargain in a distributive way, as during the Cold War and the Brussels meeting of last year, the OSCE is a lame duck. Europe/EU is pushed aside—it is also a house divided against itself— and the potential mediators and bridge builders cannot use its leverage. The problem is not with the negotiation process being actor-inclusive, but actor-exclusive. To sum up, we can conclude that the process of negotiating security and cooperation in Europe:

- Produces assured outcomes, prioritizes on issues not taken care of by more substantive regimes: if it is issue-exclusive as a result of prioritizing;
- Produces non-assured outcomes if the dominant powers exclude the lesser powers: if it is actor-exclusive through power play.

In reality, the OSCE regime does not have an encompassing, inclusive character. In practice, it is exclusive both at the issue and actor level. This exclusion generates useful outcomes at the substance level and is frustrated at the actor level because of the marginalization of potential brokers. On the same note we should observe the growing divergence, not only between interests but also on values and perceptions. Both the United States and the Russian Federation regard the OSCE as a useful instrument as long as it serves their purposes, full stop. For the Europeans—whatever their national interests—the organization is added value, being a regime that is helping to stabilize the situation in Europe. The Europeans take a less opportunistic and often more ideological view on questions concerning the character and function of the OSCE negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe.

Fedor Meerts and Paul Meerts

Source: OSCE

Human Dimension Implementation Meeting factsheet

STOP PRESS

Caspilog II Success

The first indications are that the CaspiLog II session among the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan, coorganized by the PIN Group in Baku, Azerbaijan from 5–7 May, 2007, was a huge success.

The idea for the Dialog began after a Roadshow at the School of International Relations at the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 2003, where the PIN Group was asked to analyze negotiations on the Caspian Sea. On their return, members were struck by how greatly the conflict in the region over boundaries and security prevented serious discussion of issues of joint concern. They then perceived the usefulness or organizing a track-two exercise in dialog among the Caspian littoral states to open communications over common issues not related to boundaries and security. The first session, CaspiLog I was held in May 2006, and participants requested a follow-up event this year.

The next issue of PINPoints will present full details and photographs of this important event.

Problem Solving, Decision Making, Negotiations

Most of those who work on the problems of negotiations today agree that finding an appropriate solution to an existing problem is a specific part of the decision-making procedure. There is a certain chain of procedure in this area: finding a problem-solving strategy—making a decision—achieving an outcome. This is a universal scheme that can be attributed to the solution of any problem, regardless of whether it is a domestic or international one.

But there are two additional considerations: first, some problems can only be solved internationally because their scope exceeds an actor's national capabilities and, second, countries' growing interdependence. Even if it is possible to solve a problem through national efforts, it is much better to solve it on the basis of international cooperation, as some actors possess greater expertise, more up-to-date technology, etc. In this case negotiation becomes an integral part of the decision-making procedure. Before any final decision is taken on how to proceed, those who are involved in the decision-making process must also evaluate, together with financial, technological, political, and other considerations, what is inherent to the negotiable component: who could be approached as a possible partner to try to solve the given problem; what kind of input would tip the balance in favor of a successful negotiation or result in its failure; what would the price of a negotiated solution be (in broad political, economic, and technological terms).

Before any final decision is taken on how to proceed, those who are involved in the decision-making process must also evaluate what is inherent to the negotiable component

All the elements of a possible solution can be measured in terms of monetary cost, technical outcome, political price. But there is a component that it is very difficult to quantify: an appropriate negotiation strategy. Obviously, a good negotiation strategy can help achieve a satisfactory solution of the problem under consideration; on the other hand, a poor negotiation strategy can bring disaster. This means that the negotiation strategy should become a part of the problem-solving process, that it should somehow be incorporated into the work of the management mechanism of the government, corporation, company, in fact, any entity needing to solve problems of a certain magnitude (certainly not, for example, street cleaning issues, although, these days, as it is very often *Gastarbeiter* who do this job, street cleaning may also end up becoming a negotiated issue because of the job legislation, insurance, security, and so on, that it involves.).

