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## On metaphorical exemplification in music: a reply to Sousa

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### Introduction

A recent *Festschrift* for Prof Maria do Carmo d'Orey (1933–2023)<sup>1</sup> — a sculptor, Nelson Goodman scholar, and professor of philosophy at the University of Lisbon — includes a contribution by Tiago Sousa titled *Three problems in the application of metaphorical exemplification to music*.<sup>2</sup> Here I reply to Sousa's arguments, particularly his second point, concerning the „singularity” of expressive content. This piece is thus a sequel to my own contribution for that volume,<sup>3</sup> in which I respond to James Young's criticisms of Goodman on musical expressiveness,<sup>4</sup> as well as to Nemesio Puy's reply to them.<sup>5</sup>

In the first section I briefly present the theory of expressiveness as metaphorical exemplification. In the second section I present all three problems raised by Sousa. In the

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<sup>1</sup> V. Guerreiro, C. J. Correia, & V. Moura (eds.), *Quando Há Arte! Ensaios de Homenagem a Maria do Carmo d'Orey*, Lisboa 2023.

<sup>2</sup> T. Sousa. *Três problemas na aplicação da exemplificação metafórica à música*, [in:] *Quando Há Arte!...*, op. cit., p. 333–346.

<sup>3</sup> V. Guerreiro. *Molduras, doodles e metáforas: a vingança de Goodman*, [in:] V. Guerreiro, C. J. Correia, & V. Moura (eds.) *Quando Há Arte!...*, op. cit., p. 281–332.

<sup>4</sup> J. Young. *Goodman on metaphorical exemplification and musical expressiveness*, [in:] *Quando Há Arte!...*, op. cit., pp. 253–268.

<sup>5</sup> N. Puy. *From literal to metaphorical exemplification in music. a reply to Young*, [in:] *Quando Há Arte!...*, op. cit., p. 269–280.

third section I address the second difficulty, since it raises a different challenge from the other two, concerning the plausibility of exemplification (metaphorical or otherwise) as a vehicle for expressiveness. In the fourth section I address the first and third problems together since both concern i) metaphor in descriptions of music; ii) whether *metaphorical* exemplification is a consistent idea.

## **I Expressiveness and metaphorical exemplification**

Goodman builds his conception of expressiveness on the idea of metaphorical *exemplification*: „what is expressed is metaphorically exemplified.”<sup>6</sup> To exemplify is to refer by *exhibiting*, like samples in a colour chart do. Most samples that come to mind exemplify *literally* what they symbolize: from samples in colour charts to painted walls there is change of *extension but not of domain*<sup>7</sup>(as in „red ideas”). The puzzle of expressiveness in music partly concerns whether descriptions of music in terms of emotion involve one or other sort of change. If those descriptions describe something, *what* and *where* are the features they describe?

Goodman strives to show us how *symbolizing* is compatible with the *opaqueness* of artworks – these are „opaque” because we are supposed to focus on *them* rather than „looking through” them, to whatever they might denote. A symbol is „transparent” when we are not meant to focus on the symbol itself but on something beyond it. When looking at a colour chart I am absorbed by images of painted surfaces and do not focus on the chart itself. With „opaque” symbols our focus is the symbol itself. Looking at George Stubb’s *Whistlejacket*, I do not think of *equidae* in the same way I think of painted surfaces when using the colour chart. I focus *on the painting* as a „horse-representation”, even if it *also* happens to be a representation of a horse.

For Goodman, every symbol belongs in a symbol system and whether it functions „aesthetically” is determined by features of that system, not by *intrinsic* properties of the symbol. In the context of different systems, structurally identical symbols can exhibit very

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<sup>6</sup> N. Goodman, *Languages of art: an approach to a theory of symbols*, New York 1968, p. 85.

<sup>7</sup> N. Goodman, *Languages of art...*, op. cit., p. 72. In Goodman’s vocabulary: „range” and „realm” (what I am calling *extension* and *domain*), so, e.g. „metaphor typically involves a change not merely of range but also of realm.” A *realm* is comprised of the objects „sorted” by a „schema” (i.e. organized by a set of symbols). Basically, when I apply „sapphire” to a lake, I am taking a symbol out of its usual „field of reference”, conscripting it to the task of organizing a different „field of reference”. *Intuitively*: moving from a painted wall to a painted door (in the field of reference of a RAL 3020 sample in a catalogue) is a change in extension; moving from a painted wall to „red desires” or „red rage” is a change in realm. See also M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit., pp. 434-442; this work includes an excellent and very useful *lexicon* of Goodmanian terms: pp. 881-894. Those who cannot read Portuguese, however, must wait for a translation.

different properties, including *expressive* properties. Reference via exhibition is exemplification. Anything can exemplify any of its properties (but not *all*)<sup>8</sup>, in the right context. The right context selects the right properties. I call such contexts „frames”. Symbol systems in use are a crucial part of such contexts.

Some music is trite, unimaginative, cliché, even clumsy. When we listen to Mozart’s *Musical Joke* (K. 522) we know it is a parody of such music. If we don’t hear it *as a parody*, we will not *understand* it. The music is not unimaginative: rather, it *refers* to unimaginative music *by exhibiting* some of the latter’s properties (i.e. it exemplifies them). Those properties are *selected* for our attention, showcased, highlighted, in sum, exemplified. When a piece *simply is* unimaginative, it is not trying to exemplify unimaginativeness. Part of what makes it bad is precisely that it is meant to do just the opposite: to showcase imaginativeness. The resulting cringe is part of our ears’ verdict upon it.

