


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Officers of the Society

President

Lewis P. Lipsitt
Department of Psychology
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912-0001
llipsitt@brownvm.brown.edu

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Kenner, LA 70065-1018
matthews@loyno.edu

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Bethesda, MD 20816
aboneau@gmu.edu

Historian

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Peter Salovey
Department of Psychology
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520-8205
peter.salovey@yale.edu



The APA Convention has come and gone along with many of the leaves on trees outside my window. This issue contains mostly material generated by the Society's Convention program and is here for the benefit of those who missed it. As you read remember to exercise your opportunity to vote for Division One on the APA Council Apportionment ballot. And by all means fill out the nomination ballot packaged with this issue so that the Elections Committee will know your wishes about future leadership of the Division. Needed are nominations for President-Elect and for two Members of the Executive Committee. The election will held in the Spring and the nominations are needed by the end of this year.



The Behavioral Mechanism: In Search of Causal Relationships

**Kurt Salzinger
Hofstra University**

Psychology is a field rampant with wonder. Over the centuries, people of all stripes have claimed an ability to influence others in a myriad of ways—pinpricks, imaging, deep muscle relaxation, moral persuasion, hypnosis, reinforcement, punishment, parenting, psychotherapy, therapeutic alliance, cognitive dissonance, brain washing, cognitive restructuring, empathy, insight, psychokinesis, modelling, Mozart's piano compositions, rap, even education, never mind the so-called somatic treatments beginning with trepanning, electroshock therapy, and lobotomies. They have also claimed that elements in nature and in our artificially constructed environment have influenced people's behavior in a variety of ways, viz., seasons of the year, electromagnetic fields, weather conditions, alien kidnappings, earthquakes, floods, diseases of various intensities, extremes of temperature—both personal and external, crowding conditions, sensory isolation, extremes of noise, stroboscopic lights, drugs, herbs, foods, food additives and preservatives.

The absurdity of some of the relationships "found" has too often induced us to ask the question "Is this a reliable relation?" rather than asking "How can this be?" We have too long concentrated on answering the question of the existence of the effect—the practical applied question, but spent altogether too little time answering the scientific question concerning the means by which that influence could be taking place. It may sound more reasonable to determine whether an effect is actually taking place before trying to find out how it works; on the other hand, deliberating and/or investigating how such an effect could possibly take place might spare us the colossal waste of time used to looking for something that is patently absurd.

Showing coincidence of similarity of people's names and their occupations, such as Sally Ride being the first woman to ride in space and Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox being concerned with animal behavior, Lipsitt (1990) has used those relations to demonstrate to his psychology classes how one can jump to conclusions about relations when there are none. Thus, one is tempted to suggest if your name is Fish that it will cause you to become an ichthyologist or at least to end up falling in love with fishing. What calls our attention to those suppositions is a discovery of an instance of such a co-occurrence. An interesting question is what about these relations convinces us that they are causal in nature.

Chapman (1967) studied what can only be called, as he did, "illusory correlations." He presented pairs of words to subjects equally often. The only difference among the pairs was that, while most words were randomly paired, some pairs contained words associated with one another as in "bacon-eggs" and some contained words that were noticeably longer than the rest. Subjects who had seen each of the particular word pairs equally often nevertheless reported that the associated word-pairs and the longer word-pairs occurred more often than the others. Thus, when we notice that a Dr. Fish is an ichthyologist, we are more likely to note it and to assume that such relations occur more frequently than they actually do. All of this leads us to the point that "observed" relations should not immediately be interpreted as causal effects. Although the causal relation posited does not exist, our behavior of positing such relations provides us with an example of another behavioral mechanism.

This article was given as an invited address of the Society at the Convention of the American Psychological Association in Washington, DC, in August, 2000. The speaker is and was Past-President of the Society.

In other words, when hearing of a relationship, we must determine by what mechanism the hypothesized effects occur. We need to discover by what agency and what process something occurs or is achieved. Our studies often show correlations between what we designate as independent variables and what we hope are the dependent variables—the effects. The basic contention of this paper is that what distinguishes application from science is discovering what intervenes between what we do and what we get, or between what happens first and then how that might produce what happens next. In application, doing something effective is sufficient; in science, it is critical to find out how this something, this independent variable produces that effect. And, of course, when we do not know what intervenes—what the behavioral mechanism is—the correlation sometimes mysteriously disappears on second look.

The behavioral mechanism

It is convenient to picture the behavioral mechanism as in Figure 1. We are, of course, interested in behavior, that is, what people and other animals do. I will include thinking and feeling under the concept of behavior. I would also




Figure 1 THE BEHAVIORAL MECHANISM

like to say at the outset that I am using the word, "mechanism" to mean in the words of the American Heritage Dictionary "that by which something is accomplished or some end achieved." I do not imply that human beings or any other animal is a machine or that I am going to try to explain behavior by assuming a mechanism like the workings of a clock. I am interested in answering the question of how come people engage in particular acts. To answer that question, it helps to know their physical state, to know how the environment supports or discourages their behavior, how much experience they have (reinforcement history), what motivation there is for the act in question (current reinforcement contingency), how other behavior makes the behavior in question more or less likely by making certain events more or less salient, what the consequences of the behavior are and finally how all these factors interact with one another.

Let us look at a couple of examples of the interaction of the physical state with the reinforcement history to generate or inhibit a behavior. A woman may, for example, be aware of the approach of an animal at a distance that others in the group are unaware of. The critical aspect of the behavioral mechanism in this case may be her superior eye sight. If she is motivated by wishing not to be different from others (her reinforcement history is such that one does not show up other people with one's superiority), she may not predict the approach of the animal and in that case, it is the reinforcement history that would supply us with another part of the behavioral mechanism to explain her behavior or lack of it.

In a second example, ask a man to locate a city on a map and find he is unable to do it. That inability might well be based on color blindness despite his experience with

black and white map reading (his reinforcement history to use a more technical expression), but here you would find an interaction of his environment (requiring as it does the discrimination of colors from one another) and his physical state. The environment is such that it fails to allow him to make use of his reinforcement history. If the map had not required color discrimination for a correct reading, the appropriate response could have been emitted. But if the man did not suffer from color blindness but had never learned to read a map (had not had an adequate reinforcement history), then he still would not have made the correct response but for a different reason, that is, the behavioral mechanism to explain his behavior would have been different; it would have pointed to his reinforcement history.

For the rest of the paper, I will give you examples of how, in various areas of psychology, we can fruitfully apply the behavioral mechanism to elucidate the phenomenon examined.

Believing is seeing

Let us first consider some research we are all familiar with, such as a straightforward psychophysical experiment in vision. The subjects sit quite still, biteboard clenched in their teeth, focussing on a faint red dot. Their instructions are to press one button when they see a light and another when they don't. The basic assumption used to be that you could simply train subjects to validly "tell" the experimenter when they saw the light. Sure enough, you sometimes had to run subjects for a while until you obtained stable behavior, inserting "catch" trials on which you presented no stimulus at all along the way, but lawful data did ultimately materialize from such experiments. The behavioral mechanism here was thought to be

simply the subject's discriminating the presence of the light. But then came signal detection theory (Sweets, 1964) and the separation of the "I see" response into two components—criterion and sensitivity; it turned out that subjects made some kind of decision about when they would say "I see" in response to what the retina registered. That there are two different events is made clear when the subject says "I'm not really sure." Indeed, our behavioral mechanism chart shows us that the "I see" response is a function of at least the physical state (how dark adapted the subject is, never mind whether he is blind or not), the reinforcement history, that is, how often lights were shown in the past as well as what the current reinforcement contingency is, for example, whether the subject's wages are dependent on the number of detections of the lights.

Some 40 years ago, a series of investigators promoted a concept of perceptual defense, according to which human beings were capable of shielding themselves from aversive stimuli without awareness. Hypothesizing an entirely different behavioral mechanism, Goldiamond and Hawkins (1958) demonstrated subjects "seeing" nonsense syllables when only a Rorschach card was very briefly presented. The particular nonsense syllable that subjects "recognized" was determined by the frequency with which each had been previously exposed (reinforcement history); in other words, subjects "saw" particular nonsense syllables determined not by the contemporary stimulus but by the frequency with which that stimulus had been presented earlier. Here we have a beautiful demonstration of the response bias effect. What should have been a foregone conclusion as to what determines a response, namely the amount of light impinging on one's retina, turned out to be two processes—one the physiological response and the other, the subject's tendency to report seeing a light or a nonsense syllable. One can also manipulate the response bias by rewarding the observers' "I see" responses and punishing their "not seeing" responses. Under such conditions, the observers will see lights even when none is impinging on their retinas. Psychophysics, it turns out, harbors two behavioral mechanisms—one stimulus controlled and one response controlled. In any case, it becomes clear that when something as precise as psychophysics lends itself to interpretation of various mechanisms, that one had better examine the existence of mechanism in cases of less precision more carefully.

Storks and birthrates, and other silly correlations

At the other extreme of experimental precision is the "silly" correlation. Any of us who ever taught a class in research design or statistics have given the stork problem as an example of such a correlation. Here, we show that correlation is not enough to allow one to talk about cause and effect. My favorite example of a silly correlation is that between number of storks flying over Sweden (I don't know why Sweden, you may know it as number of storks flying over Finland) and the number of children born on the same day. What makes such a correlation funny is, of course, the old story that used to be told by parents to their children to explain how they came to be, namely that a stork brought them. Now that is a mechanism of sorts to

explain birth; it is just not a reasonable one. It is clearly a case that people will not spend their time trying to replicate; they will dismiss the notion out of hand, refusing the prospect of being sent on a wild stork chase, so to speak.

Nonsense studies

It may not seem fair to juxtapose extrasensory perception next to stork-birth correlations. Yet our continued skepticism about ESP no matter how many times we hear of "statistically significant" results shows us how alike they are, at least in our minds. Why is that? It is so because parapsychologists' rejection of possible sensory mechanisms has not been accompanied by a description, never mind demonstration, of what that extrasensory path might consist of. To say what something is not, does not provide us with a behavioral mechanism. Let us look at a recent article on ESP by Bem and Honorton (1994). Its appearance in a reputable psychological journal, namely the *Psychological Bulletin* again started the debate in mainstream psychology on whether the experimenters took sufficient care in keeping out behavioral and sensory mechanisms that could have explained the information transfer. These authors stated in their abstract (p. 4): "Most academic psychologists do not yet accept the existence of psi, anomalous processes of information or energy transfer (e.g., telepathy or other forms of extrasensory perception) that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological mechanisms." What is interesting about the field of parapsychology is that its researchers make it their business to detect the presence of this mysterious phenomenon of extra sensory reception or transfer of information or stimulation. In the service of this search, psychologists have studied personalities of "successful" senders and receivers; they have looked at states of the subjects, the types of targets supposed to be sent or received and of course any leakages of stimulation by sensory paths instead of the extrasensory ones.

From the point of view of the behavioral mechanism, this research is most valuable when it yields such information as subjects' keen hearing ability and/or the nature of the subjects' response bias, as already discussed above with respect to signal detection theory. Concentration of the research on finding "methodological flaws" or even interpretation of the results in terms of methodological flaws is not as useful as drawing conclusions with respect to what behavioral mechanism explains the subjects' behavior best. Because of the very name "extrasensory," this kind of research is in some sense anti-mechanism if you like; it rejoices when it fails to find a mechanism that would explain the behavior of the subject and when it does so reliably, that is, when it can replicate this lack of explanatory mechanism. The Bem and Honorton (1994) article encouraged researchers to try to replicate their evidence for extrasensory psychology. In response, a meta-analysis of some 30 ganzfeld ESP studies by Milton and Wiseman (1999) concluded that the most recent experiments do not find evidence favoring the existence of extrasensory perception.

Other controversial psychological studies are in desper-

ate need of specification of mechanism. To take but a few examples, we have such relations as the effect of epidemiological variables on psychological health, seasons of the year and the occurrence of schizophrenia, molar vs. molecular analyses of schedules of reinforcement, and recovered memory. In each case what has made the area of research controversial has been the argument about the behavioral mechanism.

Mozart—music to our brains?

A whole industry has grown up recently around the idea of the Mozart effect. A governor of a state has hastened to send the music to expectant mothers to improve the intelligence of the children of that state. Grateful as we ought to be for laypeople's interest in classical music and particularly in Mozart (who could quarrel with that?) and perhaps the most immediate and powerful application of a psychological finding, we still need successful replication. In 1993, Rauscher, Shaw and Ky reported a noticeable improvement in spatial reasoning as a result of listening to some 10 minutes of Mozart's Sonata for Two Pianos in D major, K. 448. That finding inspired a spate of attempts at replication with relatively little success (e.g., Steele, Bass & Crook, 1999). Again, the question is, "By what behavioral mechanism can we expect such an effect?" Rauscher et al. pay some tribute to neurophysiology but fail to specify the behavioral parts of the mechanism. What precisely in Mozart's wonderful music makes it better than Glass in educating children? What precisely is the form of spatio-temporal functioning that they are talking about? It is not enough to say the brain profits from Mozart. Before we accept the idea that music, particularly any specific piece of music—no matter how exquisite—has an inroad to the brain, we must first lay bare the behavioral route to take.

Recovered vs. invented memory

Let us, next examine a more serious and very controversial area of psychology, namely recovered memory. Psychologists and others have been debating alternative mechanisms in books, journals, and courthouses. Those who believe in the existence of recovered memory have postulated that the psychotherapist's "memory work" is what evoked information from patients, that is, somehow removed an emotional barrier from recalling the knowledge that the patient harbored but simply could not extricate; on the other hand, many others have demonstrated that one can evoke such alleged memory by introducing the patients to it, that is, by implanting it. These different interpretations of what happens when a person (usually a woman) says that she remembers having been sexually abused are of course alternative mechanisms that have not merely yielded theoretical controversy but produced practical consequences for those who "recalled," those whose alleged behavior was recalled, and those who helped the patients do the recalling. The question central to the recovered memory area is "Can a person not know or recall a horrendous event that happened to her or him at one time and then know or recall it at another time?" Repression theory says exactly that but it is to be noted that even the idea of repression is a concept and not a factual or data-based statement.

A recent study by Miller and Wolford (1999) applied the signal detection approach we mentioned earlier to the problem of recovered memory. Using Deese's (1959) method of inducing false memories, they determined subjects' sensitivity (discriminability if you like), by examining how strongly they associate words to one another, and response bias by examining how "liberal" or "conservative" subjects are in accepting a suggested memory as real. The investigators concluded that the false memory they found reflected a response bias about what to call "old" (or experienced). Extrapolating to false memories in the therapeutic context is not all that easy since the memory in recovered memory deals with traumatic events whereas here it is simply a word previously learned or not; nevertheless, this study suggests that those with false memories have a general tendency to accept suggestions as their memories rather than having a difficulty in distinguishing thoughts from memories. That is an hypothesis that could be tested. Discovering whether people who are easily influenced suffer from an inability to discriminate reality from suggested events, or simply tend to respond in particular ways as a function of current reinforcement contingencies (Fig. 1) should be useful in arming people against being easily influenced to believe in events that did not occur.

Get me to the church on time

Let us examine still another possible behavioral mechanism. In recent weeks, newspapers have been touting the usefulness of church attendance. "Churchgoers live longer" advise the newspaper headlines. I tell myself that the headline writer used the word "church" in its generic sense but still, I find my lack of attendance at any house of worship somewhat worrisome. When I examined the paper (Hummer, Rogers, Nam, & Ellison, 1999) underlying the headline, I found a seven-year difference in life expectancy between attenders and non-attenders. The review of the literature showed that not all studies found a positive relation between religion and mortality, suggesting a spurious relationship or a variety of behavioral mechanisms to account for the religion-mortality relation. In the Hummer et al paper some of these alternate behavioral mechanisms alluded to were social ties (number of friends, relatives, people that could be called upon for help) that attenuated the church attendance mortality relationship. The paper also showed how church attendance was affected by such factors as diabetes and infectious disease mortality. Of course, most sociology studies which are dependent on questionnaires need to be followed up with behavioral studies to determine how one gets from their independent to their dependent variables even when the latter are as conclusive as death. A fairly strong relationship still remained between church attendance and mortality after the authors got through examining a number of behavioral mechanisms. They concluded that future work should look into "mediating factors" (behavioral mechanisms as I see them) such as stress (assault on the physical state of the organism and/or aversive reinforcement history), coping resources (alternate responses that produce positive reinforcers), and additional health behaviors (in which the behavior results in a long range improved heart functioning, muscle tone, etc.).

