What's cooking? Adding critical feminist research to the pot

Community kitchens, school feeding programmes, and saving schemes in Cape Town, Nairobi, and Ouagadougou

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Key messages

- A place-based understanding of crises highlights not only the multiple interlocking crises different places experience, but also the way these crises are experienced differently based on a person's socio-economic status. While global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the food price crisis, affect people worldwide, they have a larger impact on communities that are already living in situations of structural disadvantage. An intersectional perspective is necessary to understand how groups are impacted by multiple crises based on differences in gender, race, sexual identity, place of origin, and class differences.

- Crises impact on people's dignity. The design and operations of community kitchens leverage on the agency of women to ensure access to food in dignity. At the same time, crises can also open up the space for discussing and tackling hunger as a communal issue, rather than an individual struggle. When communities can have dialogues about the structural conditions of hunger, the shame associated with your and your family's hunger is reduced.

- Community kitchens provide a platform for building social capital. They bring together women from different villages or neighbourhoods, who did not know each other before. Through interaction in and about the community kitchens, they often create savings schemes to support themselves and navigate crises. They also use the platform to share information beyond food and nutrition, such as livelihood opportunities and health matters.

- In the face of crisis, in informal and low-income urban settlements social networks are often faster at providing communities with coping mechanisms than governments. It is usually women who organise in times of crisis and see to their communities' food security. Most coping mechanisms rely on women's volunteer and unpaid labour and care work. External funding is needed to make these mechanisms sustainable.

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ASALs	Arid and semi-arid lands
AU	African Union
CAN	Community Action Networks
CTT	Cape Town Together
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoK	Government of Kenya
HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
HLPE	High Level Panel of Experts
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
NEPAD	New Partnerships for Africa's Development
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ROSCA	Rotating Savings and Credit Association
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SMP	School Meals Programme
TEP	Thematic Entry Point
UNFSS	United Nations Food Systems Summit
VFH	Volunteer Food Handler
WFP	World Food Programme

This paper was produced as part of the programme Urban Food Futures. Urban Food Futures is a transdisciplinary action-research programme conducted in cooperation with TMG and its partners in local governments, academia, and civil society. This programme aims to fundamentally rethink urban food systems with a view of identifying, testing and adapting concrete solutions for liveable futures in African cities. The programme is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and it works closely with the African Centre for Cities, Food Agency Cape Town (FACT), Heinrich Böll Foundation Cape Town, Miramar International Foundation, Muungano wa Wanavijiji Akiba Mashinani Trust and Welthungerhilfe.

1. Introduction

The ongoing food crises facing the world since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic have escalated, resulting in the realisation of predicted massive food price increases in 2022. The war that Russia is waging against Ukraine brutally affects one country through aggression, yet profoundly affects numerous other countries and billions of people who receive food imports from Ukraine. The Russian invasion and its disruption of agrifood supply chains, hyperinflation due to demand from economies recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasing energy costs forced the world to face some hard truths on the state of food insecurity in many countries of the world. While world societies and economies battle from the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of its lockdown measures, and massive retrenchments in certain sectors, their food security efforts are aggravated by the climate crisis. This is the start of a major food crisis. We know the political answers to the food crisis of 2008/09: market self-regulation, increases in national food stocks, and, when necessary, expansion of agricultural inputs subsidies. Another lesson to learn from 2008 and 2009 is that the price spikes of staple foods during the hunger crises mainly affected cities, particularly people living in informal settlements and economically vulnerable areas.

While it is not the sole driver of the food crisis, the war in Ukraine has had severe impacts on food systems worldwide, both in Europe and, more crucially, in lower income countries. From an international trade perspective, the Russian Federation and Ukraine produce about 12 percent of the food calories traded globally (Glauber & Laborde, 2022). Many African countries import from one or both countries (HLPE, 2022). With many governments posing sanctions on Russia, its agricultural products can't be exported to meet global demands. Ukraine's port remained sealed for six months, until August 2022, and its agricultural and transport infrastructure is devastated. The price of vegetable oil globally reached an all-time high in March 2022, in part owing to harvest uncertainties in Ukraine (FAO, 2022). One of the most important market indicators for food crises is the "stocks-to-disappearance" ratio of key commodity suppliers, which is simply the quotient of surpluses (stocks) over consumption plus exports provided by FAO Statistics. Currently, the ratio for wheat stands at 13 percent: the same level seen during the food crisis of 2007/2008. Beyond food *availability*, Clapp (2022) argues that the crisis is related to all other dimensions of food security. Price increases and price volatility impact food *access* and *stability*, respectively; price increases generally force people to prioritise the purchase of staple food, sacrificing nutrient diversity and thus impacting food *utilisation*. Linking to the newest dimensions of food security, she highlights how the crisis has showcased the dependence of the current industrialised food system on fossil fuels, which threatens its *sustainability*, and how food production, markets and power are concentrated in the hands of a few countries and companies, undermining people's *agency* in the food system.

The FAO and all member states committed to the "right to food" to avoid hunger in times of crisis, but also to safeguard the transformation to sustainable food systems that are resilient to present and future challenges. South Africa and Kenya have enshrined this right to food in their constitutions. However, we have learned during the COVID-19 crisis that the implementation of such programmes inadequately equips cities and their populations to cope and adapt successfully to shocks. For example, the shock of COVID-19 and the slow and insufficient government responses to address the resulting food crisis in Cape Town turned social networks into resources which capitalised on the social relations and non-market food systems built in solidarity by the people. Similarly, food security worsened for the more than 75,000 Mukuru residents of Nairobi who were violently and forcefully evicted from their homes and

businesses when they were bulldozed by the government. Languishing from pandemic-related loss of livelihoods and the lack of rainfalls affecting the country's agricultural production, Mukuru slum dwellers faced extreme food insecurity. In Ouagadougou, political instability aggravated the crisis-ridden city. Rising terrorism, especially in rural areas, led to internal migration to the relatively safer capital, resulting in declines in essential staple food production in rural areas and increases in food prices in urban areas. Women were disproportionately affected as migrant women, in particular, struggled to make a living.

1.1. Coping and adapting in times of multiple crises

Social capital and relationships are potential catalysts for urban resilience. We want to explore this potential by fostering strength and mitigating the weaknesses of selected community responses during various crises. Social capital is initially employed as a key resource for coping, but later serves in successful adaptation, co-creation, and co-governance of collective action processes. Resilience in food systems during crises requires more than the ability to bounce back, react, and find a way to live with the shock. The adaptive capacity describes a system's or a society's ability to anticipate shocks, react, and minimise impacts. Adaptive capacities determine the transformative capacity which can be understood as a solution space for long-term responses to mitigate shocks and stresses. A key question is how to sustain coping strategies implemented by communities during the COVID-19 pandemic and not only give a political voice to these initiatives but use the increased food awareness and agency to help shape policy programmes that do not rely on volunteerism and women's invisible care work, in particular, as responses in times of crises.

In the first section, we provide a conceptual framework which outlines our understanding of the key concepts of Right to Food and food security, distinguishing between minimalist and maximalist interpretations. Next, we scrutinise case studies and coping strategies in three African cities that have responded to crises. Community kitchens, school feeding programmes, and saving schemes were selected because all three play a role in all three research sites, to differing extents. This allows us to draw lessons learnt and foster cross-site exchanges. In Cape Town, FACT identified the community kitchens which informed their research on agency in food systems during COVID-19 as entry points for exploring community cohesion as a way of addressing food access in marginalised communities. In Nairobi, Muungano AMT initiated the research and identified schools as an entry point for food security, building on their experience in the Special Planning Area process. In Ouagadougou, conversations with female refugees highlighted the need to understand food supply during times of vulnerability.

Community kitchens are spaces where anyone can get a meal, either free of charge or for a small sum. They are run mainly by volunteers and source food mostly through donations. In Cape Town, they are often situated in private homes and prepare meals for the neighbourhood or community. These kitchens mushroomed in Cape Town during the early weeks of lockdown. Many of the initiatives lack continuous financial support, making them an inadequate long-term response to food insecurity. In Nairobi, the kitchens are often linked to schools and focus on catering to children, with food provided with government support or NGO donations; however, the numerous informal schools in Mukuru lack such infrastructure. Also, the disruption of school feeding programmes during the lockdowns of the COVID-19 pandemic showed that established social nets can collapse during unexpected shocks. The unexpected evictions in Mukuru brought about a community kitchen that compensates for meals which would have been provided by now-bulldozed schools. Meanwhile, In Burkina Faso, school feeding programmes only exist in rural areas and not in the country's capital, Ouagadougou. Increased domestic migration has led to increased demand for food, with military-controlled distribution

points selling food at higher prices and often exposing women to gender-based violence. Community kitchens set up by women attempt to establish short supply channels with producers in peri-urban areas and create a safe place for women. Another social safety net that is being applied more and more frequently are saving schemes, such as *stokvels* in South Africa, *chamas* in Kenya, and *tontines* in Burkina Faso. These are peer-to-peer banking systems in which members invest small amounts of money to achieve unsecured loans or a payout at a later stage. Trusting membership alone is not enough to sustain saving schemes; their stability is marked by the presence of a self-regulated organisation with clear rules and regulations to manage group affairs.

We explore how community kitchens, school feeding programmes, and saving schemes work and how communities use them to cope with shocks. From October 2021 to March 2022, partner organisations unpacked these responses' potential to increase community resilience. A central aspect of the research is to explore social capital and how it could be strengthened, converted into agency, and used to increase communities' resilience in light of a multiplicity of crises. During a first workshop the question, "Why these strategies?" was framed. In a second workshop, FACT, along with partners and Muungano AMT, explored the strategies' potential and what it takes to strengthen their resilience to describe the "What next?" In their preparation for the Urban Food Future's pathways implementation plan, Muungano AMT and FACT describe what needs to change and how to adapt to enhance sustainability and resilience to cope with the forecasted food crisis.

Urban nutrition hubs emerged as a vision for transforming coping strategies in learning tools for adaptation and transformation. In our concept, urban nutrition hubs are physical places where people can come together in informal settlements and low-income neighbourhoods to generate and share knowledge on food systems, food security, their right to food and beyond. Spaces where they can connect, strengthening social capital and spearheading social change.

2. Conceptual framework

At the heart of this research is a set of debates about the current reality and future potential of community kitchens and school feeding programmes to be spaces of food security, food justice, and community transformation. These debates help frame the viability of viewing these sites as urban nutrition hubs.

Three key concepts frame this work, are closely related to each other, and each has minimalist and maximalist interpretations: the right to food, food security, and sustainable food systems. In considering each concept, it is possible to take a limited, depoliticised, bounded view which ignores linkages (minimalist perspective) or take a system-based, integrated (maximalist) perspective. The way in which these concepts are understood profoundly shapes food policy and practice, and shapes the ways in which community kitchens and school feeding schemes are understood and activated.

2.1. Right to Food

The first conceptual frame is the right to food: a basic human right protected under international human rights and humanitarian law, and in various national constitutions including that of South Africa and Kenya. However, the nature of this right, its relationship to other complementary rights, and the mechanisms by which it is to be achieved have a number of interpretations, impacting the ways we understand the work of the kitchens and school feeding programmes as recipients, programme managers, NGOs, and states.

What the right to food entails is contested. Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control". The interpretation of this right and how to achieve it lead to minimalist and maximalist interpretations. Firstly, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and the South African and Kenyan constitutions) locates food within a suite of indivisible rights, efforts to legislate and hold the state accountable for the delivery of these rights often treat these rights as independent of each other. This then leads to siloed state activity, but also siloed activities from other entities working toward the fulfilment of rights. Within the kitchens and feeding schemes, this siloing shapes the support services that these groups can command. Arguing that these rights are indivisible opens the space for activities framed more broadly as nutrition hubs seeking to advance a number of rights together.

Secondly, there are different perspectives on who bears the duty in the right to food. Within the UN framework, the obligation to realise the right to food falls on the state, which has an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to food. Under this framing, the state is obligated to work toward the realisation of the right and civil society is to hold the state accountable. However, using a food sovereignty perspective, the right to food is collectively held and collectively realised. Within this framing, the call is for communal action to shape the food system.

The state-centric approach to the right to food has been criticised for its narrow view of citizens as passive recipients of rights provided exclusively by the state. An alternative framing builds on a food sovereignty paradigm and views the right to food as being collectively held and collectively realised. It calls communities into orchestrated action to shape the food system.

2.2. Food Security

Related to the right to food, is the concept of food security. The widely accepted definition of food security is that food security exists when all people at all times have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and health life (FAO, 2001). This definition has clear links to the framing of the right to food in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is a considerable expansion of the earliest (1974) definition, which was “Availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” (United Nations, 1975).

The 2001 definition has been praised for expanding the definition to consider food security beyond issues of production, issues of accessibility, issues of individual rather than national or global food security, dietary quality, and cultural preferences (Maxwell, 1996). In 2006, the FAO identified four pillars or dimensions upon which food security rested: availability, accessibility, utilisation, and stability (FAO, 2006).

This expanded definition and framing has not been without critique. While the inclusion of access builds on Sen's entitlements and the recognition that food insecurity is rarely caused by a lack of food, an access-based framing has been critiqued as opening up food security to neoliberal interpretations that place the focus on market-oriented solutions (Canfield et al., 2021). The framing of food security has been critiqued for neglecting critical questions around the conditions under which food is produced and distributed, and for having no interest in increasing the agency of the food insecure, rather viewing food security as something that is delivered by the state, NGOs, and the market to individuals and households.

In light of these critiques, in 2020, the High Level Panel of Experts added two new dimensions to the existing four: agency and sustainability. Agency is defined as "the capacity of individuals and groups to exercise a degree of control over their own circumstances and to provide meaningful input into governance processes" (Clapp et al., 2021, p. 3). Sustainability is defined as "food system practices that contribute to long-term regeneration of natural, social, and economic systems, ensuring the food needs of the present generations are met without compromising food needs of future generations" (HLPE, 2020, p.10).



Figure 1: Six dimensions of food security. (Source: HLPE, 2020)

These additions fundamentally re-frame food security and its politics. By including agency, the accessibility dimension is transformed: the assumptions around access being predominantly market oriented is challenged. The emergent discourse is, therefore, about how food system transformation can increase access in ways that increase and exercise agency. Similarly, the inclusion of the sustainability pillar ensures the conditions under which food is produced and distributed are central to the achievement of current and future food security. This shift moves beyond viewing sustainability as the maintenance of existing conditions, but advancement toward regenerative systems. This explicitly challenges the policy and programmatic responses that are based on simply producing and distributing more food by whatever means possible, and underlines the need for transformation of the environmental, social, and economic conditions that shape the food system.

Table 1: Minimalist and maximalist interpretations of the right to food, food security, and sustainable food systems

	Minimalist	Maximalist
Right to food	A right independent of others	A right interdependent on the achievement of other rights
	State as duty bearer to deliver	Collectively held and collectively fulfilled
Food security	Focussed either on availability or accessibility	Food security is dependent on all six pillars, with the relationship between accessibility and agency being key
	Food is monetarised and commodified	Food security is based on sustainable food systems
	Food security is met by external provision	Food security is endogenous
	Individual food security	Community food security
Sustainable food systems	The focus is primarily on environmental sustainability	Sustainability across all dimensions is central
	Sustainability is the objective	Regenerative food systems are the objective.

