

Network
Perspectives

50 | 2021

PINpoints

PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

A photograph of two silver foil balloons shaped like the numbers '3' and '0', hanging from gold streamers against a white background.

Years of *PINPoints*

In this 50th Issue:

Africa's Sisyphus Stone Gets Heavier
Training Travelogue
Negotiating Jerusalem
On Strategy and Tactics
The German–Namibian Case
Major Powers' Foreign Policies
Frequent Failures at Negotiation
Historical Analogies

Contents

COLOPHON

PINPoints

PINPoints is the biannual publication of the Processes of International Negotiation Program (PIN)

©2021 PIN

PIN is a non-profit group of scholars and practitioners that encourages and organizes research on a broad spectrum of topics related to international negotiation seen as a process. The PIN network includes more than 4,000 scholars and practitioners of international negotiation. The organization is presided over by a Steering Committee, which organizes its many activities and edits the PINPoints.

PIN is a project of German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien.

ISSUE EDITOR

I. William Zartman

LANGUAGE EDITOR

Meenakshi Preisser

DESIGN AND LAYOUT

Henning Alberti, Petra Brandt

COVER PHOTO CREDITS

Unsplash / Marina Lima

CONTACT

German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
20354 Hamburg

www.giga-hamburg.de

3 Editorial: Before and Beyond COVID

I. William Zartman

5 Africa's Sisyphus Stone Gets Heavier

Mark Anstey

15 Training Travelogue, First Decade (1989–1999)

Paul Meerts

23 Negotiating Jerusalem: The Unavoidable Challenge

Cecilia Albin

27 On Strategy and Tactics

Hans van den Berg

31 Self-Centered Reconciliation: The German–Namibian Case

Rudolf Schuessler

35 Major Powers' Foreign Policies through the Prism of Justice

Mikhail Troitskiy

41 Unripe Moments: Frequent Failures at Negotiation

I. William Zartman

48 Historical Analogies and International Negotiation

Valérie Rosoux

53 Book Review

Guy Olivier Faure

56 Book and Journal Previews

59 PIN Agenda

PIN Steering Committee

Cecilia Albin

Mark Anstey

Moty Cristal

Guy Olivier Faure

Fen Osler Hampson

Paul Meerts

Amrita Narlikar

Valérie Rosoux

Rudolf Schuessler

Mikhail Troitskiy

I. William Zartman

I. William Zartman

Editorial: Before and Beyond COVID

It's a proud, splendid double anniversary we are celebrating: This is not only issue 50 of *PINPoints* but also the 30th anniversary of its first appearance in 1991. It all comes out even, a happy coincidence.

In fact, 1991 was a significant year in the life of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program. We had a pre-formation meeting in 1987, out of which came the Mautner-Markhof book, *Processes of International Negotiation* (Westview 1989), and then the Steering Committee had its first meeting in 1988 and published its first collective book, *International Negotiation* (Jossey-Bass 1991). We designated Russian member Victor Kremenyuk as editor as a welcome to the group of analysts and practitioners. That same milestone year, Bertram I. Spector, came on as project director and the first issue of *PINPoints* was published. It is noteworthy that some two dozen experts – the “inner network” – gathered to collaborate on the book and that it all took place within three years of the establishment of the Program. It's a great anniversary to celebrate.

The first 35 issues of *PINPoints* were published at IIASA, the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg outside of Vienna, where we enjoyed the multi-disciplinary atmosphere and especially the chance to join the Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP). PIN then moved in 2011 to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, where it stayed until 2017 and enjoyed contact with the diplomatic scene in The Hague, prior to moving to the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, our current home and *PINPoints* publisher.

Before going on to the other anniversary, it is worth pausing a moment to pay respects to the COVID interlude. For a year, we have operated only online and our regular activities were put on hold, along with the rest of the world. But we should first note, with prayers of thanks, that we lost no members and are all well. Furthermore, while meetings stopped and no workshops or roadshows were held, our activity kept steadily chugging along. Two works born from previous projects, *Justice and Narratives*, are moving toward publication (noted in more detail toward the end of this issue). Arguably most noteworthy, the 2020 project *The Chinese Negotiating Mindset* has kept most of its originally scheduled contributors – half of them from Asia – who have

faithfully awaited the workshop now scheduled for November 2021 (also noted towards the end of this issue). The busy record of this past “hollow year” is a testimony to the commitment and interest of the Steering Committee and its surrounding networks.

PINPoints was launched from the start as the “Network Newsletter.” It has well exceeded both elements of its self-description. The PIN Network has expanded widely, but inadequately: we continue to look for more recipients as “network members.” At one time we listed about 1,400 but most of them were libraries and institutes, whereas it is individual analysts and practitioners we look to as our natural audience.

But we have gone far beyond the calling of a newsletter. We continue to give news of our activities, to be sure, and they are only increasing as we emerge from the 2020–2021 breather, but we also tend to have more and more articles of substance worthy of a regular, international peer-reviewed ... what? Since we moved to Clingendael (No. 37), we have been calling ourselves Network Perspectives, which begs the question: If we are not a newsletter, are we a bulletin, journal, review, record?

PINPoints has carried important analytical presentations on concepts such as culture (No. 4), negotiability (No. 14), escalation (No. 14), nuclear negotiations (No. 15), the toughness dilemma (No. 18), regimes (No. 19), chairing (No. 24), the mutual enticing opportunity (MEO) (No. 24), cooperation (Nos. 26, 30), formal models (No. 27), uncertainty (No. 28), boundaries (No. 31), parties (No. 33), memory (No. 34), on-site inspection (No. 35), multinational negotiations (No. 39), focal points (No. 40), reconciliation (Nos. 41, 44), negotiating with crowds (Nos. 41, 42), narratives (No. 46), justice (No. 47), territory (No. 47), inequality (No. 47), and more. It has done reviews of negotiation studies in China (Nos. 5, 8), Great Britain (No. 6), Russia (No. 15), Taiwan (No. 30), and South Korea (No. 27), and others. It published an important statement about negotiation in Islam (No. 21). For a number of issues, it followed PIN's sole but significant activity in negotiation (Nos. 26–31): the Caspian Dialogue (Caspilog), which took place among the five Caspian states, and in whose framework three meetings were held to discuss issues of common interest other than borders, and which ended in the Almaty Declaration on Caspian Cooperation

that set the stage for the summit meeting of 2010 (we were not invited). In between these reports and articles, *PIN-Points* has regularly commented on issues and events of international negotiation importance. It has also regularly carried a preview and table of contents of the latest and upcoming publications. Most of the articles have been written by the Steering Committee members, with some guest appearances from time to time; the preceding issue (No. 48/49) included contributions from the members of the associated training arm, PIN's Program of International Negotiation Training (POINT). And then, from time to time, *PIN-Points* carries a list of the PIN books, all 32 of them, plus two currently in press (one a year, as we claim).

In a word, *PINPoints* makes for good reading about PIN and international negotiations in general. We hope you enjoy it, as our activities pick up their usual steam, and we hope you can send us additional names of people who might enjoy it too.

Mark Anstey

Africa's Sisyphus Stone Gets Heavier

“Like Sisyphus in Greek mythology, many who invoke advocacy will face a perpetual uphill battle, condemned to repeat forever the thankless task of toiling to push their chosen rock of reform up the African mountain, only to have it roll back once again. Africa will not lightly take its cue from the outside [...]. Whatever the outside world may want [...] it largely creates its own history and will be the main architect of its future.” (Clarke 2012: 207)

Introduction

Africa's nations face a deepening struggle with poverty, weak states, political instability, and violent conflict. No quick fixes are on offer. The continent comprises 54 nations with a combined population of 1.3 billion distributed across an estimated 10,000 clans speaking about 2,000 languages. Its peoples are stretched across a huge developmental divide juxtaposing enclaves of modernity and the traditional, wealth and poverty. In many nations, clan loyalties defy political coherence and a national identity.

The embers of the Arab Spring lie contained but not extinguished in the Islamic countries to the north of the Sahara. Across the Sahel,¹ states struggle with Afro-Islamic tensions with many unable to impose control over criminal militias masquerading as religious movements. Despite

decades of investment in peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives, the Great Lakes Region continues to be riven with tensions and violent instability. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) government struggles to be seen as legitimate and to broadcast control in its eastern regions where rebel groups fueled by ethnic tensions are provided resources by neighboring states Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Uganda and Rwanda under longstanding big-man rulers have tense relations tied up with DRC dynamics. Following the toppling of Omar Bashir, Sudan is in a fragile transition to democracy under a military-civilian government in which it is not yet certain that civilian rule will be achieved or sustainable. A brutal war of secession from Sudan was followed by a tribal war in South Sudan at a cost of half a million lives. There is a precarious peace in place, but the protagonists have to date shown little regard for such arrangements. In the shadow of attacks by the fundamentalist Al-Shabab, Somali negotiators struggle to work out a viable democratic design; elections planned for 2021 have been postponed. Ethiopia has managed a peace with Eritrea but is riven with violent ethnic tensions and domestic instability, and its development project in the form a dam affecting water flows on the Nile has brought it into a dangerous conflict with Egypt and Sudan. Kenya simmers with intertribal tensions. Angola is struggling to bring corruption to an end. The Lozis in Zambia want independence. To the south, Zimbabwe's economic and political crises have not been ended by Emmerson Mnangagwa's removal of

Robert Mugabe from power. South Africa's carefully negotiated democracy under the vision of reconciliation championed by Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been badly eroded in the context of poverty, crime, problems of social delivery, a crisis in energy production, problems in regional water supplies, and a massively corrupt government. The conflicts of the continent are multi-causal, differ across regions, and are resolution-resistant in their own unique ways – but some depressing commonalities are evident.

The Development Imperative

Poverty is everywhere, aggravating problems of control, revenue collection, and delivery of public goods. According to the World Bank (2019), the proportion of the world's population living in extreme poverty declined from 36 percent in 1990 to only 10 percent by 2015. But in sub-Saharan Africa the estimate is about 40 percent (416 million). Of the world's poorest 28 nations, 27 are in Africa (Patel 2018). On average Africans have lifespans nearly 20 years shorter than citizens of developed nations (61 vs. 79.5 years). Average per capita income of USD 3,399 is a fraction of that in developed economies, at USD 40,041. Citizens in South Asia, the next poorest region, have an average lifespan of 69.3 years and an average per capita income of USD 6,473. The average African child spends six years in school, compared to 12 for those in developed economies. Violent conflict is closely correlated with poverty and intolerant regimes in self-reinforcing societal “traps” that seem to interminably suck up resources without resolv-

ing differences for long (Collier 2010; Mills 2011; Sachs 2005; Calderisi 2007; Pinker 2011). Conditions are unlikely to improve in a context of rapid population growth, likely reductions in aid, and a continued use of Africa by the international community and its own leaders simply as a source of commodities. But the periodic excitement about investment into Africa and its economic prospects – and all improvement should be celebrated – needs to be put into perspective.

In 1900 Africa's population of 118 million represented 6.5 percent of the world's population; in 2021 it stands at 1.3 billion (16 percent), and by 2050 it is projected to rise to 2.5 billion (25 percent). Africa will account for over half of the world's population growth in the run up to 2050. Population growth consistently outpaces GDP and productivity growth, nullifying prosperity. Some argue that with 60 percent of the African population under 25 years old it will transform into a center of future consumerism, but this is likely only if it also possesses skills sets that attract investors and generate wealth. Without this, Africa is at risk of remaining a place of interest for extractive purposes, selling its commodities cheaply for beneficiation and wealth creation in other parts of the world. High levels of unemployed youth are a threat to national stability under any form of government. Africa's share of world trade in goods and services fell from 5.5 to 2.5 percent between 1960 and 2016. It is undertrading for various reasons: import duties, transport costs, documentary and border compliance costs (51 percent of exports are un-

processed, only 20 percent being processed, while imports are processed at a rate of 63 percent processed and only 12 percent remain unprocessed (OECD 2019; Gustafson 2018: 1).

Overall Africa is development-needy but not development-ready. Possessing the land does not in itself make it productive; large numbers of youth do not necessarily equate to economic growth. To be sure, the numbers offer opportunity in the form of a potentially expanding consumer market. But a mix of political stability, investor-friendly policies, an educated workforce, and functional infrastructure providing regular electricity, clean water, and efficient transportation and communication systems are the basics of what is required for economic growth. Official statistics need to be read carefully. At present only about 11 percent of Africa's workforce in formal employment is in the manufacturing sector, 57 percent are in agriculture, and 32 percent are in services. UNDP (2018) figures indicate that Africa's labor force participation rate at 69.5 percent is higher than in any other area of the world! But Africa struggles to feed itself; most services employment is in government rather than the private sector; and 61.6 percent of those who work earn under USD 3.10 per day (according to PPP). It is a continent of the working poor. In 2010 Clarke observed that

“at current levels Africa's middle class might approximate to the working-class poor of Europe a century ago.” (Clarke 2012: 235)

Inadequate schooling does not create a foundation of “readiness” off of which to offer investors a competent workforce.

For all its commodity-based wealth, sub-Saharan Africa remains dependent on foreign aid. Africa with 12 percent of the world's population receives about 20 percent of all international aid. The OECD (2019) estimates sub-Saharan Africa to have received over USD 1.4 trillion since 1956. Critics argue all the aid directed into Africa since 1960 has had little impact, and some such as Moyo (2009) go further, arguing it should be ended as it fuels the fires of corruption and dependency. There can be little doubting the humanitarian consequences of such an action, however, which would be borne not only by those who corrupt it but also by those already suffering poverty and economic marginalization (Mason 2021; Mills 2011; Calderisi 2007). Cogent arguments inform us that not all boats float at the same level in developing economies, one reason we see early and inevitable inequalities in wealth. But as long as nations remain commodity-based and fail to develop beneficiation processes or commercial capacity beyond the export of minerals, their capacity to develop is limited. Problems are compounded when the few who control the political environment lay claim to its mineral wealth and use the public sector as a vehicle for extending controls and favors for power retention purposes, skewing delivery of public goods. Competitiveness in the global economy requires advanced skills on many fronts. Across Africa, 20 percent of primary school

age children are not in school, rising to 60 percent of 15- to 17-year-olds (UNESCO 2021). Only 4 percent will enter higher education. While small pockets of the population are involved in world-class production systems, cybersecurity, and the technologies of the “first world,” very large numbers are stranded in poverty, dealing with conflicts over water and grazing, or surging into cities with all the problems associated with slums and service provision. Development requires re-investment in new ventures and infrastructure. Where do Africa’s wealthy elite put their monies? It is estimated that up to 40 percent of Africa’s wealth lies offshore, and sizeable proportions of development and humanitarian aid are included in this. Compounding the problem of capital flight is the problem of a brain drain. The African Union estimates up to 70,000 skilled professionals leave the continent each year for reasons ranging from escaping wars and instability to seeking better schooling, health services, opportunities to use professional skills, and economic opportunities.

Political Options and Choices: Democracy Dilemmas

How then, under hostile conditions of poverty, can a strong, stable state that is responsive to the needs of all its citizens be created? Western nations prefer development packages embodying human rights values and democratic principles; the likes of China, Russia, or the rich oil states offer a “development first” approach unencumbered by pressures surrounding elections. A nation’s political winners have choices.

The State of Play

The Economist (2020: 31) recently celebrated a surge in the number of African nations holding competitive elections, with 42 installing multiparty legislatures after 1990. All progress that brings government closer to the “by the people, for the people” goal should be celebrated, but not naively. Since decolonization, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced over 200 coup attempts, about 110 of them successful – and they are not a thing of the past, with recent coups attempted in Ethiopia and the Central African Republic, and others successfully conducted in Mali (two), Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Egypt. In the absence of institutionalized free and fair electoral systems, the problem with coups is not the removal of despotic leaders, but their failure to lead to citizen-responsive governments. An Afrobarometer (2021) survey recently indicated that 67 percent of Africans across 34 countries want democracy, but the survey also reflects growing mistrust of elections as a vehicle for holding leaders accountable, in a context of growing corruption, declining service delivery, and lived poverty. The survey suggests a general tolerance amongst Africans along lines of ethnicity and religion, though not on matters of sexuality. But surveys have their limits. It can be safely assumed that all people want freedom from hunger and repression; access to water and energy and quality education and health services; and accountable, competent non-corrupt government. Under yokes of common deprivation and repression, unity of purpose for freedom is

relatively easy to achieve among disparate groups. The test comes when the shackles are thrown off and there is not enough to go around; choices will then have to be made about the distribution of resources and opportunities, and about which ideologies should guide methods of development, how systems of governance should be designed, what principles of law should



© Pixabay / OpenClipart-Vectors

find expression across religious and cultural groups, how wealth should be created and distributed, and what checks to put on democratically elected governments and by what means. In short, it is easier to hope for the freedoms of democracy than to design or implement it in a manner perceived as fair and just by those living in it.

The last decade has witnessed a rollback in democratic freedoms and policies internationally, and many of Africa’s fledgling democracies are not stable. These countries risk death not simply by revolution or coup, but by slow strangulation and disease. Many people are under attack from those elected to protect them (Abramowitz 2019: 1; Diamond and Plattner 2015). Liberal democracy is put at risk under

many conditions: the seizure of power by “big men” and minority elites; intolerance, repression, and corruption of those elected by majority; attacks by minorities using the space offered them by a tolerant society; and internal fragmentation fostering a loss of political coherence and direction. In short, democracy can be easily rendered fragile. Its real strength is defined not only by elections but by a culture of mutual tolerance and accommodation amongst a nation’s citizens. In Africa, democracy must take root under particularly hostile conditions. If the desire for democracy is based on perceptions that it creates opportunity, jobs and wealth for everyone, and clean, competent government, disillusionment with and discreditation of the system may be the result. Surveys by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa reveal the extent to which disappointment with employment opportunities since 1994 and perceptions of ongoing economic marginalization, state corruption and incompetence, and ongoing structural obstacles threaten social cohesion (Patel 2021).

There Is Much to Sort Out If Meaningful Negotiation-Based Systems Are to Take Root

This short review of Africa’s development challenges does not really do justice to their complexity – there is much to sort out. Whether it stands still or achieves massive development, Africa faces a future of conflict. Much depends on how this is managed. Violent conflict severely constrains development (Collier 2010). Development is inherently conflict-generative, and it is

critical that negotiation become the lubricant for progress. Africa’s negotiation processes are conducted in a context of instability with high potential for violent breakdown. Complexity exists in terms of actors, institutional weaknesses, issues, context, commitment, and capacity. Complex mixes of actors engage through fragile institutions over issues whose resolution requires resources that none have, making for scenarios of on-demand anti-state mobilization but impossible short-term delivery for any group that gains control of the state.

Actors in any conflict scenario might include weak states with dysfunctional legislatures and judicial systems; security forces more focused on serving a particular elite or big man in power than a wider citizenry; citizens whose primary identity-based loyalties lie with groups across borders rather than the states in which they reside; powerful non-state actors and militias; criminal groups claiming religious identity; and pockets of business leaders and trade unions. The international community often adds complexity: neighboring states with predatory interests, powerful nations with economic interests and competing ideologies, non-profit organizations operating perhaps with good intent but in competition with one another. Complex mixes of intergroup and interstate relations are often in evidence.

Commitment and capacity questions are critical dimensions of any negotiation process. What motivates the choices and positions of parties? Persuading parties to negotiate can be difficult; persuading them not just to

lay down arms but to relinquish them and to demobilize their forces even more so. It often requires that they begin to trust their old enemies more than they trust the extremists in their own camps. It requires them to see greater benefits in peaceful relations than in sustaining a conflict, in terms of identity retention, security needs, access and influence within powerbroking and decision-making systems, recognition and status, and improved material well-being. If negotiation is to become the alternative of choice for resolving differences it must be seen as feasible, and it must be perceived to hold better prospects of meeting core needs than sustained confrontation. Feasibility is based on the history of relations, contextual potentials, relevant comparative experiences, and perceptions of one another’s competencies and intentions. Democratic structures may be seen by minority groups to diminish their security, independence, and hopes for autonomy, and to put them at the mercy of a majority group whose intention is simply to bring them to heel while marginalizing them in terms of political and economic opportunities.

