PIN·*Points*

The Processes of International Negotiation Program *Network Newsletter 27/2006*

Caspilog I in Istanbul

The Challenge of Horizontal Issues • Generalists versus Specialists • Formal Models • War by Other Means? •

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IIASA www.iiasa.ac.at

From the PIN Steering Committee

Negotiation Analysis: Globalization and New Negotiators

IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation Program (PIN) strives to make a contribution to knowledge building in the area of negotiation analysis. The 20-odd books that PIN has published since 1988 address important topics that have been neglected in the literature. But PIN also wishes to draw practical lessons regarding negotiation.

Over the years, numerous diplomats have been involved in PIN activities, as chapter authors, as discussants at PIN conferences and workshops, and not least as participants in PIN Roadshows organized at various places around the world from Kyoto and Beijing in the east to Buenos Aires and Costa Rica in the west. PIN's discussions with diplomats, though sometimes complicated and often impeded by differences in professional outlook, have always been exceptionally interesting and rewarding.

While PIN considers negotiation to be a social science area, where particularly useful approaches have been developed for applying research to training and actual practice, many practitioners in foreign ministries have a different view of the usefulness of negotiation theory for operational diplomatic activities. The diplomat/generalist tends to look at negotiation capability as an art that, like piano playing, can be gained only by hard practice. Academic analysis also provides practical negotiation lessons, and reading these analyses can be entertaining. Such theoretical advice has little value for practitioners with years of experience in the secluded "smoke-filled rooms," where crucial stages of international negotiations unfold before their very eyes.

Globalization processes are now changing the function of diplomats in international talks. Modern communications technology has radically changed how information is exchanged between diplomats "at the table" and their capitals. In a current PIN project a retired senior Swedish diplomat points to the emergence of a "new diplomacy," a development which is becoming particularly pronounced in multilateral talks on issues like economic affairs, climate change, or other environmental problems. He refers to a number of explanatory factors for this, one of which is the growing presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in global negotiations, which makes such processes increasingly less secluded from other policymaking at the international as well as at the national level. The high complexity of issues under negotiation not only increases the demand for scientific knowledge but also devalues the significance of diplomatic/generalist competence and calls for greater participation by advanced technical experts in the negotiation. On many occasions experts need to have a more vigorous role than just being the silent technical advisors sitting behind the diplomat/generalist who is performing the active role at the negotiation table.

This process of change represents a great challenge for organizations and project groups like PIN that are engaged in knowledge building in negotiation research and the application of its results to the practical process. However, better conditions for effective consultations between negotiation analysts and negotiation practitioners do seem to be emerging because of the strong impact of globalization processes on recursive multilateral negotiations. NGOs and actors representing other institutions than those of the foreign policy sector need to be given a more prominent and active role in many international negotiations. Scientific knowledge and other kinds of expertise that diplomats/generalists cannot acquire satisfactorily from policy briefs are needed in the negotiation, particularly to move it forward, as well as in problem solving "at the table." Thus, for this and other reasons, scientists as well as experts from national central agencies and ministries other than the foreign office, are now required to take on new roles in international negotiation and sometimes also substitute for professional diplomats as heads of delegation in certain negotiation groups.

Some of the Steering Committee members discussing PIN business (from left to right): P. Meerts, F. Cede, G.O. Faure, and I.W. Zartman

This rise of "the new negotiator" in international talks represents a double challenge for PIN and similar research groups that relates to both the building and the distribution of knowledge concerning international negotiation as such. Globalization tends to change the character and impact of collective decision making in multilateral negotiation. This development needs to be better understood, and this points up the need for further research. Interdisciplinary groups like PIN are well suited for this task because of the high complexity of most multilateral talks in terms of both issues and process.

The new negotiators and their advisors bring knowledge of new issues to global negotiations, but as their professional training does not include instruction or training in negotiation, negotiation analysts have a responsibility to find ways of communicating process knowledge to the new negotiators. The new negotiators are likely to be more receptive to communications from the research community concerning the conditions, mechanisms, and functions of international negotiations.

Seen in a somewhat longer time frame, an expanding role for the new negotiators is likely to affect the selection and training of diplomats/generalists, or some of them, to make them more effective in complex global negotiations. This will probably pave the way for a better use of negotiation analysis in international talks and thus also place new responsibilities on the shoulders of PIN and other similar groups to respond creatively to this call.

Rudolf Avenhaus, Franz Cede, Guy Olivier Faure, Victor Kremenyuk, Paul Meerts, Gunnar Sjöstedt, and I. William Zartman

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The Challenge of Horizontal Issues in Global Negotiations

Disputed themes continually emerge in, and disappear from, negotiation tables around the world. Conditioned by the "correlation" of interests and the capabilities of negotiating parties, negotiated topics are continually being constructed and reconstructed. However, the establishment of an agenda for an international negotiation is also strongly affected by a "core" structure of issues that have been addressed in international politics for decades or longer. Wide issue areas like, for instance, *human rights* or *trade* have become strongly institutionalized in international organizations and regimes. Broad policy areas are in turn fragmented into equally institutionalized issues and subissues that recur in negotiation session after negotiation session in various international organizations. A telling example is that of tariffs. This issue has been on the agenda of all trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for the whole of the post–World War II period.

Wide issue areas like, for instance, human rights or trade have become strongly institutionalized in international organizations and regimes.



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One example of horizontal issues are the efforts to harmonize certain environmental treaties with trade under the international trade regime of the World Trade Organization.

Fragmented and institutionalized issues have had some noteworthy and favorable effects on negotiations in which they have been addressed. Generally speaking, fragmentation of broad issue areas serves as a means of managing the inevitable complexity of multilateral talks, as it facilitates the determination of focal points in the negotiation. Recursive negotiation on institutionalized fragmented issues helps to create consensual knowledge, norms, and procedures, thus making subsequent negotiation on the same topic easier to conduct. International regime building in the environmental area since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment is a telling example of the usefulness of issue fragmentation. There is no doubt that the impressive accomplishments in this policy sector are strongly conditioned by the breaking up of the older "wide" concepts like *air* and *water pollution* into a multitude of much more focused topics, such as, for example, depletion of the ozone layer in the stratosphere, long-range air pollution in delimited geographical regions such as Europe or Southeast Asia, desertification, or biological diversity.

However, in the last couple of decades in particular, the costs of issue fragmentation in international multilateral negotiation have manifested themselves increasingly clearly and strongly. Linkages across broad, separated issue areas (e.g., trade and environment) as well as between more specific issues on the agendas of multilateral talks have grown progressively more visible and more significant.

A crude but still useful distinction can be made between natural and tactical/strategic issue linkages.[1] *Natural linkages* are

[1] For an overview of issue linkages in the negotiation system of environment and development see Chasek, P. "The Negotiation System of Environment and Development: A Ten-Year Review" in Churie Kallhauge A., Sjöstedt, G., and Corell, E. (eds.) (2005). *Global Challenges. Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development*, Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK.

provided by nature and become discernable by means of scientific research and the extensive communication of research results. For example, scientists can demonstrate a significant natural interaction between climate change and various other negotiated issues such as *ozone depletion, long-range air pollution*, or *desertification*.

Political linkages may be, but are not necessarily, conditioned by real-world natural issue couplings; but they can also be entirely or mostly politically motivated. For example, a tactical linkage can have the form of an ad hoc trade-off between two or more nations for the purpose of reaching a settlement in a negotiation. In contrast, the concept of sustainable development (economic, environmental, and social affairs) demonstrates that the creation of strategic linkages may be primarily driven by vested interests and political doctrines.

