Rohingya Crisis
End of Appeal Evaluation

Final Report

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CAFOD

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Acronyms

ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
CB	Caritas Bangladesh
CBP	Community Based Protection
CFS	Child Friendly Spaces
CI	Caritas International
CLQ	Critical Learning Question
CRA	Community Risk Assessment
CiC	Camp in Charge
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DCV	Deutscher Caritas Verband
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EA	Emergency Appeal (CAFOD)
ERP	Emergency Response Programme
EST	Environmental Stewardship Tool
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
FCDO	Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FDMN	Forcibly Displace Myanmar National
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GEF	Global Emergency Fund
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
HH	Household
IE	Integral Ecology
iNGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interview
LPG	Liquefied petroleum gas
MEAL	Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning
NAHAB	National Alliance for Humanitarian Actors in Bangladesh
NFI	Non-food items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGO-AB	NGO Affairs Bureau
NTF	National Task Force
OCH	Our Common Home
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
RRRC	Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner
SADI	Safe, accessible, dignified, and inclusive (CAFOD Approach)
SEG	Strategic Executive Group
SMW	Sense Making Workshop (17/10/23)
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
ToC	Theory of Change
ToT	Training of Trainers
UN	United Nations
VAWG	Violence against women and girls
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WFS	Women Friendly Spaces

Section 1: Introduction

This report represents the final output of the Evaluation of the '**Rohingya Crisis Appeal – end of appeal evaluation'** (Annex 1). It seeks to reflect what I heard during 11 key informant **interviews (KII)** (Annex 2) and what I read in a review of **secondary reports and evaluations** provided (Annex 3). It has been refined with insights and discussions held during a **'Sense Making Workshop'** (SMW) where key stakeholders reviewed the initial findings and discussed emerging issues and ideas. (Annex 4).

Section 2 includes a little **background on the crisis** and some insights from the evaluation of other agencies responses. It is presented to provide a context for the insights that follow.

Section 3 provides some factual information on the **scale and focus of CAFOD's support** to the Rohingya Crisis Response with details of sources of funds and their application across different thematic areas.

Section 4 is the heart of the report where I have tried to summarise **what I heard and what I read** and identify ideas for further discussion and recommendations emerging from the research. It is structured along the lines of the interrelated 'Integral Ecology Characteristics' (Annex 1):

1. Environment/Human Connection
2. Inclusion
3. Voice and Agency
4. Culture of Encounter
5. Advocacy
6. Safeguarding and SADI
7. Long Term and Flexible Funding
8. Learning Culture

Each of these sections contains the following subheadings:
- A summary of *'Activities, Outputs and Outcomes'* observed.
- *'What CAFOD and its partners did well'* (and, where possible, the contribution of CAFOD)
- *'What can be Improved?'* in the work of CAFOD and partners.
- *'Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion'.*

At the end of each CLQ section an initial **assessment of alignment** against each of the 8 'characteristics' is presented. This was made during the SMW using the following scale:
- Level 5: Fully Aligned with the IE Characteristic
- Level 4: Close to Level 4 but not quite so strong
- Level 3:
- Level 2: Close to Level 1 but not quite so weak
- Level 1: Not aligned with the IE Characteristic

Individual *'**Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion'**** are graded according to the strength with which they emerged:
- Strong: Referenced by CAFOD source, Caritas Bangladesh (CB) source and by one of the 4 independent evaluations read.
- Medium: Referenced by two of the above.
- Weak: Referenced by 1 of the above sources but more than once.

Section 5 seeks to present brief **conclusions** on alignment and summarises the emerging areas for further investigation/improvement. It also begins to explore **CAFOD's 'added value'** in responses to protracted crises.

Section 2: The Rohingya Crisis

In August 2017 a series of attacks launched, by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on *"approximately thirty police outposts and a military camp in north Rakine state"[1]* resulted in a crackdown by the Myanmar (aka Burma) authorities on the Rohingya ethnic group predominantly located in Rakine state.

This resulted in the movement of almost 1m Rohingya refugees from Myanmar into neighbouring Bangladesh between August and September 2017. A further 700,000 Rohingya remained in Myanmar with many being kept in internment camps- deprived of basic rights.

The roots to the 'Rohingya Crisis' run deep. The Rohingya ethnic group are largely Muslim who speak a language/dialect that has some similarities to communities in the Chittagong Hill tracts but is considered significantly different from Bengali and Burmese. (73% of the affected people are illiterate[2]) Their history is the subject of hot debate, but it is widely recognised that their presence in Myanmar dates to c.3000BC: well before the establishment of the Burmese/Myanmar state (c.1000AD[3]) and even the birth of Buddhism (c.400BC[4]).

The persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar has been going on for centuries but took a chilling turn for the worse after the military coup in 1962. It is widely perceived that the military junta, seeking a way to strengthen and provide cohesive identity to its population, identified Buddhism as one of the key defining tenants of Myanmar/Burma. This placed minorities such as the Rohingya (and Karen) as outsiders and signalled a dramatic worsening of their rights. E.g.,

"the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was a critical step as it removed the status the Rohingyas had been granted at independence (from the British in 1948) and insisted that they accept identity cards that described them as 'foreigners'"[5]

Despite partial and temporary democratic reforms, 2015 saw all Muslims excluded from the Myanmar electoral process and in 2016 the efforts to remove the Rohingya from Burma became more direct, powerful, and sustained- culminating in the events of 2017.

"The immediate cause of their flight was described by the UN-mandated Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar as a "widespread and systematic attack on [civilians]" including "murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, and enslavement" with "elements of extermination and deportation" as well as "systematic oppression and discrimination [that] may also amount to the crime of apartheid." As of July 2020, over 900,000 stateless Rohingya refugees reside in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas. The vast majority live in 34 extremely congested camps."[6]

The Humanitarian Response

The initial humanitarian response to the 2017 influx of new refugees into Bangladesh, built on existing structures established in Bangladesh over the previous decade.

A number of camps (34 TBC) were established. These were divided into blocks (with an average of 500 residents/100 households per block).

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[1] https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-021-00093-9
[2] https://odi.org/en/events/the-rohingya-crisis-voices-from-the-field/
[3] https://newint.org/features/2008/04/18/history
[4] https://news.stanford.edu/2018/08/20/stanford-scholar-discusses-buddhism-origins/#:~:text=Buddhism%20itself%20started%20sometime%20in,developed%2C%20it%20spread%20beyond%20India.
[5] Azeem Ibrahim 2018, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Genocide. Hurst
[6] https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/concern-worldwide-evaluation-report-rohingya-emergency-response-2017-2020-october

The governance of the humanitarian effort is complex and multi-layered[7] bringing together multilateral agencies the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and a multitude of NGOs (Fig 1).

Figure 1: Rohingya Humanitarian Response Governance

Key actors in the governance and management of the humanitarian response include:
- The humanitarian response for the Rohingya refugee crisis is facilitated by the **Inter-Sectoral Coordination Group (ISCG)**
- The **Strategic Executive Group** (SEG) is designed to be an inclusive decision-making forum consisting of heads of international humanitarian organizations. It guides the ISCG Secretariat.
- On the government side, a **National Task Force** was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It leads the coordination of the overall Rohingya crisis.
- Together (SEC/ISCG and NTF) develop a **Joint Response Plan** that seeks to coordinate activity across 10 thematic sectors (see Fig 1) and the efforts of Government departments and >130 humanitarian organisations. (Approximately 50% local/national and 50% INGO)
- Each theme/sector is coordinated by a **Thematic Coordinator** (dominated by INGOs) – meeting bi-weekly to try to ensure coordination.
- **Implementing agencies** deliver the work based on ability to deliver and access to resources (!!!??)
- Each camp were assigned a civil servant from GoB Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) to be the **'Camp in Charge'.** These CiC are *"responsible for the daily administration, coordination and delivery of services in conjunction with the army."* (Gov and Community Participation)
- Within camps there are democratically elected **Camp Committees** and **Block Management Committees.** These committees were instituted in 2007 to perform a *"consultative role for identifying priorities, planning activities, and implementing programs. …the committees are not decision-making bodies".* They have *"an established gender quota"* partly to counteract the male dominated Majhi system (1 out of 1200 female!!) that preceded it and continues to perform an important role today.
- Typically, a **Majhi** oversees a block. They are largely considered to be key respondents and often responsible for handling small disputes. Majhi's report to both the army and CiC.
- Additional **Community Participation Initiatives** have also been created- often linked to thematic programmes.

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[7]https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20180606_acaps_npm_report_camp_governance_final_0.pdf

At a camp level regular monitoring meetings generated key data on the focus and performance of services provide, e.g.

- https://data.humdata.org/dataset/location-of-cic-office-in-the-rohingya-refugee-camps-of-kutupalong-area?
- https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh/iscg-3w-dashboard
- https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/common-feedback-platform-cfp-monthly-camp-analysis-report-june-2023?_gl=1*ha5izm*_ga*MjE3OTEyMTI1LjE2ODk4NTk1NjY.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY5MDE5ODA5Ny4zLjEuMTY5MDE5ODIzMS4zOC4wLjA.

Snapshot of the Humanitarian Response:
- 1 million people fled and were welcomed into Bangladesh on land near the eastly city of Coxs Bazaar.
- Camps quickly became overcrowded. *"The camps are severely crowded with almost one million people sharing 26 square kilometres—that's 40,000 people per square kilometre"*[8]
- Bangladesh refused to recognise the Rohingya as refugees (rather seeing them as Burmese citizens who should return quickly to their home). Unwanted at home and faced with reluctant hosts the **Rohingya effectively became stateless.**
  "Bangladesh has not signed the Refugee Convention, which means they are not bound to the obligations within it." Written Submission Oct 23
- Initially the welcome was warm but as time went on there were apparent **tensions with local Bangladeshi communities** who found their livelihoods affected by the new arrivals (farmers etc). The protracted nature of the emergency and the reluctance of refugees to return home led to a **deterioration in the relationships with GoB** impacting the lives of refugees:
  - Bangladesh refused to allow Rohingya to work outside camps- for fear of upsetting its own citizens. This severely hampered the ability of humanitarian service providers to build greater self-determination and sufficiency.
    - In September 2019 the host authorities built a fence round the camps and severely restricted the ability of Rohingya to use mobile phones /internet. [9]
    - In Nov 2019 the Bangladesh government prohibited the Rohingya refugees in the camps from working – reducing the ability of humanitarian organisations to build capacity and 'localise' the response (UK Parliamentary Evidence 2020[10])
  - Delays in GoB permission and approvals (e.g., visa requests, new projects and in receiving foreign donor monies (FD7) hampered the programme.

Bangladesh itself is regarded as highly susceptible to natural disasters. It is rated 29th on the INFORM risk index. The camps were built on marginal land, exacerbating this problem and were highly **vulnerable to flood and fires.**

This has two implications:
1. Risk of secondary disaster affecting the refugees.
2. Quite high response capacity, although limited refugee/camp experience.:

"As the impacts of human-induced climate change become more and more apparent and visible and lead to significant losses and damages, it is necessary for all actors, including governments as well as others, to work together in a whole-of-society approach going forward…………We must examine how the global

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[8] https://www.oxfam.org/en/blogs/four-things-know-about-covid-worlds-largest-refugee-camp
[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kutupalong_refugee_camp
[10] https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/1704/pdf/

community perceives this agenda and join forces to support climate-friendly humanitarian actions in Cox's Bazar."[11]

"Between January 2021 and December 2022, there were 222 fire incidents in the Rohingya camps including 60 cases of arson, according to a Bangladesh defence ministry report released last month." https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-64858932

Camps have also become highly political and prone to criminal elements[12]:
- **People trafficking[13]** and migration to Indonesia and Malaysia
- Suggestion that recent fires might have been **arson**- started by factions in the camp looking to encourage refugees to return to Myanmar.

  "The gangs, so-called freedom fighters, from within Rohingya have been taking advantage of our vulnerability … They don't want us to survive peacefully as there are masterminds from overseas behind them" https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/sabotage-suspected-in-rohingya-camp-fire-says-official-probe/2843922

Following the emergence of **COVID 19** in 2020 it is estimated (as of 24 April 2022), that there was 5,922 COVID-19 confirmed cases (out of 99,049 tests) and 42 deaths in the refugee camps. https://www.medrxiv.org/content/medrxiv/early/2023/02/24/2023.02.21.23286227.full.pdf
While the death toll was less than many observers feared, the impact on economic factors seems to have been significant…

"There has been a sharp decline in refugees' well-being. More than half the men and 84% of all women say they've not been able to make the same money as before. Nearly a quarter of all refugee households moved into a higher category of vulnerability—meaning they had less food and experienced more economic stress. Families were much more likely to accept high-risk jobs or send their children to work."[14]

The pandemic also appears to have contributed to a decline in access to food, spikes in domestic violence and an increase in the domestic burden carried by women during 'lockdown'.

In 2023, the Rohingya response appeared to be facing declining international support/fatigue – i.e., faced with reduced budgets at a global level, the **WFP cut its daily allowance to refugees** from US$12 per month several months ago to just $8 a month.[15]

- The Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan 2023 is only 29.7% funded.
- None of the recent (since 2020) response plans have reached their fundraising target.
- This is considered to be one of the biggest challenges of a protracted crises.

In 2021 Human Rights Watch exposed **a Biometric data scandal**[16]- where data collected to streamline/simplify access to resources in camps- was shared with Government of Myanmar without the consent of refugees – with potentially compromising or dangerous implications.

"The data privacy and security of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has reportedly been jeopardised by the UN Refugee Agency. In an expose published on 15 June by Human Rights Watch (HRW), UNHCR stands accused of improperly collecting the Rohingya's biometric information and later sharing it with the Myanmar government without the Rohingya's consent. Refugees said they had been told to register to

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[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/5/rohingya-refugees-in-bangladeshs-hot-zone-for-climate-threats
[12] https://www.dhakatribune.com/nation/2023/06/26/youth-killed-in-coxs-bazar-rohingya-camp
[13] https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/atwg_draft_dashboard_-_jan_-_dec_2022.pdf
[14] https://www.oxfam.org/en/blogs/four-things-know-about-covid-worlds-largest-refugee-camp
[15] https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/02/un-slashes-food-rations-rohingya-bangladesh-camps
[16] https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent

receive aid, but the risks of sharing their biometrics had not been discussed, and the possibility this information would be shared with Myanmar was not mentioned." ODI[17]

*From as early as 2015 the Government of Bangladesh developed plans to relocate up to 400,000 (Check this figure. 100k?) Rohingya to the **Island of Bhasan Char** in the Bay of Bengal[18]? These plans attracted widespread criticism and as of August 2022, 26043 refugees are thought to have been relocated to Bhasan Char[19].*

Insights from Other Evaluations (to inform this one?)

A quick glance at a small number of external Rohingya response evaluations (i.e., Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, IOM/UNHCR & UNICEF) of the Rohingya crisis have thrown up several interesting insights/themes which might be relevant to this study:

- **Weak participation/accountability** to affected persons: failure to have strong systems of feedback and /or affected persons designing and implementing services. Language and illiteracy a significant issue.

  "Overall leadership on participation is generally perceived as weak, with a lack of clear strategy and objectives, and too much expectation that accompanying political challenges can be solved by technical actors. Humanitarian modes of operation such as inflexible project cycles and short timelines also limit the scope for deeper and more sustained engagement with communities."[20]

  "The Rohingya have been systematically excluded from social, economic, and political life in Myanmar for decades. This marginalisation has also been reflected in their experience of displacement in Bangladesh, where Rohingya have been severely limited in their ability to exercise basic rights as refugees. These experiences have combined with restrictive gender norms, language barriers and the dislocating experience of displacement itself to pose significant practical challenges to broad-based participation." Lough et al 2021

- **Slow/Weak Localisation**[21]: lack of support or capacity building for local implementation partners

  "Building collaboration relations between international and local organizations based on sub-contracting rather than complementarity, hierarchy rather than an equal partnership, and modifying international organizations to be "local" hinders the local agency within the humanitarian space."[22]

- **Lack of Coordination/integrated programming:** limited coordination between the implementing agencies HQ and field; weak interagency coordination; poor coordination across thematic projects; lack of partnerships with Government.