To date, scant attention has been paid to this side of negotiation analysis. The Harvard University professor, Robert Putnam (1988), published a brilliant article, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," regarding "double-decker" negotiations, in which he suggests that every negotiation has two dimensions, one dimension being at the table— "in the field" and the other where the actual decisions are made. His idea was that with the growth of interdependence and globalization, the negotiable element of a solution of any problem should become an integral part of the decision-making procedure. This, in turn, means that negotiation should become more of a science and less of an art, as outlined in Howard Raiffa's greatest work, *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (Raiffa, 1982). In other words, the focus of negotiation research must be shifted from

Source: http://www.freefoto.com / Ian Britton

Source: European Commission, 2007

The negotiated dimension has become an integral and, very often, extremely successful part of entire areas, like security, development, protection of the environment, and human rights.

Source: European Community, 2007

Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant U.S. Attorney General of the Antitrust Division met Neelie Kroes, Member of the EC in charge of Competition, in October 2006.

The EU–US relationship is the deepest and largest bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world. It encompasses $US600 billion of trade in goods and services each year, large flows of investment, and provides employment to as many as 14 million people on both sides of the Atlantic. Strengthening the relationship between the EU and the US would translate into huge economic benefits and make both economies more competitive and dynamic. Strategic preparations by each side in advance of the talks are thus vital.

Source: European Commission, 2007

the identification of unique and individual qualities that can be demonstrated only by the masters of the negotiating profession to the identification of the universal and repeatable features that can be taught to any individual, irrespective whether he or she possesses diplomatic credentials. This was, in effect, the essence of another book produced at Harvard, Fisher and Ury' s (1981) famous *Getting To Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in*.

Almost every transnational organization has its own negotiation team.

The problem described there is how to include negotiation, international or not, within the regular decision-making procedure. To a certain extent, this has already happened: almost every transnational organization has its own negotiation team. Many government agencies also set up negotiation units. The negotiated dimension has become an integral and, very often, extremely successful part of entire areas, like security, development, protection of environment, and human rights.

To continue this line of analysis and to outline some practical lessons, the following proposals are made:

- During the evaluation of problems needing solutions, an additional dimension must be taken into account—the negotiable part of the possible solution must be identified and analyzed: what it may bring to the solution process, who may contribute, the role of the negotiable part, and so on;
- What type of negotiation might be suggested, its agenda, participants, desirable outcome;
- What negotiation strategy might be suggested, the bargaining component, what may be and should be expected from the negotiations in question and more widely—on the political, financial, and technical fronts;
- Who should be entrusted with the task of negotiation (diplomats, the military, lawyers, scientists) and what should be the coordination procedure ("who is the boss?");
- What type of outcome should be expected. The essence of this task is to make negotiation a regular ingredient of the decision-making procedure, with the understanding that the more complicated and more integrated the international environment becomes, the more sought-after and desirable both the art and science of negotiations will be.

Victor Kremenyuk

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Source: http://www.sxc.hu

Why IIASA Needs PIN and PIN Needs IIASA…

Report of a valuable scientific summer experience

In the summer of 2006 I was one of the PIN participants in the Young Scientists Summer Program at IIASA. The Program was set up to give up to 50 young researchers each year the opportunity to work on their research in the inspiring setting of IIASA and to learn from each other's work and the expertise of the IIASA staff. I entered the Program with a research proposal on the Western Sahara conflict. This long-lasting conflict between Morocco and the inhabitants of the Western Sahara over sovereignty is a very interesting example of a conflict in which negotiations and mediation have played an important role. However, a solution to the conflict has yet to be found.



Source: Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC

A long line of Saharan dust swept across Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara (furthest left on African coast) and out over the Canary Islands on 3 March 2004 in this satellite photograph of Earth.

Morocco claims and administers Western Sahara, whose sovereignty remains unresolved. A cease-fire has remained in effect since September 1991, administered by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), but attempts to hold a referendum have failed and parties thus far have rejected all brokered proposals; several states have extended diplomatic relations to the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" represented by the Polisario Front in exile in Algeria, while others recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Most of the approximately 102,000 Sahrawi refugees are sheltered in camps in Tindouf, Algeria.

Source: *The World Factbook.*

In the initial stages of my work at IIASA I had the opportunity to discuss my research with the members of the PIN steering committee. In particular, the conversations with Professor Zartman—who knows this conflict very well and has published a lot about it—were of enormous help. He offered me a very realistic perspective on the case and warned me not to be too ambitious in my goals. He turned out to be very right! The conflict has a long history attached to it and the historical relations between the conflicting parties, sometimes going back more than ten centuries, are still of great importance today.