Consider Debussy’s piano piece *Voiles*, from his first book of *Preludes*. It is made of piano sounds, yet one vivid impression of listening to it is that of hearing things „fluttering”. This is a metaphorical description since piano sounds are not the sort of things (like sails or veils) that can flutter. Because we are supposed to *notice* this, we say that the music *metaphorically exemplifies* fluttering movement. Since the piano piece does this *as the kind of aesthetic symbol it is* (i.e. via its *sonic* properties), we also say that it *expresses* fluttering movement.<sup>9</sup> While expressiveness *always* involves metaphorical exemplification, the reverse is not the case.<sup>10</sup> Here are the conditions of expressiveness, specified by Carmo d’Orey:<sup>11</sup>

*a* expresses *F* =

1. *a* possesses *F* (or is denoted by a label<sup>12</sup> coextensive with *F*).
2. That possession (or denotation) is metaphorical.
3. *a* refers to *F*.
4. *a* is an aesthetic symbol *functioning aesthetically*.
5. Property *F* depends only on the kind of aesthetic symbol that *a* is.
6. The transfer implied in the metaphor is one of domain, not merely of extension.

<sup>8</sup> N. Goodman, *Languages of art...*, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>9</sup> The metaphorical expression of emotional qualities will follow the same pattern.

<sup>10</sup> About this, see N. Goodman, *Languages of art...*, op. cit., pp. 52, 86–87; M. Carmo d’Orey, *A exemplificação na arte: um estudo sobre Nelson Goodman*, Lisboa 1999, pp. 474–482.

<sup>11</sup> M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit., pp. 476–482.

<sup>12</sup> Goodman speaks of „labels” that are applied to particulars, although he also condescends with the deep-seated habit of speaking of exemplifying properties.

An „aesthetic symbol functioning aesthetically” is a symbol functioning in the context of a symbol system with certain features, which Goodman called „symptoms of the aesthetic”.<sup>13</sup> I cannot go into an explanation here, but it is unnecessary for our purposes. It suffices to say that exemplification *combined with* other such features plays a crucial role.

One aspect of Debussy’s piece is that it uses the whole tone scale. This property of the piece is not exemplified by it. You may notice it, if you have musical training, but you are not *supposed to notice* it in the way you *must* notice that the Mozart piece is a parody. The whole tone scale is partly responsible for the ambiguity, the sense of suspension, of untetheredness (due to its conspicuous lack of a tonal centre, leading note, etc.), that makes up the acoustic impressions of „fluttering” in *Voiles* (some of it is also due to agogics).

Take the metaphor „the lake is a sapphire”.<sup>14</sup> Since the lake is not an aesthetic symbol, it cannot *express* the property of being a sapphire by metaphorically exemplifying it. The lake simply *has* some properties: it is blue, translucent, coruscant, iridescent, etc. Because of this, it is *denotable* by labels that extensionally overlap with „sapphire” and, thus, by providing a proper *frame*, the metaphor turns the lake and the sapphire into *symbols* of those properties<sup>15</sup> (*nota bene*: it doesn’t *make* the lake blue, translucent, etc.). *Within the frame of the metaphor*, the lake metaphorically exemplifies sapphiric qualities. But the lake doesn’t *express* such properties in the way Debussy’s piece does in fact express fluttering movement.<sup>16</sup>

## II Sousa’s three problems

What are the three problems raised by Sousa? The first is „the problem of the metaphorical character”, as he calls it. It concerns a debate that divides philosophers of music: should we consider descriptions of music with emotion predicates (e.g. „sad”, „joyful”, „mournful”, „anguished”, „sprightly”, etc.) as metaphorical or literal descriptions?<sup>17</sup>

The idea is that *if* application of emotion predicates to music turns out to be literal, not

<sup>13</sup> N. Goodman, *Languages of art...*, op. cit., pp. 252-255; Idem, *Ways of worldmaking*, Indianapolis 1978, pp. 67-68.

<sup>14</sup> N. Goodman, *Metaphor as Moonlighting*, „Critical Inquiry” 1979, vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 125-130.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit., p. 427.

<sup>16</sup> See N. Goodman, *Languages of art...*, op. cit., pp. 86-87. See also N. Goodman, & Elgin Catherine Z. *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences*, Indianapolis 1988, p. 21: “Works are said to express only such properties as they metaphorically exemplify *when interpreted as aesthetic symbols*.” (my emphasis). It is quite common for such passages in Goodman to go unnoticed; their importance is easy to miss, since Goodman doesn’t *highlight* them. But thanks to Carmo d’Orey’s (op. cit., pp. 466-477, including footnote 27) impressive work on Goodman’s philosophy, they came to my attention.

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, R. Scruton, *The aesthetic understanding: essays in the philosophy of art and culture*, New York 1983; M. Budd, *Musical movement and aesthetic metaphors*, “The British Journal of Aesthetics” 2003, vol. 43, issue 3, pp. 209–223; N. Zangwill, *Music and aesthetic reality: formalism and the limits of description*, London 2015.

metaphorical, this will undermine metaphorical exemplification. Since literal exemplification will not do either (music cannot *literally exhibit* emotions), we then need another theory. Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Davies<sup>18</sup> and Kivy,<sup>19</sup> Sousa argues that there is nothing metaphorical about predicating *appearances*. For instance, I see a cloud as dog-shaped; I say, „That one is a dog!” I reckon it is safe to treat these cases as elliptical forms of saying that something is dog-shaped, or that observing its shape resembles observing a dog’s shape. There is no metaphor here, just as there is no metaphor when we say of a dog-picture that „it is a dog”. Thus understood, the claim is that the cloud is dog-shaped; it *resembles* a dog.