  (See UNICEF evaluation in relation to WASH, which also highlighted the lack of focus on gender https://evaluationreports.unicef.org/GetDocument?fileID=11379 p.44)

- **Weak consideration of environmental challenges** in the humanitarian response (resulting in vulnerability of affected people to extreme weather events)

- Failure to see **protection as the key driver** for the response (better understanding required)

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[17] ODI 2021, Although shocking, the Rohingya biometrics scandal is not surprising and could have been prevented. Kerrie Holloway, Oliver Lough.

[18] Ishrat Hossain 2020. After Humanitarianism: Bangladesh's Evolving Rohingya Policy https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27059

[19] https://www.unicef.org/media/131641/file/2023-HAC-Bangladesh.pdf

[20] https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/Inclusion_IP_Rohingya_case_study_web_mWH7sWq.pdf

[21] https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-022-00122-1#Sec11

[22] https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-022-00122-1#Sec11

- **Lack of focus on gender** dimensions: lack of female staff in the field, poor representation on committees/male dominated Majhi, consideration of steps to protect women, e.g., lighting, women only toilet and washing facilities.

- **Short termism/lack of focus on securing medium to long term political solutions**: Despite hostile relationships with host population, Bangladesh government and Government of Myanmar- there was a lack of urgency to seek medium- and long-term political solutions.

Section 3: CAFOD's Response and Role

CAFOD's response to the Rohingya is summarized in the Evaluation TOR (Annex 1).

"Long-term CAFOD partners, Caritas Bangladesh[23] and DAM[24] were involved in the immediate, community-led response where local communities provided emergency relief such as food and shelter. A large-scale response was rapidly established with significant presence of UN agencies, international NGOs as well as Bangladesh national NGOs with significant experience of emergency response such as BRAC, Caritas Bangladesh and DAM.

CAFOD launched an appeal in September 2017 which raised £436,000. CAFOD also joined the DEC appeal and received a total of £803,000. CAFOD has also continued to give smaller grants in recent years to support the response, e.g.

- *£17,000 in private donor funding (ARUP?)*
- *£100,000 from COVID fund (CAFOD internal fund)*
- *£50,000 from General Emergencies Fund (CAFOD internal fund).*

CAFOD responded with support to 2 long-term partners, both of which had significant experience within emergency response in Bangladesh.

Caritas Bangladesh established an office in Cox's Bazaar, initially largely staffed by their team based in Chattogram where they had an established Diocese office and programme. An appeal was launched through Caritas Internationalis to include provision of shelter, food, non-food items, protection, and psycho-social provision. Caritas Bangladesh participated in the UN cluster system and established a strong capability in shelter and camp improvements introducing many locally led adaptations to ensure greater adaptability to the local environment as well as low-carbon solutions such as solar lighting. Through the Caritas Internationalis co-ordination structures, Caritas Bangladesh were able to draw on <u>surge capacity including surge capacity provided by CAFOD in WASH and protection</u>. CAFOD primarily supported work on shelter (including camp infrastructure- bridges, drainage, and ditches etc.) NFIs and protection as well as support to Caritas Bangladesh too strengthen safe-guarding approaches and systems.

DAM launched an appeal through its international connections and worked in consortium with a range of INGOs with a focus largely on medical provision and education. DAM approached CAFOD for support to a project to develop and distribute a specially designed cooking stove fueled with rice husks as a lower-carbon alternative to gas cooking stoves, along with solar powered streetlights, and awareness raising on DRR.

A Programme Board meets quarterly to oversee the programme. ……"[25]

In addition to the financial resources, CAFOD mobilised the surge team. Part of this was to provide extra internal capacity to CAFOD (e.g., Zoe Corden) but we also provided technical support to Caritas Bangladesh through the CI Working Group Mechanisms (e.g., Brian Standley).

Table 1 summarises the funds received by CB from CAFOD and their use (as defined by CB in their reports to CAFOD and DEC). Using these definitions, and whilst indicative only, the majority of the programmatic funds were spent on Shelter[26] (42%) and Protection (24%) activities. It is estimated that, by the end of 2022, the CB response had reached 45559 FDMN households and 9391 host community households (Giving Hope 2022).

Fig 1 presents a simple timeline of the Rohingya Response.

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[23] https://caritasbd.org
[24] https://www.ahsaniamission.org.bd
[25] CAFOD 2023. Rohingya Evaluation TOR
[26] The heading 'Shelter' includes camp infrastructure initiatives such as drains, ditches, bridges, and culverts.

Table 1: CAFOD Rohingya Response Source and Application of Funds

Sources of Funds

DEC Appeal	803,000
CAFOD Appeal	436,000
Total	**1,239,000.00**

Application of Funds

TOTAL DISBURSED		SOURCE	PERIOD	A0 NEED ASSESSMENT	A1 FOOD SECURITY and NUTRITION	A2 WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION and HYGIENE PROMOTION	A3 SHELTER, SETTLEMENT and NON FOOD ITEMS	A4 HEALTH ACTION	A5 PROTECTION	A6 EDUCATION	A7 CAPACITY BUILDING / WORKSHOPS / TRAININGS	A8 ADVOCACY	A9 PEACE BUILDING	A10 DRR & LIVELIHOODS	A11 OTHERS	PROGRAMME STAFF	PROGRAMME SUB TOTAL	OPERATIONAL COSTS	OVERHEAD	TOTAL
330,000	BAN194	DEC 1	2017		48,525		218,584				290					16,706	284,105	22,964	22,931	330,000
88,221	BAN195	CAFOD Appeal	Oct 18 to Jan 19				67,464		1,345		5,022			4,843		3,363	82,038	4,574	1,609	88,221
474,437	BAN199	DEC 2	2018?						244,367					95,633	93,670	0	433,670	9,729	31,038	474,437
17,200	BAN200	ARUP	Sep 17 to Oct 18		1,548	2,924	10,664		344							0	15,480	860	860	17,200
198,520	BAN216	CAFOD Appeal	Jan to June 20?				160,758									19,146	179,904	9,162	9,453	198,520
128,000	BAN227	CAFOD Appeal	Aug 21 to Jan 22		45,331	46,764	7,243									10,487	109,825	5,887	12,288	128,000
50,000	BAN241	General Emergencies	2022			5,745	24,100		2,315	210				4,575		0	36,945	10,665	2,390	50,000
1,286,378	Total			0	95,404	49,688	464,713	0	246,056	0	5,312	0	0	100,476	93,670	49,703	1,105,022	53,176	78,180	1,236,377
	% of Programme Costs			0%	9%	4%	42%	0%	22%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	8%	4%	100%			
	% of Total Costs														85%	89%	4%	4%	6%	100%

Fig 1: CAFOD Rohingya Humanitarian Response Timeline

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Wider Events	Govt Myanmar Crackdown; 1m refugees to Bangladesh		Tighter GoB Restrictions	Start of COVID 19 pandemic	HRW Biometrics Expose (5/21)		WFP cut daily allowance from $12 to $8.
CAFOD Humanitarian Response Milestones	CAFOD appeal. £436k raised.	DEC, Disaster response Phase 1 Final Report (4/18); DAM Project (Oct 18 to Feb 19)			CB Final Evaluation Report "Emergency Response/	CB Gender Audit (5/22); Evaluation of '2021 Caritas Response in Cox's Bazar' (8/22)	

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Section 4: Critical Learning Questions and Insights

The Context

"It was Incredible: the most awe-inspiring thing I've ever seen- in my life." KII

In September 2017, over 700,000 people fled Myanmar and descended on eastern Bangladesh having faced unimaginably trauma in their own country. In the space of 2 months a city the size of…. Newcastle or Nottingham developed in an area of forest reserve in a country prone to extreme weather events.

Many of the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nations (FDMN) were bereaved and suffering from acute trauma. Few had time to collect more than the clothes on their back before fleeing.   The situation was *"chaotic"* and *"overwhelming"* (KII).

Whilst CAFOD partners in Bangladesh had significant experience of dealing with natural disasters there had little experience of dealing with a large-scale political disaster of this magnitude. They responded quickly, with great professional skill and with determination. CAFOD's partners became a critical but small player in a *"massive humanitarian architecture"* (KII) of a response led by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB).

CLQ 1: To what extent did CAFOD engage with partners to protect and regenerate the environment (OCH 1)

In the space of a few months 700000 people, equivalent to a city the size of Newcastle, descended on an environmentally sensitive area of forest reserve in eastern Bangladesh. In an area of steep wooded valleys and ravines, the environmental damage was massive and the ongoing vulnerability to severe weather events inevitable (Box 1).

Environmental/Human Connection: Activities, Outputs and Outcomes.
The partnership with CB and DAM meant the CAFOD was able to support humanitarian action at the very start of the crisis. CB had worked with the Rohingya Community in Bangladesh since 1992. CB mobilised emergency food distributions for incoming FDMN in September 2017 (Giving Hope 2022). Overall, the evaluation found that the response was quick whilst CB and DAM brought a strong track record on DRR and broader environmental initiatives, this took time to influence the response given the overwhelming human challenge faced.

In early 2018 there were dire warnings, that steps were not being taken to mitigate the significant risks that the rainy season and cyclones would present to refugees. However, by April 2018 CB had carried out a range of DRR preparedness studies covering 5200 families (CAFOD/DEC 2018) with evidence of **communities feeling better prepared** as a result (Saha 2022).

There is a suggestion (KII) that cyclone risk assessments piloted across coastal regions in Bangladesh will soon influence programming within Coxs Bazaar (linking humanitarian and longer-term programming).

At the very heart of the CB response (42% of programme spend) was the provision of shelter. In 2021 the German Foreign Ministry evaluation identified that **shelter remained the main risk identified by refugees** themselves. The provision of well treated strong bamboo and quality tarpaulin was a priority. CB provided locally sourced and treated bamboo, extending the life of bamboo from 6 or 7 months to 2 years. Perhaps more significantly. It developed a set of **pilot designs for shelter** and a 'model village' that influenced wider practice across the refugee camps, CB, co-chaired, the Shelter and NFI working group and through this and demonstrating best practice (Box 2) it had a **significant influence on housing/shelter strategy** across the Rohingya crisis response. An embedded CRS staff member was widely acknowledged as playing a critical role in these achievements.

> **Box 1: Environmental Vulnerability**
>
> *"The upcoming (2018) rainy and cyclone season poses a significant risk of flooding and landslides to the refugee population. Actors have been trying to put into place preparedness measures, but the overarching sense is that it is too late to make enough improvements to prevent significant damage to the camps and that mistakes made at the outset will be responsible for the gravity of the situation (e.g., toilets on top of hills, environmental destruction, shallow well contamination, camp layouts etc)."* Zoe Corden Trip Report 2017
>
> *"Although the Humanitarian Charter conveys rights to life with dignity, protection and security, due to a number of constrains, living conditions in the FDMN camps are dire and lag behind the Sphere Standards. Residing in the coastal region of the country the camps are situated on hillsides and find themselves at high risk of being exposed to cyclones, high wind speeds, heavy rains, and landslides. The host communities of Cox's Bazar are also effected by the large Rohingya presence in terms of rising prices, decreasing wages, environmental degradation as well as growing pressure on existing natural resources and public services."* German Foreign Ministry (2021)

> **Box 2: Enhanced Resilience to Extreme Weather Events**
>
> One of the FGD respondents stated, *"We did suffer during winters. and storms. However, after the help of Caritas our houses changed a lot. Including my house most of the shelters here are made of bamboo, tarpaulin, bamboo fence, rope. Whenever we need any of these materials, we informed Caritas, and they provided those according to our needs. We are living secure, safe, and comfortable life now."* Saha 2022

CB's track record on environmental initiatives appears to have influenced their programming and helped to ensure that the environment has remained central to their work in the camps. They have supported the development of **kitchen gardens** and exploiting small spaces to grow nutritious food. They have explored

planting and grassing with cash support and there appears to be willingness to explore further innovation including community managed plantations.

"You can identify where Caritas works because you look at the shelters and you see it's covered in vegetables and plants and other parts of the camp were a lot sparser." KII

The creation of the camps caused significant **deforestation** and the ongoing need for firewood saw this continue. CAFOD supported a DAM project pilot that explored the use of rice husk briquettes, and efficient cookstoves as an alternative to firewood. Whilst this project was not sustainable (CAFOD 2020, BAN195 DAM completion report) this project felt like an important statement of environmental intent.

The long-term solution to the issue of firewood was the use of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). In this regard it is widely perceived the **CB led the way** and the **provision of LPG gas was adopted more widely** and taken over by the UN across the wider camps. This has contributed to the regeneration of deforested areas…

"Over time, the area has been transformed from a forest reserve, "to a desert, to saplings and now it is a green environment". KII

The research suggests that CB were also felt to be **pioneers of the use of solar street lighting** within camps. These lights help to make safe and accessible areas during periods of darkness and had a particularly strong benefit for women. Solar lighting formed part of wider efforts to improve the infrastructure within the camps. CB, for example, appear to have played a strong role in improving pathways building bridges over ravines, and generally helping to support access and mobility within camps (CI Eval Feb 18).

CB developed a reputation for the design and implementation of **innovative infrastructure** within their camps (SMW). This was largely supported by CRS but included the mapping of camps using GIS (using data provided free of charge by IOM) and the strategic positioning of latrines and water sources, culverts, and bridges. This appears to have significantly reduced the vulnerability of camp residents to extreme weather events and was something adopted more widely across the camps as a result.

CAFOD through the CI WASH WG provided technical support to WASH activities and contributed to the creation of a large-scale **sewerage treatment** plant at the very beginning of the response (SMW). The research found that CB's contribution to WASH was affected by a **lack of capacity** or dedicated resources given other priorities identified. However, it did provide training to refugees on hygiene and the repair and maintenance of latrines with 87% of those who received training claiming to have applied their new knowledge and the incidence of open defecation reducing as a result (Box 3).

> **Box 3**
> *"Host community toilets maintenance responsibility depends on their own family. 95% of the Rohingya community were happy to receive the maintenance services, which were provided by Caritas Bangladesh. More importantly, they trained the volunteers, who could look after the facilities after the completion of the program.   Hygiene practice is a behavioural change. Training can bring positive behavioural change within the target group of people. 20% of the respondents from different families attended different hygiene sessions. This percentage was good enough to make the program sustainable."* Saha 2022

What CAFOD and its partners did well

The research identified strong humanitarian practices in incredibly challenging situation. We found a strong commitment to environmental factors in the middle of what was an environmental catastrophe. CB (and CAFOD), for example, supported **innovative experimentation** in the introduction of, cookstoves LPG, shelter and camp infrastructure, and provision of solar lamps in public spaces. The use of local staff (working in Chittagong Hill tracts and experience of terrain) was also considered to be important. CB appears to have had the most significant added value in its 'leadership' of shelter (and infrastructure) initiatives within the camp.

The research found it hard to distinguish CAFOD contribution to the success of these interventions. Perhaps there are 2 broad areas where we can create a causal link:

- **Support to innovation (Box 4)** *"CAFOD always offered support to the organization with limited resources to test a replicable model."* KII
- CAFODs role as an **environmental advocate** appears to have increased during the crisis and is now acknowledged by other members of the CI family. *"I would say CAFOD were, always proactive in bringing that topic (environment), into the discussion. I would definitely say that's CAFOD's identity"* KII.

What can be Improved?