Clarity of expectations, options, and possible consequences are required for effective negotiation. Why would democracy be attractive to so many Africans? Failure to deliver on expectations spells disillusion, and if democracy is to prevail it is important that it is felt to succeed. Do African hopes reside simply in an end to repression, or is there a perception that democracy will somehow create levels of material well-being associated with such systems in the West? Is the language

of democracy simply used as a mobilization strategy “against” a regime of repression, or are people fighting “for” a particular system of values? What do people expect it to deliver – what capacity will a democratic government have to deliver on those expectations? It is not sufficient to ask Africans in general terms whether they want democracy, better services, and access to justice. Democracies take many forms. Design specificity lies in the details of expectations, hopes, and fears of the various groups involved within particular intergroup milieus. Some may perceive an opportunity to exercise the advantage of their majority in numbers and be resistant to any constitutional checks that curb capacity to bring rebellious minorities to heel. Minorities may accept a democracy only along terms that secure degrees of autonomy and material well-being beyond those a state is willing or able to offer. So, exactly who wants what form of democracy, and under what conditions?

The liberal democracy preferred by the West is defined not simply by majority rule but by robust protections for individual and minority freedoms and checks on abuses by those in power; tight protocols on campaigning, use of funds, and behavior in office; constitutional courts and other watchdog bodies; and regular elections and term limits to ensure accountability. These limits are uncomfortable for the long list of African leaders who have refused to leave office, sometimes over decades. I deal with this later in the paper.

At the same time, there is cogency in the argument that democracy based on universal suffrage and term limits not only is not a priority for Africans, but actually generates instability. As no short-term solutions exist to respond to the poverty, unemployment and suffering of many African people, long-term planning and implementation are required. Term limits and regular elections intended to keep politicians accountable do not allow time for long-term delivery. Instead, they promote political competition and instability. As no government is likely to be able to deliver all the wants and needs of a people in the short-term, countries are at risk of regular changes without long-term direction – a constant crisis of conflicting policies and plans and failure and political instability (Twineyo-Kamugisha 2012). But in the absence of elections, what mechanisms might ensure accountability?

Western advocates sometimes need reminding of the recency of universal suffrage and human rights values in their own systems, the reality that their own democracies evolved through a long and often very violent history, and only really flourished in contexts of wealth. They were rooted in the first instance in power-pacting (e.g. the Magna Carta) rather than any ideas of the common vote or protection of human rights. Constitutionalism and a rule of law long preceded modern democracy in Europe (Zakaria 2004). Wealth accrued from slavery, before it was banned in 1830 and for some time thereafter, and then through exploitative labor practices both domestically and in the colonies. In the Congo, King

Leopold II of Belgium amassed a fortune through ivory and then rubber through a ruthless system of forced labor and terror estimated to have cost 10 million lives (Hochschild 2006: 233; Anstey 2006: 40). Between 1904 and 1908, German colonial troops committed a genocide on the Herero and Nama people in what is now Namibia (see Schuessler in this *PINPoints*). The British extracted mineral and agricultural wealth through a mix of measures that included military domination, political exclusion, co-optation of chiefs, land dispossession, and forced removals. In South Africa, the British had ended the Dutch practice of slavery (most of the enslaved being imported) but needed a cheap, regular, and compliant labor force for their diamond and gold mines and sugar plantations. Indian and Chinese workers were imported to supplement local labor. Slavery had been banned, but a raft of measures to control labor supply and costs were introduced, including labor taxes, centralized recruitment and wage-control systems, compounds, pass laws, and race-based employment laws. Labor militance was met with blunt repression (Finnemore and Koekemoer 2018; Lapping 1987). These measures laid the platform for Apartheid. Profits were either simply accumulated offshore or, in the Rhodesian and South African cases, partly reinvested in the development of infrastructure and a manufacturing sector under a continuation of systems of racially based repression. Wealth accrued in Europe from such practices fueled leaps in science and technology, accelerating a rapidly widening divide in wealth between Eu-

Europeans and those in the developing world. So, it is not surprising that independence should carry high hopes of freedom and material well-being. The West pushed democracy as the means to these ends.

Experience reveals democracy is not an automatic route to development, economic opportunity, wealth, or political stability. It does not simply end corrupt government or concealed systems of elite or big-man predation. As Bill Zartman (2015) points out, it simply offers the opportunity for a people to change their government by ballot. And votes are determined not simply by economic rationality. The democratic surge in the 1990s delivered a clutch of illiberal democracies in which big-man leaders found ways to rig systems to remain in power while securing a continuation of foreign aid (van de Walle 2001). Some of this has been through the tricks of election-rigging, but regular elections are also insufficient to prevent serious abuses of power. Sixty years ago, the Algerian revolutionary Frantz Fanon (1963) argued that African dignity required a purge of the colonizer but warned the way would be opened for predatory indigenous elites to move into power, singing liberation songs while looting the national coffers. More recently, Moeletsi Mbeki has observed,

“Independence did not bring about economic transformation in Africa as it did in Asia; if anything it entrenched the economic inequalities inherited from colonialism.”

The new black elites merely replaced the former white colonial elites, but the exploitation of the black masses continued as before, as did the exploitation of Africa’s resources [...] drawn from the continent and exported to the rest of the world.”
(Mbeki 2009: 7)

The complexities of how indigenous elites come to block democracy and economic development are reflected in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) insights into why nations fail, Mbeki’s (2009) analysis of poverty in Africa, and Southall’s (2013) analysis of how national liberation movements who mobilized under banners of democracy came to undermine it once in power in Zimbabwe and Namibia, as well as in South Africa. The checks and balances reflected in South Africa’s liberal democratic constitution, along with five free and fair elections since 1994, have not prevented the rise of a “party-state” in which a small elite under a commandist logic have fundamentally corrupted the role of parliament and the independence of the civil service in a large-scale system of patronage and crony capitalism with ruinous economic consequences. Accountability shifted from voters upwards to senior members of the party. South Africa’s judicial system currently faces a critical test in investigating state corruption, some of which has resulted in criminal proceedings against a former president, Jacob Zuma. This may bol-

ster trust in South Africa’s commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law, but for a long time the system failed, allowing corruption to become embedded in a context of failing service provision.

In their hasty withdrawal in the 1960s, the departing Europeans left behind an array of problems. The system of borders across the continent they negotiated amongst themselves in their own interests in 1885 often fit poorly with clan realities and traditional political and social systems. Clans are often straddling borders or collected uncomfortably within borders they would not have chosen themselves, making difficult the design of functional states and efforts to build a larger sense of national identity and unity. The decolonization and Black Lives Matter movements are important everywhere in the pushback against the repression, abuse, and discrimination against black people owing to their color. Across Africa, progress has been achieved as regards systems of direct racial repression, but people continue to endure repression, discrimination, marginalization, and violence for reasons other than racial identity – ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and political beliefs being some of these. Some suffer simply because they are not members of the political elite that assumed power once liberation from colonialism or white-minority rule was achieved.

Europeans neither negotiated nor rendered workable democracies in conditions which currently prevail in Africa. Their direct presence was profoundly disruptive of traditional sys-

tems and ways of life; their withdrawal did not end systems of extraction, exploitation, or poverty, and it contributed to the array of problems of state design and nation-building currently faced. In assuming sovereignty, Africans also assumed responsibility for resolving or at least managing these problems. They are rightly resentful and suspicious of those they see as having contributed so heavily to their creation. Europeans and those of European origin in Africa in a new age of human rights seem sometimes not to understand how their history has undermined their moral voice. At the same time, Africans are not sufficiently resourced in terms of capital, technology, or skill levels to deal with all their problems alone. Deng (1997: 6) states,

“Insofar as the modern African state is the creation of European conquest, restructuring the continent, linking it to the international system, and reconceptualizing and reconstituting the state will require the cooperation of Africa’s global partners.”

Unfortunately, the international community is itself divided over issues of intervention, aid, and forms of governance.

Democracy may be a relatively recent form of government, but Europe and North America have the most experience with it. Economic conditions, ethnic division, and political opportunism in Africa make democracy a difficult goal to achieve. Democracy resides most comfortably in contexts

of mutual tolerance and wealth. The primary questions are how to create conditions conducive to political stability, and how to build the trust and capacity of groups to work towards that objective. As Deng (1997) points out, the diversity of conditions across Africa means there can be no one-size-fits-all approach: relatively homogeneous societies such as Botswana enable the creation of national frameworks with which most people in a nation can identify; pluralist societies in which there is a high degree of intercultural tolerance and a sense of national identity enable functional federal arrangements; more seriously divided nations may need to rely on either power-sharing in a decentralized system based on a cooperative endeavor between geographically defined identity groups under a national umbrella (in an extreme form, confederalism in an attempt to reconcile unity with separation), or an acceptance of partition (as in Sudan). African leaders are faced with problems of creative design for nation-building purposes. Western institutions are faced with the challenges of assisting them in a manner sensitive to history and perhaps with a wider lens than that offered by strict tenets of liberal democracy. The philosopher John Rawls, usually associated with A Theory of Social Justice, shortly before his death mooted thinking to the effect that advocates of liberal democracy were at risk of putting new boundaries of intolerance around notions of “decent people.” In The Law of Peoples, in which he advocated moving beyond the exclusivism of liberal systems, suggested that not

all nations within a “society of decent peoples” might separate church and state or conduct elections based on universal suffrage but would be defined by their non-aggression against other peoples; their respect for human rights in terms of life, liberty, and property; and their structures of consultation within a commonly shared framework of justice (a constitution) under a commonly accepted system of authority that did not need to use force for compliance. Participation in political decision-making might take place through representative groups operating within their own hierarchies rather than through individuals.

One can see problems of accountability in such systems, but the important point is that it encourages wider thinking about system design and assistance. Democracy cannot be imposed (although some post-war experiences suggest otherwise). It must be discovered and developed by people within a nation under their own unique conditions. And this is an uncomfortable process accomplished perhaps in small steps rather than great leaps, and, as we learnt in South Africa, a mix of courageous leadership and sensitive but principled external support.

Agendas find their roots in expectations and wants and are inherently complex. Developmental divides see national leaders juggling with farmer-herder conflicts aggravated by population pressures, expanding desertification, and state incapacity, along with problems of urbanization and the tensions of managing modern businesses in a global economy; problems of political design and outbreaks of inter-

group violence may also occur. Agendas must take into account ceasefire arrangements; disarmament and demobilization; issues of accountability and reconciliation; the creation of integrated security forces; the design of functional political systems for nations in which clan identities undermine projects to build and sustain a national identity; the design of electoral systems; agreement on economic policies directed at rapid growth and poverty alleviation; steps to eliminate corruption; and wealth distribution policies.

Two important realities exist for any government taking on responsibilities for development in Africa. First, all development requires energy. The general upliftment of the world's expanding population will require a huge increase in use of energy (Anstey 2019: 77 and 117; Avila, Carvallo, and Kammen 2017: 15). The climate crisis requires that Africa's development not be founded on the carbon fuels that enabled development elsewhere – some of which certain African states have in abundance. As the climate crisis plays out in terms of droughts, desertification, extreme weather, and disease it may well give rise to mass migrations, rising levels of intergroup confrontation, and an increasing temptation to exploit carbon fuel reserves. South Africa has already broken “green” ranks, choosing to respond to its energy crisis through measures based in carbon fuels. And climate measures carry important implications for peoples who count their wealth through family size and livestock ownership such among some in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Second, development is always disruptive of economic

and social and political systems – it is inherently conflict-generative. Things do not remain the same. Every dam built, every mine opened, every electri-

These tensions require effective systems of conflict prevention, regulation, and resolution often beyond the scope or experience of traditional dispute



© Pixabay / Gerd Altmann

fication project, every agricultural development scheme, every vaccination campaign, every new commercial venture, every new manufacturing facility sees new social stakeholders, new opportunities for wealth, new regulatory requirements, and new tensions generated over ownership, participation, and distribution of wealth.

Bigger Vision, Better Conflict-Management Mechanisms

Africa's Sisyphus stone of development and stable government is quickly becoming heavier in the context of population pressures, the climate change crisis, possible decreases in foreign funding, and a lack of “readiness” for the size of transformation required. The answer is also the problem – development is itself conflict-generative.

resolution mechanisms. These may remain functional in some cases, but new systems including innovative hybrids are required for societies in transformation. In one country, I witnessed a vice chancellor of a university (also a qualified attorney who had been active in the national judiciary constructed along colonial lines) submit himself to a council of headmen over damages his cattle had inflicted on a neighbor's property. He was operating across traditional and modern paradigms of conflict resolution. Effective conflict regulation and resolution resides first in the negotiation of rules and procedures, then in how these are applied to substantive differences. Societies in transition are often clearer about who they do not want to be than who they want to be, and about which rules

should apply in which circumstances. There is urgency in stabilizing lawmaking bodies – designing the rules that govern the rule-makers is primary and must find resonance with people on the ground.

Africa's history did not begin with the arrival of Europeans – long before then, the continent had seen the rise and fall of empires, violent ethnic clashes, active participation in local and international slavery, and large-scale migrations of people. Each nation has its own complex mix of clan relations; religious tensions; precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial histories; economic realities; and development needs and priorities. Each is part of a network of international relations and subject to the vicissitudes of the global economy, superpower relations, the climate crisis, and global pandemics. Looking for blame is not the same as looking for solutions and will not necessarily produce remedies – nor will simplistic advocacy of preferred ideological models. Liberal democracy is a product of Western culture – the outcome of a particular developmental trajectory. Africans rightly want systems that have cultural resonance, but there is new urgency in this search, and inevitably it must occur in interaction with external powers. Conflict is unavoidable – the design and implementation of functional conflict management systems is critical if time and resources needed to come to grips with development problems are not be wasted.



REFERENCES

- Abramowitz, Michael (2019), *Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Retreat*, Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat> (14 June 2021).
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (2013), *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*, London: Profile Books.
- Afrobarometer (2021), *Pan-Africa Profiles*, <https://afrobarometer.org/pan-africa-profiles> (6 June 2021).
- Anstey, David (2019), *Towards Sustainable Energy Conversion: An Overview*, Self-published.
- Anstey, Mark (2006), *Can a Fledgling Democracy take Flight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?*, in: *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 6, 2, 35–68.
- Avila, N., Juan Pablo Carvallo, and Daniel M. Kammen (2017), *The Energy Challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Guide for Advocates and Policy-Makers*, Boston: Oxfam.
- Calderisi, Robert (2007), *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Clarke, Duncan (2012), *Africa's Future: Darkness to Destiny*, London: Profile Books.
- Collier, Paul (2010), *Wars, Guns & Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, London: Vintage Books.
- Deng, Francis M. (1997), *Ethnicity: An African Predicament*, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/ethnicity-an-african-predicament/> (10 July 2021).
- Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner (eds) (2015), *Democracy in Decline?*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 106.
- Fanon, Frantz (1963), *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press.
- Finnemore, Martheanne, and Gary Koekemoer (2018), *Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa*, Johannesburg: LexisNexis.
- Gustafson, Sara (2018), *How Well is Africa Integrated into World Trade?*, 5 July, <https://www.agrilinks.org/post/how-well-africa-integrated-world-trade> (13 May 2020).
- Hochschild, Adam (2006), *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, London, Pan Books.
- Lapping, Brian (1987), *Apartheid: A History*, London: Paladin.
- Mason, Rowena (2021), *Outrage Aimed at No10 as MPs Back £4bn Cut to Foreign Aid Budget*, in: *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jul/13/tory-rebels-unsure-if-they-have-numbers-to-block-foreign-aid-cut> (13 July 2021).
- Mbeki, Moeletsi (2009), *Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing*, Johannesburg: Picador.
- Mills, Greg (2011), *Why Africa is Poor and What Africans Can Do About it*, Johannesburg: Penguin Books.
- Moyo, Dambisa (2009), *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, New York: Farr, Straus and Giroux.
- OECD (2019), *Africas Development Dynamics 2019*, <http://www.oecd.org/dev/africa/Africa-Development-Dynamics-Competitive-firms-committed-governments-catalysts-continent-economic-transformation.htm> (14 January 2020).
- Patel, Nirav (2018), *Figure of the Week: Understanding Poverty in Africa*, 21 November, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/11/21/figure-of-the-week-understanding-poverty-in-africa/> (13 January 2020).

Pinker, Steven (2011), *The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes*, London: Allen Lane.

Rawls, John (1999), *The Law of Peoples*, London: Harvard University Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey (2005), *The End of Poverty*, London: Penguin.

Southall, Roger (2013), *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*, Scotsville: University of Kwazulu Press.

The Economist (2020), *Democracy in Africa: Generation Game*, 7 March, 31–33.

Twineyo-Kamugisha, Elly (2012), *Why Africa Fails: The Case for Growth Before Democracy*, Cape Town: Tafelberg.

UNDP (2018), *Human Development Indices and Indicators*, New York: UNDP.

UNESCO (2021), *Education in Africa*, <http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/education-africa> (2 June 2021).

van de Walle, Nicoas (2001), *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

World Bank (2019), *Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Africa: In Five Charts*, 9 October, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-africa-in-five-charts> (12 June 2021).

Zakaria, Fareed (2004), *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, New York: Norton.

Zartman, I. William (2015), *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York: Polity.

ENDNOTE

¹ Including Nigeria, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Uganda, and Kenya.

Paul Meerts

Training Travelogue, First Decade (1989–1999)

This travel writing reflects the first third of a personal account of 30 years of training: an educator's memoir that is intended to be a historical overview, complete with some humor and some lessons learned. The main lesson: Prepare for the unknown and manage expectations, as perceptions determine reality. This article also reflects a personal approach to international negotiation processes: using lectures and exercises as an instrument to enhance the understanding of students, civil servants, military officers, and politicians in international political relations, empathically but while focusing on the mechanics and context of the international negotiation processes.

Introduction

My first training abroad in international negotiation, in 1989, was a disaster from the start. It had been preceded by twelve years of developing and implementing simulation exercises and negotiation skills training. Simulation exercises were not new to me: I created my first one when I was twelve and used others with friends for the next half-century. These simulations were made for fun, a kind of computer game without computers: they included maps, constitutions, "journals," conferences, etc. (they can still be found in the Dutch Society for Geofiction). My educational exercises started when young Dutch diplomats complained about the negotiations that they had to perform in simulation exercises that concluded their three months of training in diplomacy. They said, "You gave us a lot on the content of our exercise, but nothing on the techniques and processes."



The author at the Diplomatic Academy of the Sultanate of Oman.
© Paul Meerts

The institute where I began working in 1978 had used educational simulations since 1967. They were conceived by Isaac Lipschits – later a professor at Groningen University and, by chance, my boss in 1974, who wrote a book on simulations in international politics (Lipschits 1971), the first of its kind in the Netherlands. However, at the time, I had no knowledge about negotiation itself. It greatly helped that I met many experts during the first conference on international negotiation processes of the PIN programme in Laxenburg (Austria) in 1989 and that PIN invited me to join its Steering Committee in 1999.

When my institute merged with three other organizations into the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in 1983, the development of new exercises became one of the institute's priorities. I am grateful to many of my collaborators, including Roel Gans, Theo Postma, and Wilbur Perlot, who helped me to design and implement these role plays and turn them into tools for teaching and training international negotiation techniques (Meerts 2009). I am also very appreciative of trainers from abroad, such as Pierre Casse, Raymond Saner, and John Hemery, along with many

other colleagues who helped me accomplish my 30 years of training. It is an enormous advantage when trainers with different training methodologies work closely together.

Rome, 1989

The NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome invited my deputy and me to run a simulation game at their premises in Rome. I would use what was my best exercise at the time: one simulating a meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) on a crisis in Yugoslavia. I wrote this game after doing some research in Belgrade in 1980, discovering that Yugoslavia was a much feebler



© Pixabay / Evgeny Ignatik

federation than I had perceived. If it were to fall apart, how would this process unfold? Experts said that my scenario was complete nonsense. However, as time passed, it became reality. I did not need to change my game; it became more realistic by the year. The CSCE meeting negotiated the issues of security, economic affairs, and humanitarian affairs within and

among three blocs: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the neutral and Non-Aligned Countries (Meerts 1991).

As no direct flight was available to Rome from the Netherlands, my deputy and I flew Alitalia connecting in Milan. When we boarded, my deputy asked me if I was fearful of flying. I said no, but wondered how he, a colonel in the Dutch Air Force, could be afraid of flying. He explained that, as a psychologist and not a pilot, he had never taken to the skies as he did not trust airplanes. NDC paid for business-class seats, and perhaps it was his fear of flying that encouraged him to take advantage of the all-inclusive bar. In any case, the fact of the matter is that he was completely drunk when we landed in Milan. I managed to get him onto the plane to Rome and, after landing, pushed him into the NDC car with a military driver to take us to our hotel. I could not wake him the next morning, so I told the hotel reception to wake him at 2 p.m. and to deliver him to the NDC building for his speech on crisis management.