The same applies to musical descriptions: an object can possess a  $\phi$ -appearance (where  $\phi$  is an emotional predicate) without it being the *subject* of experiences of  $\phi$ . So, the musical case is a mere „secondary extension” of the emotional predicates.

This is one of three sub-arguments Sousa lists under his first difficulty (call it „the argument from secondary extensions”). The other two are the „fictional predication argument” and the „argument from true descriptions”, as I call them.

Attribution of emotional states to fictional characters in stories is commonplace; but no one thinks that „Sherlock Holmes is sad” is a metaphor on account that fictional characters are not real people and cannot have emotions. So, why think that emotional descriptions of music are metaphorical? Since even Sousa dismisses this as a weak, easily answerable argument,<sup>20</sup> it is not entirely clear why he invokes it. However, there is a stronger version of it in Stephen Davies,<sup>21</sup> which Sousa does not mention, and so I will respond to *that* version (in section IV). Finally, Sousa observes, following Dodd,<sup>22</sup> that attributions of  $\phi$ -appearances (where  $\phi$  is an emotion predicate) are standardly *true* in a way that even apt metaphors are not. As a rule, metaphors are literally false statements. But when we say, for instance, that the *Finale* of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony is „raging”, this is just true simpliciter, as it would be if we said that the movement is „turbulent”.

My major concern here is Sousa’s *second* problem („the singularity of what is expressed”),

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<sup>18</sup> S. Davies, *Musical meaning and expression*, Ithaca 1994.

<sup>19</sup> P. Kivy, *The corded shell: reflections on musical expression*, Princeton 1980.

<sup>20</sup> Sherlock Holmes may not be an actual human being, but descriptions-of-Sherlock-Homes all exemplify the label descriptions-of-human-being, and a description-of-human-being-as-sad is no more metaphorical than a description-of-human-being-as-having-two-legs. Cf. C. Elgin & I. Scheffler, *Mainsprings of Metaphor*, „The Journal of Philosophy” 1987, vol. 84, issue, 6, pp. 331-335. See also M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit., pp. 371-393 on fictional representation.

<sup>21</sup> S. Davies, op. cit., p. 139.

<sup>22</sup> J. Dodd, *The possibility of profound music*, „The British Journal of Aesthetics” 2014, vol. 54, issue 3, pp. 299–322.

which I call „the argument from expressive uniqueness”. This is not an argument against a *metaphorical* variety of exemplification but against exemplification (*metaphorical or otherwise*) being the *vehicle* of expressiveness. Sousa bases his argument on Malcolm Budd’s „heresy of the separable experience”:<sup>23</sup> the *point* of expressiveness is to produce an experience that is *bound to this specific piece of music*. When I experience the peculiar blend of turbulence and excitement in the *Finale* of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony, that experience is not *fungible*, i.e., I cannot use the *Finale* of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony as a vehicle for the same experience of excitement.

Now think of paradigm cases of *samples*: paint samples, colour charts. Suppose you want to paint a stair railing with „Traffic Red” (“RAL 3020” in the RAL colour chart). At the paint shop you look at that sample in the colour chart. It is an *announcement* of something beyond itself (paint smeared on surfaces). The sample in front of your eyes now is not *essential* to the value you are pursuing. Other samples will be *functionally equivalent*, thus mutually exchangeable *salva utilitate*, in a way that musical pieces, performances and experiences thereof *cannot be*. Therefore, expressiveness cannot be *explained* by exemplification. Even granting that exemplification *could* be metaphorical, there would still be a problem in using it to explain expressiveness. If *a* can metaphorically exemplify *F*, then *other things* can do so as well. But for Sousa this is to commit the „heresy of the separable experience”. If musical works were like samples, they would be a very strange sort: of what use would be a colour chart containing samples of hues that would be instantiated *only* by those very samples, and nothing else? It seemingly defeats the purpose of being a sample.

Sousa’s third problem is what he calls „the confusion between metaphorical description and property ascription”. I shall call it „the argument from confused ascription”. The point here is that metaphorical exemplification is a category mistake: exemplification concerns the instantiation of properties while metaphor concerns the *description* of properties. When Romeo describes Juliet as “the Sun” he is describing in a certain manner a cluster of her properties: character traits, physical beauty, certain relations between them, etc. There is nothing metaphorical about the way Juliet *instantiates* (if she does) the properties that Romeo describes metaphorically. Likewise, the description „The lake is a sapphire” is a metaphor; but the lake’s instantiation of certain properties (being blue, translucent, iridescent, coruscating, etc.), has nothing to do with metaphor. There are only *literal* properties.<sup>24</sup> So metaphorical exemplification is a bogus phenomenon and can’t be used to explain musical expressiveness.

<sup>23</sup> M. Budd. *Music and the Emotions. The Philosophical Theories*. London 1992, p. 125; 142; 152.

<sup>24</sup> J. Young, *Art and knowledge*, London 2001, p. 74.

