


# CRASH MONKEY & ACE Systematically Testing File-System Crash Consistency


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
### What is a File System?

- A file system is a structured representation of data and a set of metadata describing this data.
  - Data includes abstractions like files and directories
- File system data structures are persisted
  - Stored on hard disk, SSDs etc
- re persisted etc

#### What is a crash?

- An event that results in interruption of ongoing processes in the system
- Loss of current working state in memory
- Storage left in an intermediate state








Image source : <u>https://www.fotolia.com</u>







# I wish file systems were crash-consistent!


#### File System Crash Consistency

- 1. Ordering : Filesystem operations change multiple blocks on storage that needs to be ordered Inode, bitmaps, data blocks, superblock
- 2. Persistence : Data structures are cached for better performance
  - Great for reads!
  - But writes have to ensure that modified data in cache is written back to disk

#### Example of a crash scenario

Let's consider what happens during a file append


### File Append Example




#### These updates must occur in a specific order

Example adapted from https://cbw.sh/static/class/5600/slides/10\_File\_Systems.pptx

10



#### File system consistent, but data is lost



#### File system inconsistent : space leak

#### How did FS developers handle this problem?

- 1.Don't bother to ensure consistency • Run a program that fixes the file system during bootup

  - File system checker (*fsck*)
  - Results in data loss, but fixes inconsistency

2.Use a transaction log to make multi-writes atomic

- Log stores a history of all writes to the disk
- After a crash the log can be "replayed" to finish updates • Journaling file system (ext4, f2fs, btrfs, xfs)









#### File System Crash Consistency

- **1. Ordering :** Filesystem operations change multiple blocks on storage that needs to be ordered
  - Inode, bitmaps, data blocks, superblock


# 2. Persistence : Data structure Great for reads! But writes have to ensure that modisk


2. Persistence : Data structures are cached for better performance

But writes have to ensure that modified data in cache is written back to

#### The Persistence Operations

- Journaling file systems aim to ensure crash consistency
- But, can result in data loss if file system operations are not persisted explicitly
- Changes are in memory until explicitly flushed (or a file system background checkpoint at regular timeouts)
- fsync(), fdatasync(), sync







#### Crash Consistency

- lost.
- recover the correct state be persisted in order.

File missing
Windows cannot find the file. Would you like some wine instead?
Yes No



Metadata Corruption

#### • On crash, all the in-memory component of a file system structure is

# Ensuring crash consistency requires that all necessary information to




Unmountable FS

Data Corruption

Memory









Memory









Memory








Memory











Memory

Storage




mkdir (A) touch (A/bar) fsync (A/bar) mkdir (B)






Memory

Storage




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
Memory

Storage




mkdir (A) touch (A/bar) fsync (A/bar) mkdir (B) touch (B/bar) rename (B/bar, A/bar)







Memory

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
mkdir (A) touch (A/bar) fsync (A/bar) mkdir (B) touch (B/bar) rename (B/bar, A/bar) touch (A/foo)






Memory

Storage




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Memory


Storage



Expected


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
Memory

Storage




**Expected** 






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
















- fsync(A/foo) commits tx that unlinks A/bar
- Which means step 1 above is persisted, but rename is not persisted
- End up losing file A/bar

nks A/bar rsisted, but rename is not



Memory


Storage

#### Exists in the kernel since 2014! Found by ACE and CrashMonkey



mkdir (A) touch (A/bar) fsync (A/bar) mkdir (B) touch (B/bar) rename (B/bar, A/bar) touch (A/foo) fsync (A/foo) **CRASH!** 