As seen in Table 1, minimalist and maximalist interpretations of key concepts enable us to position the work of the kitchens and school feeding schemes within a conventional framework and envision their movement through an enabling political economy to imagine and realise them as urban nutrition hubs. It poses a conceptual pathway from the right to food as something expected of the state to collectively fulfilled; from the right to food as an independent right to one that is part of an interdependent set of rights; from food security as something to be delivered to something endogenous; from food security as individually experienced to a community food security perspective; from working toward sustainability to working toward socially inclusive and transformative food systems.

3. A place-based view on crises

Crises are invisible companions in individuals' everyday life, with segments of the population experiencing them in different ways. For some of us, crises are peaks of escalating challenges which hasten a pivot or turning point: they give new energy and lead to change. For others, crises are constant stressors and a constraint on our abilities to respond to shocks. In the following subchapters, we outline three crises that impact the research sites: the aftermath of COVID-19 lockdowns in Cape Town, South Africa; recent evictions in Nairobi's informal settlement of Mukuru, and mass domestic migration in Ouagadougou. We shed light on an underlying, and often unseen, crisis that impacts food security: gender-based violence, and its impact on women's often-invisible care work in food systems.

3.1. COVID-19 lockdowns in Cape Town

Despite its stunning beauty and booming tourism industry, Cape Town is a city of injustice and crises. Forged through multiple waves of military force and colonial dispossession, and shaped by inequality by design, it is of little surprise that, despite close to three decades of democracy, it remains a city in which injustice is deeply etched and multi-faceted. Consequently, Cape Town continues to operate as a city of enclaves, locking some into comfort and excess, and others into poverty and violence.

Upon COVID-19's spread, past failures to invest in equal and quality public services, safety nets, and secure, decent employment translated into massive socio-economic and health crises which deepened existing inequities. On 25 March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 global pandemic, the South African government introduced strict lockdown regulations to halt the spread of the virus. Gazetted in the Disaster Management Act of 2020 these regulations restricted movement for all citizens, confining them to their homes except for essential purposes (food and medicine procurement) or official essential services (food and health services provision) (Paganini et al., 2021). Families crammed into tiny homes with no indoor plumbing were asked to shelter in place, frequently wash their hands, and isolate if they experienced symptoms. School children living in energy-poor households with limited internet access were asked to study online in places where mobile phone data costs dwarf daily incomes. Formal and informal workers and traders without medical insurance, savings, or regular incomes were asked to forego daily wages. Despite a moratorium on evictions, many found themselves on the streets, only to have temporary shelters torn down by city authorities. The Police Service and the National Defence Force enforced these measures, resulting in fatal consequences, particularly in high-density, low-income communities (Knoetze, 2020). The first lockdown saw most of the economy, particularly the informal economy, shut down, drastically reducing income opportunities for marginalised communities.

The COVID-19 lockdowns had massive impact on South African food security. In Cape Town, FACT conducted a household food security study using the FIES's eight-item questionnaire in September 2020 to assess conditions and behaviours that hamper one's ability to live healthy, active, and dignified life. The study revealed that more than half of the surveyed households were food insecure (54.0%), with 30.6% severely food insecure. The most food insecure study location was St. Helena Bay with 89.9% of households being food insecure, followed by Gugulethu (64.0%) and Khayelitsha (55.5%). Mfuleni (15.0%) and Mitchell's Plain (18.0%) have fewer food-insecure households (Paganini et al., 2021).

Thousands of children lost access to the only nutritious hot meal they could depend on when schools and early childhood development centres closed. Small-scale food growers, livestock herders, and subsistence fishers lost access to community gardens, grazing fields, and fishing grounds. While the South African state struggled to get its relief response going, decentralised, people-led relief efforts rapidly appeared, as they often do in disaster situations. Churches, charities, welfare, and community-based organisations as well as social movements sprung into action, buoyed by a wave of volunteerism, good will, and, for some, an enforced break from employment.

The lockdown exacerbated the food security issues that communities in informal settlements had grappled with as private, individual, and shameful struggles before the pandemic. The intensification of hunger and media attention on the issue brought food insecurity to the foreground of public and communal spaces . Protests and politics started to focus on food, which increased civic engagement on the topic, changing the way people understood their right to food (granted by the Constitution) and their role in achieving it. Community initiatives and organisations appropriated the technocratic discourse on food security, spearheading mutual aid and activism (Paganini et al, 2021; Clapp and Moseley, 2020).

3.2. Large-scale evictions in Nairobi

Today, over 60 per cent of Nairobi's population lives in informal settlements that make up just 5 per cent of the city's residential areal. Many homes in these "slums" are built with corrugated iron sheets and residents lack access to adequate sewage, electricity, or water systems, denied to those without tenure rights to their dwellings. Located in the southeast of Nairobi, Mukuru kwa Njenga is one of the city's largest informal settlements and one of the seven locations that form the 689-acre (2.8 KM^2) Mukuru Informal Settlements Belt.[1] This sliver of land represents no more than 0.4% of Nairobi's land area, yet houses almost 10% of its population, for a total of about 400,000 residents (KNBS, 2019; Muungano wa Wanavijiji, 2020). In addition to space limitations, inhabitants of Mukuru face land tenure insecurity: every square inch of land in the Mukuru Informal Settlements Belt is disputed, with inhabitants living under the constant threat of violent evictions. Over the years, justification for violent displacements of "informal" workers and residents has included concerns over tax evasion, trespassing, traffic congestion, and food safety. The latest example of this occurred on 8th October 2021, when "informal" residents of Mukuru kwa Njenga were forcefully evicted from their houses and business premises before the structures were flattened by bulldozers acting on orders from the Government of Kenya and supported by government-deployed police officers. Yet the highway that displaced Mukuru residents in Oct 2021, was equally informal: it did not feature in the 2014 Masterplan for Nairobi, nor was a strategic environmental assessment of its costs undertaken. It was, however, defended by the government, including the National Environmental Management Agency (NEMA), as a viable means to "decongest" the city" (The Elephant and Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2022). By 17th November 2021, at least 18,988 households or 75,952 individuals had been rendered homeless as their houses and possessions had been bulldozed to the ground (Muungano Alliance, 2021).

In Kenya, land is one of the most contested natural resources and ownership of land is a critical financial and political asset crucial for power projection, especially in strategic locations. Those in power seek control over land to secure their financial positions and advance political interests. In Nairobi, land has historically been used to advance economic and political interests at the expense of others. The city sprang out of a colonial railway stop at the dawn of the 20th century. The subsequent east–west spatial planning represented the racial segregationist rules of the time: British colonists occupied extensive tracts of prime land to the west of the city, including Runda, Karen, and Muthaiga while South Asians occupied mid-lying locations such as Ngara and Parklands, and Africans were restricted to low-lying flood-prone areas to the east of the emerging city, including Pumwani, Ziwani, and the present-day Mukuru Informal Settlements Belt (K'Akumu and Olima, 2007; White, 1990).

[1] The other six locations are Imara Daima, Mukuru kwa Ruben, Land Mawe, Nairobi South, and Viwandani.

Figure 2: Map of Colonial Nairobi in 1954 - The red zone marks the boundary of the White Highlands in Nairobi. Within this zone, African residents were confined to limited areas of land mainly in the low-lying south eastern sides of the city. Some resorted to squatting in areas such as the then South Estate close to the Industrial Area, where present-day Mukuru emerged (Kenya National Archives, 2022)



When Kenya gained independence in 1963, the money line replaced the colour line. Rather than dismantle the unjust systems built during the colonial period, the newly minted African political elite reinforced them. Kanyinga (2009) argues that while most poor people were confined to the smallest and worst-serviced land areas, richer ones occupied the prime former "White Highlands." In the ensuing decades and amidst a growing population, more city land was allocated to the wealthy and politically connected through corrupt means. Consequently, poor Kenyans were squeezed further into smaller and poorly serviced areas, contributing to the emergence of slums such as Mukuru kwa Njenga.

The situation worsened during the 1990s. In 1991, following a decade of protracted street battles with pro-democracy activists, the Kenyan government re-introduced multiparty politics (Wambua, 2017). Rising political temperatures threatened the ruling party's 30-year grip on power. Predictably, President Moi turned to land as a potent political bargaining chip to secure support for himself and his party (Kanyinga, 2009). The government transferred public land in and around Nairobi to influential individuals whose support Moi needed to retain power. The lands in Karura Forest and Uhuru Park were allocated to Moi's party loyalists who intended to develop the critical ecosystems into real estate. According to Hayanga (2006), it is such corrupt allocations that formed the crux of the battles between Prof. Wangari Maathai's Greenbelt Movement and President Moi's regime in the 1990s.

Similar allocations also created a battleground between the government regime and civil societies such as Muungano AMT. While the Greenbelt Movement fought for green spaces, Muungano AMT fought for housing rights in the slum areas such as Korogocho, Kibra, and Mukuru kwa Njenga. These are battles that continue to date. The one in Mukuru is unique in that beyond ownership, there are also conflicts over land use.

The 1973 Nairobi Masterplan designated Mukuru Informal Settlement Belt as an industrial area. Over the years, people squatted on public lands located around the industries, close to their places of work. Unknown to the occupants, the government had transferred their localities to political heavyweights who never developed

industries as required by law. Instead, some sold the land or used it as collateral for bank loans.

The most recent outcome is the evictions in November 2021, less than a year before the upcoming elections. Done under the guise of road expansion, the demolitions have brought wanton suffering to residents of Mukuru kwa Njenga. One of the most alarming consequences of the sudden loss of homes and businesses is its impact on food security.

Residents of Mukuru kwa Njenga live in a fragile environment, often one crisis away from disaster due to a confluence of structural failures. This is especially apparent in the food insecurity index in the area. A multisectoral report identifies the Mukuru as one of the three most food-insecure urban areas in Kenya (IPC, 2020) and this is mainly attributed to poverty; a majority of people living in Mukuru work in the informal sector, while the few employed in the formal sector attract low wages. Lacking the resilience to withstand shocks, Mukuru's inhabitants can be plunged into hunger and want by any crisis that disrupts any of the food system components, including pricing and income. The 2021 evictions to clear the path for Catherine Ndereba Road created a food crisis across several dimensions.

For many Mukuru residents who owned shops, worked in the informal sector from their home, or rented out accommodation, the demolitions destroyed their sole revenue sources. In a follow-up report, Odenyo (2022) laments the loss of human lives in the demolitions, both as cherished members of families and communities and as breadwinners who left behind vulnerable dependents. He presents the story of an anti-demolition protestor shot by the police, while Ram (2021) tells the story of a man killed by falling debris as he tried to salvage his properties.

When more than 19,000 households were demolished, more than 19,000 families lost their access to infrastructure required to cook and prepare food, placing particular stress on those with special nutritional requirements, such as sick people and breastfeeding mothers.

Although the government halted the demolitions in January 2022, the situation on the ground remains apprehensive. The evictees have neither been relocated nor compensated for their losses. Civil society organisations, including Muungano AMT, continue to scramble to address victims' immediate needs. An immediate and effective response provided by the Muungano AMT is community kitchens. These kitchens provide necessary food aid while residents work in cooperations with Muungano AMT to configurate long-term solutions land tenure insecurity in Mukuru kwa Njenga.

3.3. Terrorism and domestic migration in Burkina Faso

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has experienced an unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis that has resulted in more than 2,000 civilian and military deaths (Gormezano, 2022) and forced millions of people to flee their homes.

Most recorded incidents are perpetrated by unidentified armed groups and take various forms, including attacks, targeted assassinations, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, incursions into villages and IDP sites, random identity checks on roads, arson, and assault (Global Cluster Protection Burkina Faso, 2021). The areas most affected are the Eastern, Sahel, Northern, Centre-Northern, Boucle du Mouhoun and more recently Cascades regions.

The ousting of the Blaise Compoaré regime in 2014 and the election of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in 2015 marked the beginning of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso. The frequency of attacks and their increasingly deadly nature point to a failing and lax political and military system that should not be attributed solely to the Kaboré regime, according to journalist Serge Atiana Oulon (2020). From the power of Blaise Compaoré to that of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, via the transition of Michel Kafando, the institutional mechanisms for anticipating, preventing, managing, and repressing insecurity have not been set in motion. The current security crisis in Burkina Faso is also a failure of the intelligence and security services and the government to anticipate, prevent, contain, and manage the threat (Oulon, 2020). The Burkinabé people blamed the Kaboré regime of incompetence as their slow response did little to halt the unbearable massacres. On the evening of 23 January 2022, the national army overthrew the regime. Lieutenant-Colonel Henri-Paul Sandaogo Damiba's accension to power promises a new era of refunding and reconquering territorial integrity for the country. This senior infantry officer in the Burkinabe Armed Forces came to power with a precise doctrine to fight terrorism: adapting state

responses to local realities to deal with the mobility and flexibility of the jihadists (Topona, 2022).

The security crisis has led Burkina Faso into a humanitarian crisis. The spiral of attacks attributed to armed jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have left at least 2,000 people dead and 1.8 million internally displaced (SP/CONASUR, 2022). Domestic migration of people fleeing insecure areas has dramatically increased in the past months. Between 31 January 2022 and 28 February 2022, the number of IDPs increased from 1.74M to 1.81M, an increase of 4.17%, up 62% over the previous year when the number of IDPs was 1.12M (OCHA, 2022b). The sheer volume of people on the move makes it increasingly difficult for the Burkinabé government and international organisations to provide solutions for IDPs. The persistent security crisis is thus coupled with a humanitarian crisis.

The humanitarian crisis is characterised by massive domestic migration and its corollaries. Populations from areas heavily affected by the security crisis migrate to areas still under state control. Some of them join host families, others set up informal refugee sites, and still others join the temporary, official IDP host sites set up by the government and its partners. Host towns and families quickly find themselves facing crises due to the massive presence of people in emergency situations. The OCHA estimates that there are 3.5 million people in need in Burkina Faso, of which 2.2 million are non-displaced, i.e., the host communities (OCHA, 2022a).

When it comes to people's right to food and dignity, the situation is alarming. Malnutrition and food insecurity became commonplace occurrences between 2019 and 2020 as millions of people fled their farming hamlets, sources of income, and food stocks. Exacerbating precarious housing conditions, overcrowding, high rents, falling morale, and a host of social problems including loss of morale and dignity, fraud, and gender-based violence riddle both the host areas and temporary reception sites.

In a study conducted by OCHA (2022a), the affected population reported their unmet essential needs include food (85% of respondents), shelter (34% of respondents), and non-food items (29% of respondents). The survey also revealed that only 20% of respondents felt the aid they received fully covered their basic needs.