Linkages have contributed to the acknowledgment, or creation, of so-called horizontal issues, which bring together separate themes in the same or different regimes. Horizontal issues are often constructed in order to develop strategies to decrease issue fragmentation in a policy sector, say environment, in order to avoid suboptimization in the generation of collective goods. There are, for instance, reasons to harmonize the climate regime (1992 UNFCCC/1997 Kyoto Protocol) with the regime pertaining to the depletion of the ozone layer (1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).

Scientists can demonstrate a significant natural interaction between climate change and other negotiated issues such as ozone depletion, long range air pollution, or desertification.

Horizontal issues are addressed recurrently and without difficulty in debates at the UN and other organizations, particularly in the context of the UN aim of sustainable development. In contrast, negotiation on binding and costly commitments concerning horizontal issues is an extremely cumbersome task for the parties involved. A good example of this are the efforts to harmonize certain environmental treaties with trade under the international trade regime of the WTO. One basic problem is where basic norms and principles collide. Over the years, trade talks in GATT/WTO have been guided by clear and consistent goals that essentially call for trade liberalization. Similarly, environmental negotiations have been driven by fundamental objectives like increased environmental security, human health, or the protection of species. Environment/trade negotiations have often become heated and complex events because basic objectives have collided making pragmatic trade-offs difficult to achieve.

Furthermore, both trade and environmental issues are complex from a purely technical point of view. In both issue areas recursive negotiation has contributed to creating a strongly constraining institutionalized negotiation system containing expressed values and norms, concepts and ideas, as well as informal procedural rules to guide party performance at the table. Such regimes have facilitated negotiation within a given institutionalized issue area. Furthermore, parties typically know each other well, including their code of performance, interests, concerns, capabilities, and likely positions on subissues. The problem is that a confrontation of two or more such issue-specific regimes is likely to impede negotiation not only because there are colliding values and differing expectations involved but also because parties at the table misunderstand each other to a degree that they themselves are not fully aware of.

Environmental negotiations have been driven by fundamental objectives like increased environmental security, human health, or the protection of species

Effective harmonization of issue-specific regimes and the handling of horizontal issues will require some institutional reform in international organizations, for example, with regard to exchange of information and interorganizational consultations. It is important that officials and consultants designing such reforms take on a negotiation perspective and that negotiation obstacles are considered in reform plans. For their part, negotiation analysts have a responsibility to build a sufficient knowledge base regarding the problems of negotiating horizontal issues.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

Source: © European Community 2006

Children playing in a camp in the aftermath of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake that cost thousands of lives, and left millions homeless. Environmental negotiations have been driven by fundamental objectives like increased environmental security, human health, or the protection of species.

Negotiation: Generalists versus Specialists

If one were to look for a profession that is naturally predestined for the business of international negotiations, then, according to conventional wisdom, it would be diplomacy. Indeed, professional diplomats can be considered as negotiators par excellence, as their career profile perfectly fits the role of an active player in international negotiations.

Diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting negotiations among representatives of groups or nations is usually performed by professional diplomats whose entire education and training have been geared toward endowing them with the necessary qualifications for the job. Yet, in the modern world, the art of diplomacy is no longer the sole domain of career diplomats. Frequently and increasingly, negotiators come from different backgrounds, thus challenging the privileged position of the career diplomats who were trained as generalists. The very fact that, today, the subject matter of many negotiations demands a high degree of technical expertise and knowledge in a whole variety of fields has eroded the monopoly of diplomats in the process.

However, it would be wrong to completely discard the role of "generalists" and to conclude that the "specialists" have become the primary actors in diplomacy. The general picture is much more complex. It shows that, for the most part, career diplomats and experts are "condemned" to work hand in hand within the framework of the negotiating teams.

Source: NASA

Right: The author, Franz Cede, is Ambassador of Austria to the EU and Head of Mission to NATO. Here, he is seen as a working diplomat at NATO negotiations.

When dealing with matters characterized by a high degree of specialization (e.g., environmental issues, trade, or disarmament) there is an obvious need for first-class experts in the relevant area. Within any delegation tasked to conduct such negotiations, a division of labour can usually be observed between the career diplomats on the one hand and the technical experts on the other. While the career diplomats cover the political aspects of the issue, the specialists are responsible for taking care of the technical substance. In multilateral negotiations the interface between generalists and specialists is not always without friction. Specialists usually stick to rational positions based on scientific knowledge and put aside considerations of convenience or politics. In contrast, career diplomats, whose job it is to incorporate the technical "meat" into the instructions of their political masters are bound to respect the prevailing political parameters. At the end of the day, it is more often than not the experts who have to bow to the political imperatives defended by the diplomats.

Source: © European Community 2006

Meeting of the European Council, 2005, that brought together the Heads of State or Government of the EU under the British presidency. The agenda topics included renewal of the Common Agricultural Policy, EU–Africa relations, the fight against terrorism, employment and growth, sustainable development, climate change and foreign affairs, and the EU candidature of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It is not surprising that the ranks of traditional diplomats are being swelled more and more by experts from many disciplines.

In short, it has to be recognized that, irrespective of the increased and irreplaceable input of experts in modern international negotiation processes, the dominant role of career diplomats remains unchallenged.

What are the good and bad sides of diplomats in international negotiations?

Let us begin with the positive aspects. Undeniably, the professional background of diplomats provides them with a huge advantage over the so-called experts. Usually the diplomat speaks several languages fluently. Diplomats are versed in drafting documents and in communicating in an international environment. More often than not, professional diplomats have a multicultural background enabling them to swim like fish in different waters. Their training also gives them an excellent basis for understanding the main features of the international system, its institutions, and legal framework.

Most important, however, is the capacity of a good diplomat to put an issue into a broader perspective. Diplomats should be able to distinguish between the important and the insignificant. As generalists they should likewise have the analytical skills to make a judgment on the overall situation and to view issues in both a domestic and international context.

The experts—exceptions notwithstanding—are usually focused on the narrow

confines of the relevant subject matter to which they apply the scientific method.

On the negative side, the observation can be made that their education as generalists inclines diplomats to be somewhat superficial, as the author of this article, himself a career diplomat, is particularly well placed to comment upon—and not without a grain of self-criticism. There is some truth in the saying that generalists know nothing about everything whereas experts know everything about nothing. As a matter of fact, in today's world, complicated as it is, the claim of the diplomat to be able to address any subject at any time from a position of authority appears to be somewhat preposterous.

On the other hand, an intelligent generalist, even if a quick learner, will never be able to rival the expertise of the specialist who has a grip on all the details and commands the subject in its various ramifications. The synergies between both talents are obvious: the generalist bringing with him the talents of a diplomat at his best will be an outstanding salesman, able to communicate the technical background of a given issue so as to have the maximum impact on the other side of the negotiating table. In this sense, there is a measure of interdependence between the two types of negotiators.

Diplomacy has much to do with psychology. Understanding the attitudes and expected behavior of all actors in a given negotiating situation does not merely concern the students of Sigmund Freud but constitutes a formidable challenge for any skilled diplomat. For this reason great importance must be attached to a thorough study and good knowledge of the background of the key players in the negotiation exercise. Clearly, the acquisition of these skills is not limited to diplomats. One often sees a diplomat trampling into negotiations like the proverbial bull in the china shop, while other diplomats, because of their human qualities, have a flair for the prevalent group dynamics and may become extremely successful at mastering tricky situations.