The research, whilst recognising the 'overwhelming' nature of the crisis and the restrictive operating environment, identified a number of areas for possible improvement. These include the greater **integration of activities across the thematic areas** in the camp (Box 5). To some extent this was determined by GoB policy, but it was identified as an area for improvement. Similarly, in efforts to enhance the maintenance of latrines and toilet hygiene it was felt that **separate training for male and females** (Helios Evaluation 2021) would have increased the impact. Whilst the provision of training was important there was a sense that this should have been made more sustainable by the provision/allocation of future funding for latrine maintenance/repair 'kits.

There were a number of references to the potential to have anticipatory programming or 'nexus' – stronger **links between short and long term programming**- but also a recognition that this was also limited by the political sensitivities surrounding the response. CI and CAFOD's efforts around the environment were considered strong, but there was a sense that at times their house is not 'in-order'. For example, the extensive use of plastics within the response was something the participants felt could have been addressed better.

CB's support to Shelter was often held up as the example of where it had max value. These efforts were supported by an **embedded/seconded CRS member of staff**. Whilst there were frequent discussions about the pros and cons of embedding specialist staff to complement CB's own resources- it was widely acknowledged that a focus on areas where the CB response had a particular strengthen or added value was important. (e.g., WASH where CB didn't have the capacity).

It was felt that concerns raised regarding the speed with which environmental dimensions were considered in the response have to some extent been mitigated by the emergence of the Environmental Stewardship Tool (EST). This has been used in the recent Ukraine crisis response and a new updated version is under development. Should its use be mandatory for all responses above a certain level (SMW)? The EST is also felt to address some of the concerns regarding CAFOD/CAFOD partner's own environmental performance.

Might the EST play a role in helping partners prepare for complex emergencies of this nature? (SMW)

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion

The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.5 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst participants felt that CAFOD had encouraged a thoughtful environmental dimension to the response, building on CB strengths, this was not proactive at the very start of the crisis.

Box 4: Shelter Innovation

"CB did this really incredible little pilot area, which would be funded under the DEC partly, which was it really, really strong environmentally. It took into account the terrain it took into account the knowledge of the Rohingya people coming over, so they used a lot of their own knowledge in building shelters and created an outstanding quality shelter community within Kutupalong camp.
That was based on natural materials, ….
they really used their knowledge of DRR and the kind of things that they had done elsewhere and applied it to doing that." KII

Box 5: Need for greater coordination.

"Linking humanitarian responses and development interventions by integrating shelter, DRR, sanitation and protection as inter-supportive component of a single programme: Promotion of safe and resilient shelter is inextricably linked with disaster risk reduction, sanitation, and protection, which has also been confirmed by the evaluation respondents. There are other organizations doing sanitation and protection, but the existing coordination mechanisms is not well established to facilitate inter-organizational coordinated planning and ensure concerted efforts."
German Foreign Ministry 2021

It is recommended that:

- CAFOD/CB should explore how environmental factors could be more quickly addressed in humanitarian responses. To what extent should the EST tool be mandatory in humanitarian interventions- perhaps above a certain scale? (STRONG)
- CB/CAFOD review its own environmental stewardship practices in humanitarian responses, e.g., what could be done to reduce the use of plastic? Does the EST adequately address this concern? (MEDIUM)

CLQ 2: To what extent did CAFOD support partners on gender and inclusion specific outcomes/approaches (OCH 2) (including here inclusion gender, age, disability etc.)

The Rohingya culture was widely acknowledged to be conservative, and this is reflected in defined gender roles. Many FDMN were suffering from extreme trauma- exacerbated by the speed of the attacks in Myanmar and their expulsion from their homeland. The nature of the terrain, fast onset, and extreme weather events made life for people with disability particularly challenging. COVID was thought to have increased cases of GBV and domestic violence within the camps. (69% of women in the host community experienced violence v 62% in the camp community) (Caritas Development Institute, 2021)

Inclusion: Activities, Outputs and Outcomes
Targeting
Overall, the evaluation identified **strong targeting of FDMN** with impressive, monitoring system, and disaggregation of beneficiaries. The 2020 Annual Report to CI, for example, identified 30% of HH being prioritised as a result of community led disaster risk management assessment. This targeting was based on low income, those at high risk from extreme weather, the quality of their existing shelter, marital status etc (Box 6).

Box 6: Gender and Staffing

"Vulnerable groups are prioritised in the queuing system to minimise waiting times as well as prioritised for seated waiting. Caritas Bangladesh have specifically identified that women have participated less in activities – and to address this have recruited female volunteers from the host community to increase participation of women."
CAFOD_DEC_EAM17_Ph1 6 Month Final_EAM17 (April 2018)

"Female Staff in emergency programs of CB: We have analysed the staff number of emergency, recovery and DRR programs of CB and found that there was 19% women from 2014 to 2017 while it is 34% from 2018 to 2023. We found that ERP in Cox's Bazar project contributed the increased % of women staff in emergency response programs." Caritas Bangladesh written submission Sep 23

CB made clear attempts **to recruit more female staff** to assist in the response. Whilst still not high there have clearly been some improvements on this front (Box 6).

Inclusive Programming
The research found that CB's work to improve toilets (training, maintenance), bathing facilities (separate for women), shelters and infrastructure (street lighting, ramps, and pathways) had a significant impact on women, children, elderly, and those with disability. For examples, specific changes were made in the design of shelters in response to feedback **reducing the vulnerability of women** (e.g., creating closed sides with ventilation at the top- increasing privacy)**.** Many of these innovative initiatives were picked up by other actors within the camps and were adopted as wider practice.

In addition to the activities identified in CLQ1, Caritas Bangladesh initiated a wide range of **community-based protection initiatives** (accounting for more than 20% of CAFOD support), such as, Child Friendly Space (CFSs)/ Multi-purpose Child and Adolescent Centre (MCAC), Community Base Protection (CBC)/ Barefoot Counsellors (BFC), and Women Friendly Spaces (WFSs)/ Multipurpose Women and Girls Center (MWGC) project.

These were positively regarded particularly given the political sensitives with GoB re protection activities. Amongst those initiatives flagged as impactful were training, provided in FDMN and Host communities (Helios 2021) for income generation activities (e.g., embroidery), helping to, in the words of one informant, *"breaking conservative attitudes to women's income generating roles" (KII).* As a result of these initiatives, women were found to have a **greater control over income at the household level**, and to have **invested this in education and health.**

"Working for child protection and gender-based violence by providing solutions and assistance, Caritas brought a great behavioural change among the Rohingya people. It reduced child marriage, child labour and violence against women. They increased women's decision-making power in the family as well."

And also, positive change in host communities
"In the last two years, 100% female host communities had seen positive changes in Gender based violence related issues." Saha 2022

Box 7 contains further examples of positive gender outcomes.

Cash for work initiatives were seen to increase female control over how household income was used. *"Proceeds used for education and health- therefore potentially having longer term benefits"* (Helios 2021)

……And critically helped to challenge gender norms….

"Can you imagine, a woman with a veil, in her traditional dress? She is actually making her own house like she is literally working on a bamboo mat, which is very non-traditional." KII

CB's efforts in cash for work (partially DEC funded) were seen to give 'equal weight' to people with disability. There was also evidence that learning re disability had resulted in the provision of more porters and thereby more equitable access to support (CAFOD_DEC_EAM17_Ph1 6 Month Final_EAM17, April 2018)

Gender Awareness
To help address the significant staffing imbalance – and increase the effectiveness of CB, a gender audit was carried out in 2022. This exposed a limited understanding of and **weak commitment to gender** within the organisation. (Gender Audit /Box 8 Ref). CAFOD is perceived to have played a strong role over many years, supporting CB efforts to improve gender equality within its own organisation. Whilst the 2022 audit identified many areas for improvement there was a sense that CAFOD's support, e.g., the creation of a 'Gender Cell' within CB, had contributed to a **significant improvement** in this aspect (SMW).

"I think a CAFOD was very instrumental in having the gender strategy in CB. CAFOD support to gender audit widely acknowledged. This is felt by some to have been an important and potentially impactful initiative. CAFOD helped to institutionalise the gender and safeguarding strategy. Beyond policy and rolled out. This was very positive." KII

What CAFOD and its partners did well
All FDMN were in need and the pressure on the host community became increasingly clear (Box 1). The research, however, does identify the strong steps taken by CB to identify and target the most vulnerable. This is reflected in the focus of programmatic work mentioned in CLQ1 and the prioritisation of protection initiatives. To CB's credit, the speed and priority given to protection seems to be at odds with wider practice (see external evaluation insights Section 2).

Perhaps CAFODs contribution was most significant in the development of CB's safeguarding (CLQ6) and gender strategy.

Box 7: Positive Gender Outcomes

"CB has provided roads and streetlights. Now most of the people have enough lights besides their houses. They can easily and safely move from one place to another through roads at night. Children and women are not afraid of going outside in times of their need. People can go to markets and hospitals at night." Saha 2022

"CB's CBP programs are effective in addressing violence and promoting resilience and peaceful relationships:
• *The Barefoot Counsellor volunteers play an important role in preventing violence, trafficking and other forms of gender-based violence and child abuse.*
• *Caritas Bangladesh' strict practice of confidentiality builds trust and encourages community members to report cases of sexual and gender-based violence.*
• *Training of volunteers and staff is effective and contributed to community capacity-building*
• *The CBP approach has strengthened networking in the camps and has promoted inclusivity*
• *CBP complaint mechanisms are helping to resolve disputes and to foster resilience and peaceful Coexistence".* (Helios 2021)

"Now my husband gives value to my words and discusses family matters with me, which certainly a matter of joy for me. He appreciates on my coming to the WFS these days. Now I have no difficulties to come here." (previously abusive relationship)" Annual report to CI 2020

"97% of the respondents agreed that the newly constructed latrines ensured easy access to women and children including person with disabilities and can use safely and comfortably" Helios 2021

What can be Improved?

The research identified 3 broad areas where practice could be improved:

- The first is a stronger commitment to **gender and balanced staffing** within CB.

  "All male from Caritas Bangladesh there and preventing and like the way that women from the Rohingya communities were able to communicate and share their needs." KII

- Secondly, accelerate the wide-ranging **recommendations in the Gender Audit**. Whilst improvements clearly have been made on this front this was felt to have hindered the effective participation of a large proportion of refugees in programming.

- Thirdly, feedback identifies the **provision of specialist technical staff**, particularly in the areas of trauma and disability as ways to potentially strengthen the response (German Foreign Ministry 2021).

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion

The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.6 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst participants acknowledged that there was considerable room for improvement it was felt that CAFOD had played a constructive role over many years in encouraging more progressive gender attitudes within CB and the response demonstrated a strong commitment to the disaggregation and targeting of FDMN/Host communities.

It is recommended that:

- CAFOD encourages the potential deployment of additional technical staff (secondment), where an explicit need is identified, in complex and protracted emergencies responses. (perhaps those over a certain scale) (STRONG)

- CAFOD explore further the need and timing of a gender audit in responses of this nature. Should a gender audit be carried out earlier in a response to secure greater benefit sooner? (MEDIUM)

CLQ 3: To what extent did CAFOD support local voice and agency and leadership? (OCH 5)

The overwhelming nature of the crisis in its early stages limited voice and agency but it appears that CB response was quick to work with local people, adopt simple messaging and rapid feedback loops to help enhance the participation of and their accountability to FDMN. GoB restrictions on the FDMN made greater responsiveness a significant challenge throughout the protracted response. Counter intuitively, whilst resulting in frustrating and operational challenges, the GoB FD7 approval process has encouraged a strong level of community consultation.

Voice and Agency: Activity, Output, and Outcome.
Overall, the evaluation, found that CB was fully committed to engaging with FDMN and ensuring that their views influenced programming on the ground (Box 9). To this end, they appear to have been one of the first INGO/NGO s to **employ local people** (e.g., from the same region of Bangladesh and from within the FDMN community) across the programming to enhance local engagement and voice.

CB also appear to have been one of the few NGOs, to provide **strong visual information** to summarise and inform FDMN about their rights- although it is thought that this was not in the Rohingya native language (CI 2021 Real time evaluation). Feedback loops appeared to be impressive and effective in ensuring that the **views of FDMN quickly fed back** to CB and influenced future programming. There was, however, a sense that the DAM was a little more prescriptive and had slightly less effective feedback mechanisms in place.

CB also appears to have played a facilitative role between FDMN and other NGOs when appropriate. For example, CB passed on claims by refugees of 'rough behaviour' by WFP staff. These behaviours don't appear to have been repeated and there were *"No complaints were received about Caritas staff behaviour"* (CAFOD DEC April 18)

The research identified some evidence of CBs approach to community engagement **influencing wider practice** for example *"CB piloted the sector approach for site upgrades. It was a very community led process …..Lots of partners have been encouraged to visit it and learn the community mapping methodology. We now have 15 partners doing site improvement and they all benefit having an agency providing learning from the pilot"* IOM Shelter and NFI Coordinator.

"So, they (other INGOS/NGOs) had to rely heavily on these risk action plans that Caritas developed to identify where they're going to locate the lights, where they're going to locate the WASH facilities and those things. And that was all done through that community consultation." KII

Box 9: FDMN Influence Programmes

"Most humanitarian organizations … view FDMNs as .. passive recipients of goods and services. Although sometimes humanitarian organizations do consultation through the use of participatory tools as mere techniques but FDMNs right to genuine participation in thinking and acting by themselves to solve their problem is rarely facilitated. <u>*One of the remarkable success the project made was to facilitate self-help in DRR measures among FDMNs households;*</u> *put forward a lesson that facilitating community managed DRR as a promising path for way forward in future."*
German Foreign Ministry 2021

- *Shelter identified by FDMN as the priority issue.* (c.42% of CAFOD's funds supported Shelter initiatives) *(German Foreign Ministry 2021)*
- *"Refugees Feedback on 'usefulness' of contents of food parcels was shared with WFP and they plan to drop sugar from the complementary food package. Feedback also contributed directly to inclusion of LPG cook stoves and solar lamps and mosquito nets".* (CAFOD Dec Aril 2018)
- *"Repeated request from refugees for livelihood opportunities. But not possible given GoB restrictions. Exploring planting and grassing opportunities in the future."* (CAFOD DEC April 2018)
- Helios Evaluation (2021) identified that every cash for work *"intervention was selected through community consultations directly or indirectly"* and targeted vulnerable FDMN.
- CB and CRS 10% of participants surveyed *"allowed for real time improvements on feedback and ensuring protection messaging was being heard. It was simple and effective"* KII

Support to CB 'voice and agency' (as opposed to the 'voice and agency' of FDMN and host communities) is explored further in *CLQ 4: Culture of Encounter* and the promotion of CB voice and agency in international fora (e.g., NAHAB, START)) and in *CLQ 5: Advocacy* where CB influenced operational practices such as shelter design and FD7 approval processes across the Rohingya response.

What CAFOD and its partners did well
Overall, the evaluation found that CB was **committed to hearing the views of FDMN** and using these insights to inform their work- in a timely way (Box 10). they appear to have shared successful methodologies such as community mapping with others and have, as a result, influenced wider programming practice. Where appropriate they have also fed back the views of FDMN to other agencies.

What can be Improved?
The main area identified for improvement was addressing the perceived **weak engagement of women** in defining priorities and feedback mechanism. (Saha 2022 and KII). There was a strong sense that this was, in part, contributed to by the **overwhelmingly male CB staff.** It was felt that this inevitably limited who was willing to talk and the issues they were willing to discuss.