The situation is particularly critical for women. Official data shared by the National Emergency Relief Council reports that over 60% of IDPs are children and over 22% are women (OCHA, 2022a). The humanitarian aid provided does not consider the needs of girls and women (Labaume, 2020). Internally displaced women face specific challenges which increase their vulnerability. The first challenge is access to clean water: while the lack of water affects the entire population without distinction, women disproportionately suffer the consequences because collecting water is their traditional responsibility. After traveling long distances to reach water, they are confronted with queues that can be counted in hours (if not days) then receive a quantity of water that is insufficient to meet their needs (Labaume, 2020). Shelter and food supply is a major challenge for internally displaced women. IDPs are staying with host families, in informal sites, or in official reception sites share meals with a community. Often outnumbered in host homes and overcrowded formal and informal reception sites, women are forced to search for resources beyond the cereals and oils provided by humanitarian organizations and government. This often forces women to leave the relative safety of their camps in search for water, firewood, and other food stuffs to prepare their meals, which exposes them to gender-based violence (GBV) and commercial sex work (Ouédraogo, 2020; Kola, 2022), which Cendrine Labaume (2020) describes as the practice of survival sex. Poorer women are particularly affected, as GBV in host sites and families is linked to the socio-economic status of IDPs. These practices go against the right to food, which is the right for people to feed themselves in dignity.

3.4. The ongoing pandemic of gender-based violence

Gender-based violence (GBV) refers to acts of violence directed at a person based on their sex or gender identity and it includes physical, sexual, verbal, and psychological violence, as well as threat of violence, coercion, and deprivation of liberty (Dlamini, 2021; Ott, 2021). While GBV includes violence against men and boys, LGBTQI and gender non-conforming individuals, violence against women, in both private and public spheres, represent the most common form of

GBV (Keith et al., 2022). GBV includes intimate partner violence (IPV), non-partner sexual violence (NPSV), harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriage, psychological abuse, and feminicide (Keith et al, 2022).

While the prevalence of GBV is global, numbers in sub-Saharan Africa show the critical situation in the region. WHO estimated that in 2018 33% of women in sub-Saharan Africa had experienced intimate partner violence at least once in their lifetime and 20% at least once in the previous 12 months (WHO, 2021). Other estimates are even higher, standing at 44% of women between 15 and 49 years of age in sub-Saharan Africa experiencing IPV, which includes physical, sexual and emotional partner violence (Muluneh et al., 2020). The actual number is likely to be even higher, as GBV is typically underreported by survivors for a variety of reasons, including fear of shame and stigma, financial obstacles, perceived impunity of perpetrators, lack of awareness or access to available services, threat of retaliation or normalisation of violence (believing that violence is normal) (Palermo et al., 2014).

Not only is GBV a crisis in itself, it is also exacerbated by the presence of other crises, such as pandemics, evictions, and climate crisis. Crises increase the risk of GBV for women, while undermining women's economic and social standing (Davies & Bennett, 2016; Wenham et al., 2020; WHO, 2007). Women and girls living in precarious economic conditions are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment and abuse. Girls interviewed by Human Rights Watch (2021) during a crisis indicated that they experienced ongoing sexual harassment from men in their communities, some of whom, for example, lured them with gifts of food or sanitary pads. Crises drive up tensions within households due to loss of income and economic difficulties (often resulting in physical and verbal violence) and women's domestic burden is often increased under coercion from their spouses. Economic difficulties during crises leads to a slew of human rights abuses against women: women and girls are forced to exchange sex for money, food, and sanitary pads, leaving children vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, including sexual exploitation and forced labour. GBV may also be manifested during pandemics, war, conflict and other shocks as female genital mutilation, child/early marriage, forced marriages, transactional sex, and trafficking as coping mechanisms (Peterman et al., 2020). For instance, forced marriages may be arranged as negative coping mechanism to a desperate situation in hopes that they will ensure a daughter's safety and financial security while reducing the burden on a family (Giovetti, 2019; UN Women, 2021). Hunger or food scarcity and loss of income exacerbate GBV and invigorate commercial sex work as a survival mechanism. Consequently, during crises, women experience more sexual exploitation, abuse, and gendered denial of access to basic services (UN Women, 2021). Women's vulnerability to GBV during crises is further exacerbated by the inability to access one's usual social networks and sources of social support (Neetu et al., 2020).

3.4.1. Gender based violence in South Africa

South Africa is a deeply violent society and continues to wrestle with the impact of decades of institutionalised racism, sexism, exclusion, structural violence, and other factors that undermine human development and social cohesion (GovSA, 2020). GBV is a major, deep seated, systemic, entrenched, and widespread concern in South African institutions, cultures, and traditions (van Rensburg, 2022). Indeed, GBV is seen as a historical legacy. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, "violence inherited from the apartheid still resonates profoundly in today's society dominated by deeply entrenched patriarchal norms and attitudes towards the role of women and which makes VAWC [violence against women and children], especially in rural areas and in informal settlements, a way of life and an accepted social phenomenon." (Alber et al., 2018). President Cyril Ramaphosa recently described it as the country's "second pandemic" (GovSA, 2020).

Femicide is the most extreme form of GBV in the country. It is defined as the killing of a female person or perceived female person on the basis of gender, whether committed within the domestic relationship, interpersonal relationship, or by any other person or whether perpetrated or tolerated by the State or its agents and private sources (GovSA, 2020). In 2009, a national femicide study revealed that about 1,800 women were murdered by their partners, while recent data shows 897 femicides in 2021 (GovSA, 2020; Vallabh, 2022).

Another prevalent form of GBV is domestic violence. As domestic violence is not categorised and recorded by the South African police service, there are no national statistics available; however, a domestic violence study conducted in six South African provinces found that victims of domestic violence in South Africa are typically abused on an ongoing basis, with 83% of abusive incidents taking place in the victim's home (Alber et al., 2018).

According to South Africa's 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, one in five women over the age of 18 has experienced physical violence at least once in their lifetime. In the Western Cape province, 45% of women have experienced abuse and GBV (Alber et al., 2018). The provincial Social Development Department recorded 401 GBV cases between April 1, 2021 and March 31, 2022, including 207 cases of physical violence, 60 of emotional abuse, 35 of verbal abuse or intimidation, 33 of child neglect, and 21 of rape (Thebus, 2022).

The COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns were associated with a spike in GBV and femicide in South Africa. According to the South African Police Minister Bheki Cele, during the first week of the national lockdown the number of GBV reported cases reached 2,230, which amounts to 30% more than for the same period in 2019 (MSF Southern Africa, 2020). Similarly, UN Women-Africa (2020) reported a 37% increase in the weekly average GBV cases reported in South African GBV cases over 2019. In the time span of three weeks, the GBV Command Centre, which operates under the South African Ministry of Social Development, received 10,660 phone calls, 1,503 unstructured supplementary service reports, and 616 SMSs reports regarding GBV during lockdown (UN Women-Africa, 2020).

There are many factors that explain GBV in SA. They include:

The influences of culture, tradition and religion - Culturally, males are often placed in a powerful position in relation to women due to practices such as lobola, ukuthwala, and Sharia law where women are inherently subordinate to men. This often becomes normalised, with both males and females conforming to these cultural and religious practices. Unfortunately, some of these practices implicitly or explicitly condone and tolerate GBV (CSVR, 2016).

Economic factors - Lack of economic independence among women enables GBV. There is a strong link between poverty and GBV. It is hard for women who are economically dependent on their male partners to leave abusive relationships. The relationship between poverty and GBV is not linear and there are multiple other factors (culture, tradition, religion, etc.) that significantly contribute to GBV.

Alcohol abuse – Alcohol abuse is linked with increased risk of all forms of interpersonal violence, including GBV. Substance abuse has been positively linked to GBV in many studies. One of them reported by CSVR (2016) found that 67% of men had consumed alcohol before abusing their partners. Rigid gender norms encourage men to equate violence with manhood and risk-taking behaviours (such as alcohol abuse) (CVSR, 2016), precipitating GBV. Men use alcohol as an excuse for their behaviour ("I was drunk") while women use it to justify their partner's behaviour ("He was drunk, but is sweet when he is not drunk").

Guns - CSVR (2016) reported guns remain a significant cause of violent death in South Africa. Gun violence affects men and women differently. Young men are more likely to be perpetrators and victims of gun violence (Ratele, 2013), while women are more likely to be victims of gun violence in intimate relationships (Mathews et al., 2008).

Institutional factors – GBV continues to perpetuate as a result of weak or non-application of laws, slow administrative and judicial procedures in dealing with GBV, victims' low legal knowledge of GBV, lack of cooperation among government departments, budgetary constraints, etc. (CSVR, 2019).

The Constitution of South Africa sets the framework for an effective legislative response to GBV: Chapter 1 positions human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms as well as non-racialism and non-sexism as founding principles. Chapter 2 affirms equality, human dignity, life, freedom, and security of the person. These rights underscore a national commitment to building a society that is free from all forms of violence and that respects, protects, and fulfils the human rights principles of bodily integrity and autonomy (GoSA, 2020).

A number of policies and legislation are in place to respond to GBV:

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 establishes crimes of violence against women and children as a national priority.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 establishes mandatory minimum sentences for certain forms of rape.

The Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997 allows for bail conditions to be tightened for those charged with rape.

The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 sets out to offer options to victims of abuse through identifying certain obligations on law enforcement bodies and making provision for interim protection orders.

The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 codified and broadened the definition of rape and other sexual offences and introduced new offences that relate to GBV, including using or exposing children to child pornography and pornography (both off- and online). It provides for the National Policy Framework on the Management of Sexual Offences Matters, 2012.

The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 6 of 2012 was passed to provide for effective prosecution and conviction of offenders. The National Development Plan, the Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy (2011) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (2016) are key policies in shaping the NSP.

Beyond the formulation of legislation, efforts to address GBV include the establishment of the Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA) Unit within the National Prosecuting Authority to increase prosecution of the perpetrators of GBV. The unit focuses "primarily on sexual offences, domestic violence, trafficking in persons, enforcement of child maintenance, managing of young offenders and other issues involving the victimisation of women and children" (Alber et al., 2018). Additionally, the South African post-Apartheid government and civil society have initiated programmes to prevent and respond to violence against women and children. Key programmes and initiatives include the Victim Empowerment Programme, the 16 Days of Activism campaigns, the 365 Day National Action Plan to End Gender Violence, the Thuthuzela Care Centres, Gender Links, People Opposing Women Abuse, Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre, the Women's Legal Centre, and Sonke Gender Justice (Alber et al., 2018).

3.4.2. Gender based violence in Nairobi

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, an estimated 27.2% of adolescent girls and young women (AGYW) of ages between 15 and 24 in Kenya had reported being physically or sexually assaulted by an intimate partner, with Nairobi county accounting for more than 60% of such cases (KNBS and MOH, 2015). National data illustrate that intimate partners are the primary perpetrators of sexual violence against young women in Kenya (Ministry of Labour & Social protection of Kenya, 2019), cautioning against a false dichotomy of intimate partner violence and sexual violence. Harmful gender stereotypes are used to justify violence against women and enforce male aggression, control, and domination, while burdening women with docility, subservience, and reliance on men as providers, fostering a culture of abuse outright (Giovetti, 2019). Families and communities have shared beliefs and unspoken rules that both proscribe and prescribe behaviours that implicitly convey that GBV against women/children is acceptable in Kenya, even normal (Glass et al., 2018; Nancy et al., 2019; Read-Hamilton & Marsh, 2016). This includes social norms pertaining to sexual purity, family honour, and men's authority over women and children in the family. Community leaders, institutions, and service providers, such as health care, education, and law enforcement, can reinforce harmful social norms by, for instance, blaming women and girls for sexual assaults or by justifying a husband's use of physical violence as a means to discipline his wife. Both behaviours are viewed as essential to protect the family's reputation in the larger community (Glass et al., 2018).

Often negative health and social consequences of GBV are never addressed because Kenyan women do not disclose GBV to providers or access health care or other services (e.g., protection, legal, traditional authorities) because of social norms that blame the woman for the assault (e.g., she was out alone after dark, she was not modestly dressed, she is working outside the home), norms that prioritise protecting family honour over the safety of the survivor, and institutional acceptance of GBV as a normal and expected part of displacement and

conflict (McCleary et al., 2016; Stark et al., 2013; Wirtz et al., 2013; Wirtz et al., 2016).

The COVID-19 pandemic, like any other crises, immediately raised concerns for escalated GBV due to economic disruption and subsequent household/relationship stressors, together with social and travel restrictions (Flowe et al., 2020; Roesch et al., 2020; Wenham et al., 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, exposed the countries' deep-rooted and longstanding gender inequalities. The pandemic brought about a gender inequality crisis across several key domains of life including employment and ability to earn, family life, and health (Blundell et al., 2020). Due to the imposed containment measures, various industries closed and many workers were laid off, leaving breadwinners suddenly and unpreparedly left without income. While Kenyan women and youth already faced high unemployment rates, the pandemic exacerbated the situation, relieving self-employed women of their informal work and making youth employment nearly unattainable. Upon the onset of the pandemic, incomes for female-headed households declined while the majority of women, particularly those working in the urban informal sector, lost their jobs; more women than men ate less or skipped a meal to cope with hunger; unpaid care work as schools closed increased more for women than for men; and GBV notably increased due to restrictions in movement. Amongst the most prone to GBV were women who had lost their jobs and income due to the pandemic and were made completely dependent on their husbands or partners and girls who were stuck at home with no school. They faced more sexual and physical domestic violence while restrictions on mobility limited their access to protection, treatment services, and justice (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Stigma, discrimination, and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people also heightened during the COVID-19 crisis, with denial of access to shared water sources and/or evictions of tenants from the LGBTI community under pressure from other tenants, attempted rape of gay couples to "correct their error", assaults, and robberies. This GBV goes unreported in fear of stigma, discrimination, and the continued criminalization of same-sex relations (UN Human rights & Social Justice, 2020)

This pattern was repeated with the forced evictions of residents of Mukuru in Nairobi. In the absence of housing structures and supporting and protecting community structures, the threat of GBV ballooned (Amnesty International, 2021; The Elephant and Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2022).

Since the onset of the COVID- 19 pandemic, GBV increased five-fold in Nairobi's informal settlements (Human Rights Watch, 2021). With the Mukuru evictions of Oct 2021, GBV cases increased seven-fold in these areas (Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya, 2021).

There are many organizations who help GBV victims in Nairobi, ranging from the Kenyan government including administration, nongovernmental organisations like the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Plan International, and Trends and Insights for Africa (TiFA).

Over the last decade and a half, the Kenyan government has enacted laws including the 2015 Protection against Domestic Violence Act, the 2011 Female Genital Mutilation Act, and the 2006 Sexual Offences Act. It has also established guidelines on how incidences of GBV should be managed and survivors supported by the police, medical staff, and judicial officials. Kenya has ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) and several international treaties that obligate it to protect women and girls from discrimination and GBV.

3.4.3. Gender based violence in Burkina Faso

The problem of inequalities and disparities between men and women is a serious one in Burkina Faso. Indeed, in all areas of political, economic, social, and cultural life, inequalities and flagrant disparities are observed, particularly to the disadvantage of women who are the most frequent victims of violence. Even though men are sometimes as much victims as women in the domestic sphere, especially in urban areas, men are twice as likely to be the perpetrators of Gender Based Violence (GBV) than women (Trust Africa, 2019).

