


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Well, this is certainly an earlier than usual Spring, although I have noticed over the years that they come sooner and sooner. (Or is it that the years are getting shorter?) In Washington the cherry blossoms were some 2 weeks early as this issue of *TGP* is not. The contents, nevertheless, include a symposium from last August's APA Convention featuring Doug Herrmann, Tom Cadwallader, and Bob Sternberg. An article by David Lykken re-evaluates the Stanford Prison Experiment, and we also have a quiz on page 23. This being the Election Issue, the usual bios and statements by candidates for Society offices take up a significant piece of the pie. Enjoy!



IQ Tests as Measures of Competency

A Symposium

Positive Societal Consequences¹

**Douglas J. Herrmann
Thomas C. Cadwallader
Indiana State University**

Psychology and society in general have been hurt by the notion that IQ tests reflect intelligence. We claim that two evils have been caused by this notion. The first evil is that many people have believed that their IQ scores correctly identified them as being low in intellectual capacity when, in actuality, the IQ score underestimated their intellectual potential. When told by professionals that their intelligence is low, people have their esteem lowered and have their performance suffer. The second evil is that bigots of different types (e.g., sexists, ageists, racists, and ultranationalists) have had their confidence in their bigoted beliefs increased when group IQ statistics are consistent with these prejudices. Were psychology to give up on the claim that IQ tests measure a permanent intellectual property called intelligence, many individuals and groups would no longer see themselves as inferior. If instead, IQ tests scores were to be regarded as measures of **competence**, rather than of intelligence, then individuals and groups would see that, with effort, they could increase their competence to meet job, academic, and societal requirements.

Positive Societal Consequences of Considering IQ Tests as Measures of Competence

Psychologists are among the professionals who are the guardians of the human spirit. We are dedicated to lessening misery and wherever possible to bringing people happiness. However, IQ tests often put us and our profession among the destroyers of the human spirit.

Cadwallader and Herrmann (1999) argued that it is not possible to measure intelligence. To pretend that we can measure, or even estimate, intelligence implies that we can anticipate a person's intellectual potential throughout life (Brody, 1992; Eysenck, 1998; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Sternberg, 1985, 1990, 1997). In order to anticipate such potential throughout life, IQ tests must have the capability to predict what challenges and hardships a person will encounter as life

goes on. If IQ tests reveal a person's intellectual capacity, then IQ test scores should anticipate periods of growth or decline in intelligence. However, as Tom and I argue, a test cannot anticipate such growth or decline because such changes depend on the vicissitudes of life that are unknown when a test is taken.

IQ tests were labeled by Binet and Simon (1905), and later by Goddard, Terman, and others, as measures of intelligence. These tests clearly provided a means of controlling certain resources of society. Initially, the controlled resource was public education. Next the military used IQ tests extensively in World War I. Later, higher education and civilian employment came to rely in IQ scores.

Parents and possibly children recognized early on that IQ test scores can limit a person's access to these resources and a person's chances for achieving employment in the occupation that she or he desired (Brim, Glass, Neulinger, Firestone, & Lerner, 1969; Gould, 1981). In order to gain entry to an occupation requiring high intelligence, a person had to achieve a high IQ test score. If such a person obtains low IQ scores, he or she must give up pursuit of a high intelligence occupation because IQ tests are said to measure a characteristic that cannot be changed.

1. We need to point out that previous psychologists have been concerned about measures of competence. For example, Gelman (1982), Berry (1984), and Sternberg and Kolligan (1990) have provided an analysis of the measurement of competence (see also Schmidt, & Hunter, 1993). McClelland argued that competence testing is more appropriate than intelligence testing for selecting people for different occupations (McClelland, 1973, 1994; see also Barrett, 1994, Barrett & Depinet, 1991, and Wagner, 1997). However, the position we offer contrasts with that taken by McClelland. Where McClelland distinguished between intelligence and competence testing, we have claimed that IQ tests, really are just tests of competence.

This paper benefited considerably from discussions with colleagues who, although not necessarily agreeing with us, made us aware of certain issues concerning intelligence and competence. We thank the following: Scott Adams, John B. Carroll, Michael Gruneberg, Mary Ann Guadagno, and Ulric Neisser. We also are very grateful for Wilbert J. McKeachie and Robert J. Sternberg for considering our views in the symposium and for commenting on the positive and negative aspects of these views.

Although it has been said that the administration of public education has been enhanced by IQ tests, these tests have often had negative consequences on education and the public. Much of the public resents IQ testing (Brim, Glass, Neulinger, Firestone, & Lerner, 1969). The negative consequences of treating IQ scores as supposed measures of intelligence have grown to such large proportions that they seriously undermine our profession. IQ tests have continually put psychologists into the role of defending a measure that really does not capture what the label of intelligence means to people outside of psychology. Cadwallader and Herrmann (1999) have proposed that IQ scores be conceptualized as measures of competence in order to avoid the negative effects that the intelligence label of IQ tests has had on society.

We are not claiming that psychological tests in general are useless as measures of cognition. Tests have proved to be valuable as applied to measuring what a person knows or can do in the present and near future (Goslin, 1963, 1967). Test scores can be extremely helpful to a person who wants to determine how he or she might improve their skills (Detterman & Sternberg, 1982; Flynn, 1999; Neisser, 1998; Perkins & Grotzer, 1997). However, tests cannot play such a role if a person believes that the scores reflect a permanent characteristic limited by genetic potential. Our complaint is with the interpretation of IQ tests.

The purpose of this article is, first, to identify the damage inflicted on society by regarding IQ tests as measures of intelligence. Second, this article will show how the competence label on IQ tests can remedy the damage inflicted by regarding IQ tests as measures of intelligence. We begin by explaining how the assumption that IQ tests reflect intelligence has led to two evils that have damaged society in important ways.

We wish to point out that the next section addresses only the effects emanating from the practice of regarding IQ tests as measures of intelligence. We do not intend this discussion to suggest that psychologists who have engaged in this practice have done anything improper. Suffice it to say that we too have regarded IQ tests as measures of intelligence in our careers. For a variety of reasons we recently came to recognize the problems inherent in this practice, leading us to share our views on these practices and the negative outcomes that result from them.

The Two Evils of IQ Testing

The First Evil: IQ Tests Destroy the Human Spirit of Many Members of Each Generation. IQ tests generally underestimate or overestimate the intelligence of a substantial proportion of people tested. Such errors in measurement affect self-concept and intellectual growth.

Underestimates. Underestimates occur because cultural differences render some test items inappropriate. Underestimates occur also because the test taker experiences fatigue and anxiety and sometimes because of intellectual blocks (Sutaria, 1985). Additionally, underestimates occur because the tests are not administered properly or scored correctly. Finally, because

most people acquire additional knowledge and skills as life proceeds, tests fail to anticipate the intellectual growth of many people.

The consequences of underestimating intelligence are disastrous for the individual and for society in general. People given inappropriately low IQ scores have their self-esteem damaged, leading their intellectual performance to suffer. They lose faith in their abilities, cease trying to do their best, lower their life goals, and live lives that are less fulfilled than they would have lived had their confidence not been dashed by inappropriately low IQ scores.

Overestimates. Some people have their intelligence overestimated because guessing sometimes inflates their scores. Guessing may be especially successful when people belong to the dominant culture and have acquired knowledge that enables them to guess more successfully. Additionally, overestimates may occur when tests are not administered properly or scored correctly. The number of people who receive overestimated IQ scores is probably smaller than those who receive underestimated scores. Nevertheless, overestimates of intelligence are damaging because inflated scores delude the test taker into believing they possess intellectual skills that they do not. The test taker with such a deluded self-concept is less likely to make efforts to improve his intellectual skills. This test taker is also likely to attempt tasks for which failure is inevitable.

Given that IQ tests have been common for decades, underestimates and overestimates of intelligence have misled probably hundreds of thousands of young people or more. Because young people accepted an IQ score that underestimated or overestimated their intellectual capacity, they ceased trying to improve themselves and made inappropriate decisions about employment and personal matters. People were led to believe that what they can or cannot do on a test indicated what they will do or never will do in life.

Public Perceptions of the Accuracy of IQ Tests. Although psychology claims that IQ tests validly measure intelligence, many members of the public doubt this. Nonprofessionals often challenge the validity of IQ tests on the basis of people whose behavior is paradoxical in comparison with their IQ. For example, almost anyone who is familiar with IQ tests can relate stories of one or more persons they have known who had a high IQ score but nevertheless behave in a professionally incompetent and socially inept manner.

On the other hand, other people can relate stories about persons who had a low IQ but were able to do clearly intelligent, often brilliant, things. Moreover, many people have heard of cases concerning individuals who have been classified as retarded, only to be reclassified later as having normal intelligence. Sometimes people have been discharged from institutions that held them when their IQ scores were found to be incorrectly low. How many persons unjustly spent their entire life in institutions is unknown.

Because of paradoxical observations of behavior and IQ scores, many members of the public are highly

skeptical of the claim that IQ tests can measure intelligence. However, because nonprofessionals lack the technical training and professional standing to challenge the psychological wisdom on intelligence, they have no way to tell us their disbelief in the claim that IQ tests measure intelligence.

The Appropriateness of Predicting Future Performance. Some people grow intellectually as they age and others regress intellectually. Sometimes these changes are dramatic, evoking inspiration or sadness. It is logically not possible to estimate someone's intelligence throughout his or her life with an IQ test administered today because of the impossibility of foretelling the future.