### III Are expressiveness and exemplification incompatible?

Does the argument from expressive uniqueness show that exemplification plays no role in musical expressiveness? While it does raise a serious concern, I think it falls short of plausibly excluding such an explanation. Let us phrase it in a succinct form:

1.  $a$  exemplifies  $F$  if, and only if,  $a$  is a sample of  $F$ .
2. If  $a$  is a sample of  $F$  then it is possible that there is some  $b$  such that  $b$  is a sample of  $F$  and  $a$  is not numerically identical with  $b$ .
3. Necessarily, if  $a$  is expressive of  $F$  then for any  $b$ , if  $b$  is expressive of  $F$  then  $a$  is numerically identical with  $b$ .
4. If  $a$  is expressive of  $F$  then  $a$  is not a sample of  $F$ .

**Therefore,** If  $a$  is expressive of  $F$  then  $a$  does not exemplify  $F$ .<sup>25</sup>

This is my formulation, not Sousa's, but I think it helps to clarify what, if I am right, goes wrong in his train of thought. So, let us flesh it out and assess it. Premise 1 is vacuously true (though explanatorily useful); premise 2 simply follows from the understanding of what a sample is, and premise 3 lacks justification; it is arbitrary, borne out of a conceptual illusion that, I argue, is at the core of Sousa's reasoning on this matter. The conclusion is obtainable by *modus tollens* from 4 and 1. However, premises 2 and 3 form the truly juicy part of Sousa's reasoning, and of our discussion. Together they make up the idea that „expression is of the singular and exemplification is of the general”, which I deem a prejudice. Since premise 2 follows from the nature of samples, premise 3 is then the target of this reply.

Debussy's *Voiles* (DV) is aesthetically expressive, among other things, of fluttering movement (FM). Or perhaps we should say that its metaphorically exemplifying fluttering movement is *part* of whatever *richer whole* constitutes its expressive profile (I don't need to solve that issue here). According to the conclusion, it cannot be a sample of FM; thus, it cannot exemplify it. What is wrong here? Although the conclusion seems intuitively false - for any expressive gesture, however „unique”, is, simultaneously, *a token of the kind of gesture it is* and, as such, it can be a sample of that kind (as well as many others).

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<sup>25</sup>Here is the argument form, rendered in notation:

1.  $E(a, F) \leftrightarrow S(a, F)$   
2.  $S(a, F) \rightarrow \Diamond(\exists b)(S(b, F) \wedge \neg(b=a))$   
3.  $\Box X(a, F) \rightarrow (\forall b)(X(b, F) \rightarrow (b=a))$   
4.  $X(a, F) \rightarrow \neg S(a, F)$   
 $\models X(a, F) \rightarrow \neg E(a, F)$

The purpose of premise 2, ultimately, is to bolster the idea that whatever a symbol symbolizes is *external* to it (an idea that led people like Beardsley to reject exemplification as a criterion of aesthetic relevance, for instance).<sup>26</sup> Goodman used exemplification precisely to show how symbolic properties need not be external to the artwork (aesthetic symbol); so the argument from the heresy of the separate experience attempts to make this idea backfire, by showing that samples *cannot* be unique or singular, while uniqueness or singularity are required (so the argument goes) for expression. Hence, while it can be argued that even things that are self-exemplifying do not challenge Premise 2, since that doesn't preclude the metaphysical possibility that something else also be a sample of it – the sort of challenges raised by Goodman's „having seven syllables” exemplifying *heptasyllabic*–,<sup>27</sup> the truly interesting cases for aesthetic expression are those in which a sample and what it samples are not „externally related”. Even if there were no clear cases of something being a sample of itself, being a sample of itself is not a Goodmanian condition for being an expressive „aesthetic symbol”. Insofar as Premise 4 is falsified, the logical nit-pickings around self-sampleness turn out to be but the carding of goat's wool.

Now, here is one of those interesting cases: a bottle of wine from a particular batch is a sample of the batch's oenological properties, and yet the focus of any tasting experience are the individual samples at hand. This will be the case whether there are a thousand bottles left in the batch or just one, in which case the individual bottle is *still* a sample of the batch, and it will be *tasted as such*. It is not difficult to construct musical examples with the same structure as our oenological counterexample.<sup>28</sup> Still, Sousa could counter here that we still expect oenological properties to be fairly consistent across samples in a batch, no less than we expect consistency of visual properties across colour charts, despite the shift in the focus of experience. However, neither the *epistemic* possibility that some other bottle from the batch is still lying hidden somewhere, nor the *metaphysical* possibility that the same batch comprised one more bottle, will change the fact that only bottles from the same batch (i.e. parts of the same *scattered object*) can be used as samples of it. In other words, a sample of a

<sup>26</sup> See the debate between Beardsley and Goodman in: M. Beardsley, *Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education*, "Journal of Aesthetic Education" 1975, vol. 9, issue 3, pp. 5-26.

<sup>27</sup> Goodman, *Ways of worldmaking...*, op. cit., pp. 60.

<sup>28</sup> Do bear in mind that in a musical analogy, the proper correspondence will not be between *bottles* and *musical works*, but between *bottles* and *performances of a musical work* (the *batch* is the analogue of the musical work). The analogy is not perfect, since performances of a musical work will exhibit an *expressive variation* while oenological properties will not vary that way from bottle to bottle. However, the point of the analogy does not depend on wine being expressive just like music is, but on the fact that in appreciating the fluttering peculiar to Debussy's *Voiles*, we appreciate something that is *exemplified* by each performance and yet each performance is not related to that which it exemplifies as something external, to which it gestures, or which it „announces”.



batch is a kind of synecdoche. We now have only to show that synecdoches can be expressive.