Statistics on GBV in Burkina Faso are incomplete because certain socio-cultural and/or honorific aspects prevent victims from reporting. However, GBV is a reality everywhere in the country. In 2018, UN Women reported that

11.2% of women aged 15-49 years reported that they had been subjected to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months; and the SIGI Burkina Faso report (OECD, 2018) added that more than one in three women (37%) have been victims of domestic violence in their lifetime, compared to one in five men (16%). In 2020, 5,324 cases of GBV of which 4253 women and 1071 men were recorded (Alboblog, 2021).

GBV in Burkina Faso is often explained as the result of cultural, customary, and/or religious factors; socio-economic factors; and institutional factors. The taught beliefs in Burkina Faso are that the man is the undisputed head of the family, dominates, and has property rights over women and girls. As such, he implicitly arrogates to himself a coercive right that women must accept as a normal cultural fact (Medicus mundi Andalucia Burkina Faso, 2018).

As further evidence of the power disparities between genders, Burkinabe women economically depend on men and have little access to factors of production. Women constitute 55% of the agricultural labour force, but no more than 40% have access to land. When they do, their decision-making power remains limited due to practices related to customary law and community land management (Ndiaye, 2021). Similarly, women have limited access to financial services: two-thirds of bank-account holders are men and 15% of the population say that men and women should not have the same power to make decisions about financial services (Ndiaye, 2021; OECD,2018).

Because of weak laws dealing with GBV, disregard of these laws, and the slowness of administrative and judicial procedures in dealing with GBV, knowledge of GBV and justice for its victims is low (Alboblog, 2021).

In addition to these factors, spontaneous factors or crises exacerbate the vulnerability of women and girls, thus increasing the risk of GBV. COVID-19 heightened GBV in Burkina Faso. The response to the pandemic, which forced people to limit their movements (Kpognon et al., 2020), increased gender inequalities and limited people's access to protection mechanisms and entry points for appropriate care (Ndiaye, 2021). Although it is difficult to carry out a quantitative study measuring the impact of COVID-19 on the increase in such violence, the testimonies of actors working in Burkina Faso point to a change in the situation and an increase in the violence suffered by women and girls (Ndiaye, 2021).

Additionally, Burkina Faso's escalating security and humanitarian crisis exposes women to rape and sexual, physical, and/or psychological aggression. Mass school drop-out, forced labour, and early and/or forced marriages along with the consequences of early and unwanted pregnancies, sexual exploitation, and abuse are increasingly common. Simultaneously, men are exposed to assassinations and kidnappings. Compounding this, low socio-economic status of internally displaced women makes them more vulnerable to GBV. Forced to travel alone for miles to fetch water, firewood, and animal feed to sell (Ndiaye, 2021), they are targeted victims of violence.

As Alboblog (2021) points out, the government has put in place mechanisms to combat GBV by setting up a legal framework that protects the rights of vulnerable people. Article 2 of the Constitution provides that "the protection of life, safety and physical integrity are guaranteed", and prohibits and punishes slavery, slavery-like practices, inhuman and cruel, degrading and humiliating treatment, physical or moral torture, abuse, as well as ill-treatment inflicted on children.

The 1990 Personal and Family Code includes provisions for equality between girls and boys in the family. This equality is enshrined throughout their lives in their relationship with their parents and vice versa.

Law No. 061-2015/CNT of 6 September 2015 on the prevention, repression, and reparation of violence against women and girls and the care of victims obliges any person who has knowledge of a committed offence to inform competent authorities, giving the victim a legal route for referral to the competent authorities via complaints. The authorities are obliged to follow up on such complaints and provide for the creation of specialized structures such as units within police and gendarmerie units, a support fund for the care of women and girls who are victims of violence, and a legal assistance fund for women and girls who are victims of violence.

Law 025 of May 2018 on the criminal code in Burkina Faso provides for sanctions for certain types of violence that were not previously repressed or sufficiently addressed, such as accusations of witchcraft.

Coping with Crises- The potential of (community-led) urban nutrition hubs

The urban nutrition hub is a vision that is yet to come to life. In our concept, urban nutrition hubs are physical spaces where knowledge generation happens and change emerges. At the same time, they are cohesive spaces, where social capital is strengthened. They are also digital spaces, where information and knowledge are generated and shared. While research during the scoping phase occurred in and on community places, such as the Ruben Centre in Mukuru, Callas and uPhakanini Kitchen in the Cape Flats, and in Foyer FAMA training centre in Ouagadougou, with the implementation of interlinking pathways, we are yet to understand the potential for these spaces as places to address urban food insecurity and build social capital. We will explore the potential for institutionalising and scaling such spaces in the course of the next research phase.

4. Community kitchens – a snapshot into the pot

Community kitchens are springing up in Nairobi, Cape Town, and Ouagadougou in response to the crises outlined in the previous chapter. They are generally run by women who volunteer their time, equipment, and financial resources to prepare meals for other members of their community. We use the term "community kitchen" in this report as an overall description for the spaces where people can access prepared meals for free or for a small fee, places that would traditionally be considered soup kitchens or communal feeding schemes. We consider community kitchens to be local structures that provide meals to families in their immediate neighbourhoods.

There are multiple models of community kitchen initiatives worldwide, such as the reinvigoration of "popular restaurants" (olla popular) of Latin America (Abarca, 2007; Barrig, 1990; Estrella et al., 2020; Hartley, 2020; Immink, 2001; Kogan, 1998). This movement serves as inspiration to communities responding to economically and socially hard times through the communalisation of food (Federici, 2019). Community kitchens exist in many urban informal settlements in Latin American cities and are mostly run by women who mobilise their own resources and turn them into big pots of food for everyone (Pinto, 2020).

Community kitchens have a long history in Latin America, especially in Peru. Here, they are collective institutions that support communities during hard times, especially miners in mining regions. Often not associated with a fixed place, but with a fixed core of people who cook and serve, community kitchens are gaining popularity, particularly as a response to crises. Sethuparvathyl (2021) describes food as invoking memory, but also physical or in-person gatherings that create social and cultural memories during the COVID-19 pandemic. Often characterised by lack of continuity in funding and reliance on multiple resources, community kitchens suffer from temporality. Two examples from Brazil and Peru challenge this and show how governmental programmes could extend the sustainability of community kitchens.

The Zero Hunger Programme in Brazil was created in 2003 as guided by a broad effort to fight national hunger. It included a set of actions and strategies to guarantee opportunities for equality and social inclusion and to support continuous access to food through school meals, distribution of basic food baskets, food banks, and community kitchens or restaurantes populares (de Araujo et al., 2016). The restaurantes populares was a public food assistance policy guided by the Food and Nutrition Security Guidelines and financed by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger in Brazil (Belik, 2011; Brasil, 2005; Botelho et al., 2019). For the first seventeen years of the programme, all clients paid one Brazilian real [2] for lunch and even less for breakfast or dinner. With everyone paying the same amount, much of the social stigma of going to the restaurants was removed, upholding the idea of food with dignity. All schools also had a

[2] 1 Real – 20 US cents in 2022 (Oanda, 2022)

kitchen and staff making meals from scratch and attention was given to sourcing food from small local farms (Chappell, 2018; William, 2019).

In Peru, comedores populares, or community kitchens, saw women from different families collectively prepare food that is later consumed in their homes or in communal spaces. Communal kitchens attempted to reduce the cost of food and increase the nutritional quality of local diets by means of economies of scale and food donations (Mujica, 1994). Community kitchens were created in the 1960s as a survival strategy for urban populations, especially in the main cities, in response to poverty and economic crisis (Garret, 2001). It is evident that the community kitchens were set up to attend to the needs of members and their families, not to make sales or profits. The kitchens do not have savings or distribute benefits to members and members themselves subsidise the kitchen directly by donating ingredients, providing labor, etc. (Blondet & Trivelli, 2004). Women who work in the kitchens operate with the logic of economic solidarity, not the market, and are not guided by commercial criteria (Zibechi, 2008).

"The reasons for implementing community kitchens—and making food production and consumption a collective responsibility—today still have characteristics in common with the past experiences but depend also on the new needs of contemporary cities in times of austerity, overcrowded cities, climate and environmental crisis" (Gennari & Tornaghi, 2019, p. 86). This statement reminds us to view community kitchens not only as feeding places, but as hubs for solidarity and places to explore the social illnesses of our cities, our histories, and our future through food.

4.1. Community Kitchens in Cape Town

The Western Cape Economic Development Programme (EDP) estimated that 90% of community kitchens in Cape Town were set up in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns and loss of wages and income (Paganini et al., 2021). The community kitchens of Cape Town are as diverse as the neighbourhoods they serve. Community kitchens are often connected to mosques, churches, schools, early childhood development centres, or community centres. Often, these kitchens are run by volunteers (mainly women) and receive food donations through faith-based organisations, philanthropic organisations, or governmental social development support. The donations are sourced mainly via Cape Town's fresh produce market (Epping) or, occasionally, large-scale or medium-scale farmers from the Philippi Horticulture Area, a vegetable production site in the peri-urban Cape Flats. Financial supports for community kitchens came through the EDP, through the CAN (Community Action Network), and partnerships with the Brewers' Collective. The District Six Committee Initiative also delivered litres and litres of soup to kitchens. Chefs in the kitchens prepare thick soups or starchy stews from the donations, based on pap (maize meal), potatoes, marrows, and beans (Paganini et al., 2021). It is estimated that during the lockdown there were hundreds of neighbourhood soup kitchens in the Cape Flats and adjacent areas. Kitchens contributed to the collective food provision effort of non-government institutions such as NGOs, religious networks, Solidarity Fund and others, who, for a couple of months at the height of the crisis, reached an estimated 1.5 to 2 million residents (A. Boraine, personal communication, 2022).

While a variety of initiatives emerged, the CANs localised non-hierarchical self-organising neighbourhood collectives, functioning under the informal umbrella network, Cape Town Together (CTT). Noteworthy for both the scale of new connections and networks they forged, as well as the mode of organisation they initiated, CTT and the CANs were launched days before lockdown with the intention of enabling the sharing of resources, including information. Through social media, volunteers in the same neighbourhoods were connected to one another (some knew one another previously, others did not), each CAN having their own communications and coordination platform (usually a WhatsApp group). Within weeks, over 160 CANs were established. Altogether, it is estimated that around 15,000 people were involved. Levels of participation widely varied, with some volunteers engaged daily and others occasionally engaged to bring specific resources or skills.

Food provision, in particular, loomed large. Initially, CAN volunteers scrambled to fundraise for, source, and distribute food parcels and supermarket vouchers. By May 2020, about 700 kitchens belonged to the CTT network with each kitchen's offering being unique. Some served every day, others on selected days. Some provided three hot meals a day, others just one.

Some offered local dishes, while others drew on the cooking traditions brought to Cape Town by migrants. To give a sense of the collective scale of these interventions, if it is assumed that each kitchen provided 100 persons with one daily meal (though some of them cooked for more than 5,000 people daily), over half a million meals were served during the first three months of lockdown.

Just as important were the bridges that allowed some measure of redistribution. Apartheid geography has been exceptionally effective in isolating those with needs from those with means. Consequently, it is those with limited resources who carry the burden of supporting neighbours and family when times are hard. It was thus clear to many volunteers that CANs in higher income neighbourhoods need to support those in lower income ones. This created the CAN Pairing programme, which saw CANs twinned with counterparts "on the other side of the tracks". While the better-resourced CANs could offer physical resources like donations and money, the other CANs in the pairings often had more information and knowledge about how to effectively organise in a crisis. Unsurprisingly, CANs from neighbourhoods with abundant resources were outnumbered by those without means, so overall, CAN pairings were limited.

While some kitchens continue to receive support through CANs, many community kitchens that opened during the first lockdown closed due to lack of continuous funding. As the crisis edged into the medium term, short-term government relief funds, civil society donations, and corporate donations dwindled, drying up necessary supplies, suffocating the sustainability of community kitchens, perpetuating hunger, and removing communities' newfound platforms for support, hope, solidarity, and encouragement.

Community kitchens, however, remain of paramount importance. They can play a multifunctional role and enhance cohesion and, herein, lies a great chance for de-stigmatising and reimagining community kitchens, replacing the antiquated view of community kitchens as feeding schemes for the destitute. We imagine these kitchens as places of learning, communication, sharing, healing, and recreation. Terms such as "feeding schemes" and "soup kitchens" imply poverty (and, for many, shame), while "community kitchens" or "community restaurants" foster dignity in the spirit of building alternatives models. Reinvention of the concept of community kitchens as hybrid models delivering food provision services, local produce marketing, and other key programmes identified by the community as priorities (such as gender-based violence education, women/children shelters, for example)[3] forms the basis of the potential of community kitchens within the Urban Food Futures programme.

What is cooking? Adding critical feminist research to the pot

In previous research (see Paganini et al., 2021), the group that formed FACT argued that feminist approaches in food security research can unearth the root causes of broken systems and power struggles and amplify marginalised voices normally excluded in mainstream food security research. This sentiment was echoed by women co-researchers who critiqued governance meetings about COVID-19's impact on food and the poor for ignoring the voices of those most affected by hunger during the pandemic. As research teams from FACT and our partners, we take discourses about food security studies out of the sole possession of experts, embrace interdisciplinary exchange, and recognise the intersectionality of compounding issues.

The Kitchen Retreat: A space to exhale, listen and learn

As external support continues to dissipate, community kitchen staff are digging even deeper to provide not only essential nourishment and shelter, but a space where their neighbours can feel "human again". Yet, mirroring experiences in the health care sector, little attention has been paid to the cumulative impact on kitchen workers who put in long stretches of work—sometimes without pay—while also struggling to provide sustenance and care for their own families. As such, a three-day retreat in November provided a welcome space to breathe, vent, reflect, dream, and document key challenges of kitchen spaces, which served as base for co-designing the next phase of the research The retreat brought

[3] The introduction was earlier published in Paganini et al., 2021

together 20 heads of community food hubs from four organisations:

- FACT (Food Agency Cape Town), an organisation of researchers who use food as an entry point to explore social justice questions within their own communities
- The Callas Foundation, a community-based organisation that links community kitchens to safe spaces for victims of gender-based violence
- Ubuntu, a human rights organisation that aims to strengthen women's voices by exploring links across gender, land, labour, and environmental rights in the towns of Stellenbosch and Klapmuts
- The Cape Town Action Network Gugulethu, a network of twenty kitchens from a high-density, low-income area on the outskirts of Cape Town

The conversations during the retreat highlighted the rich menu of services shared "alongside food": from domestic violence support, nutrition advice, and childcare or after-school care support to engaging with gang members and urging them to desist from gang violence. Participants highlighted how offering an empathetic ear helps community members to vent their anger and frustration about the "poverty porn" they are subjected to in return for mere scraps of the cake. The kitchens are situated in the often-violent environment of the Cape Flats, the area outside Cape Town where the Apartheid regime created so-called "townships" to settle "People of Colour". The ongoing spatial segregation along race lines perpetuates the historical separation of society, wealth, and power. These kitchens are spaces of shame for both their patrons who walk to distant kitchens to avoid their neighbours' stares, as well as for the policy makers and local authorities who fail to offer them protection and a predictable source of support.