Thus, we psychologists mislead people when we say that the estimates of intelligence demonstrated today represent the intelligence that a person will always have. A psychologist who administers an IQ test does not have information about the challenges, opportunities, accomplishments, and tragedies that a test-taker will face during the rest of his or her life. Psychologists who administer, score, and interpret tests do not have a crystal ball. Thus, it is unethical to present IQ scores to a test taker as reflecting the intellectual potential that the person will possess for the rest of one's life.

The Second Evil: Group IQ Scores Make Some People Feel Intellectually Inferior Because of Their Sex, Race, Age, Nationality or Other Characteristic. It is sad to contemplate but it is a fact that ageist, racist, sexist, and ultranationalist causes have taught the public that group comparisons are not appropriate while ignoring when certain aspects of research design are violated. For example, two groups can be compared if all characteristics are comparable except the variable of interest. Unfortunately, IQ test scores of groups are affected by a host of social variables that are not equal between groups: opportunity for education; quality of food; socioeconomic status; prevalent environmental stress due to crime; social rejection by other groups; and more (Herrmann & Guadagno, 1998; White, 1982; Mensh & Mensh, 1991). It is simply not possible to statistically or experimentally control all of the covariates of IQ scores that pertain to a particular group.

Comparisons of groups that differ in either age, sex, race, or nationality confound any observed differences of IQ test scores with the potential effects of uncontrolled variables. Even were it possible to control the covariates when comparing group statistics, the fundamental problem with assessing intelligence remains. It is not possible to claim that the intelligence of one group exceeds that of another group because the opportunities for future intellectual growth or deterioration for either group is unknown.

Because the public has not been educated in the proper use of statistics and because the profession has not realized that IQ tests actually measure competence, psychologists have had difficulty taking a stand against the racists, sexists, ageists, and ultranationalists. Psychologists generally detest racism, sexism, ageism, and excessive nationalism, but they have had

difficulty arguing with statistics that the public does not understand and with a widely used IQ test that supposedly reflects a permanent characteristic of intelligence.

Conversely, bigots of different types (e.g., racists, sexists, ageists, and ultranationalists) have had their bigoted beliefs increased whenever group IQ statistics are consistent with these beliefs. Thousands of minorities have been spurned, abused, and some even killed because prejudices against them have been supported by the claims of some psychologists that IQ tests measure racial differences in intelligence (Jones, 1998).

A dramatic example of the power given to bigots by IQ statistics is provided by *The Bell Curve* controversy. This 1994 book, by Herrnstein and Murray, indicated that races differ in intelligence. APA empowered a task force to respond to *The Bell Curve*. However, the task force was slow to respond, publishing its rejoinder in 1996. Accepting the definition of intelligence as a genetically based characteristic, and accepting the IQ test as a legitimate measure of intelligence, the Task Force was compelled to check every racial comparison of intelligence measures that they could find. They concluded that evidence was lacking for racial differences in intelligence. However, they also concluded that future evidence might indicate such differences are real, a conclusion consistent with the assumptions of bigots (Kinochele, Steinberg, & Gresson, 1997).

Remedies for the Two Evils Caused by Regarding IQ Tests as Measures of Intelligence

Remedying the First Evil. The damage that IQ tests do to the spirit of many people can be remedied by relabeling these tests as competence tests. Competence test scores represent how a person performs at the moment not for a lifetime. A competence test score reflects the combined influence of intellectual ability, health, advantages, disadvantages, and more, but not intellectual ability alone (as is claimed for intelligence measures). Where an IQ score is purported to be unchangeable, many people regard their competence as something that can be changed.

Competence test scores cannot squash the human spirit as is done by intelligence test scores. Anyone hearing a low competence score from a psychologist need not feel doomed to an inferior caste the rest of his or her life. Competence can be changed. People who feel that their competence score is too low can choose to improve it by taking certain actions (e.g., pursuing certain forms of education, taking certain medicines; Detterman & Sternberg, 1982). In contrast, people who feel that their intelligence score is too low are frequently told by psychologists that nothing can be done to improve the low score. Therefore, a low intelligence score will remain low because the test taker is convinced that this score cannot be changed.

Falsely high competence test scores will not delude people into a false sense of superiority as can happen with intelligence test scores. The reason that such a delusion will not be drawn with competence scores, is that the test taker is not deluded into thinking his or her

competence is permanent. People with inflated competence test scores will eventually recognize that they are unable to perform a task that the test said they could perform. When such a discovery is made, the test taker will either assume the test was in error or conclude that they were losing their competence due to lack of practice. In contrast, people who have been told that their intelligence is higher than actually the case are not prepared to modify their behavior because intelligence is supposedly invariant across the lifespan.

Remedying the Second Evil. History is replete with groups that, although being regarded as inferior, overcame incredible hardship and achieved greatness. However any group that is persuaded that they are inferior, will have difficulty in demonstrating the achievements of which they are capable. False beliefs about supposedly low abilities are destructive for groups in the same way that they are destructive for individuals.

We maintain here that the relabeling of IQ tests as a measure of competence will withdraw support from bigots. If the IQ scores of groups targeted by sexists, racists, ageists, and ultranationalists were regarded as revealing group differences in competence, then bigots could not claim that disadvantaged groups are inherently inferior. Moreover, unlike IQ scores, competence scores would indicate to a group what they need to learn in order to achieve intellectual parity with the other groups.

Were psychology to give up on the claim that IQ tests measure a permanent intellectual property of intelligence, then bigots would not be able to use our statistics to bolster their prejudices. Were psychology to regard IQ scores as measures of competence, limited in generalizability over time and over tasks (Berry, 1984; Sternberg & Wagner, 1986; Sternberg & Williams, 1998), any claims of permanent superiority of a group would evaporate. Interpreting IQ tests as measures of competence would disenfranchise bigots from receiving support from psychology.

The disenfranchising of bigots by interpreting IQ tests as a measure of competence may also be illustrated by considering further the conclusions made by the APA Task Force (reported by Neisser, et al., 1996) about race and IQ tests while evaluating the controversial book *The Bell Curve* (Hernstein & Murray, 1994). As mentioned earlier, the Task Force rejected the racist conclusions of *The Bell Curve* but also concluded that future research might find group differences in IQ scores that would be strong enough to support racial differences in intelligence. In other words, the Task Force rejected the bigotry of Hernstein and Murray but left the door left open to future bigotry by agreeing ahead of time that it was possible for group differences in IQ scores to reflect valid group difference in intellectual potential.

Why would the task force take the position that future IQ tests may reveal differences in the IQ among the races? Because the task force assumed that IQ scores actually do represent a characteristic that is relatively permanent across life. Had the task force realized that

IQ scores do not truly represent a characteristic that lasts a lifetime, they would have been able to quickly deliver the rebuke that Hernstein and Murray (1994) deserved for their invalid racist conclusions. Had the task force recognized that IQ tests measure competence, it could have spent its time conceiving of ways to eliminate group differences in competence, such as by establishing programs to correct for a lack of opportunity in health care, in adequate diet, poor education, and so on (Ceci, 1990, 1991; Ceci & Williams, 1997).

Discussion

In this paper we have maintained that both psychology and society have been hurt by the notion that IQ tests reflect intelligence (cf. Eysenck & Kamin, 1981). We have claimed that two evils have been caused by this notion, one evil affecting individuals and the other affecting groups.

Society has a vested interest in how psychology addresses the evils produced by regarding IQ tests as measures of intelligence. If psychologists see IQ scores as reflecting a permanent characteristic, then society will have no reason to correct either evil. Alternatively, if IQ scores were seen as a reflection of competence a temporary characteristic, then both evils would cease to exist. People would not have their hopes and dreams crushed by a low IQ score. Similarly, bigots could not conclude that a hated group lacks intellectual ability because competence scores of groups represent a capability in the here and now.

Methodologically and theoretically, psychologists cannot measure intelligence. We never could, and it is doubtful that we ever will. There are many reasons why such measurement is improbable but a major problem is that it is illogical to assume we can measure today the intellectual growth or decline that only the future can tell.

Damage to the Psychological Profession. Besides hurting individuals and groups, calling IQ test measures of intelligence has hurt our profession. First, persuading people that they could never achieve their dreams because they possessed an inadequate IQ has made many people distrust psychologists. Second, deluding many people that they were more able than was actually the case has also led them to also distrust psychologists. Third, many people know that some psychologists have misclassified the IQ of people in serious ways. For example, institutionalizing people as retarded who later were discovered to not be retarded. Fourth, many people are acquainted with high IQ individuals who act stupidly and with low IQ individuals who act brilliantly. These and other observations challenge the credibility of the psychological profession.

Ethical Responsibilities. The negative impact of IQ tests on individuals and groups has been so great, that the psychology profession has a moral responsibility to redress the negative effects of calling IQ tests measures of intelligence.

First, we psychologists need to educate the public about IQ tests, competence, and proper interpretation

of statistics in the context of testing. Second, we psychologists need to publicly disavow the claim that psychological tests in general can measure ageist, sexist, racist, ultra-nationalist and other group differences in intelligence or other properties. The profession has led people to believe that these tests can make such measurements. We need to explain to the public why we made such a mistake.

In addition to meeting our professional responsibilities, informing the public that IQ tests do not measure intelligence will improve our jobs too. We will no longer have to demoralize or delude people about their intelligence. Similarly, we will not have to defend statistics that exacerbate prejudices between groups.

In conclusion, if the psychological profession were to agree that IQ tests actually reflect competence, we might discover more about what makes people effective, learn how to inspire people to make the most out of their lives, and reclaim our role as guardians of the human spirit.