During the summer my research gained more and more focus: from a broad perspective on various aspects of the conflict, it evolved into an evaluation of UN intervention and mediation efforts in the conflict. I found out that the causes of the failure of the UN to broker a settlement lay largely in the mandate that the Security Council had given to the mediator. Even when the well-respected James Baker took on the challenge of mediating in the conflict, the Security Council was reluctant to provide him with a mandate that could have made a difference. And has continued not to do so to this day.

Returning home after the summer, I asked myself many times what added value my stay at IIASA had for my research. The answer to this question is twofold and also provides an answer to the question that many fellow students and friends asked me: Why is PIN at IIASA? I did not have an answer to that question when I came to Laxenburg in June, but I do have one now and it is a convincing one.

My own research benefited tremendously from the active involvement of the IIASA staff and my fellow summer students. They constantly questioned my research and forced me to explain what I was doing and why I was doing it. The fact that most of them have a completely different scientific background—mainly natural science—was very enriching. New angles and questions that I would have never thought of were added to my work and have greatly improved it.

Vice versa, the same mechanism applies: as a political scientist I had developed a natural skepticism toward modeling reality. At IIASA, building models is core business and the Institute is renowned for its climate models. Many fellow students worked with these models and got very impressive results and projections. But when we discussed our work, their main questions related not to the output of their models, but how to attract attention at the political level. We know that good models don't, ipso facto, make good policy. They can certainly contribute to good policy, but only if their outcomes are presented in policy-relevant terms. And that is exactly where PIN comes in: PIN brings to the Institute an enhanced political antenna. Because, when it comes to influencing or even changing policy, being right is not enough. The outcome of any political process is always a negotiated agreement, in which many factors have a part to play. The work of IIASA and PIN are thus highly complementary.

Source: United Nations

Attempts to mediate in Western Sahara continue. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) meets with Peter van Walsum, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, at UN Headquarters in New York.

My conclusion is clear: PIN needs IIASA and IIASA needs PIN. Being together in a truly multidisciplinary environment is a valuable asset that should never be lost. The exactness and rigidity of natural science forces researches of negotiation to be very precise in their formulations and to apply truly scientific methods. And taking the political perspective into account adds tremendous value to the modeling work. I am glad and very grateful to have been a part of this cross-fertilization in the past summer and I hope that the YSSP—including PIN—will be successful for many years to come.

Jérôme Larosch

Jérôme Larosch graduated from Nijmegen University in 2003 in political science. His final thesis was on the American National Missile Defense Program. He is currently a member of the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme (CDSP) at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. He coordinates postgraduate courses and training programs in international relations for civil servants and diplomats. He has special expertise in the area of international development aid and his current research interest is in the field of United States foreign policy, international negotiations, and diplomacy. At IIASA worked on a research project entitled "A negotiation approach towards the Western Sahara," which looked into the long-lasting conflict in the Western Sahara from the perspective of international negotiations.

IIASA—An Atmosphere of Diversity and Creativity

Reflections of a 2006 YSSP participant

In 2005 I co-authored a paper with noted scholar and PIN group steering committee member Dr. I. William Zartman entitled "Negotiating with Terrorists." Taking four historical events of violent conflict as case studies, we examined government decision making regarding whether or not to negotiate with a group that the government has deemed to be a terrorist organization. The case studies we undertook, a precursory sampling from the existing historical evidence, lent support to our preliminary conclusion that, in the cases examined at least, while governments begin with a position of adamant refusal to negotiate with a terrorist group, at some point, each turns away from that position, and does negotiate. In the early summer of 2006 I came to IIASA to continue my research on the topic of terrorism and negotiations. I was interested in addressing questions such as the role moderation plays in such interactions and how existing models put forward by game theorists have addressed the highly specific type of exchange that occurs when terrorist organizations and governments negotiate.