The retreat made it clear that the value derived from community kitchens transcends the immediate need for food, or, for those who run the kitchens, a source of income. Rather, community kitchens are becoming critical spaces where communities can seek and gain connection, exchange, and solidarity. Not unrelated to this, they are also places where norms are queried and transformation is spearheaded, where dialogues around food are happening, and where advocates' voices for changing existing food systems are heard. In other words, community kitchens can foster social values and help (re)build the broken social fabric of communities.

The assembled kitchen heads have embarked on a co-creation process to achieve their dream: repositioning community kitchens as multifaceted hubs where support for diverse needs can be aggregated, while also restoring dignity and social capital. The chosen path will include, among other tasks, conducting advocacy-driven research and visioning to uncover the communities' unexpressed values underlying their dreams for their community kitchens. The dialogue that occurred during the retreat was a snapshot of what is playing out in Cape Town's communities, the country, and the world. The retreat brought the exhaustion of women who have run their kitchens for years to the fore. Their underlying emotion was sadness about the fact that communities know what is needed, but that we are not doing what is needed, whether for ourselves (selfcare) or poverty or fixing South Africa. This knowing what is needed and not being able to respond to and satisfy it, plays out at all levels of society. The voice of fear was also underlying and unarticulated during the retreat. It was ever present as reluctance to speak up as there is a perceived risk of losing the little that one has (their involvement in the community kitchens) despite the group's capacity to sit with discomfort, speak their truths, and say what was needed. As this group continues to nurture solidarity and trust, these fears and sadnesses may dissolve and create the trust needed to speak more truths.

Photovoices: Capturing moments of sisterhood and allowing a storyline to emerge

To unravel the factors behind the community kitchen workers' exhaustion, fear, and anger and turn these emotions into positive energy and action, the group engaged in a Photovoice analyses. Photovoice is a participatory method of co-creating knowledge through collective introspection and reflective dialogues. In this technique, photography is used to capture moments and situations which reflect photographers' response to key research questions. The community kitchen workers visited four kitchens they were not familiar with and captured visual responses to probing questions such as, "What do you observe here?",

"What do I want to learn from this kitchen?", "What is it that motivates the people to wake up and run this kitchen?", or "What are their stories?". The photographic responses are mirrors for communities to reflect on the everyday. What may seem ordinary, mundane, or unimportant to the photographer nevertheless reflects day-to-day life challenges, the political environment, and the geographical space. A further additional intention was realized through the process: the creation of a safe space (group) to motivate joint sharing, learning, solidarity, sisterhood, courage, and hope within the research team.

Following a gallery walk, a joint discussion about the photos and identification of key themes for further analysis is a decisive next step; through conversation, expression, and description of everyday life, the photograph becomes research content. Through conversation around the photographs, the researchers and "the researched" mix together and agree upon research questions to guide future actions that are significant to the whole group, for example, questions around day-to-day management of community kitchens (addressing nutrition, physical space, equipment, and funding) and on future planning (addressing government buy in, protection of space, and relationship building). In the process participants gain understanding of the value of research and theoretical tools for understanding agency, social change, and power relations and learn to interpret academic views of political action and community views of research, so that they can act as bridges with the community. Indeed, the women have become trusted community advisors during the Covid-19 pandemic in absence of government support and an abundance of support from other women.

The following narrative was developed by four community writers:

Women who run community kitchens all work from a place of lacking. We were raised in the context of a racist, sexist post-Apartheid South Africa and burdened with intergenerational poverty. For us, sharing a slice of bread with a sibling for dinner is not unusual. We have all experienced or been exposed to gender-based violence. We have lost so much (family members, bread winners, dignity, hope) that the only thing that we know we can count on is more loss. Many of us once spoke of survival, but did not truly know what love is or how it feels.

Running community kitchens has been the best thing in many of our lives, but it certainly doesn't come without challenges. The major obstacles faced by all kitchens are related to space as most kitchens operate from homes and other borrowed places. Women jostle for physical space in their kitchens, but also for mental space from it. We grapple with the lack of boundaries between acting as both community members and kitchen managers; expected to feed our communities, we struggle to provide time and resources to our own families. It is a wonder that us women have been able to provide meals to so many people in this context. Yet, we do. We must. Even when we are able to source food, regular electricity and water shortages in these facilities frustrate food production and leave us scrambling to source alternatives. When gas and electricity are available, they are often unaffordable due to escalating gas and electricity prices, impacting the number of meals that can be produced daily. Higher fuel prices and frequent shortages make cooking in large pots unfeasible, meaning fewer meals can be prepared for fewer people.

These challenges may seem overwhelming, but in coming together with other women who volunteer at and run community kitchens, we have found strength to keep going. We have recognised the power of people, social relationships, and networks as most of our kitchens survived only through social networks and sharing. We have shown ourselves just how resilient we truly are and how our collective action has helped our communities. Our networking has allowed us to become part of something bigger than ourselves and inspired others to do the same. This evokes the feminist perspective that "the personal is political", which speaks powerfully to this work on the street and on paper. In solidarity, women can advocate their needs using a unified voice.

We have been able to connect with women from different communities who, in one way or another, respond to hunger and social ills in our communities. The food system itself perpetuates violence within communities and it is this violence (which we all experience as oppressed members of a patriarchal system) that urged us to respond to our communities' needs.

4.2. The Mukuru community kitchen

The forced evictions in Nairobi's Mukuru kwa Njenga slum displaced more than 75,000 people between October 2021 and January 2022. With their homes and businesses flattened, a majority of affected families lost the ability to feed themselves. Therefore, food insecurity was one of the major challenges the community was facing when Muungano AMT assessed the situation in the settlement.

Following deliberations with women from the community, Muungano AMT and TMG Research suggested the development of a community kitchen to provide the evicted families with an immediate solution to a pressing problem. Afterwards, it was determined that holding a visioning workshop would help with development of a kitchen that was most reactive to the community's needs. To develop a kitchen reactive to the community's needs, in February 2022, with the support of TMG Research and in consultation with FACT, Muungano AMT hosted a one-day visioning workshop in Mukuru kwa Njenga.

Seventeen women who represented 300 households affected by the demolitions participated in a design thinking exercise to identify visions for a community kitchen. Representatives of the affected community themselves articulated their needs and aspirations, providing a template for the pilot community kitchen. The women were split into three groups to define their goals by answering, "Why a kitchen?" With the understanding that "there are no right or wrong answers", the critical responses were clustered into three themes:

1. To establish a kitchen that adequately addresses their community's food and nutritional needs.
2. To use the kitchens as a pathway towards recovering the ability to feed themselves by providing an income stream.
3. To have a kitchen that serves as a launchpad for other socio-economic initiatives.

Each of these visions had a degree of meaning to the participants. Of highest priority, having a community kitchen would enable them to meet their urgent need to cook for their families. Importantly, the kitchen was envisioned only as a temporary buffer as communities work toward recovery. Participants desired the dignity of feeding themselves. Lastly, the participants envisioned the kitchen's longer-term benefits to the community in repurposing the facility to a catering business, for example, for school feeding programmes after the immediate shock of the crisis was resolved.

Despite minimal resources, including the lack of a covered structure, between February and April 2022, the pilot community kitchen provided an immediate lifeline in meal provision to families in Mukuru. Cooking over an open fire, women cooked dinners in shifts to fill community members' stomachs after a long day.

As the cooperating women had little prior experience working in collaboration with others, the group experienced tremendous growth after initial internal disputes as they united in their common goal of feeding their families. They were forced to arbitrate cultural differences in food preferences (for example, maize vs rice as a main staple) and make trade-offs in co-developing a menu that was culturally appropriate, met individual preferences, and was responsive to food availability and price. All viewed the kitchen as necessary to support their households and therefore did their best to ensure its success.

The most pressing challenge, however, was economic. Set up in a time of crisis, rising food costs, and rapidly escalating inflation rates – CBK (2022) reported that general inflation rose from 5.08% to 6.47% between February and April 2022 – the participating families were not in a position to adequately fund the kitchen's operations. This three-month period marked the highest inflation rate in Kenya over the past five years, with food items being the worst hit and experiencing double-digit inflation rates of more than 12% (Wamugu, 2022; Trading Economics, 2022). These price shocks were like a powerful tsunami. Such increases were witnessed across several other food commodities, overstretching and thinning out the community kitchen's already meagre resources.

One of the key learnings from the pilot phase is that community kitchens can provide a lifeline to fragile communities during times of crises. The one established in Mukuru by a group of women with the support of Muungano AMT provided residents with a source of food when they needed it most. Therefore, development of infrastructure for such community kitchen – both

in terms of space, equipment and, importantly, the social connection needed for collaboration among strangers – may be considered as a measure for community resilience building efforts for crises such as demolitions.

Another discovery is that, left on their own, community kitchens cannot sustain themselves. Given the low socio-economic status of the communities they serve and high commodity prices, these kitchens rely on external support, especially at project onset.

For long-term sustainability, therefore, the kitchens need to have a self-funding mechanism to sustain their continuous operation and value to the community. The women who run the kitchen posed food business (such as food service to the informal schools within the area) as having potential. With careful planning around day-to day-operations, management committees, and relationship building with stakeholders, such a model could transform community kitchens into socio-economic pillars within informal settlements.

4.3. Community kitchens in Ouagadougou

Community kitchens bring together a small group of people who cook cost-effective meals to tackle food insecurity, stimulate income-generating activities, and rebuild social ties (Faivreau & Fréchette, 2017). Community kitchens are community survival initiatives in low-income areas based on the mutual provision of services to ensure food assistance (Fréchette, 2000). Community kitchens in Burkina Faso exist as part of family solidarity (Yago, 2021). Communities in Burkina Faso, grouped together in extended families, have adopted the commoning of goods and resources as a mode of management: collective field, collective granary, collective kitchen. In this configuration, where a family has many households, the crops are centralised in a common granary and distributed to the women for cooking purposes. The women cook together, but each with a different menu, and all the meals are gathered in the household of the eldest member of the family, where all family members meet to eat. This system ensures that households with poor harvests have access to food throughout the year. Beyond this family solidarity, community kitchens are governed by community solidarity, especially in school feeding programmes where each parent is asked to provide some food for the canteen.

Community kitchens have also emerged as a situational response to crises (Fréchette, 2000) as exemplified by the current humanitarian crisis resulting from the security crisis. Here, the humanitarian emergency persisted despite isolated solidarity actions (Diallo, 2022), particularly in Ouagadougou, where IDPs do not receive government support because Ouagadougou is not officially registered as a reception area. This led to the creation of the association *Femme en Marche*, the only legally registered shelter for women and children in Ouagadougou. In partnership with the organisations *Cuisine sans frontières* (Kitchens without borders) and *Ferronniers sans frontières* (Blacksmiths without borders), *Femme en Marche* provides support to vulnerable women through a community kitchen: Foyer FAMA. The community kitchen provides food for women and their children and serves as a production facility where women can make meals and snacks to sell in the city in mobile restaurants. In this manner, the shelter offers food assistance and socio-economic reintegration to its residents.

Women at *Femmes en Marche* are not passive beneficiaries. They plan recipes and menus, purchase perishable food on the local markets,

Figure 3: Cargo bikes used by Foyer FAMA – Cargo bikes (mobile restaurants), designed in collaboration with Ferronniers sans Frontières, are used by the Foyer FAMA members to sell meals in their neighbourhoods. (Photo credit: Edouard Sango, TMG Research)

then cook and share meals communally. Thus, Foyer FAMA responds to an immediate need while preserving the dignity of vulnerable women and allowing them to experiment with group care based on their experience with caring and feeding (Fournier et al., 1998).

The centre is thus committed to what Fréchette (2000) describes as the creation of economically and socially profitable services that boost local socio-economic life. The objective is not to make a profit, but to ensure an exchange and build a connection with urban society for these women who, until now, have lived in rural areas. In addition to learning to adapt to an environment different from their own in terms of social norms, the women of the centre also become aware of their personal and collective potential.

While Foyer FAMA aims to become independent from buying fresh vegetables through production. As Foyer FAMA is planning on acquiring land to produce its own vegetables, it is currently working with the woman agroecological farmers association La Saisonnière to benefit from their experience in micro-gardening.

5. School meals in urban areas

5.1. Introduction: why school feeding?

> *[...] school food has much to contribute to current efforts to meet the challenges of sustainable development. By definition, it is one of the few public services that specifically targets 'future generations'. If properly designed, planned and monitored, it is also a service that holds enormous potential to deliver multiple health, ecological, social and economic dividends, including reducing the human and financial costs of poor diet, lowering carbon emissions, creating new markets for quality food producers and empowering consumers by building their capacity to eat healthily.*
>
> *(Morgan and Sonnino, 2008)*

School feeding is widely recognised as a positive and necessary intervention to achieve multiple development outcomes. Both national governments and international organisations have voiced their agreement that providing food for children in schools not only enhances their nutrition, but also has positive impacts on education, gender equality, local economies, and agricultural development (FAO & WFP, 2018; WFP, 2019). They claim that the prospect of even one meal per day increases the chances of a child going to school attending classes, being more attentive, improving their cognitive capacity, and enhancing their learning outcomes (Milledzi et al., 2017; Abotsi, 2013; Maijo, 2018; Metwally et al, 2020). Receiving food on the condition of attending school – especially if the food is received in the form of take-home rations – increases enrolment rates, in general, and more so for girls who, in many countries, are less likely than their male counterparts to pursue primary education. Increased enrolment was found to reduce child labour (Delbiso et al, 2021) and decrease gender inequality, with more girls being able to attend school particularly when they receive take-home rations (Gelli, 2015). When supplies are sourced from local farmers, producers, and traders – as is the case in Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) programmes – school feeding can contribute to the local agricultural and economic development.

School meal programmes also benefit household members not specifically targeted by the interventions. A study of school feeding in Burkina Faso showed younger siblings of pupils receiving take-home rations had higher weights than those in the control group (Kazianga et al., 2014). In Ethiopia, school feeding was found to cover substantial food expenses for families and therefore provided relief to parents (Delbiso et al., 2021). As such, WFP (2020) referred to school feeding as the world's "largest and most widespread safety net", benefiting 388 million children in over 160 countries. However, the nutritional benefits of school meals are contested. As school feeding programmes target children who have already passed through the developmental stage at which stunting is most likely to occur (the first 24 months of a child's life), some have argued that meals for school-going children are ineffective as nutritional interventions (Alderman & Bundy, 2012). However, they can be beneficial when considering micronutrient deficiencies at any age (Bundy et al., 2009).

The numerous benefits of school feeding have caused governments in low-income countries to increase budgetary allocations to school feeding programmes, resulting in 36% more children in low-income countries benefiting from such programmes between 2013 and 2020 (WFP, 2020). This trend was reversed during the Covid-19 pandemic, when school closures and other control measures negatively affected the provision of school meals for roughly 95% of children who were part of a school feeding programme (WFP, 2020). In the aftermath of the pandemic, national and local governments as well as donor organisations worldwide are working toward reinstating pre-pandemic levels of school feeding and expanding it to children who were previously excluded (School Meals Coalition, 2021).