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IQ Tests as Measures of Competency

A Symposium

Right War, Wrong Battle

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In arguing against the overuse and misinterpretation of IQ tests, Douglas J. Herrmann and Thomas C. Cadwallader are fighting the right war. Unfortunately, they may be fighting the wrong battle within this war.

The war being fought is over the misconceptualization of IQ tests. The tests are indeed misconceptualized. The battle they have chosen is over how the tests are labeled. I do not believe the battle should be over whether they are labeled tests of intelligence or competence, or both. Rather, it should be over exactly what aspects of intelligence or competence the tests do and do not measure.

As a supporter of much of their basic position, I would have preferred a different battle. In fighting the battle they have chosen, their arguments probably will convince few people who already are devoted to IQ tests, and may even boomerang and encourage some opponents to reconsider their opposition.

Some Strengths of the Arguments

The authors make a noble effort to reconceptualize intelligence testing. Many of their points are worth heeding.

First, all intelligence tests measure a certain aspect of competence, but as McClelland (1973) pointed out, there are many other competencies relevant to school and work they do not measure. I have referred to the tests as measuring an aspect of developing expertise (Sternberg, 1998) in order to emphasize that the competencies or aspects of expertise are always under development.

There are no pure measures of some underlying competence. At the same time, it is essential to note that IQ tests measure only an aspect of competence, a point not always made clear in the two articles. It is important also to realize that calling the tests ones of competence only solves some problems, not others. For example, it is not clear that "competence test scores cannot squash the human spirit as is done by intelligence test scores." There is no great reward for being labeled as "incompetent." This label certainly is sufficient to get people fired from jobs, which in itself can "squash the human spirit."

Second, the tests have been grossly overused at times relative to the information they are able to provide. At best, they provide information regarding only a limited aspect of intelligence, or competence, or whatever. The problem is not in their being used, but in how they are used.

Third, the test scores have been used at times to justify claims that today would be considered to be racist or otherwise bigoted (Gould, 1981). Arguably, the test scores are still being used by some individuals in the same way today. But it is only fair in judging past claims to view these claims in the context they were made. Statements that today would be viewed as bigoted might not have been viewed in the same way at the time they were made, much as television shows such as *Amos and Andy* may today appear to be bigoted but may not have been so perceived when they were aired.

Finally, the authors correctly recognize that scores on tests are modifiable (see, e.g., Grotzer & Perkins, 2000; Perkins & Grotzer, 1997). But at the same time we need to recognize that, given current kinds of effort, they are modifiable only in some degree.

Some Weaknesses of the Arguments

I believe the authors' arguments are less than entirely successful, for several reasons.

Lack of Documentation. Many of the claims in the two articles are undocumented. The claims are preceded by statements such as "almost anyone who is familiar with IQ tests can relate stories...", "other people can relate stories," and "many people have heard of cases." These kinds of statements provide insufficient documentation of claims.

False Claims. Some of their claims are simply and demonstrably false. Perhaps the best example is in their characterization of the work of the APA task force on intelligence. First, the task force was not "empowered ... to respond to *The Bell Curve*" but rather to

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consider what is known and unknown about intelligence. This claim can be verified simply by looking at the charter of the group (of which I was a member). Second, the task force did not end up "accepting the definition of intelligence as a genetically based characteristic." Rather the task force recognized, as all responsible psychologists do, that both heredity and environment play some role in the development of intelligence. This conclusion seems almost incontrovertible in light of present evidence (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997).

Overblown Claims. Many of the claims in the article simply are way overblown. For example, the authors state that "we psychologists mislead people when we say that the estimates of intelligence demonstrated today represent the intelligence that a person will always have." Who makes such a claim? Most psychologists acknowledge that at least some aspects of abilities (e.g., fluid abilities) increase with age up to a certain point, and then eventually decrease. Other aspects of abilities (e.g., crystallized abilities) may continue to increase until near the very end of life (see, e.g., Horn, 1994; Sternberg & Berg, 1992).

The authors also state that "Thousands of minorities have been spurned, abused, and even killed because prejudices against them have been supported by the claims of some psychologists that IQ tests measure racial differences in intelligence (Jones, 1998)." Is there really evidence that IQ test scores in themselves have led to murders? What is this evidence? In making such a strong claim, it would be important to provide documentation of just what the cases are where people have been killed because of their IQ test scores.

Finally, the authors claim that "IQ scores are typically generalized indefinitely into the future" By whom? Under what circumstances? Do any responsible psychologists really take such an extreme position? At least some citations to believers of this position might help. Most psychologists know that the predictive value of any score decreases over time. It is for this reason that periodic retesting is recommended.

False Generalizations. In some instances, the authors make what appear to be false generalizations. For example, they state that "people given inappropriately low IQ scores have their self-esteem damaged, leading their intellectual performance to suffer." Is this generalization really true of all people? Would it include people with 150 IQs who are told they have 140 IQs? How about people with 40 IQs who are told they have 30 IQs? Is not the statement too general?

Another example of an overgeneralization is the statement that "psychology claims IQ tests validly measure intelligence." In fact, many psychologists dispute this claim (e.g., Gardner, 1983, 1999; Sternberg, 1985, 1997; among many others). So who is the "psychology" that makes this claim?

Curious Logic. In some cases, I found the logic of the arguments difficult to grasp. For example, the authors state that "Because the public has not been educated in the proper use of statistics and because the profes-

sion has not realized that IQ tests actually measure competence, psychologists have had difficulty taking a stand against the racists, sexists, ageists, and ultranationalists." The reader may see the causal connection; I don't. Whatever the IQ tests measure and whatever the public background in statistics, I believe psychologists can take a stand against all these prejudices.

Another example is the statement that the APA task force "concluded that future evidence might indicate such [racial] differences are real, a conclusion consistent with the assumptions of bigots" Are the authors suggesting that the acceptance of a possibility of a difference between groups implies bigotry on the part of those who are willing to explore group differences, or sympathy with bigots? Such ascription of guilt by association is perilous. Should we therefore not study the issue of group differences, lest we be tarred with the brush of bigotry? If socially-defined races were believed to differ in height, on average, would such a belief imply bigotry?

The authors' remarks come dangerously close to a kind of thought-police mentality whereby anyone who disagrees with them is tarred and perhaps feathered as well. Science can proceed only if scientists are free to allow for any possibilities to be revealed by future evidence. Do the authors really believe that the task force "left the door open to future bigotry" by suggesting "it is possible for group differences in IQ scores to reflect valid group difference in intellectual potential." Who is going to be the authority that allows people to speculate about what future data may reveal? The authors? Do they really want such a role? Acknowledgment of the possibility of group differences does not imply current or future bigotry.

A last example is the statement that "it is logically impossible for an I.Q. score at any one time to be valid predictor [sic] of an I.Q. score at some later time because of the influence that the environment is known to have on test-and other-performance." This statement is true only if the authors' idea of prediction is a perfect correlation. Environment affects almost all human attributes: height, weight, health status, self-confidence, and so forth. Prediction need not be perfect to be useful. It is not "logically impossible" for something to predict something else because of environmental effects, nor is it a matter of logic. It is not even empirically impossible if one allows for prediction being less than perfect.

The Basic Problem. The basic problem is that much and arguably most of the criticism that the authors direct against IQ tests applies to **measures of anything at all**. For example, it may be true that "IQ tests generally underestimate or overestimate the intelligence of a substantial proportion of people tested" loops, the authors referred to IQ tests as measuring intelligence, presumably a slip), but all psychological measures have measurement error associated with them, resulting in both underestimation and overestimation of some scores. They also state that scores can be inflated by guessing, but again, measures, including measures of competence, suffer from the same flaw.

One more example of such a problem is the statement that "IQ scores of groups are affected by a host of social variables that are not equal between groups" But many other psychological measures, including measures of competence, also are affected by social variables. In these and other respects, there is nothing special about an IQ score.

Conclusion

To summarize, conventional intelligence tests are far from perfect. I believe the most important battle to be fought is over understanding what the tests do and do not measure, and then seeking instruments to measure what now is not being measured. At the same time, consistent with the authors' position, we need to recognize that all tests measure aspects of competence in some degree. I doubt that the imperfections of IQ tests are fully to be solved by labeling the tests as ones of competence, although such labeling may be a start. What perhaps is needed most is more comprehensively to understand both intelligence and competence. We need better theories, better tests, and better efforts at modification. Most of all, we need to resolve issues, to the extent possible, by science, not polemics.

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IQ Tests as Measures of Competency

A Symposium

A Rejoinder to Sternberg

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Many psychologists hold that certain cognitive tests qualify as measures of intelligence. In our article here (Herrmann & Cadwallader, 2000), we made the argument that so-called IQ tests do not measure "intelligence" and that, instead, they measure certain aspects of current "competence." We argued further that IQ tests are mislabeled because a person's life, after taking an IQ test, will affect their competence in ways that no test can anticipate (Cadwallader & Herrmann, 1999). We argued that the mislabeling of IQ tests has misled many people about their actual cognitive potential and supported members of society who believe

that certain racial groups are inferior. Accordingly, we proposed that psychology could preclude these malevolent consequences by relabeling IQ tests to be competence tests. Sternberg claims that we are not fighting the right battle -- which he argued is to improve existing tests. Nevertheless, he conceded in the end of his commentary that "such labeling may be a start" to improving IQ tests.

