PORTFOLIO INSIGHTS

Multi-Asset Solutions Weekly Strategy Report

Global markets and multi-asset portfolios

August 14, 2017

IN BRIEF

- Market history shows that bear markets can begin at a wide range of valuations, both below and above current levels. While currently elevated levels of valuations will prove a drag on long-run returns, we do not believe that elevated equity valuations are a good guide for the direction of markets over the near- to medium-term. In our view, the single most important determinant of overall equity market direction is whether a recession is on the horizon or not.
- Reflecting a moderate pro-risk stance, our multi-asset portfolios remain overweight stocks vs. bonds. We seek broad regional diversification in our equity positions to take advantage of the breadth of global growth, the remaining catch-up potential for non-U.S. markets and historically low cross-regional equity correlation.

OF ANNIVERSARIES AND VALUATIONS

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the financial crisis, global equity markets are again making new records on a regular basis (notwithstanding current jitters related to geopolitics). This has sparked a steady drumbeat of commentary on the current state of financial markets, much of it voicing concern about high equity (and other risk asset) valuations. Valuations across many risk assets- credit as well as equities- are certainly elevated, and this will indeed pose a constraint on long-run returns and the 10- to 15-year return expectations in our *Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions* framework. However, we do not believe that elevated equity valuations are a good guide for the direction of markets over the near- to medium-term.

It is important to bear in mind that current record levels for global equities are driven mostly by the U.S. and a limited number of other regional markets, while many others still remain well below their 2007 highs. **Exhibit 1** shows that apart from the bellwether S&P 500 - up nearly 60% from its previous peak - of the other major benchmark indices only the UK and Germany have surpassed their 2007 peaks, and by much smaller amounts, roughly 11% and 7%, respectively. The Japanese Topix, many continental European indices, the Australian market, Chinese stocks and emerging market equities as a whole - all remain well below their peaks. At first glance, at least, this perspective suggests a potential for a catch-up of international equities relative to their U.S. counterparts, but this of course assumes that the level of U.S. equities is sustainable in the first place.

AUTHOR



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Although "everyone knows" that market timing is very difficult, we don't think of equity valuations as a reliable tool for anyone trying to time a market top or anticipate the start of a bear market. To pick a simple example for the U.S. market, where valuations are now the most extended of any major global index: At the 2007 market top, U.S. equities traded on a P/E of 17.5x - not particularly expensive compared to a post-1970 average of 17x, and well below today's multiple of around 23x. In contrast, at the top of the tech bubble in March 2000, US equities' ultra-high P/E of 31x certainly was at least a good warning indicator. But the roughly 20% market drop of the early 1990s started at a P/E level of about 16x, while U.S. stocks crashed on Black Monday in 1987 at a P/E of 20X.

Varied valuations at the start of hear markets.


The point here is that equity bear markets can get underway at a wide range of valuations (Exhibit 2), both below and above current levels. And while it is true that one should always use a range of valuation metrics, and that metrics other than the P/E multiple - such as priceto-book ratios, or the cyclically-adjusted PE (CAPE*) - can often give a truer reflection of underlying equity valuations, they still don't do a good job at market timing. Valuations aren't even necessarily a good indicator of the downside potential once a bear market starts. Case in point: the 2007-2009 U.S. bear market started at a fairly pedestrian valuation, but it led to the largest decline (57%) in U.S. equites since the Great Depression, larger than the drop (49%) that followed the extremely high valuations of the 2000 market peak.

Of course, investors do not consider equity valuations in a vacuum, and relative to the low level of bond yields, equities still look to be reasonably valued, even in the U.S. Our estimate of the equity risk premium (ERP) for the U.S. equity market is currently at 5.7%; that compares with a long-run average of 4.5% and a recent high of around 7.5% at the market low at the end of 2008.

While many factors come into play, in our view the single most important determinant of overall equity market direction is whether a recession is on the horizon or not. Historically only U.S. recessions have acted to trigger a global equity bear market. This is simply because only the U.S. economy is large and interconnected enough to set off a global recession. (As they say, "when the U.S. sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold.") Localized recessions can spur over- or under-performance of regional markets, but they are not enough to trigger an

EXHIBIT 1: STOCK MARKET LEVELS RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS PEAKS

Exhibit 1 shows the current level of a range of equity benchmark indices relative to their respective peaks (generally in 2007), and demonstrates that record highs for global indices are mostly driven by the U.S. While the S&P 500 is nearly 60% above its 2007 peak, other indices that are above their 2007 highs, such as the FTSE 100 or MSCI Germany, are up by much smaller amounts. A range of continental European indices as well as Japan's Topix remain well below previous peaks.



Source: ThomsonReuters Datastream; J.P. Morgan Asset Management Multi-Asset Solutions; data as of August 8, 2017. For illustrative purposes only.

equity bear market at the global level. Even then the timing of equity market peaks with respect to the onset of recession is quite variable, having ranged from zero months to 12 months over just the last three U.S. recessions. As long as we don't see an elevated risk of a U.S. recession over the next year or so—and we don't—our default position is to stick with risk assets, extended valuations notwithstanding. We do acknowledge that the

U.S. economic cycle is getting long in the tooth, but we


think it may last a few years yet.

ASSET CLASS IMPLICATIONS

In our multi-asset portfolios we retain a moderate pro-risk stance and remain overweight stocks relative to bonds. This is driven by a macro backdrop of robust and broadbased global growth, in which we see no particularly elevated recession probability in the near- to mediumterm. We continue to seek broad regional diversification in our equity positions to take advantage of the breadth of global growth, the remaining catch-up potential for non-U.S. markets, and historically low cross-regional equity correlations. Our equity overweight positions are in the U.S., euro area, Japan, and emerging market equities, while the UK remains our key underweight.

EXHIBIT 2: VALUATIONS AT EQUITY MARKET PEAKS HAVE VARIED WIDELY

Equity market valuations are a poor indicator of near-to medium-term market direction. Exhibit 2 shows that valuations levels at equity market peaks have varied widely. For each metric we show - across the last six major equity market peaks since 1980 - the range between the highest and lowest peak levels for each metric, expressed as a percentage of that metric's average since 19070 (i.e. 0% represents long-run average for that metric).



Source: ThomsonReuters Datastream; J.P. Morgan Asset Management Multi-Asset Solutions; data as of August 9, 2017. For illustrative purposes only.

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NEXT STEPS

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