Let us change the example. Each of my listening experiences of a certain musical work (performances, recordings of the same or different performances, etc.) is itself a sample of a *kind* of aural experience, namely, the kind of experience I have with performances of that particular work, *and works of that kind* (e.g., works for piano solo in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that employ whole tone scales). Each experience reveals some hitherto unnoticed detail about the work, making each experience unique but no less a sample. The *generative* aspect (more nuances each time) is compatible with uniqueness: each new episode in the series exemplifies „revealing performance”. It is in some respects like the sample in the colour chart, but also radically different in others. It would be odd, to say the least, if we went about savouring nuances across colour charts, though not at all in the oenological case. Clearly, the status of something *qua* sample is not affected by the *rarity* or *availability* of the qualities exemplified. Of course, Sousa’s objection also concerns the supposition that a sample must always be *separate* from the objects bearing the qualities sampled; it’s being a *promise* of something beyond itself.<sup>29</sup> The thrust of Sousa’s intuition lies in this: while the sample in the colour chart is supposed to make you think *only* of surfaces covered in that shade of colour, the „fluttering” passages of DV are not supposed to make you think of *other* piano pieces that „flutter” *just like that*; because *only it flutters like that*.

Let us then try and unravel the conceptual confusion. None of this bears weight against the idea that the piece *refers* to FM by *showing it*, by making it *salient*. If we give this some thought, we will realise two things: many different versions of any given piece are possible and many different performative approaches to any musical work (and each of its versions) are also possible. It is a reasonable assumption that versions of the same work, as well as different *performative approaches*<sup>30</sup> to any of these, will exemplify features they have in common, achieved by, say, combinations of the whole tone scale and other devices. And each version, with its host of approaches, will be embodied in endless performances that exemplify the approach and the version. Any one performance of the work (e.g. a Walter Gieseking rendition of *Voiles*) can be used as a sample of *that kind of experience*. But this is not surprising nor is it damaging for the concept of exemplification in music. Metaphorical exemplification *presupposes* co-exemplified labels; it *consists* in reference to those labels, if

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<sup>29</sup> S. Davies (*op. cit.*, p. 144) describes the Goodmanian idea of sample in this way.

<sup>30</sup> Examples of what I mean by „performative approach” would be: *Karajan-type*, *Furtwängler-type*, *Harnoncourt-type*, or *Celibidache-type* approaches to a Beethoven symphony.

only we remember our Goodman properly. Here is a simple schema of how metaphorical exemplification works, taken from Carmo d'Orey:<sup>31</sup>




fig. 1 the basic structure of metaphorical exemplification

Two-way arrows stand for exemplification, while one-way arrows stand for plain denotation. One example would be the term „rhinoceros”, whose literal extension (rhinos) is denoted by the label „stout and sturdy but shy”, which co-denotes a *metaphorical extension*, namely, all those persons that are stout and sturdy but shy, making the metaphor „rhinoceros” appropriate in the same way that „Sun” is appropriate to turn Juliet (within the frame of the metaphor) into a symbol of dazzlingness (co-exemplified label). Note that the people do not exemplify a „metaphorical property” of being a rhinoceros. They exemplify the label „stout and sturdy but shy” by *being* stout, sturdy, and shy, which, *given an appropriate frame* (a context that *selects* relevant properties)<sup>32</sup> makes the metaphorical application of „rhinoceros” apt for them. Here is a corresponding musical case: someone describes DV using „veils” or „sails” as metaphorical *terms* (e.g. „these sounds are fluttering veils”); we now have the literal extension of those terms (veils and sails) and their *metaphorical extension* („fluttering” musical sounds like those making up DV). The sounds literally possess certain properties that ground the application of the *label* „fluttering” (notice the distinction between *terms*, *label* and *properties*)<sup>33</sup>; so, the music *metaphorically exemplifies* (and perhaps it also *expresses*)<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> M. Carmo d'Orey, op. cit., p. 423.

<sup>32</sup> On this, see N. Puy, op. cit., pp. 274-277.

<sup>33</sup> All terms, evidently, are also labels in the Goodmanian sense. The distinction here is merely to pull apart the terms that are metaphorically applied from the labels that must be exemplified *so that the metaphor is an apt one*. When we describe the sounds as *fluttering veils*, the music must *literally* exemplify some labels (or literally instantiate some properties, in the idiom of property instantiation) and the way we *epistemically organize* those into a *Gestalt* is what *constitutes* metaphorical exemplification. In other words, what I call *terms* are those labels that are part of the metaphorical *descriptions* people make (e.g. of music), whereas what must be exemplified (or instanced) so that the metaphor is apt, I am calling *labels*. One difference is that these *labels* might not be even thought of explicitly. We seldom think of or explicitly verbalize, for any given metaphorical description we make, the labels (or properties) involved in making that description apt. We do it intuitively.

<sup>34</sup> Those who are not comfortable with the idea that FM is a proper *expressible* can take „expression of FM” as shorthand for „expression of the sensation of FM” or of some mental state that is in some perspectival relationship with FM. This will take them one step up the ladder, toward some other label, but it will require,

FM by metaphorically exemplifying it, all of which makes the metaphorical *description* in terms of veils or sails an *apt* one. This is obviously a very simplified picture. Any actual, concrete case of musical expression will involve a complex web of labels (and properties).<sup>35</sup>In the words of Nick Zangwill: „A stretch of music will bristle with different aesthetic properties, and in listening to the music and its properties, we may selectively attend to some aesthetic properties rather than others.”<sup>36</sup>

Every tree leaf in the world is different from any other, and yet any of them could exemplify *being a leaf* or being a leaf of a certain kind. Expression and exemplification are *just that combination of uniqueness and shareability*.