"I think 1 aspect that that could improve on this further is also within CB itself to have more women in decision making positions because at the moment I think also in Cox's I when I was there we had like at a maximum in the office 2 women staff, everyone else was male.   But still, I think for CB is an organization would be important to really improve on empowering women in their own organization because it's very difficult to do that within your interventions if you don't do that yourself." KII

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 4.0 (Range 3.5 to 4). Participants felt that CAFOD and partners strongly encouraged the views of FDMN in the response and proactively advocated for this more widely. Weaknesses in voice and agency could be linked to gender staffing imbalance within CB.

> **Box 10: FDMN Accountability**
>
> *"87% Rohingya respondents replied positive about the complaining system…….We are suffering for water scarcity though we got water supplies, but it is not enough for us. We got toilets and bathrooms facilities from caritas. If we face any complications we can contact them by their provided number."* Saha 2022.
>
> *"Project also engaged different community-based committees (women, people with disability, religious leaders etc., are the member of the committee) to implement the activities. Learning and challenges were shared with them for next course of action. They were also part of process like shelter repairing sludge management. Based on the response of the committees, project adjusted plan (e.g., revision of beneficiaries list)……
> In the sense of emergency repairing for protection from heavy rainfall or other natural disaster, out of 103 respondents 66% respondents mentioned that the project repaired their shelter within a week and 33% respondents answered that they it took two weeks ."* Helios 2021

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD explore further how it can encourage partners to increase female staff at key levels in their organisation. **(**STRONG)
- CAFOD explore with CB and partners how the greater participation of female FDMN and host community members can be more effective. (STRONG)

CLQ 4: To what extent did CAFOD demonstrate a culture of encounter (OCH 6)

CAFOD have worked in partnership with CB and DAM for many years. This meant that they could be mobilised at short notice in response to the rapid and overwhelming emerging Rohingya crisis. Relationships appear to be strong and based on **trust and mutual respect** (Box 11).

Whilst CB (and DAM) had **limited experience of political emergencies** such as the Rohingya crisis, they had significant experience of responding to natural disasters and could claim relatively **strong systems and procedures** and local presence that made them strong partners.

Culture of Encounter: Activities, Outputs and Outcomes
The research found that the relationship between CB and CAFOD was largely **respectful and open**. In the early period of the response CAFOD and CB held daily calls and support was clearly highly valued. There is a perception, however, that this changed a little over time and **CB became less open** and more resistant to advice over the course of the crisis response. There was a sense that CB could have used the resources available to it from CI members better.
"I don't think CB are utilising the network as much as they could for support and there is a balance to be struck by the CI network between recognising needs and providing unsolicited help." Zoe Corden Trip Report Jan 2018

Open and Safe Dialogue
When assessing the willingness of partners to discuss approaches in an **open and safe way** it was noted that CAFOD *"were not shy in voicing their opinions." (KII).* There is a sense, however, that CB developed a culture where it was less willing to receive criticism or constructive advice. As a result, some meetings were felt to be less open than might have been desired….
"I felt that once, I think it was in the beginning 2019, one partners meeting where really everyone was just praising; there was not a of honest feedback." KII

The research identified a number of examples of CAFOD proactively promoting CB's participation in international fora, for example, with FCDO and the START network (Box 12). These efforts were widely acknowledged and applauded.

"CAFOD didn't sit at that table. It was Caritas Bangladesh who sat at the table, and we were the only DEC member that would was taking that approach and I think that was really, really important that we did that. It really set us apart." KII

CAFOD appear to have been flexible and responsive to changing CB priorities (see CLQ 7)
"Whenever we came up with our proposal, they (CAFOD) never said it is not possible." KII

Capacity Building
Whilst already relatively strong (compared to other CI partners in humanitarian interventions) CAFOD worked with CI partners (and external agencies) to help build the capacity of DAM and, particularly, CB's capacity in a range of different ways. The relevance of these efforts often went beyond the Rohingya

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Box 11: A Special Relationship?

"The model of supporting this response, with the lead coming from the national Caritas, but with significant capacity building support coming in technical areas and for coordination is working well and producing good programming that utilises the local and CI network capacities effectively." Zoe Corden Trip Report Jan 2018

"CAFOD is not only a funding partner- it is a strategic partner. in emergency they are always with us. always trying to increase their support. we are not different we are the same. …. any area where we need support from caritas, CAFOD is the first to respond.   CAFOD is very respectful of our opinion- they want to hear how we feel. with some of our partners we have to think what we say. with CAFOD we have no hesitation whether positive or negative. we have a very friendly and open relationship." KII

Box 12: CB and START

"The START network, …. we are one of the very one of the strongest members in both in global and Bangladesh because of CAFOD.   CAFOD supported us in terms of financing to become to become the member of Start network and then they supported us through the due diligence process, which is very tough. We had a huge gap regarding the safeguarding and protection issue and CAFOD helped us address this." KII

crisis response itself and sort to enhance the whole organisation, e.g., safeguarding policy and training (CLQ6). Capacity building support offered included:

DAM:
- A MANGO health check was conducted in Dhaka by Thomas Delamere.
- Identified weakness in Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) and as a result linked DAM with Save the Children for guidance.

CB:
- Strong support from CRS was recognised as critical in building shelter capacity and reputation.
- Support on Safeguarding/Protection mainstreaming by Zoe Corden. Training cascading down CB Dhaka and regional staff, Coxs Bazaar field staff and senior managers.,
- Protection mainstreaming used a pilot site funded by UNHCR and appears to have been designed to influence wider practice: *"The pilot site in BB Zone has been used as a model of best practice and shared across a number of actors, including through the NFI and Shelter sectors and the DEC Response Review team."* CAFOD/DEC Report April 2018
- Brian Standley seconded to CI to be Chair of the WASH Working Group and provided support on WASH.
- Gender strategy: *"their (CAFOD) support to gender strategy ….really brought some major changes, particularly having the policy and then action items, such as, maternity leave, paternity leave."* KII

These efforts at building capacity of an already strong CB are impressive particularly given the immediate and overwhelming needs of the crisis- it was widely understood that in a crisis, of this nature, that these elements can often be forgotten.

When exploring the nature of the relationship between CB and CAFOD the issue of whether the **CAFOD staff presence on the ground** was sufficient kept recurring. There was a sense (from CAFOD, CB and independent evaluations) that the scale of the response and the need for support warranted a greater more consistent dedicated staff resource than provided- to understand the situation, to coordinate with other agencies and to provide needed additional technical expertise.

"In my opinion it is necessary to have some boots on the ground. Understanding the sheer scale and needs - is not possible if you are not there. Walk through drone footage ok but not enough. What was happening in the local community, e.g., the growth of a drug trade, coming across from Myanmar- drug enforcement authorities.. Did CAFOD go out enough in the early days? Probably not and this prevented them really recognising the scale and complexity." KII

What CAFOD and its partners did well
It is clear that CAFOD and CB have a **special relationship** built on mutual trust and respect. CAFOD has clearly taken a strong principled stance to be led by CB and this is widely recognised and appreciated.

While CB's openness to advice is questioned by some, CAFOD has retained a strong and respectful dialogue with CB. Their flexibility and willingness to respond to CBs demands is appreciated.

The extensive efforts to build capacity of CB are acknowledged and its relevance beyond the crisis response to the whole CB organisation is applauded, e.g., safeguarding and gender. CAFOD's support to CB's membership of START seeks to genuinely enhance the independence and agency of CB and is to be commended (CLQ7).

What can be Improved?
When assessing the alignment of the Rohingya crisis response to the 'Culture of Encounter' and partnership, the research identifies a number of areas where improvements might be possible:
- The response occurred in the middle of a reorganisation of CAFOD in which the emergency team became more aligned/embedded with longer term programmatic teams. It was said that this created significant tension and difficult working environment in the early years of the response but that this subsequently improved (see CLQ7).

- Coordination of and greater collaboration of CI partners to, for example, encourage greater collective reflections on what has worked well and what hasn't, provide space for greater challenge to CB approach and encouragement; encourage management response/reflections after?
- Consideration of longer-term secondments (if need and requested by local partner) - assist coordination, better/deeper understanding of reality on the ground.
- (Both issues above were recognised as needing to be led by CB. If they weren't open to these ideas then it wouldn't/shouldn't/couldn't happen)

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion

The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.7 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst the relationship between CAFOD and CB was clearly strong and built on trust the level of engagement was felt to have 'tapered off' over time.

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD explore how greater coordination /collaboration across CI partners could be enhanced- at the onset of an emergency and as the response matures. (The research insights highlight that greater coordination between CI members might have enhanced the effectiveness and efficiency of the response). (STRONG).
- CAFOD explore the 'secondment' of a CAFOD/CI MO surge capacity to CB might have helped to address specific capacity gaps, deepen CAFODs understanding of the response and enhance CI coordination (STRONG). Discuss? implications for CAFOD and its relationship with the emergency lead agency?
- CAFOD explore how it can maintain a level of engagement and influence with the local partner – despite changes in the level of funding offered (MEDIUM) (Political sensitivity? More confident?).

CLQ 5: To what extent did CAFOD engage partners in coordination/advocacy initiatives, positioning partners for the response (linkages with other organisations, raising profile etc.). (OCH 7)

CB's ability to advocate for change was severely hampered by the **GoB restrictions** which applied to all agencies active in the Rohingya response. This was further affected by the minority status of the catholic community in Bangladesh and the resulting need for great care and sensitivity when potentially criticising GoB policy (e.g., Bhasan Char discussions).

Advocacy: Activity, Output and Outcome
The research identifies that CB have been active in seeking to improve the sub-optimal operating environment and standards with camps (Box 13). CB has become an important **advocate of shelter and localization** within the Rohingya response and can demonstrate successful leadership and the subsequent adoption of their good practice.

"Caritas Bangladesh are co-leading the NFI/shelter sector alongside IOM and have pioneered the standardisation of shelter upgrade and NFI kits."
DEC Phase 1 Report, April 18.

It is possible that local structures established in the Rohingya response assisted in the ability of CB to influence wider practice..
"The UN had an NGO coordinator position for this response, which was the first time that they'd done that where they were able to collect information of how the NGOs were experiencing the crisis and what their priorities and elevate that voice through the UN system, so that was the kind of a good example of Advocacy." KII

> **Box 13: Sphere Standards**
>
> "*Although the humanitarian Charter conveys rights to life with dignity, protection and security due to a number of constrains living conditions in the FDMN camps are dire and lag far behind those of the SPHERE standard. FDMN's are restricted from movement outside the camps and do not have access to livelihood opportunities. For their survival they are absolutely dependent on aid and services provide by the GoB and international and national humanitarian actors which are wholly inadequate when compared with what is actually needed.*"
> German Foreign Ministry 2021

As mentioned in CLQ4, a major element of CAFOD's advocacy links to promoting CB and its role in the humanitarian architecture, for example becoming an active member of START. These efforts sit squarely within the enhancing **localisation agenda**.

"They (CAFOD) played a significant role in the Localisation agenda and particularly establishing us in the start network- they still pay membership fee." KII

CAFOD supported CB to join the START: Shifting the Power programme, along with DAM. As part of this programme, national NGOs, led by CB and DAM set up NAHAB (Box 14). CAFOD's support was considered instrumental in this (SMW).

> **Box 14: CB and NAHAB**
>
> "*CB is a founder member of NAHAB (National Alliance for Humanitarian Actors in Bangladesh) for creating a common space for humanitarian actors to share information, experiences, research findings and to advocate for appropriate policies, policies revision, resource allocation and uphold the humanitarian agendas in collaboration among the humanitarian actors (GO, NGO, Private sector) and to raise the voice of local and national humanitarian actors at national levels. CB is also the member of NGO platform at Cox's Bazar district, where a total of 104 national and international NGOs are the members of this platform. This platform is very active. They regularly collect the information related to different humanitarian and security needs/issues, analyse the same in their weekly meetings in a participatory way and disseminate the information or any position papers among all members.*" CB Annual Report to CI, 2020

Despite restrictions CB/CAFOD have also **proactively sort to influence** GoB and international policies and processes. At times it appears that CAFOD's enthusiasm in this respect has had to be carefully managed by CB.

"CAFOD does support advocacy at an international level and local level via the embassy. Sometimes at a global policy level they will identify advocacy ideas but sometimes we stop them." KII

Examples of active engagement include:

FD7 Delays
It is widely appreciated that the slow **FD7 GoB approval** process has hindered the response to the crisis.

"One of the major reasons that hampered project efficiency was to implement the project by the preparation and approval of FD-7; introduced by the NGO Affairs Bureau. This FD-7 only allow to plan and implement each emergency project for a duration of 6 months. Further, project approval by the NGO Affairs Bureau did not allow CB to implement the project until a next approval was obtained from the office of Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC). By the time approval of RRRC office was obtained; about fifty percent time of the 6-moth plan passed away." German Foreign Ministry 2021

CAFODs role in seeking improvements in this process were recognised.
"Some significant achievements of their (CAFOD's) continuous advocacy like recently the Government of Bangladesh has reduced the time for FD7 clearance from one year to six months and now 1 month. CAFOD talking to FCDO etc and influencing GoB policy." KII.

Restrictions on Livelihood Activities
The GoB reluctance to allow cash for work initiatives was identified as a possible contributor to the unsustainability of the DAM project initiative. Related restrictions on the movement of FDMN were also challenged ..

"Even when the government started fencing the camps so that they (Rohingya) don't get out of the camps. CAFOD have raised this important issue at the international level (without mentioning Caritas Bangladesh)" KII.

Bhasan Char and Long-term political solutions
The GoB's desire to relocate some FDMNs from Coxs Bazaar to Bhasan Char highlights the advocacy tightrope' well. CB were put under "*significant pressure*" to support the GoB position. CB consulted widely with its stakeholders and when the UN agreed to provide support in Bhasan Char felt that they needed to support the policy. Whilst CAFOD did not want funds directed to Bhasan Char there was respect for the decision taken by CB.

Coordination between CI Members
Whilst steps have been taken to help **facilitate coordination between CI members** on, for example, issues of safeguarding (see CLQ 6) and communications (Box 15) the research identified this as an area for improvement. There was a sense that CB (while electing to lead the response rather than CI) were put in the *"hotseat"* and probably should have received more coordinated support from CI than materialised.

There was a sense that this would have significantly streamlined the administration of the response (reduced reporting burden, common metrics etc) but also provided an opportunity to enhance the technical support

> **Box 15: CI Comms Coordination**
>
> *"CIMO agreed to coordinate their communication visits, in order to improve cost effectiveness, reduce time requested from the Caritas team and from the beneficiaries. As a result, CIMO agreed to identify a joint Communication Officer responsible for producing and sharing communication materials with the CI Network. The Communication Officer role will be facilitated by CRS for three months (until end of August) and then another CIMO will take over for another three months. The CRS Communication offer visited Bangladesh mid – end of June 2018. Materials produced during her visit may be found on www.caritas.org and on Caritas Baobab." Internal Comms 2018*

provided by the wider CI family and helping to ensure that available funding pots were most efficiently and effectively utilised.

"We need to coordinate more because only that way we can be more efficient with the money, because if you look at all the funding gaps here, you don't even know where to start." KII

The fact that greater coordination is ultimately at the request of CB is acknowledged. The fact this hasn't occurred in an effective way is considered by some I spoke to as further evidence of a lack of openness.

"I think the problem is always it's stressful in a big crisis and everyone's so focused on their own work that we sometimes coordinate, not with each other, but next to each other with the local partner. (not just this crisis).   it's also always up to the local Caritas agency to organize this kind of forum of exchange if they wanted, and if they think it's beneficial and we have tried to push a little bit for it, but it has not happened yet, so it still not realized." KII

Seeking Long Term Solutions
The evaluation found that respondents felt that, whilst there were ongoing efforts (e.g., *London based 'roundtables')* to encourage a long-term solution to the protracted crisis, that these efforts could have been further prioritised and made more effective.