When I arrived at NDC, I learned that there had not been enough participants for all the roles, so the NDC staff had removed two member states of the CSCE: Norway and Cyprus. We started the simulation exercise, but after fifteen minutes an adjutant of the NDC commandant arrived, saying, “Stop the exercise!” It appeared that the Greek colonel in the group of participants had called his Permanent Representative at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, demanding that Cyprus be put back into the simulation game. Right, no problem: I took the Netherlands out and asked that officer to take

the role of Cyprus. We continued our negotiations on the crisis in Yugoslavia, but for no longer than fifteen minutes, as the aide-de-camp stormed in again, demanding, “Stop the exercise!” The Turkish colonel in the audience had managed to call his Permanent Representative, who had called the commandant in Rome, telling him



© Pixabay / Gerd Altmann

that Cyprus had to be taken out of the game. This was the end of my first simulation exercise performed abroad. Destroyed by reality.

For ten years, NDC did not ask me to come back. Organisations such as NDC and diplomatic academies have a rolling staff; every few years new staff members arrive as the old ones leave, so our contacts had to be made anew. The advantage is that the new people are not aware of the problems and mistakes of the past, meaning that I taught again at NDC from 2001 until 2019, twice a year, without any problems. Lesson learned: Every disadvantage has an advantage (op.cit. Johan Crujff, soccer star).

Bucharest, 1990

Clingendael's director Joris Voorhoeve was invited by the Dutch embassy in Bucharest to take some staff with him to teach at Bucharest University, soon after the December 1989 revolution. For breakfast we had leftovers from the evening before, and we were teaching

in classrooms without heating, taking breaks – after hours of crowding together with the students – in the secretary's room, where it was warm. After all my colleagues had left, I was invited to dinner by the Dutch ambassador, Koen Stork. He was quite a character: a left-winger who acted as an informal journalist during the revolution and supported dissidents. In short, the Romanians loved him. After dinner, a few loaves of bread prepared by the ambassador himself, he took me to a meeting at which presidential candidates presented themselves. As we entered the hall, the people rose and applauded him.

A decade after the December 1989 revolution in Romania, I participated

in an EU project together with consultants from the Dutch Governmental Training Institute (ROI). Our role was to help Romania prepare for EU membership. The idea was to have an EU coordination unit at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but halfway through the project, the Romanians thought it would be better to have a separate Ministry of European Integration. The president of Romania invited our team to tell him what we had to offer him, as he wanted his staff to understand the EU as well. My colleagues worked through the night in order to present President Iliescu with an attractive project; however, I went to sleep. The next day we were received by Iliescu and his staff. "Who is from Clingendael Institute?" he asked. It was me, so he invited me to sit next to him and to explain what we could do for him. I improvised and he was satisfied, stood up and said that he had to go back to the office. My poor colleagues from the ROI had prepared a two-hour presentation with overhead projections! Lesson: Be prepared, but get a good night's sleep.

Another decade later, my colleague Wilbur Perlot and I were teaching in Bucharest again, for the European Diplomatic Programme. My wife, Judith, called me to say a volcano in Iceland was erupting and there would be no flights back to Amsterdam. I did not believe her at first, but we decided to be risk averse and booked the last *courette* on the Balkans Express to Vienna. The conductor passed by and gave us a metal clothes hanger, telling us to put it in the *courette* lock when we were going to sleep to prevent a gang from entering after the Hungarian

border to rob us. I woke at three in the morning to an enormous noise in the corridor, with men shouting and fighting. What had happened? In the next car, they had not been given clothes hangers to lock their cabins, so when the gang tried to steal from the passengers there, one of them woke up. He was a member of the Romanian national soccer team, who alarmed his teammates. The soccer team chased the would-be robbers through the train. Lessons learned:

"Liaise with your embassy, never take your return for granted, and carry a clothes hanger in order to prevent a cliffhanger."

Addis Ababa, 1991

At the request of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), I traveled to Ethiopia to design a Diplomatic Academy at its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). I arrived in Addis Ababa, where the statue of Lenin was still pointing in the direction of the airport in order to help aid workers from the German Democratic Republic flee Ethiopia in case of an anti-Marxist coup d'état. My hotel was the Hilton, just opposite the MFA. On the first day, a government car picked me up in the morning and brought me back in the evening. I subsequently told the driver that I could walk a hundred metres to the other side of the street. Wrong! My action would have robbed the man of a day's salary.

They gave me an office next to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I started working, trying first to create a network

of civil servants and university professors to forge a context that would allow the future academy to flourish. UNITAR, however, told me that I had to write a mission report and only then could I start to communicate with the Ethiopians. My response was that I could write that report at home, after I understand the opportunities and pitfalls. As I was already there, I thought about organizing a seminar on diplomatic negotiation in order to get to know the diplomats at the ministry. Good idea! As one of the diplomats told me, "We have to revolutionize this ministry." Seeing the posters on the wall with revolutionaries waving AK-47s, my answer was: "Perhaps it is better to *evolutionize* the ministry?" Anyway, when I returned to Ethiopia the following year, the Marxist dictator Mengistu had been replaced by a government of "rebels" from Tigray and Eritrea. The atmosphere was extremely tense as the Amharic civil servants did not trust the rebel government, and vice versa. There were soldiers with machine guns all over the MFA. Nevertheless, I walked up to my old office without being noticed; but a kind of panic ensued: Why is this European approaching the minister's office? Does he want to kill us? Is this a terrorist attack? Lesson learned:

"Check the local customs and keep an eye on the political context."

Kuala Lumpur, 1992

My dear friend Raymond Saner invited me to join him on a tour to Malaysia at the invitation of its Diplomatic Academy (IDFR). I had met Raymond

and his wife Lichia at a conference in Ireland. I admired them because, on the way back from Kilkenny to Dublin airport, they both fell asleep, waking up just a few minutes before the train came to a halt. (Many years later I saw William Zartman and his wife Danièle sleep on the plane from their departure in Washington, DC, until their arrival at Schiphol airport, but the view that they missed was less engaging than the one across Ireland.) Anyway, I asked Raymond to teach negotiation at my institute – Clingendael in The Hague – as a successor to the very charismatic Pierre Casse (who could hypnotize participants in class, without them being aware of it). For many years we used Raymond's *The Expert Negotiator* (Saner 2000), a very useful book, which had been translated from German, where it was originally titled *Verhandlungstechnik* (Saner 1997), and then from the English version into French as *L'art de la négociation* (Saner 2003). Same book, same content, but different titles, as the Anglo-Saxons focus on expertise and efficiency, the Germans on techniques, and the French on art and culture.

We started our three-day seminar in a resort at the seaside. The participants were divided; a group of *datos* – Malay nobles – sat in big armchairs at the front, and behind them sat the others. Raymond started; as I was a novice after all, who had to learn about training from him. Indeed, I owe much to him, although I developed my own style later on. This is what I believe: You help young people to become trainers; they copy your style at the beginning, but after a few years they develop a new

style that suits them. We agreed that he would teach negotiation techniques for one and a half days, and I would follow up with a simulation exercise of the United Nations Security Council. Well into the second afternoon, Raymond was not ready to wrap up his part yet and continued, filling up the day. The next and final morning, he continued his lecture and I foolishly accepted it. That left me with one afternoon to do my part in a three-day seminar that took us twelve hours to fly to from Europe and twelve hours to fly back. Lesson learned:

“Be assertive, even and perhaps above all towards your gurus.”

Hyderabad, 1993

My first and only time in India was at the invitation of the Diplomatic Academy in Delhi, in order to teach at the Indian Administrative Staff School in Hyderabad in the centre of the subcontinent. Arriving at Hyderabad airport in the middle of the night, I discovered there was no car waiting for me from the school. I asked an auto-rickshaw driver to take me to a modest hotel and when I awoke the next morning, I found myself at the edge of a shanty town. Luckily, I had the telephone number of the school, and this time they answered the phone. It was daylight, after all. They sent a car and brought me to the beautiful park where the institute was located. There were five problems, though:

1. I did not have a suit that could cope with tropical heat;
2. the director wanted to see me all the time, even in the middle of

simulation exercises;

3. air conditioners made such a noise that the participants could not hear me;
4. there were no flip-charts; and
5. I thought I would be able to get ice cream at a five-star hotel where the representative from Mauritius had invited us to his National Day reception. Lessons learned:

“Be prepared for the heat, have the address of your destination, check the room and discuss the arrangements, and don't expect to eat ice cream in the tropics, not even in five-star hotels.”

Vilnius and Minsk, 1994

Barry Goodfield (Goodfield 1999), a psychologist friend of mine, had been invited to Vilnius to coach leading politicians in crisis management and, most of all, how to read people. Somehow, he was contacted by a Jewish mafia boss from Georgia who lived in Lithuania and whose son was arrested for killing a journalist. The father wanted Goodfield to help him get his son out of prison. Oddly enough, the father always called the moment we were in our rooms and, as Goodfield's staff had a microphone detector with them (I still wonder why), they swept the room and found the microphones. Goodfield could not help in the end, and the son was reportedly executed. Strangely enough, however, one of Goodfield's staff ran into this son in New York City one year later. As for me, I delivered a seminar on negotiation, after which a

Lithuanian driver took me to the Belarusian border. On the other side, the director of the Belarusian East–West Institute – who was in opposition to the Belarusian government – was waiting for me and took me by car to Minsk. Many years later I learned that he had died in a car accident, which happened to many opponents of the regime. Lesson learned:

“Sometimes (or perhaps often) the reality you observe is not real, so be prepared for surreal situations.”

Tashkent, 1995

I delivered my first negotiation training in Uzbekistan in 1995. How come? Two years earlier, the Mongolians had asked me to have their diplomats invited to The Hague and for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pay for it. I told them that the ministry would not pay for an individual country, but that we might be successful if we combined Mongolian young and mid-career diplomats with those of the Central Asian countries. One motive for me in saying this was that I indeed thought it would enhance our chances. The other reason was that I was very interested in the newly independent states of the Soviet Union and I wanted to get to know them. Clingendael tried to contact the directors of the training departments of the five Central Asian states, but received no response. However, I was later invited to the International State University in Moscow (MGIMO), where the rector showed me five telephones on his desk, directly

connected with his colleagues in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He promised me that he would call his peers; indeed, one week later Clingendael received enthusiastic letters from Asia. All the “-stans” agreed and the negotiation training course could start the following year.



© Pixabay / TheAndrasBarta

As a consequence, the Central Asians invited me for a lecture tour in 1995. In Uzbekistan, I met Rustam Kasimov, who would become my friend and who invited me again, in 2010, after he became Uzbekistan’s minister of education. His students took me on a day trip, by car, to Samarkand, where we looked for the university. The young diplomats asked people where it was, but the inhabitants of Samarkand did not understand their questions, as they spoke Tajik, which belongs to the family of Persian languages. My diplomats, however, could only speak Uzbek, a Turkic language. In the end we found the university, picked up two professors, and toured Samarkand, the beautiful city of Timur Lenk, the

fourteenth-century hero of Uzbekistan. Now, they said, we were to visit a very special museum in Panjakent, the capital of the long-gone Kushan Empire.

It was to be found in Tajikistan, but the Uzbeks assured me that going there would not be a problem, even though I did not have a visa for this country. We passed the border without

any problems, but when we wanted to return to Uzbekistan, the border was closed. Somebody had noticed a European in the museum while no European passport had been seen at the border that day. The Uzbeks said: “Stay in the back of the car and don’t show your passport.” They negotiated us out of the situation – I still do not know how, although one might guess. On the way back to Tashkent, we ran out of gas and there was no service station to be seen. No problem, as one of the diplomats had a friend who was the head of a police station along the road. We went there and the friend sent a policeman up the highway, stopping the first car that passed by. The driver was ordered to empty half of his tank

into ours. He was told that this was his lucky day, for if he had not consented, they would have given him a fine.

From Tashkent, I flew to Ashgabat. I entered the small Yak 40 airplane from the back entrance and sat down. Before take-off, a flight attendant showed me what they had for sale. The last item she showed me was a copy of *Playboy*.

On another occasion, this time in 2015, the University of World Economy and Diplomacy asked me if I could bring the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) programme with me to a conference on negotiation that was being organized by another friend of mine, the excellent academic researcher and trainer Alisher Faizullaev. I looked forward to this, as Rustam Kasimov was then the university's rector. But upon arrival, he was nowhere to be found. Unexpectedly, a new rector showed up, who had previously been the Permanent Representative of Uzbekistan to the United Nations. There was no trace of Rustam. I kept asking for him and, at the end of the week, the Uzbeks gave in: I could have a phone call with him. "Rustam, how are you doing, and where are you?" I asked. "Ah," he said, "I am hunting in the countryside. I am the rector no longer." Had he fallen into disgrace? I will never know, but a few years later he was Uzbekistan's minister of education again. Lesson learned:

"In Central Asia nearly everything is negotiable, and not only in Central Asia."

Tbilisi, 1996

This anecdote is as much about St. Petersburg as about Tbilisi. As I had been invited to a conflict management conference in Tbilisi – where I would meet my good friend Tariel Sikharulidze many years later – I flew from Vienna via St. Petersburg. Arriving in St. Petersburg, I looked for the transit hall, but could not find it. I was told that I had to show my Russian visa in order to be transported to the national airport for the "domestic" flight to the Caucasus. Russia regarded Georgia as its near abroad, although it had already been independent for a few years. I had no Russian visa, so I insisted I did not need it as I was on an international trip. To no avail. The customs officer told me to fly back to Vienna, go to the Russian consulate there and get a visa for Russia. I told her I would not do that and would instead stay where I was, waiting to be transported to the Georgian plane. One hour later she came to me and shouted "Passport!" She took it, opened a side-entrance of the airport, and a bus brought me over the tarmac to the other end of the airport where the plane to Georgia was still waiting. In Tbilisi, they did not check my passport, as this was considered a domestic flight after all. While I was departing Georgia, however, they noticed that I did not have an entry stamp. No problem (for ten dollars). Lessons learned:

"Do not forget to take dollars with you, but carry new ones, as old ones will not be accepted."

Amman, 1997

The quite recently established Institute for Diplomacy of the Kingdom of Jordan asked me to deliver two seminars, of two days each, on negotiation processes. Arriving at the institute, I learned that the plans had changed. Instead of two seminars for 40 participants each, there would be one seminar for 80 people: generals, ambassadors, other high-ranking civil servants, and military officers. As this was not yet the internet age, I had to rely on the documents that I had brought with me. I had enough material for two days, perhaps for three, but not for four. That was not an issue, however, as we needed interpretation from English into Arabic, which slowed down the training process, and I improvised a bit to buy time as well. On day four, I explained the simulation exercise that we were going to use: a UNSC meeting on a border conflict between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, written a few years earlier for the Oman Diplomatic Academy (in 2015, this war became real). As both the Omani and the Jordanians were fond of Saudi-bashing, they loved this simulation exercise. While the participants were preparing for the exercise, I left the main hall to go to the toilets. Coming back, I wondered about the whispering and smiling of the people. I had forgotten to close my microphone, so everybody heard the flushing. Lesson learned:

"Do not forget to switch off your microphone."

Almaty and Astana, 1998

The European Union agreed with Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kazakhstan's Diplomatic Academy should be enlarged and professionalized. The EU furnished money for a three-year project. My task was to take care of the software: the curriculum. My Danish colleague did the hardware: refurbishing the building at Republic Square in Almaty, and buying furniture and computers, etc. The academy's rector did not speak English and received us in the only decorated room of the institute, sitting at the very end of the room with the Kazakh flag behind him and his interpreter next to him: a very formal setting and a very formal meeting. At the end of our first week in 1998, the Kazakhstani rector was happy with our proposals and therefore invited us to the *dacha* (country house) of his deputy, a Russian friend whom he knew as a colleague from the *sovkhos* (state-owned farm). After lunch, we found ourselves naked with the rector in the Russian-style sauna of his deputy, who was whipping us with branches of some kind of tree. He was hitting us so hard that we were in doubt about whether the rector was truly happy with our proposals.

The same rector, on a later occasion, invited us for lunch in the countryside, where he proclaimed, "We Kazakhs are now independent; we don't need to listen to our Russian and Jewish advisers anymore." Sitting next to him, I noted that he still had a Russian adviser: his deputy. "Oh no," said the rector, "that does not count: he is a friend." "Well," I said, "you also still have a Jewish ad-

viser; he is sitting next to you" (I discounted my Catholic father on this occasion). The same rector made me eat parts of a sheep I would normally not eat, being a "bloody Westerner." However, when he came to the Netherlands and we received him at my home, serving herring and oysters, he would not eat any of them, contrary to his female teaching staff, who took the risk and loved the fish. Something similar happened to me, my wife Judith, and my friend Barry Goodfield outside Tashkent, when we were invited to a lunch where a whole sheep was to be eaten. They gave the tongue to the interpreter, one eye to me – which I immediately hid under the ear I already had on my plate, while Goodfield swallowed the other eye – and we ended up with the skull. Our host cracked it with his fist, and everybody received a spoon with brains on it. My wife said: "Not bad, it tastes like pâté." She is braver than me. Lesson:

"When in Rome, eat Italian cheese."

The same rector, at our concluding conference in January 2000 – strangely enough in Astana, as the whole institute had been moved overnight to that city we now call Nursultan – nearly destroyed the conference, as he wanted the Kazakhstani academicians to talk as long as it suited them. It seemed that all of the foreign invitees had come to Kazakhstan without an opportunity to contribute anything. On the second day, we were moved to a restaurant for lunch and I fell when exiting the bus, hitting my head. My Clingendael colleagues Kees Homan, Rob de Wijk,

and Theo Postma got me on my feet again, but I had a terrible headache and became terribly angry at the way the conference was derailing. I called all of the staff members together, including the Kazakhs, and told them that my Clingendael brethren and I were taking over the presidium and that from now on everything had to happen the way we wanted it. Later on, my colleagues told me they were quite surprised by my authoritarian behavior, which they said showed itself at just the right moment in an authoritarian country. Lesson learned:

"Effective behavior is situational."

Tehran, 1999

"You, sir, you are Eurocentric!" The bearded, young Iranian diplomat was of the opinion that my worldview had been very much determined by my Western European upbringing. In front of 120 young Iranians – male and female – at the School of Foreign Service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I admitted he was right. "I am European and I cannot and will not escape my culture, but I try to understand your views, as this is of the utmost importance in diplomacy: empathy. But empathy does not mean sympathy." It was a good two-day training session after all. A few years later I came back, taking the members of the Steering Committee of PIN with me. We had in-depth discussions with both young diplomats and experienced diplomats, sometimes behind closed doors. By the end of our tour, PIN committee members Zartman and

Kremenyuk were cooperating in building a snowman in front of our hotel in Isfahan. Lesson learned:

“Cultural cleavages can be bridged by diplomacy and exercise.”



REFERENCES

- Goodfield, Barry Austin (1999), *Insight and Action: The Role of the Unconscious in Crisis from the Personal to the International Levels*, London: University of Westminster Press.
- Lipschits, Isaac (1971), *Simulaties in de Internatinal Politiiek*, Deventer: Van Lochem Slaterus.
- Meerts, Paul W. (1991), *Training of Negotiators*, in: Victor A. Kremenyuk, *International Negotiation*, San Francisco, CA and Oxford: Jossey-Bass, 400–408.
- Meerts, Paul W. (2009), *Training and Education*, in: Jacob Bercovitch, Victor A. Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 645–668.
- Saner, Raymond (1997), *Verhandlungstechnik: Strategie, Taktik, Motivation, Verhalten, Delegationsführung*, Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt.
- Saner, Raymond (2000), *The Expert Negotiator: Strategy, Tactics, Motivation, Behaviour, Leadership*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Saner, Raymond (2003), *L'art de la négociation: Stratégie, tactique, motivation, compréhension, leadership*, Paris: Chiron.

Cecilia Albin

Negotiating Jerusalem: The Unavoidable Challenge

Rarely has the centrality of Jerusalem in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict emerged so clearly or so brutally as in May 2021. The eleven days of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in that month killed more than 250 people. As well covered in the press, the violence was triggered by clashes at the Temple Mount area/Haram al-Sharif and by Israel’s plans to expel Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem for the benefit of Jewish settlers. And rarely has a ceasefire, such as the one achieved between Israel and Hamas on 21 May, appeared so fragile for being just that – a ceasefire that does not address any of the underlying causes of conflict. During his visit to Israel and the region, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken came as close as to state that any recognition of Jerusalem as a capital for the Palestinians is a matter for direct negotiations between the parties, while the long-standing US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital remains unchanged. If any negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians are to make substantive progress toward a durable settlement, the future political status of Jerusalem (in particular, East Jerusalem) must indeed be addressed.