# Testing Crash Consistency Today

Build FS from scratch

Verified **Filesystems** 

- State of the Art : xfstest suite
  - Collection of 500 regression tests




#### Only 5% of tests in xfstest check for file system crash consistency




### Challenges in crash consistency testing

Lack of automated infrastructure



#### Our work addresses both these issues, to provide a systematic testing framework

# **Bounded Black-Box Crash Testing (B<sup>3</sup>)**



www.github.com/utsaslab/crashmonkey

#### New approach to testing file-system crash consistency

- Focus on reproducible bugs resulting in metadata corruption, data loss.
- Focus on bugs where explicitly persisted data/metadata is corrupted
- Found 10 new bugs across btrfs and F2FS;
- Found 1 bug in FSCQ (verified) file system)







#### CrashMonkey and Ace : Features

**Fully automated** 

File system agnostic

Completely black-box

Finds real bugs

**Fully automated** 

No manual checkers and workloads

File system agnostic

Completely blackbox

Fully automated

File system agnostic

No annotations Doesn't need to look at file system code Completely black-box

Fully automated

Works on any POSIX file system, including verified FS

File system agnostic

Completely blackbox

Fully automated


Acknowledged and patched by kernel developers

File system agnostic

Completely blackbox


### B3 vs other approaches

Metric	Verified FS	Model Check	xfstests	<b>B3</b>
Fully Automated				
Black Box				
FS agnostic				
Find previously unknown bugs				



## Challenges with systematic testing

#### Lack of automated infrastructure



### CrashMonkey

- Efficient infrastructure to record and replay block level IO requests
- Simulate crash at different points in the workload Automatically test for consistency after crash. Copy-on-write RAM block device


# How to crash the file system for testing?

- Actually crash the file system
  - 1. Randomly power cycle the VM or the server •
    - Restarting the VM after crash is slow!
    - Unlikely to reveal bugs
  - 2. Run the file system in user space
    - Not all file systems can be run as user space processes
    - Redesign file systems

#### SIMULATE crashes instead of trying to actually crash the system!



### How does CrashMonkey simulate crashes?




Block IO (BIO) requests

Device specific driver


mkdir (A) touch (A/bar) fsync (A/bar) mkdir (B) touch (B/bar) rename (B/bar, A/bar) touch (A/foo) fsync (A/foo) **CRASH!** 





### CrashMonkey Architecture





- Trace all BIO requests
- To simulate crash, simply drop the BIO requests after a particular point.





































# Challenges with Systematic Testing



 Given a workload compliant to POSIX API, we saw how CrashMonkey generates crash states and automatically tests for consistency

# Challenges with Systematic Testing




- Given a workload compliant to POSIX API, we saw how CrashMonkey generates crash states and automatically tests for consistency
- Next question : How to automatically generate workloads in an the infinite workload space?

# Exploring the infinite workload space

#### **Challenges:**

- Infinite length of workloads
- Large set of filesystem operations
- Infinite parameter options (file/directory names, depth)
- Infinite options for initial filesystem state
- When in the workload to simulate a crash?




Arguments to system calls

Length of workloads

#### Initial FS state

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Length of workloads

#### Initial FS state


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Arguments to system calls





Length of workloads


Initial FS state

Image source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cube 60



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Arguments to system calls





Length of workloads

Arguments to system calls



Length of workloads

Initial FS state

Arguments to system calls




Initial FS state

Length of workloads

#### Choice of crash point

- Only after fsync(), fdatasync() or sync()
- Not in the middle of system call



- Developers are motivated to patch bugs that break semantics of persistence operations
- Crashing in the middle of system calls leads to exponentially large crash-states.