There is a perceived fear that the Rohingya crisis would slip further down the international list of priorities as a result of events such as Covid, the Ukrainian war, the cost-of-living crisis, and climate change and that CI had not done enough to prevent the crisis being forgotten and funding continuing to decline as a result. There was a sense that these discussions needed to focus on solutions based on the voluntary repatriation of FDMNs. This was considered crucial to sustain a cooperative relationship with the GoB.

"I think the Caritas Network and its strength and its presence in Europe and the influence also that for example the Caritas has in Germany as a national organization also would have been used more to advocate for (Rohingya) people who are now completely forgotten by the media." KII

There was a sense that there was a need for greater coordination of advocacy efforts across CI (perhaps with Caritas Asia playing a stronger role) and the need for a more joined up approach between international programmes and advocacy within CAFOD itself (SMW).

Proactive Programming
Less confidently, the research questioned whether there were lessons regarding **proactive programming or preparedness (**the term 'anticipatory action'[27] was also used). Could more have been done, prior to 2017, to either reduce the persecution facing the Rohingya in Myanmar, to identify triggers that would escalate the nature of the problem or prepare for the likely escalation in events?   Similarly, should CI be looking today, across the region, and making active connections with how minorities are treated in neighbouring countries that could inform **future long-term programming**. Respondents did sound a note of caution and realism about what CAFOD/CI could realistically do – given failures of UN and others to do the same.

What CAFOD and its partners did well
The research found that, in an incredibly challenging political environment and whilst managing an overwhelming crisis, CAFOD and CB efforts to advocate for positive change should not be underestimated. Success in influencing shelter practice (and camp infrastructure), the localisation agenda and government approval processes FD7 are all significant achievements.

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[27] "Anticipatory action is now commonly defined as acting ahead of predicted hazards to prevent or reduce acute humanitarian impacts before they fully unfold. Anticipatory action works best if activities (the delivery), as well as triggers and decision-making rules (the model) are pre-agreed to guarantee the fast release of pre-arranged financing (the money)." https://www.unocha.org/anticipatory-action#:~:text=Anticipatory%20action%20is%20now%20commonly,impacts%20before%20they%20fully%20unfold.

CAFOD also appears to have played an important role in trying to keep the Rohingya crisis at the forefront of international discussions.

"What CAFOD has been doing for a long time for CB is exceptional more than the other CI is doing for us because it is doing some advocacy on behalf of Caritas. at the international level, every four or five months, XXXX has taken some advocacy issue which is important for the current context. And he has taken this issue to at the international level, or through FCDO or through their UK Government" KII

What can be Improved?
The research identified a number of areas where advocacy support an**d** coordination could perhaps have been enhanced. These include:

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Box 16: Explicit Advocacy Goals

"Having advocacy as an in-built intervention of the project: The project should have in-built component of advocacy for:
• *Establishing functional multi-stakeholder participatory response approach and systems.*
• *Coordinated planning together with site development WASH and protection.*
• *Regular inter-sectoral coordination meeting at CiC.*
• *Quick approval of the project by the RRRC office.*
• *Special emergency response programme as such the project duration is more than 6 months and beyond the scope of FD-7."*
German Foreign Ministry 2021
</td></tr>
</table>

- More explicit recognition of advocacy as a strategy in project proposals? (Box 16). It was felt that a 'strategic' advocacy plan should have accompanied CAFOD's support to the Rohingya response and that this should have linked to the long-term funding needs of what soon became a protracted crisis.
    - o Strengthen links between CAFOD programming and CAFOD advocacy priorities – to help keep protracted crisis in the public consciousness (SMW)
    - o A comparison was drawn with South Sudan who have a joint funded dedicated advocacy position – and whether such a resource for the Rohingya response would have enhanced advocacy outcomes (SMW)
- Greater coordination of CI efforts. This was mentioned in many of the discussions (CLQs) as an issue that undermined the Rohingya response. It was, however, noted that this was largely a matter for CB to request- and was out of the hands of CIMOs.
    - o Consider working through CIDSE/CI where CAFOD capacity on the ground is weak (SMW).
    - o In Columbia a CI advocacy working group has been established- led by local partners but with CIMON representation. This has enhanced coordinated of advocacy efforts (SMW)
    - o Is this something that Caritas Asia is well suited to lead on? (as Caritas Europa led on recent immigration issues in Greece) (SMW)

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 2.4 (Range 1.5 to 3.0). whilst CAFOD and CB had encouraged operational good practices there was a perceived lack of 'strategy' about wider advocacy on the return of FDMN to Myanmar and keeping the Rohingya at the front of public minds. CI coordination on topics such as media and safeguarding were felt to have reduced the burden on CB.

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD explores how a joint CI advocacy strategy (including promoting longer-term political solutions to the crisis) could be developed in a protracted crisis of this nature. (STRONG)
    - CAFOD explores what conditions a dedicated advocacy resource would be justified to retain attention and focus in a protracted crisis.
    - CAFOD explore role of CIDSE/Regional CI network to help coordinate such an advocacy strategy.
- CAFOD explores whether proactive risk-based programming, perhaps at a regional level, could help to reduce risk of similar crisis occurring, e.g., joint programming at a regional level to raise the profile of minorities a risk and explore how these minorities could be supported. (WEAK)

CLQ 6: To what extent did CAFOD engage with partners to embed safeguarding and SADI (OCH 8)

The Rohingya crisis created a traumatised and vulnerable FDMN population and a significantly challenged host community. The rapid and significant deployment of staff to help meet their needs represented a significant safeguarding challenge. This phase of the Rohingya crisis occurred at a time when the international humanitarian sector was facing considerable scrutiny following high profile safeguarding scandals.

Safeguarding Activities, Outputs and Outcomes
The research highlighted a strong and attentive CAFOD focus on safeguarding from the beginning of the crisis response (Box 17). CAFOD took a direct and strong involvement in increasing awareness of and capacity in safeguarding practice- including training for CB staff (including key decision makers and senior leaders do) and supporting directly (funds and technical expertise) a 'Train the Trainers' programme to help ensure that the principles were embedded ("*Now we understand: what is safeguarding, what is not safeguarding, what is the role of CB staff members, what is the role of the project participants? What to do? what we should not do? We now have the policy, we have the guidelines..*" KII) across CB activity in Coxs Bazaar and beyond.

Enhanced SADI processes were thought to have helped CB staff *'think through issues and act appropriately'* (SMW) and appeared to result in positive outcomes.

> **Box 17: Early Warning & Action**
>
> *"There were some serious concerns arising from observation of the current activities being implemented. (These include the Child Friendly Space (CFS) not meeting sector requirements for activities and a serious need for protection mainstreaming in the health clinic – for more details please see my field trip report). DAM is planning to expand their activities and improve the quality of their work in the coming weeks, this will be crucial to ensuring a quality response and Do No Harm (DNH) principles."* Zoe Trip Report Oct 17

"The project trained all permanent and temporary staff (including hired consultants) on gender, sexual harassment, and safeguarding policy…………..It was impressive, 100% children reported that they did not face harassment on the way to visit education centre or in the education centre." Helios 2021

What CAFOD and its partners did well
CAFOD is widely seen to have made a significant contribution to **safeguarding**: critically not just in supporting the development of a safeguarding policy but through the provision of training and the active rollout of the policy across the whole of Caritas Bangladesh.

"In relation to protection- safeguarding - we had no guidelines- we started with support from CAFOD- using their own guidelines. We shared these with others." KII

CAFOD also helped to coordinate (with Steering Group in partnership with CRS) efforts across CI thereby reducing the transactional burden on CB in complying with safeguarding requirements.

> **Box 18: Safeguarding Outcomes**
>
> *"A stronger referral pathway has been established in collaboration with the child protection sub-sector and the other child protection agencies to help best with the missing children issue. It has been working well as the site management, child protection focal agencies, the community leaders, volunteers, and members of community-based child protection committees are participating in successful reunification of the lost children with their families."* Annual Report 2020 to CI
>
> *"One of the Camp in Charge (CiC) representatives noted that the performance of Caritas Bangladesh's Barefoot Counsellors and staff are amongst the best of the humanitarian agencies and "helps easy management of the camp, especially regarding the protection issues."* Caritas Development Institute 2021

These inputs had impact beyond the immediate response and continues to influence programming across the CB portfolio (Box 18).

"CAFOD made a very important large contribution in the field of safeguarding, I think later on we built on that in one of our projects that is implemented outside of Cox's, the Child Protection project." KII

CAFOD is thought to have proactively sort funding from others in CI to enable this.

What can be Improved?
The research identified few areas for improvement. One, however, was to question to what extent is SADI preparedness built into ongoing work with partners to help to streamline future crisis responses?

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 4.4 (Range 4.0 to 5.0). Participants felt that safeguarding was seen as a priority from the start of the crisis response and suitable CAFOD resources were allocated to it- over a consistent period. CAFOD chaired the protection mainstreaming working group and helped to ensure that the benefits were embedded and longer term.

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD explore whether partner SADI 'preparedness' should be a core part of CAFOD's ongoing relationship with partners. (WEAK)
- CAFOD explore whether it is possible to proactively create an agreed CI approach to safeguarding which can be used in all future crisis response (and LT programming) to avoid the initial hiatus that occurred in this crisis response. (MEDIUM)

> **Box 19: Managing Multiple Demands**
>
> *"CB, …. fell under a lot of pressure around protection and the safeguarding …… Caritas Bangladesh was struggling with the fact that they were getting a lot of different demands from different CI members. Around how to approach safeguarding, …….. We've got much better coordination mechanisms around things like that, but that was definitely a learning through that particular response that everybody jumping on this bandwagon with their own ideas and their own methodologies and their own approaches. CAFOD was guilty of that ourselves. We were demanding certain processes from partners."* KII

CLQ 7: To what extent did CAFOD provide long term and flexible funding to partners (OCH 9)

The initial financial response of the international community to the Rohingya crisis response was strong. In later years, as the focus of global attention shifted to Covid and Ukraine and other global challenges, the strength of financial support waned (Figure 2).

"Like when the crisis starts in back in 2017, you know the ratio of funding was really high even. around the expected level funding we received during 2017 and 19, but gradually it started declining from 2019, the beginning of 2019, but it made a huge impact during the 2020, when the covid pandemic started. But in 2021, we also received a slightly increased amount due to the health hazards and the emergency needs inside the camps. But at the beginning of 2022, the funding again started declining. In 2023 we couldn't even ensure 50% of the total requirement for the Rohingya response! These are dangerous times. Reduced funds. Increasing frustration. Risk of greater criminality." KII

Long Term Flexible Funding: Activities, Outputs and Outcomes
CAFOD support for the Rohingya Crisis Response, funded by the DEC, CAFOD Emergency Appeals and small additional funding pots, totalled £1.2m over 5 years. CAFOD did not provide financial support in 2023. Whilst the scale of support was important the research highlights the value attached to the flexibility and timeliness of this support.

Unlike funds from the DEC, funds from the CAFOD Appeal were considered to be more flexible and came without the *"huge pressure"* to spend the money quickly. This allowed CAFOD funds to be used more *"strategically"* (SMW).

> **Box 20: Fast Start**
>
> *"The strong relationship that has been built between CAFOD and Caritas Bangladesh over the past years was an asset to developing the DEC appeal quickly and efficiently with a sense of partnership. The way of working for the Rohingya emergency response for CB has been swifter than their normal way of working and they appreciated more action and decision making from CIMOs than what is normally a more consultative approach e.g., sending funds quickly, agreeing earmarking quickly, direct conversations on issues.*
> *CB also noted that it was appreciated that CAFOD had deployed a staff member to develop the DEC project documents from the EA in partnership with them rather than requesting they complete all documents themselves."*
>
> Zoe Corden, Trip Report, Oct 17

Figure 2: Trends In Funding for Rohingya Response

Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan 2023

https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1143/summary

Amounts shown for the current year (far right bar) are for the year to date. No data is shown in years where there was no plan/appeal.

The flexibility with which CAFOD funding appears to have been appreciated *"so we have to change- CAFOD always supported - they were flexible"* KII

This flexibility of CAFOD funding was deemed to be particularly important given the inevitable delays in GoB approvals and resulting changes necessary in the focus of CB work. There was also a sense that CAFOD always ensured that a greater proportion of funds raised ended up with local partners in the spirt of 'The Charter for Change' (Box 21).

Box 21: Charter for Change

"The Charter for Change proposes that 25% should go to NGO but it doesn't come. Only 6% comes. CAFOD is different. In the name of localisation- they (other INGOS) set up offices in country- but local NGOs are not empowered." KII

"Many INGO are reluctant to give greater control for design and implementation to local partners. So, they do not encourage local decision making they impose the decision. CAFOD never says this. CAFOD also seeks to ensure that local partners access the majority of funds raised. CAFOD is always open and keen to share." KII

While the research highlighted strong CAFOD financial support for the crisis a number of respondents mentioned the negative impact of internal CAFOD tensions on the effectiveness of these funds. Tensions at the time between the Emergency Response Team and the International Programmes Teams within CAFOD led to a *"dysfunctional"* (KII) working environment. These working relationships appeared to improve after six months (due to personnel changes) and further with the reorganisation of the humanitarian and programming teams in a common structure following the 'IP Futures' process (SMW).

The ability of the CB led response to actively make linkages between short term humanitarian and longer-term programming appears to have also been negatively affected by GoB restrictions, e.g., the reluctance to permit cash for work and other livelihoods-based initiatives. Despite this, however, linkages were made and continue to be made in for example, the integration of DRR assessments across the programme spectrum and lessons from environmental initiatives informing the work in the camps e.g., tree planting, household gardens etc.

Securing Long Term Funding

Whilst CAFOD was proactive in helping CB seek alternative funding to support the crisis response (Box 22) the research highlighted a sense, given the fact that the crisis was always likely to be a protracted one, that not enough was done by CAFOD to help CB look beyond EA and DEC funds.

Box 22: Enhancing Fund Raising Capacity

*"CAFOD and Caritas Denmark supported development of an advocacy tool anticipatory action in humanitarian response.
We had 2 follow up meetings with FCDO…. that tool was fantastic to make them understand that we have a high level of capacity to manage institutional funds and we are credible. (links to longer term programming)". KII*

"it's not just the Rohingya issue. I think it's an issue within CAFOD about how we're set up to say this is going to be a protracted crisis. This isn't going to go away. Let's think about how we can fund in the long term, knowing it's going to be a problem for partners in two years' time, three years' time. And perhaps there are awash with cash in the first few years so. ……. Can we integrate and not separate this as humanitarian funding?." KII

This issue was flagged at the very onset of the response.
"Given the likelihood any returns will take years to complete, CB should consider a follow-on Protracted Crisis Appeal (PCA) to try to maintain some continuity for staffing and response plans." Brian Standley, Visit Report Jan 17

SMW participants suggested that greater clarity on internal CAFOD funding (e.g., GEF) process would also be helpful and that it could be strategically used to help support protracted crisis where need is still high but the ability to attract external funding has waned as a result of the maturity of the crisis (SMW).

What CAFOD and its partners did well

CAFOD was strongly appreciated by CB as a **long term and flexible partner.** In a challenging funding environment and over the course of what has become a protracted crisis this has proved to be invaluable. CAFOD EA funds dovetailed/complemented effectively with the more rigid DEC funds.

The partnership, however, was recognised as going beyond funding. CAFOD's support financially has reduced but its work to help CB become a member of START and raise funds for humanitarian work is

identified as a significant achievement- contributing to the longer-term **sustainable funding of CB** activities. (Box 23)

What can be Improved?
The research questioned whether, given the high likelihood that the Rohingya crisis would become a protracted crisis and the parlous state of ODA budgets, whether CAFOD and other CI agencies should have worked with CB earlier to **identify institutional funders** who could have contributed to the programme.