A related paper by Sloan, Bagiella and Powell (1999) examined the relationship between religiosity and medical recovery. They cited various interesting statistics—all in need of behavioral mechanism specification—25% of all respondents concerning unconventional therapy used prayer and 48% of hospital inpatients wanted their physicians to pray with them. The authors of this paper are definitely troubled by some studies that they cite, particularly by those that find religious activity to help improve the health of patients. Concentrating like the ESP researchers in finding out whether the phenomenon of help from religiosity exists, these researchers make little attempt to discuss what the behavioral mechanisms might be. Their lack of interest seems to extend to the marital state variable shown to exert an effect on health outcome. They say (p. 666): "Although physicians may choose to engage patients in discussions of these matters to understand them better, we would consider it unacceptable for a physician to advise an unmarried patient to marry because the data show that marriage is associated with lower mortality." Clearly these investigators view non-medical variables to work in mystical ways rather than by way of a behavioral mechanism. Knowledge of what in marriage is so salutary would allow the physician to give the right advice: Whether it is simply having someone around to make sure medication is taken on time, or the social reinforcement that comes from a friend, or the financial support from another bread winner, etc.

Tucker, Schwartz, Clark and Friedman (1999) investigated the complexity of the marital variable, taking into account the age of the subjects involved. Although being married did constitute a protective factor for men, remarried men were at greater risk than those consistently married when aged less than 70 years but not when over 70. For women, marriage apparently is no protective factor with respect to mortality but having children does increasingly protect women as they grow older. Various behavioral mechanisms must be investigated to put more substance into these findings. Indeed, statistical results can supply us with hypotheses concerning these mechanisms and should be used in that manner. Mere speculation about the meaning of the results is definitely inadequate when talking about a science. In other words, these statistics could alert us as to what population to watch out for on a statistical basis; when we learn what particular behaviors are protective for these statistically identified populations, we can also help people who are not members of these groups by providing them with other sources of the behavioral mechanism such as social network ties, extra financial support, servants, caregivers, institutions, tendency to behave in a medically protective manner, etc.

Of course, to return to the matter raised before, the question of the efficacy of prayer was long ago examined by Francis Galton who published a paper on that subject in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1872. The paper saw the light of day only after a switch of editors, with the first editor rejecting it because it was "too terribly conclusive and offensive not to raise a hornet's nest" (Forrest, 1974, p. 111). Galton cited various statistics showing that prayer did not increase the longevity of clergymen even though they prayed more than those who had other professions,

nor did it increase the longevity of monarchs whom the public blessed so often. When Galton compared clergymen to other professions in terms of longevity, he found them to be only marginally superior to lawyers and physicians (which he explained by pointing out that clergymen's country life was conducive to good health); when he followed up the mortality of eminent clergymen, he found them to be more definitely inferior to both doctors and lawyers. He therefore concluded that prayers of the clergy were "futile in result" (Forrest, 1974, p. 129).

Our relationship is chemical

We are currently living in an age of the quick fix which in our area of knowledge translates into administration of drugs. Sometimes and somehow these drugs may be effective but as psychologists we must once again identify the behavioral mechanism. Sprague and Slector (1977) studied the effect of methylphenidate (ritalin) on various behaviors of children. Interestingly enough, they found that different classes of behavior did not vary in the same way with increases in dose; thus, learning reached its peak at a dose of .3 mg./kg, descending to a level below placebo at 1 mg./kg. On the other hand, teacher ratings of the social behavior of the same children manifested a continuous improvement with an increase in dosage of ritalin. The nature of the behavioral mechanism here is critical. It raises the possibility that the drug works by reducing stimulus input effectiveness; that may reduce distracting stimuli, thus improving social behavior, while simultaneously reducing the stimulus input of the material to be learned, thus reducing the effectiveness of that class of behavior. By knowing how an effect occurs, one can extrapolate and use the drug most effectively. Without that knowledge, one has to try out each drug separately for each function that one is interested in modifying or studying.

More recently, Spiga, Pearson, Broitman, and Santos (1996) studied the same drug with respect to cooperative responding. In one condition, children's responses resulted in reinforcement for themselves only; in the other condition, responses resulted in reinforcement for themselves as well as for others. The latter may be termed cooperative responses. Children given ritalin continued to work for reinforcement when they were the only recipients, but reduced the amount of work they did when the reinforcers were delivered to them and to others. Thus the behavioral mechanism, suggested earlier that ritalin reduces the effectiveness of stimulus input, appears to include the effect on social stimulus input as well.

Essence of schizophrenia

A behavioral mechanism can also be used to explain complex disorders. A case in point is schizophrenia. Some years ago, I posited the following behavioral mechanism for schizophrenia, namely a tendency to respond preponderantly to stimuli immediate in one's environment (Salzinger, Portnoy & Feldman, 1966; Salzinger, 1984). Stated in a simple way, the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia claims a greater concentration of dopamine in schizophrenic synaptic sites than in normal synapses. My own observation of schizophrenic individuals' greater tendency to respond to stimuli as

they come along, that is, out of context, suggested the Immediacy Hypothesis to me. I followed that hypothesis up by examining both experiments and clinical phenomena to see how well such a posited behavioral mechanism would fit. Thus, one can view paranoid behavior as reactions to stimuli out of context. Somebody joking "I'm going to kill you, if you do that again" would then be responded to as a real threat. Only the initial manifest content rather than the delayed underlying meaning would constitute the discriminative stimulus.

I was able to operationalize thought disorder in schizophrenia by using the cloze procedure (Salzinger, Portnoy & Feldman, 1978; Salzinger, Portnoy, Pisoni & Feldman, 1970). Cloze procedure studies showed that schizophrenic patients manifested strong relations between successive words in their speech; the further apart the words were, however, the weaker their connections. Thus, the phenomenon that many of us who speak with schizophrenic patients experience, namely feeling we understand what the patients are saying without actually doing so stems from the fact that words in their speech cohere only over short spans. That short range stimulus control by verbal responses over one another shows the place of immediacy of control for response-produced stimuli. The word "mine" which can refer to one's possessions in one context can in the speech of a schizophrenic patient as easily evoke a discussion of mining operations in the very next phrase. These two different meanings are more likely to change with the immediate rather than the more remote context for schizophrenic patients. The finding that patients who hallucinate tend to talk to themselves sotto voce suggests that it is the patient's failure to discriminate between his or her own speech and that of others that produces the phenomenon of "hearing voices." Apparently, they do not recognize the voice that is saying unpleasant things to them as their own; the content of what they say is more immediate than the recognition of the voice as their own.

The varying symptoms found in different patients can be explained by their varying conditioning histories. What schizophrenic patients have in common is that their peculiar behavior is controlled by immediate stimuli rather than the more remote ones, but the particular immediate stimuli that happen to be there when their specific conditioning takes place vary as a function of chance. In sum, and without providing any other examples that can be found in Salzinger (1984), the behavioral mechanism of responding to stimuli immediate in the patient's environment is what allows us to gain a better understanding of the disorder as well as to suggest a way of ameliorating the problem, as Leibman and I (Leibman & Salzinger, 1998) recently showed. When we encouraged the patients to examine their environment more thoroughly, that is, beyond the immediate stimulus that happened to get their attention at the time, we found that both paranoid ideas and hallucinations occurred with a lower frequency and with less conviction.

A much earlier study (Salzinger & Pisoni, 1958) examined the behavioral mechanism of conditioning to explain what goes on during an interview, that is, why different interviewers derive different diagnoses. We posited that the interviewer provides discriminative stimuli (namely questions) as well reinforcers ("yeah, yes, I see, I can understand that" and the like) during an interview. We decided to keep the discriminative stimuli relatively constant and varied the interviewer reinforcers during the interview. By making our reinforcers contingent on so-called affect responses (the lack of which is supposedly symptomatic of schizophrenia), we demonstrated that the subject's amount of affect depended on the amount of reinforcement that the interviewer provided. Thus, here the behavioral mechanism allowed us to elucidate a methodological question.

We (Salzinger & Pisoni, 1960) also compared the conditionability and, even more important, the rate of extinction for normal and schizophrenic patients. We found that schizophrenic patients' behavior extinguished more rapidly than that of normal individuals. In terms of the Immediacy Theory, this meant that the absence of reinforcers was more important to schizophrenic patients than to normal individuals because the former tended to respond preponderantly to immediate stimuli, providing more evidence for the Immediacy Theory.

The irrational exuberance of psychological concepts

I want to talk next about the use of behavioral mechanisms to explain some concepts that have become quite popular in psychology and especially in psychotherapy in recent years. Mindfulness is a good example. Langer (1997, p. 4) assigns three characteristics to mindfulness: "the continuous creation of new categories; openness to new information; and an implicit awareness of more than one perspective." Allow me to translate these characteristics into behavioral mechanisms. "Continuous creation of new categories" means responding to the same stimulus in different contexts. For example, one can use a hammer to drive a nail into a board in one context but use it as a weight to keep a book open to a given page in another. "Openness to new information," to take her second characteristic, means withholding or at least postponing one's rejecting response and trying out alternative responses to various stimuli. For example, one should consider various routes of getting to a particular location even if on first thought it seems like the long way around. Finally, having "an implicit awareness of more than one perspective" suggests again that one respond differently to a stimulus from one time or one context to another. For example, one can learn from a very young child who uses a broom as a hobby horse. The behavioral mechanism that comes to mind for all of three characteristics is variation of one's behavior. In other words, to produce mindfulness, we must reinforce variability of behavior. This is also a behavioral mechanism for creativity and for problem solving in general. Reinforcing variability of response as an educational technique or as a way of

improving one's interpersonal behavior is still another use for this mechanism. Positing such a mechanism allows one to better advise people on how to improve their condition than telling them to be more mindful.

Why Gershwin was constipated

When George Gershwin went into psychoanalysis, Oscar Levant, his friend and famous interpreter of his music, asked him "Does it help your constipation?" Gershwin replied, "No, but now I understand why I have it."

The need for behavioral mechanisms is great indeed to gain an understanding of how our psychotherapies work, new and old alike. A recent study by Jacobson, Dobson, Truax, Addis, Koerner, Gollan, Gortner and Prince (1996) was determined to uncover the active ingredients of cognitive-behavioral treatment a la Beck (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The study assigned 150 depressed patients randomly to three treatments: the behavioral activation aspect of the cognitive-behavioral treatment, a treatment including the latter plus teaching the skill to modify automatic thoughts, and finally the full monte, that is, including the first two treatments plus the core cognitive schemas of negative verbal interpretations of life events. Each group was thus treated on the basis of one, two or three behavioral mechanisms. The idea was to investigate whether adding behavioral mechanisms other than the basic behavioral one would make a difference in the treatment effectiveness. The result was that either the behavioral activation or the treatment of controlling the automatic negative thoughts achieved the same effectiveness as those treatments plus the attempt to directly modify the patient's cognitive schemas (the supposed essence of Beck's treatment). The point of this is that by laying bare the behavioral mechanisms that constitute the complete treatment procedure, we can understand which is the active one.

Yet another concept that has become very popular in clinical psychology in general and in psychotherapy in particular, including behaviorally oriented approaches, is that of acceptance. This concept differs quite markedly from the classical approach that behavior analysts have taken to abnormal behavior. They normally first do a functional analysis of the behavior, that is, they find out what controls the behavior of interest. Thus, if an individual is too shy in social situations, the behavior analyst uses such techniques as behavioral rehearsal in which the client comes into a strange situation and is instructed to start a conversation with a supposed stranger. The therapist who plays the stranger then reinforces the behavior of the client, slowly shaping behavior appropriate to the situation. The client is also given homework that instructs him or her to increasingly make more assertive responses in increasingly more uncertain situations for the client to deal with. In functional analytic psychotherapy (Kohlenberg and Tsai, 1991), the shaping of appropriate behavior takes place in the therapeutic situation itself as well as in homework assignments.

By way of contrast, the concept of acceptance is based

on the assumption that much abnormal behavior depends on experiential avoidance, that is, on avoiding thinking about aversive events rather than accepting them and going on from there. It also maintains that working on acceptance can very often be more effective than meeting the aberrant behavior head on. Acceptance is often colorfully defined, as for example, by Hayes (1994, p. 30), "experiencing events fully and without defense, as they are and not as they say they are." Later he defines it more technically (p. 30), "making contact with automatic or direct stimulus functions of events, without acting to reduce or manipulate those functions, and without acting on the basis solely of their derived or verbal functions." Indeed, Acceptance and Commitment therapy is based on the notion that many of our difficulties stem from experiential avoidance, that is, of trying to avoid those aversive thoughts. Verbal behavior is the important culprit in this conceptualization and one needs to specify it more exactly by means of a behavioral mechanism. I would say that it consists of responding to all stimuli in one's environment verbally first rather than enjoying what acceptance therapists describe as "living in the moment."

The trick, if this theory is correct, is to discover the conditions under which human beings do not respond verbally first to their environment. Obviously there are those in which one responds automatically and ironically enough "mindlessly," which we just described as undesirable behavior. What is more, a recent paper on acceptance as an alternative to thought suppression (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes and Scott, 1999) suggested that (p. 143) people ought to abandon thought suppression for "more effective forms of mental control ... [and learn] acceptance-based strategies such as mindfulness training." By living in the moment, acceptance-psychologists are also saying that one ought to vary one's behavior (as we already pointed out) thus coming up with alternative solutions to one's problems.

To give an example, it is clearly more efficient to set one's car in motion without instructing oneself verbally, although initially while learning to drive, that is not a bad method of getting oneself going. When it comes to swerving to avoid hitting an oncoming car, it is even more important to turn the wheel before any verbal behavior at all; otherwise collision is in prospect, of course. Thus, it seems that one way of mitigating one's useless or interfering verbal behavior is to rehearse the conditions under which the nonverbal behavior becomes automatic, that is, becomes faster because it is more quickly and more efficiently followed by a desirable consequence. Psychologists who believe in acceptance theory want the patient to respond to the environment without the verbal behavior of experiential avoidance. I am suggesting that we must provide a behavioral mechanism that would produce the change desired—in the case of acceptance, one must also learn to respond to stimuli other than the aversive ones and to emit other responses that would garner positive reinforcers. Acceptance would mean taking the elevator (the nonverbal behavior) despite the verbal behavior of "I am going to have a panic attack." Disparity

between verbal behavior and nonverbal behavior is not infrequent. When it happens, we often call it lying or lack of insight. The underlying behavioral mechanism of Acceptance Theory is to reduce the strength of one's verbal response-produced stimulus control over one's other behavior.

In conclusion, I am saying that psychology has not been paying sufficient attention to what explains the relationship between our independent and dependent variables. Finding relationships is an engineering task; finding the behavioral mechanism to explain the relationship is what constitutes science and that is where we should turn our attention. By finding the mechanism, of course, we do not merely satisfy the basic science mandate, we also eventually provide the means by which we can introduce and maintain the effect under consideration in a more effective manner or by a different route, that is, we can, in this way, do the applied engineering task more effectively by knowing and using the mechanism than we could previously by merely knowing that "some" relationship exists.

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Hedonism: A Hidden Unity and Problematic of Psychology

Introduction

Brent D. Slife
Brigham Young University

This special section of *The General Psychologist* is unusual in two important respects. First, one overall argument is made across the articles of this section, with the authors of each article presenting their particular segment of the argument from their particular subdiscipline or discipline. Second, one uniting but relatively overlooked theme in psychology—hedonism—is delineated, with its main problems and its main prospects.

The need for separate authors stems from the need to cover the relevant mansions of this theme. Hedonism has come to imply more than its conventional definition that pleasure is the sole or chief good in life (cf. Webster's Dictionary, 1981). The doctrine of hedonism has been broadened to mean that sophisticated versions of pleasure, such as happiness, well-being, and self-interest are the sole or chief goods in life. In this sense, hedonism is one of those rare underlying assumptions that pervades virtually all the subdisciplines of psychology in many subtle and surprising ways, as these authors demonstrate.