# Limitations of B<sup>3</sup>

- No guarantee of finding all crash-consistency bugs in a filesystem
- like journaling or CoW
  - Does not crash in the middle of system calls
- bug.
- Needs larger compute to test higher sequence lengths


Assumes the correct working of crash-consistency mechanism

Can only reveal if a bug has occurred, not the reason or origin of



### Bounds chosen by ACE

Arguments to system calls



Initial FS state

X

Length of workloads

**Bounds picked based on** insights from the study of crash-consistency bugs reported on Linux file systems over the last 5 years

- Study the workload pattern and impacts of crash consistency bugs reported in the past 5 years
  - Kernel mailing lists
  - Crash consistency tests submitted to xfstests
- 26 unique bugs across ext4, F2FS, and btrfs

Consequence	# bugs
Corruption	17
Data inconsistency	6
Unmountable FS	3
Total	26

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lesystem	# bugs		
Ext4	2		
F2FS	2		
btrfs	24		
Total	28		

# ops	# bugs		
1	3		
2	14		
3	9		
Total	26		

Consequence	# bugs	Filesystem	# bugs	# ops	# bugs ``
Corruption	17	Ext4	2	1	3
Data inconsistency	6	F2FS	2	2	14
Unmountable FS	3	btrfs	24	3	9
Total	26	Total	28	Total	26

#### 1. Crash consistency bugs are hard to find

- identified and patched
- Usually involve reuse of files/ directories

Bugs have been around in the kernel for up to 7 years before being

Consequence	# bugs	Filesystem	# bugs	# ops	# bugs
Corruption	17	Ext4	2	1	3
Data inconsistenc	y 6	F2FS	2	2	14
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Total	26	Total	28	Total	26

- 1. Crash consistency bugs are hard to find
- 2. Small workloads are sufficient to reveal bugs
  - 2-3 core operations on a new, empty file-system

#### e hard to find **cient to reveal bugs**

Consequence	# bugs	Filesystem	# bugs	# ops	# bugs
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- 1. Crash consistency bugs are hard to find 2. Small workloads are sufficient to reveal bugs 3. Crash after persistence points
  - Sufficient to crash after a call to fsync(), fdatasync(), or sync()

## Study of crash consistency bugs in the wild

Consequence	# bugs	Filesystem	# bugs	# ops	# bugs
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- 3. Crash after persistence points
- 4. Systematic testing is required

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
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- 4. Systematic testing is required

Fallocate : punch\_hole : 2015

Fallocate : zero\_range : 2018



Arguments to system calls




Initial FS state

X

Length of workloads

**Bounds picked based on** insights from the study of crash-consistency bugs reported on Linux file systems over the last 5 years

Arguments to system calls



### Length of workloads

### Maximum # core ops is 3




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### Arguments to system calls

Root 
$$< A \rightarrow (foo, bar)$$
  
 $B \rightarrow (foo, bar)$ 

**Overwrites to start, middle,** end of a file and append



Length of workloads

### Maximum # core ops is 3




×

Arguments to system calls

Root  $< A \rightarrow$  (foo, bar)  $B \rightarrow$  (foo, bar)

Overwrites to start, middle, end and append




### Length of workloads


### Maximum # core ops is 3


### New, 100MB FS


### **Initial FS state**


×

















If metadata operations, pick file or directory names If data operations, pick a range of offset and length









If metadata operations, pick file or directory names If data operations, pick a range of offset and length

### 2. Select Parameters

- 1. creat(A/bar)
- 2. rename(B/bar, A/bar)



- operation
- at these points
- Parameter to the ulletpersistence function is again chosen from the file/directory pool






- creat(A/bar) 1.
- rename(B/bar, A/bar) 2.

Between each core operation, add a persistence


Consistency will be checked

### 3. Add Persistence

84



- operation
- at these points
- Parameter to the ulletpersistence function is again chosen from the file/directory pool



### 2. Select Parameters


- creat(A/bar) 1.
- rename(B/bar, A/bar) 2.

Between each core operation, add a persistence

Consistency will be checked


### 3. Add Persistence

- creat(A/bar) 1. fsync(A/bar)
- rename(B/bar, A/bar) 2. fsync(A/foo)





ullet




### 2. Select Parameters


- creat(A/bar) 1.
- rename(B/bar, A/bar) 2.

Add file create/open/close to ensure the workload executes on any POSIX compliant filesystem.