The three months I spent as a guest researcher at IIASA were something of a magical experience for me both personally and professionally. I began my summer as a participant in the 2006 Terrorism Workshop, an event that roughly coincided with the beginning of the Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP), in which I had been chosen to participate. At the Terrorism Workshop, I had the opportunity to meet with the members of the PIN Steering Group, as well as with other contributors to a forthcoming volume of a paper on Negotiations with Terrorists, within which my work with William Zartman will appear. As a workshop presenter, I benefited immensely from the discussion and feedback relating not only to my own portion of the presentation, but also from that relating to the presentations of other workshop participants.

Equally thrilling was the opportunity to work together closely with the members of the PIN steering committee whose expertise in the area of international negotiations included that of I. William Zartman,

Negotiating can be fun. Tanya Alfredson, Katherine Calvin, and Jérôme Larosch, the PIN Program's 2006 YSSP participants compare notes and ideas.

YSSP participants from many different countries and disciplines come together at IIASA for three months each summer.

Gunnar Sjöstedt, Guy Olivier Faure, Rudolf Avenhaus, Paul Meerts, and Victor Kremenyuk, a group whose members hail from six countries, whose experience spans decades, and whose collective works constitute some of the most pivotal contributions to negotiation theory. At the same time, the informality, respectfulness, and warmth of their interactions made it clear that this was also a group that has known, respected, and worked together for many years. With me, the PIN members were equally gracious, making my introduction to IIASA welcoming and warm.

This atmosphere of both diversity and creativity combined with respect and a spirit of collaboration was one that would be echoed in my remaining experiences at IIASA. In fact, coming to know the individuals that comprised the wonderfully diverse group of summer scientists would prove to be one of the most rewarding aspects of my experience at IIASA.

In the YSSP group, there were 49 researchers in total, representing 18 different countries, 14 different functional areas, and 49 different sets of research questions. In truth, I arrived at IIASA thinking that, given our differences in training and scientific or research expertise, forging a common understanding between such a diverse assortment of individuals would not come easily. Perhaps our experience together would be more defined by the things that divided us then by what might unite us.

Given the diversity of our geographic origins, there were languages of many nations spoken that summer within the halls of the Habsburg castle where IIASA resides. Science also has many languages. Would the mathematicians find common ground with the theorists, the engineers and biologists with economists and political scientists? Or would the disciplinary barriers between them prove too significant? What might a researcher on negotiation theory bring to, and also take away from, an experience such as this?

Negotiation is foremost about confronting perspectives that are alien to one's own experience.

IIASA was founded at the height of the Cold War, one of the moments of modern history defined by the tensions created out of a clash of divergent perspectives. Out of historical necessity, IIASA, with the help at the time of Howard Raiffa, one of the Institute's founding members and a renowned expert in negotiation, fashioned itself into an institution that is expert not only at scientific discovery and innovation but also at bringing together individuals from different worlds for the purpose of sharing information, exchanging ideas, and creating lasting and meaningful human connections where none existed before.

From the moment of our arrival it seemed to me that we, the members of our group of summer scientists, were either consciously or unconsciously negotiating for ourselves what the role of our own disciplinary proclivities might or should be within the larger community. Negotiation is foremost about confronting perspectives that are alien to one's own experience. At IIASA we did this among ourselves every day; in interdisciplinary discussion groups, seminars, and talks, but also in the often extended bike rides home from the *Schloss* that became our daily ritual. All the visiting researchers at IIASA took a bike for the summer through the IIASA bike exchange program, and conversations that were triggered as a result of personal research or a lecture from a visiting scholar would continue as we set off on our bikes at the end of the work day, sometimes by the dozen, past cultivated fields of sunflowers, shady brooks, and that more than occasionally included a stop off for a glass of wine or apple juice at one of the many village *Heurigers* that are part of the Austrian summer.

I learned a great deal from my summer at IIASA, from my mentors and colleagues in the field of negotiation theory but also from my colleagues and friends in Evolution and Ecology, Risk and Vulnerability, Population and Climate Change, Land Use Change and Dynamic Systems. And thanks to the program organizers, scientific coordinator and all of the permanent staff at IIASA, I also learned a great deal about the creative potential inherent in groups comprised of individuals with varying expertise and perspectives.

Tanya Alfredson

Tanya Alfredson is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) program in International Relations with a concentration in Conflict Management and International Law. She is the recent co-author of a paper with Dr. I William Zartman on Negotiating with Terrorists and a consultant for the FAO Program on Negotiations. Her main interests include negotiation processes in violent civil conflicts, conflict management, multiparty processes and mechanisms of enfranchisement. At IIASA she worked on a paper analyzing the tactical uses of negotiations between governments and extremist groups.