Marissa Beyers first offers some crucial conceptual distinctions to make sense of hedonism in psychology, along with its customary disjunctive—altruism. Jeff Reber next reveals the pervasive effects of hedonism in social and evolutionary psychology, even on those investigating altruism. Ed Ganitt then shows how most cognitive and economic models assume sophisticated versions of hedonism, to the extent that rationality itself is considered to necessitate self-interest. Justin Calapp follows suit with considerable evidence that business and organizational models and strategies, particularly in their ultimate concern for the "bottom line," are no less hedonistic. Amy Fisher Smith affirms a similar conclusion in psychotherapy, where the desired outcome routinely assumes hedonism, such as happiness or well-being.

At this point, the argument turns to the "why" question: Why is this assumption, in all its subtleties and variations, so pervasive? How has it insinuated itself so thoroughly into nearly all of psychology's pivotal concepts and constructs - from social relationships to cognitive and behavioral mechanisms to applications

in therapy and business? Melinda Petersen provides our tentative answers (from this group of authors) to these questions in her fine article. However, her article and our tentative answers raise another general concern: What is the effect of this pervasiveness in psychology. That is, is the dominance of hedonism good for psychology?

Each of the authors addresses these questions with a decidedly mixed report on its benefits. Although hedonism has clearly served as a heuristic for both research and practice, this heuristic has been relatively unacknowledged and almost completely unexamined. What will the status of hedonism be when it sees the light of disciplinary scrutiny? As preliminary scrutinizers, these authors directly address the main advantages and disadvantages of hedonism within

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their own domain of inquiry, and I, in my brief conclusion, end the section with a more general take on this important question for the discipline.

The Practical and Disciplinary Significance

Before getting too academic and professional, however, we thought it might be helpful to begin this special section with a practical, real-life illustration of the significance of the hedonism issue. Like many, we see reported acts of altruism and heroism all the time in our local newspapers. As it happens, one such act happened near my home a few years ago, and I was struck by the resulting discussion about it in my neighborhood.

It was not unlike many acts of altruism. When the young man saw the car plunge into the canal and no one climb out, he knew something was wrong. He waded into the freezing water and worked for several minutes inside the submerged vehicle extricating the unconscious driver (*Deseret News*, August 1997). He not only risked hypothermia with the freezing water in performing this rescue; he also risked being trapped in the vehicle and swept away with the current. The only thing he said after the police arrived was, "Anyone would have done it."

In my neighborhood, however, there were two types of explanations: Some called him a "hero," putting himself at risk for someone he didn't know, while others assumed that he was a "glory hound," seeking thrills or accolades for himself. When I reflected on how my own discipline of psychology would explain his actions, I frankly had a difficult time coming up with a theory or explanation that would truly grant him a "hero" status. Although it is true that psychologists have many explanations for such actions, they all seemed to boil down to some sort of reason or motive that involves self-interest, and thus hedonism.

I wondered: Are there any real heroes? Is it even possible to perform some action that is purely for the sake of someone else, without any motive of self-benefit? The literature of my discipline seemed to answer these questions negatively. This realization led me to ponder about my own capability for altruistic actions. I am no hero, to be sure, but I wondered whether I could truly serve my psychotherapy clients, or could I only work with them if they somehow benefited me?

In pondering this question, another possibility occurred to me: My discipline could itself be deluded by an unacknowledged paradigm of hedonism. Our disciplinary consensus on hedonism might not come from the facts of our research, but from an unacknowledged philosophical bias in interpreting our research. Could such a bias be strong enough not only to direct disciplinary research but also to reinterpret even altruistic data in its favor? These are the types of questions that have spurred this special section.

A Contradiction in Terms: Hedonistic Altruism

**Marissa S. Beyers
Melinda J. Petersen
Brigham Young University**

Our common sense understanding of altruism, that it is possible for humans to act selflessly, seems to come in direct conflict with more formal accounts of altruism. Specifically, scientific accounts of altruism in psychology seem to include more hedonistic accounts of behavior. It is these two accounts of behavior that are the main topic of this symposium. In this particular paper, we set out to show that investigations, hypotheses and explanations regarding altruism cluster around two sets of assumptions, namely, hedonistic and non-hedonistic altruism. Although hedonistic altruism seems like a contradiction in terms, it best captures the way in which altruistic behavior is explained in mainstream psychology. The terms hedonistic and non-hedonistic are important in that they evidence the logical incompatibility that exists between the different sets of assumptions that define each type of explanation. As we shall see, however, both can be demonstrated to be important to psychological explanation.

Hedonistic altruism, by our definition, assumes that altruistic behaviors benefit the self either implicitly or explicitly, directly or indirectly. As the name implies, this type of altruism assumes hedonism which, as broadly conceived, refers to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This conception, however, extends beyond the primitive notion of hedonism and takes into account more sophisticated notions such as happiness and peace or discomfort and guilt. Hedonistic altruism is present when some sort of benefit for the self is the ultimate goal of the agent. In this sense, even when an individual is in the "service" of another or sacrificing for another, this service is merely the means to the ultimate end of serving the self. In other words, the rewards of hedonistic altruism are not simply consequences that may or may not ensue from altruistic actions, these rewards are pursued (either consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly) as ends in themselves. Consequently, all behaviors are ultimately oriented toward, and in pursuit of, some type of benefit, whether or not this benefit is realized; and, as such, the hedonistic individual is ultimately I-centered or egoistic.

Alternatively, non-hedonistic altruism assumes that the consistent pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, either implicitly or explicitly, is not the primary concern of the individual. Non-hedonistic altruism assumes that the individual is capable of being genuinely other-centered in his/her dealings with others. When this individual is in the service of another, the service itself is the ultimate end, whether pleasurable or painful. Being other-centered, then, may include enduring pain and forsaking pleasure, perhaps even survival, in the service of another. According to this conceptualization, the individual can be motivated to actively seek out benefit for another as an end in itself. Rewards may follow from non-hedonistic altruism, but these rewards are not intended; they are not the reason or motivation for performing the non-hedonistic action. That is, these rewards can ensue, as an accidental or incidental outcome of action, but these rewards can never be pursued (even unconsciously) because then the action would ultimately be motivated by hedonism.

At this point the logical incompatibility of these two conceptions of altruism becomes apparent. Each conception has its own philosophical assumptions (as will be discussed in later papers) as well as a different source of ultimate motivation (or cause). One cannot hold a behavior to be motivated by both hedonistic and non-hedonistic altruism at the same time and be logically consistent. In other words, individuals cannot be ultimately motivated to benefit themselves and motivated to benefit the other. One can presumably hold both motivations simultaneously, but only one can be the ultimate motivation—the motivation that results in our actions. Hence, both cannot be correct explanations for any single action. By definition, hedonistic altruism precludes non-hedonistic altruism as an ultimate source of motivation, and vice versa.

Hedonistic altruism is the preferred explanation for altruistic behavior in the main "forces" of psychology.

namely humanism, behaviorism, psychoanalytic theory and evolutionary psychology. A brief example from each of these areas will give us a taste of the pervasiveness of this concept. Consider Freud's psychoanalysis. In this theory the pleasure principle governs the id. Indeed, one could say the pleasure principle governs the entire psyche ultimately, because all other psychic structures ultimately evolve out of and serve the id. Freud (1963) referred to the pleasure principle as dominating all mental processes, he states: "It seems as though our total mental activity is directed towards achieving pleasure and avoiding unpleasure" (p. 356). With this sort of theorizing, even religious values/wishes, presumably from the super-ego, cannot be devoid of hedonism. That is, religious values are ultimately developed, according to Freud, to benefit the psyche. Thus, there is no non-hedonistic altruism and there are no acts or thoughts purely for the sake of another because all actions must in some way satisfy the id's needs.

Similarly, many humanists invoke a hedonism, although more implicitly, in their explications of human behavior. Rogers (1951) states, "Behaviors are not caused by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy... there is no behavior except to meet a present need" (p. 492). From this perspective, an individual behaves in order to alleviate current tensions (i.e., pain or discomfort) and facilitate pleasure by making sure every need is met. Additionally, humanists assert that individuals can only be mentally healthy if they behave consistently with their desires or by following the prompting of their inner selves. When individuals' needs are not being met or their goals aren't being pursued, the result is not only painful, but culminates in mental dysfunction. Like the psychoanalytic perspective, humanism accounts for behavior from a hedonistic framework where mental dysfunction and unhappiness are the result of not acting hedonistically.

Behaviorism also reveals hedonistic assumptions. Specifically we behave according to the reinforcement that follows behavior. An organism will continue to repeat those behaviors which result in a positive environmental response. Similarly, behaviors followed by non-reinforcing or unpleasant stimuli will not be learned or repeated. Skinner (1972) explains, "We are so constituted that under certain circumstances food, water, sexual contact, and so on will make any behavior which produces them more likely to occur again People behave in ways which, as we say, conform to ethical, governmental, or religious patterns because they are reinforced for doing so" (p. 35-36). Hedonistic altruism is fundamental to this approach: an organism will only behave and learn in the context of pleasurable circumstances. The organism will always seek after pleasure.

Finally, evolutionary psychology assumes that all living organisms are acting for the sake of their own genetic material. According to natural selection, the evolutionary progress of the species is dependent

upon successful genetic proliferation. Organisms will proceed with caution to avoid pain and seek out pleasure in order to ensure survival and reproduction. For evolutionary psychology, this means that all human behavior and social interaction is oriented toward survival and the maximization of fitness. This consistent pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is ensured through the agenda of natural selection. In other words, the governing mechanism of evolutionary psychology, natural selection, makes hedonistic action a matter of survival.

Given the scope of hedonism's influence, it may be difficult to even conceive of non-hedonistic behavior. Yet non-hedonistic altruism is clearly important to psychology as a profession. Psychology bills itself as a service occupation—many psychologists would say they are helping their clients through therapy or helping their students through instruction—they are serving them. According to the two definitions clarified earlier in the paper, there are two ways to interpret what psychologists might mean by service. According to hedonistic altruism, for example, psychologists would conceive of their clients as a means to their own livelihood or self-confidence. Similarly, service could be seen as reciprocal helping behavior—both parties act for their own benefit and both are rewarded—the psychologist provides service so that the client or student will aide the psychologist and the client or student supports the psychologist because it is self-benefiting. In any event, the benefit or advantage for the individual is the main goal, it is what is pursued.

Alternatively, the psychologist could be motivated to serve the client or student non-hedonistically. The professor may spend time working with a student because the student is in need. The psychotherapist may implement a particular therapy technique in the genuine interest of the client. A non-hedonistic perspective permits either possibility. In other words, a non-hedonistic accounting of a particular behavior does not preclude the possibility of the individual acting hedonistically at another time. As we shall see, however, a hedonistic perspective tends to be all encompassing—hedonistic theories of human nature preclude even the possibility of the non-hedonistic explanation.

Within psychological explanation, human nature is understood to be inherently hedonistic (Higgins, 1997; Buss, 1998; Wilson, 1998). However, we contend that it cannot be considered the only possible conception of altruism. That is, it must be possible for the psychologist to genuinely serve his or her client or student. A hedonistic accounting means that it is impossible for someone to choose personal suffering for the sole benefit of another person because that would violate human nature. In this sense, suffering for another only occurs because such suffering brings benefits or advantage to the sufferer. Consequently, no one would be able to be genuinely altruistic; motivations would be universally and deterministically hedonistic.

As an example, consider Mother Teresa, one praised for her acts of charity, love and altruism in tending to

the poor of Calcutta. If non-hedonistic actions are impossible and hedonism is what motivates us, then Mother Teresa must have been acting to bring herself pleasure or avoid her own pain. This violates the very motives that some would praise Mother Teresa for, but if non-hedonistic altruism is not even possible, then all that is possible is hedonistic motivation. Mother Teresa had to act in a way to benefit herself. From this perspective, she helped others in order to help herself and she could not have done differently—thus it makes little sense to praise her for her “good” works.

As psychological theory does not seem to allow for genuine altruism, it raises questions regarding the use of the term altruism at all. Our culture’s notion of praiseworthy actions indicate that we at least recognize this non-hedonistic possibility. Accordingly, psychologists would not even be talking about hedonistic altruism if non-hedonistic altruism were not at least logically possible. It is at least conceivable that someone would act for the sole benefit of another person. The clarification is only made because there are at least two logically possible conceptions of behavior. Hedonistic altruism stands in opposition to non-hedonistic altruism—it is non-hedonistic altruism’s logical opposite. The fact that hedonistic altruism is discussed, tested and debated is because there is a genuine alternative. As hedonism becomes an issue in response to non-hedonistic altruism, it makes little sense to define the opposite of hedonism (altruism) in a hedonistic way.

Having clarified the two ways in which altruistic behavior can be discussed makes it possible for us to evaluate the stance of particular theories in psychology and make explicit what kinds of assumptions psychologists and scientists make about altruistic behavior. Although psychological theory may assume hedonistic altruism, non-hedonistic altruism is still crucial to our understanding of psychology as a profession and to our interactions with one another. As will be shown, failing to recognize the logical possibility necessitated by the foiled relationship of these two prominent explanations leads to the confounding of these two conceptions of altruism in psychological experimentation and theorizing.

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Privileging Hedonism: Confounds and Consequences

Jeffrey S. Reber
State University of West Georgia

Despite the logical importance of preserving both the nonhedonistic and hedonistic conceptions of altruism as necessary and independent, they are often combined, confounded, and ultimately confused. In evolutionary and social psychology literature we find at least two ways in which this confounding occurs: either one of the conceptions is dismissed altogether, or both conceptions are unknowingly combined. The purpose of this presentation is to examine the literature with regards to these two types of confounds and to show how in both cases a hidden and often unacknowledged acceptance of hedonism unifies social and evolutionary psychological theories and ultimately negates the possibility of altruism.

Altruism Dismissed

As an illustration of the first kind of confound consider a chapter written by David Buss (1998), a prominent evolutionary psychologist, who begins his work with the real-life story of a man whose friend is falsely accused of a crime and incarcerated for a period of four years. The man felt so sorry for his friend that he refused to sleep on a bed and would only sleep on the floor during the time of his friend’s imprisonment. Buss states, “He did not want to enjoy the comfort of a soft bed knowing that his friend was sleeping on a single, musty mattress” (p. 253). Although the man, the friend, and many of us might view this behavior as an example of genuine altruism, for Buss and other evolutionary and social psychology theorists it is nothing more than a “cooperative alliance”—a reciprocal relationship that is not altruistic at all, but is designed to maximize the benefits to both men.

This pattern of presentation wherein an author begins with a description of a seemingly altruistic behavior and then accounts for it in a nonaltruistic way is a common practice in the evolutionary and social psychology literature (Batson, 1998; Kohn, 1990). Articles concerning reciprocity and altruism typically end up being articles on reciprocity rather than articles on altruism (e.g., Trivers, 1971; Pollock & Dugatkin, 1992). Chapters on cooperation and altruism turn out to be chapters on cooperative alliances that maximize individual gain (Buss, 1998) rather than chapters on selflessness. When altruism is discussed it’s existence is often questioned (e.g., Franzoi, 2000) or it is described as “puzzling and problematic” (Buss, 1998, p. 254).

Ultimately, altruism is dismissed as a genuine possibility because it contradicts the fundamental assumptions of competition and natural selection in evolutionary psychology and the basic principles of self-interest and pleasure-seeking in social psychology (Kohn, 1990). For evolutionary psychologists an act that benefits someone else but is costly to one’s self

neither maximizes survival nor facilitates the proliferation of one's genes and therefore makes no sense and cannot occur (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). According to natural selection all acts must rely on adaptive mechanisms that ultimately increase wellbeing and genetic fitness (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). Consequently, we help others only to the extent that at some time, now or later, that help will be reciprocated, our benefits maximized, and genetic proliferation ensured.

For many social psychologists people are thought to be inherently motivated to maximize pleasure and minimize pain (see Batson, 1987 for a review). Hence, we help others in order to increase or maintain a good mood that is pleasurable (Wegner & Petty, 1994) or to escape a bad mood that is painful (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). In both cases, it is assumed that we ultimately act for the sake of our own well-being rather than for the benefit of others. Thus, even when we may be acting prosocially and helping others we are doing so only to the extent that we will ultimately get something out of it for ourselves.