Alongside their benefits for children, stakeholders have started to recognise school feeding programmes' potential to achieve other positive outcomes within food systems. For instance, HGSF programmes are designed to source food from local producers and traders, in an attempt to create markets for local quality food producers and expand local agricultural

production (FAO & WFP, 2018; Sonnino et al., 2014). School feeding may thus contribute to efficient food systems through fostering local economic and agricultural development, diversifying local production, and introducing nutrition-sensitive and environmentally friendly agricultural practices (FAO & WFP, 2018). Therefore, in lower income countries, school feeding has been framed as a tool for advancing sustainable development processes (Gaddis & Coplen, 2018).

School feeding has also been praised for employment creation. An analysis by WFP (2020) shows that for every 100,00 children served, school feeding programmes create, on average, 1,668 jobs. This figure does not include indirect employment such as local farmers or traders supplying the schools and is, therefore, a conservative estimate. The Global Survey of School Meals Programs, one of the largest data collection efforts on national school feeding programmes worldwide, also presents data on employment as provided by national governments. In South Africa, it is estimated that 60,000 jobs are created by school feeding programmes (GCNF, 2021b). In Kenya, it is estimated that in 2021, school feeding programmes created 3,000 jobs for cooks and preparers, 10,000 jobs for food packagers and handlers, and 3,000 jobs for food service managers (GNFC, 2021).

Figure 4: Jobs created by school feeding programmes in 48 countries. (Source: WFP 2020)



School feeding sits at the intersection of many interlocking development issues: children's health and wellbeing, food and nutrition security countering hunger and malnutrition, the power of public procurement (Morgan & Sonnino, 2008; Swensson & Tartanac, 2020), employment and care work (Gaddis & Coplen, 2018), and gender equality for girls attending schools and women working in school kitchens. Looking at its impact on education, nutrition, and economic development, its benefits reach individual children, households, and the larger society. However, school kitchens can also be places where exclusion, discrimination, and oppression are perpetuated and, potentially, countered. "School meals may be a space for (re)creating and maintaining (in)equities, and injustices. Concurrently, the planning and execution of school meals, including deciding on menus and procuring the food, may also become a site of social struggle and resistance" (Ruge et al., 2022). This may be the case, for instance, when the food served is not culturally appropriate for all children (e.g., due to religious differences) or nutritionally deficient (e.g., lack of variety or presence of highly processed pre-packaged foods in the meals served).

In the context of crises, school meals have proven to be responsive and adaptable, even with some initial problems. When the COVID-19 pandemic forced school closures in most countries, governments were relatively responsive in adapting the feeding programmes to overcome this challenge. Some of these changes were spearheaded by countries' judiciary systems, as in the case of South Africa, where a court recognised children's inalienable right to receive school meals and the duty of the South African state to find alternative solutions (Section 27, 2020). Were school meals more resilient than other food initiatives? If so, why? If not, what held them back?

School feeding in Africa: the shift toward "local"

School feeding programmes are carried out in most countries in Africa and, in 2019, reached 65.4 million children on the continent (African Union, 2021). Many of these programmes were started by international organisations and charities, chief

among them the WFP. While WFP was able to reach thousands of children, many of its school feeding programmes were based on food aid received from industrialised countries – mostly the US – which many criticised for the negative impact on local farmers (Morgan & Sonnino, 2008). In response, programmes based on purchases from local farmers where possible (HGSF) were promoted in multiple international arenas.

African governments have been among the most supportive of HGSF and most of them base their school feeding programmes on this model. In 2003, they took their first implementation steps when they included HGSF in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, the agricultural programme of the Africa Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which coupled children's adequate nourishment with stimulation of local food production (De Schutter, 2014). Since then, the African Union has promoted the HGSF model among its member states as a pathway to meet the SDGs and Africa's Agenda 2063 in multiple sectors: education, nutrition, health, gender equality, agriculture, and local development (African Union, 2021). To this end, in 2016, African Heads of State and Government set the 1st of March as the African Day of School Feeding. In 2020, 21 of the 39 countries in the African Union were implementing HGSF programmes (WFP, 2020).

5.2. School feeding as a safety net: how tight is the mesh?

School feeding's efficiency in addressing food insecurity has earned it the label of social safety net. It is estimated that through the provision of one meal per day at school for 180 school days a year (as a global average), school feeding represents a transfer of income to households amounting to 10 to 15% of household expenditure (WFP, 2013). This, in turn, increases households' ability to withstand shocks such as economic and financial crises. In fact, as a response to the 2008 food and fuel price crises, at least 38 low- and middle-income countries worldwide increased their interest and investment in school feeding programmes (Bakhshinyan et al., 2019; WFP, 2013). In 2019, 388 million primary schoolchildren, about half of the world's pupils, received lunch or a snack at school, making it the largest social safety net in the world (Logan, 2022; WFP, 2020). Besides functioning as a short-term safety net in response to a shock, many argue that school feeding can be understood as a long-term social protection mechanism (WFP, 2020).

Beyond being a response to economic crises, some authors argue that school feeding is also an instrument to address social crises. Gaddis and Coplen (2018) identify food insecurity as one of the symptoms of social reproduction crisis, where social reproduction is understood as the set of processes "required to maintain everyday life and to sustain human cultures and communities on a daily basis and intergenerationally" (Di Chiro in Gaddis and Coplen, 2018: 90). The authors argue that in a situation where feeding children has become the sole responsibility of the family (or more likely the mother), but the family is not able to provide, governments, international organisations, and NGOs "stepped in to mediate this crisis by offering free or heavily subsidized school lunches" (Gaddis & Coplen, 2018: 90). As such, school feeding can re-collectivise social reproduction duties, whose impact weighs particularly heavily on poorer populations.

The preparation of school meals, therefore, represents one of the instances where (mostly women's) care work is remunerated. Based on Nakano Glenn's typologies, Gaddis and Coplen (2018) identify three forms of care work that women undertake in school kitchens. The first is the direct physical and emotional care of feeding and conversing with children. The second is the maintenance of the physical space where school meals are prepared and consumed. The third is "community mothering", the fostering of social relations between children and adults – teachers, food producers, and other community members – which, when kitchen workers work in the community where they live, involves fostering links with neighbours and community members.

School feeding and COVID

School feeding, therefore, is often recognised as a social safety net that helps poorer households cope with economic and social crises and shocks. Through these functions, they contribute to people's resilience. However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and government control measures showed that school feeding itself may not be as resilient as imagined. When governments worldwide closed schools as a containment measure, most also halted school feeding programmes. On top of the inability of

poorer households to access diverse and nutritious food – mostly due to lack of income rather than availability of food itself – school closure further impeded access to food for children (Aborode et al., 2021). Unable to go to school, many children missed their main meal of the day and source of important nutrients, exposing them to food insecurity and malnutrition, loss of learning time, and child labour (Delbiso et al., 2021; Ruge et al., 2022). WFP (2020) estimates that, at the peak of the crisis, 370 million children were affected.

In South Africa, the delivery of school meals was affected by the school closures as part of COVID-19 pandemic containment measures. As such, the vital role played by school feeding in South Africa's food system became apparent (Paganini et al., 2021). The NIDS-CRAM survey by a consortium of South African universities found that only 25% of the respondents reported a child in their household had received a school meal in the previous week compared to 80% before the pandemic (Spaull et al., 2020). It took a court ruling in Equal Education and others vs. The Department of Basic Education and others to compel the government to deliver school meals whether the learners were at home or school (Section 27, 2020). In the ruling, the judge asserted that failure to deliver school meals violated children's rights to basic education and nutrition as stipulated in the South African constitution.

While taken by surprise, governments and NGOs soon improvised new approaches to school meal programmes. Some countries like Liberia switched to take-home rations (UNICEF & WFP, 2020). Other countries like Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, and Lesotho used unconditional cash transfers which were found to increase household food consumption (Borkowski et al., 2021). The third adaptation was multiple responses at decentralised levels also referred to as multimodal approaches (WFP, 2020). For instance, in Brazil, funds initially allocated for school feeding at the federal level were used to provide vulnerable families with food baskets designed by nutrition specialists, while at the state level, some states distributed rechargeable debit cards (WFP, 2020). Similarly, following a Supreme Court order in India, states used different approaches such as home delivery of meals, take-home rations, and cash transfers (Borkowski et al., 2021). Amolegbe (2020) also suggests issuance of food vouchers from vetted vendors to school children which can be used when schools are not in session.

School Meals Coalition: a network of governments promoting school feeding

As a response to the negative impact COVID-19 had on school feeding, the School Meals Coalition was established in the lead-up to the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS). This coalition, an initiative of governments, development partners, universities, and businesses, works with the primary objective of restoring school meals to the over 370 million learners who were affected by the pandemic by 2023 and reaching an additional 70 million who were previously excluded by 2030. The Coalition strives to increase the quality of school health and nutrition programmes through evidence-based decision making, better coordination of donor funding, and exchanges in the community of practice (School Meals Coalition, 2021). It asserts that HGSF could link nutrition, agriculture, and social protection through targeted procurement of local, nutritious, and indigenous food products to benefit women producers and traders while preserving food culture and protecting biodiversity. As such, the Coalition claims to offer more than school feeding but to unlock the potential of these programmes in transforming entire communities through improved health, nutrition, and education outcomes and development of local agriculture (School Meals Coalition, 2021).

The Coalition will work with various partners to achieve its goals. While research and development organisations can become partners with the Coalition, the focus of implementation of school feeding programmes is on national governments. As of April 2022, 65 governments from both the North and South (including Kenya and Burkina Faso) had joined the coalition. At the global level, the Coalition's management and coordination will be supported by WFP through its Schools-based Programmes Division (UNFSS, 2021). The Research Consortium for School Health and Nutrition hosted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine will coordinate the efforts of academia and think tanks to provide credible, independent research for evidence-based decision-making. Furthermore, the Education Commission will work with governments to find

more sustainable funding for school feeding and support transition toward self-reliance while WFP will work with the African Union Development Agency in monitoring and evaluation of the coalition's work (School Meals Coalition, 2021a).

5.3. School feeding in Kenya

The Urban Food Futures programme will carry out action research on school feeding in Kenya, more specifically in Nairobi; therefore, this chapter focuses on the East African country. However, selected insights from Burkina Faso and South Africa are included to inspire some comparative reflection. While the role of school feeding programmes has been explored in transformation of rural poverty, little has been done in the context of urban food systems and in particular informal settlements, spaces that face unique poverty challenges emanating from colonial history and marginalisation. Consequently, an understanding of school feeding in urban centres, with a focus on Nairobi, can provide entry points to not only improve child nutrition and but also transform these cities' food systems.

Historical perspective

In Kenya, school feeding was introduced in 1987 by a government-supported institution called the National School Feeding Council. The Council relied on support from the Ministry of Education, Health, Culture and Social Services and nongovernmental and religious organisations such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya and the Catholic Secretariat (Nzoka, 2018).

The expansion of the Kenyan national school feeding programme relied on support from international donors, particularly the WFP. In 1980, the government was assisted by the WFP in setting up the regular School Meals Programme (SMP) targeting primary schools in areas with low school enrolment and completion rates, which included those in arid and semi-arid areas of the country and in the informal settlements of Nairobi (WFP, 2018). School meals programmes were then expanded with the introduction of supporting free primary education in 2003 (MoEST, 2003).

After a period of cooperation with international organisations, the government of Kenya began weening itself from donor aid with the aim of assuming exclusive responsibility over school feeding. In 2009, it took over the responsibility of school feeding in arid and semi-arid areas and introduced the HGSF model, characterised by strategic procurement of food from local farmers and traders through school committees to promote agricultural and community development (WFP, 2018).

In Burkina Faso, school feeding – in French cantines scolaires – was introduced by the French colonial administration, as integral part of Western-modelled schools that were being set up in the country (Kaboré, 2018). While introduced centrally, the programmes were organised and sourced locally, as the colonial administration relied on parent and local authorities to provide the food needed to feed school children, in a system called 'endogenous canteens' (Kaboré, 2018). Supplies were collected by village chiefs from the village households (even those who did not have children in school age) in the form of a crop tax, a fixed quantity of food determined by the colonial administration (Diasso, 2014).

School feeding today

Since the handover of the SMP from WFP, the government of Kenya has been funding its school feeding programme without external support. In 2021, the government committed about 18 million USD to the programme, which covered meals for 11% of children enrolled in government schools (GCNF, 2021). Government school feeding in Kenya reaches only children in primary school and geographically targets schools in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) and in Nairobi's unplanned settlements (WFP & EPRI, 2018). Currently, the government is not providing school meals in informal settlements.

School feeding in Kenya is based on a three-pronged approach of provision of school meals, inclusion of nutrition and nutrition education in school feeding, and procurement of food from local producers, where possible. They deliver this approach via their two main programmes: the SMP and the HGSF programme. In the former, the majority of the food is imported, while selected items such as cereals may be sourced locally. Since the school feeding programme has multiple objectives, the programme is managed by a multi-sectoral team at each government level and is coordinated by representatives from the Ministry of Education (GoK, 2017). Other departments represented in the multi-agency

team are agriculture, health, social protection, and finance. The national government provides national oversight of the programme, policy guidance, implementation guidelines, and capacity building on key issues such as nutrition and health standards, procurement procedures, and funding and resource mobilisation. It is the responsibility of the national government to promote and enable participation of counties and stakeholders in the definitions and improvements of policies and guidelines for school meals in Kenya.

The government's recognition of the need for school feeding programmes and additional support to marginalised areas is reflected in their numerous policies and legal documents that underpin the design and implementation of school feeding in Kenya, outlined in Table 2.

Legal or policy document	Relevance for school feeding
Constitution of Kenya	Includes the Right to Food among its Social and Economic rights (GoK, 2010)
National School Meal and Nutrition Strategy 2017-2022	Developed jointly by the Ministries of Education, Health, and Agriculture, it is the main policy that guides the implementation of HGSF (GoK, 2017). It employs a three-pronged approach in provision of school meals, nutrition and nutrition education in school feeding, and local food procurement.
Vision 2030	Aims to transform Kenya into a middle-income industrialised country with high quality of life for all, in alignment with the SDGs (GoK, 2107); school feeding is a key step in achieving these goals.
Sessional No. 2 (2015) on education and training	Reiterated the government's commitment to meet the goals of the Basic Education Act (2013) such as increased enrolment and completion rates, identifying the expansion of the school feeding programmes and their link to nutrition and nutrition education as key in achieving these goals (MoEST, 2015).
National Education Sector Plan (2013-2018)	Reiterated the government's commitment to meet the goals of the Basic Education Act (2013) such as increased enrolment and completion rates, expansion of the school feeding programmes, and implementation of nutrition and nutrition education to school feeding (MoEST, 2015).
National School Health Policy and National School Health guidelines	Proposed the provision of water and sanitation services, immunisation, and deworming in schools via regular school feeding programmes; provides a framework for collaboration and coordination to enhance learners' health (GoK, 2009a; GoK, 2009b).
Food and Nutrition Security Policy (2011)	Identified 14 priority interventions in nutrition of which school feeding was one (GoK, 2011a).
National Nutrition Action Plan (2018-2022)	Committed to improve nutrition for learners through school feeding (GoK, 2018).
National Social Protection Policy (2011)	Provided a framework for implementing Article 43(3) of the constitution which mandates the state to provide social protection to vulnerable people and their dependants, recognising school meals as a vital social safety net for learners and their families (GoK, 2011b).