This poses formidable challenges for negotiators. The city is in conflict over many things, all intertwined: ethnic and spiritual values and symbols, political interests and prestige, scarce resources such as land and housing, and economic concerns. As the recent violence has highlighted, both Israelis and Palestinians view Jerusalem as an integral part of their history, ethnic-

religious identity, and nationhood. The absolute value attached especially to sovereignty in Jerusalem is reflected in each party’s willingness to make concessions on most other matters, such as access to the holy sites and cultural-religious autonomy. Palestinians specifically have come to regard sovereignty as the only means to retain land in the city and preserve its Arab

At a time when diplomatic talks over Jerusalem seem distant and elusive, this short article recalls how the city’s (in-)tractability and (non-)negotiability have in fact fluctuated over time. I revisit some key turning points in efforts to resolve the Jerusalem problem through negotiation. I argue that there are at least three decisive factors that led to progress in such negotiations



© Cecilia Albin

and Christian–Islamic heritage and character. At the micro-level, the highly symbolic features of the problem are reflected notably in the conflicting Jewish and Muslim claims to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area. Israel’s de facto changes on the ground, in particular Jewish settlements/neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the so-called security fence separating Arab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, have made it increasingly complicated for two nationalities to divide or share rule over the city. Finally, political dynamics both between and within the two main parties are rarely favorable to negotiations, of which the current situation is a stark example.

in the past and that remain applicable and fundamental today. These factors are then discussed briefly in the current context.

Turning Points in Negotiating Jerusalem

The 1993 Oslo Accords, largely a product of Norwegian backchannel diplomacy, were a turning point of sorts in placing Jerusalem on the negotiating table. After decades of peace talks sweeping the issue under the rug, the Accords comprised the first official recognition by all key parties of Jerusalem’s negotiability, and Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were to address it in the


final stage of permanent status talks. However, both before and after signing the Accords, Israel in particular made clear that its long-standing position remained unchanged: Jerusalem must remain united under its sovereignty and as its exclusive capital (Interview 1994). Negotiable were the religious interests of the Palestinians and other groups in the city under Israel's rule.

The Camp David negotiations of July 2000, which came to focus heavily on Jerusalem, mark therefore a very significant turning point. With US President Bill Clinton in a mediating role, Israel officially negotiated political rule over the city with the Palestinians. For the first time since the capture of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel thus considered a political redivision. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to Palestinian rule in the Old City's Muslim and Christian quarters and in Jerusalem's outer Arab districts. PLO leader Yasser Arafat, for his part, accepted (or at least considered accepting) Israeli sovereignty over the Old City's Jewish Quarter, the Wailing Wall and, very importantly, Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. However, each side insisted on exclusive sovereign control over the entire Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area, so the negotiations soon came to focus on this particular site (Dayan 2002). Regarding this and other aspects of the Jerusalem problem, President Clinton invented and tested creative and elaborate proposals. These included various ways of dividing sovereignty over the city between the two parties, including the Old City and the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and even di-

viding the function of sovereignty itself (Enderlin 2002). These were reportedly rejected by Arafat.

The Camp David summit eventually collapsed, chiefly as a result of the failure to reach agreement on sovereignty over the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif area. Yet the summit is significant in several respects. Israel no longer considered sovereignty over Jerusalem non-negotiable and it, alongside the United States, recognized Palestinian national aspirations in the city. The Jerusalem conflict became focused on control over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area, and agreement on other aspects of it was reached or appeared possible. At the start of the summit, Israel had reportedly not planned to concede significantly on sovereignty over the city's core areas, including the Old City (Gold 2001). Overall, the American mediating role was central to

tions over Jerusalem. Following private talks with both Israel and the Palestinians, President Clinton launched another plan for Jerusalem and an overall settlement in December 2000, the so-called Clinton Parameters. Israel would retain sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and the city's Arab neighborhoods would be part of a Palestinian capital and state. The Clinton Parameters also moved further toward the Palestinian claims: Palestinian sovereignty was suggested for the entire Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif area and the rest of the Old City apart from the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall, which were to fall under Israeli sovereignty. Nonetheless, both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships reportedly accepted the plan, with some reservations. Arafat has been singled out as the party who, as opposed to Barak, hesitated in the end to



© Pixabay / Tumisu

what was achieved or proved possible to achieve.

Subsequent diplomatic initiatives, also led by the United States, confirmed these developments in negotia-

close the deal in time – thus committing “an error of historic proportions” (Clinton 2005). Talks continued based on the Clinton proposals despite the second Palestinian uprising (the Al-

Aqsa Intifada) and violent clashes in the city: it was Ariel Sharon's arrival into power as Israel's new prime minister in 2001 that ended them.

Similarly, the so-called Geneva Accords of December 2003 – an unofficial peace agreement launched by Yossi Beilin, then Israel's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo – stipulated sole Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif (United Nations 2003a). Despite the bold and detailed nature of these and other clauses, the Accords received some support in the Israeli and Palestinian communities. From the United Nations, the United States, Europe, and much of international community, they received considerable attention and endorsement. The Geneva Accords resemble the detailed informal agreement of 1995 on all final-status issues reached in secret talks between Beilin and Mahmoud Abbas, a high-ranking Palestinian official and negotiator. A US-led initiative in the Middle East, the so-called Road Map of May 2003, had already marked another development – namely international endorsement of dual Israeli and Palestinian capitals in Jerusalem. Worked out by the United States, the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union, the plan, which gained broad international support, called for a negotiated solution to Jerusalem based on the political and religious concerns of both Palestinians and Israelis and their respective states (United Nations 2003b).

Three Factors Needed for Successful Negotiations

Probably no actor, strategy, or proposal could bridge the positions of the presently dominant representatives of both the Palestinians (Hamas) and Israelis in negotiations over Jerusalem. However, if and when conditions permit renewed negotiations, these will need to directly address the Jerusalem issue again given its centrality. It remains to be seen whether such talks are able to pick up where they left off.

Drawing on past progress over the issue, I point here, in brief, to three factors that, despite many regional changes that have since occurred, will remain fundamental in driving negotiations toward a successful conclusion: American mediation, unofficial (informal) diplomacy, and creative problem-solving.

First, a strong third-party role, exercised particularly by the United States, will be vital to make progress on a negotiated solution for Jerusalem. In virtually all cases when progress has been made, the United States has been present and decisive as a mediator. The Norwegian role in producing the 1993 Oslo Accords is a possible exception, depending on how the success and contribution of those accords are assessed today. One of the most well-informed and vocal critics of Norway's role argues that the country's weak power position paved the way for a process heavily biased in favor of Israel, which has not been constructive (Henriksen Waage 2005). Even when far easier matters in the Israeli–Arab conflict have been negotiated,

a heavy-handed US role has at times been required to reach agreement. One example is American mediation in the talks leading to the Sinai II agreement between Israel and Egypt (discussed in Saunders and Albin 1993).

The United States has assumed a number of different functions as mediator to date, including initiating and hosting negotiations and making numerous proposals. The one that only the United States itself can fulfill effectively, and that undoubtedly will be required, is that of heavily leaning on and pushing parties for concessions. This, of course, requires in turn a US administration willing to get deeply involved in the Middle East peace process once again. Given the sharp Israeli–Palestinian power inequality, the United States may be needed primarily to shift weight from the Israeli side. But other factors, such as ideology and domestic or regional constituencies, may render either of the two parties reluctant to concede on an issue as sensitive as Jerusalem's status. In other words, a structurally weak party can also be the more intransigent one – as Clinton's account of the December 2000 talks (above) illustrates.

Second, informal (unofficial) channels of exchange must continue to be used both prior and parallel to official negotiations, with a clear connection to a US leadership role. The reasons for this are because of the parties involved (requiring, among other matters, both trust and relationship-building), the issues (complexity), and the strategies best used (requiring transparency and confidentiality).

Third, negotiating Jerusalem will require imaginative and creative problem-solving strategies to tackle the many challenges outlined at the outset of this article. In earlier work, I set forth some such strategies for negotiating the sovereignty of Jerusalem as an indivisible good – namely, sharing, division, delegation, compensation, and issue linkage (Albin 1993). They all remain relevant and have, of course, already been used at least implicitly or to some extent in earlier negotiations and proposals. But such strategies must now be used in ever more sophisticated manners and combinations to keep up with the growing complexity of the Jerusalem issue.



REFERENCES

- Albin, Cecilia (1993), *Negotiating Indivisible Goods: The Case of Jerusalem*, in: *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, XIII, 1, 45–77.
- Clinton, Bill (2005), *My Life*, New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- Dayan, Aryeh (2002), *Barak Began Referring to the Holy of Holies*, in: *Haaretz*, 9 December.
- Enderlin, Charles (2002), *Shattered Dreams: The Failures of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002*, New York, NY: Other Press.
- Gold, Dore (2001), *Jerusalem in International Diplomacy: The 2000 Camp David Summit, the Clinton Plan, and their Aftermath*, in: *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, 447, 1 February.
- Henriksen Waage, Hilde (2005), *Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent*, in: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 34, 4, 6–24.
- Interview (1994), with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on Israel Radio, 9 June, A Resolution of the Israeli Cabinet Secretariat of 28 May 1995 Affirmed Its Intention to “Act to Strengthen the Status of United Jerusalem as the Exclusive Capital of Israel.”
- Saunders, Harold H., and Cecilia Albin (1993), *Sinai II: The Politics of International Mediation, 1974–1975*, Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins University.
- United Nations (2003a), *The Geneva Accord (Beilin-Abd-Raboo Document)*, 12 October, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-210008/> (7 July 2021).
- United Nations (2003b), *A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 7 May, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-186742/> (7 July 2021).

Hans van den Berg

On Strategy and Tactics

Negotiations are not about winning or losing, they are about where you are and what the next step is (Ryzov 2019; Zartman and Rubin 2000). Strategy will provide a template from which to work and plan that next step (Wheeler 2013; Cassan and de Bailliencourt 2019). Preparations of strategy in negotiations often center around the topic or issue at hand. In doing so, negotiators overlook the grand strategies of the actors at the table, and sometimes even their own. These grand strategies influence perceptions and why actors want something, rather than what they want. Therefore, in preparing for negotiations it is important

“to know and comprehend the mentality, concerns and aspirations of ‘the other.’”
(Baños 2019: 276)

To understand the moves and strategies in a particular negotiation it is vital to understand the grand strategy governing the way an actor analyzes and perceives a political situation, especially when it is one of conflict. Parties can have different reasons to be at the table. For example, Russia’s presence at the Minsk negotiations over the Donbas and Luhansk regions probably had little to do with reaching a peaceful solution and a return to stability. The Kremlin’s interest was, and is, to keep parts of Ukraine unstable to prevent NATO and EU membership considerations, which coincides with a broader desire to prevent NATO and EU expansion in its near abroad.

Perceptions are influenced by sets of beliefs and rationalities that differ between parties. These sets of be-

liefs and rationalities influence not only the observations of the flow of political events, but also the norms, standards, and guidelines by which the actor makes decisions (George 1969). Grand strategy, according to Gaddis (2018), is the combination of matching finite resources with infinite goals and acting accordingly to the context when it changes. Strategy requires an overview of the whole, which in turn reveals the significance of its respective parts, having a clear direction and destination while using the resources and tactics to steer clear of the obstacles.

of the other parties at the table. Additionally, it is crucial to understand

“the perceived capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources.” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 14)

Meerts (2015) differentiates three types of power within negotiation: First, there is the power of conduct, which is marginal and originates from the negotiator (Meerts 2015: 28). This social power centers on the relations



© Pixabay / Gerd Altmann

Power, in negotiations,


“can be increased by understanding and exploiting the context in which the negotiation is taking place.” (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 265)

But it is equally important to analyze the nature and sources of power itself in any situation, even more so how actors perceive their own power and that

between parties and on the influence of people in determining the process and, with that, the outcome. Second, there is structural power – the power of the state, which remains constant across different situations. Consisting of hard power (exemplified by military force, economic strength, population size, geography, and so on) and soft power (in terms of culture, foreign policy, and so on), it comprises the total resources held by an actor. Third, there

is comparative power – the ability to translate structural power to the context of the negotiations. These are the resources that can be directed toward a particular conflict or concern (Zartman and Rubin 2000: 10).

The set of beliefs and rationalities that influence an actor's perception is determined by a wide array of elements. The first step is to analyze and understand the culture of the different parties as well as their historical behavior and relationship. For instance, when the Dutch negotiate with Suriname, each must be aware of their shared history, the colonial influence, current political discussions, reputations, and relations. The second step is to determine how the actor perceives the world. Walker (1990) reasons such a world view can be either in conflict temporarily interrupted by peace or at peace temporarily interrupted by conflict. More important is to identify what the actor believes to be the source of the conflict, whether this be miscommunication/misunderstanding, war-oriented state actors miscalculating their own abilities and those of others, or the failure of the international system to effectively govern. The third step is concerned with analyzing how the parties perceive the flow of events. Are the process and outcome set in stone, or is the actor able to exert influence (and if so, how much)? Are they optimistic about achieving their goals? And, finally, does the actor believe in chance, or are events and choices interconnected within a greater plan? The fourth and last step analyzes the way goals are set. An actor can set multiple goals with a variety of sub-objectives, each



© Pixabay / Daniel Diaz Bardillo

with a different level of achievability and payoff, or set multiple goals and aim for maximum payoff. How goals are pursued also needs to be considered, as well as which resources are used and how risks of political action are calculated, controlled, and accepted (George 1969).

Within negotiations, Kilmann and Thomas (1977), followed up by Galdwin and Walter (1980), developed a model specifically on behavioral strategies. Determining which is applicable to the actor and the context depends, according to this model, on certain behavior: the level of assertiveness and cooperation. The level of assertiveness is influenced by the stakes in the outcome, which is a nod to how important the outcome is to a party or actor and at what price an outcome is agreeable (Galdwin and Walter 1980; Kilmann and Thomas 1977; Meerts 2015; Saner 2012), in addition to being affected by the relative power of the parties – in other words, the power that each brings to the table and the relevance it has to the issue at hand. High or low

relative power will influence the choice of behavioral strategy. Those with high relative power will have to consider if, when, and how to use it (Galdwin and Walter 1980; Kilmann and Thomas 1977; Meerts 2015; Saner 2012). Those with low relative power will need to find a way to translate the lack of resources into desires. Scoring high on both will result in assertive behavior, while scoring low creates unassertiveness.

“A stronger party would have no need to negotiate since it could simply take what it wants. Yet weak parties not only take on stronger ones in negotiation, they often emerge with sizeable – even better than expected – results.”
(Zartman and Rubin 2000: 3)

The level of cooperation, in turn, is determined by two factors, one being interest interdependence: “the more the interests of the parties coincide, the more they will want to cooperate” (Saner 2012: 118); by the same token,

the less their interests coincide, the less willingness there will be (Galdwin and Walter 1980; Kilmann and Thomas 1977; Meerts 2015; Saner 2012). The strength of this factor also depends on whether the parties acknowledge and understand their own interdependencies – i.e., if I wish to achieve my goals I might need to help (the) other(s) to achieve theirs. The other factor in the level of cooperation is the quality and value of the relationship. The importance of the personal relationship is often taken for granted, but we act differently towards friends, people we respect or trust. The personal relationship influences the likability factor and how willing parties are to make compromises (Galdwin and Walter 1980; Kilmann and Thomas 1977; Meerts 2015; Saner 2012). But it is also about the value the parties place on the relationship. For instance, within the European Union the shadow of the future plays an important role. Members know they will have to deal with each other time and again. This incentivizes them to compromise on issues less important right now, expecting others to do so on issues important to them in the future. On the other hand, Russia puts less value on relationships. Actors in international political negotiation will always have to deal with the Kremlin. It has a voice and vote in high-stakes negotiations because of its veto on the UN Security Council, along with its resources and influence. When interests are interdependent and the actors both acknowledge this and value the relationship, cooperative behavior will likely result; independent interests or a lack of acknowledgement/value of

interdependency, however, will lead to uncooperative behavior.

Different combinations make for different behavioral strategies:

1. being assertive but uncooperative will make for a competitive behavioral strategy,
2. lack of assertiveness and cooperation creates avoidance,
3. cooperative behavior combined with unassertiveness will inspire an accommodative behavioral strategy, and
4. being assertive and cooperative makes for a collaborative behavioral strategy;
5. however, in the middle of it all is a compromising behavioral strategy (Galdwin and Walter 1980; Kilmann and Thomas 1977; Meerts 2015; Saner 2012).

One behavioral strategy is not by default better than another – the one best applied depends on the context and goals. Even more so, over time a behavioral strategy can shift due to changing circumstances. For instance, a new government might take a new and different approach to its foreign policy, which might raise the stakes in the outcome. As a result, this actor that may have initially pursued an avoidant or accommodative behavioral strategy might now shift towards a competitive or collaborative one. Within negotiations, actors can shift from being accommodative to avoiding to competitive, and so on, depending on the flow of events.

A solid strategy provides an overview of all the different routes that can be taken and of which behavioral strategy best fits which context; tactics

underpin such a strategy. Tactics give negotiators practical tools to avoid or overcome obstacles along the way and to switch from one route to another when necessary. Certain tactics fit certain strategies better than others. At the same time,

“a poorly prepared tactic can play havoc with even the best strategy and spoil the cooperative climate of a negotiation.” (Saner 2012: 137)

There are many tactics available; below I illustrate a few to demonstrate their relation to behavioral strategies.

One influential tactic is control over the agenda. Whoever controls the agenda has significant influence over the negotiations by determining the order of the topics discussed. Will the most pressing issue be dealt with first or left to the end, using time pressure to get a deal close to the preferred outcome? Controlling the agenda also enables the negotiator to prevent others from blocking certain routes by adjusting the discussion time or the process where necessary. In a competitive behavioral strategy, the negotiator is more likely to dictate the agenda and set it to their advantage without consulting others. On the accommodative and collaborative side, negotiators are more likely to set the agenda together and adjust accordingly to the process.

Another tactic concerns time. For instance, delaying can shift the context and the situation in one's favor. The value of resources relevant to the negotiations can change over time, making it worthwhile to wait for bet-

ter times, thereby changing the power balance (Zartman and Rubin 2000). But it can also work against a party, diminishing the advantage over the current context. Time can also improve or diminish the quality of the relationship. Those pursuing a competitive behavioral strategy will want to dominate the process and time frame or cut negotiations short, while those in an avoidant or collaborative mode might want to play for time until the situation is ripe to negotiate.

Location, as a tactic, is often underplayed or forgotten. However, where the meetings take place, with whom, and where everyone sits at the table can all have a significant impact. Are you invited to stay at the most luxurious hotel, meet with the ministers in the grandest room of the ministry? Or are you meeting with a junior member of staff or an intern in a backroom of a conference center? Do you sit next to your negotiating partners or across from each other? Such decisions reflect the respect and importance that actors place on the negotiations and the others at the table.

A final tactic to mention is flattery and charm. The Dutch, for example, are considered to be down-to-earth and straightforward. But they are also vulnerable to flattery and charm (Meerts 2012). Take them out dining in a nice restaurant, pay them compliments about their behavior and there is a good chance they will be willing to make compromises for you. Flattery and charm influence personal re-

lationships, increasing the chances of moving the other parties from being competitive or avoidant towards being collaborative and accommodative.

Negotiation strategy often centers around, alongside the interests and perceptions of the parties, the issue at hand. However, in international political negotiation it is more often the rule than the exception that affairs beyond the negotiation table influence the behavioral and grand strategy of the parties. We must therefore analyze the nature and sources of power as well as how they relate to the specific context. Furthermore, it is important to understand not only the set of beliefs and perceptions that influence the way parties observe the flow of political events, but also the norms, standards, and guidelines by which they make decisions. All of this intersects to determine the behavioral strategies and tactics in the specific negotiations. Taken together, this information will enable negotiators to create a general template to help them determine where they are and what the next step is.