In both evolutionary and social psychology the possibility of genuine altruism is dismissed, not because examples of altruistic behavior cannot be found or because altruistic explanations for these behaviors are not forthcoming, but only because altruism contradicts the hedonistic assumptions underlying these two psychological theories. Of course, evolutionary and social psychologists never come right out and say they are dismissing altruism only because it is incompatible with their hedonistic world-view. Instead, they treat it as if it never really existed in the first place. The problem is, the possibility of genuine altruism is implicitly acknowledged in the descriptions that begin their articles and chapters. Anyone reading Buss's (1998) account of the man who slept on the floor for his friend in jail would consider the possibility that the act was genuinely altruistic. At the very least, they would recognize what genuine altruism could be like even if they didn't think it was possible. In this sense, then, altruism continues to exist even if only in contrast to the hedonism evolutionary and social psychologists propose, and therefore it cannot be completely ignored.

Altruism Combined

The second way in which hedonistic and nonhedonistic altruism is confounded is best illustrated by the theories of evolutionary and social psychologists who attempt to show that genuine altruism is possible. Although these theorists attempt to escape hedonism they still end up smuggling hedonistic assumptions into their theories. Rushton's (1981) theory of the altruistic personality, for example, claims that some people do act selflessly to benefit others, but this only occurs if they have an altruistic gene that predisposes them to do so. In this sense, altruism is the product of a genetic determinism and can only occur to the extent that it proliferates the gene that caused it. Ultimately then, this theory, like other evolutionary theories, endorses hedonism and genuine altruism cannot occur.

A more subtle example can be found in the work of Daniel Batson who contends that empathic concern for another person can produce genuine altruism (e.g., Batson, 1991). Batson's research suggests a model of empathic altruism that begins with perspective-taking, or trying to see the world through the eyes of a person suffering or in need. Once the perspective of the other is taken, two possible responses may occur: one could feel personal distress and experience self-oriented feelings by being troubled or upset by the other's suffering, or one could feel empathic concern, which entails other-oriented feelings of sympathy and compassion. In the first case, the personal distress leads to helping behavior in order to relieve one's own negative feelings of worry. In the second case however, feelings of empathic concern for the other's well being lead to helping behavior in order to relieve the other person's feelings of distress. For Batson, the second case involving empathic concern exemplifies genuine altruism.

This notion that empathic concern can lead to non-hedonistic altruism has been rigorously attacked in the social psychology literature because it threatens the assumptions of hedonism that are so fundamental (e.g., Neuberg, et al., 1997). Batson has responded to these attacks (e.g., Batson, 1997) leading to a classic debate that has proceeded much like a chess match with each side of the argument providing research results to support their respective views. Despite his efforts, however, Batson has had some trouble defending empathy-altruism against claims that his theory endorses some form of hedonism. Indeed, it appears that a subtle hedonism could pervade his theory in a number of ways.

Some researchers have effectively questioned whether empathic altruism can ever be truly other centered and selfless, arguing that when one is experiencing empathy for another person the lines separating self and other become blurred, such that any helpful act that results could not be genuinely for the other, because it is simultaneously for one's self (e.g., Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). Researchers have also proposed the possibility that there may be empathy specific aversive arousal or punishments in the form of guilt that the person anticipates experiencing if he/she does not assist the other in need, making the altruism hedonistic (e.g., Hoffman, 1981). Others have argued that there are empathy specific rewards that are being sought after, such as relief from negative affect resulting from empathic sadness, or an increase in positive well-being resulting from having served someone else (e.g., Cialdini, et al., 1987).

An additional issue of concern is determinism. Batson (1991) seems to provide ample evidence that empathic altruism is a voluntary, agentic act, such that when a person has the opportunity to escape the situation rather than aid the suffering person, they most often choose to help the other person. But this only occurs if the person first empathizes with the plight of the suffering other. It is possible that altruism would not have occurred if the empathy hadn't brought it about. Empathy, then, could be a causal agent that moves a person

to act altruistically. If altruism is determined in this way then it cannot be genuine and meaningful. It is simply the necessary consequence of an empathic response without which no altruistic action would have taken place.

Finally, Batson (1991) seems to have clearly identified that empathy-altruism is not an altruism which is pursued because of the rewards or freedom from pain that one can gain, but rather that any rewards or relief that ensue are merely unintended and unforeseen benefits that resulted. Furthermore, he has shown that people who experience empathic concern for another are willing to endure pain and forego pleasure for the person who is suffering. Clearly, this kind of self-sacrifice for another seems to epitomize genuine altruism and support his contention that empathy-altruism is non-hedonistic.

There remains however one problem: Hedonism still defines altruism. That is to say, altruism is understood as relief from pain or the gaining of pleasure, albeit for the other person. Such a conception fails to acknowledge the possibility that non-hedonistic altruism could manifest itself in allowing another person to suffer and endure pain or in withholding pleasure and gratification; two things parents and therapists know something about. To be genuine, altruism must be genuinely *non-hedonistic*. As such, it must be possible that hedonistic concerns such as pleasure and pain are absolutely irrelevant to the altruistic act. There may be many other reasons for serving others altruistically that do not concern pleasure and pain at all but stem from motivations such as loyalty, love, and religious conviction. It seems that if empathy-altruism were independent of hedonism it would not confine itself to hedonistic concepts. Because it does, there is good reason to question how genuinely nonhedonistic empathy-altruism is.

In conclusion, hedonism is clearly a widespread assumption underlying evolutionary and social psychology theories. It is so pervasive that it even gets smuggled into theories that argue for a genuine altruism. Hedonism is simply accepted as a fundamental principle of human being and as such the possibility of a genuine altruism is not only "puzzling and problematic" (Buss, 1998, p. 254), but ultimately negated.

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Cognitive Psychology, Rationality, and the Assumption of Hedonism

Edwin E. Gantt
Brigham Young University

The past four decades have witnessed an astonishing explosion in the amount of theory and research in psychology that is conducted from within the cognitive psychological framework of explanation. Indeed, as one author has noted, "Cognitive psychology has evolved over the past 40 years to become the dominant approach to virtually all aspects of human psychology" and "promises to dominate the scientific study of mind and behavior well into the twenty-first century" (Kellogg, 1995, p. xix). As established in such early texts as Wason and Johnson-Laird's (1972) *Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content*, Janis and Mann's (1977) *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*, and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky's (1982) *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, a central area of investigation for cognitive psychology has been human reasoning, judgement and decision-making. In many ways, contemporary cognitive psychology has staked out an identity for itself by offering to explain

the basic processes and nature of human choice and rationality.

One clear result of this immense effort to explain human rationality has been the generation of a staggering number of research findings and a bewildering (and often contradictory) array of theories and models to explain those findings (for a review, see Manktelow, 1999). For example, it has been suggested that human beings are: good "intuitive statisticians" (Peterson & Beach, 1967), poor intuitive statisticians (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), rational analysts (Oaksford & Chater, 1994), irrational animals (Stich, 1985, 1990), possessors of content-dependent rules (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994), possessors of abstract mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), deliberate Bayesian probability theorists (Heit, 1998) and "fast and frugal" algorithmists (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Despite their seeming diversity, however, I will argue that most of the theories thus far tendered by cognitive psychologists to explain human reasoning have been united by a common—though usually inexplicit and unexamined—commitment to one or another form of hedonistic explanation. Indeed, I believe that many in contemporary cognitive psychology have simply equated rationality with hedonistic self-concern. That is to say, for many in cognitive psychology, human reasoning is, at its fundamental root, nothing more nor less than a matter of self-interest, and the processes of decision-making are ultimately driven by matters of individual self-concern.

This paper will briefly examine two of the more widely-accepted theories of rationality and decision-making in contemporary cognitive psychology. In particular, it will briefly examine the key features of one normative theory—Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Manktelow, 1999)—and one descriptive theory—Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). I will argue that each of these theories is in fact just a species of the more general Rational Choice Theory, a model of human rationality originally developed by scholars in the field of economics but which has since spread throughout the rest of the social sciences (see Monroe, 1991). Because the more local, psychological theories of rationality and choice are the conceptual offspring of Rational Choice Theory, they each, though admittedly in slightly different ways, equate rationality with hedonic self-concern. That is, each of these popular theories characterizes human social behavior as the result of fundamentally non-social, egoistic reasoning processes in which one's relationship with others and things is cast in terms of relative costs and benefits to self. I will also argue that if rationality is equated with self-interest, then behaving in a genuinely (i.e., non-hedonistically) altruistic manner towards another, even were it conceptually possible in such models, could only be explained as an irrational act. In short, I will show that in the rationality-equals-hedonism perspective taken by many contemporary cognitive theorists, one's way of relating to others can only be seen to be rational to the extent that others are taken to be objects or sources of

possible pleasure or frustration.

The Essential Tenets of Rational Choice Theory

The notion that it is natural for people to pursue individual self-interest is one of the oldest of the Western intellectual tradition (see Rogers, 1997), and can be found forcefully defended in the writings of thinkers as otherwise disparate as Epicurus, Aristotle, Augustine, Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Nietzsche, Freud and Skinner. Epicurus, for example, contended "that all men at all times, pursue only their own pleasure" (Russell, 1945, p. 245) because pleasure is their "primal and congenital good" (Epicurus, 1981, p. 294). And, although his theological speculations would seem to have very little in common with the more earthy and practical philosophy of the Epicureans, even St. Augustine (1997) argued:

"For, that man might be intelligent in his self-love, there was appointed for him an end to which he might refer all his actions, that he might be blessed. For he who loves himself wishes nothing else than this. And the end set before him is 'to draw near to God.' (p. 60)

Closer to our own century, Jeremy Bentham (1914) asserted that "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" (p. 1) and that "the individual always pursues what he believes to be his own happiness" (Russell, 1945, p. 775). Likewise, Mill (1969) wrote, "Of the social virtues it is almost superfluous to speak; so completely is it the verdict of all experience that selfishness is natural. The people we regard as moral are simply selfish in a different way. Theirs is a sympathetic selfishness" (p. 394). Clearly drawing on this tradition of thought, Freud (1966) held that "our total mental activity is directed towards achieving pleasure and avoiding unpleasure—that it is automatically regulated by the *pleasure principle*" (p. 443).

For many in our own day, the doctrine of naturalistic hedonism has become the dominant means of explaining all manner of human activity, including crime (Becker, 1968), drug addiction (Waal & Morland, 1999), changes in sexual morality (Coleman, 1990), warfare (Scott, 1987), regret (Zeelenberg, 1999), voting (Riker, 1990), marriage (Becker, 1973, 1974), and even altruism (Vine, 1992). Indeed, many would seem to agree with the 19th century moral philosopher, Henry Sidgwick (1981), who felt that it was "hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes that 'interested' actions, tending to promote the agent's happiness, are *prima facie* (lit.: "at first sight") reasonable: and that the *onus probandi* (lit.: "burden of proof") lies with those who would maintain that disinterested conduct, as such, is reasonable" (p. 120; translations added). A central theme running throughout much of recent social scientific literature is that human existence is fundamentally economic existence. We are, it is held, *homo economicus*, and, as such, in all our interactions with others and the world we perpetually and inescapably seek to maximize our individual gains (or pleasure) and minimize our individual costs (or pain). Accordingly, in this conceptualization, to be human is to be "selfish and

greedy, or at least exclusively self-interested" (Zey, 1998, p. 40-41). Indeed, as Hobbes (1962) maintained, were it not for the controlling influence of a powerful and organized state that could impose its will on us individually via the threat of force and the promise of security, we would wage unrestricted warfare upon one another and the "life of man [would be] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Part I, ch. xiii).

For its most ardent enthusiasts, the doctrine of naturalistic hedonism "offers the best—and perhaps the only—hope for meaningful progress in social science" (Rule, 1997, p. 79). Some have even held that explanations invoking natural self-interest "tap the most fundamental levels of social reality" (Rule, 1997, p. 79) and, thus, allow the social scientist to adopt "the least unrealistic assumptions a theorist is called upon to make" (Moe, 1980, p. 14). Perhaps the most well-known and widely embraced social scientific formulation of the naturalistic hedonism thesis is Rational Choice Theory. With roots in the utilitarian thinking of Hobbes, Bentham and Mill, the behaviorism of Skinner, and the exchange theories of Homans (1961) and Blau (1970), Rational Choice Theory came to its recent prominence primarily through the efforts of James S. Coleman (1990), William Riker (1990), and Herbert Simon (1985) in the late 1980s and early 1990s (cf., Zey, 1998). Frequently heralded as "the only theory with the possibility of producing paradigmatic integration" (Zey, 1998, p. 4) in the social sciences, Rational Choice Theory has not only spread throughout the social sciences, but has enjoyed particularly enthusiastic reception among many cognitive psychologists. Indeed, Riker (1990) has maintained that the relative disparity in theoretical development between natural and social science is attributable to the fact that the latter "has not been based on rational choice methods" (p. 177).

In his text, *Theory and Progress in Social Science*, James B. Rule (1997) identifies three essential tenets of the Rational Choice school of thought. First is the notion that "Human action is essentially *instrumental*, so that most social behavior can be explained as efforts to attain one or another, more or less distant, end[s]" (Rule, 1997, p. 80, italics in the original). Individuals are said to organize these various ends into relatively stable hierarchies of utility or personal preference. Second, individual actors "formulate their conduct through *rational calculation* of which among alternative courses of action are most likely to maximize their overall rewards" (Rule, 1997, p. 80, italics in the original). The particular outcomes of these calculations, of course, rely almost exclusively on the individual's access to relevant information concerning the possible risks and benefits involved in a given course of action. The third and final tenet of Rational Choice Theory is that "Large-scale social processes and arrangements—including such diverse things as rates, institutions, and practices—are ultimately to be explained as results of such calculations" (Rule, 1997, p. 80). This last point, according to Rule (1997), is a crucial claim for adherents of the theory, in that the "doctrine provides the indispensable analytical tools for relating aggregate events and processes to the

microworlds of face-to-face interaction and individual decision making" (p. 81). It is, of course, the level of the "microworld of face-to-face interaction and individual decision making" with which the cognitive psychologist is most intimately concerned. Thus, we will now turn attention to several theories of rationality and choice that are current in contemporary cognitive psychology and which have firm conceptual roots in Rational Choice Theory.

The Essential Tenets of SEU and Prospect Theory

According to Manktelow (1999), in his book *Reasoning and Thinking*, Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory is the "foundational normative theory of decision making" (p. 191) in cognitive psychology. Drawing directly upon the basic assumptions of Rational Choice Theory, SEU theory conceptualizes decision making and choice as a sort of gamble, in which "we have to trade off the *utility* of a certain outcome (positive or negative) against its *possibility*" (Manktelow, 1999, p. 192). Decision making is a gamble on this model not only because do we not always have the information necessary to make the most rewarding choice (i.e., our expectations may be inaccurate or incomplete), but choosing one course of action and its possible consequences typically means that we lose out on the possible benefits of alternative courses of action. This is what is usually termed the "opportunity cost" of making decisions. In this model, then, our thinking and our choices are driven by our self-interested desire to "beat the house," so to speak. That is, rational thinking and choice are tied directly to the natural desire to maximize the personal utility of our preferences, to make the most for ourselves out of any situation or relationship. As a normative theory of decision making, SEU theory seeks to establish norms for good (i.e., rational) decision making. In such a model, rationality is quite clearly—and I would add, inescapably—held to be equivalent to the pursuit of one's own individual interests in the most potentially rewarding manner possible.

In an effort to address some of the practical limitations of SEU theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992) have put forth what they call Prospect Theory. One of the central problems Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identified with SEU theory is that people frequently deviate from the abstract norms that it presumes. SEU theory does not predict outcomes well in conditions of uncertainty or risk—conditions which are clearly endemic to daily life. People simply do not seem to engage in the complex computation of abstract probabilities that SEU theory requires. Therefore, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest a descriptive—rather than normative—account of human rationality and choice. One other, less formal name for this descriptive approach is the "cognitive miser model," the central thesis being that "people are limited in their capacity to process information, so they take shortcuts whenever they can" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 13). These shortcuts, of course, are more commonly known in cognitive psychology as heuristics, and are presumably employed to minimize

the amount of effort and energy that needs to be expended in the making of choices and decisions. On this model, the individual is thought to be a sort of "motivated tactician," that is a tactical thinker who is fundamentally motivated to make quick and rewarding decisions with as little expended effort as possible. Confronted constantly with the need to make choices, "Sometimes the motivated tactician chooses wisely, in the interests of adaptability and accuracy, and sometimes the motivated tactician chooses defensively, in the interests of speed or self-esteem" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 13). Clearly, however, whatever the particular decision at hand might be, the "motivated tactician" always makes his or her choice based on fundamentally self-interested criteria and concerns.