### 3. Add Persistence

- creat(A/bar) fsync(A/bar)
- rename(B/bar, A/bar) 2. fsync(A/foo)






ullet










This workload with 2 core operations is the same workload required to trigger rename atomicity bug!



### 2. Select Parameters

- creat(A/bar)
- 2. rename(B/bar, A/bar)

### 3. Add Persistence


- 1. creat(A/bar) fsync(A/bar)
- 2. rename(B/bar, A/bar) fsync(A/foo)

## Challenges with Systematic Testing

Lack of automated infrastructure

CrashMonkey

### **Bounded Black-Box Testing**



### Evaluation

We seek to answer the following questions:

- 1. Can B<sup>3</sup> reproduce known bugs in the kernel?
- 2. Can B<sup>3</sup> find new bugs in Linux Filesystems in a reasonable time?
- 3. Resource consumption by ACE and CrashMonkey
- 4. How can we generalize and scale this approach?

## Test Setup



- Cluster of 65 nodes
  - 40 cores, 48GB RAM, 128GB SSD
  - 12VMs on every node, each with 2GB RAM, 10GB storage
    - Restricted by storage
  - Total 780 VMs in parallel
- Generate workloads on a local server and distribute over network to the VMs

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1				
Seq-2				
Seq-3 metadata				
Seq-3 data				
Seq-3 nested				
Total				

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1				
Seq-2				
Seq-3 metadata				
Seq-3 data		ion workloads 15 days of testing	on 780 VMs in pa	rallel!
Seq-3 nested				
Total				

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1	300			
Seq-2	254K			
Seq-3 metadata	120K			
Seq-3 data	1.5M			
Seq-3 nested	1.5M			
Total	<b>3.37M</b>			

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1	300	3		
Seq-2	254K	14		
Seq-3 metadata	120K	5		
Seq-3 data	1.5M	2		
Seq-3 nested	1.5M	2		
Total	<b>3.37M</b>	26		

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1	300	3	3	
Seq-2	254K	14	3	
Seq-3 metadata	120K	5	2	
Seq-3 data	1.5M	2	0	
Seq-3 nested	1.5M	2	2	
Total	<b>3.37M</b>	26	10	

Sequence Length	# workloads	# Bugs Reproduced	# Bugs found	Time (min)
Seq-1	300	3	3	1
Seq-2	254K	14	3	215
Seq-3 metadata	120K	5	2	102
Seq-3 data	1.5M	2	0	1274
Seq-3 nested	1.5M	2	2	1274
Total	<b>3.37M</b>	26	10	2866 (2 days)

## Are Verified File Systems Crash Safe?

- Tested FSCQ and Yxv6 with CrashMonkey and Ace Found broken fdatasync guarantees in FSCQ
- Acknowledged and patched

Time to integrate back-box testing in your file system development cycle!



### Results

- Reproduced 24/26 known bugs across ext4, btrfs and F2FS
- Found 10 new bugs across btrfs and F2FS • Found 1 bug in a verified file system, FSCQ

## Generalizing Ace

- Open Source
- compute is available
- Adding support for more system calls is straightforward
  - Increases the space of workloads

### Easily expandable to test higher sequences exhaustively if more

# Integrated with Ace fuzzer to test random, but valid sequences

## Using CrashMonkey & Ace

### Open Source : <u>https://github.com/utsaslab/crashmonkey</u>

CrashMonkey: tools for testing file-system reliability (OSDI 18)

test-harness crash-consistency file	e-systems Manage topics					
⑦ 835 commits № 63 brancl	hes 🗇 0 packages	🛇 <b>1</b> release	🛷 1 environment	<b>LL 10</b> con	tributors	কাঁু Apache-2.0
Branch: master   New pull request			Create new file	Upload files	Find file	Clone or download <del>-</del>
<b>wijay03</b> Update README.md				~	Latest com	mit 407e1d1 7 days ago
ace	update ace to reflect adapter	usage change				2 months ago
<b>code</b>	Fix comment about struct field	d kernel version.				10 months ago
docs	added an example usecaseE					2 months ago
👕 googletest @ aa148eb	Pull in gtests for C++ code.					2 years ago
setup	Add script for building VMs. U	Jpdate README a tad	more.			2 years ago
test	Add tests for unaligned <4k w	vrites for WriteData.				2 years ago
vm_scripts	Almost done with documenta	tion				last year