■

REFERENCES

- Baños, Pedro (2019), *How They Rule the World*, London: Ebury Press.
- Cassan, Hervé, and Marie-Pierre de Baillencourt (2019), *Traité pratique de négociation*, Brussels: Larcier.
- Gaddis, John Lewis (2018), *On Grand Strategy*, London: Penguin Press.
- Galdwin, Thomas N., and Ingo Walter (1980), *How Multinationals Can Manage Social and Political Forces*, in: *Journal of Business Strategy*, VII, 54–68.
- George, Alexander L. (1969), *The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making*, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, XII, 2, 190–222.
- Kilmann, Ralph H., and Kenneth W. Thomas (1977), *Developing a Forced-Choice Measure of Conflict-Handling Behaviour: The “Mode” Instrument*, in: *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, XXXVII, 309–325.
- Meerts, Paul W. (2012), *Dutch Bargaining*, in: *PINPoints*, 38, 27–31.
- Meerts, Paul W. (2015), *Diplomatic Negotiation, Essence and Evolution*, The Hague: Clingendael.
- Ryzov, Igor (2019), *The Kremlin School of Negotiation*, Edinburgh: Canongate Books Ltd.
- Saner, Raymond (2012), *The Expert Negotiator: Strategy, Tactics, Motivation, Behaviour, Leadership*, Leiden: Brill.
- Walker, Stephen G. (1990), *The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis*, in: *Political Psychology*, XI, 2, 403–418.
- Wheeler, Michael (2013), *The Art of Negotiation, How to Improvise Agreement in a Chaotic World*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Zartman, I. William, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds) (2000), *Power and Negotiation*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.


Rudolf Schuessler

Self-Centered Reconciliation: The German–Namibian Case

At the end of May 2021, the governments of Germany and Namibia announced the successful conclusion of negotiations on reconciliation for the genocide that German colonial troops committed against the Herero and Nama, two peoples whose uprising was crushed from 1904 to 1908, when Namibia was known to much of the outside world as German South West Africa (Häussler 2018; Kössler 2015; Sarkin 2011). The exterminatory brutality of the campaign against the Herero and Nama is often called the first genocide of the twentieth century, and it has been cited as a precursor to the Holocaust (Boehme 2020). Representatives of the victims, Namibian politicians, and German activists have long pushed for official recognition of the atrocities as a genocide by Germany and have demanded an apology as well as reparations. Victim representatives have also fought court cases in the United States to force the German government to pay reparations. However, German government officials stalled reconciliation for decades and have only recently begun to retreat inch by inch to a position that acknowledges the genocide. It looked as if an agreement between the two sides would help not only to reconcile the Herero and Nama with Germany but also to bring a divisive negotiation process to an end.

And then, the whole thing exploded. Major representatives of the Herero who had not been included in the negotiation process objected that the agreement shows insufficient regard for the interests and feelings of the Herero, who were, after all, the main

victims of the genocide (Grünhagen 2021). Beyond that, no direct reparations are envisaged for the Herero and Nama; instead, a rather modest payment of EUR 1.1 billion over 30 years to the state of Namibia was agreed upon, which is supposed to be used for so-



© Pixabay / Jorono

cial and development projects with a focus on the Herero and Nama. The German side denies that these payments constitute reparations. Opposition parties in Namibia have joined the chorus and massively bashed the treaty in the country's newspapers. Only a few of the agreement's specifications have transpired so far, secrecy having been sworn in order to protect the treaty from attacks. Nevertheless, enough has been revealed and leaked to fuel such attacks. Now, the fully negotiated German–Namibian agreement is likely to fail. It is a falling knife that German politicians dare not try catch, fearing serious harm. How could this sorry situation have come about? I will offer an interpretation.

Some points are obvious. First, major Herero heritage groups and represent-

atives are maximalists. They insist on recognition of the atrocities as genocide and demand reparations – that is, direct payments to the descendants of the victims, which implies a legal right to the payments. Various German governments were willing neither to

call the crimes against the Herero and Nama genocide nor to pay reparations. Classification as genocide was long thought to hurt the German position in law courts and to be considered a step towards reparations. Germany's current payment of reparations to other groups and countries harmed by various kinds of German aggression in the twentieth century, however, is seen as a precedent. Hence, German government lawyers have strongly advised successive governments against officially speaking of genocide and a *fortiori* against paying anything under the designation "reparations." A string of decisions in favor of Germany by mainly US courts between 2001 and 2019 have somewhat eased the pressure in these respects. In 2001 Herero representatives began to sue Germany

in US courts, but their specific claims were rejected. In 2019 a US court confirmed the German legal position that US courts are not responsible for handling the cases. In the literature on German–Namibian reconciliation, it is assumed that the pressure of the legal cases increased the willingness of the German government to negotiate (Boehme 2020). It is also possible, however, that German successes in US courts created some room for the negotiations, which German governments over the years had long considered too risky. Most likely, each factor reinforced the other.

One of the outcomes of these developments is that the g-word is increasingly used in official communications, since German officials now believe that negative legal repercussions can be avoided. While an early use by German MP Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul in 2004 was disclaimed as private opinion by the German government (Boehme 2020: 245), the word's use in a 2015 newspaper article by Norbert Lammert, then president of the German parliament, attracted not only widespread public acclaim but was also not disowned by Angela Merkel's government. A crucial event with respect to the use of the g-word was the 2016 declaration in the Bundestag (German parliament) of the Turkish massacres of Armenians as genocide (Heinemann 2016: 461; the connection to the Armenian case is also made by Lammert 2015). This documents the interdependence of cases of historical justice. If the Turkish atrocities against the Armenians are acknowledged as genocide, the German parliament can

hardly label the atrocities against the Herero and Nama otherwise. Or can it?

The phrasing in the agreement that has leaked so far recognizes the atrocities only as

*“what has been called genocide since the 1948 Genocide Convention of the UN.” (See also the wording in *Auswärtiges Amt* 2019)*

Hence, the German side still implicitly insists that colonial atrocities were not conceived as genocides at the time they occurred, or to put it a bit less benevolently, for the German government, they are called genocide now, but were not genocide then. This exercise in historical moral relativism is hard to square with a genuine willingness to reconcile with victims and their descendants. Is this phrasing really the only way to procure legal security for the German side? I doubt it, given that not only scholars but also German government officials are now freely and without rebuke speaking of a genocide against the Herero (the Nama going often unmentioned in the process).

However, the particular use of the g-word is perhaps not the main obstacle in the agreement for Herero and Nama representatives. The German side still refuses to touch the word “reparations,” and is hardly likely to do so, given the announced willingness of EU partner countries to sue Germany for WWII reparations. It is thus highly probable that Herero maximalists and German negotiators cannot come to an agreement. Hence, recalcitrant Herero representatives were precluded from taking part, and an agreement

was sought with the Namibian government that included more pliable Herero representatives in the negotiations. Given the rivalries between diverse representatives of the two aggrieved peoples, this seems natural. But the non-participation of the longstanding “supreme” representative group of the Herero and its leader should have sufficed to render Berlin skeptical of the gains to be made, even if the authority of the group is now challenged in Namibia. While important Herero and Nama representatives insist on reparations, the Namibian government seems to be more interested in the money than in the label under which it is dispersed. Here lurks a second problem: the Namibian government is dominated by the Ovambo, a people to whom the interests of the Herero and Nama have not always been dear. German commentators point out that the agreement allocates payments mainly for the benefit of the Herero and Nama, and that the agreement is good if the respective plans work (Grünhagen 2021). I cannot help but remark that this is a justification that documents a not entirely unproblematic state of mind that has recently gained some currency in Germany. Everything is good if the plan is well intentioned. Nobody is to be blamed if the nice plan founders in the face of reality. After all, planners cannot be made responsible for the inconsiderate behavior of reality.

In the Namibian case, it may be worth asking what would happen if the Namibian government fails to handle the funds to the satisfaction of the descendants of the victims? Germany would be blamed, and its relations

with the Herero and Nama would further deteriorate. In matters of reconciliation, it may be helpful to primarily care for the descendants of the victims and not for a state that did not yet exist when the crime happened and in which not even all descendants of the victims live. Did successive German governments really try every reasonable approach with the Herero and Nama before they turned towards the Namibian government as an almost exclusive negotiation partner? The literature on the case suggests otherwise. As far as I can see, the options of direct payment to Herero groups or a split payment for Herero and government projects, even without using the r-word, have not been gauged. Perhaps other options would have been more expensive than the EUR 36 million a year deal that is now foundering. Yet, cheap solution or not, how can the German government expect to reconcile without engaging directly with the descendants of the victims?

The only plausible answer in my view is that the whole process of reconciliation for the Herero–Nama genocide was utterly self-centered from the German side. First, it did not get under way for a long time because it was considered too unimportant. German politicians could aspire to stand in the limelight only for reconciliation with Israel or Jewish representative groups because the Holocaust is *the* German genocide which (indeed) overshadows all others. However, singling out the Holocaust as unique should not mean Germany can escape atonement for other atrocities or genocides. In the first decade of the 2000s, as postcolonial theory

began to make inroads in German universities and among German elites, the situation began to change. While politicians of all parties had previous to then shown marked disregard for German colonial crimes, there is now a split between parties. Some observers note a difference between parties in opposition and government (Boehme 2020: 247). Though Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, played down

Ironically, this does not mean that the parties are less self-centered. German politicians who push for reconciliation with the Herero and Nama are under surveillance by morally sensitive backers and constituencies. The course taken by the negotiations suggests that the German government's prime objective was to create an image of successful reconciliation, regardless of who got what (in other



© Pixabay / Dean Moriarty

reconciliation with the Herero and Nama, his Green Party in opposition is pushing for it. In my view, however, whether a party is in power or in opposition does not fully account for the mood swing. A younger generation of German politicians on the left (LINKE, Green Party, Social Democratic Party) takes colonial crimes much more seriously than their predecessors, and to a lesser degree this is even true for the moderate right (Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union, CDU/CSU). Moreover, the elites and societal groups to which these parties cater are themselves more sensitive to colonial injustice.

words: regardless of real historical justice). German elections in the fall of 2021 offered a compelling date for a successful conclusion of the negotiations (see Russmann 2021). If such an agreement were to fail, the governing parties – especially the Social Democrats, who are unlikely to end up in power – might be deprived of the spoils of moral righteousness. The CDU, on the other hand, which was always reluctant to give much away for the purposes of postcolonial reconciliation, might face increased pressure from the Green Party, its probable new coalition partner, to give a bit more. This is even more likely if my assumption of a

generational effect proves true. In this case, the Green Party would not value reconciliation markedly less once it is in power, although Green leaders might be willing to sacrifice the issue for gains in other policy domains. But in that case, the CDU would need to pay dearly to have control of the issue.

As so often, acting hastily just before a door is thought to close has backfired. It is not clear what will now become of German–Namibian or German–Herero and German–Nama reconciliation. Perhaps the best thing for German moral consciousness and German national interests would be a patient renegotiation of the whole issue. A genuine willingness to let the Herero and Nama take control and be there every step of the way to profit from the reconciliation process beyond receiving grand gestures and restitution of cultural objects (such as the stone

cross of 1486, which marked the landing of the Portuguese) might dispose some of the victims' descendants favorably towards Germany, whether the process ends with a conclusive agreement any time soon or not.

■

REFERENCES

- Auswärtiges Amt (2019), Aus der Vergangenheit in die Zukunft. Deutsch-Namibische Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 1 July, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/ausussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/afrika/1897660> (15 June 2021).*
- Boehme, Franziska (2020), Reactive Remembrance. The Political Struggle over Apologies and Reparations between Germany and Namibia for the Herero Genocide, in: Journal of Human Rights, XIX, 238–255.*
- Grünhagen, Freya (2021), Wie sühnt man einen Genozid?, in: IPG Journal, 31 May.*
- Häussler, Matthias (2018), Der Genozid an den Herero, Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.*
- Heinemann, Patrick (2016), Die Deutschen Genozide an den Herero und Nama. Grenzen der juristischen Aufarbeitung, in: Der Staat, LV, 461–487.*
- Kössler, Reinhart (2015), Namibia and Germany. Negotiating the Past, Windhoek, Namibia: University of Namibia.*
- Lammert, Norbert (2015), Deutsche ohne Gnade, in: Die ZEIT, 9 July.*
- Russmann, Natalie (2021), Abschluss des Aussöhnungsabkommens zwischen Namibia und Deutschland in Sicht?, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Country Report.*
- Sarkin, Jeremy (2011), Germany's Genocide of the Herero, Cape Town: UCT press.*

Mikhail Troitskiy

Major Powers' Foreign Policies through the Prism of Justice

This paper looks at the interplay of justice conceptions underlying international postures of three key powers that have been concerned throughout their contemporary history with the ethical basis of their foreign policies. Comparison of the justice conceptions that nations rely upon to back up their foreign policy aspirations is useful as an analytical tool, allowing us to explain and forecast foreign policy moves by major nations and to assess the strength of their commitment to conflict in disputes. Resilient as they are, the justice conceptions these players rely upon are often more helpful in predicting future trends in their relations than the central notions of meta-theories of International Relations, including survival and relative power, identity and norms, domestic political regimes, and interdependence.

More importantly, much of the interaction among justice-conscious powers – those inclined to invoke justice as the foundation of their doctrines and postures – can be reduced to and described in terms of the justice debates outlined above. As we shall see below, clashes between justice principles make certain disputed issues in relations among major powers virtually non-negotiable or – at the very least – severely complicate lasting negotiated solutions.

Sources and Targets of Global Justice Conceptions

For the purposes of this essay, justice is defined as a match between entitlements and benefits (Welch 1993). Justice principles are usually underpinned by salient points, such as conspicu-

ous numbers or symmetries, or ethical concepts – for example, broadly recognized values – that support the argument in favor of a particular solution: allocation of costs, benefits, risks, etc. (Schuessler and van der Rijt 2019). Different conceptions of justice can compete with one another in a negotiation because of their equal “persuasive power,” so that the choice of conception to underlie the solution will be based on factors exogenous to negotiation, such as the sheer balance of forces among negotiating parties. That balance, however, will not fully determine the outcome of negotiation because even the most powerful actor will try to make sure that the justice conception behind the negotiated agreement is at least in part accepted by the weaker parties in order for the agreement to hold for a sustained period of time.

whom” and “from whose perspective” become non-trivial questions when the conception is applied to a group of actors. Both individual states and the community of nations – global and regional – can generate conceptions of justice and apply them either to individual states or to the community as a whole. As a creator of justice conceptions, the international community is usually represented by sizeable and/or influential groups of players – states, non-state actors, transnational networks, etc. – claiming to speak on behalf of the community, to know its entitlements, and to be able to assess its actual benefits in a particular situation or domain (on norm entrepreneurs, see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

It makes sense to consider a number of influential partial-justice conceptions through the prism of several key debates. These debates are happen-



© Pixabay / Gerd Altmann

Defining justice for the purposes of foreign policy and global order analysis requires differentiation between the sources and the target audiences of justice conceptions. Justice “for

ing within and between policy communities of nation-states and international organizations. The debates are often implicit: they may not refer directly to abstract conceptions, yet

they bear on policy choices driven by competing justice conceptions. As an illustration, I consider several key dyads of conceptions driving major policy debates. Those dyads are presented in Table 1 according to the “from whose perspective”/“for whom” classification.

While reciprocal behavior is almost universally considered to be fair, the quest for future compensation is also driven by a specific conception of justice: agreement to diminish one’s entitlement in the present for the sake of survival and/or greater benefits in the future. Reciprocal behavior can under-

equality vs. equity controversy onto international relations. Equity is understood here as proportionality to a certain merit, contribution, or distinguishing feature. In the world arena, the equality vs. equity debate takes the form of “parity vs. equity.” Would it be fair for states unquestionably to respect one another’s declared interests on the basis of parity, or claim priority on the grounds of larger responsibilities, contributions to global causes, or supposed virtues?

Justice conceptions generated by the international community as a whole but applied to individual states and/or their policies engage in the debate between solidarist values (i.e. the imperative of helping distressed people in other countries) and statist values (sovereignty). Debates arising from community-driven conceptions applied to the community itself revolve around the notions of effectiveness as opposed to equality and equity in solving global problems, as well as around competing notions of efficiency and procedural justice in multilateral negotiation.

The competing approaches to international and global justice presented in Table 1 are rooted in ethics and/or rationality that usually shape perceptions of entitlement. The ethics component designates what is morally desirable, while the rationality aspect refers to the ways for individual states and groups of states to survive and prosper in the long term under uncertainty. The comparative assessment of costs and benefits defining rationality in the case of international and global justice pertains to expectations of strategic gains

For whom From whose perspective	Individual player (State)	Community as a whole
Individual player (State)	Reciprocity vs. Altruism Parity vs. Equity	Status quo vs. Revolutionary progress
Community as a whole	Solidarist/Humanitarian vs. Statist values (Global commons are at stake, but individual states are affected by adherence or non-adherence to these values that are espoused by the community as a whole.)	Effectiveness vs. Equality Efficiency vs. Procedural justice (These are the values shared by the majority of community members. Those members, however, do not agree on prioritization.)

Table 1. Major global justice debates classified by the source and target group. “For whom” refers to the actor or group of actors likely to absorb the implications of applying a certain (contested) notion of justice – the conception recipient. “From whose perspective” designates the bearer and promoter of a specific concept of justice.

In international politics, individual actors – for the most part, states – engage in two general modes of behavior: conflict and cooperation. Conflict usually comes at a significant and uncertain cost, while cooperation entails the risk of being exploited. In terms of competing justice conceptions, that choice can essentially be seen as one between reciprocity and altruism, or equality and compensation. These principles can be subsumed under the rubric of “inter-national” justice, that is, justice applying to relations among states – individual members of the global community.

mine the chances for survival immediately (for example, as a result of mutual destruction) or in the longer term – as a result of attrition in protracted tit-for-tat hostilities. Thus, the core justice debate on the level of state-to-state interaction is between reciprocity now and altruism for the sake of future benefits. This debate between separate nations (or rather their negotiators) bears directly on the global dimension of justice: the extent of altruism that states are able to muster determines the scope of cooperation that can be expected on the global scale.

The second state-to-state justice-driven debate is the projection of the

and losses rather than to their immediate allocation. Such understanding of rationality allows for a consideration of certain recurrent postures and strategies of states and groupings as rooted in rationalist conceptions of justice and a juxtaposition of those conceptions with others rooted in ethics.

Next, I apply the above classification of justice conceptions and insights about the role of justice in foreign policy making to the worldviews of three major justice-conscious powers in the global arena.

Justice Operationalized: Competing Agendas

The United States, China, and Russia have distinct positions on the main justice dilemmas outlined in the previous section. Such positions at times facilitate, but more often complicate long-term cooperative arrangements among those nations.

Throughout its history, the United States – represented by key policymakers and dominant public opinion trends – has believed in its special mission: its ability and duty to serve as an example for other nations and to help them achieve success through democratization and increased openness. This sense of mission has implied effective alignment in US foreign policy vis-à-vis its national goals and its broader global interests. Since the end of World War II and at least until the arrival of the Trump administration to the White House in 2017, the Washington policy community considered promoting democracy, protecting human rights and freedoms, liberalizing trade and transnational flows of capi-

tal, and strengthening firm military alliances under US leadership in Europe and Asia to be in the interest not only of the United States, but of the world as a whole.

Conversely, as a provider of the global commons, Washington has expected other world capitals to follow its lead. If security and economic prosperity of the United States and that of the global community are linked, then it makes sense for that community to support the core directions and priorities of US foreign policy. President Clinton made this point clear when he called the United States the only “indispensable nation” (McCrisken 2003).

A clear manifestation of this aspect of the US perspective on global justice is Washington’s reluctance to make deals or even engage in negotiation on “regional zones of influence” with other major players, especially those openly critical of the US global agenda. In Central and Eastern Europe as well as in post-Soviet Eurasia, the United States promoted accession of post-communist nations to NATO and to the European Union over the concerns of Russia (Goldgeier 1999; Marten 2018).

Having taken office in January 2017, the administration of US President Donald Trump asserted equity as the underlying principle of its relations with



© Unsplash / Joshua Rawson-Harris

Such a narrative and the corresponding strategy are based on a strong endorsement of hierarchy and equity as opposed to equality and parity. As long as hegemony is effective in “growing the pie” for the whole community of nations – or at least for those who want to bandwagon with the United States – the imperative of formal equality takes backstage.

allies and competitors alike. As the world’s most attractive market and the owner of the most powerful military, the United States demanded larger material contributions by its allies to their own security and changes in the conditions of trade with other economically advanced nations in order to restore an equitable balance of jobs in the manufacturing sector. Trump’s

narrative of America's "greatness" and the ensuing rights he claimed for the United States essentially signified his quest for equity as opposed to parity in international affairs.

As an agent of global advancement, the United States has traditionally favored change over the status quo – especially if that status quo was suboptimal, that is, plagued by an unresolved problem. The mix of solidarity with suffering people in other nations, orientation towards action to address social ills, as well as the interests of US-based transnational businesses brought about the interventionist streak in US foreign policy (Kagan 2007).