The Negotiator's Fieldbook

Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Christopher Honeyman,
Editors

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

The Negotiator's Fieldbook

The Desk Reference for the Experienced Negotiator

Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Christopher Honeyman, Editors

Published by the American Bar Association, 2006
Section of Dispute Resolution, Washington, DC

If one had to condense the main message of *The Negotiator's Fieldbook*, edited by Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Christopher Honeyman, into just two sentences this reviewer would pick out the following ones: 1. "Negotiation can help achieve the maximum results with the minimum long-term cost"; 2. "Fractionation is the opposite of what is so desperately needed."

The first proposition constitutes the raison d'être of the value of negotiation research in general and of this academic discipline in particular. The second statement rightly draws the lesson from what appears to be the main handicap of specialization (i.e., the inability to take a holistic approach to the negotiation process). The Fieldbook, which the editors call a desk reference for the experienced negotiator, is an outgrowth of a long line of research projects sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation. The precursor of the Fieldbook was a series of 25 articles published in the *Marquette Law Review*, Spring 2004. Therein the authors dealt with the need for a truly interdisciplinary "canon of negotiation." The joining of talents with the knowledge and expertise of outstanding academics and practitioners has yet produced another excellent result. *The Negotiator's Fieldbook* stresses the multidisciplinary approach to negotiation theory and practise covering an extraordinarily broad range of issues.

It is much to the credit of the editors that they have highlighted the central place of negotiation as an appropriate mode of dispute resolution. It may come as a surprise to many European readers that in the United States the likelihood "when someone makes a federal case of something, that it will actually go to trial is now all of 1.8%." The percentage may be higher in Europe although, there too, out-of-court settlements are on the rise, especially in the field of family law. If need be, the Fieldbook is a testimony to the growing importance of dispute settlement through negotiation. The relevance of negotiations as a way to resolve legal disputes may have been the primary motivation for the American Bar Association and its dispute resolution section to lend their support to the project of publishing *The Negotiator's Fieldbook*.

Aside from its merits of stressing the need for a multidisciplinary approach to negotiation and the importance of negotiation in dispute resolution, the Fieldbook will certainly frame, for the time to come, the debates on what should be included in the curricula of academic institutions in the field of negotiation studies. The editors take the view that a "canon of negotiation" begins to emerge, implying that teaching and textbooks have to take a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach embracing the process of negotiation in its entirety, drawing from the many fields which have contributed to the collective understanding of negotiation.

The book contains 80 articles written by widely acknowledged academics, younger talented researchers, or professionals with proven qualifications as negotiators. The list of names is impressive. Rather than citing and singling out any of the authors, the summary of contents listing the titles and all contributors is attached to this review. The voluminous book (768 pages) is divided into six major chapters addressing such a great variety of important subjects that one may get easily lost in the maze. This remark is not meant as a criticism but rather as advice to readers: *The Negotiator's Fieldbook* is not the kind of book you might be able to read overnight from beginning to end. It will rather be consulted as a reference book, in the best sense of the term, on each subject of interest. All contributions make excellent reading. The innovative Fieldbook can be highly recommended to any serious student of modern negotiation research.

A final remark: if the reviewer had two wishes to express, these would be the following. May this excellent book find its way to the desks of as many readers as possible, not only in the United States. Second, may a new edition of this important publication contain even more contributions from the non-Western world. The global impact of the emerging canon of negotiations would thus be even greater. On the whole, the editors and authors are to be congratulated for this outstanding result of their research project.

Franz Cede

Summer Workshop on PIN's 2007 Project: Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution



The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program has long hung on the edge of extending its field of interest into the broader area of conflict prevention, management, resolution, and transformation. The opportunity presented itself with an invitation from Sage Publishers to edit the latest Sage Handbook, on conflict resolution. Indeed, as one of the chapters notes, "There is little negotiation that does not have to do with conflict resolution" and "[negotiation] is the most common (although not the only) way of preventing, managing, resolving and transforming conflicts." As a result, an illustrious group of social scientists will gather at IIASA between 31 June and 2 July 2007 for a large-scale workshop to review each other's work and take stock of current knowledge and new challenges in this rather new field of inquiry and even of specific practice. Some two-thirds of the 36 international authors, including the members of the Steering Committee and the new associate member, Dr. Jacob Bercovitch of the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand, will participate in the workshop. The Handbook is edited by Dr Bercovitch, Dr. Victor Kremenyuk, and Dr. I. William Zartman of the PIN Steering Committee. Following the workshop, the chapters, already in semi-final stage, will undergo final revisions and be submitted to the publisher for appearance in early 2008.