In our article here (Herrmann & Cadwallader, 2000), we argued that so-called IQ tests do not measure "intelligence." Instead, they measure certain aspects of a person's current competence for the kinds of tasks that make up the test (Barrett & Depinet, 1991; Berry, 1984; Gelman, 1994; McClelland, 1973; Sternberg & Kolligan, 1990). We argued that IQ tests are mislabeled. These tests do not qualify as measures of "intelligence" because after taking an IQ test, a person's competence will increase and/or decrease by life's challenges in ways that no test can anticipate. We

argued that the mislabeling of certain tests as measures of "intelligence" has had malevolent consequences, misleading many people about their actual cognitive potential and supporting prejudiced members of society in their beliefs that certain groups are inferior cognitively. Accordingly, we propose that psychology could help many people avoid the malevolent consequences of the IQ label by relabeling IQ tests as tests of competence.

Sternberg stated that he felt that we (Cadwallader and Herrmann) were fighting the right war but the wrong battle. By this statement, he meant that the right war is "the misconceptualization of IQ tests" (Sternberg, 2000, p. 2). The right battle, according to Sternberg is one in which psychology attempts to determine what aspects of "intelligence" the tests do and do not measure. The wrong battle is the one, which he says has been chosen by us (Cadwallader and Herrmann), in which psychology must decide "how the tests are labeled" (Sternberg, 2000, p. 2).

The matter of correct labeling has implications for the right war. A proper labeling of tests (the wrong battle according to Sternberg) necessarily requires a determination of what IQ tests measure (the right battle according to Sternberg). If it is agreed that IQ tests actually measure competence, then it would be pointless to worry about which aspects of "intelligence" are or are not involved in IQ tests. Our rejoinder to Sternberg's commentary, therefore, attempts to evaluate his claims that IQ tests deserve to be so named and attempts to evaluate his conclusions about the negative impact of the IQ label on society.

Sternberg agreed with some of what we wrote in our papers and disagreed with much of the rest. First, he agreed that "all intelligence tests measure a certain aspect of competence" (Sternberg, 2000, p. 2) but stopped short of agreeing fully with our position that IQ tests measure competence only. His recently introduced terms, "developing expertise" (Sternberg, 1998) and "successful intelligence" (Sternberg, 1999), seem to us to be the functional equivalent of "competence." However, there are important differences between Sternberg's terms and "competence." Specifically, "competence" refers to what a person can do, whereas "expertise" and "successful intelligence" refers to a high level of competence, often associated with elitist parts of society. Second, he agreed that IQ tests "provide information regarding only a limited aspect of intelligence, or competence, or whatever" (Sternberg, 2000, p. 3). Third, he agreed that "the test scores have been used at times to justify claims that today would be considered to be racist or otherwise bigoted" (Gould, 1981). Finally, Sternberg notes that we all agree "that scores on tests are modifiable to some degree" (see also Flynn, 1999 and Neisser, 1998).

We do not want to get bogged down over details. We are, in fact, grateful to Sternberg for helping us to see some weak points in our arguments. What we want to do here is to show that there is indeed an important battle to be waged, namely, to revise the general con-

ception of what it is that IQ tests address. We believe that such a battle will show that IQ tests in fact address competence.

Sternberg's commentary is stimulating and interesting, but it does not persuade us that we are fighting the wrong battle. In our view, the weaknesses he perceives in our papers constitute substantial arguments, valid claims, sound generalizations, and careful logic about whether "intelligence" can be measured. No doubt there are political underpinnings of the debate about IQ tests, but this is not the place to consider such matters (Mensh & Mensh, 1991; Laosα, 1996; Kincheloe, Sternberg, & Gresson, 1997).

Sternberg is probably the most distinguished researcher in the IQ field in the past twenty years. He is widely respected for his important contributions on this topic. Nevertheless, Sternberg has adopted a less than flexible position in his commentary in which he attempts to shield the IQ test from criticism. For example, common sense arguments were criticized by Sternberg for not originating out of research. Some questions, philosophic in nature, do not need experimentation. Some of our claims were dismissed by Sternberg as being false and overblown, although these claims were not new and have been advanced previously by others (Eysenck & Kamin, 1981; Flynn, 1999; Gould, 1981; Goslin, 1963; Greenspan & Driscoll, 1997; Hoffmann, 1962; Kaufman, 1994; Lave, 1988; Mensh & Mensh, 1991; Neisser, 1998; Ravitch, 1983; Reschly & Grimes, 1990; Sutaria, 1985).

Additionally, Sternberg has adopted a less than sensitive position regarding the negative effects of IQ tests on society. None of Sternberg's criticisms focus on the fundamental charge that IQ tests do not measure intelligence and that the practice of regarding IQ tests as such a measure impacts badly on individuals and groups in American society and elsewhere. Many people have witnessed how so-called IQ test scores have flattened the motivation of students and destroyed their ambition; surely Sternberg is aware of this problem. Sternberg claimed that racists' use of IQ tests has decreased, but surely he knows also that IQ tests continue to aid and abet racist claims (e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) about the intellectual inferiority of minorities (Jones, 1998). IQ tests are far more than benign academic tools.

Near the end of his commentary, Sternberg notes that "science can proceed only if scientists are free to allow for any possibilities to be revealed by future evidence" (Sternberg, 2000, p. 7). But science is not value free in how it interprets evidence. Moreover, scientists are also expected to be as accurate as possible in their theorizing and labeling of constructs. If a measure that supposedly reflects a certain property turns out to represent another property, then the scientist is obligated to report this change as quickly as possible in order to prevent any more damage from the older, inaccurate notion. There is no doubt that the IQ test has had an enormous impact on our society and societies all over the globe. If the interpretation of these tests has

not been appropriate, it is in society's and psychology's best interests to correct the mislabel that fosters invalid interpretation of tests scores as measures of "intelligence." The next step may be to reconceptualize the IQ test as a measure of competence.

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We thank colleagues who, although not necessarily agreeing with us, informed us about certain issues concerning intelligence and competence. We especially thank our colleague, Ed Kirby, for his advice on this paper. We also are very grateful to Robert J. Sternberg for his patience with the controversial issues we have raised.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM A Reply to Haney and Zimbardo

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Abstract. In a recent article, Haney and Zimbardo (1998) reviewed what they consider important lessons learned from their Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE: Haney, C., Banks, W. & Zimbardo, P., 1973). These "lessons" include the proposition that behavior is determined by the situational context rather than by characteristics of the behaving individuals. Haney and Zimbardo then proceed to allege that the five-fold increase in the U.S. prison inmate population is due to an arbitrary refusal by the criminal justice system and by the Supreme Court to learn, or to accept, the lessons of the SPE. They further allege that the disproportionate numbers of African Americans among that population is due to the "racialization of prison pain."

I argue in contrast that the SPE proved very little, certainly not the validity of the discredited radical environmentalism that Haney and Zimbardo seem anxious to preach to policy makers and the courts. The sharp increase in numbers of prison inmates has been a somewhat delayed response to the epidemic of violent crime that began in the U.S. early in the 1960s. The proportion of African American inmates is about equal to the proportion of the victims of violent crime who identify their assailant as black. No one as yet has managed to design a prison environment that successfully rehabilitates violent criminals who remain unsocialized through their teens. The real lesson that should inform U.S. prison policy is the fact that children black or white who are reared without fathers are about 7 times more likely in consequence: to become delinquent, to drop out of school, to be abused, to become runaways, to become unmarried teenage parents, and to become victims or perpetrators of violent crimes. The place to fight crime is in the cradle and the place to look for truly useful social policy advice is in Jack Westman's 1994 book, *Licensing Parents*.

More than 25 years ago, Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973) transformed the basement hallway of Stanford University's Psychology Department into a make-believe prison block where a group of male student volunteers posed either as inmates or as guards. Some of the "guards" behaved badly and some of the students "begged to be released from the intense pains of less than a week of merely simulated imprisonment" (Haney & Zimbardo, 1998, pp. 709.) The experiment was therefore aborted after just six days and nights. Apparently many who read about the Stanford Prison Experi-

ment (SPE), as this six day venture came to be called, agreed with the authors that it had demonstrated "the way in which social contexts can influence, alter, shape, and transform human behavior" (pp. 709-10). Based on studies of this kind, some of them Gedanken experiments as in the following quotation from Mischel's influential textbook, many psychologists came to believe that social learning determines personality and that social context determines behavior.

"Imagine the enormous differences that would be found in the personalities of twins with identical genetic endowment if they were raised apart in two different families ... Through social learning vast differences develop among people in their reactions to most stimuli they face in daily life." (Mischel, 1981, p. 311.)

It was natural, therefore, to believe that crime is largely a consequence of criminogenic contexts that could be eliminated by social engineering. It follows also that prisons, should they be necessary at all, provide an excellent opportunity for the rehabilitation of misdirected youth through the provision of healthy social learning and a more beneficent behavioral context. Haney and Zimbardo (1998) devote most of their article to a regretful discussion of the five-fold increase since the early 1970s in the proportion of Americans serving time in prison, of the change in prison policy since then from rehabilitation to mere segregation, and of what they call "the racialization of prison pain." The enormous recent increase in the rate of imprisonment of convicted offenders was not in response to a corresponding increase in the proportion of citizens victimized by violent crime, at least not according to the National Crime Victimization Survey. This increase in numbers of inmates is therefore attributed to an apparently willful refusal by "correctional administrators, politicians, policymakers, and judicial decision makers" to appreciate "most of the lessons that emerged from the SPE" (p. 718).. According to Haney and Zimbardo, these lessons are:

1. "SPE demonstrated the power of situations to overwhelm psychologically normal, healthy people and to elicit from them unexpectedly cruel ... behavior" (p. 719).

