Blind Spots	<b>WEST</b> Mainstream Narrative	Time	<b>RUSSIA</b> Mainstream Narrative	Blind Spots
The feeling that it was a painful decision by the USSR leadership, for which Russians paid a huge price and deserved much more in return.	End of Cold War was a victory for democracy and freedom	1989 1990		
The use of military force against Parliament shattered the trust in democracy for large parts of the Russian population.	Domestic political events in Russia are viewed relatively favourably because Yeltsin is believed to be an important partner	1991 1992 	No recognition of Russia as an equal partner.	Intensity of negative Western view of the Chechnya War is underestimated in Russia.
The negative effects of the economic 'shock	Positive image of Russia cracks because of Chechen Wars Russian support for Serbian leader Milošević is	<ul><li>1994</li><li>1995</li></ul>	The West keeps the technology market closed to Russia.	Transformation of NATO from an military defence alliance into an organisation for "out of area" missions was ignored
therapy' created strong disappointment with Western-style liberal and democratic values.	NATO enlargement served to stabilise former Warsaw Pact states and was not directed	1996 1997	Plans for NATO enlargement violate the agreements reached in the early 1990s.	There was no coherent agenda on this after 1990, rather a complex interplay of
There is reason to perceive a broken spirit. Russia's discontent with the post-Cold War order starts from the early 1990s.	against Russia – in particular because NATO was by that time an organisation that was primarily focused on "out of area" operations.	1998 1999	NATO bombing of Belgrade ignores Russia's position and undermines the UN.	different actors, factos and resets. The Western involvement in the Yugoslav
The importance of the Balkan Wars for Russia.	Arrest of Yukos CEO Khodorkovsky and later	2000 2001 2002	Russian cooperation after 9/11 is not responded to properly. Terrorism threat in Russia is ignored by the West.	wars – particularly the Kosovo War in 1999 – was primarily driven by other considera- tions than Russia.
That Russia took an active and cooperative	the Politkovskaya case led to deterioration of Western-Russian relations. "Colour Revolutions" (2003, 2004, 2005) were	2003	Iraq intervention, bypassing the UN Security Council	The Khodorkovsky and Politkovskaya cases were very important for the perception of Russia in the West.
stance in the war on terror is not represented in the Western mainstream narrative.	Putin's speech at the Munich Security	2004 2005 2006	"Colour Revolutions" are a Western plot to gain influence in Russia's neighbourhood. Russian-Georgia conflict is partly a defensive	Geopolitical considerations (such as an enlargement of Western influence in
The tepid reaction reconfirmed the perception that the West is unwilling to engage in substan- tive discussions.	Conference came as a big surprise and led to a reassessment of Russia.	2007	<ul> <li>reaction to excessive intervention by the West in the post-Soviet space.</li> <li>The proposal for a European security treaty is</li> </ul>	post-Soviet space) were not relevant in the Western public view on the "colour revolutions".
Western public mainstream discourses underestimate how unconvincing the assurance	Russian-Georgia war was provoked by and characterised by a disproportionate use of military force by Russia.	2009	<ul> <li>rejected high-handedly by the West.</li> <li>The US plans for a Ballistic Missile Defence system mark the start of a new arms race.</li> </ul>	
that it was not against Russia is perceived.	Duma election and protests against Putin were seen as the Russian "colour revolution" which was brutally suppressed by Putin.	2011	Arab Spring provokes criticism of the West for not respecting sovereignty.	
	Russian actions in the Ukraine crisis demonstra- ted the revisionist and expansionist foreign	2013	Russia does not use its veto in the UN Security Council regarding the Libya intervention; however, the intervention is misused for regime	

through increased deterrence. 2014	policy agenda and can only be contained		change.	
	through increased deterrence.	2014		