The "diplomat–negotiator" will continue to have a raison d'être as long as he/she is able to achieve the highest qualifications and a high degree of adaptability to the new challenges of international negotiations.

Franz Cede

PIN Young Scientists, 2006

The Processes of International Negotiation program welcomed three young scientists to the Young Scientists Summer Program at IIASA in 2006. A short digest of their research follows:

Game Theoretic Models of Terrorist Challenges: Third Party Actors, Political Capabilities, and the Role of Negotiations
Tanya ALFREDSON

Governments frequently turn to game theory when considering how to respond to terrorism. It is thus imperative that available schematics reflect the dynamics of terrorist challenges faithfully.

Existing models are largely two-actor (governments and terrorist) models. A more faithful construction would capture interactions and payoff structures resulting from 3 (and possibly 4 or 5) actors. Specifically, models should take into account how government choices affect constituencies that are neither current terrorists, nor current members of the governmental authority, but who comprise distinct categories of 'players,' with their own payoff structures and capacities for making strategic choices aimed at altering the direction of the conflict.

Using case analyses this study examines how well cases support two-actor models or whether cases support alternative formulations. Finally, because existing models have important implications for the role of negotiations, this study considers the implications of 3-actor models for tactical use in negotiations by governments.

A Negotiation Approach to the Western Sahara Conflict
Jérôme LAROSCH

The ongoing conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front regarding sovereignty over the Western Sahara poses a challenge to theories of international conflict resolution. Although there have been—and still are—attempts at third party intervention in the conflict to bring about a lasting and mutually acceptable solution, thus far the parties have held to their respective positions firmly, and an end to the conflict does not seem near.

The United States is arguably the only country that could play a decisive intervening role. Most theories of intervention assume that third parties have an exogenous motivation for conflict resolution, but the Western Sahara clearly shows that this is not always the case. To understand why the US is not prepared to intervene, better understanding of the potential costs and benefits of intervention for the intervening party is needed.

Modeling Climate Change Negotiations
Katherine CALVIN

The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005 and more recent climate change talks in Montreal have brought climate change negotiation to the forefront in the international news. Researchers have used game theory to analyze these climate change negotiations and the development of international environmental agreements. Results from these models find that a coalition of all countries is optimal but not stable; instead, the equilibrium coalition has low membership. Most of these analyses assume that abatement technology does not change, resulting in an abatement cost function that is constant throughout time. Other research, however, suggests that abatement technologies experience technological change. This research modifies a game-theoretic model of climate change to include technological change. Several methods of including technical change exist; this model assumes that investment lowers the cost of emissions abatement. Furthermore, the model compares a situation where investment is chosen noncooperatively by individual countries with one where investment is specified by the international environmental agreement.

Negotiation Studies in South Korea

Negotiations studies have been growing in Korea since the late 1980s, pioneered by scholars who studied in the United States. In 1997, after the bailout of the South Korean economy by the International Monetary Fund, there was a restructuring of many enterprises and their finances, and overseas investment flooded into the Korean market. This enhanced the need for negotiations studies, and it was then that new negotiations curricula were drawn up and institutions for teaching negotiations began to develop. Today, negotiation skills are fundamental to firms' hiring and training practices to promote efficient management.

Colleges and universities in the Seoul area currently list more than 50 courses in the field, and there are various approaches to the subject. In Economics, negotiations are studied in terms of conflict analysis, patterns of conflict resolution, processes of conflict, and negotiation strategy. How cultural differences affect negotiation forms an important part of international negotiation studies. Negotiation analysis and conflict processes, scientific analysis of negotiation, negotiation skills, group negotiations, and negotiation in organizations are also treated as important subjects in law and public administration. Courses include mediation and multilateral negotiation related to the World Trade Organization and Free Trade Associations as well as topics related to North Korea, including North Korea's negotiation strategy and tactics, the economic blockade of North Korea, and the six-party talks about North Korea's nuclear development.

The government is seeking to pass a bill that will require mediation of public-sector conflicts. This bill emphasizes that negotiation is a core solution in conflict management. When it is passed, the government will provide support for the study of negotiations.

About 200 books about negotiation have been published in Korea since the mid-1990s, with around 30 new volumes being produced every year. The Korean Association of Negotiation Studies (KANS) was founded in 1991. For the interested reader I provide a list of major treatises about negotiation, including some published in the *Journal of Negotiation Studies* regarding the North Korean nuclear problem.

Jaehoon Cha, *The Structure and Transformation of Japanese Negotiation Behavior with US Trade* (Seoul: Hanul Academy Press, 2006) [in Korean].

Seyoung Ahn, *Global Negotiation Strategy* (Seoul : Bakyoungsa Press, 2006) [in Korean].

Rosung Kwak, *International Negotiation: Competing for Cooperative Gains*, (Seoul : Kyoungmun Press, 2005).

Dalkon Lee, *Negotiation* (Seoul : Bupmunsa, 2005)

Gi-Hong Kim, *Why Korean Negotiators Do Not Gain in Their Bargaining* (Seoul : Good Information , 2005) [in Korean].

Keuk-Je Sung, Hunjoon Park, Nohyoung Park and Rosung Kwak (eds.), *Negotiation Teaching Manual,* (Seoul: Kyunghee University Press, 2004)

These are just some samples of major university texts.

I would also like to introduce my major treatises about the North Korean nuclear problem and North Korean negotiation behavior. They can be found in the Korean Journal of Negotiation Studies.

Jaehoon Cha, "The Change in North Korea's Negotiation Behavior during the First Nuclear Crisis," *Journal of Negotiation Studies*, Vol. 5, no. 1 (Seoul: K.A.N.S. 1999. 4).

Jaehoon Cha, "Structural Power and Organizational Processes in Negotiation," *Journal of Negotiation Studies*, Vol. 8, no. 2 (Seoul: K.A.N.S. 2002.12).

Jaehoon Cha, "Studying the Conditions of Effective Mediations for 6-Way Negotiations," *Journal of Negotiation Studies,* Vol. 9, no. 2 (Seoul: K.A.N.S. 2003.12)

Jaehoon Cha, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Conflicts for 6-Way Negotiations," *Journal of Negotiation Studies*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (Seoul: K.A.N.S. 2005.12)

Other treatises can be found on the KANS homepage, www.kans.or.kr.

Prof. Dr. Jaehoon Cha
Kyonggi University, Seoul, South Korea
(Mootis@kyonggi.ac.kr)

Source: NASA

South Korea has ongoing concerns regarding North Korea's negotiation strategy and tactics

Source: www.kans.or.kr

Negotiation skills are seen as fundamental to promoting efficient management in South Korea

Successful Caspian Dialog

On 13–14 May 2006 the PIN Program organized the first Caspian Dialog (CaspiLog 1) session among the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan. The Dialog took place at the Imperial Mint of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul under the auspices of the Hollings Center for International Dialogue. Its purpose was to enable the Caspian states, preoccupied with contentious issues of boundaries and security, to talk informally and off the record about issues of common interest that they do not usually discuss.

Source: Eyup Salman

Topkapi Palace, Istanbul, where the Dialog took place

The scientific work of IIASA formed the basis of the Dialog sessions. Four IIASA scientists—Ulf Dieckmann (Evolution & Ecology), David Wiberg (Land Use Change), Yaroslav Minullin (Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies), and Fabian Wagner (Transboundary Air Pollution)—were invited to give presentations on recent developments in water and air pollution, fisheries, and energy. David Griffiths of Dalhousie University, a specialist from the International Oceanographic Institute, who had already organized two dialogs on maritime accidents, then gave a presentation on his subject.