Linked to this and CLQ5, a number of respondents highlighted the importance of CB partners (including CAFOD) keeping the Rohingya crisis at the **forefront of potential donor's thoughts** (see CLQ 5).

"We need really specific funding for the emergency response at Cox's Bazar and it is really important that CAFOD continue with their advocacy work" KII.

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.2 (Range 3 to 4). Whilst CAFOD were flexible in their funding the DEC money was not. An over reliance on the Emergency Appeal and DEC funds and the lack of a long-term alternative funding plan were negatives.

> **Box 23: Impact of START**
>
> "**Fund access to Start Fund Bangladesh:** Caritas Bangladesh has accessed GBP 1.5 million to reach 110,000 people (21,483 HHs) with cash, Food, shelter, and WASH NFIs support who were affected by Cyclone, Flash floods and monsoon floods, riverbank erosion, landslides, Cyclone, water logging, fire incidents and COVID-19 across the country through 16 response projects. CB alone accessed 19% of total disbursed fund GBP 8.86 and covered 913,137 population. This is highest amount in terms of fund and population of sole agency out of total 47 member NGOs (26 national and local NGOs and 21 INGOs) of Start Fund Bangladesh. Most of the funds are from UKAid/FCDO since the beginning of Start Fund Bangladesh while very recently Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and JOA have started to fund." written response from CB Sept 23.

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD, as a matter of course, in a protracted crisis prioritise support to partners to identify and secure additional sources of medium to long term funding (*Earlier recognition of protracted status) (MEDIUM)*
  - CAFOD explore support for 'local' fund raising support to access local funding opportunities (SMW)
- CAFOD clarify the GEF allocation process and whether these finds might help provide funding for protracted crises responses.

CLQ 8: To what extent did CAFOD/partners embed lessons from evaluations? (Is there a culture of learning/learning together?) (Culture of encounter?) (OCH10)

Culture of Learning: Activities, Outputs and Outcomes
The Rohingya crisis response was rapid and overwhelming, however, the research highlights a commitment on the part of CB to the **collection and analysis of disaggregated FDMN data** from the very start- informing programmatic work (Box 24).

Whilst the ongoing collection of 'monitoring data' appears to have been strong it feels like there has been **less of an emphasis on learning** across and beyond discrete projects. In the case of CB this is not thought to be resistance but just a matter of current operational priorities taking precedence over time to reflect.

"I would say it's not that they're resistant, they are very open to learning. BUT…It needs high level support, you know, so that someone really does it very well, which means a stronger meal budget, meal programming, and the MEAL team needs to be stronger." KII

(Whilst this report might be the counter to this claim) there was a feeling that CAFOD also lacked a strong culture of reflection and learning from and across specific interventions, e.g., reflect more widely on the lessons from the Rohingya crisis and other similar humanitarian interventions to enhance future policy and practice.

"(within CAFOD) there's never been historically a fantastic culture of taking of evaluations and like really applying them into kind of the ways of working." KII

What CAFOD and its partners did well
CB instituted strong monitoring systems and feedback loops (listening to FDMN and host communities) that appear to have influenced programmatic focus. CAFOD helped CB to navigate reporting requirements for DEC and other donors- to avoid repetition of reporting.

What can be Improved?
The research highlighted a sense that, CAFOD (and partners), could reflect in a more structured way on the lessons learnt to help prove and improve their impact. This might include:

- Reflection across other emergency responses. To counter the suggestion that all emergencies are different could CB/CAFOD identify some sub learning questions that would allow greater comparison, e.g.,
  - Safeguarding, - along the lines with Integral ecology characteristics.
  - Environmental practices, e.g., EST and reducing CAFOD/CAFOD partners footprint (SMW).
  - Would deep dive on Ukraine and South Sudan bring out lessons that would complement this study? (SMW)
- Experiences within protracted crisis and the challenges of linking humanitarian with longer term programming.
  "There could be an interesting parallel with other countries who face protracted "refugee" situations but have not signed the Convention. e.g., Jordan. What does it mean for humanitarian organisations trying to provide sustainable livelihoods etc in such contexts? Bigger than this piece of work, but maybe

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Box 24: Data Analysis

"Caritas Bangladesh MEAL team have been consistently collecting data at distributions. At distributions people receiving aid are recorded via fingerprints and have their ration card punched. Daily distribution reports are given to UNHCR or WFP and exit interviews were conducted on food and NFI distributions in November and December 2017. When possible, data is disaggregated by sex and age, focussing also on identifying the number of Female Headed Households among the families receiving aid. For example, data from the March 2018 distributions, shows that out of the 4439 HHs who received NFI kits, 1,108 HHs were Female Headed Households; and out of the total 22,195 individuals benefiting from the March 2018 distributions, 54% were children, 23.65% females (aged 18-59) and 18.44% male (aged 18-59)."
CAFOD DEC April 2018

"Since now it's a third project and we always have to do evaluations. These evaluations always influence our next project and are always done in a participatory manner. So, for example, and with the last evaluation, we had a very strong focus on gender specific issues, because especially in the shelter sector, it's quite male dominated sector because we have men who do the labour, men who usually speak for the households." KII

we could draw upon experience from the Syria team in the Sense Making Workshop? Did they have any innovative solutions which could be replicated?" Written Submission Oct 23

How could the performance in humanitarian responses be more accountable- internally and perhaps across CI? How can senior managers be encouraged to ensure accountability…Share lessons learnt and ensure accountability at a senior level?

Emerging Ideas for Further Discussion
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 2.7 (Range 2 to 3). Participants felt that CAFOD did not do enough to share learning and embed internally in their own policy and practice.

It is recommended that:
- CAFOD creates a structured and intentional learning plan that helps to ensure that insights from its own humanitarian experience, and that of its partners, are systematically captured and used to review existing policy and practice. (MEDIUM)
- CAFOD should explore whether there are particular critical learning cross cutting questions (e.g., embedding environmental thinking in humanitarian interventions, advocacy in a protracted crisis, the humanitarian development nexus, safeguarding) where it can take a leadership role in facilitating exchange amongst CI members and influence wider best practice. (WEAK)

Section 5: Conclusion

The following section summarises the alignment of the Rohingya response with the characteristic of OCH/IE and emerging 'Recommendations'. It also reflects on CAFOD/CB performance in relation to other actors in the Rohingya response and then it starts to identify CAFOD's 'added value' in a protracted emergency of this nature.

CAFOD Alignment against OCH Characteristics and Recommendation Summary

OCH Characteristic	SMW Assessment of Alignment	Recommendations
Environment/ Human Connection	**3.5 (Range 3.0 to 4.0).** CAFOD had encouraged a thoughtful environmental dimension to the response, building on CB strengths, but this was not proactive at the very start of the crisis.	1. CAFOD/CB should explore how environmental factors could be more quickly addressed in humanitarian responses. To what extent should the EST tool be mandatory in humanitarian interventions- perhaps above a certain scale? (STRONG) 2. CB/CAFOD review its own environmental stewardship practices in humanitarian responses, e.g., what could be done to reduce the use of plastic? Does the EST tool adequately address this concern? (MEDIUM)
Inclusion	**3.6 (Range 3.0 to 4.0).** Whilst considerable room for improvement it was felt that CAFOD had played a constructive role over many years in encouraging more progressive gender attitudes within CB.	3. CAFOD encourages the potential deployment of additional technical staff (secondment), where an explicit need is identified, in complex and protracted emergencies responses. (perhaps those over a certain scale) (STRONG) 4. CAFOD explore further the need and timing of a gender audit in responses of this nature. Should a gender audit be carried out earlier in a response to secure greater benefit sooner? (MEDIUM)
Voice and Agency	**4.0 (Range 3.5 to 4).** CAFOD and partners strongly encouraged the views of FDMN in the response and proactively advocated for this more widely.	5. CAFOD explore further how it can encourage partners to increase female staff at key levels in their organisation. (STRONG) 6. CAFOD explore with CB and partners how the greater participation of female FDMN and host community members can be more effective. (STRONG)
Culture of Encounter	**3.7 (Range 3.0 to 4.0).** Whilst the relationship between CAFOD and CB was clearly strong and built on trust the level of engagement was felt to have 'tapered off' over time.	7. CAFOD explore how greater coordination /collaboration across CI partners could be enhanced- at the onset of an emergency and as the response matures. (STRONG). 8. CAFOD explore if the 'secondment' of a CAFOD/CI MO surge capacity to CB might have helped to address specific capacity gaps, deepen CAFODs understanding of the response and enhance CI coordination (STRONG). 9. CAFOD explore how it can maintain a level of engagement and influence with the local partner – despite changes in the level of funding offered (MEDIUM)
Advocacy	**2.4 (Range 1.5 to 3.0).** Whilst CAFOD and CB had encouraged operational good practices there was a perceived lack of 'strategy' about wider advocacy on the return of FDMN to Myanmar and keeping the Rohingya at the front of public minds. CI coordination on topics such as media and safeguarding were felt to have reduced the burden on CB.	10. CAFOD explores how a joint CI advocacy strategy (including promoting longer-term political solutions to the crisis) could be developed in a protracted crisis of this nature. (STRONG) • CAFOD explores what conditions a dedicated advocacy resource would be justified to retain attention and focus in a protracted crisis. • CAFOD explore role of CIDSE/Regional CI network to help coordinate such an advocacy strategy. 11. CAFOD explores whether proactive risk-based programming, perhaps at a regional level, could help to reduce risk of similar crisis occurring, e.g., joint programming at a regional level to raise the profile of minorities a risk and explore how these minorities could be supported. (WEAK)
Safeguarding and SADI	**4.4 (Range 4.0 to 5.0).** safeguarding was seen as a priority from the start of the crisis response and suitable CAFOD resources were allocated to it- over a consistent period. CAFOD chaired the protection mainstreaming working group and	12. CAFOD explore whether partner SADI 'preparedness' should be a core part of CAFOD's ongoing relationship with partners. (WEAK) 13. CAFOD explore whether it is possible to proactively create an agreed CI approach to safeguarding which can be used in all future crisis response (and LT programming) to avoid the initial hiatus that occurred in this crisis response. (MEDIUM)

	helped to ensure that the benefits were embedded and longer term.	
Long Term and Flexible Funding	**3.2 (Range 3.0 to 4.0).** Whilst CAFOD were flexible in their funding the DEC money was not. An over reliance on Emergency Appeal and DEC funds and no long-term alternative funding plan were negatives.	14. CAFOD, as a matter of course, in a protracted crisis prioritise support to partners to identify and secure additional sources of medium to long term funding (*Earlier recognition of protracted status) (MEDIUM)* • CAFOD explore support for 'local' fund raising support to access local funding opportunities (SMW) 15. CAFOD clarify the GEF allocation process and whether these finds might help provide funding for protracted crises responses.
Learning Culture	**2.7 (Range 2.0 to 3.0).** CAFOD did not do enough to share learning and embed internally in their own policy & practice.	16. CAFOD creates a structured and intentional learning plan that helps to ensure that insights from its own humanitarian experience, and that of its partners, are systematically captured and used to review existing policy and practice. (MEDIUM) 17. CAFOD should explore whether there are critical learning cross cutting questions (e.g., embedding environmental thinking in humanitarian interventions, advocacy in a protracted crisis, the humanitarian development nexus, safeguarding) where it can take a leadership role in facilitating exchange amongst CI members and influence wider best practice. (WEAK)

The strongest perceived CAFOD alignment was seen in *'Safeguarding and SADI'* (4.4) and *'Voice and Agency'* (4.0) with weakest performances in *'Learning Culture'* (2.7) and *'Advocacy'* (2.4). Using a simple radar/spider diagram these assessments can be represented:

It is recommended that CAFOD formulate a management response to these conclusions and emerging recommendations.

CAFOD Relative Performance

The Rohingya crisis has been described in this report as overwhelming and chaotic. The scale and speed of the crisis were exceptional. The performance of CAFOD and partners should be assessed in this context.

The following section seeks to compare at a superficial level the CAFOD/CB performance with other NGOs active in the response. Here I have taken some of the insights from external evaluation reports presented briefly in Section 2.

• External evaluations point to the **weak consideration of environmental challenges** in the humanitarian response. It is highlighted that this led to exacerbating the vulnerability of affected people to extreme weather events. Whilst the focus of the CB response initially focused on the human tragedy, this report

identifies that environmental factors were considered early on in the response and that the focus on shelter and camp infrastructure reduced vulnerability to extreme weather events and influenced wider practice. CAFOD were considered important advocates and supporters of this approach.

- The external evaluations highlighted a **lack of focus on gender** dimensions, e.g., lack of female staff in the field, poor representation on committees/male dominated Majhi, consideration of steps to protect women.. CAFOD's strong performance on inclusive infrastructure such as shelter, solar lighting and women only washing, and toilet facilities seems to be a significant advance on this. CAFODs support to gender in CB also hints at a long-term commitment to improve the situation and address deep seated issues.

- CAFOD/Partners approach to voice and agency was not perfect but did demonstrate strong targeting of interventions, real time feedback loops and evidence of communities influencing programme design and implementation (It was the highest ranked for alignment). This seems at odds with wider practice where the **participation of and accountability** to affected persons appears to have been weak.

- CAFOD also scored highly on culture of encounter where they contributed to extensive capacity building initiatives, and proactively supported and promoted CB in local and regional fora. This appears to contrast with insights from external reviews that identified **slow/weak localisation**[28]: lack of support or capacity building for local implementation partners.

- Advocacy was identified as the weakest element of CAFOD/Partners response. Whilst CAFOD/CB can point to some success in influencing good practice at an operational level they too have shared the same challenges as other NGOs in failing to **focus on** medium- and long-term political solutions.

- Safeguarding, by contracts, was CAFOD's highest scoring characteristic. CB's response promoted protection when politically sensitive to do so and also saw safeguarding embedded across CB's activities. Wider practice appears to have failed to share the same urgency regrading protection.

This simple comparison with other INGO external evaluations highlights many of the shared challenges faced by agencies in the Rohingya Crisis Response. They also, however, appear to show that CAFOD/partners performed relatively well by comparison.

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[28] https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-022-00122-1#Sec11

CAFODS Added Value in a Protracted Crisis

KII respondents were asked for 3 words that described the CB led Rohingya Crisis Response:

ambitious   brian   care   centric   chaotic   committed   **community**
compassionate   connect   coordination   cross   devoted   dynamic   facilitators   **fast**
flexible   **focused**   honest   **innovative**   knowledge
leadership led local   lots   **love**   needs   opportunistic
overwhelmed   partnerships   **people**   poor   poorest   professional   quality
quick   reach   receptive   replicated   resourceful   respond   rohingya   rolled   sectoral   sense   service   teamwork
things   **timely**   transparent voice

KII respondents were also asked for 3 words that described CAFOD's role or contribution to the Rohingya Crisis Response

accompaniment adaptive   agency   agile   aligned   ambitious   appropriate   capacity
challenging   **committed**   context   cooperative   enabling   encourage–innovation   environment
environmental   filling   **flexible**   forward   gaps   gender   helpful   humanitarian   ie   innovative
internally   listening   local   need–based   open   partner   **partnership**   raising–voice
relationship   reliable   resourced   rights–based   space   strategic
**supportive**   tailored   term   thinking   **timely**   understanding

Drawing on KII held, a relative sense of CAFOD/Partners performance, a discussion at the SMW and the collection of 'key words', CAFOD and partners are recognized as a small player in the global humanitarian architecture but one that can '*punch above its weight'*.   CAFOD's emerging 'added value' includes:

- **Long term partnerships-** ability to bridge humanitarian responses and long-term programming.
    - **Solidarity beyond funding**

- CAFOD's position within a **unique global network** and through this CAFOD has the potential to mobilise resources and advocate for positive change. CAFOD is seen to have the ability to play a **leadership role in coordination**.
    - CAFODs crucial role in linking partners to other actors and the **facilitation** of important relationships (This is perhaps recognition that CAFOD resources are stretched, and partnerships are critical).