Hopefully, at this point, it is clear that each of these two cognitive psychological theories of rational thinking and decision making are fully informed by the basic — though arguable — assumptions of Rational Choice Theory. Each not only exhibits a commitment to hedonistic explanation, but also equates rationality with self-interest. That is, each suggests that the fundamental criterion for making rational choices and decisions is a self-interested one. The major difference between the two theories would seem, then, to be only a matter of emphasis. As a normative theory, SEU theory holds that it is in our best interests to possess as much information as possible so as to make the most potentially gratifying (i.e., rational) choices. The more information we have, the better the odds are that our gamble between utility and possibility will pay-off in our favor. Prospect theory, on the other hand, maintains that as necessarily limited human beings we never have access to all the information we need and, therefore, cannot always make the most gratifying (i.e., rational) choices. Our decisions will always be made in terms of our own self-interest, they just will not always be the best or most rational (i.e., most gratifying) that we could have made.

Implications for Altruism

This type of theorizing would seem to have at least two major implications for the question of genuine (non-hedonistic) altruism. First, if we take seriously — as these theories seem to do — the notion that all thinking and decision making is driven by and weighed against a fundamentally hedonistic self-concern, then genuine altruism is not genuinely possible. That is, insofar as we hold an altruistic act to be one that is the result of a choice motivated by genuine concern for the welfare of another without regard for consequence to self, then it becomes impossible for anyone to engage in such an act because genuinely other-regarding ways of thinking and acting are precluded from the outset. This is not to say, however, that acting in a manner beneficial to another is not possible. Rather, it is to say that, if we take human reasoning and decision making to be at root a matter of self-interest, then any "altruistic" act — regardless of how potentially beneficial to others it may be — is really just a selfish and ultimately self-serving act. If all my decision making is a sort of gambling grounded in estimations (however accurate

or inaccurate) of potential cost and benefits to myself, then I am from the very outset incapable of regarding or considering another except as a means to my own ends, a potential risk or benefit to myself and my projects. It becomes difficult at this point to adequately or meaningfully distinguish between persons and any other objects that may be found in the world that would present themselves to the self as a possible source of gratification or frustration.

The other possible implication of explaining rationality and choice in the terms of naturalistic hedonism is that even we were to allow for altruistic thinking and acting, such thinking and acting could only be understood as essentially irrational. In other words, because rationality has from the very beginning been defined by and equated with self-interested hedonistic concern, any act done entirely out of concern for the welfare of another is *ipso facto* an irrational act. Thus, it would seem that given the present assumptions of naturalistic hedonism in cognitive theories of rationality and choice, we are firmly planted on the horns of a dilemma. Either genuine altruism is impossible because all thought and action is inescapably self-interested, or altruism is possible but ultimately irrational, and, thus, inexplicable and mysterious — perhaps even pathological.

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The Problems and Prospects of Hedonism in Business Organizations

Justin W. Calapp
Brigham Young University

Perhaps the area where the unity of hedonism is the least hidden is in business. With its background and philosophical roots firmly planted in capitalist economic theory, business theory has been unified through its assumption that hedonism is the ultimate concern in human action (Smith, 1937; Jensen & Meckling, 1994; Drakopoulos, 1991). That is to say, business theory adopts a fundamental premise of economic theory, that people's decisions, personal choices and preferences are motivated by that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain (Wilson, 2000; Frey, 1997; Reder, 1994;

Drakopoulos, 1991). This assumption of self-interest is considered to be a universal law of nature that is applicable in all settings, in all contexts, and in all situations. This means that business theorists have assumed that people have the same motivations in a business setting as they would in a market-place setting. People-and also organizations- operate so as to maximize their own profit and minimize their risk. Consequently, the ultimate end of business and the ultimate motivation of the consumer are supposedly clear-self-interest.

The primary focus of business, then, is the means to reach that end. Little, if any, contemporary business literature critically examines or even questions this hedonistic end. Rather, this end is already assumed, and the focus is always the means by which an organization can go about achieving the end. As a result, though hedonism was explicitly discussed and ultimately accepted in economic theory as a driving factor in human decision-making, it has now become a hidden, implicit unifier of business theory.

One of the consequences of this implicit unification is a lack of formal examination. Hedonism often gets disguised in such a sophisticated and subtle manner, that it is difficult to examine. For example, hedonism is often referred to as "the bottom line", or as a "return on shareholder investment". These terms are rarely directly connected to hedonism in business, though firmly grounded therein. In fact, hedonism has become so pervasive, yet hidden, in business that it is often understood as a social norm (Miller, 1999). That is, to act in one's own best interest, to act in a hedonistic, even greedy, manner is a socially acceptable way to act. The upshot is that the society that endorses such norms rarely examines them. Rather, the norms are considered a transparent and non-consequential mode of operation within that society.

It takes someone like Miller (1999), who is outside the business discipline and who has studied hedonism as a social psychologist, to show us its pervasive nature. He says,

"If a scientific theory is to exert power over people's behavior, its validity must be widely acknowledged. This precondition certainly seems to be met in the case of the self-interest assumption, for the belief in the power of self-interest, far from being confined to theoreticians closeted in ivory towers, is held, in some form or another, by people in all segments of society: politicians, policy analysts, educators, captains of industry, athletic coaches, and, most importantly, the layperson" (p. 1054).

But where exactly does this implicit assumption and wide acknowledgement manifest itself in business? Current best selling books and formal textbooks on business talk about the bottom line, but they rarely connect it with hedonism (cf. Dempsey, 2000; Heskett, Sasser, & Schlesinger, 1997; Greiner & Kinni, 1999).

For example, in a national bestseller entitled, *Forging the Ultimate Weapon: Customer Service*, Davidow and Uttal (1989) make the comment, "Customer service, we

discovered, is a potent competitive weapon in every business" (p. xvii, italics added). One might expect this book to advocate putting customer service first in business. However, we must ask the question of Davidow and Uttal: What is the ultimate concern for providing customer service? As we see later in the book, the authors clearly answer that customer service is to be used as a tool or a vehicle for increasing profitability and maintaining a competitive edge on your competition. That is, customers are the means for the "bottom line". In terms previously defined by Beyers and Petersen (this issue), customer service is a type of hedonistic altruism—a seeming altruism toward the customer that is really under laid with hedonism. Davidow and Uttal's brand of customer service appears to treat customers as the end, but instead sees and treats the customers as a means to the hedonistic end of the business.

Hedonism as a Problem for Business

Herein lies the fundamental problem that hedonism presents to the business community. To truly serve customers—that is, to make them top priority—the business organization has to make the customers truly the end, the ultimate concern, and not simply a means to some other end. Davidow and Uttal (1988) admit the latter when they say, "[Companies who effectively employee customer service] trounce their competitor by spending more effort and money on service, and by spending them in smarter ways. They 'spoil' customers not from altruism but purely out of self-interest" (p. 206). If, however, the customer is merely an instrument of some ultimately selfish end, how much real customer service will be provided? If the customer is the means to profit, then customer service will end when profit is jeopardized. In fact, there are scores of businesses that claim that customer service is their top priority, but it is obvious to their customers that this claim is false. They are a "priority" perhaps, but obviously not the "top" priority.

This false claim is another instance of the confounding of hedonism and altruism, as identified in previous articles of this journal issue. What passes for altruism in business is really a confounding of hedonism and altruism—ultimately a type of hedonism. Unfortunately, this confounding is a major problem for business. It results in considerable confusion in the everyday workplace—confusion about what the priorities of the company really are. Part of the origin of this confusion is the inconsistency of business training and business goals.

Most employees within organizations need not be formally trained to understand that business texts, and experts on business endorse hedonism as the ultimate end of business. Miller (1999) offers a good example of the norms facilitated by such training. He claims that most people would agree that, "It is good to pursue what pays. Thus, appeals to self-interest, although explicitly pointing to the means by which the goal of self-interest can be achieved, implicitly point to the wisdom and appropriateness of pursuing self-interest"

(p. 1055). For instance, Dennis Bakke, the CEO of AES, a global electricity giant, in an interview with *Harvard Business Review* (2000) made this statement about the nature of business. "When I give speeches nowadays and ask the audience, 'Why do businesses exist?' 75% of the people say the same thing, regardless of whether I am at Harvard Business School or a Christian college. They say, 'To make money.'" (p. 59). As a result of this social norm, most employees clearly have a grasp on the principle of self-interest, for one's self as well as one's company.

It must seem puzzling, then, for an employee to read a mission statement that speaks so glowingly of customer service, and claims that "the customer is job 1". A hypothetical employee—let's call her Sally—should illustrate this confusion. When new employee Sally comes to work, she inherently understands the supposed hedonistic nature of business by virtue of the social norm. Traditional textbooks and "common sense" have already told her that customers are important only insofar as they are the means to profit and the retention of her job. Still, when she is trained on her company's mission statement and core values, she sees clearly altruistic rhetoric; even rhetoric that says the customer is the ultimate reason for being in business. The rhetoric would mean that the business is the means and the customer is end—clearly the opposite of what she considers business norms.

Sally experiences what in clinical settings is often referred to as a "double bind"—considered by some to cause schizophrenia (e.g., Barnes, 1997; Bateson, 1972). The first bind is the contradictory messages she is receiving. On the one hand, business is in the business to make money, while, on the other hand, we as employees are to make the customer's needs our top priority. The second bind, however, is perhaps less obvious. The second bind is that Sally is unable to comment on the contradictory message. That is to say, she is not prepared or not able to make sense of the first bind because the hedonism that is underlying the contradiction is not explicitly recognized. Plus, she is likely to have few skills in dealing with such inconsistencies in business. There is currently no business training for such seemingly contradictory messages. Indeed, it is rare that business texts are even straightforward about their ultimate hedonism, let alone their dealing with the philosophical inconsistencies of business.

An Alternative to Hedonism

Given that hedonism has problems, should we be exploring alternatives to hedonism? Non-hedonistic altruism can be an alternative explanation that adequately accounts for behavior in organizational settings. Interestingly, there is a small minority of business leaders who recognize the significance of moving away from hedonism and not allowing it to be the ultimate concern of business. For example, The CEO of Bain & Company, Frederick Reichheld, comments on the need for open dialogue among other business leaders as a step in the right direction to

making non-hedonistic altruism a viable alternative in business. As he puts it,

"[A CEO roundtable] provides a unique networking and learning opportunity for CEO's who are committed to responsible leadership, who see financial success as a reward for serving customers and employees well-not as the primary end of business, and who feel a duty of stewardship to their institution which does not end with the maximization of shareholder value" (Reichheld, web page, Bain & Co, at <http://www.bain.com/capabilities/loyaltyeffect/ceoroundtable.html> www.bain.com/capabilities/loyaltyeffect/ceoroundtable.html; viewed 4/14/00).

Reichheld is not alone in his views, though he is currently in the minority. Bakke (2000), commenting about his organization on the issue of profit, states, "Profits are a consequence of doing a good job stewarding and of meeting a need...Profits in and of themselves, however, are not the central purpose of AES." (p. 61) Another way to characterize that issue is that profits can ensue, following a true altruism toward one's customers. However, if profits are pursued, then customers will become merely the instruments of profit and move to other companies where they are not treated so crudely.

Mitroff and Denton (1999) also agree that, "Although we have to make a profit in order to support ourselves, we exist primarily to serve the needy, the disadvantaged, and the poor. Doing good is our ultimate goal, not making money" (p.59). These authors are offering a clarion call to the business community. They have recognized that hedonism is ultimately a poor principle in business and are offering an alternative, non-hedonistic theory that provides optimistic prospects for business organizations.

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Limitations in the psychotherapeutic relationship: Psychology's implicit commitment to hedonism

Amy Fisher Smith
Texas A&M University - Commerce

In his analysis of contemporary culture, Taylor (1989, 1991) describes several modern themes or "moral ideals" that are implicitly endorsed by society. By "moral ideal," Taylor (1991) does not intend the more pejorative meanings of "moral" including close-mindedness and judgmentalness. Rather, "moral ideal" refers to shared cultural meanings about what constitutes the good life or our vision of a better existence. According to Taylor (1991), this moral ideal of contemporary culture includes the notion of "individualism" and its corollary, "authenticity." The ideal of individualism incorporates modern culture's emphasis upon self-determination or autonomy and the freedom to choose one's own way of life.

In addition to individualism and its emphasis upon freedom and autonomy is the moral ideal of authenticity, which, in the cultural ethic of our time, has come to mean being true to one's uniqueness by seeking out one's own way of life. Taylor (1991) explains,

"People are called upon to be true to themselves and to seek their own self-fulfillment. What this consists of, each must, in the last instance, determine for him- or herself. No one else can or should try to dictate its content" (p. 14).

The best life, then, is not only one that is freely and autonomously chosen, reflecting our commitment to individualism, but one that is authentically chosen, grounded in and directed by an inner, true self. If, as Cushman (1993) and others (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999) have argued, psychology is a historically embedded cultural practice, then it both reflects and impacts cultural values. Given its inherent value-ladenness, these authors contend that psychology has been implicitly influenced by the cultural ideals of individualism and authenticity as well as a proponent of such values (Cushman, 1993; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Smith, 1999; Taylor, 1991).

For instance, individualism values are endorsed by the

formal profession of psychology as demonstrated by the American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles (1992). The Ethical Principles and Code of Conduct for psychotherapists mandates that psychologists respect clients' "self-determination and autonomy" (American Psychological Association, 1992). Indeed, the importance of such individualistic notions as self-management and subjectively-determined choice are viewed as rights that ought to be respected.

Such values are also endorsed at the level of individual psychotherapy practice. In a widely cited survey of mental health values conducted by Jensen and Bergin (1988), mental health practitioners showed a high agreement about general values that were considered important for a mentally healthy lifestyle. These "mental health values" clustered around "freedom, autonomy, and responsibility;" "self-awareness and growth;" and "inner potential and ability to grow" (Jensen & Bergin, 1988, p. 293). The point is that individualism and authenticity values may be so ingrained in our collective culture that they have been automatically incorporated into psychology's broader worldview regarding positive mental health. Indeed, these values are so pervasive that their conflation with positive mental health often goes unnoticed (Leahey, 2000; Tjeltveit, 1999).

Despite its admirable intentions, the pursuit of individualism and authenticity is problematic. The problem, as some critics suggest (Cushman, 1990; Guignon, 1992; Richardson & Christopher, 1993; Taylor, 1991), is that we valorize authenticity and individualism to such an extent that being true to oneself (i.e., authentic) means fulfilling the self. When self-fulfillment is equated with securing and expressing one's genuine and authentic self, a "debased and travestied" form of authenticity emerges—that of hedonism (Taylor, 1991, p. 15). At least in some respects, then, psychotherapy implicitly relies upon a particular form of hedonism—the hedonism of authenticity as self-fulfillment. Unfortunately, this implicit reliance upon hedonistic authenticity both limits and undermines the psychotherapeutic relationship. The purpose of the following paper is to demonstrate psychology's reliance upon hedonistic authenticity as well as its consequences for psychotherapy.

Hedonistic Authenticity in Psychotherapy

The notion of hedonistic authenticity arises in several theories of personality. Humanistic or third force psychology explicitly values the authenticity of self-fulfillment. In general, humanistic theories emphasize human uniqueness, freedom, and psychological growth (Slife & Williams, 1995). Rogers (1970), for instance, emphasizes the individual's potential for growth by positing an inner and unique sense of knowledge and value within each person—the "organismic valuing process." What is best for persons is ultimately determined by them—by their intuitive, organismic knowledge of self. True to the notion of authenticity, such knowledge is generated from within the individual, free from external influences. Rogers (1970)

elaborates,

"Instead of universal values "out there," or a universal value system imposed by some group—philosophers, rulers, priests, or psychologists—we have the possibility of universal human value direction emerging from the experiencing organism" (p. 441).

Persons who attune to their innate organismic valuing process—their authentic selves—will ultimately become "fully functioning persons" or what Maslow (1954) describes as "self-actualized" persons.