Regarding the Caspian's status as a Sea/Lake, the director of the Caspian Environmental Project of the United Nations Development Program in Tehran provided delegates with a background analysis of the nature of the Caspian, which was followed by a talk by I. William Zartman of IIASA's Processes of International Negotiation program on the dynamic characteristics of sea/lake regimes around the world. Finally, the executive manager of the Black Sea Economic Council, a neighboring sea/lake regime, explained the workings of Black Sea cooperation.

Representatives of the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea meet with PIN and IIASA scientists in Istanbul

Participants from the Caspian included an official and an unofficial delegate from each of the five littoral countries except for Turkmenistan (the Russian official was also absent on account of sudden illness, but the PIN Group contains a Russian). Discussion sessions gave participants a chance to first present their official positions on Caspian issues and clear the table of contentious matters, then turned to a discussion on the applicability to the Caspian of the various presentations made earlier. Social sessions—a dinner tour on the Bosphorus, lunches together at the conference site, dinners together—loosened the atmosphere and contributed to a relaxed exchange.

In the final session, there were positive comments from all the participants on the usefulness of the Dialog. Above all, the need for information and for cooperation were emphasized, both of which, delegates felt, had been present in the Dialog. Wishes were expressed for research projects on the subjects discussed, a focus on avoiding lose/lose situations by developing win/win solutions, studies of instances of cooperation and incipient regime development, development of security on the issue areas discussed, development of crisis responses to pressing topics such as endangered sturgeon and maritime accidents, and the fostering of a Caspian Basin identity.

The parties agreed to a second meeting (CaspiLog 2), which has been tentatively scheduled for April 2007 in Baku as a PIN sideshow at the first Conference of Parties (COP 1) of the Tehran Environmental Convention. They also agreed to prepare a "homework assignment" for distribution before COP 1 on the measures that each state is currently undertaking on water and air pollution, fisheries, and energy. IIASA scientists will contribute substantive studies focusing on Caspian conditions to the PIN sideshow, and a young scientist from IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program with an interest in the Caspian may also be invited to Baku.

The idea for the Dialog began after a Roadshow at the School of International Relations at the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 2003, where the PIN group was asked to analyze negotiations on the Caspian Sea. On their return, members were struck by how greatly the conflict in the region over boundaries and security prevented serious discussion of issues of joint concern. They then perceived the usefulness or organizing a track-two exercise in dialog among the Caspian littoral states to open communications over common issues not related to boundaries and security.

PIN members Kremenyuk, Meerts, and Zartman organized the Dialog, and other PIN members took part as chairs and facilitators.

I.W. Zartman

The Bosphorus, traditional meeting place between East and West

Lessons Learned from Formal Models

After a series of workshops devoted to the PIN project on formal models in international negotiations, the first held three years ago, the work has been completed. Some clear lessons have emerged in the course of the project.

To Howard Raiffa's original categorization of formal models *of* and *for* negotiation we have added models *in* international negotiations. Models *of* negotiations are heuristic and dynamic encapsulations of the negotiation process, a simplified guide to understanding the behavior of rational negotiators. Models *for* negotiations combine the given preferences of the parties into optimal outcomes but do not capture negotiation processes; in fact, they give advice as to how to agree immediately. Models *in* negotiation stand in between the two previous types: they provide external data relevant to the solution of a concrete negotiation problem, but they do not handle the procedural or structural aspects of the process of negotiations.

Of course, modeling has its own justification, which is not necessarily dependent on its practical value, and there are also lessons that show how the application of models to negotiation has an impact on their own development. But what interested us more was the effect and usefulness of modeling for the analysis and practice of negotiation.

Models *in* negotiations provide a useful input into the process, combining insight with transparency in a self-reinforcing relationship. Models *for* negotiation are most helpful when used for negotiations instead of replacing them, as a reference outcome, and as a stimulus to creative thinking.

Lessons for negotiation *theory* can be sought from formal models *in*, and even more from models *of*, international negotiations; models *for* international negotiations, by their very nature, do not claim to contribute to negotiation theory, although they provide some helpful illustrations of relevant concepts.

A major conceptual lesson for theory from formal modeling *of* negotiation is that the appropriate game-theoretical tool for modeling negotiations is their representation in extensive form, usually performed graphically as an inverted tree describing the strategic possibilities of the players from the beginning to the end of the game. It has been shown that the elements of this representation fit well into the analytical framework of negotiation theory developed by the PIN Program. This tool nicely describes simple negotiations, but also permits the analysis in words of negotiations that are too complicated to be analyzed informally.

Another lesson is the general principle that, if one wants to keep a quantitative analysis tractable, technical intricacies quickly limit the number of assumptions and the complexity of the set of rules, and therefore formal methods and models are by nature incomplete tools for representing real-life issues. Finally, as current game-theoretic and rational choice literature emphasizes, better information is an important aspect of reaching agreement, a point shared by analysts of models for and around negotiations. But as, in particular in strongly competitive situations, decision makers are not inclined to reveal their preferences, formal theory has developed methods for dealing with this problem.

Models *for* negotiation are in fact alternatives to negotiation, but they carry some powerful lessons of their own. As they purport to present optimal outcomes and offer procedures to do so, they can provide outcomes that serve as targets for the negotiation process and against which negotiated outcomes can be judged. In addition, models for negotiation incorporate, and even depend on, concepts already established in the negotiation process, confirming their utility from a more abstract point of view. These include packaging, successive intermediate positions, and the use of the adjusted winner model that can be tailored to produce an outcome with other properties that parties find desirable

In looking for lessons from formal models, the *practitioners'* two eyes focus on two sides of the model, asking whether its findings are insightful and *useful* for their practice, and whether they are clear and *transparent* to the practitioner. The two are interdependent. The first is useless if the second does not obtain, and the reverse is also true. The judgments will differ according to the models' relationship to negotiation. Quite generally, models *in* negotiation can be seen as making important contributions to the diagnosis and formulation of

Source: © European Community 2006

EU negotiations to limit emissions. The IIASA RAINS model is a model used in negotiation. It forms the basis of European environmental negotiations, but interaction between modelers and negotiators was needed to develop the model's full utility.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982, was the result of intense interaction between modelers and negotiators.

Source: UN Photos

negotiators' positions; models *of* negotiations tend to be user-unfriendly by nature and of only indirect relevance, and models *for* negotiations describe optimal outcomes but say little about the process of achieving them.

Models used *in* negotiation do not simply provide information but also carry with them a requirement. Initially seen as a black box, both IIASA's RAINS model for European environmental negotiations and the MIT model for the Law of the Sea negotiations, demanded interaction between modelers and negotiators to bring out their full utility. Not only did the modelers have to instruct the practitioners about their new tool, in order to achieve transparency and overcome suspicions about mysterious mechanisms inside; the modelers also needed to hear practitioners' reactions and corrections in order to perfect their own work. Thus the first criterion, usefulness, was dependent on the second, transparency.

Models *for* negotiation create for themselves a different challenge if they seek to attract practitioners. Their avowed purpose is to bypass negotiations, to create a more effective and efficient process that eliminates politics and persuasion, and instead pulls the rabbit out of the computer, given appropriate inputs. The attractiveness of their solutions—as seen in the current wave of fair division proposals—is that they avoid the messiness of strategic thinking and its cost in time and friendships, by confronting conflicting parties with the implications of their preferences. The workshop discussions raised the case of negotiations in the European Union as a setting where formal models for the *for* type would be helpful, where parameters that are the basis for initial negotiation positions change but options are assumed to be known beforehand. In this dynamic situation formal models could help to quickly analyze new options: as the European Union expects unanimity on most issues, states have to analyze fall-back positions before the start of the negotiations and, given the number of possibilities, formal models could help to organize positions.