The mistake is thinking that if exemplification plays a role in expressiveness, then the *individuating* features of the expressive act embodied in the work must be part of what is exemplified. This is a confused idea of how exemplification works. It contradicts the logic of exemplification. And here Sousa could reply „Precisely my point! I claim that expressiveness is incompatible with exemplification”, but the problem is that the *uniqueness* of an exemplificational symbol does not flow from the *referential mechanism* of exemplification. There is a *false dichotomy* here between the unique or singular and the shareable, when in fact expressiveness *always* involves a *relation* between a unique particular and a complex web of co-referring labels, as a condition of our recognizing *any* expressive feature. That is the difference between denotation and exemplification: exemplification is a *two-way* relation between a concrete object and a system of labels. Even the sample in the colour chart is a unique concrete object. But for the purposes of colour charts, that uniqueness is completely irrelevant to us. The less we notice it the better. That is not the case, for instance, with facial expressions as exemplifications of character traits in a portrait. Just imagine that the painter executes a series of preliminary studies before completing the portrait and the idea I am trying to push forward will come out even clearer. A unique sequence of musical sounds arranged by Debussy uniquely expresses FM (among other things), *because it is that unique musical sequence expressing FM*, rather than: *a musical sequence expressing such-and-such-unique-FM*. It seems like a minute verbal detail, but it marks an important difference. Sousa’s picture of things is the following: if exemplification played any role in expressiveness, then the expressive uniqueness of DV would be due to the exemplification of a unique property,

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as its component, the metaphorical exemplification of FM (it will make us hear „things fluttering *in* the sounds”). So it makes no difference for me whether we say that FM is *expressed* in this piece or that its metaphorical exemplification is part of the expression of some other „proper” label. It doesn’t change anything in my argument.

<sup>35</sup> M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> N. Zangwill, op. cit., p. 163.

viz. *DVFM*,<sup>37</sup> conceived non-relationally. Since Sousa thinks the consequent describes an inconsistent state of affairs, it would follow by *modus tollens* that the antecedent is false, and exemplification plays no role. But this, I believe, is a confusion.

Ultimately, the confusion comes down to the „transparency” and „opaqueness” of exemplificational symbols. The colour chart is transparent in this sense, while Mondrian’s *Broadway Boogie-Woogie* (1943) is opaque, even though it is also made of many coloured squares. Basically, Sousa argues that opaqueness cannot coexist with exemplification. He rigidly connects shareability with symbolic transparency, and thus also rigidly connects the latter with exemplification. But this is surely wrong: the coloured squares in *Broadway Boogie-Woogie* metaphorically exemplify energetic rhythmic sequences - not *quite* the same as the squares in *Victory Boogie-Woogie* (unfinished, 1944) but related, just like different *types* of „musical fluttering” are related. If expression was as radically atomized as Sousa seems to conceive it, we wouldn’t be able to grasp the *relation* between Mondrian’s two paintings. So, while it is true that exemplification requires sharing of properties, it is not true that this excludes the uniqueness *and* symbolic opacity.

The third premise of the argument connects expressiveness and uniqueness through the „heresy of the separable experience”. On the surface, it sounds outright preposterous: for any truly *expressible* property F, there is only *one* single expression of that F. But that is where Sousa’s reasoning from Budd’s „heresy” leads him to. If F is shareable between particulars, it cannot be the *content* of expression. And this makes it arbitrary. Let us see how.

Several different performative approaches to DV will share the *kind* of „musical fluttering” (FM) that the piece uniquely embodies. So FM is an *expressive property* of the music, if anything is. Consider another example: both Fauré’s *Pavane* and Ravel’s *Pavane* are „sad sounding pieces”, they embody „musical sadness” (MS). Because MS is shareable, Sousa must exclude it from expression, but it would be odd to exclude it from exemplification. So, the issue is really about *a distinction between properties*: how do we tell properties that can be genuinely expressed from those that are merely exemplified? Let us return to Debussy and musical fluttering. If we ask at what point shareability breaks down, where „exemplifiable features” cease and „genuine expression” begins, the arbitrariness of premise 3 stands out. Any performance of DV by different performers (e.g. Gieseking and Tsybuleva) must „embody” FMDV, so it seems FMDV is shareable. Shall we look for genuine expression only at the level of concrete particulars such as *Gieseking’s-performance-of-DV-at-time-t*? But then what *unifies* Gieseking’s performances of DV *expressively*? What makes it interesting to

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<sup>37</sup> Debussy’s-*Voiles*-Fluttering-Movement.

group *them* together, rather than part of them with performances of early 20<sup>th</sup> century piano music that uses whole tone scales? We would end up with this bizarre scenario: *bona fide* expression at the level of concrete performances –*FMDV-by-[performer P]-at-time-t* –and exemplification for more general labels, all the way up to „plain” FM. But as a move against the Goodmanian theory of exemplification this is just too awkward and burdensome; even perhaps to the point of wondering whether it would not be less burdensome to ditch Budd’s „heresy”. After all, it seems that taking the „heresy” to the letter would eventually deliver the prescription: *Thou shalt not use a performance-of-DV-by-Giesecking-at-t to acquire the same experience of musical DVFM afforded by a performance-of-DV-by-Tsybuleva-at-t!* But this is plainly *wrong*: part of the *expressivecore* of DV are precisely the *shareable* elements of DVFM!