According to Maslow (1970), individuals reach their potential growth or self-actualization by meeting their needs. Such needs are arranged in a hierarchy, with lower level needs requiring satisfaction before higher level needs can be met. Persons exercise their autonomy and make choices in light of these needs. Hence, being true to oneself or authentic means fulfilling one's needs. One fulfills one's needs by becoming aware of one's emotions and feelings (Maslow, 1970). Rather than succumbing to the demands and expectations of others, we ought to attune to our feelings, and use these as a guide to our actions (Slife & Williams, 1995).

Maslow's ideas clearly reflect authenticity values, wherein one's truth or best direction for life lies within the self. Furthermore, the emphasis upon this internal truth or knowing is interconnected to need-fulfillment. Hence, need satisfaction and authenticity are equated in the vein of hedonistic authenticity. Even though the humanistic theorists do not explicitly advocate hedonism, the consequences of upholding individual need satisfaction and authentic direction ultimately emphasizes a self-focus over obligations and responsibilities to others. As Slife and Williams (1995) note, "Most humanistic theorists strenuously maintain that no one should pursue his or her own fulfillment at the expense of others, but there is, in humanistic theory, no construct nor argument to explicitly prevent this kind of selfishness" (p. 36). Hedonistic authenticity is so crucial to humanistic theory that those who fail to achieve need satisfaction fail to reach their potential and fail to be actualized. Hence, failing to fulfill one's needs is really a rejection of one's authenticity, and ultimately a rejection of positive mental health.

Rather than explicitly emphasizing authenticity as the humanists do, some psychological theories directly espouse hedonism as a therapeutic goal. Regardless of the specific emphasis on hedonism, however, authenticity values emerge as well, because the two assumptions are yoked in reciprocal relationship to one another. For instance, Albert Ellis' (1973) rational-emotive therapy is explicitly hedonistic in outlook. He advocates "long-range hedonism" as a goal of psychotherapy in which clients ought to seek more pleasure than pain (Ellis, 1973, p. 23). From his perspective, pleasure in life emanates from the elimination of irrational beliefs. The hedonism that Ellis advocates, however, is not a simple hedonism (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).

Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) argue that Ellis qualifies his emphasis upon hedonism by advocating a specific kind of "detachment" from many "common cultural beliefs and values" (p. 68). Detachment from such external influences (i.e., cultural beliefs) is considered necessary in order to combat irrational beliefs, which arise, in part because persons make their identity dependent upon external sources such as approval from others (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Ellis' emphasis upon hedonistic detachment betrays his implicit commitment to authenticity. In order to maintain positive mental health—which is defined in hedonistic terms—one must detach and reject external sources of influence, and depend instead upon one's own internal sense of truth (i.e., rationality) to achieve mental health. Maximizing positive mental health means relying upon one's authentic center to achieve hedonistic ends.

Of course, other psychotherapeutic orientations do not articulate an explicit reliance upon authenticity and hedonism in the same manner of humanistic and cognitive therapies. Nevertheless, recall that many therapists, regardless of their theoretical orientation, endorse notions of freedom, autonomy, and authenticity as transcendent mental health values (Cross & Kahn, 1983; Smith, 1999; Jensen & Bergin, 1988). There is a high consensus among mental health practitioners that clients ought to decide what is best for themselves, rather than passively relying upon the external authority of the therapist for guidance. Hence, helping the client achieve authentic self-reliance in the pursuit of happiness (i.e., hedonism) may be a therapeutic value inherent in the therapy process itself, regardless of the therapist's espoused theoretical orientation.

Implications for psychotherapy

When hedonistic authenticity contributes to the implicit framework for conducting psychotherapy, psychotherapy itself becomes a technique to help clients attain their happiness or pleasure while avoiding unhappiness or suffering. Psychotherapy becomes the means to a particular end. What predominates in this practice of psychotherapy is what several critics have labeled "instrumental reasoning" (Taylor, 1991, p. 5; Guignon, 1992, p. 219). Instrumental reasoning is the kind of reasoning we draw upon when we "calculate the most economical application of means to a given end," and where "maximum efficiency" is the best measure of success (Taylor, 1991, p. 5). From the perspective of instrumental reasoning, the self ought to be able to use its own resources and internal, authentic sensibilities to attain maximum efficiency or what Cushman (1993) describes as better "mastery" or control over the self.

Guignon (1992) has described this technical control of the self as a "psychotechnology for self-improvement" wherein clients presume that with the help of experts (i.e., therapists), they ought to be able to "reengineer their own lives according to a rational blueprint" (p. 219). Psychological research and practicing clinicians, of course, provide the necessary information for such successful reengineering. Indeed, as hedonistic

authenticity and instrumental reasoning would suggest, clients often approach treatment with the implicit expectation of attaining maximum results (e.g., alleviating distress and maximizing satisfaction) with minimal demands on clients' time and finances.

For example, it is generally recognized that clients enter psychotherapy with the expectation of rapid and successful treatment (Garfield, 1978). The rise in popularity of brief psychotherapy treatments seems to be, in part, a response to these client expectations (Pekarik, 1985). As Koss & Shiang (1994) note, "patients typically come to psychological treatment seeking specific and focal problem resolution, rather than general personality 'overhauls'" (p. 664). Such "focal problem resolution" is achieved rapidly by the client through learned technical mastery of the self - through the development and use of coping mechanisms (Pardes & Pincus, 1981).

The very goals of brief therapy seem undergirded by instrumental reasoning in conjunction with hedonistic authenticity. Indeed, in their description of the goals of brief therapy, Koss & Shiang (1994) include, "removal or amelioration of the patient's most disabling symptoms as rapidly as possible" (p. 668) and treating "specific emotional difficulties effectively at a relatively reasonable cost" (p. 664). The major goal of treatment is to maximize the client's psychological benefit at a minimal cost (Koss & Shiang, 1994). Diminishing or removing symptoms and maximizing the client's benefit means securing the client's satisfaction and happiness. Ultimately, then, the therapist is a resource for the client's consumption. The client uses the therapist to obtain access to the technical skills necessary to achieve relief from symptoms (i.e., happiness). The client is a resource for the therapist's use as well. For instance, the therapist might use the client to achieve expert status and monetary gain.

One of the driving forces behind this instrumental reasoning in relationships is the implicit endorsement of hedonistic authenticity. The necessity for a means/end calculation that maximizes clients' benefit or happiness only arises given the pervasive and implicit endorsement of authenticity as self-fulfillment by therapists and the discipline at large. That is, when hedonistic authenticity implicitly informs the framework for psychotherapy and psychology's broader notion of positive mental health, the therapist's main function is to maximize the client's self-directed fulfillment.

Of course, the problem with maximizing authenticity and self-fulfillment is that relationships are limited by an inherent self-interest and self-focus. Guignon (1992) explains,

The outcome is a kind of 'therapeutic contractualism' that treats marriage, friendship, and love relations as a means to individual self-enhancement, that is, as contractual arrangements to be maintained only so long as I 'continue to grow' or 'still feel good about myself' in the relationship. (p. 220)

This is not to say, of course, that all psychotherapy is conducted with a means/end calculating agenda that

maximizes clients' happiness. Rather, the point is to recognize the consequences that logically follow from implicitly endorsing hedonistic authenticity as a taken-for-granted truth. When authenticity as self-fulfillment is tacitly endorsed in psychotherapy, the helping profession inevitably sinks into self-serving contractualism. This is surely an impoverished view of relationship. How can a psychotherapeutic relationship—or any relationship—be caring for the other's best interest when it is limited from the outset by hedonistic selfishness?

In order to rescue psychotherapeutic relationships from hedonistic authenticity and the instrumental means/end calculation that accompanies it, a new conceptualization of self and authenticity needs to emerge. Rather than referring to self-fulfillment only, a re-interpretation of authenticity might include a commitment to others in addition to and even prior to the self. From this perspective, being true to others would be more important than being true to oneself.

Caring relationships require this kind of other-centeredness rather than an exclusive self-centeredness (Levinas, 1969/1961). Including other-centeredness in our understanding of authenticity opens new possibilities for conceptualizing the psychotherapeutic relationship, psychotherapy goals, and psychological growth. Such possibilities include altruism, the importance of obligations to others, self-sacrifice, and even meaningfulness in suffering. However, by continuing to privilege hedonistic authenticity, such considerations do not arise at all. Rather, the self is free to seek its own path to self-gratification, where others are merely the means to one's greater happiness.

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Naturalism in Psychology: Necessitating Hedonistic Altruism

Melinda J. Petersen
Marissa S. Beyers
Brigham Young University

At this point, we have explored our two conceptualizations of altruism and demonstrated their logical incompatibility. Accordingly, it has been shown that psychology, as a discipline, favors one while ignoring the other. It is our contention that the popularity of hedonistic altruism in psychology stems from the fact that both psychology and hedonism are grounded in naturalistic assumptions. Indeed, as this paper will argue, naturalism in psychology not only favors hedonistic altruism, it requires hedonistic altruism. The scientific method, as conceived of by the field of scientific psychology, precludes the plausibility of a non-hedonistic altruism, and as a result, genuine altruism is never really studied or explored. The pre-investigatory philosophy underlying psychology and scientific method dictates a particular interpretation of both data and observations. This leads to the confounding illustrated in the previous papers, wherein even those who set out to study non-hedonistic altruism find themselves confounding it with hedonistic altruism. The purpose of this paper, then, is to understand

naturalism and its assumptions. In doing so, we will understand why psychology favors hedonistic altruism and, more importantly, why non-hedonistic altruism is ignored.

Psychology is driven by the scientific method (Hempel, 1965; Slife & Williams, 1995; Wundt, 1902). The scientific method is the preferred tool of investigation for the natural sciences as it has afforded them technological advance, control and the ability to predict natural occurrences. In adopting the scientific method, psychology has also adopted the assumptions grounding this method. The scientific method was designed to investigate the natural world and one assumption we make is that objects in the world are governed by natural laws. In this sense, objects and events in the world are understood as having a causal nature, as deterministic, and calculable. These naturalistic assumptions fit nicely with the goal of science (i.e., control & prediction) because if the scientist knows the natural laws governing an object (which are deterministic and calculable) then the scientist can predict the actions of the object (Hempel, 1965).

Given the assumptions of naturalism, there should be no factors effecting a phenomenon under investigation but those in the natural world. Once those are known, experiments are designed to test our predictions and, by implication, test our understanding of the natural laws in place. These experiments, of course, are completely reliant on the scientific method; it is the tool by which we uncover this information. Psychology, in utilizing the scientific method, assumes that human beings are like any other object in the natural world. Specifically, human beings and their actions are governed by natural laws in the same way that other objects in the world are governed by laws. This explains why a method used to study the acceleration of falling objects can be similarly applied to human social interaction; fundamentally, the two phenomena are the same. Hence when we design experiments to test our ability to predict human behavior, or to isolate those regularities we presume to be universal to human behavior, we are ultimately testing our understanding of the laws underlying behavior-including altruistic behavior.

When scientists and psychologists look at human behavior, they see hedonistic behavior because hedonistic behavior is considered natural and lawful. Not surprisingly, this assertion comes directly from the natural sciences which assume hedonism to be the motivation that ensures survival. Evolutionary theory asserts hedonism to be a natural law: living things will always attempt to maximize their own survival (Buss, 1998; Darwin, 1872; Wilson, 1998). Plants turn toward the sun and animals hunt for food and flee from predators. In this sense, all behavior is purposive. The goal is always the same, to seek out benefits and avoid harm-survival is hedonistic. From an evolutionary perspective, it is inconceivable that an animal would seek its own destruction, unless ultimately that destruction had some benefit to the survival of its kin. As inclusive fitness dictates, an organism will show distinct favorit-

ism toward protecting or acting to benefit those with the most similar genetic makeup. As evolutionary theory places human beings at the top of the evolutionary continuum, they are no different than any other living organism. Accordingly, like trees or ground squirrels, human beings are governed laws of nature.

Hedonistic explanations, therefore, are consistent with naturalism in that hedonistic behavior is understood as a universal: all organisms, including human beings, always act to maximize their benefit (or survival or pleasure) and always seek to minimize their detriment (or death or pain). Hedonistic explanations of behavior meet the criteria of universality and are consonant with the natural laws governing other objects in the world, such as trees and animals. No one has ever contended that human beings always act selflessly. Similarly, human beings have never been shown to uniformly behave selflessly under the same circumstances. In short, there can be no universal law of non-hedonistic altruism. In this sense, genuine altruism is inconsistent with naturalism. Hedonistic explanation can be descriptively universal and thus more law-like than non-hedonistic altruism.

The lawful character of hedonistic explanations not only fits well with the scientific method, indeed they are the only possible kind of explanations consistent with the method's naturalistic framework. Because the scientific method is designed to study laws in the natural world, it cannot study events that do not conform to a naturalistic, lawful formula. When data from an experiment is analyzed, we look for the regularities. We compare our numbers to the probability that the numbers occurred by chance. We look for patterns in the data not generated by chance as chance occurrences supposedly tell us nothing about human nature or human experience. As part of the natural world, human nature and activity are assumed to be fundamentally ordered and lawful, otherwise we wouldn't be using the scientific method to study them. When we plug our experimental manipulations into the scientific method and end up with results that are not statistically regular, which do not reveal something universal and lawful, then our experiment has failed, except insofar as to tell us that our experimental manipulation has no effect. Within the framework of the scientific method, there are only two options: events are either lawful and therefore statistically regular, or they are random and left to chance. Random or non-lawful events cannot be predicted, and thus cannot be explained scientifically (Hempel, 1965). The scientific method is simply not equipped to study anything that is not lawful. Therefore, the scientific method is not equipped to study, and cannot explain, non-hedonistic altruism.

There are three consequences to non-hedonistic altruism's poor fit into the assumptions underlying the scientific method. First, non-hedonistic actions, when studied, must be manipulated to fit the method. Because mainstream psychology recognizes the scientific method as the most appropriate way to conduct research, any phenomenon under study must fit into its formula. When studying altruism, scientists must set

up and control certain prior conditions. An experimental manipulation is added and then the subjects' responses or behaviors are catalogued for evidence of either altruistic action or intent. Not only do we have a problem with operationalization to contend with, but if altruistic behavior is not evidenced in a statistically significant number of respondents under these given conditions, then we lose any possibility of altruism in the statistical wash. That may be because there is no such thing as altruism, or it may be because altruistic behavior is not statistically or lawfully governed.

A second problem researchers of altruism face is that in the manipulation to fit the method, the non-hedonistic qualities of non-hedonistic altruism are lost and thus genuine altruism seems to disappear—it seems to cease existing in any scientific way. Because we have no scientifically recognized manner in which to study what is not statistically lawful, and non-hedonistic altruism seems to be such, then the only conclusion the scientific method leaves open to us is that non-hedonistic altruism does not exist. Any behavior which seems to be non-hedonistic (and therefore outside the scientific method) must then be explained within the assumptions and requirements of the scientific method used to study the behavior. The result is that non-hedonistic altruism is explained in hedonistic terms. Hedonism surfaces not because the data or observations require it, but because hedonism fits into the assumptions of our method.

Finally, because hedonistic altruism is the only lawful explanation available to scientific psychologists, it becomes a law of human nature. Therefore, not only is non-hedonistic altruism impossible to research, it is impossible. Like other laws of nature, the law of hedonism must be in force at all times and in all circumstances. The law of gravity cannot be true except when circumstances call for an exception. Likewise, if human beings are governed by a hedonistic law of behavior, then human beings can never be anything but hedonistic. Just as a rock or squirrel cannot step outside of the law of gravity, human beings can never escape the law of hedonism. It will never be possible, nor has it ever been possible, for anyone to ever act other than hedonistically. The law is universally, transculturally, and trans-historically binding.

Furthermore, human beings cannot be held accountable for their hedonistic actions because there is no alternative open to them. We do not hold people responsible for being subject to the law of gravity, because they cannot be anything but subject to the law of gravity. We also do not praise people for being subject to the law of gravity for the same reason. Returning to the example of Mother Teresa from the first paper (Beyers and Petersen, 2000), in tending to the needs of the poor in Calcutta, she must have been acting to either bring herself praise or some other form of satisfaction, or else working to diminish her own pain and suffering. Mother Teresa must have been

behaving hedonistically because that is the only option available to us in explaining her actions. And she could not have acted otherwise because she was subject to the law of hedonism. Praising Mother Teresa because her actions, governed by a natural law, happened to result in good things for other people makes little sense. It would be like praising the sun for melting the winter snow.