- **Technical expertise** and ability to mobilise at short notice. Safeguarding, environmental programming (linked to protection, e.g., solar lights reducing vulnerability of women) were identified as specific technical areas of strength.
    - CAFOD were seen to be willing to try new ideas and **support innovation.**

- Commitment to **localization** (e.g., empowering local organisations, building their capacity)
- A**daptability** and ability to respond **flexibly** (technical support and finance)

It was widely agreed that the 'value add' was context specific and that attempts to prioritise these further were not helpful.

The following Figure summarises these observations:

Technical Expertise
(Environment,
Safeguarding)

Coordination/
Leadership

Bridging Humanitarian
and LT Programming

Partnership
(Partner led/ Strategic –
what next?)

Facilitation/
Making Linkages

Localization

Global Network (CI
and beyond).

Flexible (and LT)
Funding (e.g.
support innovation)

Solidarity Beyond
Funding

End

Annex 1: TOR

Introduction

In August 2017 a violent crackdown by Myanmar's military on Rohingya people living primarily in Rakhine State in Myanmar led to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fleeing the violence in which over 6,700 were killed, thousands were injured including through rape and other forms of sexual abuse. Many of their homes and villages were destroyed. Over 700,000 sought refuge in the Cox's Bazaar area of Bangladesh. The Rohingya have endured decades of persecution and displacement, with over 100,000 Rohingya refugees already living in Bangladesh, primarily in the Cox's Bazaar region prior to the August 2017 influx. Long-term CAFOD partners, Caritas Bangladesh and DAM were involved in the immediate, community-led response where local communities provided emergency relief such as food and shelter. A large-scale response was rapidly established with significant presence of UN agencies, international NGOs as well as Bangladesh national NGOs with significant experience of emergency response such as BRAC, Caritas Bangladesh and DAM.

CAFOD launched an appeal in September 2017 which raised £436,000. CAFOD also joined the DEC appeal and received a total of £803,000. CAFOD has also continued to give smaller grants in recent years to support the response.

Brief outline of CAFOD response

CAFOD responded with support to 2 long-term partners, both of which had significant experience within emergency response in Bangladesh.

Caritas Bangladesh established an office in Cox's Bazaar, initially largely staffed by their team based in Chattogram where they had an established Diocese office and programme. An appeal was launched through Caritas Internationalis to include provision of shelter, food, non-food items, protection, and psycho-social provision. Caritas Bangladesh participated in the UN cluster system and established a strong capability in shelter and camp improvements introducing many locally led adaptations to ensure greater adaptability to the local environment as well as low-carbon solutions such as solar lighting. Through the Caritas Internationalis co-ordination structures, Caritas Bangladesh were able to draw on surge capacity including surge capacity provided by CAFOD in shelter and protection. CAFOD primarily supported work on shelter, NFIs and protection as well as support to Caritas Bangladesh too strengthen safe-guarding approaches and systems.

DAM launched an appeal through its international connections and worked in consortium with a range of INGOs with a focus largely on medical provision and education. DAM approached CAFOD for support to a project to develop and distribute a specially designed cooking stove fueled with rice husks as a lower-carbon alternative to gas cooking stoves, along with solar powered streetlights, and awareness raising on DRR.

CAFOD's new strategy, Our Common Home emphasizes the link between the Cry of the Earth and the Cry of the Poor. Recently (and after the bulk of our Rohingya response work) 10 Integral Ecology characteristics have been developed to guide our future work.

Purpose of the end-of-appeal evaluation

1. The end-of-appeal evaluation aims to draw together learning from across CAFOD's Rohingya Crisis response to understand how best we can strategically support responses that align with and support our strategic priorities.
   a. Sub-questions:

  i. How CAFOD can best support responses that contribute towards our integral ecology characteristics specifically[29]; we respond to the inseparable cries of the Poor and the Earth, we recognize, celebrate, and promote 'local agency, voice and leadership', we ensure safeguarding and inclusion as cornerstones of our work and we protect and seek to regenerate the environment.
  ii. How can we best support local voice and agency in emergency responses?
  iii. What is CAFOD's added value and what is our best contribution in response to the social and environmental crisis?

Evaluation approach

The aim of the evaluation is to build on existing analysis and learning from the response – with a particular focus on partner perspectives – and to developing learning for CAFOD and partners future responses. It should be quite light touch.

Several evaluations have already taken place throughout the response including:

- A CI-led real-time evaluation
- 2 DEC evaluations
- Partner-led programme evaluations
- Gender Audit

These evaluations along with programme monitoring and other reports will provide the primary data source for this final evaluation.

It is anticipated that the evaluation will involve desk research, key informant interviews with a range of stakeholders, focus group discussions and lessons learnt workshops involving CAFOD and main partners. No site visits are proposed. This is due to the wide availability of data from programme monitoring and completed external and internal evaluations as well as other circumstances whereby access to the camps is restricted. While this restricts community participation in the evaluation, the evaluation will look at existing documentation of existing participatory monitoring and evaluations to ensure this perspective remains central to the findings and lessons learnt.

A consultant will be recruited with expertise in evaluating emergency responses and a good understanding of the role of faith-based organisations in emergency response. The consultant will be required to present a viable and cost-efficient methodology, carry out the desk research, carry out key informant interviews and focus group discussions as appropriate and facilitate learning workshops involving CAFOD and partners.

Evaluation output:

A short evaluation report including evaluation findings, lessons learnt and recommendations for action. The report should focus on presenting the outcomes of the evaluation in a practical and accessible format to encourage adoption of findings by stakeholders which would also include a presentation to key CAFOD staff of the findings.

Timeframe

It is anticipated that the evaluation will take between 6-8 working days within a 2-month period. The exact timing is to be agreed in consultation with the consultant, CAFOD and partners but is likely to be fully completed by August 2023 at the latest.

Consultant

The consultants must be suitably qualified and experienced including:

- A strong track record in evaluating emergency responses.

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[29] CAFOD recognises 10 characteristics which reflect our understanding of an integral ecology approach – one which serves to address both the cry of the earth and cry of the poor. Descriptions of the 10 characteristics are in the annex below but for the purpose of this evaluation the focus would be on characteristics 1, 3, 4 along with ensuring safeguarding and inclusion are cornerstones of our work.

- Good understanding of the role of faith-based organisations.
- Experience and understanding of partnership approaches to emergency response and development.
- Strong understanding of participatory evaluation approaches
- Strong understanding of gender and environment in humanitarian contexts
- Excellent interpersonal and communication skills both written and verbally in English.
- Previous experience working or evaluating emergency response programming in Bangladesh is an ideal

Applications

Expressions of interest should include.

- The consultant's proposed approach to conducting this evaluation and how the requirements of the ToR will be met
- Proposed budget to complete the work
- CV of consultant
- Two examples of similar/relevant work
- Two referees who the consultant has completed work for in the past.

Please submit the expression of interest to submissions@cafod.org.uk no later than?

1) We respond to the inseparable Cries of the Poor and the Earth and focus on the poorest, most vulnerable and excluded to support their survival and long-term flourishing.

We recognise that there is one social and environmental crisis, expressed through the inseparable cries of the poor and the earth. This crisis is deeply rooted in the direction and social implications of technocratic and economic growth. Everything is connected. The threat to our environment and climate is a threat to the survival and dignity of all people. Injustice, within and between generations, is reflected in the causes and symptoms of systemic poverty, vulnerability, exclusion, and environmental destruction. Issues of peace and conflict, and environmental degradation and regeneration are often inseparable. We work towards a world "where all people, communities and the earth may flourish, and no one is beyond reach of the love and support they need to fulfil their potential". We seek a new economy and political order. We embrace this profoundly political mission. We are counter-cultural and open to risk where appropriate. We challenge ourselves and conventional notions of progress where these do not serve the common good. In every context, we identify where we can make our best contribution in response to the social and environmental crisis. We seek comprehensive solutions which consider the interactions within and between natural and social systems. We may respond to the symptoms of the social and environmental crisis, to save lives and reduce suffering, where the poorest, most vulnerable and the excluded cannot be reached by the State or other services, but increasingly we focus on the causes of this crisis. We recognise that people experience context-specific, multiple, and overlapping vulnerabilities which defy simple classification. We prioritise time and resources to define and identify those who are the poorest, most vulnerable and the excluded in the local context, reach them and ensure their involvement in identifying programme priorities.

2) We identify and challenge the systems, structures and social norms that discriminate against women, girls and excluded groups, to bring about empowerment and transformative change, including gender justice.

We recognise and challenge the long history of violence, oppression, domination, discrimination, and exclusion against women, girls and excluded groups. They remain disproportionately affected by poverty, insecurity, conflict, and climate change. Their contributions are also a big part of the solution, if given the opportunity to flourish socially, economically, and politically. The pursuit of the common good and the pursuit of justice and equity are inseparable. We believe that all women, girls and excluded groups should live free from violence and fear, with equitable access to assets and services. Our programmes are gender sensitive, include a strong emphasis on inclusion, and work to create relationships that enable women and men to flourish. Where possible, our programmes identify opportunities to empower women, girls and excluded groups, or to go further to transform the systems, structures and social norms that discriminate against them, to achieve justice. We work as part of the Catholic Church on issues of power that constrain our ability to reach these people, including attitudes and behaviours related to gender or discriminated groups. We use our voice and influence to support the Church to identify and challenge internal barriers towards equality.

3) We protect and actively seek to regenerate the environment.

We emphasise the interconnectedness of the environment, poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion across our work. The environment is not something separate from ourselves or a mere setting in which we live. Instead, caring for the environment is integral to our task of tackling the scandal of poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion. In everything we do, we must protect the environment through analysis, monitoring, avoidance, mitigation, and restoration activities. We will not support work that is likely to harm the environment (or people) and we will not walk-away from any harm that we may cause inadvertently. We seek opportunities to regenerate the environment, as either a primary or secondary purpose of relevant programmes. We invest in the skills and capacity of our staff and partners to exemplify environmental

stewardship, in both rural and urban areas, and in our operating models, supply chains, energy supplies, vehicles and travel, and our ways of working. Throughout programme and project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, were recognise, understand, and act on the positive and negative, potential, and actual, impacts of what we do and how we do it. We will mobilise others to reduce their own environmental impact and promote societal change. We aim to be carbon neutral by 2030.

4) We recognise, celebrate, and promote 'local agency, voice and leadership'.

We prioritise the voice, agency, and leadership of local partners and communities, especially women and young people. We place the poor, vulnerable and excluded, and our fragile planet, at the centre of what we do and how we do it. Being impartial or seeking equality is not enough: we must reject the systems and structures of oppression and discrimination and enable *equitable* outcomes. We seek to understand the power inequalities that constrain people's ability to be active (co-) creators in their own future, including our own roles in challenging, and sustaining, unjust structures and systems of power. We seek to re-balance social, economic, political, and cultural power in ways that achieve the common good. We seek innovative roles in partnerships to reflect our legitimate role and demonstrate our added value. In everything we do, we ask ourselves whether we are enabling greater local agency, voice, or leadership – within our organisation, or with our volunteers, partners, the communities we serve, or others. We amplify quieter voices where appropriate. We promote the leadership, proactive involvement, and influence of women in all levels of decision-making to achieve better community engagement and development outcomes, and to celebrate their inherent power. We will not compete with local partners for funding, programme space, visibility, or research. Instead, we will support local capacity strengthening and capacity sharing initiatives; amplify their voices where appropriate; promote local partners' financial sustainability; and encourage their engagement in coordination mechanisms and work to remove barriers to participation where they exist. We oppose the shrinking of civil society space (including constraints on humanitarian aid) and seek to protect human rights and environmental defenders.

5) We invest time, energy, and resources in a 'culture of encounter'.

Restoring and strengthening relationships is central to the common good. A culture of encounter means not just seeing, but looking; not just hearing, but listening; not just passing people by, but stopping with them, allowing us to be moved with compassion, to draw near to touch. This inspires a culture where the 'Other' is truly a person, not something impersonal, and demands that we participate as equals. It cannot be separated from questions of power and injustice: as we listen to others and see the world from the perspective of those who suffer most from unjust systems, we shine a light on those systems, open ourselves to change, and convert ourselves to the demanding consequences of our faith and the need for a renewed earth. It is about the *transformation* of ourselves and of the systems of injustice. A culture of encounter infuses our daily practices and is evident in the analysis, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of every initiative; it is never an add-on or obstacle to what we do. It is rooted in diversity, equity, inclusion, and anti-racism, with an optimal mix of partners and collaboration with other actors. It inspires us to focus on beginnings and potentials, not hasty accumulation of achievements, and to start processes that we cannot unilaterally manage to their conclusion. Within a culture of encounter, we are confident in our own value and contribution. We seek to build trust, stay present, look beyond short-term or rigid outcomes, and speak robustly when appropriate. We prioritise time, space and energy for dialogue, reflection, mutual learning, and shared development, within CAFOD, with and between our partners, supporters, and the communities we serve, and with others. Together, we seek and achieve solutions for the common good, with solutions never imposed (by us or others). This cannot be rushed: we remove arbitrary deadlines and other barriers whenever possible and mitigate their impact when not. We continue to accompany or walk alongside our local partners, even when we cannot 'fix' the situation, but recognise that different levels of partnership and 'encounter' are appropriate and act proportionally. We encourage partners to 'encounter' others directly (including governments, donors, UN agencies and civil society organisations), and provide support if such help is asked for.

6) We connect local, national, and international influencing for systemic change and justice for current and future generations.

We recognise that processes of change are as important as outcomes. We systematically integrate advocacy into programmes to influence change from local to global levels. We connect local actors, voices, and realities to wider processes. We seek to ensure national and international policy decisions, business practices, etc. respond to local needs, with a preferential option for the poorest, the most vulnerable, the excluded and our planet. We speak-out boldly when it is right to do so. We make the most of the power and influence of the Church locally, nationally, and internationally, and our wider network of partners and communities.

7) We ensure safe and dignified programming through a unified system of programme quality, due diligence, compliance, and accountability.

We prioritise the safety, access, dignity and inclusion of community members and project participants reflecting the dignity and intrinsic worth of every woman, man, and child. We recognise that diversity enriches a culture of encounter and improves programme quality. We know how our partners work and their capacity in relation to the safety, dignity and access of people and communities. When gaps or concerns are identified, we support and accompany partners in ways that are tailored and proportionate to reflect the diversity of our partner portfolio, but if improvements are not made, we will consider ending our partnership.

8) We invest time and resources for holistic, rigorous analysis and design leading to integrated, multi-year and multi-stakeholder programmes

We invest time and resources for local partners to lead analysis and design, with community, stakeholders and our staff involved as locally appropriate. We recognise and understand issues of power, identify and separate symptoms from causes, and know where, how and with whom to achieve greatest impact. We work where we can demonstrate our added value. We promote a long-term perspective to benefit current and future generations and the planet, but still act with urgency. We encourage multilateral partnerships, peer-to-peer engagement, and connections between local, national, and international levels. We support cross-border programmes where it adds value.

9) We invest time and resources in monitoring and evaluation, learning and adaptive management.

We understand and demonstrate whether our actions and use of resources are helping us progress towards the flourishing of people, communities, and the earth. When they are not, we take appropriate action to change course. We invest in the skills of staff and partners. While we quantify success for the sake of accountability, but much of what is important cannot be measured and the quantitative can suffocate the qualitative. We use appropriate tools and approaches, modified based on context. We answer, "what has changed" and "how" as well as review "what we did". We start, adapt, and stop programmes in response to monitoring findings, feedback, and learning. We monitor, evaluate, and learn from both processes and outcomes. We invest time and resources for reflection and discernment, using qualitative and quantitative information to gain insight. We accept the legitimacy of honest failure and are truly open to share and learn from it.