Table 2: Policy and legal framework for school feeding in Kenya

As school feeding in Kenya employs a decentralised model, the funds are transferred from the Ministry of Education to school committees through devolved units responsible for procurement, storage, preparation, and serving of meals (GoK, 2017). Funds are disbursed according to school enrolment and available funds (Ministry of Health, n.d.). Local school committees manage the school feeding programmes in line with the established national guidelines. Such a decentralised model is most appropriate when food is procured from local suppliers. School meals programme committees in both rural and urban contexts are composed of four teachers and four parents who issue a call for tenders and buy food from local traders or farmers. Meals are prepared by cooks employed by the schools or by parents who offer their labour as payment for their children's meals (Ogachi, 2016).

Government-run school feeding in Kenya faces a series of challenges that hinder its expansion. The first is lack of funds. In the schools where the programme is available, its presence is intermittent, depending on the timely release of government funds. Ogachi (2016) found that few schools have dining and storage facilities, with informal schools being worse off compared to government schools. Similarly, Omondi (2019) found that 47% and 18% of the sampled schools in the informal settlement of Kibera had inadequate food preparation equipment and water supply, respectively. Omondi also states that the inadequacy extends to the training of those employed in the programme, as over half of the cooks had not been vetted or issued with hygiene certificates by the authorities. The 2021 Global Survey of School Meals Programs revealed that schools meals in Kenya include exclusively grains, legumes, oil, and salt and lack fresh foods, meat, or dairy (GCNF, 2021). To compensate, fortified foods and vitamin supplements are often distributed. A final common criticism is that the meals are not distributed equitable as, often, the most vulnerable target children live in informal settlements where school meals are not funded.

School feeding in Burkina Faso today

In Burkina Faso, the Department for the Allocation of Specific Means to Educational Structures is the state body in charge of managing school feeding at the national level (Sánchez & Sanchez, 2015). At the local level, the decentralised bodies of the ministry in charge of national education are responsible for implementing and managing school canteens (PNSHN, 2016). Faced with the difficulties that hinder the efficient operation of the canteens, the state decided to transfer the management of school canteens to the municipalities. To do this, since 2006 the government has been progressively implementing School Management Committees as a new model for school administration and management. School Management Committees involve different local actors, notably mayors, traditional chiefs, Mothers' associations, Parents' associations, and teachers with the aim of distributing the burden of management and responsibility of schools and school canteens to the whole community (Sánchez and Sanchez, 2015).

The National School Nutrition Programme: school meals in South Africa today

The school feeding programme in South Africa follows two implementation models: centralised and decentralised. In the centralised model, Provincial Education Departments (PEDs) contract goods and services suppliers for the school feeding programme in the entire province. In the decentralised model, schools receive funds from PEDs and contract local suppliers, usually women-led businesses to deliver food and fuel and offer support services (Devereux et al., 2018). While the South African school feeding programme is not explicitly based on HGSF, most of the food sourced in the programme is produced by South African companies. However, as HGSF is not an explicit aim of school feeding, local sourcing could be replaced by sourcing from increasingly abundant foreign agri-food corporations (Wegerif et al., 2021). The national trend in favouring global suppliers is echoed in the decentralised model of school feeding, as schools tend to source food supplies from supermarkets linked to global corporate supply chains (Devereux et al, 2018). Meals are then prepared daily on school grounds by a team of cooks (often unemployed mothers) supervised by a teacher appointed as 'nutrition coordinator' (Wegerif et al., 2021).

School feeding in informal settlements: the case of Mukuru

Children in Mukuru, as in other informal settlements, face many difficulties in accessing schooling. While primary education has been free for children in Kenya since 2003, parents still need to account for supplementary fees and other costs when sending children to school, such as school uniform and exam papers. Moreover, the number of formal government-supported schools in Mukuru is inadequate for the number of children present in the settlement (Ngware et al., 2013). A survey carried out by Muungano AMT in 2018 revealed that the six formal schools in Mukuru accommodate only 9,000 of the roughly 120,000 school-aged children in the settlement.

Consequently, 147 informal schools have sprung up in Mukuru **(Muungano wa Wanavijiji, 2021)**. This type of school offers education for comparatively lower fees and to a larger number of students and has enabled many children and youth from informal settlements to access education (Waweru & Kaugi, 2015). However, most of these schools are registered as NGOs or charitable organisation with the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Services, rather than as educational institutions with the Ministry of Education (Malenya, 2020). As such, they rarely receive state funding. In their survey, Muungano AMT found that of 94 schools offering primary education in Mukuru, only 9% received the government's Free Primary Education (FPE) funds. Therefore, fees are paid either by parents or NGOs (Malenya, 2020).

As informal schools are not supported by government funding, school feeding programmes in these schools also rely on other sources of funding. Of the schools surveyed by Muungano AMT in Mukuru, 60% ran school feeding programmes, which were paid for by parents or alternative institutions, such as NGOs or international organisations. On average, the amount charged per student per day for meals is 50KSH (Muungano wa Wanavijiji, 2021). [4] If parents are unable to cover this cost, their child does not receive the meals. As many Mukuru residents earn less than 150KSH a day, this is a likely reality for many children. Further research is necessary to understand how current school feeding programmes function in informal schools and the community.

Kenyan school health guidelines promote school feeding alongside provision of clean water and sanitation services. In their survey, Muungano AMT discovered that only 25% of the schools in Mukuru had been connected to tap water while over half of the schools (51%) purchase water from water vendors. In the remaining schools, water was collected through boreholes (8%), public taps (13%), or from the learners' homes (7%). The importance of access to water for operationalising the right to food through school feeding points to the importance of considering the right to food as interdependent on other rights, including to water.

Another challenge faced by informal schools in Mukuru relates to the tenure of the land. During the evictions that took place in October 2021, 11 informal schools in Mukuru kwa Njenga were dismantled. This meant that the children who attended these schools had to relocate, putting pressure on schools in other parts of the settlements and stretching their limited resources.

5.4. The potential of school feeding for urban food systems transformation

In all three case study countries, some form of decentralised management takes place. This form of management is generally more apt for sourcing supplies at the local level. In Kenya, local school committees, which comprise four teachers and four parents, run the school's feeding programme according to national guidelines, buying supplies from smallholder farmers or local traders. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the national government devolved responsibility to the School Management Committees, which include municipal representatives, teachers, parents, and other community figures such as traditional chiefs. These trends point to the possibility of involving multiple stakeholders within the school's community in the running school feeding programmes to ensure that such programmes bring economic development to the local community at large. However, decentralised management does not always mean localised procurement and redistribution of wealth within the community. In South Africa, for instance, in

[4] 50KSH = 0.45USD (InforEuro, November 2021).

provinces where school feeding follows the decentralised model, schools can choose where to source food and often choose supermarkets because of their price advantage, benefiting corporate giants rather than distributing wealth among local producers and traders.

To leverage school feeding as a tool to transform urban food systems, decentralised management needs to be coupled with local procurement. This can be achieved through the preparation of meals in community kitchens managed and run by women, as in the case of Mukuru, and the procurement of supplies from local producers and traders.

How can school feeding become more responsive and respond to shocks quicker? And how can it benefit the whole community? How can this lead to the inclusion of children who are currently "falling through the gaps" of the school feeding safety net? Can it achieve these goals by focusing on the right to food from a maximalist perspective, including the community in decisions made about school feeding (what to serve, where to source, what other activities), by providing quality work to those who are employed in and manage school kitchens, but also produce the food, transport it, process it, prepare it, and distribute it?

6. Informal saving schemes

Financial security is essential. Money empowers people, giving them the ability to access more options in life, but money's scarcity limits many people's ability to attain financial independence and stability, especially those living in the fragile conditions of impoverished or oppressed societies. In such conditions, people seek ways to overcome their financial challenges and build wealth. While some of those solutions come through structured interventions by, for instance, governments, there are those made through community action. An example of community-driven solutions to financial challenges is a rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA).

ROSCAs are groups of individuals or households who come together and act as an informal financial institution, primarily as a saving scheme. Members pool funds through regular contributions, typically weekly, bi-monthly, or monthly. Pooled funds can be used as a collective resource or provided to members as a lump sum. In the merry-go-round system, the total pooled funds are usually handed to one member at each meeting, with the cycle going around until all members have received their share. Thus, members are guaranteed to receive a substantial amount of cash that they can use to cater to various needs. Some merry-go-rounds do not work with money but with food items. On regular dates the members of the group buy food items for the member whose turn it is to receive support.

Other ROSCAs work with saving accounts based on the same principles as a bank account. The members can pay as much money into their accounts as they want whenever they want. Some ROSCAs, referred to as table-banking, also give out loans (with interests) to members depending on the amount they have been saving, thus on their financial capacities.

The institutions, therefore, serve a critical function, especially in communities where formal banking is limited or unavailable. They provide peer-to-peer banking in which members can get unsecured loans, which would otherwise be impossible in formal banks. With low incomes and little to no collateral, the only source of financing people in poor economies can depend on is their community-saving schemes. Vermaak (2000) states that these funds help members address their needs and achieve their aspirations. Many economists argue that is why ROSCAs are widespread in developing countries, with a massive presence in Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia.

Countering arguments that ROSCAs emerge only out of exclusion and necessity, critical feminist scholars have pointed to their relevance in their members' social life. Feminist economists Hossein and P.J. (2022), for instance, argue that ROSCAs should not be considered solely as coping strategies in the face of financial exclusion, but rather as a conscious choice for "humane, inclusive money systems because they are ethical and good." They highlight how ROSCAs remain popular even in financially integrated contexts because they bring social value to their members' lives, especially women. As such, ROSCAs are a manifestation of the care work women conduct daily in their communities, "founded on the human spirit of helping one another" (Hossein & P. J., 2022, p.7).

The social significance of ROSCAs is strengthened by their role as informal safety nets. The members pay into an emergency fund or help each other out financially and in kind when one of the members faces an emergency, for example an accident, hospital bills, or a funeral. In this way, ROSCAs function as insurance. The flexibility of ROSCAs arrangements allow members to change the order in which they receive the communal pot based on the urgency or necessity (Baland et al., 2019). However, membership to a ROSCA is tied to the ability to contribute financially, which may not be possible in situations of protracted personal or household crisis, as can be the case for, for instance, HIV-affected households (Foster, 2007).

ROSCAs maintain a strong presence in many African countries, partially due to the small size of most economies and the large pool of unbanked people. The proportion of people with a bank account for most countries on the continent falls well below the global average of 69% (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018). In Nigeria, in the largest and most populous African country with largest economy in Africa, only 44% of the population had a bank account in 2014, a percentage that

has decreased since to 39% in 2017 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018; The East African, 2015). The African Development Bank and the World Bank report that, compared to men, women face greater barriers in accessing formal bank services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015; Triki et al., 2013).

However, in recent years the development of digital financial tools, especially mobile money, has boosted account ownership in parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5). Nonetheless, ROSCAs on the continent remain popular, pointing to the relevance of their social role beyond financial utility. In fact, the development of mobile money technology has even facilitated some of the processes of ROSCAs. Members can contribute to a digital wallet through their phone and track other members' contributions, which can facilitate bookkeeping. While digital contributions have some advantages in relation to facilitated transactions and transparency, some authors report that digitalised ROSCAs can lead to members losing out on face-to-face meeting and the social relations associated to it (Komen & Ling, 2021).



Figure 5: Percentage of adults with bank and/or mobile money account. (Source: Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017)

Characteristics of ROSCAs

ROSCAs vary from one country to another and regionally within a single territory, making it difficult to generalise. However, regardless of their origin, two characteristics are common to all ROSCAs across the continent: a trusting network of members and a self-regulating framework.

ROSCAs typically draw their membership from people with a shared background, such as family, workmates, and those living within the same community. Even if strangers at the onset, members often form life-long relationships as they have shared struggles and aspirations. This commonality grounds the social capital needed to create reliable networks of members (Ibrahim, 2019). Therefore, all people enrolled in a ROSCA deposit funds confident that all other members will do the same. The inherent social capital also allows the ROSCAs to give credit, believing that members will pay back within the stipulated timeline (Dumes, 2007). Based on networks of trust, ROSCAs play a social function, with members depending on other members for moral and psychosocial support (Salamon et al., 2009).

Just as crucial to the functioning and stability of ROSCAs is the presence of a self-regulating framework. This usually comes in the form of rules and regulations used to manage the group's affairs, such as the amount deposited each day or week, or the conditions for repayment in case of loan (Ibrahim, 2019). These rules are decided by the members themselves, without any external authority or superimposed system. New members are carefully selected and, when they join, the rules are carefully explained to them (Hossein & P.J., 2022). This chapter describes ROSCAs from three different parts of the continent: stokvels in South Africa, chamas in Kenya, and tontines in Burkina Faso. While functioning on a similar basis, these three ROSCAs present differences rooted in their historical and contextual specificity. The chapter looks into the history of these ROSCAs, their evolution, and present characteristics, particularly in urban areas. We seek to understand ROSCAs' present and potential future roles and their impacts on food systems in urban areas.

6.1. Stokvels in South Africa

In South Africa, stokvels consist of 15 members on average, but vary widely from group to group (Bhopela & Khumalo, 2019). The most common form of stokvels is the saving scheme, in which members receive the pooled funds as a lump sum on a rotational basis. Another popular type is the Grocery Stokvel, in which members save toward groceries and gifts, especially during the December holidays. Burial societies provide death insurance by covering funeral costs for members and their families (NASASA, 2021).

While there are also other kinds of stokvels, including investment ones, most groups are multi-functional and flexible enough to meet the evolving needs of their members.

For decades, millions have depended on stokvels for financial services. Although the concept of stokvels can be traced back to Black workers in rural farms, they fully developed in urban areas, particularly Johannesburg. In the late 1800s, Johannesburg attracted many Black rural–urban migrant workers following the discovery of valuable minerals, including gold and diamond. The mining industry was highly racist in its practices and laid the foundation for apartheid and economic subjugation. In addition to paying Black mine workers much lower wages than their White or Coloured counterparts, mining companies offered them no social security (CJPME Foundation, 2014). Thus, the men who worked in mines and their families experienced high poverty and income insecurity. Althout recent statistics on racial dustribution in stokvels are scanty, Naong (2009) reports that a majority (80%) of all stokvel members are Black. At slightly less than 10%, Coloureds hold a distant second position while Whites and Asians constitute a negligible number of members (Naong, 2009). Eleswhere, Bophela and Khumalo (2019) and Ngobo and Chisasa (2018) reveal that Black women form the highest percentage of stokvel members.