Additionally, we cannot hold people responsible for acting in hedonistic ways. It makes little sense to assume that people should be held to an altruistic standard, when pure altruism, non-hedonistic altruism, really is impossible. In fact, if hedonism fits the criteria for a natural law, then the possibility of doing otherwise is slim, if not impossible. The deterministic, causal nature of laws really negates the question of what is the moral or good behavior in a given set of circumstances because what is possible given those circumstances has already been circumscribed by natural law. The notion of morality is completely subsumed by the lawfulness of behavior.

Psychology, as a science, has pledged its allegiance and fidelity to the scientific method. The scientific method, wedded to its naturalistic assumptions, allows only one view of altruistic behavior: altruistic behavior must be defined as hedonistic altruism. It is conceivable that hedonistic altruism is the only explanation possible for human behavior and perhaps science is only showing us that our common sense notions about the altruistic motivation in ourselves and others are mere delusions. But the possibility also exists that this is not the case. There is good reason to believe that human beings are capable of non-hedonistic altruism. This possibility, however, needs to be honestly explored within the psychological community, a seemingly impossible task given its predilection for conventional method. Instead of studying behavior in a genuine attempt to understand our human experience, psychology is allowing the assumptions of its method to always and already define the human being as hedonistic, without even recognizing the altruistic alternative.

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Summation

Brent D. Slife
Brigham Young University

Referring to the title of this special section, "Hedonism: A Hidden Unity and Problematic of Psychology," there is surely no doubt about hedonism's status as a unifier of psychology. As the foregoing authors have amply demonstrated, the notion that we seek pleasure and avoid pain—in all its sophisticated variations—permeates virtually every aspect of our disciplinary theories and practices. The only real question at this point is: Is this hidden unifier "problematic"?

If it is not problematic, then neither its unifying status nor its hiddenness should concern us; hedonism is harmless. If, however, it does contain problematic implications, then questions arise both about whether it should be so pervasive and about whether it should remain hidden. Our collective conclusion, from the preceding reviews of many of the subdisciplines of psychology, is that hedonism is indeed a potentially problematic concept. Consequently, psychologists do not have the luxury of allowing it to remain unexamined, and the discipline cannot allow it to run roughshod over other potentially useful concepts, as any unconsciously held paradigm can.

Its problematic aspects can be summarized in two essential themes. The first is a problem that any relatively unrecognized assumption has: We cannot know whether it is valid until we have examined and investigated it. Even if it is validated in one context, this does not mean it is valid in another. Science requires that we constantly explicate assumptions, so that we can continually test and investigate them. Hedonism, however, has frequently been treated as if it were a truism—as if it did not require testing or examination.

This is particularly evident in the more applied specialties of psychology, such as psychotherapy and business. As Amy Fisher Smith notes, it is sometimes important that a therapist's motives be purely altruistic, and not hedonistically altruistic. Although there are certainly times in which a therapist gains as well as gives, many therapists would like to have the ability to make decisions that are solely in the client's interests. Otherwise, a therapist could overlook an option that is clearly best for the client because it does not

involve benefits for the therapist.

Similarly, as Justin Calapp illustrates, some people in business wish to provide truly altruistic mission statements—organizational motives that put the customer first. As Calapp shows, however, as long as profitability is the "bottom line," such priorities are precluded by a sophisticated hedonism that always has the self or, in the case of business, the organization as the ultimate beneficiary. Again, the question is: is it impossible to engage in a truly selfless act? Our discipline seems to assume that it is. However, is this assumption a conclusion drawn after careful empirical study, or is it an assumption drawn from a familiar naturalistic way of thinking about ourselves?

The latter seems to be the more likely, especially when one considers the second category of problematic implications—the inevitable confounding that occurs when hedonism has been studied. As Jeff Reber shows much of the social psychological research on altruism is really research on hedonism. This is not to say that hedonism always wins the empirical battle with altruism, but rather that the researchers never design their experiments in a way that allows for altruism to be truly examined and tested.

Melinda Peterson and Marissa Beyers make very clear that we cannot really examine a concept unless we have a viable, conceptual disjunctive in which to contrast it. Hedonism has so dominated the discipline—again, mostly unconsciously—that no such disjunctive has been developed or allowed to become viable. Indeed, as Ed Gantt demonstrates in his article, any such disjunctive would have to be understood as an irrational and unscientific conception, because hedonism is considered necessary to rationality and thus the scientific enterprise.

What all this means is that the hidden unity of hedonism is not harmless. Indeed, it could be the worst kind of problematic in a science—an unacknowledged philosophical bias that manages to escape empirical scrutiny. Our recommendation, given this possibility, is simple and straightforward: We need to explicate this bias whenever it is assumed and examine it empirically and theoretically. Up to this point, hedonism has been viewed as an innocuous truism, rather than a potentially problematic object of study. It is our hope that this special section not only raises the consciousness of psychologists about this "hidden unity" in the discipline, but also begins a badly needed examination of its problems and prospects.

This symposium was presented at the Convention of the American Psychological Association in Washington, DC, August, 2000. It was sponsored by The Society for General Psychology.



THE PLEASURES AND AGGRAVATIONS OF BABIES: Including some lessons for lifespan development

Lewis P. Lipsitt
Brown University

This is not my Division I President's Address, which was delivered at the APA convention on August 6, 2000, in Washington, DC. Rather, it is an encapsulation of my address. The original presentation was laced with color slides of infants and children going places and doing things, and we do not have the capacity to reproduce those photos here. What appears here is thus a condensed report of my lecture.

For my taste, we Psychologists do not talk enough about nor research adequately the pleasures and annoyances inherent in the human condition and which underlie and mediate most behavior. While I hold this truth to be self-evident across the lifespan, my remarks today are addressed particularly to the lacuna in our knowledge about the hedonic nature of infancy.

Can there be any doubt that pleasure and annoyance mediate and condition most of our approach and avoidance behavior, at every stage of life and in every facet of our being? Can there be any doubt that many, if not most, of life problems which humans present for treatment, remediation, or relief stem from the joy we seek and the aggravations we yearn to avoid?

It all begins in infancy. The normal human newborn likes—enjoys—some stimulus events more than others and abhors stimulation that older, articulate humans regard as hurtful. Moreover, the inarticulate newborn comes equipped with behavioral gifts of the species that enable signaling of pleasure and regret; witness the loud cry of the baby and, indeed, its reduction or elimination when the right alternative experiences are provided. It is perhaps a measure of the importance of hedonic responsiveness, moreover, that babies born under conditions of risk, or with birth injuries, usually retain some capacity, although compromised, for its expression.

A major conclusion that I wish to draw is that pleasure and aggravation, the two sides of the hedonic coin, are propaedeutic: Thorndike's Law of Effect would have no meaning without hedonics, and learning processes as we know them would be impossible. Classical escape and avoidance conditioning depend upon hurtful or annoying conditions that prompt or command a flight response. Operant learning is clearly based upon contingencies closely connected with hedonic priorities of the organism.

In general, and I realize I am at risk of both circularity and of imputing intentions to organisms that may have

no way of reporting these directly, organisms act to perpetuate pleasure and to gain release from pain or annoyance.

At the risk of compromising exactitude, I submit the following expressions as statements of fact, which are always subject to retesting and empirical verification. While statements of facts are either right or wrong, our knowledge about their veracity is always uncertain, and that is what makes science so exciting. Thus I offer these propositions with the full understanding that they are, as it were, open for discussion long after my voice is gone. Please regard the following as "overheads" which may sometimes be accompanied by pleasant looking pictures of babies and other human beings.

- Most babies are born with all of their sensory systems functioning. They can see and hear; they are acutely aware of tastes and taste changes; they feel touch; and they are great odor detectors. Babies born at risk (for example, prematurely, with the cord around the neck, into families or environments which introduce toxic substances, like smoke, alcohol, and lead into the babies' lives) continue to be at risk for developmental disorders due to such conditions impinging on their receptors and the nervous system.
- Newborns are affected by the stimulation in their environment. They habituate to sounds and odors in the first days of their lives.
- Newborns are not merely passive creatures reacting to whatever happens to be there. They select and self-administer stimulation. They engage in motoric responses that enhance stimulation—such as turning in the direction, preferentially, of their mothers odor.
- Babies in the first few weeks of life learn. Their behavior is affected by the environmental. Inputs, and besides being capable of habituation, they are classically conditioned in naturalistic circumstances and are capable of operant learning.
- Thorndike's Law of Effect lives. Those responses followed by a satisfying state of affairs tend to get repeated in the future, and, those that are not followed by agreeable circumstances will tend not to be repeated.
- Babies thus are under incentive control, like adults. Babies are guided by rewarding or reinforcing cir-

Prof. Lipsitt is now and was President of the Society for General Psychology and this material is adapted from his Presidential Address.

cumstances. Newborns track the incentives, sucking differently for a very sweet fluid, for example, than a less sweet fluid. The tracking with behavior change is a matter of pursuing the pleasures of sensation and avoiding annoyances.

- Much of the stimulation that a baby receives from the environment is provided by the baby's caretakers, usually the parents, who closely interact with the child. These interactions cause changes in the baby's behavior, and especially facilitate learning. Humans are person-environment reciprocators from the start.
- Much of human behavior involves perpetuating and restoring pleasant stimulation and, on the other side of the hedonic coin, rejecting and fleeing from annoyances. This includes thought processes and other aspects of cognitive development, which may be seen as extensions, elaborations, and successors of these basic conditions of human development.

Einstein is believed by anthropologists to have said that physics is child's play compared with a child's play behavior. Behavior science is, in principle, more complex than physics although, to be sure, our knowledge of the laws of behavior have not risen nearly to the level extant in the physical sciences today. But unpredictability, which so bothers some critics of behavior science especially those who point to the many occasions in which it appears that humans are *not* under obvious incentive control, is characteristic of the "harder" sciences as well, and is due to our inadequate knowledge. This, again, is what makes the science of behavior and the discovery process, as in other sciences, exciting. The following quote is attributed to Spreat and Spreat: "Much like the laws of gravity, the laws of learning are always in effect."

The Marginalization of Academic, Non-Scientific Psychology in the American Psychological Association

Donald A. Dewsbury
University of Florida

As can be seen in Division 1 (the Society for General Psychology) the range of activities of psychologists is remarkably broad. The different interests that constitute psychology have been effective in finding representation in the American Psychological Association (APA) and other organizations. However, even with the complex organization of a group like the APA, some interest groups fall between the cracks and fail to gain effective representation. I wish to define such a group that I believe generally under-represented in the APA and elsewhere. The cluster of interests to which I refer is composed of the Academic, Non-Science Psychologists (ANSP). Within the divisional structure of the APA this includes parts of Division 1 and such divisions as Division 10 (Psychology and the Arts), Division 24

(Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology), Division 26 (History of Psychology), Division 32 (Humanistic Psychology), and Division 36 (Psychology of Religion). Although parts of these divisions may fall outside of the realm of ANSP and parts of ANSP may fall within other divisions, this list should suffice to define the content areas to which I refer.

According to the first paragraph of the Bylaws of the APA, the objects of psychology are "to advance psychology as a science and profession and as a means of promoting human welfare." Later in the paragraph one finds reference to education, application, and the promotion of public welfare. To accomplish these objectives, the APA has established four directorates, each with a corresponding Standing Board. These are concerned with Science, Practice, Education, and Public Interest. The resources of these administrative units are used for the advancement of the interests of these four clusters. The interests of ANSP fill between the cracks, however, and received less attention. This lack of representation has numerous implications. Few interests of the ANSP are addressed in the Monitor, much of which is structured around the four directorates. Few issues are discussed at the meetings of the Council of Representatives. At the annual conventions, it is common for these divisions to have appreciable program time in marginal slots and to be centered at peripheral hotels, as exemplified by the location at the Toronto conventions. Few resources are devoted to these groups. Although there are some division journals which publish material in these fields and *Contemporary Psychology*, the *Psychological Bulletin* and the *Psychological Review* occasionally publish relevant articles, none of the existing APA journals is dedicated to any of the interest of the ANSP. All are devoted to practice, science, education, and public interest.

The Council of Representatives is currently considering a Five-Year Report of a Blue Ribbon Panel of the Policy and Planning Board that would restructure the committees of the APA. There is much of value in the effort to make the APA structure more cost effective. However, increased emphasis would be placed within the existing Boards, thus exacerbating the present problem.

In an ideal world, the APA might establish a new Board and Directorate concerned with academic, non-science psychology. Realistically, however, these groups are so small that this would appear impractical. An alternative approach would be to expand either the Science or Education Board and Directorate to explicitly encompass the concerns of ANSP. This might be accomplished by assigning a single staff member to deal with these interests and, thus, could be done at minimal cost to the APA.

My proposal is the cousin of that of Slife and Williams (1997), who sought the formal recognition of a subdiscipline of Theoretical Psychology. Although I am sympathetic with that effort, which is not incompatible with my own, I believe it is in the interest of all of these

groups that the range of interests be broadened. An encouraging start is represented by one of the caucuses formed within the Council of Representatives: the Coalition for Academic, Scientific, and Applied Psychology (CASAP). Although much of the activity of this group is concerned with scientific interests, it represents a model and a start at effective representation because Academic Psychology is mentioned explicitly. Some psychologists might drift to the American Psychological Society (APS) in seeking effective representation. However, it should be remembered that the APS was formed from the Assembly for Scientific and Applied Psychology. The emphasis has been on science. Consultation of the web page of the APS (APS, 2000) defines its mission as "to promote, protect, and advance the interests of scientifically oriented psychology in research, application, and the improvement of human welfare. According to the following paragraph, it is "the leading national organization dedicated

solely to the science of psychology." To be clear, I am not opposing science in psychology; I have spent too many years and published too many scientific articles to want to do that. What I am seeking is additional representation. At the founding of psychology, psychologists as diverse as William James and Wilhelm Wundt were greatly concerned that psychology was losing its links to philosophy and the related interests in religion, the arts, and the like. I believe that we should provide a structural means to represent these interests.

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Society Awards

Winners and Call for Submissions

The Society for General Psychology, Division One of the American Psychological Association, announces its Year 2001 award winners who have been recognized for outstanding achievements in General Psychology. This year the winner of the William James Book Award is Michael Tomasello for his book *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, which was published in 1999 by Harvard University Press. This award is for a recent book that serves to integrate material across psychological subfields or to provide coherence to the diverse subject matter of psychology.

The Year-2001 winner of the Ernest R. Hilgard Award for a Career Contribution to General Psychology is Murray Sidman. And the winners of the George A. Miller Award for an Outstanding Recent Article in General Psychology are Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman of Simon Fraser University for their article "Psychology's Reality Debate: A 'Levels of Reality' Approach" which appeared in the *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* in 1999 (pp. 177-194). In each case the awardees receive a certificate and a cash prize: \$500 for the Hilgard and Miller awards, and \$1000 for the William James Book Award. The winner of the competition to deliver the Year-2001 Arthur W. Staats Lecture for Unifying Psychology who will receive an award of \$1000 will be determined and announced later.

For all of these awards, the focus is on the quality of the contribution and the linkages made between the diverse fields of psychological theory and research. The Society for General Psychology encourages the integration of knowledge across the subfields of psychology and the incorporation of contributions from other disciplines. The Society is looking for creative synthesis, the building of novel conceptual approaches, and a reach for new, integrated wholes. A match between the goals of the Society and the nominated work or person will be an important evaluation criterion. The Staats Award has a unification theme, recognizing significant contributions of any kind that go beyond mere efforts at coherence and serve to

develop psychology as a unified science. The Staats Lecture will deal with how the awardee's work serves to unify psychology.

There are no restrictions on nominees, and self-nominations as well as nominations by others are encouraged for these awards. For the Hilgard Award and the Staats Award, nominators are asked to submit the candidate's name and vitae along with a detailed statement indicating why the nominee is a worthy candidate for the award and supporting letters from others who endorse the nomination.

For the Miller Award, nominations should include: vitae of the author(s), four copies of the article being considered (which can be of any length but must be in print and have a post-1995 publication date), and a statement detailing the strength of the candidate article as an outstanding contribution to General Psychology.