2. "SPE also revealed how easily even a minimalized prison could become painful and powerful"

3. "If situations matter and people can be transformed by them when they go into prisons, they matter equally, if not more, when they come out of prison" (p.720).

4. "In prison, explanations of disciplinary infractions and violence [should] focus more on the context in which they transpired and less on the prisoners who engaged in them" (p.720).

5. "Good people with good intentions are not enough to create a good prison ...the SPE and the perspective it advanced also suggest that prison change will come about only when those who are outside of this powerful situation are empowered to act on it."

6. "Finally, the SPE implicitly argued for a more activist scholarship in which psychologists engage with the important social and policy questions of the day" (p. 721).

I agree with at least some of these rather vague prescriptions, although I am astonished by these authors' claim that a handbook for prison reform (indeed, a basic text in enlightened criminology) can be harvested from watching a handful of college students role-playing guards and inmates for six days in a Stanford basement. But I disagree strongly with some of the more specific claims or assumptions made by Haney and Zimbardo.

Personality is more Important than Context

The situationist model still embraced by Haney and Zimbardo is wrong. The Gedanken experiment suggested by Mischel has now been conducted by Bouchard et al. (1990) and the results were opposite to Mischel's expectation. Identical twins separated in infancy and reared apart are as similar in personality as identical twins reared together, and that is very similar indeed (Tellegen, et al., 1998). About half of the variance (more than half of the stable variance) in basic traits of temperament or personality is associated with genetic differences between people.

Anyone familiar with the realities of prison life knows that some inmates are predictably violent and dangerous while some are predictably passive or tractable. We recently obtained scores on the Multi-dimensional Personality Inventory (Tellegen & Waller, 1994) from 67 inmates at Minnesota's maximum security prison, Oak Park Heights¹, men whose mean age was 32. We collected MPQs also from more than 850 male twins aged 30-33 (Lykken, in press). The men in our inmate sample had been convicted of serious crimes, usually murder. Because the MPQ is

¹ I am indebted to Dr. Kenneth Carlson at Oak Park Heights Correctional Facility for collecting these data and sharing them with me.

a self-administered inventory and requires high school reading skills, a considerable proportion of the inmate population could not be sampled but there is no reason to think that the participants differed temperamentally from the non-readers.

Figure 1 shows the profiles of the 22 inmates scoring highest and the 22 scoring lowest on the aggression scale of the MPQ, plotted using the data from the




Figure 1. Inmate Personality Profiles. Mean MPQ profiles of inmates in a maximum security prison who scored highest or lowest on aggression. A T-score of 50 represents the mean for some 850 non-criminal males aged 30-33; a T-score of 70 is 2 standard deviations above the mean; etc.

noncriminal male twins as norms. The most aggressive inmates are deviant also on most of the other MPQ scales; they are more than one SD below the normal mean on well being, achievement, and social closeness, the traits that comprise the Positive Emotionality super-factor of the MPQ. The aggressive inmates are more than one SD above the mean on stress reaction and on alienation which, with aggression, comprise the Negative Emotionality super-factor. And they are more than one SD below the normal mean on control (vs. impulsiveness), and on traditionalism, two of the traits that comprise the Constraint super-factor. The non-aggressive inmates, on the other hand, yield essentially normal profiles except for that low score on aggression and an elevation on harm avoidance. In spite of their confinement in the same "painful and powerful" prison environment, these men show great variability, one from another, not only in personality but also in their tendencies to make or to stay out of trouble in that environment.

Modern Prisons are not Places of Unremitting Pain

Because the six day SPE "had painful, even traumatic consequences for the prisoners [Stanford students pretending to be inmates] against whom it was directed" (p. 719), Haney and Zimbardo concluded that real prisons must have devastating psychological effects upon real inmates serving long sentences. Perhaps because they are situationists, rather than trait psychologists, they neglected our

extraordinary human capacity to adapt to circumstances, good or bad. Suh, Diener, & Fujita (1966) have shown that both positive and negative life experiences have usually lost their effect on subjective well being after six months. A year after either winning the lottery or being permanently crippled in an accident, most people experience about the same average level of happiness that they felt before that event. In a study I did long ago in another Minnesota prison (Lykken, 1957), one inmate, the pitcher on the prison baseball team, had been paroled the previous fall. He made it back in time for the spring baseball season by the expedient of breaking the display window of a jewelry store and then leisurely collecting rings and watches until arrested on the spot. He admitted he was happier back in prison than he'd been on the outside.




Figure 2. Inmate Personality Profiles. MPQ profiles of the 22 men who scored highest on Well Being, and the 22 who scored lowest, among 67 inmates of a maximum security prison.

The mean expected release date for our sample of Oak Park Heights inmates is the year 2030 yet, after having been there for an average period of 37 months, many of them appear to have become well-adjusted to prison life and many are surprisingly happy. Figure 2 shows that, while the lowest-scoring third professed considerable pain and alienation, the upper-third scored higher on well being than three-fourths of our 850 noncriminal young men. Oak Park Heights is a modern prison,




Figure 3. NCVS vs UCR Data: Violent Crimes. Trends since 1973 in violent crime as revealed by the National Crime Victimization Survey versus the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports.

well run and reasonably safe because the staff, rather than the inmates, are in control. The well adjusted inmates can take classes, learn skills, find peaceful ways to pass the time. I would not wish to be incarcerated at Oak Park Heights, not even if I were made pitcher of the baseball team, but at least I could get a lot of reading done.




Figure 4. U.S. Illegitimacy Rate. The increase since 1960 in the rates of violent crimes reported to the police and in the proportion of the U.S. male population serving terms in state or federal prisons.

The Epidemic of Imprisonment is due to an Epidemic of Crime.

The National Crime Victimization Survey, on which Haney and Zimbardo rely, has summarized annually since 1973 the reports of more than 90,000 Americans over age 12 concerning whether they have been the victims of specified crimes during the past year. These reports are from members of a stratified sample of families interviewed either in person or by telephone by (mostly female) employees of the U.S. Census Bureau. The Uniform Crime Reports, compiled by the FBI since 1929, summarize crimes actually reported to the police. As Figure 3 reveals, these two methods of measuring violent crime tell very different stories. The FBI data indicate an increase since 1973 of 54% (a peak increase of 73%) while the NCVS data indicate an actual decrease in violent crime of 15%. NCVS interviewers do not contact transients, people who are in hospital or in jail, nor do they venture into the more dangerous regions of the inner city. The NCVS tells us about middle-class crime while the UCR includes the rapid rise that ghetto crime has been displaying since the early 1960s.

Figure 4 reveals that the increase in the rate of imprisonment actually lagged the increase in the crime rate, beginning its acceleration only about 1980. The figure also displays the much-heralded dip in violent crime that has occurred since about 1993. The most likely explanation for this modest decline is the fact that 1.3 million potential perpetrators, compared to about 200,000 in 1970, are now behind bars. Because the typical prison inmate committed some 12 serious crimes during the year prior to his last arrest (Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington, 1988), taking a million such men off the streets and into prison is bound to yield at least a temporary diminution in the crime rate. Haney and

Zimbardo consider it "barbaric" that we have so many men in prison. While it is not a satisfactory solution to our crime problem, I believe with most Americans that sequestering violent criminals is preferable to just turning them loose.

Rehabilitation Does Not Work

If Haney and Zimbardo are correct in what they think they learned from the SPE, everyone—including prison inmates—should respond to socialized environments in a socialized manner. By creating such conditions in our prisons then, after perhaps a fairly short period of acclimation and habituation, formerly unsocialized inmates should become accustomed to behaving like law-abiding citizens and be ready for release. As Haney and Zimbardo point out, it would be necessary also to provide socialized environments for these parolees to return to, adequate jobs, housing in good neighborhoods, and the like.

And there is no doubt that some inmates, after serving their time even in our current unenlightened prisons, manage to remain within the law (or at least unapprehended) after their release. Some inmates, after all, are reasonably normal, socialized persons who were unfortunate enough to be too strongly tempted; some, indeed, were actually innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted. Because recidivism is only frequent and not inevitable, one may be led to believe that some criminals are rehabilitated even by the present system and, therefore, that many more might similarly benefit from a more enlightened correctional system.

The fact is, however, that Haney and Zimbardo cannot point to a single convincing study indicating that prison reforms designed to augment rehabilitation have ever been successful. I am not about to claim that every reasonable method has been tried. In fact, I should be very interested to see what would happen if each new inmate were to learn that his future supervisor, teacher, and disciplinarian was to be a distant computer, "John," with whom he could communicate by means of a very sturdy keyboard and monitor inset into the wall of his cell. The computer would provide programmed learning tasks appropriate to the inmate's ability and interests. By doing what the patient but implacable computer required, the inmate could earn more palatable food, TV time, access to a telephone, and other privileges. Only after he had achieved appropriate basic educational goals, and had demonstrated his willingness to live by the computer's rules, would an inmate begin to be allowed to mix with other inmates and take further steps in demonstrating his improved level of socialization.

But I am not so naive as to claim, as Haney and Zimbardo seem to believe that, even with unlimited resources and control, I (or they) could turn Oak Park Heights into a prison with single-digit recidivism rates. A young person who has managed to reach his or her late teens almost wholly unsocialized is likely to remain a danger to society for life. Like our talent for language, our human proclivities for socialization require to be elicited, shaped, and reinforced in childhood or they may be forever lost. As Judge C. D. Gill (1994) has wisely observed, "The place to fight crime is in the cradle."