Authors and chapters of the Handbook are listed below.

Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. The Editors (Jacob Bercovitch, I William Zartman, Victor Kremenyuk)

Part I History and Methods of Study

1. The Evolution of Conflict Resolution : Louis Kriesberg, Syracuse (USA)
2. Methods and Approaches: Daniel Druckman, George Mason (USA)
3. Case Study Approaches: Jack Levy, Rutgers (USA)
4. Quantitative Approaches: David Singer, Michigan (USA)
6. Experimental Approaches: Dean Pruitt, SUNY (USA)
7. Constructivism: Richard Jackson, Manchester (UK)

Part II Issues and Sources of Conflict

8. Ethnic/Identity: Don Rothchild, UC Davis (USA)
9. Economic/Resources: Philippe le Billon, British Columbia (Canada)
10. Territory/Boundaries: John Vasquez, Univ. of Illinois (USA)
11. Religion: Mark Gopin, George Mason (USA)
12. Ecology: Gunnar Sjoestedt, Ukrikespolitiska Institutet (Sweden)

Part III Methods of Managing Conflicts

13. Conflict Prevention: Michael Lund, MSI (US)
14. Negotiation: I William Zartman, SAIS-Johns Hopkins
15. Mediation: Jacob Bercovitch, Canterbury (NZ)
16. Arbitration, Adjudication, and Law : Franz Cede, Vienna, Austrian Foreign Ministry (Austria)
17. Diplomacy: Christer Jansson, Lund (Sweden)
18. Problem Solving Approaches : Tamara D'Estree, Denver (USA)
19. Dialog: Harold H Saunders, International Institute for Sustained Dialogue
20. NGOs and Conflict : Andrea Bartoli, Sant'Egidio, Columbia, and Yannis Psimopoulos, Columbia (USA)
21. UN, other IOs, and ROs, and Conflict Resolution : Connie Peck, UNITAR (USA)
22. Regional Organizations : Max van der Stoel and John Packer, OSCE

Part IV Current Features and Dilemmas in the Study of Conflict Resolution

23. Terrorism and Conflict Resolution: William Donohue, Michigan State (USA)
24. Media and Conflict Resolution: Eytan Gilboa, Southern California (US–Israel)
25. Democracy and Conflict Resolution: David Rousseaux, Albany, and David Kinsella, Portland State (USA)
26. Intractable Conflicts: Fen Osler Hampson, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carlton (Canada)
27. Culture and Conflict Resolution: Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne (France)
28. From Peacekeeping via Peacemaking to Peacebuilding: Paul Diehl, Illinois (USA)
29. Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Valerie Rosoux, Louvain (Belgium)
30. Durability of Peace Agreements, Transformation & Post-Conflict Management: Scott Gartner, California at Davis (USA)
31. Peace vs. Justice : Cecilia Albin, Uppsala (Sweden)
32. Civil War and Its Spread : Kristian Gleditsch, Essex (UK)
33. Development and Conflict: Paul Collier, Oxford (UK)
34. Human Rights and Conflict Resolution : Eileen Babbitt, Fletcher School, Tufts (USA)
35. Force and Arms Control: Victor Kremenyuk, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)
36. Non-State Actors: Hemda Ben Yehuda (Israel)
37. Training and Education in Conflict Resolution: Paul Meerts, Clingendael (Netherlands)

Conclusion: Emerging Problems in Theory and Practice: The Editors



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International Negotiation
CONTENTS Volume 12, no. 1 (2007)

PIN Books

Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations, R. Avenhaus, I.W. Zartman, editors, Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York.
ISBN 978-3-540-68303-2

Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, I. William Zartman, G.O. Faure, editors, 2005, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
ISBN 13-978-0-521-85664-5

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

New PIN Book:

Diplomacy Games

Formal Models and International Negotiation

RUDOLF AVENHAUS and I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
Editors

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems?