Edit

## Using CrashMonkey & Ace

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- 1. Setup

- 4. Demo
  - Video

- 7. Research That Uses Our Tools
- 8. Contact Info

### **Advanced Documentation**

- 1. VM Setup and Deployment
  - Setting up a VM
- 2. CrashMonkey

  - XfsMonkey
- 3. Ace
  - Bounds used by Ace

  - Generalizing Ace

2. Push Button Testing for Seq-1 Workloads 3. Tutorial on Workload Generation and Testing

5. List of Bugs Reproduced by CrashMonkey and Ace 6. List of New Bugs Found by CrashMonkey and Ace

> Deploying CrashMonkey on a Cluster Deployment on the Chameleon Cloud

• Running CrashMonkey as a Standalone • Running CrashMonkey as a Background Process • Writing a workload for CrashMonkey

Generating Workloads with Ace

## Push button testing!

### Push Button Testing for Seq-1 Workloads

This repository contains a pre-generated suite of 328 seq-1 workloads (workloads with 1 file-system operation) here. Once you have set up CrashMonkey on your machine (or VM), you can simply run :

```
python xfsMonkey.py -f /dev/sda -d /dev/cow_ram0 -t btrfs -e 102400 -u build/tests/seq1/ > outfile
```

Sit back and relax. This is going to take about 12 minutes to complete if run on a single machine. This will run all the 328 tests of seq-1 on a btrfs file system 100MB in size. The bug reports can be found in the folder diff\_results. The workloads are named j-lang<1-328>, and, if any of these resulted in a bug, you will see a bug report with the same name as that of the workload, describing the difference between the expected and actual state.

### More here : https://github.com/utsaslab/crashmonkey

## Impact of our tools



Our tools found 10 long-standing bugs in btrfs and F2FS in the Linux kernel, and 1 bug in a verified file system, FSCQ.



Spurred discussion and effort towards documenting the crash guarantees of various Linux filesystems in the kernel



The tests generated by our tools have been added to xfstests, the file-system test suite for the Linux kernel.




Used in research file systems like BarrierFS to test their crash-consistency guarantees.

# What did we learn from B3?

### Even if you build verified software, testing is important!

A custom tool that is application-aware is more powerful than a generic testing approach



yashree-VirtualBox: /home/jayashree/crashmonkey/demo/crashmonkey root@jayashree-VirtualBox:/home/jayashree/crashmonkey/demo/crashmonkey# ./demo.sh btrfs btrfs\_out

Ι


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💌 🜒) 4:14 PM 🔱

## Summary

- File system crash consistency bugs result in severe consequences like metadata corruption and data loss. To address the lack of infrastructure for testing such bugs :
- CrashMonkey
  - Record and replay framework
- Automated workload generation using Ace
  - Study the past bug pattern and explore a bounded space
- Found 10 new bugs in Linux FS and 1 bug in a verified FS

### Our team







Jayashree Mohan

Ashlie **Martinez** 





Soujanya Ponnapalli

Pandian Raju

Vijay Chidambaram





- Found 1 bug in FSCQ

Try our tools : <u>https://github.com/utsaslab/crashmonkey</u>

Contact : Jayashree Mohan (jaya@cs.utexas.edu)

## Questions?

## CRASH MONKEY & ACE

 B<sup>3</sup> makes exhaustive testing feasible using informed bound selection Easily generalizable to test larger workloads if more compute is available Found 10 new bugs across btrfs and F2FS, most of which existed since 2014