The Black-White Ratio of Prison Inmates Reflects the Black-White Ratio of Criminal Perpetrators.

Haney and Zimbardo, in referring to "the racialization of prison pain," seem to attribute the fact that nearly half of the prison inmates in the U.S. are African Americans to racist bias on the part of the police and the courts. They even exaggerate the discrepancy by saying, "although they represent only 6% of the general U.S. population, African American men constitute 48% of those confined to state prisons" (p. 714.) With similar logic one might say that, since men constitute only about 45% of the population of Norway, the fact that 95% of Norwegian prison inmates are male is evidence of gender bias. In another place (Lykken, 1995), I have offered a more reasonable and, I believe, a more constructive explanation for the racial discrepancy in American prisons:

Although one might suspect that the criminal justice system is quicker to arrest and to convict Black than White suspects, reports by victims of the race of the person who robbed or assaulted them correspond closely to the proportions of Blacks and Whites arrested for such crimes (J. Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). "In 1988, in the nation's 75 most populous urban counties, Blacks were 20% of the general population but 54% of all murder victims and 62% of all defendants" (Dilulio, 1994). In Little Rock, Arkansas, victims of more than 80% of the violent crimes (97% of Black victims) reported during 1991 identified the assailant as Black (Uyttebrouck, 1993). Although African Americans make up only one-eighth of the population of the United States (one-third of the population of Little Rock), one gets the impression that many more than one eighth of the perpetrators of the violent crimes that we read about daily or see reported on the television are Black and this impression is correct; in 1991, Blacks accounted for 32% of U.S. property crime and 45% of violent crime (FBI, 1992).

In 1965, when the Black illegitimacy rate had climbed to about 25%, Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote his famous memorandum on the break up of the Black family, predict-




Figure 5. U.S. Illegitimacy Rates. Birth rate for unmarried women by race: United States, 1970-92. Modified from Vital and Health Statistics, Series 21: Data on Natality, Marriage, and Divorce, No. 53, DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 96-1931, Figure 4, p. 4.

ing much of the social dislocation that has since come to pass (see Rainwater & Yancey, 1967). White illegitimacy, which was only about 5% in 1965, has now exceeded the level that, in the Black community, presaged all those dire consequences. In his (1987) found that the strongest predictor of both homicide and robbery by Black juveniles was the local percentage of Black households headed by females. Sampson also found a similar relationship within the White community, where the percentage of families headed by females was a strong predictor of both juvenile and adult offending. Figure 5 shows that White illegitimacy in the U.S. is rapidly catching up to the Black rate, which seems now to have reached its asymptote.

It can be shown that, computed separately for Blacks and Whites, a youngster reared without the resident participation of the biological father is about 7 times more likely in consequence to become delinquent and then criminal (Lykken, 1997). Fatherless rearing results, across racial lines, in similarly increased risk for child abuse, for teenage runaway, for school dropout, teenage pregnancy, and welfare dependency.

Summary

While I agree with Haney and Zimbardo that psychologists should try to play a stronger and more constructive role in advising those responsible for social policy, I am persuaded that the vague and politically correct nostrums that they recommend cannot be helpful. We have too many men (and increasing numbers of women) in prison because we have too much crime. We have too much crime because an ever-increasing proportion of our children are reaching adolescence essentially unsocialized. Some of these youngsters can be described as psychopaths, meaning that their innate temperaments from early childhood made them very difficult to manage, too difficult for the average parent. But crime has increased far too rapidly to be attributable to dysgenic factors. Most of these troublesome youth are what I call sociopaths, meaning that their rearing environment failed to elicit, shape, and reinforce their inherent human capacity to develop an effective conscience as well as their instincts of empathy and altruism and social responsibility. All but the most difficult children become adequately socialized in the extended-family environments of traditional societies that most resemble the environment of human evolutionary adaptation in which our ancestors evolved their innate talent for social living. Such traditional societies have very little crime.

Crime rates increased when the child-rearing practices of modern societies deviated from those to which our species had become adapted and we began to entrust the responsibility of socializing children almost entirely to young parental couples most of whom are untrained and inexperienced. Now more than a third of all American infants are being raised without even the help and support of a resident biological father. I believe that this social revolution, which began earlier among African Americans but the White community is catching up, is the root cause of our current epidemic of crime and other social pathology. If Haney and Zimbardo wish to give useful advice to policy makers, I suggest that they forget about the SPE

and consult instead Jack Westman's important book, *Licensing Parents*.

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Reason and Our Emotions: A Hard Sell

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My objective is to present to you the basic elements of my cognitive/emotional/relational approach as clearly as I am able. As we go along, I will also cite some of my recent books in the hope that some of you might be interested in reading them, for example, my autobiography (Lazarus, 1988)

First I present a real life argument between an American husband and wife (from Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994) which I use to illustrate concretely some of the prototypical characteristics of anger. Second, I discuss the generalized structure of emotion narratives. Third, I return to the argument and analyze it from the standpoint of my theory. Fourth, I discuss some common theoretical research mistakes about emotion. Fifth, I examine the relations between reason (or cognition) and emotion which, as you will see, is what I call a hard sell. Sixth, I offer some comments about the practical significance of my approach to the emotions. Seventh, I close the lecture with the relational meanings of each discrete emotion, which I refer to as core relational themes. Because of the limits of time, I have not chosen to talk about cultural factors in the emotion process.

1. The Argument

The argument began while the couple was making breakfast and getting ready to go to work. The husband usually has fresh orange juice squeezed by his wife. This morning she fills the glass with frozen juice.

The husband wonders out loud why she has not followed the usual routine. She responds testily that she must be at work early, and if he wanted freshly squeezed juice he should do it himself. He takes offense at her tone and sulks a bit, making no response when she speaks. She says, "Well, it looks like sulking time. That's all you know how to do- sulk. You have no consideration for me, and I'm sick of doing everything as if you were a spoiled child." His anger is now rising too: "No, it's me you don't consider." Getting up from the table, he utters an insulting epithet and walks out.

The wife is now irate and she follows him into the bedroom, noting in an accusatory way that he had been uncommunicative last night when he got home from

work. She also suggests that they have been failing to get along. The wife is now saying very harsh things to her husband, and she goes over a long list of character assassinations, most of which she has used in other arguments. The mutual anger escalates. "To hell with you," he shouts, hatefully. "And to hell with you," she rejoins in the same vein.

As the husband is putting on his coat to leave for work, he volunteers with evident distress that he learned yesterday at work he would have to take a pay cut and that a number of employees had been let go. At this admission by the husband, the wife's behavior is suddenly transformed from attack to trying to make amends. She holds out her hand to keep him from leaving and apologizes for her outburst.

The anger has disappeared for the moment. She now feels guilty for what she has said, and anxious too about his job and their economic plight, which she verbalizes. He sits down and says that he shares her anxiety, his anger also having mostly abated. She pulls him up to her and hugs him, and he responds in kind. She asks why he hadn't told her about this last night, but he shrugs his shoulders. Both seem relieved and even affectionate, though he is not as demonstrative as she, and was more wounded by the interchange. They begin to discuss their reactions to the job crisis, but have to stop talking to go to work, promising to speak about it again that evening.

2. The Generalized Structure of the Emotion Narrative.

I believe that emotions are best understood and studied in research as dramatic stories (see Lazarus, 1991, and Lazarus 1999). An emotion narrative has two main features: a figure, which is the provoking action, and a ground or background, which consists of the personalities of the participants and the history of the relationship. Figure-ground analysis was introduced by European Gestalt psychologists as a way of examining psychological phenomena, especially perception, both as a whole and as component parts or substructures that comprise that whole.

The **figure** consists of the immediate provocation of an emotion. It usually consists of an action by another person or the physical environment. Provocations may also include some obvious nonactions, for example,

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when we expect another person to do something we want and we wait *in vain* for that person to do it—say, to give an opinion, pay us a compliment or provide support or affection.

The *ground* in a figure-ground analysis sets the stage for the emotional reaction. Because of individual differences in the way people react to the same or similar provocations, if we don't know the background, it may be difficult or impossible to understand why the person displays or experiences a particular emotion.

Background variables consist mainly of: (1) the participants' goals and goal hierarchies; (2) beliefs about self and world, including what they have learned to expect from each other, and what each person considers personally important about the other; (3) personal resources, such as intelligence, social and work skills, coping styles, health and energy, education, wealth, supportive family and friends, physical and social attractiveness, and ways of thinking (e.g., self confidence, which brings to mind Bandura's concept of self-efficacy). These personality characteristics greatly influence how we react to any given provocation.

The two sets of variables — that is, figure and ground — lead to appraisals by each person of the personal significance of what is happening for their well-being. An important premise is that we are constantly *appraising* ongoing and changing *relationships*, with our environment with respect to their relevance or non-relevance for our well-being and the choice of coping strategy.

An emotional encounter is not a single action or reaction, as in a still photo, but a continuous give and take between people, which is better illustrated by a story as portrayed in a motion picture film. The flow of actions and reactions provides feedback to both participants and it may result in several different emotions, which could change as the social encounter unfolds.

What I have said seems to describe a subjective (or phenomenological) approach to emotion. Still, it is not a true phenomenology but one that is substantially modified to express the human capacity, evolved through natural selection in our species, to perceive and understand the realities of our lives. The key idea is that in appraising — that is, evaluating what is happening — we always *negotiate* between two points of view: (1) wanting to know how things actually are so we can cope with them effectively; and (2) wanting to put the best light possible on what is happening so as not to endanger our morale or lose hope. From an evolutionary perspective, both points of view are essential in aiding our species, and each of us as individuals, to survive and flourish.