This racial and gender distribution reflects the historical financial inclusion of different social groups in traditional banks during the apartheid period. Through stokvels, members could enjoy financial services from which they were excluded, including making savings, borrowing credit, and being insured against calamities. Whereas men primarily established burial stokvels, women formed a wider variety of stovkels to cater for daily needs in their homes, including purchasing food (Verhoef, 2001). Ncobo and Chisasa (2018) argue that is partly why there are more female stokvel participants than male even today. Shingirirayi and Robertson (2021) affirm that grocery stokvels are widely popular as they enable members to purchase essential food products in bulk and therefore more affordably.

The South African government reports that as of 2019, more than 10 million people suffered from moderate to severe food insecurity (Stats SA, 2022). The report goes further to state that the people most affected are largely Black and largely female. The demographic patterns of food insecure people are similar to those of stokvel membership. As the ongoing food price crisis which has escalated food insecurity indicates (Sulcas, 2022), food security is tied to economic access. Therefore, during crises such as the covid-19 pandemic which hurt people's livelihoods, stokvels provided a lifeline through provision of loans for purchase of staple foods (PMBEJD, 2020). In view of the role stokvels in food system resilience, Lukwa et al. (2022) highlight the need to develop partnerships and collaborations between stokvels and relevant food system stakeholders.

There have been concerted efforts to formalise stokvels with prominent South African banks establishing products targeted explicitly at stokvels (Rumney, 2021). Some of the perceived benefits of formalisation include access to subsidies, strengthening stokvel management systems, and integration into formal institutions, including the court system (Dube & Edwell, 2018; Hutchison, 2020). It remains to be seen how such integration will impact the nature and operation of the stokvels, which are currently highly informal.

6.2. Chamas in Kenya

"Chama" is a Swahili word that, in financial terms, means investment group, welfare association, or merry-go-round (Isaboke, 2016). Chamas are ROSCAs that distribute their assets to members in repetitive cycles and can be found all over Swahili-speaking East Africa.

In its latest survey on financial access within households, the Central Bank of Kenya reports that up to 70% of surveyed households rely on chamas for financial services (CBK, 2019).At the same time, FSD Kenya reports that 41% of adult Kenyans are members of a chama- 10% more than formal bank accounts (Johnson, 2018). These figures indicate that a significant portion of the Kenyan population depend on the informal financial services afforded by being members of chamas.

Following independence in 1963, Kenya established the national philosphy of *Harambee* which promoted the pooling of resources by citizens to tackle development challenges (Chieni, 2011). Mbithi and Rassmusson (1977) argue that the Harambee movement sought to encourage self-reliance amongst citizens including through self-help groups. Chamas are

among the groups that emerged in the spirit of Harambee. An example is Wendo wa Wote Women Group, one of the oldest Kenyan chamas in continuous existence (Maundu, 2022). It was formed in 1964 by 29 women in Makueni County to combat poverty jointly by pooling funds, with each member contributing a penny during regular meetings. Decades of prudent financial management have made the group endure and possess millions of assets today. Save for four, all the founding members have passed on. Yet, Wendo wa Wote Women Group lives on through the founders' daughters and daughters-in-law, who have since inherited the chama.

From the 1960s to the early 2000s, most Kenyans found accessing formal banking systems was an uphill task. This was first because of the poor infrastructure, whereby banks only had a presence in the major towns, of which there were few and widely scattered. Furthermore, many banks were exclusionary and operated like elite social clubs, leaving up to 70% of Kenya's population unbanked as of 2007 (Kimenyi & Ndung'u, 2009). With most people locked out of formal banking services, chamas became a viable option and grew significantly.

Chamas grew beyond women's savings groups, and mixed gender chamas started to operate, typically comprised of people with a shared background such as relatives or close workmates. This has led to the emergence of more than 300,000 chamas around the country, jointly commanding an asset base of $3.5 billion (Andoi, 2021). Consequently, chamas have a prominent presence in the Kenyan economy. Johnson (2018) reports that 41% of the adult population are members of chamas, 10% more than those who hold accounts in traditional banks.

In 2007, when M-Pesa was launched, financial inclusion in Kenya stood at 30%, referring to those holding bank accounts. In the past fifteen years, the proportion of people holding bank accounts has barely changed, while mobile penetration has helped push the financial inclusion rate to over 70% (The East African, 2015). While the traditional banking sector has been locked in a continuous battle for survival by fighting the mobile banking sector, membership in chamas has barely been affected. On the contrary, these innovative mobile and internet financial systems have helped strengthen chamas (Gichuki & Mulu-Mutuku, 2018). They enable faster, more affordable, and more efficient cash transfers.

Chamas provide social safety nets for communities, including food security. The solid social networks formed through chamas also provide people who guarantee the well-being of their counterparts, including providing for their dietary needs. Therefore, even if operating only in the background, chamas are critical components of urban food systems in Kenya.

6.3. Tontines in Burkina Faso

Tontines are saving schemes in Burkina Faso. "Tontine" is a relatively recent term coined under 20th-century French colonial influences in West Africa (Institut Afrique Monde, 2006). Tontine has since grown into a blanket term for the saving schemes that had existed for centuries in various societies, mainly present-day Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali. Tontines today play a significant role in the informal economies of these countries and hence influence multiple aspects of the food system. While they share many similarities with chamas and stokvels, tontines have distinct characteristics derived from the unique cultural contexts in which they have developed.

Despite the colonial name, the tradition of tontines extends beyond the colonial period. Saussey (2011) posits that the precursors of tontines were "mutual aid and solidarity networks" found in ancient Burkinabe societies. She bases her argument on the preeminence of collectivist philosophies such as "Nug yend pa wukd zomye". A proverb of the Mossi people, this phrase translates to "One hand does not pick up the flour." Such communal ideals, she points out, informed the development of mutual aid and solidarity structures with the understanding that each member of a given society depended on all others. Thus, there emerged a variety of mutual aid networks based on the needs of that particular community. Issoufou (1992) points out that the pre-modern economies of Burkinabe societies were cashless. Therefore, the mutual aid networks therein performed functions atypical of contemporary societies, in which cash contributions dominate. For instance, in Sosoagas, members met to work collectively on one member's farm, moving from one farm to another, thus sharing labour and ensuring everyone planted, weeded, and harvested on time. Despite the difference between sharing labour or financial resources, these groups

provide both economic and social insurance today as in the past. Besides galvanizing resources for joyful events such as weddings, groups also provide reprieve during difficult times such as funerals. Therefore, just like in present-day Burkinabe societies, the groups in old society offered critical insurance services, especially to the most vulnerable.

Burkinabe society has significantly changed in the past half a century. Although agriculture is still a focal point, its economy has become more diversified and driven by cash. The increased economic emancipation of women has given them a more active role in the economy (Manyanja, 2018). Furthermore, highly populated urban areas such as Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso have emerged, including due to internal migrations. Additionally, the country exists in a much more globalized world in which international events shape and affect local realities. Such globalisation has also been accelerated by the development of digital technologies, with slightly a quarter of the twenty-two million Burkinabes having access to the internet (Kemp, 2022).

Today tontines are not family restricted but are based on neighbourhood and work relations. They are often inter-generational, with a shared vision with the rest of the members as the main precursor to becoming a member. Another significant change in the membership of tontines is gender distribution. In ancient systems, strict gender divisions and norms meant that collective groups consisted of men and women only (Kieran et al., 2018). Although this largely remains the same due to cultural conservatism, there is an increased emergence of mixed-gender tontines, especially in urban areas.

Furthermore, increased digitalisation has led to the emergence of internet-based tontines (Akande & Turner, 2018; Mousso News, 2020). The use of platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook groups have enabled tontines to attract more members but has also led to increased cybercrime Kabdaogo (2021). Such financial cybercrimes happen amidst growing concerns over finance-related internet security in the country (UNODC, 2021). The government of Burkina Faso has therefore gotten involved in regulation tontines a vast departure from the past where such saving schemes controlled themselves internally (Sig-Burkina, 2012).

Notwithstanding the variations between tontines and older systems, these present-day saving schemes have retained critical elements of their predecessors. These include serving the dual function of providing both economic and social support to members, including sustaining their food security. Through the provision of credit, tontines provide members a protective shield during harsh times such as the food shortages of the Covid-19 pandemic.

7. Conclusion. From here, where to?

The envisioned urban nutrition hubs are spaces of multiple intersections sustaining individuals and communities. From a transformation perspective, this pathway reflects on how urban nutrition hubs could open spaces for the re-imagining of unjust food systems and unpack power relations that shape urban planning in post-apartheid cities in South Africa. They are often the spaces from which communities seek and gain connection, exchange, and solidarity. These urban nutrition hubs provide respect to local social values and the social fabric of communities. Respect for local identity and peoples' different values identities manifested in food. A more nuanced review of urban nutrition hubs in both cities reveals their potential as beyond the feeding component. Food becomes an identity and collective culture, which is often manifested in (unpaid) care work mostly provided by women in gardens, kitchens, and feeding schemes. Federici's work describes these types of urban nutrition hubs as places of transformation where the production and processing of food in urban spaces is commonised and organised by a community that equally decides and benefits. She describes the idea of commons as a feminist concept as a way of resistance and reorganisation in times of social injustice and ecological crisis. Creating collective food kitchens, food committees, and collaboratively farms, Federici says that women transform social relations through communing by sharing their struggles and exhaustion with their invisible care work and producing knowledge, empowering themselves, and creating. Federici argues that the women's answer to patriarchal capitalism is these commons, sharing resources, and building collective power (Federici, 2014; 2018).

Three tools for urban food systems transformation were identified during the scoping phase of the Urban Food Futures programmes: community kitchens, school feeding programmes and informal savings schemes.

Community kitchens

Community kitchens provide emergency relief in poor urban communities. In times of crises, food insecurity rises among the populations living in poor urban areas. In our case study areas, loss of livelihoods, disruption of food distribution channels, and destruction of homes have left many residents unable to access food. While many households view community kitchens as a temporary reprieve, it is important to develop kitchens that can be used in the long term. The development of long-term solutions is seriously hampered by skyrocketing commodity prices. Besides food items, the cost of fuel can disrupt operations of communal facilities. Therefore, in developing community kitchens, there is a need to put protective measures in place to sustain them. In such scenarios, community kitchens can fill the gap by providing regular meals especially to the most vulnerable. This requires an enabling environment for the many volunteers to obtain a support structure for their work in terms of resources, volunteer stipends, and skills building including around gender-based violence.

Community kitchens, as many other food initiatives in informal settlements, are run by women. Communities rely on their unpaid care work. Often, the resources consumed in community kitchens are sourced from the women themselves (their own pensioners grants) or from their immediate community (donations). Social capital is often the only capital in these communities, yet the ethics of outsourcing of state responsibilities for feeding its nation via placing this burden upon the shoulders of the urban poor is questionable, at best. A three-year co-research project on community kitchens would produce data to fuel community and civil society engagement in political summits, enabling communities to bring "pots and pens to parliament" and exercise their political voice.

Community kitchens serve as government agents for school feeding programs in informal areas. Citizens have the right to food and it is the government's responsibility to guarantee this right. However, such guarantee is often lacking, especially in areas where legal grey areas exist, such as food provision in private informal schools in Nairobi. Learners in such schools usually lack access to adequate nutrition as a consequence of their families' poverty and their government's complacency, hampering their academic progress. Community kitchens run by women's groups can serve as food preparation and distribution points targeting these informal schools.

School feeding

Community school feeding creates employment, valuing the multiple forms of care taking place in school kitchens. Locally focused school feeding has the potential to create meaningful work in most nodes of urban food systems, from production to transport, processing, and catering. Linking school feeding to local food flows and its actors, as well as community kitchens and urban producers can create more livelihood opportunities for parents, neighbours, and community members, thus benefiting the whole community. Economies of scale can make each meal cheaper for parents (or the government) to fund and the revenue generated for producers or traders supplying the programme remains within the community. As many parents in informal settlements work in the informal food sector, involving the sector in the provision of resources for school feeding programmes would mean additional income for parents who would then be able to afford school meals for their children.

Community school feeding could operationalise collective right to food and food security. The nourishment provided in school feeding programmes is often conceptualised as a solution to educational issues that affect undernourished children, e.g. cognitive delays, lack of attention, problems with retaining information (Oostindjer et al., 2017). However, beyond the educational outcomes, school meals can be understood as a way to operationalise the right to food, if they provide healthy and nutritious food to all children indiscriminately and involve the community in the process. This shift would align school feeding with a maximalist understanding of right to food, while remaining grounded in the state's responsibility.

The involvement of parents, teachers, and other community stakeholders in the running of school feeding programmes can contribute to the operationalisation of the right to food as a right held collectively rather than individually. Moreover, it can strengthen the link between the access and agency dimensions of food security by allowing communities to make meaningful contributions to the decision on what their children eat (including quality and safety oversight), where it is sourced, and by whom it is prepared.

Community school feeding could be more resilient and adaptable than regular school feeding. School meals are embedded in the policy and legislative instruments and have the backing of international organisations and the development discourse. In time of acute crises and disruption of the normal system, governments found emergency solutions to expand the notion of school feeding beyond the school and the pupil, targeting the whole household and including food baskets and cash transfers. However, this process took longer than the setup of other initiatives, such as community kitchens. How can official, government-supported school feeding programmes go beyond a rigid, bureaucratic structure and reach children who are falling through the cracks? What can community school feeding learn from community kitchens to become more responsive and respond to shocks quicker?

Could meals be served year-round, guaranteeing the continuous nourishment of children and the constant demand of supplies from local food flows? Could school meals be linked to production in controlled environments taking place on school grounds?

Informal savings schemes

In times of crises, (digital) saving schemes offer low-income communities more support than formal state interventions. With limited access to formal banking services and often selective government presence, such communities are largely left on their own in terms of crises. The Covid-19 pandemic provided a pressure test on the resilience of communities to external shocks, especially those affecting the food system. Saving groups could be strengthened and adapted quickly to stresses that limit physical contact, such as containment measures, by introducing digital tools and online transactions to substitute in-person meetings (Redford & Verhoef, 2022).

Informal savings schemes can be leveraged from the household level to communal action fostering food availability. Saving schemes are a financial asset at the household level in many African countries. Scaling the model to a communal level would allow schools and community kitchens to buy bulk and break dependencies on food donations or expensive food provisioning.

What's next?

Coping strategies associated with community kitchens, school feeding, and informal savings schemes offer the opportunity to learn bottom-up for long-term urban food system transformation. They show how adaptability can ensure that communities are ready and react quickly to crises. Moreover, through the actions of communities organising to address their own food needs, these strategies contribute to the agency dimension of food security. However, in view of the extensive toll taken by women, who offer their unpaid labour to provide for their communities, and the risks associated to unsecure resources, it is clear that these mechanisms also need rethinking. In the next phase of research, we will further study how these coping mechanisms can address local crises, including GBV. We will further explore the role and potential of a physical space in the community to foster the social relations necessary to build resilience, experimenting with urban nutrition hubs. Moreover, we will identify entry points for possible collaborations between local governments and community-based organisations to ensure institutional support.

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