In contrast to the status-happy United States, an actor seeking to arrest the decline of its status usually promotes parity and continuity as core principles to underlie a just world order (Krickovic and Zhang 2020). Among major powers, an illustrative example is provided by Russia – a nation with a widespread belief that it has suffered from a rapid decline in status as a result of the demise of the USSR.

Russia is on the record for attaching high value to the concepts of sovereignty and "foreign policy autonomy." One may even argue that Moscow views those as ends in themselves. It means Russia cherished its determination to say "no" to the United States, because agreeing with Washington would be tantamount to forswearing an "independent" foreign policy.¹ But Russia may be painting itself into a corner: feeling obliged to stand up to the United States' preferences and overall international agenda may result in suboptimal policy decisions

that would sometimes involve higher costs but bring smaller benefits. Why would Russia nevertheless stick to its principles? The answer may have to do with the perception of justice espoused by its key policymakers and embedded in Russia's dominant foreign policy discourse, which has shown remarkable resilience and outlived individual leaders.

Russia's opposition to the United States' agenda in the post-communist era is rooted in the multipolarity doctrine formulated in the mid-1990s by the Foreign Minister of Russia at the time, Evgeny Primakov. This doctrine assumes that an international order involving several peer great powers is more stable and less prone to conflict than an order with only one superpower at the top. From the perspective of the multipolarity doctrine, the sheer arbitrariness of the sole superpower is potentially more dangerous for the international community than mutual balancing by medium-sized great powers, none of which can dictate global rules of the game.

Such a proposition is highly debatable and has been contested, one of the most powerful counterarguments being the reference to the highly conflict-ridden international politics in Europe between the two World Wars. Multipolarity is indeed also taking on the hegemonic stability literature (Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry 2001) that draws upon nineteenth-century and interwar history to posit greater stability of the world order in the presence of just one superpower with vested interests in the smooth functioning of the international institutions it designed at the peak of its relative power.

Nevertheless, even in the mid-1990s – the historical moment when Russia was conspicuously weak – Moscow remained committed to the global justice principles of parity and status quo as opposed to collective risk-taking for the sake of progress. Disregarding the arguments about the risks for Russia of a fluid alliance-making environment in Europe short of an offshore hegemon and with numerous great powers pursuing their narrowly defined national interests, Moscow continued to work against US global preponderance, refusing to recognize America's special role in the world.

According to that logic, undefeated in the Cold War, Russia was entitled to eventual restoration of parity with the United States after the period of post-communist decline and domestic turmoil ended. However, as the Russian official narrative goes, the United States tried to get the most out of the unipolar moment and is still "clinging on" to its waning hegemony as alternative centers of power have risen to challenge that hegemony over the decades since the end of the Cold War. Hence, since the end of the Cold War the quest for parity framed in justice terms could have at times blurred Moscow's strategic vision and led Russia to forswear some reasonable options of global positioning not based on obstructing US hegemonic power. The Russian case clearly illustrates the power of justice conceptions in shaping the identity and behavior of a major international player.

Compared to the US and Russian cases, Chinese mainstream conceptions of the world order are more dif-

difficult to pin down. Statements by China's top decision makers on the conceptual underpinnings of their foreign policy are intentionally vague, non-obliging, and non-controversial. When they choose to be more specific, they resort to disparate slogans (*The Economist* 2018) that hardly make for a coherent doctrine, to say nothing of a broad conception of global justice. At the same time, the actual impact of any doctrinal idea voiced or promoted by a Chinese mid-ranking government official, scholar, or intellectual entrepreneur is difficult to gauge.

The main candidate for a fundamental justice-laden concept underlying China's mainstream worldview is *tianxia* – a vision of a harmonious world striving to achieve progress, enjoying a meritocratic leadership, and undivided by any parochial forces, including those of nationalism. A Duke University Press collective volume on *tianxia* explained that the concept literally means “all under heaven.” It “refers to a system of governance held together by a regime of culture and values that transcends racial and geographical boundaries” (Wang 2017: 1). *Tianxia*'s champions have traditionally contrasted it with the international relations order whereby distinct nation-states nearsightedly pursue their narrowly defined and usually opposing interests.

While espousing *tianxia* as the intellectual backdrop of foreign policy doctrines, over the past several decades China has also been promoting a somewhat contradictory vision of the world without global or regional hegemony. Beijing's views on the vir-

tues of multipolarity – that is, the absence of an overarching authority in the international arena – largely converged with those of Moscow, which gave observers grounds to question the applicability of *tianxia* to China's actual contemporary foreign policy. However, the contradiction between *tianxia* and “multipolarity” has traditionally referred first and foremost to China's neighborhood, where Beijing claims special rights to manage conflicts, control waterways, build infrastructure, and develop the biological and mineral resources of the surrounding oceans. Beyond its neighborhood,

more with restorative justice – winning back China's rightful place in regional, if not global, governance – than with revolutionary change for the sake of progress typical of the US perspectives on justice.

With a degree of simplification, US, Russian, and Chinese approaches to justice in international affairs are summed up in Table 2. The upper row shows the spheres of application of justice principles, with columns under each “principle” comparing mainstream approaches of the three nations to the corresponding “principle.”

Concept Actor	Global order	Distribution of roles	Stability	Interventionism	Means vs. ends
United States	effectiveness	equity	change	solidarism	efficiency
China	efficiency	equity	restorative justice	statism / globalism	efficiency
Russia	equality, reciprocity	parity	status quo, continuity	statism	procedural justice

Table 2. Competing perspectives of the United States, China, and Russia on the international justice dilemmas

China seeks to project an image of a successful country whose economic advancement is fully in line with the interests of other nations – especially those receiving Chinese investment or engaging in other kinds of economic collaboration with China.

While *tianxia* as a concept cannot claim as much clarity and applicability to contemporary international affairs as the “manifest destiny” espoused by the United States, both concepts are elitist in that they value equity over parity and change over status quo. In its current interpretation, *tianxia* is aligned

Conclusion

Negotiations among major justice-conscious powers over competing perspectives on global justice have so far mainly been tacit. While the parties lay out their approaches to justice in unilateral and bilateral documents – US national security strategies, Russian doctrinal foreign policy and security documents, the Sino-Russian 2001 Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and other “white papers,” communiques, and declarations – they usually nego-

tiate on specific issues, avoiding direct conversation about the underlying conceptions of justice. However, while lurking in the background, those conceptions produce a visible – and at times decisive – impact on the outcome of talks. US–Russian negotiations on the enlargement of NATO between 1996 and 2004 as well as their discussions about possible limitations to missile defense, space weapons, and other new military technologies eventually ground to a halt largely because of their diverging views on the “status quo vs. change” dyad. Later, in the 2010s, solidarism clashed with statism in US–Russia relations as the sides traded accusations of interference in internal political affairs and elections. China and the United States found themselves unable to agree on the legal regime of the seas around China because of Beijing’s uncritical commitment to restorative justice.

The room for compromise in those negotiations was limited because reaching a deal would have required that at least one of the sides backtrack on its deep-seated conception of justice that usually stemmed from the identity of the respective party – that of the only superpower for the United States, the “honorably discharged” superpower for Russia, and *tianxia* for China. Bridging the gaps between the conflicting conceptions of justice that underlay the negotiating parties’ positions turned out to be particularly difficult.

REFERENCES

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, in: *International Organization*, 4, 52, 887–917.

Gilpin, Robert (1981), *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Goldgeier, James M. (1999), *Not Whether but When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Ikenberry, G. John (2001), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kagan, Robert (2007), *Dangerous Nation: America’s Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage Books.

Keohane, Robert O. (1984), *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Krickovic, Andrej, and Chang Zhang (2020), *Fears of Falling Short versus Anxieties of Decline: Explaining Russia and China’s Approach to Status-Seeking*, in: *Chinese Journal of International Relations*, 13, 2, 291–251.

McCracken, Trevor B. (2003), *Bill Clinton and the ‘Indispensable Nation’*, in: Trevor B. McCracken, *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 159–182.

Marten, Kimberly (2018), *Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s*, in: *European Journal of International Security*, 3, 2, 135–161.

Putin, Vladimir (2017), *Speech and Answers to Questions at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club*, 19 October, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882> (22 June 2021).

Schuessler, Rudolf, and Jan-Willem van der Rijt (eds) (2019), *Focal Points in Negotiation*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

The Economist (2018), *Mind-Boggling: China is Struggling to Explain Xi Jinping thought*, 8 November, <https://www.economist.com/china/2018/11/08/china-is-struggling-to-explain-xi-jinping-thought> (22 June 2021).

Wang, Ban (ed.) (2017), *Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Welch, David A. (1993), *Justice and the Genesis of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ENDNOTE

¹ For example, President Putin had difficulty naming another player that can act “independently” (Putin 2017).

I. William Zartman

Unripe Moments: Frequent Failures at Negotiation

The current international landscape is littered with unconsummated negotiations – instances of conflict objectively ripe for resolution where negotiations have been attempted but floundered as the conflict ambled on, sometimes sporadically, sometimes violently. In fact, if the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were a time of successful conflict management, the first decades of the current century have been marked by much negotiation that has gotten nowhere (Zartman 2019). PIN has published a whole book on failed negotiations (Faure 2012), presenting a number of ways of accounting for incomplete processes. Current negotiation breakdowns add to the list: even when compromise solutions seem available they arise from external and internal factors that make it practically – but not conceptually – impossible for the parties to seize the opportunity offered by a mutually hurting stalemate.

Negotiations have been attempted, often for long periods of time, but have made no impact on the even longer conflict in the case of the Union of Democratic Forces for the Republic (UFDR) in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Houthis in Yemen, the Karama (Dignity) Operation of Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Al-Shabab in Somalia, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/AiO), the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal, the People's Front for the Liberation of Saqiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) in Morocco, Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) in Azerbaijan, the

Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, the National Coalition of Syrian Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNC), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Not surprisingly, it appears that in most cases the fruits were ripe enough to begin negotiations, but quickly soured before a sincere search for solutions could get underway. Neither side was strong enough to make the other feel hurt or even feel that a stalemate had been reached, because of a variety of characteristics to be examined.



Pixabay / Gerd Altmann

All of the conflicts examined are asymmetrical and contain a non-state armed group (NSAG) fighting a government, although the direction of the asymmetry may be reversed when the NSAG is stronger than the state. Most cases involve a central conflict in which the NSAG is attempting to take over the central government. Casamance, Artsakh, and Western Sahara represent regionalist or secessionist cases; and although the UFDR has proclaimed a state, its goal is far more a simple cry for attention from the capital. In half the

cases (Morocco, Senegal, Syria, Israel, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia), the state is a relatively strong actor, whereas in the other half, it is the significant weakness of the state that is a major cause of both the conflict itself and the failure of the negotiations. Objectively, both types of cases produced stalemates. Even where one side appeared surprisingly strong, it was still unable to tip the balance and eliminate its opponent, the impending exception being Afghanistan.

Cases

The following sections present attempts to encapsulate the conflict and negotiations, with apologies for the condensation (it could be an outline for a book). The focus will be on structures and attitudes; if structures are the objective reality, attitudes are the conclusions and interpretations drawn from the perception of that reality. Structural analysis alone tends to miss this.

In the CAR, government coherence and effectiveness were destroyed by a series of military coups, and authority broke down into tidal ethno-religious campaigns between Christians (Anti-balaka) and Muslims (Séléka). In the poorest northeast sector of the country, Muslim tribal militias arose to call on government to provide attention to their socio-economic needs (Magnuson 2019). Several agreements were reached with the government, but each provoked a split in the movement over the negotiations themselves and the government left the agreements. Finally, the UFDR declared secession as the Dar al-Kouti chieftainship and continued its rebellion. Inability to find a valid

spokesman on either side doomed the negotiations.

In Yemen, a rather stateless polity, a Shi'a rebel group, the Houthis, have gone through six wars since 2004. When the Arab Spring called into question the government, itself a mélange of shifting tribal supporters, a Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General (UNSESG) mediated transition government and a national dialogue in 2011 (Blumi 2011; Hamidaddin 2015). But the Houthis, animated by their chant, "Death to America, Death to Israel, Victory to Islam," felt they were not sufficiently involved and began the seventh war in 2014, making major gains; they benefitted from Iranian support as the government tried to hold on with Saudi support. New UN mediation produced a number of broken ceasefires. Outside patrons enabled each side to doggedly cling to a hope of victory.

In *Libya*, the state collapsed with the assassination of Muammar Qaddafi during the Arab Spring, leaving the country in a civil war among various tribal militias. After elections produced results mirroring militias and Islamist tendencies, several attempts were made with Turkish, Qatari, and Italian support to gather these militias in a UN-backed and UN-moderated government seated in Tripoli, but they were countered by a strongman, Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who gathered the forces in the east and south with French, Russian, Egyptian, and Saudi support and besieged the government (Lacher 2020). Several UNSESGs attempted to bring about a coalition of the coalitions and then hold a new election, supposedly to be decisive; the event

will finally be held in December 2021. With self-motivated outside support, each side maneuvered to fill the power vacuum.

In *Somalia*, the collapse of the state and anarchy among the various factions came with the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1979, leading to one or more secessions in the north (Somaliland) and northeast (Puntland). In the main part of the country, the UN tried to install a government but so did several Islamic groups moving in to fill the power vacuum (Menkhaus 2021). After the failure of the Islamic Courts Movement, a radical youth group, Al-Shabab, took over, exacting a harsh rule and spreading into neighboring Kenya. A transition government aided by the UN turned into an authoritarian venture in 2021. As in Yemen and Afghanistan, the principles of religious inspiration vs. international authorization provided the legitimization that prevented agreement.

In *Sudan*, an already broken-up state, a half-century conflict became the subject of serious US activity after an intense campaign by the American Protestant (primarily Evangelical) community. Working with the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and its Kenyan mediator, an agreement was achieved in 2005 for a test period of six years, followed by a referendum. The vote in 2011 produced an independent South Sudan, which immediately fell into tribal war between its two main factions – the Dinka and others behind President Salva Kiir, and the Nuer and others behind Vice-President Riek Machar (SPLMiO). Repeated mediation by IGAD states over the fol-

lowing decade finally produced a Revised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in 2018; results are still being watched. In a society of retributive justice, trust and conciliation are outside the tradition.




Pixabay / Gordon Johnson

In *Afghanistan*, a collapsed state at best, the aerial attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 (9/11) organized by al-Qaeda led to the US invasion of Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda was based. In the ensuing vacuum, a group of radical students, the Taliban, seized government until they were overthrown by a US and Allied invasion. But when the elected government turned out to be corrupt and ineffective, the Taliban rose again and pursued a military campaign, eventually taking over the country as the US ran away and the government collapsed. After two decades, the United States decided to negotiate its own withdrawal in exchange for a promise of a liberal social regime and no haven for al-Qaeda. In tangled negotiation logic, when the threat of leaving provided an untenable agreement for its departure, the United States held to its end of the proposed bargain and fled in 2021, unprepared for its defeat.



Pixabay / Gordon Johnson

In *Senegal*, a functioning state, the Casamançais believed that their isolated region in the south had been promised its own independence by the end of the first decade of Senegalese independence (Diallo 2015). When, in 1980, this proved to be an illusion, a peaceful protest was suppressed violently and the MFDC was formed, launching a guerrilla war against the state. President Abdou Diouf repressed the movement but reached a last-minute ceasefire that collapsed; his successor, Abdoulaye Wade, promised a conclusion of the conflict in 100 days but only produced a second temporary settlement that he considered conclusive and then let the issue drop. Under President Macky Sall, the Swiss Center for Humanitarian Dialog (CHD) and the Italian St. Egidio undertook mediation with the two wings of the movement, but without conclusion as the two wings competed for a non-agreement. In his second term, Sall launched a campaign of military repression as the talks foundered. However, after decades of delay the Casamance was finally attached to Senegal by the construction of a bridge across the Gambia River, and the de facto isolation was reduced.



Pixabay / Gordon Johnson

In *Morocco*, a strong state, the Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara in 1973 was accompanied by a Moroccan Green March (which included the army) to occupy the territory, shared with Mauritania. However, a nationalist group, the POLISARIO Front, set up refugee camps in neighboring Algeria, from which it waged war on Moroccan forces. It eliminated the Mauritanian claim, pushed the Moroccan army into a stalemate, and declared itself a state – the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was admitted into the African Union. A ceasefire was declared by the UN in 1991 in order to hold a referendum, but in the following years the two sides were unable to agree on a voters' list, despite the mediation of a series of UNSESGs (Mohsen-Finan 1997). Finally, in 2007, Morocco offered a compromise solution of autonomy within the kingdom, but this, too, was refused by the POLISARIO, which remains in camps in Algeria and holds about 15 percent of the now-Moroccan Sahara. The incompatibility of the principles of postcolonial succession and historic legitimacy vs. national liberation and national self-determination left little room for negotiation and compromise.

In the *Caucasus*, the Soviet policy for dealing with the nationalities problem was to mix national groups in various Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). Thus an Armenian population was contained outside Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh province of the Azerbaijan SSR, and the Turkic-speaking Azeri region of Nakhchevan was separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by the Armenian SSR. On the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh rose with Armenian help to claim its independence; a ceasefire was arranged in 1993 by Russia, the United States, and France in the OSCE Minsk Group, leaving the secessionist government as Artsakh claiming independence for Nagorno-Karabakh and a larger occupied territory surrounding it. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan collected arms and allies and in 2021 launched an offensive with significant Turkish help; Russia was able to mediate a ceasefire after the occupied territories, and much of Nagorno-Karabakh was regained by Azerbaijan, but a reduced Artsakh was left, with a corridor to Armenia. Each side clung uncompromisingly to its international law principle in the conflict of national self-determination vs. state territorial integrity.

In *Ethiopia*, a strong post-revolutionary government led by the TPLF elected an Oromo successor, Abiy Ahmed, who adopted a new policy of national union of the tribal parties. He also ended two decades of war with neighboring Eritrea, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize. But the move was in fact a means of gaining support in his efforts to tame the TPLF, which made moves to obtain

greater autonomy and undermine the national unity policy. The government responded with a savage invasion of the province in 2020, and a massacre and starvation of Tigrayan leaders and people ensued, despite attempts by local elders and African leaders to mediate the conflict.

In *Syria*, a strong if unraveling state, Arab Spring protests spread in 2011 and by the next year, the government of Bashar al-Assad began to feel strains, including the loss of some of his army to a highly factionalized resistance (Aita 2015). Despite Russian air support, the regime continued to lose positions. Within the power vacuum particularly in eastern Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Da'esh) arose, to be met by increasing Western and Russian opposition; in its disarray, the Syrian resistance began to include Islamist factions as well, some connected with al-Qaeda. By 2015, Russian troops were involved in saving the regime, Turkish troops moved across the border to keep Kurds in Turkish territory separate from Kurdish forces in eastern Syria, which American troops were supporting, and a Turkish-supported al-Qaeda resistance clung to the northwestern province of Idlib. Rather than negotiate, each outside party took a piece of Syria and held on.

In *Israel*, the independence war in 1948 left it with 51 percent of the territory, but by the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, it had taken 77 percent. Israel's dream if not overt aim is to unite the whole territory of the area formerly known as Mandatory Palestine in a one-state solution under its rule; the goal of the Palestinian Authority, which

has recognized Israel, is to hang onto the remaining 23 percent in a two-state solution, even though it longs for its own one-state solution. Relations between the two deeply unequal parties have been stable under Israel's firm and growing hand. But relations with

elements? What impedes successful negotiations, conflict resolution to bring long-standing conflicts to an end, or even just conflict management? What is stopping the implementation of stable ceasefires to give the conflicting parties time to cool down



© Pixabay / OpenClipart-Vectors

one arm of the Palestinians, the elected government of Hamas in Gaza, have erupted on the slightest pretext, as Hamas seeks, in vain, to raise violent protest over Israeli occupation. Four times (2008, 2010, 2012, 2021), Egypt has brokered a ceasefire between the two parties, who have vowed not to speak to each other. The first three truces broke down when the moment of violence had passed, and the latest one looks no more promising.

Causes

What are the causes of process failure in these cases, and are there common

and, having been burned, turn to an effort to end the dispute?