Appraisal theory is designed to deal with the inevitable individual differences in the way we react emotionally to events in our lives. These reactions depend not only on what is happening but also on personality characteristics — that is, what we want, what we believe about ourselves and the world in which we live — and our resources for coping with environmental demands, constraints, and opportunities.

In effect, appraising has to do with the way we interpret our relationships with these environmental conditions that determines emotions. As a result of this process, each of us constructs *relational meanings* and *coping processes* that are integral aspects of an emotion. Appraisals, relational meanings, and the coping strategies that flow from them, are the key constructs of my cognitive-motivational-relational theory of the emotions (see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, in press).

3. Now back to the argument.

Having indicated the most important concepts of my approach to the emotion process, I return now to the argument in order to analyze it from my theoretical standpoint. The relational meaning of anger is a demeaning offense against me and mine. What the other person has done to arouse anger is to belittle the person who has, in effect, been made to feel small or insignificant. From a relational perspective, the likelihood of feeling demeaned depends, of course, on personality characteristics and on the provocative act itself. The main goal underlying anger is to preserve and enhance one's self-esteem.

What was the *provocation* in the marital argument? Clearly it is the seemingly trivial refusal by the wife at breakfast one morning to squeeze the orange juice. When the husband asked about this, the wife assaulted him. The proximal reason for her attack is that he had seemed to sulk the previous evening when he came home from work. She had interpreted this as a withdrawal from her — that is, as evidence of his indifference. This pattern had been a long-standing issue between them, and she wanted to retaliate for what she regarded as his demeaning behavior and to repair her wounded self-esteem. The wife also resented the fact that her husband did not do his share of household chores. And she felt contempt for him because he was less successful in the world than she had hoped he would be.

So she laid a trap for him by refusing to squeeze the orange juice. When he questioned her in a complaining tone about this, she attacked. She was spoiling for a fight, ready to pounce on him like a cat on a mouse when, as she knew he would, he appeared to challenge her action. Her hateful attack all but forced him to respond in kind with an attack of his own, and the interpersonal ugliness escalated.

Throughout this marital altercation there were numerous missed opportunities to cope in ways that would be both self-protective and help preserve the marital relationship. Here are three examples:

(1) Each could have made a benign interpretation of the other's actions. If the wife had correctly interpreted her husband's actions the previous evening, or had been more confident of his affection, she might have made a different appraisal. Or, if either participant had been concerned about preserving the relationship as much as they were concerned with repairing their ego wounds, the whole scene would have been different.

(2) The husband could have avoided taking the bait and said nothing about the orange juice, or he might have refused to contribute further to the mounting expressions of hatred. But this might not have worked because it would have frustrated her strong need to assault her husband and she might have become even more angry.

(3) He could have acknowledged earlier (say, last night or right after the argument began), that he might lose his job and was distressed about this. As we observed in the description of the argument, when he finally did this, it effectively transformed his wife's emotional state. Her anger turned to guilt when she realized she had misjudged his behavior the previous evening, then to anxiety as she realized she now must share the problem that his job on which they depended was suddenly in jeopardy. With the realization that they needed to pull together to deal with a common problem, the dominant emotional climate changed from bitter anger to a modest degree of affection; they both needed to join forces to combat the danger.

Here is a living instance of the principle that when relational meaning changes, so does the emotion. Research by Laux and Weber (1991) has shown that in anger-based emotional encounters, husbands and wives escalate their direct assaults on each other, whereas in anxiety-based encounters (e.g., when their child is in trouble or ill) assaultiveness is rare and there is a joint effort to address the realities rationally.

4. Common Theoretical-research Mistakes

Here I take up two kinds of mistakes with respect to the emotions. There are also important mistakes about how to think about coping but I think this adds too much complexity and time to this lecture.

I suggest that the tendency to make a sharp contrast between negatively toned and positively toned emotions (often referred to as negative or positive affectivity), as if they were opposites, is misleading and unfortunate. There are two reasons why I say this.

1. First, dividing the discrete emotions into two types on the basis of their affective valence minimizes their important individual qualities and distinctive adaptational meanings. Because each emotion, such as anger, anxiety, hope, and so on, has its own distinctive narrative, each tells us different things about a person's struggle to adapt; thus, each has a different antecedent cause, a different subjective experience, and a different behavioral outcome. Lumping them together into two broad categories — that is, negative affectivity and positive affectivity — and ignoring the differences among the discrete emotions, forces us to overlook vital information that we need to have to properly understand and predict adaptational behavior.

On the other hand, it is also important to recognize that there are also many interdependencies among the discrete emotions. To illustrate, pride and shame are closely related. Pride arises from being credited with a socially valued personal quality, whereas anger results from feeling slighted or demeaned; their relational meanings are, in effect, opposites, which indicates a

close, albeit negative, relationship to each other.

As another very different example of interdependence, anger can be a way of coping with shame, which is an extremely distressing emotion because to feel shame we have to accept the blame for a serious characterological failing. The anger involved in shifting blame from oneself to another helps us feel better and more in command of ourselves. Anger, therefore, transforms shame. Notice again the important principle here: **Change the relational meaning and the emotion changes.**

The interdependence of the emotions is often not recognized because appraisal theorists are mainly concerned with distinguishing the cognitive/motivational/relational antecedents that make each discrete emotion distinctive. Identifying the unique meaning of an emotion and examining its interdependence with other emotions are both valid, though seemingly opposing perspectives, and this complicates the way emotions should be conceptualized and studied. For example, interdependence implies that it might be a better research strategy not to study a single emotion by itself but look at closely related clusters of emotions — that is, those that are readily transformed into one another by a change in the appraised relational meaning.

2. The second reason for not lumping emotions together on the basis of their supposed negative and positive valences is that these valences are not at all true opposites. Every emotion has the potential of being both negative and positive in its valence and these valences are often combined in the same emotional experience. Not infrequently, for example, positively toned emotions involve harms and threats. They may also originate from negative life conditions.

To illustrate, relief occurs when we are dealing with a threat that has abated or disappeared. Hope, though often considered a positive state of mind, commonly arises in a situation in which we are threatened and anxious but we nevertheless hope for the best. Hope is, in effect, usually combined with anxiety. Consider, for example, what happens when we are awaiting a biopsy for a suspected cancer or when we fear we will do poorly on an exam or interview for an important job. In both instances, we hope that what we fear is not our actual fate (Lazarus, in press)

The same reasoning also applies to happiness and pride. For example, though **happy** about something positive, we may fear that the favorable conditions provoking our happiness will soon end, so we engage in anticipatory coping to prevent this from happening. Or we fear that when conditions of life are favorable, others will resent our good fortune and try to undermine our well-being (see Lazarus, in press).

And when **pride** is viewed by another as a result of having taken too much credit for our own success, that of our child or a student protege, or when a public display of pride is viewed by others as a competitive put-down, we may be wise to keep our prideful feelings to ourselves. Western biblical language expresses this in the aphorisms "Pride goeth before a fall," and "overweening pride."

Love is commonly viewed as a positive experience, but it can be very negative when unrequited or when we have reason to believe our lover is losing interest. When **gratitude** violates our beliefs and values, the social necessity of displaying it even when it is grudging can be a negative experience. Finally, **compassion** can be aversive when we fail adequately to regulate our emotional reaction to the suffering of others.

Giving relational meaning a key role in the emotions, as I do, signifies that a sudden change in what has been happening or a self-generated reappraisal can readily transform one emotion into another. We saw this in the initially anger-laden argument of the married couple used as an illustration. If we study the emotions separately, or lump them together into two overbroad types of affective valence, we will fail to grasp the distinctive and complex adaptive processes characteristic of each discrete emotion, and we will also overlook their close functional relationships, which is an important aspect of their interdependence. We will then approach the emotions too simplistically rather than with a respect for their rich and flexible attributes as they occur and change in nature.

What I have just noted also suggests that, as wise psychologists, we must learn not to dichotomize every concept and issue and think in either/or terms. Instead, we need to recognize the complexity and mixed valences of psychological states and processes.

5. Reason and Emotion, the Hard Sell

In the United States, and much of Europe too, we most often view emotion as unreasonable and nonadaptive. We blame it for our troubles, and regard it as irrational. However, it is important to see that emotions mainly reflect how we are getting along in life and that they are logical and depend on reason or thought.

This is a "hard sell." I mean by this that it is difficult to convince people about the role of reason or rationality in emotion because of an ingrained way of thinking, which arose in ancient Greece and was fostered by the Catholic Church in Europe in the Middle ages after the fall of Rome.

For example, writing about the public attitude toward the death penalty for criminals, the distinguished American columnist, Anthony Lewis (1998), wrote: "People want the death penalty, I am convinced, for emotional rather than rational reasons." I would, instead, have said "for reasons that are not thoughtful and wise." The point is that it is no more irrational to desire the death penalty, as many people do, than to reject that penalty, as many people do. We have no way of knowing whether emotion leads to being for or against the death penalty.

Another example can be found in a recent best seller, *Emotional Intelligence*, in which Goleman (1995), previously the science writer for the New York Times, described two separate minds, one devoted to emotions, the other to reason. He writes (p. 8): "In a very real sense we have two minds, one that thinks and one that feels."