Nominations for the William James Award should include three copies of the book (dated post-1995 and available in print); the vitae of the author(s) and a one-page statement that explains the strengths of the submission as an integrative work and how it meets criteria established by the Society. Text books, analytic reviews, biographies, and examples of applications are generally discouraged.

Winners will be announced at the Fall convention of the American Psychological Association the year of submission. Winners will be expected to give an invited address at the subsequent APA convention and also to provide a copy of the award address for inclusion in the newsletter of the Society.

All nominations and supporting materials for each award must be received on or before April 15, 2001. Nominations and materials for all awards and requests for further information should be directed to General Psychology Awards, c/o C. Alan Boneau, Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030. Phone: 301-320-3695; Fax: 301-320-2845; E-mail: aboneau@gmu.edu.

William James Book Award Winner

Excerpts from the Nomination Letter

This is a little book that stands—and occasionally dances, for it is written with a grace that's unusual in academic writing—on a mountain of learning. Michael Tomasello is one of the very few people who has studied the cognitive development of both very young human beings and very young nonhuman primates. He has paid particular attention to the acquisition by human children of the capacity for symbolic representation—most notably, language—and the lack of that capacity, or any semblance of it, in all but the most exhaustively trained primates.

Tomasello further suggests that the distinctively human cognitive capacities have a single biological root, which arose relatively recently in our evolution: our ability to pool our cognitive resources—to think together. Human children begin to diverge from their nonhuman primate cousins before the end of the first year of life, when they begin not only to speak and understand language, but to engage in joint attentional activities, and to take the perspective of another person. The real human leap into culture, on Tomasello's argument, should not be represented by an ancient hominid using a tool, as in Kubrick's unforgettable image in "2001: A Space Odyssey," but by a nine-month-old, turning his head to see what his

mother is looking at.

Tomasello's book also offers a fresh and original rethinking of the much-reworked nature/nurture debates. As he writes, "Genes are an essential part of the story of human cognitive evolution, perhaps even from some points of view the most important part of the story since they are what got the ball rolling. But they are not the whole story, and the ball has rolled a long way since it got started. In all, the tired old philosophical categories of nature versus nurture, innate versus learned, genes versus environment are just not up to the task—they are too static and categorical—if our goal is a dynamic Darwinian account of human cognition in its evolutionary, historical, and ontogenetic dimensions."

/s/ Elizabeth Knoll,

Senior Editor, Behavioral Sciences
Harvard University Press.

Society President-Elect Lyle Bourne who chaired the William James Book Award Selection Committee would like to recognize and thank the following individuals who assisted in the process of judging this year's William James Book Award nominees: Alan Boneau, Greg Carey, Lew Harvey, David Miklowitz, Akira Miyake, Bernadette Park, Peter Polson, Louise Silvern, and Mike Wertheimer

Getting Down to BUSINESS

Executive Committee Minutes: August 2000

The Division One Executive Committee (EC) meeting was called to order by Dr. Lewis Lipsitt at 7:38 AM on August 5, 2000. The Division One Business meeting was called to order by Dr. Lewis Lipsitt at 3:03 PM on August 5, 2000 in the Washington Convention Center and the actions of the EC were presented at that meeting. This review is to provide the members of Division One with an overview of activities, at the EC meeting. The Divisional activities during the convention were excellent this year, and we hope to see all of you at the Annual Business Meeting next year.

Two representatives of the Science Directorate, Dr. Mary Bullock and Dr. Nancy Dess, the Senior Scientist attended the EC meeting and presented an overview of current Directorate activities, future plans, and ideas under consideration. They thanked the Division for using the "Decade of Behavior" Logo on the journal.

The minutes of the March 26 and 27, 2000 EC meeting submitted by Dr. Lee Matthews as Secretary were reviewed and approved following emendations by the EC members.

In his President's report, Dr. Lipsitt thanked Dr. Kurt Salzinger for his service to the division as President last year and as Past President this year. He announced the appointment of Dr. Harold Takooshian as the new Fellows Chair and thanked Dr. Morton A. Gernsbacher for her past service as Chair of the Fellows Committee. One of Dr. Lipsitt's primary initiatives is the recruitment of new generalist into the Division.

Dr. Kurt Salzinger, as Past President thanked the members of the EC for their support this past year.

Dr. Matthews presented the financial report. The Dues Assess-

ment Rate structure for the division was reviewed and will be sent to APA by next week with no changes.

Dr. Lyle Bourne, as President-Elect reported that he has asked Dr. Robert Perloff to serve as the Program Chair for the 2001 convention as he will be out of the country this Fall and early Winter. Dr. Bourne and Dr. Frank Farley will serve on the Program Committee. Dr. Perloff noted that he had already attended an APA Convention program meeting regarding divisional program submissions and deadlines.

D. Lipsitt noted several problems regarding the APA Central Office handing of this year's convention program. These were discussed by the EC. Apparently there were problems, not only with Division One, but several other divisions. Among these difficulties were that no titles were given for the talks by several of the division's invited speakers, although titles were submitted by the division. Dr. Bourne noted that he had registered a complaint and contacted the convention program staff.

Dr. Peter Salovey as Editor of the *Review of General Psychology* presented his report. His term of office will be up in 2002 and a new Editor needs to be appointed. He suggested that a list of possible names for the position might be based on past authors of articles or past reviewers. Drs. Lipsitt and Bourne led a discussion of the need to begin planning for a new Editor for the journal. The details of a selection committee and the elements of the job description will need to be addressed by the EC this Fall.

The good news is that the number of library subscriptions is now up to 54, doubling in the past year. Dr. Salovey provided a handout with the data for this year to date and a table of

contents for the journal for the rest of 2000. He had a meeting the previous day with APA Publication staff. He noted that membership in the division is down and that in general we are a division of people's "second interest", as the discipline and membership in APA becomes more specialized. The issue of membership was discussed in greater detail under the Membership Report. It was also noted that options such as the possibility of producing the journal electronic rather than/or in addition to paper production is still being considered.

As our Council Representative, Dr. Gregory Kimble reported on the establishment of the APA companion practice organization, which is a 501(C-6) entity under IRS codes, so that necessary political activity can take place. Dr. Kimble noted that a new Council business item regarding restructuring Council so that there would be a seat for each state on Council was deferred, so that a Task Force could be appointed by the Board of Directors to investigate the implications. Dr. Kimble was thanked by Dr. Lipsitt for his work on behalf of the Division and congratulated on his reelection to the position.

Dr. Alan Boneau reviewed the status of *The General Psychologist*. He noted that he will be completing his tenure as Editor at the end of next year, and that a search is currently underway for a new Editor to be appointed for 2002. He recommended that this task be accomplished as soon as possible, to ensure a smooth transition. Dr. Lipsitt and the members of the EC thanked him.

Dr. Lipsitt gave the report for the Nominations and Election Committee. The newly elected officers for 2001 are:

President Elect Designate	- Dr. Linda Bartoshuk
Council Representative	- Dr. Greg Kimble.
Members-At-Large (01-03)	- Dr. Wendy Williams
	- Dr. Frank Farley

Dr. Linda Bartoshuk was welcomed to the meeting as the President Elect Designate for 2001, based on the election results.

Dr. Alan Boneau reported on the current status of the Awards Committee. He noted that he will be stepping down as Chair and that a replacement will need to be appointed. It was decided that the Officer assigned to Chair each of the Awards will be responsible for notifying the Awardee of the honor, and that the official notification will be by formal letter, cosigned by the current President.

As of the EC meeting, the following was the status of the Year 2001 Awards and Committee Chairs:

Hilgard Lifetime Achievement	Murray Sidman
William James Book Award	Michael Tomasello
C. Alan Boneau Award	Elizabeth Lynn for 2001
	Helen Warren Ross for 2002
-George Miller Award	Pending
Arthur W. Staats Lecture	Pending

A motion had been made by Dr. Frank Farley and seconded by Dr. Lipsitt by e-mail on August 1, 2000 regarding increasing the amount of the honorarium to \$1,000 for the Hilgard Lifetime Achievement award. An e-mail vote taken of the members of the EC on August 1, 2000 approved the change, effective with the 2000 awards. Since this award is for a lifelong contribution to the field of psychology, the EC members felt that the monetary award should reflect the stature of the award. This decision was unanimously ratified by the EC.

As a carry over item, the related issues as to the amount of the honoraria when there are multiple winners for a single award and dual authorship of an award were also discussed. A comparison of the expenses for 1999 and 2000 indicated that the total

award amount had doubled from \$2,500 to \$5,000. After some consideration of other alternatives, it was decided that rather than failing to acknowledge a significant contribution, or penalizing authors for collaborative scholarly research, that the amounts set for the awards should not be split among dual authors, but should be a "per person" amount. Effective with the year 2001 awards, the amounts will be as follows:

Hilgard Award	\$1,000
Williams James Book Award	1,000
Arthur W. Staats Award	1,000
C. Alan Boneau Award	500
George A. Miller Award	500

Dr. Lipsitt thanked Dr. Boneau for his ongoing work in reorganizing these activities.

Dr. Wertheimer agreed to integrate the information he has on the By-Laws/Handbook revisions, with the draft Dr. Matthews has placed on computer. Dr. Matthews is to send his copy to Dr. Wertheimer.

Dr. Lipsitt asked for comments on the issue of how decisions are made by the Board of Directors regarding who will represent APA at public functions when expertise is required on a specific topic. Dr. Salzinger and Dr. Lipsitt will follow-up with a letter and talk to other divisions about this issue. Dr. Lipsitt discussed various proposals, which might be made to CODAPAR. These

projects could be used to support joint activities for several divisions. There was discussion of mounting such initiatives. It was suggested that Bob Perloff also be contacted to provide additional ideas. A variety of areas were discussed including: clinical applications of scientific information; the presentation of "All children can learn" workshops at divisional meetings; across boundary integration at all regional meetings by having a Division 1 representative meet with younger members of the society; and starting a student affiliate program at regional meetings. When considering either of the last two, the way to cover expenses for travel at the regional meetings would also need to be addressed. Dr. Lipsitt volunteered to spearhead investigation of such projects.

As mentioned earlier, Dr. Lipsitt announced the appointment of Dr. Harold Takooshian as Fellows Chair. Dr. Wertheimer has agreed to serve as a member of the committee. APA approved the following Current Fellows individuals for Fellow Status in Division 1: Henry E. Adams, Irene Deitch, Roy Freedle, Richard M. Lerner, R. Duncan Luce, Janet R. Matthews, Lee H. Matthews, John D. Robinson, Gene P. Sackett, Bonnie Strickland, and Phil Zimbardo. Dr. Boneau will arrange for Certificates for the Fellows.

A list of individuals had been recommended as potential New Fellows and those names were "carried over" from the March Meeting. Dr. Harold Takooshian will be asked to contact them about being candidates as New Fellows.

Increasing membership in the Division remains the most pressing issue. The deadline for next year's applications for membership is February 1, 2001. Dr. Boneau and Dr. Newcombe reported on several possible ways to increase membership by targeting members of APA who are not currently members of any division. Dr. Lipsitt appointed the current President, Past President and President-Elect as part of the Membership Committee. A new Chair will also need to be appointed. Funding of up to \$1,000 for brochures, postage and other materials had previously been approved at the March EC meeting, based on the cost of current mail-outs to division members.

The Division Leadership Conference historically has usually been attended by the President-Elect. Because of circumstances both last year and this year, the rotation has been out

of sequence. Dr. Linda Bartoshuk is scheduled to attend in the Spring of 2001.

Dr. Donald Dewsbury gave the Historian's report. He noted that all the archival information he had on hand from the division over the past several years has been sent to the APA archives. He encouraged members of the EC to send him documents for inclusion. Some discussion was held regarding the type of material to be sent, for example, e-mail between EC members. Dr. Dewsbury recommended that we send any such information to him and that he would then sort for duplicates. The bill for shipping of the materials to APA will be sent to Dr. Matthews so that Dr. Dewsbury may be reimbursed.

Dr. Matthews moved and following discussion, the EC approved renewal of the division's membership or support of the following organizations for 2001

1. The Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences
2. Assembly of Scientist-Practitioner Psychologists
3. The Psychological Archives in Akron (for one more year).

Dr. Michael Wertheimer and Dr. Greg Kimble reported on the work that they have done on the *Pioneers Series*. They noted that copies of Volume IV were supposed to have been in the APA Convention Bookstore but are not here. Consideration for authors for Volume V is progressing with about 19 authors. There will be more women represented in this volume. Since there continues to be interest in additional historical figures and more potential authors, the EC voted to both thank Drs. Wertheimer and Kimble for their ongoing work and to provide divisional support for travel and support expenses in this important and ongoing project of the division.

Under Old Business, the EC voted to approve the positions of Historian and Newsletter Editor as full voting members of the EC. The proposed separation of the Secretary and Treasurer's positions was approved subject to the outcome of the vote of the membership at the Business Meeting. Drs. Lipsitt and Bourne moved that Dr. Michael Wertheimer be appointed as Secretary for the division and Dr. Lee Matthews be appointed as Treasurer. Dr. Wertheimer and Dr. Matthews will begin the transition of records and duties in the Fall of 2000 regarding the Secretary's position, with Dr. Matthews having primary responsibility until 2001. The proposed separation of the positions was approved at the Business meeting.

Dr. Bourne also noted that he will schedule the Mid-Winter EC meeting in Washington, DC, as he will be working on research in Europe in the early months of 2001.

As an informational item, Dr. Bourne noted that he had spoken with Gary Vandebos regarding the possibility of going to an electronic journal. There are several issues to be considered. One is the apparent decline in membership for the division. Dr. Bourne will get in touch with Pat Mayamoto, who tracks the membership data for APA. While the production and distribution cost is much lower, another concern is the loss of revenue on subscriptions from libraries. Thus, the possibility of a hybrid of both electronic and hard copy should be considered.

Under New Business, Dr. Lipsitt received a communication from the Clinical Geropsychology division requesting that we provide a link to their website from our Webpage. The EC approved

the linkage. The Division Webpage needs updating and Dr. Salzinger noted that our two Webmasters are still available to make changes, if someone will supply him with current material. It was decided to handle this matter by e-mail. Dr. Lipsitt reminded the Nominations Committee about the need to contact Garnett Coad, the APA Director of Elections about the new Division officers.

Dr. Matthews moved that each year the President of the division be approved the use of a Divisional suite, for a maximum of 3 nights during the APA Annual Convention. In addition to the President having the suite for her/his personal use, the suite will be used to schedule the EC meetings and a reception for the invited speakers and awardees each year. The EC committee approved the motion.

Other issues discussed but not resolved included the possibility of making a social hour/conversation hour with the Award Winners part of the program, or combining with one or more divisions for a joint social hour on a permanent basis. It was decided to continue this issue via e-mail and to come to some resolution at the Mid-Winter meeting in 2001.

Dr. Lipsitt noted that he would be attending a meeting related to who authorized an APA position paper on the Causes of Violence. Apparently this was a communication involving several organizations, such as the American Pediatric Association, the Association of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and other groups. Dr. Lipsitt noted that at least one of the conclusions was that the media was responsible for violence and that the statements involved too simplistic interpretations of complex issues involving multidetermined factors such as poverty, neighborhood influences and other factors. Dr. Lipsitt is attempting to determine if this position was the result of a council statement and the manner in which it was authorized. Dr. Lipsitt will e-mail information to the EC regarding this issue.

Attendance has not been good at the Divisional functions. Possible reasons mentioned for the lack of participation included a lack of cosponsorship, the need for more/better notification of divisional events and further involvement across divisions. Ways to facilitate improvement included obtaining a list of the Divisional Program Chairs early in the process. It was noted that the Presidents of the small number divisions, especially 3 and 6 are making an effort to be more informed. Dr. Bourne noted that he had been in contact with these individuals regarding such increased cooperation.

Dr. Lipsitt adjourned the Business Meeting at 4:03 PM.

On a personal note, as these will be my last minutes for the Newsletter, I want to take this opportunity to make a few comments. First I want to thank all the members of the EC and all of you in the Division for your support and encouragement in the past two years. I look forward to serving as your Treasurer starting in 2001, and do not regret having my "second hat" as Secretary made into a separate position. Secondly, as my kindergarten teacher use to say to emphasize her point RECRUIT, RECRUIT, RECRUIT new members, as they truly are the lifeblood of any organization.

Sincerely,

Lee H. Matthews
Secretary/Treasurer

The **GENERAL** *Psychologist*

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