Diplomacy Games will be published by Springer in July 2007 and can be ordered from their web site at: http://www.springer.com/west/home/economics/political+science?SGWID=4-40578-22-173721828-0

New-Look PINPoints

PINPoints readers have asked for details of the editorial team of the new-style magazine, which appeared for the first time in November/December.

Iain Stewart, Head of Publications, oversees the production of PINPoints. A former journalist, who studied at Newcastle University in the UK, Iain believes in making scientists' work more accessible and wishes to bring IIASA's research to a wider audience. "This is especially necessary in communicating the latest thinking and findings to policymakers, who may not have a strictly scientific background," he says. "The inclusion of design details and color photographs into PINPoints has certainly generated enthusiasm and interest in our readership."

Kathryn Platzer is IIASA's editor and strives to maximize the readability of the articles. Kathryn studied at Edinburgh University in Scotland and at the Centre Européen at Nancy University in eastern France, before becoming an advertising copywriter, then moved to editing after having a family. Ingrid Teply-Baubinder has worked at IIASA for 30 years. She studied at Vienna University and is a qualified interpreter, hence her ability to typeset so fluently in English. Ingrid also designed the new PINPoints layout and chooses the color scheme.

We are always adding to our mailing list, so if you are not in our database or know someone who would like to receive PINPoints twice yearly, please drop your personal details by e-mail to: molina@iiasa.ac.at.



PIN·*Points*
The Processes of International Negotiation Program *Network Newsletter 28/2007*

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Issue Editor: I. William Zartman

IIASA is a nongovernmental, international research institution sponsored by scientific organizations from 18 countries.

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Processes of International Negotiations

Steering Committee Members

Rudolf Avenhaus is Professor of Statistics and Operations Research at the University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich. Prior to his academic appointment in 1980, he was research assistant at the Mathematical and Physical Institutes of the universities of Karlsruhe and Geneva, research scholar at the Nuclear Research Center, Karlsruhe, and lecturer at the University of Mannheim. From 1973 to 1975, and again in 1980, he worked at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg. Professor Avenhaus is author of numerous papers in Physics, Statistics and Game Theory and its applications, in particular, to arms control and disarmament, co-editor of four books on nuclear safeguards, and author of the books *Material Accountability* (Wiley 19977), *Safeguards Systems Analysis* (Plenum 1986) and *Compliance Quantified* (with M. Canty, Cambridge 1996).

Franz Cede has been Austrian Ambassador in Brussels since September 2003. He has participated in numerous international conferences and bilateral negotiations. In 1993, he chaired the Senior Officials Meeting in preparation for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. Ambassador Cede is a frequent lecturer at Austrian and foreign academic institutions. He is a member of the German Society of International Law, the Austrian ILA branch, and the scientific consultative groups of the Austrian Human Rights Institute in Salzburg. He is co-editor of the Austrian Review of International and European Law (AREIL). His fields of interest are the codification process in the UN system, European Law, and human rights issues.

Guy Olivier Faure is Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, Paris V, where he teaches "International Negotiation," "Conflict Resolution," and "Strategic Thinking and Action." He is a member of the editorial board of three major international journals dealing with negotiation theory and practice: *International Negotiation* (Washington), *Negotiation Journal* (Harvard, Cambridge); *Group Decision and Negotiation* (New York). His major research interests are business and diplomatic negotiations, especially with China, focusing on strategies and cultural issues. He is also concerned with developing interdisciplinary approaches in domains such as terrorism, and engages in consulting and training activities with enterprises, multinational companies, international organizations, and governments.

Victor Kremenyuk is Deputy Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow and a research associate at IIASA. His areas of interest are international conflict resolution, crisis management, foreign policy, and the negotiation process. He has published more than 100 works in Russian and other languages, and edited both the first and second editions of PIN's book *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*.

Paul W. Meerts, M.A., studied political science and international relations at the Universities of Amsterdam and Leiden. He has been research fellow in Dutch Political History at the Universities of Leiden and Groningen, as well as coordinator of diplomatic training at the Netherlands Society of International Affairs and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations at Clingendael. He is currently serving as Deputy Director of the Clingendael Institute and is a consultant in diplomatic training. He trains diplomats and civil servants in international negotiation worldwide.