#### IV Is there a role for metaphor in expressiveness?

Sousa’s first and third problems concern not exemplification *per se* but the idea of a *metaphorical* variety of it. As we recall, the first difficulty involved three sub-arguments: the argument from secondary extensions; the argument from fictional predication; and the argument from true descriptions. The third difficulty consists in the argument from confused ascription. Since I have argued against these views elsewhere,<sup>38</sup> and since Sousa’s arguments here, unlike in the second problem, are more derivative, I will settle for a summary of counter-reasons.

*The argument from secondary extensions.* Those who think there is a substantial epistemic difference between literal and metaphorical speech (e.g. Davidsonians about metaphor<sup>39</sup>) believe that if descriptions of music in terms of emotion turn out to be literal that strikes a terrible blow to Goodman’s theory, but this is misguided. Recall fig. 1 above. What makes exemplification metaphorical there is the *shift in domain*, from a literal extension to a metaphorical one. This sounds circular, but we can replace „metaphorical” in the latter phrase for some other term. The latter is only qualified as metaphorical because of the shift in domain (from rhinos to people). Let us imagine that „rhinoceros” became an incredibly popular metaphor, applied to people, eventually dying out, becoming literalized (like „legs” and „back” as applied to furniture). The shift in domain doesn’t go away. „Metaphor” stands

<sup>38</sup> V. Guerreiro, op. cit., pp. 302-324.

<sup>39</sup> J. Young, *Art and knowledge*, London 2001, pp. 170; D. Davidson. *What Metaphors Mean*. „Critical Inquiry” 1978, vol. 5, n°1, pp. 31-47.

for „transfer” and that is what we have there: a transfer or *mapping* from one domain to another. Even a partisan of resemblance theory like Young says: „there is a *cross-domain resemblance* between music and bodily motion.”<sup>40</sup> He thinks cross-domain mapping is the underlying mechanism for musical expressiveness, which is ironic, given that defenders of the metaphorist thesis appeal to the very same thing (e.g. Peacocke 2009). The fact that such resemblances are *cross-domain* (i.e. what we may call, with Elgin, „metaphorical likening”<sup>41</sup>) is *more relevant* and a much more important concession than any talk about how we understand the terms with which we describe musical experience. Furthermore, if „the music is sad” is literal because it is shorthand for „the music resembles human behaviour under the effect of sadness” then „the music is fluttering” would also be literal because the relevant resemblances are as „cross-domain” as the emotional ones. So, this move could turn any metaphorical description of music into a literal one.

For Goodman, the boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is unstable; it oscillates with use and habit. Metaphors can die out, but differences in domain do not. Musical sounds are *not* sails or veils. There is a grain of truth in Young’s criticism that Goodman’s theory of expressiveness is a *version* of the resemblance theory.<sup>42</sup> But it is only a grain of truth: the rest is that resemblance theory is also a version of Goodman’s that *lacks* something: a proper framing for resemblances. Goodman’s is not the defective version. At most, resemblance theory appeals to one sort of framing, derived from some evolutionary story.<sup>43</sup> Because she considers only one kind of frame, the resemblance theorist thinks there is no frame, that resemblance is „naked” or „natural”. I cannot explore this here, but the mistake is to see resemblance as primitive, when *the frame* is the truly operative element.

*The argument from fictional predication.* Davies’ stronger version of this argument goes like this: there is a distinction between „what a painting expresses and what is expressed in it by a depicted character”.<sup>44</sup> How do we distinguish between them if we take expressiveness to be metaphorical exemplification? It can be posed as a dilemma: Are *both* expressions metaphorical? Do both count as expression? If they do, how to distinguish them? If not, metaphor explains nothing.

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<sup>40</sup> J. Young, *Critique of pure music*, Oxford 2014, p. 21, my emphasis.

<sup>41</sup> C. Elgin & I. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 333. See also M. Carmo d’Orey, op. cit., pp. 420–423. The concept of *metaphorical likening* has the advantage of suggesting that the resemblance is something that the metaphor *does* or *achieves*, by *framing* properties.

<sup>42</sup> J. Young, *Goodman on metaphorical exemplification...*, op. cit., p. 261.

<sup>43</sup> See S. Davies, *Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music* [in:] idem. *Musical Understandings & Other Essays in the Philosophy of Music*. New York 2011, pp. 7–20.

<sup>44</sup> S. Davies, *Musical meaning and expression*, Ithaca 1994, p. 139.

Here is my answer to this dilemma. A depicted character is an element in a (complex) symbol; some parts of symbols are symbols themselves. What is true of the parts is not necessarily true of the whole and vice-versa. We need only remember Goodman's distinction between *pictures of unicorns* and *unicorn-pictures* to break the dilemma. Unicorns don't exist, but *unicorn-pictures* do. Unicorn-pictures are denoted by and exemplify the label „unicorn-picture”, and *its* secondary extensions. A picture need not *denote* a unicorn to be a unicorn-picture. As Elgin puts it, the extension of an *x*-description is not determined by the extension of „*x*”.<sup>45</sup>

All representation is representation-as:<sup>46</sup> any picture pictures its subject *as* being this or that way. The dabs of paint representing Icarus' flailing legs in Bruegel's famous painting represent him *as two-legged*. A woman-picture that was also a smiling-woman-picture would be no more metaphorical than an Icarus-picture that is a two-legged-person-picture. There is no shift in domain across the extensions of relevant labels. The same doesn't apply to a man-description that is also a giant-insect-description. Such pictures and descriptions can be parts of a more complex symbol. What the symbol *as a whole* is expressive of is a different matter. An allegorical painting doesn't have to be entirely made of allegorical pictorial parts. To suppose otherwise is to commit the fallacy of decomposition.