Of course, more lessons than just outlined have been learned. Nevertheless one may say that, in sum, models *of* negotiations are inherently more useful to modelers than to negotiators, as they explain the process in their chosen terms of analysis, thereby strengthening that analysis for further understanding of the negotiation process. Models *in* negotiations provide a useful input into the process, combining insight with transparency in a self-reinforcing relationship. Models *for* negotiation are most helpful when used *for* negotiations instead of replacing them, as a reference outcome, and as a stimulus to creative thinking.

Rudolf Avenhaus

Negotiating with Terrorists:

Workshop and Second Call for Papers

Negotiating with Terrorists is the subject of IIASA workshops in 2006 and 2007 for the twenty-first book of the PIN Program. Presentations at the first workshop on 9–10 June 2006 analyzed individual cases, such as Breslan and Kandahar, as well as best practices and conceptual questions. Proposals are invited for the second round on 27 June 2007, which will focus on the mind of the terrorist in negotiation and the relation between moderation and negotiation. The project benefits from generous support from the US Institute of Peace.

The project aims to explain when and how negotiations are and can be conducted with terrorists. The study seeks to discover patterns and regularities in government–terrorist relations in various types of terrorist situations, including the possibilities of creating the preconditions necessary for effective negotiation. The purpose is not to promote negotiations but to find out when they are possible and when not, and how to conduct them when possible.

In some cases (absolute terrorists, including suicide bombers), negotiations are apparently impossible and irrelevant; in others (contingent terrorists, including rebels and hostage takers), negotiation is sought by terrorists but on unacceptable terms. As negotiations take place in many of these cases, this project seeks to explain the process by which such negotiations have been enabled and to see whether, when, and how the process can be effectively expanded.

Papers at the first workshop were presented by Alex Schmid, University of St Andrews (CSTPV); P Sahadevan, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Kristine Hoeglund, Uppsala University; Jayne Docherty, Eastern Mennonite University; Adam Dolnik, Nanyang Technological University; Deborah Goodwin, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; Jacques Richardson, Decision and Communication Consultant ; Tanya Alfredson, The Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Richard Hayes, Jonelle Glosch, Evidence Based Research Inc., VA; Karen Feste, University of Denver; and the members of the PIN Steering Committee.

I. William Zartman

Modeling Climate Change Negotiations

In the winter of 2006, I was accepted to participate in the Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) at IIASA for the following summer. The program offers graduate students the opportunity to spend three months conducting research on a topic of their choosing. Aside from the opportunity to live and work in Austria, YSSP allows students to converse and learn from other scholars, including both the IIASA staff and other YSSPers.

Motivated by my own country's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, I decided to delve further into this field…

While at IIASA, I worked on research using game theory to understand the outcomes of international environmental negotiations. The project began as an assignment for a Climate Policy Analysis course I took at Stanford University in the winter of 2005. I needed a topic for the final class project, so the professor, John Weyant, who is now my advisor, suggested I read a paper on international environmental agreements. The paper, a 2001 book chapter by Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco, developed a framework for modeling the formation of environmental coalitions. Fascinated by the paper, I decided to continue the project after the class ended. For the next several months, I conducted an extensive literature review, reading as many papers describing game theoretic models of international environmental agreements as I could find. Motivated by my own country's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, I decided to delve further into this field, choosing it as my dissertation topic and the subject of my summer research at IIASA.

At IIASA I implemented a game theoretic model of climate change negotiations and modified that model to explicitly consider technical change in its cost of abatement. I wanted to know if accounting for technological progress would encourage more countries to sign an international environmental agreement. What I learned instead was perhaps more valuable.

Prior to my summer at IIASA, my academic life only included technical subjects and technical people. I have a Bachelor's Degrees in Mathematics and Computer Science from the University of Maryland, a Master's Degree in Management Science and Engineering from Stanford University, and am pursuing a PhD in that same department at Stanford. At IIASA, however, I was in the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) group, where I was exposed to political scientists, as opposed to engineers, mathematicians, and economists.

I will never forget my first encounter with a political scientist. Sometime during my first week at IIASA, I described my project to another PIN YSSPer, Jérôme Larosch. Jérôme works as a negotiation trainer at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands. After listening to a few minutes of my project description, he barraged me with questions. He wanted to know why I was developing a model, why I thought I could predict the future, why I thought this would be a benefit to anyone, why, why, why. It was a question I could not answer. I knew the literature on game theory and international environmental negotiations. I knew what other researchers had done, but I did not know why they did it… at least not at the beginning of the summer.

He wanted to know why I thought I could predict the future.

Over the next three months, I had the opportunity to have several more discussions with Jérôme. I also had the good fortune to work with two supervisors from the PIN Steering Committee: Gunnar Sjöstedt and Rudolf Avenhaus. Professor Sjöstedt, a political scientist, pushed me to learn about the negotiation process and to consider the individual players in the game I was analyzing. Professor Avenhaus, a game theorist, helped me work through the technical details of my project and encouraged me to explore the explanation behind my results. Jérôme continued to ask why. Each of the three influenced my summer project and my dissertation. Because of Professor Sjöstedt, I

am now trying to adapt my model to actual world regions, rather than arbitrarily numbered and parameterized players. Because of Professor Avenhaus, I think about what is driving the results of my model and how I could change those results, as opposed to simply accepting them. Because of Jérôme, I know to explain my model as a tool for understanding negotiations, rather than imply it is a crystal ball capable of predicting future negotiations. To each, I am grateful.

Kate Calvin

PIN•*Points*

The Processes of International Negotiation Program

Is Negotiation War by Other Means?

The Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz said that war is "politics (*Politik*) by other means." Can we widen this notion by adding that—by implication—negotiation is war by other means?

Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian general, military strategist in the Napoleonic wars, and Director of the Prussian war college. A portrait by Karl Wilhelm Wach.

In practice, negotiation and the use of force often go together, run parallel, or interchange. Wars may start after diplomatic negotiations have failed. If one military force has been more successful than another or has failed to achieve its goals, there may be a need for diplomacy to break the stalemate. After the defeat of one of the parties, clearly, the victor will follow a dominant negotiation strategy for most of the time, while the other side will have to be accommodating. In such a context one has to question the extent to which such negotiations can really be called negotiations. If a negotiation process is a voluntary exchange between reasonably autonomous parties, how can we use the label "bargaining" for a situation with such an extreme asymmetrical power balance? Perhaps it should be seen as a diktat, as the Germans—or, at least, Adolf Hitler—perceived the Conference of Versailles to be.

Negotiations such as these will not bring about true peace unless additional measures are taken. For instance, the victor should avoid taking overly draconian initiatives and should create conditions that will foster peaceful developments in the foreseeable future. In that sense, the mistakes made after the first world war were not repeated after the second. There must be justice, but this is more easily said than done. The ideal path is "from peace to justice," but "peace versus justice" is more often the reality; for instance, war criminals are not always ready to agree to peace if they know that justice will be done at their expense. Nevertheless, for there to be reconciliation, "some" justice should be done. However, the victims of justice of this type are often those who played a relative minor role in the atrocities, leaving the bosses to find their way to safe havens before it is too late.