10) We seek funding that contributes to and enables an integral ecology approach.

We recognise that income, regardless of its source, can take us *towards* or *away-from* our strategic intent, and seek only funding consistent with our understanding of progress. We will pursue new funding opportunities and reject others which may contradict or undermine our integral ecology approach. We aim to diversify our income sources and create alignment, coherence, and complementarity across them to achieve an integral ecology approach and increase the quality, reach and impact of our work. Our supporter fundraising will continue to inspire and encourage existing supporters and help inspire and recruit new

supporters. We invest in and support partners to access and manage institutional funding *if they want such help* and support partners more consistently to develop their own sustainable, community fundraising, *where viable and wanted*. We consider it an organisational success if our partners' income increases with our support, even if our own income falls. We provide traditional grant funding and work with interested partners to explore more diverse, innovative ways to use resources to deliver our mission and catalyse local voice, agency, and leadership.

Annex 2: Key Informant Interviews (KII)

1. Richard Sloman – CPR Bangladesh, rsloman@CAFOD.org.uk
   Phil Talman – PO Bangladesh, ptalman@CAFOD.org.uk
   Janet Symes – Head of Region Asia and Middle East, jsymes@CAFOD.org.uk
2. Sebastian Rozario – Executive Director - sebastian.rozario7@gmail.com
   Mr Remi Subhash Das – Director of Finance and Admin,
3. Brian Standley – International Programme Accompanier, bstandley@CAFOD.org.uk
   Laura Purves – Senior Emergency Response Officer, lpurves@CAFOD.org.uk ?????
4. Zoe Corden – former ERO, Zdcorden@gmail.com
5. James Gomes – former Regional Director of Chittagong director@mawts.org
6. Yael Eshkel - yael.eshel@gmail.com
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   Ehsan Rahman – DAM Executive Director ehsan1155@gmail.com
9. Tom Delamere -Deputy Country Representative and Head of Programmes SS, (19th Sep)
10. Snigdha Chakraborty, CRS
11. Christin Mothsche and Anna Lena Timme, Caritas Germany

Annex 3: Key Documents

CAFOD documents for review:
1. CI (2021) Rohingya Crisis Real Time Evaluation Report Final, Feb 21
2. German Foreign Ministry (2021) Evaluation Report German Foreign Ministry financed Caritas Relief Program for "Provision of life-saving shelter and camp infrastructure for Rohingya refugees and neighbouring host communities in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh", as well as financial assistance to mitigate the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic".(December 2021)*
3. Saha (2022) Emergency Response Program for Forcibly Displaced People from the Myanmar (Emergency Appeal 03/2019& 2020) (Polin Saha)
4. Helios (2021) Evaluation of "2021 Caritas Response to the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) and Host Community (HC) in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh (07/2021 Bangladesh). HELIOS
    - EA 2019/2020 Final Evaluation and CB response
5. Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response: Lessons Learned Report | Disasters Emergency Committee (dec.org.uk)
6. 2017 Rohingya Crisis: Appeal for People Fleeing Myanmar Final Report | Disasters Emergency Committee (dec.org.uk) – Final Report.
7. CB (2023) 2017-2022 Giving Hope
8. CB (2020) Caritas Response to the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals and Host Community in Bangladesh (Annual Report 2020 to CI)
9. EA Completion Report 2020
10. EA 07/2021 Completion Report
11. Gender Audit, Gender Sensitive Programme Strategy and Gender Action Plan
12. Caritas Development Institute (2021?), Advocacy learning paper – protection. Caritas Bangladesh Community-Based Protection
13. EA2017 BAN199 final report.
14. DEC Phase 1 final report
15. CAFOD 2021, BAN200 Rohingya Refugee Response Report: ARUP (1/5/18 to 31/12/18) (2019?)
16. CAFOD 2020, BAN195 DAM completion report Project Completion Report DAM/CAFOD (October 2018 to Feb 2019)
17. CAFOD staff trip reports:
    - Zoe Corden trip report Oct 2017
    - Zoe Corden trip report Jan 2018
    - Brian Standley trip report Jan 2017
18. Annex 1 Attendance of Protection Mainstreaming
19. Annex 2 Attendance of TOT on Protection Mainstreaming
20. PPSMG Briefing Note
21. PM Dhaka training Report

Red denotes independent evaluation.

Other Documents/References

Azeem Ibrahim (2018). The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Genocide. Hurst

Christian Aid (2020) Evaluation Report, Rohingya Emergency response 2017-2020, Proaction Consultancy 2019, Evaluation of Christian Aid's Rohingya Crisis Response in Bangladesh, Evaluation Report

Cook, A. D. B and Ne. (2018). Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and Disaster Management in Bangladesh: The 2017 Rohingya Exodus https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20025

Malang Faye (2021). A forced migration from Myanmar to Bangladesh and beyond: humanitarian response to Rohingya refugee crisis. Journal of International Humanitarian Action

Hargrave et al. (2020). The Rohingya response in Bangladesh and the Global Compact n Refugees. Lessons challenges and opportunities. HG and British Red Cross.

Holloway and Lough (2021). Biometric scandal

Lough et al (2021). Participation and Inclusion in the Rohingya refugee response in Coxs Bazar, Bangladesh. Humanitarian Policy Group/Overseas Development Institute)

Mitu et al 2022. Climate Risks and Truncated Opportunities: How do Environmental Challenges Interest with economic and Social Disadvantages for Rohingya Adolescents in Bangladesh? Sustainability 2022 14, 4466

Annex 4: Sense Making Workshop (SMW) 17th October 2023, Aide Memoir

Rohingya Crisis Response Evaluation

SMW PART 1 (AM)
Attendees: Janet (part), Richard, Catherine, Laura (Part), Maya, Phil, Brian

Report: Clarifications, Gaps, and Inaccuracies
The group made a series of helpful comments that should be reflected in the main report. These included:

- Reflecting CAFODs longer term investment into strengthening CB's policy and approach to gender. Recognising the long-term nature of cultural change of this nature.
  - Original gender policy supported by CAFOD.
  - 'Gender Cell' established within CB.
  - Highly patriarchal society- change won't happen overnight.
- Greater reference to CAFOD/CB's contribution to camp infrastructure (perhaps disentangling from 'Shelter') and making stronger links across to safeguarding and inclusion.
  - CRS role? Use of GIS rainfall and run-off. Innovative.
  - Used by others across the various camps.
  - IOM provided free data to facilitate GIS.
- WASH- first large scale treatment plant installed at the very beginning of response.
- Gender p19 (Check Host community or FDMN)
- Clarify 'cash for work' situation. What did CB do? What difference did GoB policy have on this? IB to follow up with CB directly.
- Perhaps be more realistic in reaching conclusions- consider long term and incremental processes of change- and the challenging operational context.
- Anticipatory Action: check relevance- political and environmental risks?
- Consider change to references to tension in CAFOD team- reference improvements that have been made. Better but still working through the implications.
- Advocacy: need for stronger linkages across CI. (who holds this relationship?)
  - CAFOD 'Not sufficiently joined up!" how programming and advocacy coordinated?
- Potential role for Caritas Asia in strengthening advocacy across countries.
- SADI processes helped to clarify how staff think through 'issues and act appropriately (e.g., army post)
- Is there a need for CI to support members re SADI and humanitarian space? (Greater consistency and coordination across CI members)
  - How to ensure CI members are better prepared?
- Learning: push back on identifying cross cutting CLQ- evaluations should be 'demand' driven/practical.
  - How can we facilitate greater exchange with CI members/partners?
  - How can we be more proactive and intentional with our learning?

Assessment of alignment with OCH/IE characteristics

The group were asked to assess (individually) the degree of CAFOD alignment with the 8 OCH/Integral Ecology characteristics. We then briefly discussed why the ratings were given and any differences in viewpoints.

Environment/Human Connection
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.5 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst participants felt that CAFOD had encouraged a thoughtful environmental dimension to the response, building on CB strengths, this was not proactive at the very start of the crisis.

Inclusion

The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.6 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst participants acknowledged that there was considerable room for improvement it was felt that CAFOD had played a constructive role over many years in encouraging more progressive gender attitudes within CB.

Voice and Agency
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 4.0 (Range 3.5 to 4). Participants felt that CAFOD and partners strongly encouraged the views of FDMN in the response and proactively advocated for this more widely.

Culture of Encounter
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.7 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst the relationship between CAFOD and CB was clearly strong and built on trust the level of engagement was felt to have 'tapered off' over time.

Advocacy
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 2.4 (Range 1.5 to 3.0). whilst CAFOD and CB had encouraged operational good practices there was a perceived lack of 'strategy' about wider advocacy on the return of FDMN to Myanmar and keeping the Rohingya at the front of public minds. CI coordination on topics such as media and safeguarding were felt to have reduced the burden on CB.

Safeguarding and SADI
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 4.4 (Range 4.0 to 5.0). Participants felt that safeguarding was seen as a priority from the start of the crisis response and suitable CAFOD resources were allocated to it- over a consistent period. CAFOD chaired the protection mainstreaming working group and helped to ensure that the benefits were embedded and longer term.

Long Term and Flexible Funding
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 3.2 (Range 3.0 to 4.0). Whilst CAFOD were flexible in their funding the DEC money was not. An over reliance on Emergency Appeal and DEC funds and no long-term alternative funding plan were negatives.

Learning Culture
The SMW assessed CAFOD alignment against this characteristic as 2.7 (Range 2.0 to 3.0). Participants felt that CAFOD did not do enough to share learning and embed internally in their own policy and practice.

Using a simple radar/spider diagram these assessments can be summarised as:

Alignment with OCH Characteristic

The strongest perceived CAFOD alignment was seen in *'Safeguarding and SADI'* (4.4) and *'Voice and Agency'* (4.0) with weakest performances in *'Learning Culture'* (2.7) and *'Advocacy'* (2.4).

Small Group Work

Following the assessment of the alignment of the response to OCH characteristics the group reviewed the 'Ideas for further discussion' and prioritised those for discussion in the afternoon session.

Whilst 'Learning Culture' scored fairly low on the ratings (second lowest to 'Advocacy') it was felt that there were initiatives underway already that did warrant this being the focus of the afternoon session. It was agreed to focus on 'Advocacy and Funding' (given the strong links between the two) and the 'Environment/Human Connection. The 'Ideas' were revised into the following sets of questions:

Advocacy and Funding
- How can CAFOD (help partners to) focus on advocacy where they can most meaningfully make progress?
    - Staying true to humanitarian values
- How can CAFOD most effectively contribute to CI advocacy coordination?

- How can CAFOD best help partners to secure longer term funding in a protracted crisis and response?
    - Spikes within a crisis
- How can CAFOD best generate funds for a protracted crisis? (link to advocacy, communications etc)

Environment/Human Connection
- How can CAFOD most effectively encourage environmental challenges to be considered earlier in crisis responses? What tools and approaches have been used successfully? (Indigenous knowledge? Preparedness?)
- How can CAFOD ensure that it (and its partners) 'walks the talk' and follow environmentally sound practices in their humanitarian work?

SMW PART 2 (PM)
Attendees: Janet (part), Richard, Catherine, Laura, Maya, Phil, Brian, Philippe, Nieve, Maria, Uli

Small Group Work
The large group agreed to split into 2 to review the questions above. The following are some insights from these groups:

Advocacy and Funding
- There wasn't a strategic plan during the crisis to prioritise advocacy issues or around (the inevitable) longer term financing needs.

- In the Rohingya situation GoB restrictions made some advocacy activities very challenging. There was, however, scope to:
    - influence the FD7 approval process.
    - influence good humanitarian practice in certain areas (safeguarding and shelter)
    - actively engage for a safe and voluntary return to Myanmar for FDMN
    - keep the Rohingya at the forefront of CI thinking for longer.
- there was a perceived lack of a coordinated approach on how to achieve these things- which undermined efforts.
- The starting point is always a conversation with partners.

Capacity
- There was a need to increase the capacity to lobby.
    - South Sudan- had a (joint funded) dedicated staff member ensuring strong presence.

- Local resource was considered important for fund raising (e.g., FCDO or UNHCR funds dispersed to locally active organisations/in country)
    - But obvious pros and cons of having more CAFOD staff embedded/in situ in local partners.
- But sometimes good to *'take small steps- they have the potential for big impacts.*

Networks/Coordination
- Idea from Columbia where a CI advocacy working group is formed of the local partners and 2 CIMOs. The chairing of the meetings is rotated and other CIMOs are informed of emerging priorities and strategies.
- Networking was considered critical:
    - Seeking direct UN engagement (as a potential source of influence and funds).
        - Perhaps host UN delegation to deepen their understanding of the issues and the work of partners.
    - Working through CIDSE/CI (particularly where presence on the ground is weak)
    - Consider role of regional Caritas (Caritas Asia) particularly where issue (Rohingya expulsion from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Treatment of minorities in India, Myanmar, Bangladesh etc) cuts across different countries. Could the regional caritas lead?
        - Did Caritas Europa take an effective lead in Greece recently?

Internal CAFOD Funding
- It was suggested that greater clarity of decision-making processes around internal CAFOD funds would be helpful.
- Could this resource play a particular role in protracted crisis (where external fund raising is more challenging)?
    - Perhaps prioritised on ability to raise fund s and need.
- Global emergency fund a way to help cope with spikes.
    - Could a % of GEF funds be reserved for protracted crisis?
- Even small amounts can be very impactful- perhaps over several years- demonstrates ongoing support and continuity for partners and can be used to leverage other external funds/support staff posts.
- (Perhaps these could be linked to an Emergency Preparedness Plan)

'It's Not News'
- How to keep a protracted crisis in the front of minds and counter the "it's not news" response?
- Every second counts
- Regular updates perhaps linked to key thematic priorities (food systems, gender, etc etc)
- How does CAFOD prioritise advocacy? (Advocacy feels disconnected from Programming!)

Environment

EST
- CAFOD has developed a tool EST that has the potentially to substantially improve this aspect. It has been used in the Ukrainian response.
    - A new version will be available in the New Year 2024
    - Perhaps its use should be mandatory for all responses above a certain level.
- It covers:
    - CAFOD compliance (Own house in order)
    - New operations tab (flights and CAFOD practice)
    - Preparedness (c. 'anticipatory action') for:
        - Cafod
        - Could be adapted for partners- Partners (environment and advocacy)
        - Preparedness for mitigation plans- agro-ecology.
    - There is also substantial potential for 'partner to partner' and 'community to community' learning. .

Integration
o   Protection and the environment (e.g., solar lights reducing vulnerability of women)
o   This is part of CAFOD's added value.

SADI
o   Promotes participatory approaches and the community voice and…
o   Indigenous knowledge (Community of Practice in CAFOD is strong)
  o   Could be built into early warning systems, e.g., fruit on trees and community response plans.
  o   Start with partners/'local' meaning of words (not ours)

CI Leadership?
o   Is there an opportunity for CAFOD to play a greater leadership role across CI in the 'environment'?
o   CIMS? SDLR?
o   DRR Interagency group
o   Perhaps integrating a 'survivor community led response'.

CAFOD Added Value

"What we are good at is hard to measure".

The group briefly discussed CAFOD's added value (particularly in a protracted crisis such as the Rohingya Crisis). It was widely agreed that the 'value add' was context specific and that attempts to prioritise these were not helpful.

Whilst largely supporting the ideas emerging in the report, the SMW highlighted additionally:
▪   the value of Solidarity Beyond funding,
▪   CAFODs crucial role in linking partners to other actors and the facilitation of important relationships (perhaps more realistic than expecting stretched CAFOD resources to do everything).
▪   That it would be good to do a 'deep dive' on Ukraine and South Sudan to see what lessons emerged there.