The basic dispute in almost all cases is over political control of a sovereign territory. In a few cases – Casamance, Western Sahara, Palestine, Artsakh – the issue of sovereignty over a territory was a post-colonial issue and a zero-sum contest. Such issues by their nature alone can account for the failure of negotiation, until the stand-off becomes so costly that it is untenable. Usually, compromises are possible (Zartman 2020). In Casamance, development cooperation can submerge the call for independence, and in Western Sahara

and Artsakh, the half-loaf of autonomy has been mooted; but there is no alternative to a two-state solution for Palestine and Israel. In the other cases, the issue of control over an already sovereign state is also zero-sum, although power-sharing in some form may be a solution to consider. But behind these factors are even more obdurate elements that keep the zero-sum status in place.

Hopefully it sounds more like a gospel singer with a repeated refrain than a broken record when I emphasize that the basic cause for failure in a process analysis is the absence of ripeness for negotiation: there was no stalemate in which each side felt it was hurting, and no sense that a way out was attainable through negotiation. Importantly, this is not to say that objectively there was no stalemate; it is just that the parties did not feel it, nor did they feel the harm that it was causing to their resources, projections, and conditions. Indeed, in most cases – Western Sahara, Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, and Palestine – one or more parties could arguably contest that there is a stalemate at all, at least in the short run, because the conflict is still going on, with at least one side still feeling that victory is possible and necessary. That perception could be contested in the long run, but long-term vision is not widespread, especially when fighting is ongoing. In these cases – equally divided between strong and weak states – the NSAG itself was not strong enough to make the state feel stalemated or vice versa. But the next question is, why was the stalemate not perceived, and even felt painfully?

Before digging further, unusual situations were witnessed in the CAR and Senegal, where rebellions were not simply against the government but *for* government attention – a cry of pain for more, not less, attention from the central authority. Northeast CAR on the dry fringes of Sudan, and the southern enclave of Senegal, nearly amputated by the penetration of Gambia, appealed for a reversal of government neglect. The respective states did not perceive the situation as a stalemate because they paid no attention to the neglected areas in the first place.

One answer to the absence of pain lies in one or more parties' firm and unshakable commitment to its/their cause/s. Unshakable conviction can indeed be shaken, in the long run, by defeat, fatigue, and conversion, but these are very long-term effects; commitment is the weak party's answer to military force, as the early Christians knew, among others. A blinding commitment – as in Western Sahara, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria – makes a party impervious not only to appeals to compromise but also to pain; continuing the fight is good for the causes, which will win out in the end, and rewards are elsewhere. Such commitment may come from a religious ideology – as in Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan – but also less philosophically from the belief in the necessity and attainability of the cause – as in Western Sahara, Libya, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Israel.

The commitment may also be to the leaders' followers, who have been told of the inevitability of victory as a payment for public support; reversal is political suicide for the leaders. Too much

blood and treasure has been invested in the entrapment to be outweighed by anything a compromise could offer; there is a double commitment as a result – to the issue of the conflict and to the political and material investment sunk in trying to attain it. The Saharan, Artsakh, and Ethiopian cases each show this effect on both sides. Why negotiate when one will *and must* win?

An opposite effect comes from the disorganization and fragmentation preoccupied with infighting and rivalries; one or more parties may be unable to see a stalemate right under its nose, or, upon seeing the stalemate, may splinter over what to do about it, in an instance of the much understudied TQ (tactical question – fight or talk?) (Zartman and Alfredson 2010). Libya, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Sudan are cases of fragmentation's blocking negotiation by preventing the emergence of a valid spokesman. For the same reasons, it may not be possible for a spokesman to negotiate even when offered the opportunity; concession is a sign of weakness in the eyes of the internal opponent – as in Casamance, the CAR, and Syria.

An exceptionally strong cause of negotiation breakdown in at least half the cases is the presence or even direct involvement of foreign supporters, a characteristic of the twenty-first century system of world disorder with which this discussion began. External assistance can hold off a stalemate and certainly the sense of pain, reinforce a commitment, or encourage fragmentation. External involvement need not be in direct support of a party; it can also be designed to seize the oppor-

tunity offered by a power vacuum, or sometimes even simply to prevent a rival from doing the same thing first – as in the CAR, Western Sahara, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. It is important to point out that in no case was the NSAG a proxy – in the sense of a creation – of the supporting state; it had its own reasons for the fight, often quite different from its external supporters, and on occasion was the tail that wagged the dog. It is hard to argue a painful stalemate when foreign support is assured by benefits from the conflict for the foreign patron.


A final cause for missed ripeness and failed negotiation can be found at the hands of the mediator or peacemaker, often for standard reasons. A weak and unsupported mandate leaves the mediator with nothing but his own persuasiveness to effectuate his mission, as in the CAR, Senegal, Western Sahara, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Palestine, Sudan, and Afghanistan. In Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Western Sahara, the UN mediator was sent out naked with orders to bring peace while being undercut by rivalries within the mandating agency, as was also the case for US mediators in Palestine and Afghanistan. In these instances, it was usually not the persona of the mediator that was ineffective but rather the restraints under which s/he operated and the lack of resources and muscle at her/his disposal. Mediators cannot fabricate pain or stalemate; they can only convince the parties that it is there.

Strategies and Tactics

In each case, the application of the generalized causes of failure will need to be adjusted to fit the contours of the individual instance, party, and moment. There are two ways of helping to produce a ripe moment when the sense of one is absent among the parties (Zartman and de Soto 2012): either by hardening the objective stalemate or by ripening the parties' subjective sense of it. The first must come from the mediator's backers or mandators, since the mediator is unlikely to have a command of effective measures; these can include sanctions, arms transfers, and allies' support, among others; as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said about his trip to Iraq, "It is good to engage in peacemaking, but it is even better when one has a threat of force to back him up." The second is primarily the challenge of the mediator, who faces the dilemma of convincing the ruler that victory is impossible while simultaneously not alienating him/her and losing his/her contact (as happened with the UN mediators in Syria).

Not as frequently observed is the need for keeping the sense of ripeness alive or at least revivable until the negotiations find a firm footing. Too often, the process starts but soon loses its momentum because the stalemate seems to weaken, opportunities to break out arise, or the pain is lessened by some help from friends. How often did a ripe moment seem to appear in Palestine, Syria, or Sudan, only to be upset as the conflict returned with force?

Toward the other end of the peace process, it is important that the sense of a way out – to again take up the language of ripeness – be transformed along the process into a mutually enticing opportunity. The mediator's second job – the first being one ripening – is to help the parties find a way out of their painful impasse through cooperation with each other. But for that, the mediator and outside parties must keep alive the threat of hurt if the stalemate returns. That can be a powerful alternative to a mediated agreement (BATNA) even if it disrupts the positive atmosphere of finding one.



Pixabay / Gordon Johnson

Above all, broad external support for the activity of peacemaking is crucial (Zartman 2020). Mediation and helpful measures were often outside the realm of important interest for relevant states. Frequently, the issue was in an area of concern, but engagement was rejected for fear of offending one or more of the parties. Thus, the United States and France, though favorable to Morocco, at first did not support inter-mediate solutions in the Western Sahara over concerns about the likely negative Algerian reaction, but the United States finally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in 2021; the humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Yemen were decried

by the United States, but more direct action was hampered by a low level of interest or by concerns over relations with the principal parties to the conflict. Among the cases listed here, only in Sudan was the mediator supported by actions from the home office. Yet international support for peace efforts is crucial, from international figures known for their participation in past efforts, or from international friends or contact groups endorsing steps such as ceasefires, even unilaterally.

More than simply overcoming ambivalence, the foreign supporter takes the challenge of ripeness to a higher level. The negotiation process has often broken down because the foreign patron did not feel that the chance of victory was waning. In the process, it actually became involved for secondary – even frivolous – reasons not directly connected to its national security, but rather to fill a void or prevent the rise of a rival. Countering such actions by an external rival is usually not worth the cost. The Russian release of Soviet support for national liberation movements provides an example of a helpful move, but one that shows that such shifts are major events not easily achieved.

Another major obstacle, the ideological or religious commitment of a party to its cause, is difficult to circumvent. As noted in dealing with terrorists (Faure and Zartman 2010), one cannot negotiate belief systems, only the creed's acceptance or authorization of violence. But reducing violence does not counter political conviction or authorize conciliation. The only way for

that to happen is to foster fatigue and encourage splits within the movement, along with material or political gain. The effect was present on both sides in Syria – inconclusively, however.

What is striking is that these reasons for negotiation collapse – ideological commitment, foreign involvement, zero-sum issues – are beyond the purview of the usual negotiation process of concession, compensation, and construction. They are impervious to the power of the BATNA; in fact, they are the BATNA to the parties. It is hard to invoke the threat of alternatives when broken negotiations are viewed as preferable. This is the dilemma that this article highlights, the persistence of current conflicts that are locked in by effects outside the negotiation process.



REFERENCES

- Aita, Samir (2015), *Suria: Aspirations and Fragmentations*, in: I. William Zartman (ed.), *Arab Spring: Negotiations in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 291–331.
- Blumi, Isa (2011), *Chaos in Yemen. Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Diallo, Boucounta (2015), *La crise casamançaise: Problématique et voies de solutions*, Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Faure, Guy Olivier (ed.) (2012), *Unfinished Business: Why International Negotiations Fail*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Faure, Guy Olivier, and I. William Zartman (eds) (2010), *Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics*, London: Routledge.
- Hamidaddin, Abdullah (2015), *Yemen: Negotiations with Tribes, States, and Memories*, in: I. William Zartman (ed.), *Arab Spring: Negotiations in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 116–144.
- Lacher, Wolfram (2020), *Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict*, London: I. B. Tauris.
- Magnuson, Salama (2019), *Negotiations with Non-State Actors*, PhD Dissertation, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University.
- Menkhaus, Ken (2021), *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, Adelphi Paper 364, London and New York: Routledge.
- Mohsen-Finan, Khadija (1997), *Sahara Occidental: Les enjeux d'un conflit régional*, Paris: CNRS.
- Zartman, I. William (2020), *Negotiating Zero-Sum Conflict over Territory*, in: *PINPoints*, 47, 5–6.
- Zartman, I. William (2019), *Fragmented Conflict: Handling the Current World Disorder*, in: *Global Policy*, 10, S2, 6–13.
- Zartman, I. William, and Tanya Alfredson (2010), *Negotiating with Terrorists and the Tactical Question*, in: Rafael Reuveny and William Thompson (eds), *Coping with Terrorism*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 247–286.
- Zartman, I. William, and Alvaro de Soto (2012), *Ring Mediation Initiatives*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Valérie Rosoux

Historical Analogies and International Negotiation

In the aftermath of mass atrocities, negotiators and mediators walk a tightrope between the present and the future but cannot simply ignore the past.¹ But is it possible to rely only on the so-called “lessons of the past” in order to move on (May 1973; Neustadt and May 1986)? What are the scope and limits of precedents in deadlocked situations? Does the use of historical analogies really impact peace processes? More importantly, is analogical reasoning a creative goal to be pursued (Spector 1995) or a trap to be avoided? Does it help overcome established impasses, or does it provoke them? Individually and collectively, these quandaries point to an overarching question: to what extent can negotiators and mediators learn from past experiences in order to mediate and negotiate the “hardest cases”?

These questions imply a particular research posture, requiring one to consider not only the reality of the events that occurred, but also – and above all – the meaning and emotions, if not the passions, that are attached to them (Hassner 2015). The objective is not to distinguish “good” and “bad” analogies, “relevant” and “superficial” ones, or “sound” and “unsound” ones (Fischer 1970: 251). It is rather to stress the ambivalence of historical analogies that are neither positive nor negative per se – meaning that their value fundamentally depends on the objective being pursued.

Accordingly, the question posed here is whether historical analogies impede conflict resolution or whether they can guide stalemated talks toward just and fair solutions. In dissect-

ing the processes related to the weight and the uses of the past, the idea is not to claim that the appropriateness – or lack of appropriateness – of historical analogies is the determinant of provision and success in the hardest cases. Scrutinizing the dynamics related to the long-term memory of protracted conflicts does not imply any disregard for the structural factors that to a large extent determine the process. In all cases, the balance of power and the evolution of parties’ interests are among the most compelling variables to be considered. Similarly, geopolitical, economic, social factors are so critical that they simply cannot be neglected. Nonetheless, the ways in which the past is interpreted, misinterpreted, or even manipulated contribute to and help create the context that shapes international negotiations.

The political use of the past is not a new phenomenon. In classical times, historical references were already one of the most favored arguments used in the Greek literature. The philosopher Demosthenes, a Greek statesman and orator of ancient Athens, systematically referred to the past to provide solutions to the political problems of his time. Isocrates, one of the most influential Greek rhetoricians, used history to promote new types of relationships between individuals. Aeschines, also among the ten Attic orators, regularly denounced threats to democracy by relying on references to the past. Since then, leaders, philosophers, diplomats, professional negotiators, and mediators have often considered history a useful guide for their decisions – whether to justify their positions or to condemn or praise

proposals. This is not surprising, since history is suited to multiple – if not contradictory – interpretations, and thereby provides an infinite repertoire of possibilities.

In the last 50 years, historical analogies have received increased interest from scholars in the fields of political science, history, and psychology, who have considered both their instrumental and cognitive uses. Historical analogies draw parallels between past and current events (comparing, for example, the 9/11 attack in New York to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor). They signify

“an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one aspect, then they may also agree in another one.” (Khong 1992: 6–7; Ghilani et al. 2017: 275)

They provide, in other words, “shortcuts to rationality” (Jervis 1976: 220). Like metaphorical analogies, historical analogies help make the world intelligible and frame possible actions. However, historical analogies are distinct from metaphors that compare semantically distant domains (comparing, for instance, the 9/11 attack in New York to a move in a chess game) (Ghilani et al. 2017: 275; Spector 1995). Beyond this distinction, it might be interesting to further explore the range of potential references to past experiences. If most precedents are related to “event-to-event” parallels, we could also consider the possibility of an “event-to-concept” reference (9/11 being understood as an aggressive attack, for instance) or an “event-to-model”

reference (9/11 being associated not only with an aggressive attack, but also with the need for a defensive response). Likewise, “concept-to-event” or “model-to-event” references could also be conceivable.²

From a cognitive perspective, negotiators and mediators draw upon the past in order to cope with the uncertainty and ambiguity of novel situations. In doing so, they organize and often simplify unfamiliar information in a coherent manner (Gillespie et al. 1999). In this way, negotiators and mediators use history to try to learn from the past in order to discover which attitude in the present is appropriately comparable. From a more political perspective, negotiators and mediators use the past opportunistically to rationalize choices they have already made on other grounds. Most scholars strictly distinguish these two approaches; however, they can sometimes be non-mutually exclusive. Cognitive and political uses of the past are closely intertwined most of the time. Memory shapes negotiators and mediators – they are partly formed through its action – and they in turn influence the content of memory by their own representations. As the case studies show, it is vital to account for both dynamics.

If we consider all the stages of a negotiation process, at least five sets of questions can be addressed regarding the role of historical analogies. In raising these questions, the objective is not to gauge the accuracy of the historical analogies: as suggested by the case studies, the most important point does not concern their scrutiny (Korn-

probst 2007), but their functions and consequences for the negotiation process. The first set of questions regards agency. Who refers to the past? Do all parties involved in the negotiation process draw explicitly upon history? If so, a symmetry can be observed between parties with respect to the past. Asymmetrical situations are conceivable when the past is perceived as useful for some and embarrassing for others. Aside from the parties them-

being often directly based on precedents), or do they keep looking back during the preliminary contacts and the information phase? Do they prefer to use historical analogies in the argumentation phase, the adjustment phase, or both? Continuity (when parties underline historical analogies throughout the whole process) and discontinuity (when they do not play the history card except at precise moments) are also conceivable variables.



© Pixabay / Arek Socha

selves, what is the specific attitude of mediators vis-à-vis the past? Do they look back and search for precedents, or do they consider each novel configuration to be unprecedented? More significantly, in whose name do negotiators and mediators refer to the past? In using historical analogies to describe current events, (how) do they express loyalty towards past, current, and/or future generations?

A second type of question relates to timing. When do negotiators and mediators rely on the lessons of the past? Do they refer to the past only during the preparation phase (the diagnostic

A third type of question focuses on the process itself. How do negotiators and mediators build their “database” of available historical analogies? Do they proceed spontaneously or more intentionally? Some parties create archives even before sitting down at the negotiation table. Others apprehend the “diagnostic phase” under the guidance of experienced advisers or even historians. Moreover, why in any given case do some historical analogies come to the fore and others not? From a more psychological perspective, do leaders and negotiators share the existential concerns anchored in past traumatic

events? This question is key to understanding dynamics, turning points, and potential entrapments. However, it raises the issue of conscious/unconscious processes, which remains highly challenging for political scientists and social scientists.

A fourth type of question concentrates on the past itself. To what kinds of recollections of the past do negotiators and mediators refer? Do they evoke vivid memories (based on their person-

The fifth series of questions underscore the impact of historical analogies. What are their concrete consequences in terms of outcomes? In short, what is the efficacy of historical analogies? Do they enable the parties to move on, or do they reinforce the deadlock? Do they “open” the minds of the negotiators, or do they rather “close” them (Klapp 1978)?

Most case studies provide rich evidence of negotiators drawing on his-

with the memories rather than without them or against them.

REFERENCES

Fischer, David Hackett (1970), *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*, New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Gillespie, James J., Leih L. Thompson, Jeffrey Loewenstein, and Dedre Gentner (1999), *Lessons from Analogical Reasoning in the Teaching of Negotiation*, in: *Negotiation Journal*, XV, 4, 363–371.

Ghilani, Djouaria et al. (2017), *Looking Forward to the Past: An Interdisciplinary Discussion on the Use of Historical Analogies and Their Effects*, in: *Memory Studies*, X, 3, 274–285.

Hassner, Pierre (2015), *La revanche des passions*, Paris: Fayard.

Jervis, Robert (1976), *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Khong, Yuen Foong (1992), *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam. Decisions of 1965*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Klapp, Orrin E. (1978), *Opening and Closing: Strategies of Information Adaptation in Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klar, Yechiel (2014), *From 'Do Not Arouse or Awaken Love Until it so Desires' through 'Return to Zion' to 'Conquest of the Land': Paradigms Shifts and Sanctified Reenactments in Building the Jewish State*, in: *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, XXXIII, November, 87–99.

	<i>Escalation</i>	<i>De-escalation</i>
<i>Common past</i>	Conflictual	Harmonious
<i>Past of my group</i>	Unfair – Heroic	Ambivalent
<i>Past of the Other</i>	Ferocious	Ambivalent
<i>Past of a third party</i>	Precedent as a counter-model	Precedent as a model

Table 1 Repertoire of References to the Past
© Valérie Rosoux

al experience), transmitted memories (from one generation to another in family circles, for instance, knowing that transmitted memories are not systematically less powerful than vivid ones), and/or official memories (representations of the events that are presented as decisive in the life of a nation)? What are the familiar stories or the mythologized events that reduce uncertainty and provide coherent pictures (Klar 2014)? Do the chosen narratives that are highlighted at critical junctions accentuate “near precedents” (drawing parallels between relatively recent events) or “far precedents” (distant references that remain meaningful in the culture or religion of the parties, such as, for instance, references to the return of the Jewish exiles from Babylon, the fall of Jerusalem, or the Crusades)?

As illustrated in Table 1, the historical analogies they use are related to a broad repertoire. Four main categories of evocations can be delineated: the parties’ common past (be it conflictual or harmonious, related to wars, previous talks, or even common victories – see Table 1); the past of their own group (presented as unfair, heroic, or ambivalent, i.e. characterized by glorious and embarrassing events); the past of the Other (most often qualified as ferocious unless rapprochement is needed); and the past of third parties (concerning mainly international precedents that are presented as either models to be applied or counter-models to be avoided at all cost). The examination of such categories might help us to better understand how negotiators and mediators can try to live

Kornprobst, Markus (2007), *Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies*, in: *Millennium*, XXXVI, 1, 29–49.

May, Ernest R. (1973), 'Lessons' of the Past. *The Use and Misuse of the History in American Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May (1986), *Thinking in Time. The Uses of History for Decision-Makers*, New York: Collier Macmillan/Freedom Press.

Spector, Bertram I. (1995), *Creativity Heuristics for Impasse Resolution: Reframing Intractable Negotiations*, in: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, DXXXII, 1, 81–99.