Peace and justice are also insufficient unless followed by long-term cooperation. A common project for the future (Arab League, European Union) will take the problems to a new level thereby solving, or at least transforming, them. Negotiations rolling out of an undecided war have a much more balanced character than those where victors and victims sit round the table together. However, the way Talleyrand operated during the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 clearly shows that unpromising circumstances can sometimes be turned to one's advantage by skilled and effective negotiators.

Talleyrand was the chief French negotiator at the Congress of Vienna, and in 1815 signed the Treaty of Paris. It was partly because of his negotiating skills that the terms of the treaty were so lenient toward France.

Negotiation and warfare as Siamese twins?

As well as the negotiations used in pre- and post-war situations, there are processes of conflict management in which negotiation and warfare are used as parallel tools—where they go hand in hand. Of course, there will not always be an equilibrium. During this process, war or negotiation may be dominant, but this will depend on current developments, the changing positions and strengths of the parties, and the shifts in interests and emotions. For emotions can play a decisive role in negotiations. Atrocities can lead to an abrupt end of hostilities and the upgrading of negotiations. It is often supposed that outbreaks of war will put a hold on negotiation processes, but this is a dubious proposition. Parties will always need to communicate, be it over temporary cease-fires like that on the Western Front during World War I, the exchange of prisoners, or attempts to put an end to the fighting when losses suffered on both sides become too serious. Havoc can, indeed, inspire fresh talks. Such negotiations will not be visible but will proceed through back channels—back-channel negotiations can be extremely helpful in restraining the warring parties and devising formulas for the future.

But while negotiations can be pushed forward by the threat of force or use of force, threats can also disrupt them. While there are many examples of "gunboat diplomacy" that have pushed the negotiation process in a positive direction, again one has to ask: to what extent can these talks still be seen as genuine bargaining? And there are just as many examples of fruitful negotiation processes being destroyed by violent acts that frequently aim to destroy peaceful attempts to end the crisis. In a way, the implementation of the Oslo Accords, negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, has been eradicated by the violence of extremists who did not want the moderates to be successful. This destructive behavior could hardly be positive in any way, and a downward spiral in relations has been the outcome. The problem, which we often face within the negotiation process, is that violated trust is even more difficult to handle than lack of trust, for it creates an atmosphere of more severe distrust than before the negotiations started, with initially positive emotions turning negative.

Selling the outcome

In the case of Oslo one of the main problems was the inability of the parties to

sell the outcome to their populations. We witnessed the same development in the South Caucasus where, after successful negotiations between the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorny-Karabagh issue, Minister Sarkassian was shot and killed in the Armenian parliament, while President Ter-Petrossian had to resign in favor of one of the staunchest opponents of the deal: the "President" of Karabagh, who then became President of Armenia, thus ending the process. The Minsk group is still unsuccessful in its attempts to repair the "crisis." But is it a crisis, or is it non-peaceful coexistence? The term smouldering crisis seems to be an appropriate one. The negotiations will continue without any visible progress until the Azerbaijanis can one day use their oil revenues to reopen the war that "ended" over 12 years ago, apart from a few stray incidents. We should add that, though public support is vital for successful negotiation, it is even more important in the case of warfare. A war lacking public support will be shipwrecked sooner than any bargaining process.

To sum up, the interaction between negotiation and warfare as parallel tools in conflict management is an uneasy one. Depending on the circumstances, the mix can be successful or disastrous, and no prescription can be given apart from a tentative one. An approach using negotiations "supported" by the threat of viable—and if possible legitimate—warfare, seems to be a reasonable way of balancing the phenomena of negotiation and warfare.

Source: Red Cross

Kramorth, a village in Nagorny-Karabagh. Deminers from the nongovernmental organization Halo Trust are at work along the old front line, 500 metres from the local school. Entire fields are still off-limits to farmers, and mine accidents have become a regular occurrence since the cease-fire in 1994.

As, under international law, the legitimate use of force (e.g., sanctioned by a mandate of the Security Council of the United Nations) is of utmost importance in avoiding ceaseless reminiscences by the losing party, negotiations will also have to play their part in preparing for "just" warfare. They are not always successful, as we have seen in the run-up to the war in Iraq. It depends on the actors and their interests, of course. The dilemma is, however, that the opponents of the war, by voting against a resolution to use force while blocking a legitimate war option, cannot prevent a war from breaking out. And negotiation and warfare remain more connected if the violence is rooted in legitimacy.

Source: United Nations

Despite the Oslo Accords, violence in the Middle East continues

A third way: Coercive diplomacy?

Between warfare and negotiation we have coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy can be seen as a tool to be used while it is too early to apply warfare, should negotiations fail to work. But how effective is it to threaten the other side, even supposing that the victim will perceive the threats as credible? One could postulate that a threat of warfare can be a useful means of getting the enemy to surrender without a fight. Terror has exactly that effect: threatening the opponent by using limited but very focused force, but without unleashing a full-scale war. However, threatening the other side means the loss of surprise, which could be a major obstacle, as it gives the opponent the opportunity to prepare for war himself. Nevertheless, threats in warfare are a viable tactic. But is this also the case in negotiation? It is absolutely clear from serious negotiation literature that threatening the other party is not seen as an effective tactic. It destroys the relationship and thereby the chances of creating a win/win outcome. In exceptional cases threatening the other side might be the only option

Source: United Nations

The UN Security Council holds an open meeting on the Middle East in July 2006. Vijay K. Nambiar, Head of the UN team dispatched to the Middle East to defuse the current crisis, briefs the Council.

left, but its polarizing effects are not to the liking of negotiation analysts. We might postulate that threatening the other party is usually an ineffective tool in international negotiation, at least if one is striving for an integrative sustainable agreement. Threats can be effective in nonnegotiable situations where diplomacy is still the vehicle but the use of force is not yet an option, apart from limited hit-and-run actions. In warfare, threats are a viable tactic for sure, but even here the probability of a backlash has to be kept in mind. Coercive diplomacy is also an in-between tool as far as timing is concerned. It will not last long. Either it will collapse into warfare or it will open routes back to the negotiation table where trust will have to be re-established.

In balance?

Negotiation and warfare are intimately linked. They share a common goal; they use the same strategies; but their tools are completely different. Words and regimes are the methods of negotiation; violence and technology are the instruments of warfare. Diplomacy is based on software, militarism on hardware. Actors in the two areas thus have to have different characters. Creativity is important for diplomatic negotiators; discipline is vital for military officers. This does not mean that diplomats do not need hardware and discipline or that the military can do without software and creativity. All these skills will have to be applied, but the emphasis will be different. As mentioned earlier, negotiation and warfare are closely connected, run parallel, or intersect constantly. Negotiation is often unsuccessful without the threat of war, and wars cannot be concluded without follow-up negotiations. On the basis of common aims, common strategies, and close connectedness, we conclude that negotiation is indeed warfare by other means, and vice versa.

The question is: at what stage of the conflict do we sit down and negotiate? In practically all circumstances warfare will be followed by negotiation, and therefore bargaining is bullying by other means. And as negotiations will nearly always preclude warfare, in such cases war is wheeling and dealing by other means. And, of course, both will often run parallel. In fact, negotiations will take place during violent conflicts while skirmishes will happen during serious peace talks. It would therefore be more realistic to conclude that negotiation and warfare are politics by other means.