Gunnar Sjöstedt is senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and also associate professor of political science at the University of Stockholm. His research work is concerned with processes of international cooperation and consultations in which negotiations represent an important element. He has studied the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as a communication system and the external role of the European community, as well as the transformation of the international trade regime incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its external relations. He is the editor of *International Environmental Negotiations* and the co-editor of *Negotiating International Regimes*, the second and fourth books, respectively, in the PIN series.

I. William Zartman is Jacob Blaustein Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Organization at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *The Practical Negotiator*, *The 50% Solution*, and *Ripe for Resolution*, editor of *The Negotiation Process* and *Positive Sum*, among other books, and co-editor of *Escalation and Negotiation*, one of the most recent books in the PIN series. He is organizer of the Washington Interest in Negotiations (WIN) Group and has been a distinguished fellow of the US Institute of Peace.

Tanja Huber was born in Vienna, Austria and holds a master's degree in geography from the University of Vienna, specializing in the fields of international development and metropolitan growth in Latin America. She is the in-house communication link between IIASA and the members of the PIN Steering Committee, as well as coordinator of IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP). She has authored various articles on PIN's research activities and is currently writing a chapter for the forthcoming book on "Facilitation of the Climate Talks."

Recent PIN Books



Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, edited by I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, 2005

How can an escalation of conflict lead to negotiation? In this systematic study, Zartman and Faure bring together European and American scholars to examine this important topic and to define the point where the concepts and practices of escalation and negotiation meet. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and war-making and peace-making strategists, among others, examine the various forms escalation can take and relate them to conceptual advances in the analysis of negotiation. They argue that structures, crises, turning points, demands, readiness, and ripeness can often define the conditions under which the two concepts can meet. The authors take this opportunity to offer lessons on theory and practice. By relating negotiation to conflict escalation, two processes that have traditionally been studied separately, this book fills a significant gap in the existing knowledge and is directly relevant to the many ongoing conflicts and conflict patterns in the world today.

Contributors

I. William Zartman, Guy Olivier Faure, Patrick M. Morgan, Rudolf Avenhaus, Juergen Beetz, D. Marc Kilgour, Paul W. Meerts, Sung Hee Kim, Daniel Druckman, Lisa J. Carlson, Dean G. Pruitt, Karin Aggestam.



Peace versus Justice, edited by I. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk, 2005

This book examines the costs and benefits of ending the fighting in a range of conflicts, and probes the reasons why negotiators provide, or fail to provide, resolutions that go beyond just "stopping the shooting." What is the desired and achievable mix between negotiation strategies that look backward to end current hostilities and those that look ahead to prevent their recurrence?

To answer that question, a wide range of case studies is marshaled to explore relevant peacemaking situations, from the end of the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars, to more recent settlements of the late 20th and early 21st centuries—including large scale conflicts like the end of World War II and smaller-scale, sometimes internal conflicts like those in Cyprus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Mozambique. Cases on Bosnia and the Middle East add extra interest

Contributors

Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas, Juan Carlos M. Beltramino, Franz Cede, Daniel Druckman, Christophe Dupont, Janice Gross Stein, Victor Kremenyuk, Robert B. Lloyd, Terrence Lyons, Paul W. Meerts, Vitaly V. Naumkin, James C. O'Brien, Marie-Pierre Richarte, Valérie Rosoux, Beth A. Simmons, I. William Zartman, and Irina D. Zvyagelskaya.

Negotiating European Union, edited by Paul W. Meerts and Franz Cede, 2005

The European Union can be perceived as an enormous bilateral and multilateral process of internal and external negotiation. This book examines negotiations within member states, between member states, within and between the institutions of the Union and between the EU and other countries. It also analyzes processes, actors and interests. This book is, therefore, a unique probe into the relatively unknown arena of negotiation processes in the European Union.

Contributors

Franz Cede, Rinus van Schendelen, Mendeltje van Keulen, Pieter Langenberg, Derek Beach, Dorothee Heisenberg, Ole Elgström, Leendert Jan Bal, Peter van Grinsven, Alain Guggenbühl, Alice Landau, and Paul W. Meerts.