

A light blue world map with white landmasses. A red circle highlights the Netherlands in Western Europe, with a small red dot marking its location.

# Collaboratively increasing the resilience of critical services in the Netherlands through a national DDoS clearing house

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## A few DDoS trends

- Volume at 1+ Tbps, likely going up (Dyn 1.2 Tbps, GitHub 1.3 Tbps)
  - Many widely distributed sources (Mirai 600K, Hajime 400K)
  - High propagate rates (e.g., Mirai from 42K to 71K bots in 1 hour)
  - Complex traffic (e.g., bot churn, volumetric/TCP state exhaustion)
  - Easier to launch through booters/stressers (Mirai)
  - Reflection attacks possible (e.g., Mirai and Reaper botnets)
- ➔ At the same time, our societies increasingly depend on network services!

- Antonakakis, T. April, M. Bailey, M. Bernhard, E. Bursztein, J. Cochran, Z., Durumeric, J. A. Halderman, L. Invernizzi, M. Kallitsis, D. Kumar, C. Lever, Z. Ma, J. Mason, D. Menscher, C. Seaman, N. Sullivan, K. Thomas, and Y. Zhou, “Understanding the Mirai Botnet”, 26th USENIX Security Symposium, 2017
- S. Herwig, K. Harvey, G. Hughey, R. Roberts, and D. Levin, “Measurement and Analysis of Hajime, a Peer-to-peer IoT Botnet”, Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2019, San Diego, CA, USA, February 2019


# Netherlands critical infrastructure

- Services whose “failure or disruption ... would result in severe social disruption and poses a threat to national security” (NL gov’t)
- Providers protect their services through (3rd party) DDoS mitigation systems (e.g., scrubbing)
- Limited DDoS information sharing, focus on person-to-person comms during attacks (reactive)
- Trigger to change: estimated 40 Gbps DDoS attacks in January 2018, resulting in various service outages

The screenshot shows a news article on the NOS website. The main headline is "Na banken nu ook Belastingdienst en DigiD slachtoffer DDoS-aanvallen". Below the headline, there is a sub-headline "DigiD: Je eigen inlogcode voor de hele overheid". The article text, partially visible, discusses a DDoS attack on the tax authority and DigiD, mentioning that the service is currently unavailable and that the government is working on a solution. The article is dated 9 January 2018.

## New: DDoS information sharing in NL

- Continuous and automatic sharing of “DDoS fingerprints” buys providers time (proactive)
- Extends DDoS protection services that critical service providers use and does not replace them
- Improves attribution, allowing for better prosecution and increased deterrent effects
- Open to all critical providers in the Netherlands (Internet, financial, energy, water, etc.)




# DDoS fingerprints

- Summary of DDoS traffic
  - Domain names used
  - Source IP addresses
  - Protocol
  - Packet length
  - No victim IP addresses!
- Created from network measurements
  - Examples: PCAP files, Netflow, IPFIX, sFlow, and Logfile
- Fingerprint extension records (optional)
  - Device-specific packet filter rules that ops teams used
  - Suspected type of DDoS attack (e.g., Mirai or Hajime-powered)
  - Contact details of ops team
- Challenge: creation at high speed (10s of Gbps)

# Status

- Embraced by a coalition of 25 players from industry (ISPs, xSPs, IXPs, banks, not-for-profit DPS) and gov't (ministries and agencies)
- Including various existing collaborative anti-DDoS initiatives, such as the Dutch Continuity Board (DCB), NoMoreDDoS, and NaWas
- Working groups:
  - **Clearing house**
  - Cross-industry information sharing
  - Outreach
  - Ground rules and incident response
  - Exercises
- Facilitated by Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL)

# Clearing house overall architecture (DRAFT)



# Clearing house pilot

- Netherlands
  - Approach: start small and iteratively scale up to more partners
  - Infra operators: NBIP, KPN, VodafoneZiggo, NL-ix, SIDN
  - Government: THTC, NCSC-NL
  - Financial: Dutch Payment Association
  - Research: University of Twente
- European Union  **CONCORDIA**  
Cyber security cOmpeteNCe fOR Research anD InnovAtion
  - Part of CONCORDIA project ([www.concordia-h2020.eu](http://www.concordia-h2020.eu))
  - Development of a “cookbook” to run system in multiple member states
  - Use cases are pilot in the Netherlands and a second one in Italy
- Develop clearing house
  - Extend and improve existing components
  - DDoS-DB of the University of Twente ([ddosdb.org](http://ddosdb.org))
  - NBIP’s DDoS pattern recognition system ([ddos-patterns.net](http://ddos-patterns.net))

## Next steps

- Initial version of NL pilot
  - Setting up joint development and experimentation environment
  - First share pre-generated fingerprints, then on-the-fly generated prints
- Agree on and flesh out charter/manifesto
  - WG Ground rules and incident response
- Envisioned growth paths
  - Netherlands → Europe → global (e.g., through CONCORDIA)
  - Extend to “non-critical” service providers



## Q&A

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