However, politicians will realize, hopefully, that the consequences of using negotiation or war in conflict situations are not at all comparable. Force might help to manage a problem in the short term, but bargaining is the best tool for long-term problem solving. Conflict management can be carried out by force, but negotiation is the most effective tool for conflict resolution. In that sense the utility of negotiation is greater than that of warfare: to really solve an interstate conflict through violence is virtually impossible; to do so through international negotiation is highly probable. However, not all conflicts are ripe for negotiation. Thus, the less useful tool of warfare is often the only alternative. But even then diplomats should try to keep the dialog going, to negotiate as a form of communication in order to keep open the option of real give-and-take. The sooner that enforcement can give way to mutual understanding, the more valuable the final solution will be.

And if the argument against negotiation is that warfare is a more effective tool as it will create more assured outcomes than bargaining, then we might counter by citing Sun Tzu who said in *The Art of War*: "That which depends on me, I can do; that which depends on the enemy cannot be certain. Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so." Add to that his maxim, "An undecided war creates a feeble peace" and the conclusion that negotiation is more useful to politics than force comes to the forefront of one's mind—even if one brushes aside the notion that peace established by outright enforced victory could be established in the short run but will fail to create a sustainable nonviolent situation in the long run.

But there are always exceptions to these value judgements. In some cases war is unavoidable and must be waged. But it should never be waged without giving negotiation processes ample opportunities to perform their duties for the peace of mankind.

Paul Meerts

Note: This article is based on a paper to be delivered at the Third International Conference of the College of Social Sciences of Kuwait University in December 2006.

Methodology of Negotiation Analysis

Explaining the process

The PIN Program has identified its research focus and its methodological preference: it is "the process." In almost every PIN publication, it is stressed that what PIN actually wishes to study is how a process of negotiations develops, what makes it move, and what makes it so specific. Not only does this approach usually not raise any uncertainties in people's minds but, more than that, it is accepted and supported by the PIN audience and networks.

The PIN group is, however, frequently asked how the idea of this "process of negotiation" can be explained in detail and how it can be presented to interested readers. Any methodology can be regarded as complete not only when its main idea ("the process") is identified but also when it can be explained in ways that make the keyword understandable.

Discussing "the process": Paul Meerts and I. William Zartman during the Caspilog I talks in Istanbul.

Here is a proposal as to how this can be done which has already been presented to different audiences and published both in Russian and in English. It will be developed further in the future because it provides a good opportunity to work on the methodology of negotiations analysis.

Three different aspects of the process of negotiation can be singled out:

- Negotiation as a tool in a given conflict resolution strategy;
- Negotiation as a method of decision making that aims to solve a problem via dialog among the actors;
- Negotiation as a channel of communication in which different actors exchange information and codes in order to arrive at a common understanding of the problem that they face and to reach a joint solution.

The positive side of this methodology is that it relies on an existing body of literature and on some well-known methods that, although developed during the last 50 years, used to be treated independently with no attempt being made to bring them into a wider system of perspectives and approaches. The proposal to identify the above three elements of the process and, through them, to suggest a new methodology for negotiation research is based on two pillars: the existing body of literature beginning with T. Schelling, H. Raiffa, A. Rapoport, I.W. Zartman, and others; and an amalgamated systemic effort that helps to bring together numerous individual approaches studied in the ground-breaking publication, *International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches*, Issues (both the 1991 and 2002 editions).

Negotiation as a tool in a given conflict resolution strategy puts negotiation into the perspective of conflict studies and the theoretical perspective of the conflict strategy. All the major writers on the subject (Axelrod, Rapoport, Schelling) recognize negotiation as a tool of conflict strategy, though for some (i.e., Schelling) it is a secondary issue that can be used only when all other means, mainly coercive, have proved fruitless, while for the others (i.e., Axelrod), it is a major tool that can help both in winning the conflict and in leaving the protagonists happy with the result.

Author Victor Kremenyuk at work at IIASA

The PIN group is, however, frequently asked how the idea of this "process of negotiation" can be explained in detail and how it can be presented to interested readers.

Here, the main thrust of the study of negotiations is to bring together conflict resolution and negotiation strategy. Obviously, in this case, negotiation plays a subsidiary role and does not determine the goals and principles of the strategy. Conflict resolution determines what the desired outcome of the negotiation will be, who the actors are, and the possible strategy for an agreement. The conflict resolution strategy is, essentially, the normative beginning for the negotiation strategy, while the strategy itself is built along other lines that form part of the negotiation process.

Many of these issues have already been described and analyzed in the literature. Thus, the research task here is not to invent something new but to build a bridge between the subject of conflict resolution and the subject of negotiation process through a more detailed study of the negotiation strategy: for example, identification of goals and principles, assessment of resources for agreement, identification of the strategic and tactical levels.

The second aspect, *Negotiation as a decision-making procedure* was originally studied in H. Raiffa's *Art and Science of Negotiation* and labeled as "interactive decision making." This needs further explanation, as elements such as the role of power, culture, intermediaries, and other elements in negotiation make the decision-making process either more regular and predictable or, vice versa, more difficult and obstacle-prone.

Formal models and methods may play a significant role when one is dealing with negotiations. The existing models ("zero-sum" versus "non-zero-sum" game) entail the development of a substantial explanation regarding conditions for interaction to accompany the decision-making specifics. To date, relatively few works have concentrated on this subject (with the notable exception of the "Formal Models" project co-edited by I.W. Zartman and R. Avenhaus), but in reality this aspect of negotiation provides excellent perspectives: multilateral negotiations, conference diplomacy, negotiations in conditions of asymmetry, and so forth.

The third aspect, *negotiation as a channel of communication* also opens up an interesting and promising area for research. It incorporates such elements as the language of negotiation, cultural discrimination, coded messages, the psychological aspects of negotiation, and many other issues that concentrate on the connection between the information flows and the conduct of negotiations, the formation of ideas and images, and their role in shaping desirable outcomes.

It is possible to disentangle whatever information is obtained on negotiations into these three important sections, each of which will explain some important essence of the whole process. Splitting the process into parts does not mean that "the process" will be overshadowed by its parts. On the contrary, the idea of splitting the process into these three mutually complementary parts will first allow the different sides of the process (strategy, decision making, communication) to be seen and, second, provide an understanding of how they interact in one process.

Victor Kremenyuk

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Upcoming Roadshow

Lahore, Pakistan

The next PIN Roadshow is being planned for 11–13 February 2007 in collaboration with the Forman Christian College (FC College) in Lahore, a chartered university established in 1864. The audience will include faculty members of the departments of political science/international relations/diplomacy and graduate students, and the PIN group is hoping to be joined by diplomats as well as journalists.

The Roadshow will help to identify chances for rapprochement with Pakistan colleagues and spark some interesting discussions. Among the topics to be presented, are Water Negotiations, Nuclear Negotiations, and Negotiations on the Resolution of Military Confrontations.

Tanja Huber

Lahore, the capital of Punjab, is the second most populous county in Pakistan with 6.5 million inhabitants and one of the 30 largest cities in the world. It is sometimes known as the Garden of the Mughals after the rich heritage of the Mughal Empire. The Badshahi mosque (pictured here) is a Mughal treasure.

Source: Pakistan pics

CaspiLog II

After the success of the Caspian Dialog Session I (CaspiLog I) in Istanbul in May 2006, the PIN group is planning to host a second session (CaspiLog II) this coming spring 2007 in Baku, Azerbaijan. Again, IIASA scientists will be invited to join the group to give substantive presentations on research methods in their fields. PIN will act as facilitators, aiming not to make policy but to make available the tools and venues so as to involve the five Caspian littoral states in mutually beneficial activities. Stay tuned for more information on this exciting endeavor.