*The argument from true descriptions.* Once again, this seems to be an issue for Davidsonians about metaphor, or anyone who thinks metaphors are epistemically deviant. Perhaps terms like „turbulent”, and „fluttering”, become literal, by way of habit, when applied to musical movement. Still, there is what even partisans of resemblance theory don't deny: cross-domain resemblance; a transference or mapping from the realm of moving objects to the realm of sonic relations. A musical piece expresses turbulence, or tempestuous agitation, just like it expresses fluttering movement: by exemplifying labels/properties that co-refer things (e.g. storms, stormy behaviour, etc.) in a domain distinct from the sonic. We hardly ever notice that expressions such as „The whole tone scale is the *key* to understanding *Voiles*” are metaphors, because we get used to them, though this latter one is plainly true *and* metaphorical.

*The argument from confused ascription.* This objection ignores the role of labels and context in exemplification, as if there was such a thing as reference by *sheer possession* of properties, without the need of a context that *selects* relevant properties. It ignores the role of exemplification *in making metaphor work*. Of course, if you think metaphors are just

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<sup>45</sup> C. Elgin & I. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 332.

<sup>46</sup> M. Carmo d'Orey, op. cit., p. 402.

linguistic „blows to the head”<sup>47</sup> you will not be impressed by this charge. But such a view is by no means a default view on metaphor, that we should accept unquestionably. Without a system of labels in place, a context, nothing is a sample, nothing exemplifies, nothing refers. It is context that makes the relevant properties and resemblances *salient*. Some readers might find it strange to claim that Debussy’s piece expresses fluttering movement without invoking Debussy’s *intentions*. From a Goodmanian point of view, we don’t need to know authorial intentions to know what a work exemplifies, though knowing them may be of *heuristic* value in finding out. The properties of the music itself, in relation with the symbol systems in use are enough to make it „flutter”.<sup>48</sup> The acoustic properties of the piece are such that the metaphorical description „these sounds are fluttering veils” would be *plausible* even if the prelude had no title. The piece’s metaphorically exemplifying fluttering consists in the contextual selection of cross-domain resemblances between musical sounds and fluttering veils. The same contextual selection determines whether a sentence is metaphorical. However, „metaphor” is just a word. Should we use „illustration of cross-domain resemblances” instead of “metaphorical exemplification”, to appease those who privilege linguistic descriptions, the result would be just the same. There is no confusion between description and ascription because metaphor is based on „framed resemblances”. For any two objects in different domains there is *some* frame under which one of them *maps onto* the other. The Sun vividly resembles a flickering flame, but its resemblance to bleach (both whiten things) stands out when properly framed. The resemblance theorist’s reliance on a single frame (dispositions installed by our evolutionary history) is curious, since it is an essential feature of the *perspective-building* function of art (which Young theorised so well) to make some resemblances *recede* and others *stand out*: selecting, amplifying, simplifying, juxtaposing, correlating, connecting.<sup>49</sup> It would be most strange if music was the single exception to this. Part of what composers do is teaching us how to listen in different ways, however subtly. And this involves constant framing and re-framing of resemblances across domains, generating different salience patterns at each time.

## Conclusion

Some of the difficulties raised by Sousa to the idea of expressiveness as metaphorical exemplification are not altogether new, nor does he present them as such. Also, the objections

<sup>47</sup> D. Davidson’s expression (op. cit., p. 46).

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion of this point, see S. Davies, op. cit., pp. 140-143. I will not respond here to Davies on Goodman’s anti-intentionalism. See also C. Elgin & I. Scheffler, op. cit., p. 334.

<sup>49</sup> J. Young, *Art and knowledge...*, op. cit., pp. 82–85.



addressed here, or versions thereof, are only a small part of what is to be found in the extant literature<sup>50</sup>. However, they are representative of the resistance aroused by Goodman's ideas. It has become *too* fashionable for them to be unfashionable. Whenever that is the case, some stirring is in order. I do not expect to have shaken all the sceptic's (certainly not Sousa's) doubts about the fruitfulness of Goodman's theory, but I will be satisfied if this is enough to spark a renewed interest in it.

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<sup>50</sup> For an overview, S. Davies, op. cit., pp. 137–149.

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## SUMMARY

**Vítor Guerreiro**

### On metaphorical exemplification in music: a reply to Sousa

I address a series of difficulties raised by Tiago Sousa against the use of Nelson Goodman's concept of metaphorical exemplification to explain expressiveness in music, especially purely instrumental music. My aim is not exactly to defend Goodman, but rather the soundness or plausibility of using metaphorical exemplification in explaining expressiveness. I approach Sousa's difficulties in two blocs: i) his first and third problems challenge the metaphorical character of certain descriptions of music, and the consistency of metaphorical (as opposed to literal) exemplification; ii) his second problem is directed at the compatibility between exemplification (metaphorical or otherwise) and expressiveness. I focus especially on this second problem: if what a musical work expresses is uniquely bound to the experience of *that* musical work and no other, how can expressiveness be anything like the exemplification of properties by samples? My further aim, more than dispelling these difficulties beyond any doubt, is to rekindle discussion of Goodman's ideas on expressiveness. They are just too fashionably out of fashion, which is always a sign that some stirring is in order.

## Keywords

musical expressiveness, metaphor, exemplification, Goodman