ENDNOTES

1 *An extended version of this article was published in International Negotiations, vol. 24 (3), 2019, 493–522.*

2 *I would like to thank I. William Zartman for this insightful suggestion.*

G I G A

German  Institute for Global and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien

Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
20354 Hamburg
Germany
www.giga-hamburg.de



Policy Advice Based On Cutting-Edge Research

The German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) is an independent social science research institute funded by the Hamburg Ministry of Science, Research, Equalities, and Districts and the German Federal Foreign Office. Its mission is to analyze political, social, and economic developments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as global issues. The GIGA is committed to a global approach to scholarship, which entails incorporating perspectives,

concepts, and experiences from these different world regions. As a member of the Leibniz Association, the institute is dedicated to the principle of “*theoria cum praxi*”: science for the benefit of society. Research-based policy advice forms a key part of the GIGA’s mandate.

GIGA President Prof. Amrita Narlikar is a member of the PIN Steering Committee. The GIGA has hosted the secretariat of PIN since 2018.



www.giga-hamburg.de

Guy Olivier Faure

Book Review

Negotiations: Lessons from the Past

Two recently published works on negotiation deserve particular attention, *The Negotiator: The Masterclass at Saint-Germain* by Francis Walder (London: Unicorn, 2021) and *Landmark Negotiations from around the World: Lessons for Modern Diplomacy* edited by Emmanuel Vivet (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2019), the first being a translation of a book published in 1958 (Paris: Gallimard) that was awarded at the time the prestigious Goncourt Prize.

The Negotiator deals with the Peace of Saint-Germain, which was signed in 1570 between two representatives of the Catholic king of France and two Protestant noblemen. The tactics, maneuvers, and compromises they resort to for the possession of two cities, Sancerre and Angoulême, constitute the material of this story, which also draws on psychology and the historical context. A woman appears, endowed with a power of seduction only to disappear at some point. The treaty is ultimately concluded, and the author, embodied by one of the king's negotiators, questions the value of his action. During his career, he has accomplished various missions from which he applies the lessons he has learned. In addition, what he offers the reader is a "portrait of the negotiator" with his finesse, tricks, and shenanigans, all cleverly used. The negotiation is conducted in an apparently most civilized context where good manners seem to reign, but in reality is dominated by latent violence. Everything takes place in negotiation under the sign of ambiguity and in the gray zone because, as he affirms in the first lines of the book,

"Truth is not the opposite of lying, betraying is not the opposite of serving, hating is not the opposite of loving, trust is not the opposite of mistrust, nor rectitude that of falsehood."

Landmark Negotiations from Around the World analyzes 30 negotiations, from Roman diplomacy during the Republic (Stouder) to Christopher Columbus negotiating with the Catholic monarchs (Caldwell), the Congress of Vienna (Meerts), the first British embassy in China (Faure), and those in the framework of the two World Wars (Homrighausen; Vivet; Stimec), along with more recent examples such as the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran (Laboulaye; Langenegger), the peace agreement with the FARC in Colombia (Schram), and the Trump/Kim summit in Singapore

(Young), to name but a few. This book brings together the subject areas of history and negotiation studies, focusing on their overlap and analyzing the negotiation narratives by applying elaborate concepts of negotiation theory. An impressive number of variables are considered as having been essential to the reaching of these agreements or the failure to do so, such as the credibility of the negotiator, the anchoring position, the power of perseverance, linkage dynamics, ripeness, readiness, trust, the sequential approach of the problem, building up packages, information gathering, concession management, ambiguity, secrecy, honor, face, management of powerful symbols, surprise, fear, uncertainty, escalation, uncontrolled hatred, and the ability to make effective use of a turning point.

Aside from both books' general intention to contribute to knowledge about negotiation, they have many other elements in common, such as the form of presentation. These are stories, testimonies on negotiations of a historical nature. However, their analyses come in different forms. *The Negotiator* slips in its reflections in the form of a fictional autobiography, while *Landmark Negotiations* radically separates the analysis from the narrative with a similar structure for all accounts. Conceptual convergence is strong under somewhat different vocabularies. The semantics of the practitioner are often quite different from those used by the researcher: anger, guile, lies, and manipulation are transformed, for example, into emotional outbursts, hidden moves, misrepresentation, and reframing techniques.

The main differences lie in the international dimension of the negotiations chosen in *Landmark Negotiations* with its cognitive, cultural, and value-based components. Historically, discussions between Catholics and Protestants, all French and heirs to the same Christian culture, barely two decades after the start of the Reformation in France, do not feature protagonists displaying notable cultural differences.

Each negotiation is unique, singular by virtue of its object, its participants, and the context in which it takes place. The result is explained by the process, which is conditioned by internal and external variables such as the psychology of the actors, the issues, the balance of power, and cultural differences. Drawing general conclusions presents considerable but not insurmountable difficulties, as most of the PIN's works show by systematically presenting two

conclusions, one intended for researchers and the other for practitioners. It might thus be opportune to follow up on *Landmark Negotiations* by compiling the many lessons that the book contains. This task has been done, for example, in the book edited by I. William Zartman (2000) *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflict*, in which lessons are drawn from African, Arab, and Chinese wisdom as expressed through a dozen cases.

The question of causation is central to any analysis of negotiation, and it is explored explicitly in *Landmark Negotiations: We know why and how the Good Friday Agreement on the Northern Ireland conflict was concluded in 1998* (Berreta). We learn about the variable that explains how France and Spain came to sign the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 (Vivet). We comprehend why the main monuments of Paris were not destroyed when the German army was forced to fall back from the capital in August 1944 (Stimec). We understand how Europe rebuilt a balance at the end of the Napoleonic Wars with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Meerts). We also grasp why that meeting between two civilizations, the Western and the Chinese, in 1793, ended in blatant failure (Faure).

The Negotiator offers us a very detailed analysis in which personalities play a major role, psychology is mixed with cold strategic calculations, and the profusion of tactics animates the story and feeds the strategies. Emotions also have their place here, as in any real human interaction. The overall negotiation is an exercise in diplomatic lacework taking place on the edge of the abyss.

The issue of causality raises that of effectiveness. An effective negotiation must reach a stable agreement: a lasting result. At the same time, negotiations are trapped in an evolving context, and what is possible at one point is no longer possible the following decade. This is the case with the sophisticated construction of *The Negotiator*, which ended two years later with the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre in which nearly 30,000 Protestants were murdered. *Landmark Negotiations* abounds in examples of failures or unsuccessful negotiations, such as the German "all-or-nothing" approach in 1917 (Vivet) linked to the First World War, the Constantinople Conference (Dasque) in 1876–1877,

and the Trump and Kim Singapore Summit 2018 (Young). There is much to learn from failures, as examined in the article by Zartman in this issue of *PINPoints* and demonstrated in *Unfinished Business: Why International Negotiations Fail* (Faure 2012), another PIN book in which 39 main reasons for possible negotiation failure are highlighted.

The question of method raised in Zartman's introduction to *Landmark Negotiations* is important because it relates to the relevance and usefulness of both types of work. This collection of cases adopts an inductive approach. Cases speak for themselves, but "all negotiations are sui generis," as rightly underlined. The deep nature of idiosyncratic events makes any comparison/integration an intellectual and methodological challenge. To what extent do the findings hold beyond the case itself? *The Negotiator* draws on a deductive approach. The author starts from a well-established analytical framework, even if it remains implicit, and applies it to a particular situation, a problem of allocation of resources – in this case, the distribution of cities between Catholics and Protestants to put an end to the Wars of Religion.

In practice, the analyst, as shown in both books, does not adopt a unitary approach but rather a mix of approaches. When the explanation comes, the "inductivist" also has to make use of concepts belonging to well-established theories as analytical tools. The "deductivist," although equipped with a conceptual analysis system, might also be led by the case and turn inductive. Whatever formula is adopted, subjectivity is never absent, whether regarding the construction of the story or the analytical angle of approach.

"History is the science of the misfortune of men,"

concluded a French writer (Queneau 1966), trying to take stock of and summarize what we know about the history of humanity. Negotiation, when well applied, may be a balm to the wounds of events, thus amply justifying its interventions. It is this purpose that the two works discussed here intelligently serve.

■

REFERENCES

Faure, Guy Olivier (ed.) (2012), *Unfinished Business: Why International Negotiations Fail*, Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Queneau, Raymond (1966), *Une Histoire Modèle*, Paris: Gallimard.

Vivet, Emmanuel (ed.) (2019), *Landmark Negotiations from around the World: Lessons for Modern Diplomacy*, Cambridge, UK: Intersentia.

Walder, Francis (2021), *The Negotiator: The Masterclass at Saint-Germain*, translated by Gerald Lees, London: Unicorn, originally published as *Saint-Germain ou la négociation* (1958), Paris: Gallimard.

Zartman, I. William (ed.) (2000), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflict: African Conflict Medicine*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Book Preview

Negotiating Justice: From Conflict to Agreement

Edited by Cecilia Albin

How do parties to international negotiations handle conflicting notions of justice? What impact do they, and the manner in which they are addressed, have on the process and the outcome? Can justice contribute to effective agreements, or any agreement at all, in this context?

The significance of these questions emerges across the spectrum of international affairs. Divergent views of justice are very common indeed, and frequently undermine collaboration even when the stakes are high and widely shared. From the outset a key challenge in climate change negotiations, for example, has been conflicting notions of who should undertake how extensive greenhouse gas emission cuts – given inequalities in past, current and future projected emission levels – and at whose cost – given differences in responsibility for the problem, in resources and in gains to be had from emission abatement. In another core area of global security, namely negotiations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), charges regarding lack of fairness and balance in the implementation of treaty obligations is a recurrent theme (Melamud, Meerts, and Zartman 2014). Sharp critique of nuclear states for failing to engage seriously in disarmament is one issue which often causes stale-mates. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), opposing notions of procedural justice frequently become stumbling blocks in negotiations which prevent or undermine effective agreement.

All justice conflicts do not make it to the negotiating table or to a negotiated solution. As with other matters, negotiations normally get underway only when each party sufficiently recognizes a dependency on or mutual gains to be had from a joint solution. Thus the stark inequality in the international distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, for example, will be hard to resolve through negotiations. Despite recognition that the pandemic must be fought globally, rich countries have bought up most supplies of vaccines to date for their own populations. The moral (and self-interested) obligation of national leaders to prioritize the well-being of their own populations in the first instance clashes, or seems to clash, with considerations of international justice and solidarity.

This book explores in depth how justice is, and may best be, negotiated when parties adhere to conflicting notions of what it means and requires. “Conflicting notions” refer to the endorsement of different principles, or to conflicting interpretations of how the same justice principle is to be applied and implemented. It may also involve some party adhering to a justice principle, while its counterpart endorses criteria other than justice as the proper basis for the case at hand. Conflicting notions arise in negotiations, as elsewhere, because of the absence of consensus on one overarching standard which defines the meaning of justice. Rather, there are usually several alternative principles on which a negotiation process and an agreement can be based and still reasonably be considered just and fair. Although broad international acceptance of many criteria now exists, there is no consensus on priorities among recognized principles. Moreover, almost any principle can be interpreted and applied in different ways. Negotiators may thus agree on the principle, but not on its requirements in a particular context.

The approach is cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural: A diversity of cases and methodological traditions are used to explore and illuminate a set common analytical questions, which set the overall framework for the book. The questions are:

1. Why do parties adhere to conflicting notions (principles, interpretations) of justice in international negotiations?
2. How do conflicting justice notions affect the negotiation dynamics, and what are different ways in which they are (can be) handled?
3. Are some ways of handling such notions in the negotiation process “better” than others, in the sense of enhancing the chances of an (effective, durable) agreement being reached?

The first introductory chapter elaborates on each of these questions in the context of existing research and puts forward propositions which then are examined in the cases which follow. It helps to tease out what is relevant and important across a set of diverse cases, and facilitates the drawing of conclusions for the volume as a whole.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Negotiating Justice: An Introduction

Cecilia Albin

Understanding Justice

David A. Welch

Justice in Decision-Making: How and Where to Find It and Use It

I. William Zartman

Negotiating Postcolonial Legacies: Conflicting Justice Notions in the Belgian Case

Valérie Rosoux

Negotiating Justice in the Shadow of the Law: Land Reform and Change in South Africa

Mark Anstey

Managing Conflicting Justice Notions in the World Trade Organization

Anders Ahnlid

Negotiating Justice: A Chinese Perspective

Guy Olivier Faure

Justice in Negotiation Training

Paul Meerts


Lessons for Research and Practice

Cecilia Albin

Journal Preview

International Negotiation

A Journal of Theory and Practice



Contents Vol. 26, No. 3, 2021

**This issue:
Peace Negotiations**

**Guest editor:
I. William Zartman,
Johns Hopkins University**

Introduction
I. William Zartman

The Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition Agreement
Joel Singer

**West Bank Areas A, B and C – How Did They
Come into Being?**
Joel Singer

**Where You Sit is Where You Stand: Table
Arrangement Battles in Middle East Peace
Conferences**
Joel Singer

**Not All Ceasefires Are Created Equal: The Role
of Third Party Manipulation in Sudan’s Major
Ceasefire Agreements**
Allard Duursma

**Envoy Envy? Competition in African Mediation
Processes and Ways to Overcome It**
David Lanz

**“Spoiling” in the Public Sphere: Political
Opposition to Peace Negotiations and the
Referendum Campaign in Colombia**
Joana Amaral

**Negotiating with a So-called ‘Non-Partner’:
Lessons from Palestinian-Israeli Negotiation
Practices (2000-2020)**
Yuval Benziman

**Regional-Based Conflict and Confidence-
Building Strategies: The Case of the Union for
the Mediterranean**
Larry Crump

oPINion A New PIN Product

The PIN Program has developed a new product, a sporadic analysis of some current events from the point of view of negotiation, termed *oPINion*. The item usually about 1,500 words aims to provide a special insight on a given event. It will appear irregularly every several months as the occasion occurs and will be found in the PIN website. Topics already analyzed include the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) War, Brexit final negotiations, and Northern Macedonia's entry into the EU.

Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman

Workshop PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, 23–24 November 2021 China Negotiating All-Out: Mindset and Strategies

China has been transforming itself in what might well be considered the greatest experiment of the past few centuries. All visible aspects of daily life and of the macro economy have been significantly changed. Improving material living standards and nationalism, reframed as “patriotism,” has replaced Marxism in its Maoist form. Now the field of operations of China has become the whole world. This is a historical moment to start restoring the power and glory of the new “Middle Kingdom.”

Different types of negotiation are conducted according not only to the nature of the deal (politics, trade, business, etc.) but also to the status of the country that China is dealing with: big power, competitor, friendly regime, new tributary, and so on. Three types of Chinese negotiation style may be differentiated within the “New Great Game,” according to who negotiates: the diplomatic style used by officials representing their country; the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) negotiating style when implementing big projects decided by their government; and, the business negotiating style used by smaller Chinese companies (whether they be public or private, subcontractors of the SOEs, or companies just doing business, selling technology, equipment, or consumer goods), over which the Chinese government has very little control.

Ostensibly diplomatic negotiations are managed with the same terms and manners as any other country. However counterparts of Chinese diplomats may miss the most important part, the invisible one: mindset. Chinese negotiators have their own way of seeing the world, their position in it, their role, and they have their own judgment on what everyone should do in the international arena. Beliefs, values, relation to time and history, all play an important part in these definitions and perceptions.

To summarize a complex situation, the Chinese negotiators’ mindset is conditioned by these elements inherited from the past and indeed the present. They are proud but anxious and on alert, and, when dealing with foreigners, especially accountable to the Party, knowing that as stated in its constitution and reminded to all Chinese by Xi Jinping, China is a “People’s democratic dictatorship.” Such a cultural and psychological load will weigh heavily on their strategic choices and behaviors.

Negotiating is a key tool to achieve Chinese grand designs, ambiguously expressed in labels such as the “New Silk Road.” The country needs still the rest of the world for getting its most crucial resources and as markets for its products. What may be unique is that China has had to deal with these harsh constraints for millenaries, as they are basic components of its civilization. The Middle Kingdom managed to keep its civilization going uninterrupted for several millennia because of particular systems of thinking such as Confucianism and Taoism. These two systems are much more than a set of beliefs, or even methods to deal with others and the society. They are wisdoms, ways of thinking and handling problems – and they do so through managing a complex relational balance valid in any situation, including negotiations. Confucianism and Taoism govern in a complex and ambivalent way the code of conduct of Chinese negotiators. They are critical dimensions to explain, for instance, why Chinese negotiators are so comfortable with handling paradoxes.

Chinese negotiators have their own particulars such as their holistic approach, handling of paradox, search for a golden mean, playing fuzzy, being extremely concerned by face, playing indirect, resorting to faked data, using ambiguous control, flattering, bribing. However, they can be very faithful to friends, generous, ready to accept sacrifices – thus presenting the characteristics of an oxymoron. They have a very unique approach to markets, and disregard rules and conventions, all being combined with an acute sense of their own importance and a basic distrust of others. To develop their strategy, they borrow from an extremely rich array of tactics.

As China is now developing its influence and protecting its interests in all parts of the world, its negotiators are carrying out or have carried out a host of projects different in nature, scope, and degree of cooperation/conflict – even in the most unlikely places on the planet. We want to get deep in some of those projects that will be chosen as exemplary for research, and for their potential to bring to light new findings. Examples are China–US trade negotiations, China–European Union negotiations, Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative, China–Taiwan negotiations, China–India negotiations, China with Africa, China–Japan, and joint ven-

ture negotiations with foreign companies. We also want to consider disputes between – China and its neighbors such as over the Spratly and Paracels islands.

The current project is of an inductive nature. From this great variety of cases, it aims to characterize what defines the Chinese negotiation style and what are the seminal components helping constitute “Chineseness” at the negotiation table.

Before tackling these cases, we would also like to take stock of the major research findings on Chinese approach to negotiation and push further than dealing with strategies, tactics and techniques. The purpose is to grasp the sources of these behaviors strongly embedded in tradition (Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist) and shaped by the Maoist ideology mitigated by the Deng Xiaoping thinking. Then they will be related to negotiation strategies and behaviors as the book is about negotiation.

1 Introduction

Guy Olivier Faure (CEIBS, Shanghai, China and PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, Germany) and I. William Zartman (Johns Hopkins University, Washington, USA and PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, Germany)

2 The Essence of Chinese Negotiation and the Chinese Mindset

Guy Olivier Faure (CEIBS, Shanghai, China and PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, Germany)

3 The Confucian Approach to Negotiation

Zhang Shougang (Xi'an Siyuan University, Xi'an, China)

4 Taoism and Zen

Wei Aoyu (Centre Euro-Asie HEC, Paris, France)

5 Taoism in Chinese Current Negotiation Practice

Tachia Chin (Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, China)

6 Tai Chi and Chinese Negotiation Behavior

Alisher Faizullaev (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

7 Playing Power the Chinese Way

Liu Bih-rong (Soochow University, Taiwan)

8 The Chinese Practice

Tony Fang (Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University, Sweden)

9 Chinese Diplomatic Negotiating Style

Xia Yafeng (Long Island University, New York, USA)

10 Negotiating Face

Zheng Lihua (Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China)

11 The Language of Negotiation*Kao Chiou-fen (Partners Asia, Paris, France)***12 China–US Trade Negotiations***Amy Celico (Albright Stonebridge Group, Washington DC, USA)***13 China–EU Negotiations***Yeo Lay Hwee (European Union Center, Singapore)***14 China–ASEAN Negotiations***Frederick Kliem (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore)***15 Central ASIA and BRI***Mariya Danilovich (Center for Modern East Asia Studies, University of Göttingen, Germany)***16 China–Japan Dispute in the East China Sea***Tetsuro Iji (Toyo University, Japan), and Yuan-kang Wang (Western Michigan University, USA)***17 China and Japan on Memory Issues***Valérie Rosoux (University de Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)***18 South China Sea***David Welch (University of Waterloo, Canada)***19 China–Taiwan***Kao Kung Lian (Soochow University, Taiwan)***20 China–India***Rajesh Kumar (Researcher/Consultant, Philadelphia, USA)***21 China–Russia***Elizabeth Buchanan (Deakin University, Australia, and Modern War Institute, West Point, USA)***22 China in Africa***Hubert Kinkoh (African Leadership Center, University of Nairobi, Kenya)***23 A Sino–East European Joint Venture***Ida Manton (University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic)***24 Business Negotiations***Zhang Zhi-Xue (Beijing University, Beijing, China), and Ma Li (Beijing University, Beijing, China)***25 Lessons for Theory***Guy Olivier Faure (CEIBS, Shanghai, China, and PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, Germany), and I. William Zartman (Johns Hopkins University, Washington, USA, and PIN/GIGA, Hamburg, Germany)***26 Lessons for Practice***Robert Daly (Woodrow Wilson Center's Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Washington, USA)*