Tanja Huber

Source: Government of Azerbaijan

Baku is the capital and largest city of Azerbaijan. Its history dates back to the first millennium BC. Its oil boom dates back to 1973, and by the beginning of the twentieth century almost half the oil reserves in the world had been extracted in Baku.



International Negotiation

A Journal of Theory and Practice

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Negotiation in an Insecure World: 10th Anniversary Issue

Editor
Bertram I. Spector, Center for Negotiation Analysis

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The new PINPoints—from newsletter to color magazine. The decision to redesign PINPoints reflects the growing importance of negotiations on the world stage, as well as the increasing interest among practitioners and academics in this topic. Thanks to all who have made this metamorphosis possible.

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Processes of International Negotiations

Steering Committee Members

Rudolf Avenhaus is Professor of Statistics and Operations Research at the University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich. Prior to his academic appointment in 1980, he was research assistant at the Mathematical and Physical Institutes of the universities of Karlsruhe and Geneva, research scholar at the Nuclear Research Center, Karlsruhe, and lecturer at the University of Mannheim. From 1973 to 1975, and again in 1980, he worked at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg. Professor Avenhaus is author of numerous papers in Physics, Statistics and Game Theory and its applications, in particular, to arms control and disarmament, co-editor of four books on nuclear safeguards, and author of the books *Material Accountability* (Wiley 19977), *Safeguards Systems Analysis* (Plenum 1986) and *Compliance Quantified* (with M. Canty, Cambridge 1996).

Franz Cede has been Austrian Ambassador in Brussels since September 2003. He has participated in numerous international conferences and bilateral negotiations. In 1993, he chaired the Senior Officials Meeting in preparation for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. Ambassador Cede is a frequent lecturer at Austrian and foreign academic institutions. He is a member of the German Society of International Law, the Austrian ILA branch, and the scientific consultative groups of the Austrian Human Rights Institute in Salzburg. He is co-editor of the Austrian Review of International and European Law (AREIL). His fields of interest are the codification process in the UN system, European Law, and human rights issues.

Guy Olivier Faure is Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne University, Paris V, where he teaches "International Negotiation," "Conflict Resolution," and "Strategic Thinking and Action." He is a member of the editorial board of three major international journals dealing with negotiation theory and practice: *International Negotiation* (Washington), *Negotiation Journal* (Harvard, Cambridge); *Group Decision and Negotiation* (New York). His major research interests are business and diplomatic negotiations, especially with China, focusing on strategies and cultural issues. He is also concerned with developing interdisciplinary approaches in domains such as terrorism, and engages in consulting and training activities with enterprises, multinational companies, international organizations, and governments.

Victor Kremenyuk is Deputy Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow and a research associate at IIASA. His areas of interest are international conflict resolution, crisis management, foreign policy, and the negotiation process. He has published more than 100 works in Russian and other languages, and edited both the first and second editions of PIN's book *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues.*

Paul W. Meerts, M.A., studied political science and international relations at the Universities of Amsterdam and Leiden. He has been research fellow in Dutch Political History at the Universities of Leiden and Groningen, as well as coordinator of diplomatic training at the Netherlands Society of International Affairs and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations at Clingendael. He is currently serving as Deputy Director of the Clingendael Institute and is a consultant in diplomatic training. He trains diplomats and civil servants in international negotiation worldwide.

Gunnar Sjöstedt is senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and also associate professor of political science at the University of Stockholm. His research work is concerned with processes of international cooperation and consultations in which negotiations represent an important element. He has studied the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as a communication system and the external role of the European community, as well as the transformation of the international trade regime incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its external relations. He is the editor of *International Environmental Negotiations* and the co-editor of *Negotiating International Regimes*, the second and fourth books, respectively, in the PIN series.

I. William Zartman is Jacob Blaustein Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Organization at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *The Practical Negotiator*, *The 50% Solution*, and *Ripe for Resolution*, editor of *The Negotiation Process* and *Positive Sum*, among other books, and co-editor of *Escalation and Negotiation*, one of the most recent books in the PIN series. He is organizer of the Washington Interest in Negotiations (WIN) Group and has been a distinguished fellow of the US Institute of Peace.

Tanja Huber, born in Vienna, Austria and holds a master's degree in geography from the University of Vienna, specializing in the fields of international development and metropolitan growth in Latin America. She is the in-house communication link between IIASA and the members of the PIN Steering Committee, as well as coordinator of IIASA's Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP). She has authored various articles on PIN's research activities and is currently writing a chapter for the forthcoming book on "Facilitation of the Climate Talks."

Recent PIN Books



Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts, edited by I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, 2005

How can an escalation of conflict lead to negotiation? In this systematic study, Zartman and Faure bring together European and American scholars to examine this important topic and to define the point where the concepts and practices of escalation and negotiation meet. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and war-making and peace-making strategists, among others, examine the various forms escalation can take and relate them to conceptual advances in the analysis of negotiation. They argue that structures, crises, turning points, demands, readiness, and ripeness can often define the conditions under which the two concepts can meet. The authors take this opportunity to offer lessons on theory and practice. By relating negotiation to conflict escalation, two processes that have traditionally been studied separately, this book fills a significant gap in the existing knowledge and is directly relevant to the many ongoing conflicts and conflict patterns in the world today.

Contributors

I. William Zartman, Guy Olivier Faure, Patrick M. Morgan, Rudolf Avenhaus, Juergen Beetz, D. Marc Kilgour, Paul W. Meerts, Sung Hee Kim, Daniel Druckman, Lisa J. Carlson, Dean G. Pruitt, Karin Aggestam.



Peace versus Justice, edited by I. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk, 2005

This book examines the costs and benefits of ending the fighting in a range of conflicts, and probes the reasons why negotiators provide, or fail to provide, resolutions that go beyond just "stopping the shooting." What is the desired and achievable mix between negotiation strategies that look backward to end current hostilities and those that look ahead to prevent their recurrence?

To answer that question, a wide range of case studies is marshaled to explore relevant peacemaking situations, from the end of the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars, to more recent settlements of the late 20th and early 21st centuries—including large scale conflicts like the end of World War II and smaller-scale, sometimes internal conflicts like those in Cyprus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Mozambique. Cases on Bosnia and the Middle East add extra interest

Contributors

Patrick Audebert-Lasrochas, Juan Carlos M. Beltramino, Franz Cede, Daniel Druckman, Christophe Dupont, Janice Gross Stein, Victor Kremenyuk, Robert B. Lloyd, Terrence Lyons, Paul W. Meerts, Vitaly V. Naumkin, James C. O'Brien, Marie-Pierre Richarte, Valérie Rosoux, Beth A. Simmons, I. William Zartman, and Irina D. Zvyagelskaya.

Negotiating European Union, edited by Paul W. Meerts and Franz Cede, 2005

The European Union can be perceived as an enormous bilateral and multilateral process of internal and external negotiation. This book examines negotiations within member states, between member states, within and between the institutions of the Union and between the EU and other countries. It also analyzes processes, actors and interests. This book is, therefore, a unique probe into the relatively unknown arena of negotiation processes in the European Union.

Contributors

Franz Cede, Rinus van Schendelen, Mendeltje van Keulen, Pieter Langenberg, Derek Beach, Dorothee Heisenberg, Ole Elgström, Leendert Jan Bal, Peter van Grinsven, Alain Guggenbühl, Alice Landau, and Paul W. Meerts.