And on page 20, he says "Our emotions have a mind of their own, one which can hold views quite independently of our rational mind." I am sure that this was written to appeal to the uneducated American layperson. Still, it is bad science and misleading, especially as applied to what is known about the brain, which Goleman keeps referring to as the arbiter of our actions, when it is the mind that is really the arbiter.

One must acknowledge that sometimes intense **emotions interfere** with the thoughtful examination of an issue, but it is the **quality of thought** that should still be considered the primary basis of foolish actions. But even when we suspect direct emotional interference, we are unable to predict in which direction the reasoning error will occur.

To help you follow my reasoning, we can think of the Ancient Greek-inspired "trilogy of mind," which has to do with the relationships between cognition, motivation, and emotion. The Greek philosopher, Plato, originated this type of analysis of mind over two thousand years ago. He emphasized the conflict among these three basic functions of the mind, especially between cognition (or reason) and emotion. He seems to have viewed reason in civilized society as having the essential function of regulating emotion. In the Middle Ages after the fall of Rome, the Catholic Church adopted this view because the Platonic tradition seemed consistent with the need Church leaders saw for their parishioners to control their animal instincts and destructive emotions by an act of reason and will.

Aristotle, whose philosophical outlook was derived in part from Plato, enunciated another important principle, which is the basis of our current cognitive-mediational view of mind, well expressed in modern appraisal theories of emotion. Although conflict often occurs among cognition, motivation, and emotion, Aristotle argued that emotion always depends on thought. Both principles apply, but western thought has continued to emphasize the conflict between reason and emotion and not their interdependence.

Aristotle's contrarian view that motivation and emotion depend on reason seems to be the earliest version of the principle of cognitive mediation. Western psychology remains ambivalent about this idea for many other reasons, and there is much debate about its epistemology and metatheory (Dagleish & Power, 1999), I maintain, nevertheless, that there would be no science of the emotions if emotional phenomena were not rule based — that is, if emotions failed to follow an implacable logic (which means natural forms of reasoning that cannot be impeached). Our scientific task is to understand this logic as it applies to the emotions.

6. The Practical Significance of Appraisal Theory

The main constructs of my cognitive-motivational-relational theory of the emotions are appraisal, relational meaning, and coping. We can see how they work in the argument I used to illustrate the theory. Remember that I considered it necessary to take into account the provocation that led to the argument, the background of the

relationship, including each person's goals, beliefs, and resources, each participant's individual appraisals of what was happening from which they constructed its relational meaning, and how each of them coped with it.

The scientific and practical significance of this kind of theoretical approach is suggested by two fundamental and symmetrical premises: (1) If we begin our analysis with an emotion that we believe is being displayed or experienced by a given person, we should be able to make a good deductive guess about what that person must be thinking and wanting- in effect, we should be able to predict with some confidence the relational meaning this person has constructed about his or her current relationship with the environment. (2) If, instead, we begin our analysis with a knowledge of what a person is thinking and desiring, we also can make a good deductive guess about which emotion this person is likely to display or experience. Notice the symmetry in these two premises, which unites particular emotions and reason by identifying the cognitive- motivational details of their linkage. The deductions go both ways- that is, forward from reason to the emotion, and backward from the emotion to reason- as a consequence of the idea that emotions follow an implacable logic.

The validity of these premises depends, of course, on the soundness of one's appraisal-centered theory about the relational meanings that distinguish each of the emotions. If the theory is sound, then something like what I have said should follow, which gives us tremendous power to understand the emotion process and to influence it socially and clinically. Aristotle showed he understood this in his book, *Rhetoric*, when he analyzed a number of emotions from a cognitive mediational point of view that seems quite modern. His goal was to describe how to influence others on the basis of our knowledge of the psychodynamics of emotion, which is precisely what the word rhetoric means.

Considerable agreement exists among appraisal theorists about what a person must think and want for most of the emotions to be aroused, but some disagreements exist too. Some theorists (see Berkowitz, 1989, for example) give less emphasis than I do to feeling demeaned or slighted as a causal cognitive factor in anger. The resolution of these disagreements depends on both the logical consistency of the analysis, its fruitfulness, and the empirical evidence.

7. The Relational Meaning of Each Discrete Emotion.

I close my lecture with a list of core relational themes that represents my proposals about the relational meanings of 15 emotions. They should be read and thought about carefully, though I only have time here to read them to you without elaboration. A good source of such elaboration is my latest book (Lazarus, 1999), which I hope many of you will be able to examine.

The Core Relational Themes for Each Emotion

- Anger** A demeaning offense against me and mine.
Anxiety Facing uncertain, existential threat.

- Fright** An immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger.
Guilt Having transgressed a moral imperative.
Shame Failing to live up to an ego-ideal.
Sadness Having experienced an irrevocable loss.
Envy Wanting what someone else has and feeling deprived of it but justified in having it.
Jealousy Resenting a third party for loss or threat to another's affection or favor.
Happiness Making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal.
Pride Enhancement of one's ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either one's own or that of someone or group with whom one identifies.
Relief A distressing goal-incongruent condition that has changed for the better or gone away.
Hope Fearing the worst but yearning for better, and believing the improvement is possible.
Love Desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated.
Gratitude Appreciation for an altruistic gift that provides personal benefit.
Compassion Moved by another's suffering and wanting to help.

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TOWARD A GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PASSION: COMMENT ON THE "PASSION PAPERS"

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I read, with pleasure, the "Passion Papers" published in the summer of 1998 in the *General Psychologist*. I was particularly pleased to find some of my own passionate interests — my passion for knowledge and for being a parent — well represented in these essays (although I also noted, with mild disappointment, that passion for music received only passing mention). My colleagues' passions were, without exception, mature or generative passions — concern for others and the welfare of the human community was integral to all these passionate commitments. Even the passion for sexuality of "Anonymous" is a generous, affirming sexuality. Sadly - tragically — these mature passions do not reflect the full range of passionate human emotions. Conspicuously absent from the "Passion Papers" - for obvious reasons — is our passionate hatred in its many forms.

A few years ago, I offered some observations on the topic of passionate states in response to a paper presented by a colleague in psychoanalysis. The author had attempted to give an account of human passions consistent with "relational" models of psychoanalysis, particularly the theories of W.R.D. Fairbairn. My colleague noted that the experience of passionate emotions presents a theoretical problem for Fairbairn's theory and perhaps for all relational psychoanalytic theories that explicitly reject Freud's concept of the primacy of sexual and aggressive drives (the passions of the id) in favor of a view of human motivation as primarily objectseeking. The author emphasized what he called "healthy passions" — lasting love relationships, creative and productive work (although he also referred to compulsive, self-defeating passions) and concluded with a quotation from Disraeli that "Man is only great when he acts from the passions".

While sympathetic to many of the ideas raised in my colleague's presentation, I could not share his optimism. I was reminded, instead, of Yeats' quite different judgment in "The Second Coming".

"The best lack all conviction,

While the worst are full of passionate intensity".

If we are to develop a psychology of passion, we need, of course, to study the full range of human passions. In this spirit, I would like to offer a preliminary phenom-

enological description of various passionate states, drawing from both clinical and cultural sources, along with a search for some common features, or organizing principles, regarding the experience of passion.

Demagogues are passionate, as are fundamentalists. We know all too well about individual, violent "crimes of passion" as well as the collective, passionately inspired (if at times dispassionately carried out), genocidal atrocities that continue to be a regular feature of human history.

Freud thought, and common observation seems to confirm, that young boys and girls passionately desire and desire to *be like* their fathers and mothers. Parents are passionate in their love and protectiveness of their children. Adolescents are well known for their passionate idealizations and ambitions and we all, I think, passionately desire to be *heard*, to be recognized, to have a voice.

We would also have to include, in our understanding of passion, the competitive passions of everyday life, from passionate rivalry between siblings to our culture's (and many other cultures') preoccupation with competitive sports, as well as our moral and religious passions — our passion for justice, or for God.

We can recognize several frequent, if not invariably present, characteristics of these different experiences of passion. First, an element of idealization appears to be an essential aspect of most passionate states. (I am not using the term idealization in a technical or theoretical sense, but in its everyday meaning of regarding a person, an object or an idea as in some respect admirable, "great", wonderful, perfect, worthy of being looked up to.) Idealization of the loved person is particularly apparent in erotic or romantic passion; the success of our long-term love relationships may, in large measure, depend on a couple's ability to protect or repair the idealized qualities of the loved person from the many eroding forces of everyday life.

Parental love, as Freud wryly and famously noted in his essay "On Narcissism" (1914), also, of course, contains a quality of idealization. "The attitude of affectionate parents towards their children", Freud wrote, "is a revival. . . of their own narcissism. They are under a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child - which sober observation would find no occasion to do."

Idealization also appears to play an essential role in the realm of creativity. We find this often, for example, in the relationship of a student to idealized mentor, or

source of inspiration. But the more essential relationship between idealization and creativity may be in the artist's relationship to the creative work itself. Heinz Kohut (1966) refers to this relationship in his discussion of the role of narcissism in creativity - Kohut notes that, for the artist, the creative *work* becomes an object of idealization.

Finally, idealization is frequently encountered as an aspect of destructive passions. Destructive passions, either individual or collective, often reveal a more-or-less obvious paranoid structure, in which a persecutory object is experienced as threatening to a grandiose ideal. Extreme religious fundamentalism would seem to have this structure and Hitler, of course, promised to restore "greatness" to a "purified" German nation. We know that Hitler's ideas and rhetoric had powerful, widespread appeal. Certainly an aspect of this appeal, in addition to the scapegoating of Jews and others, was the *appeal to greatness*. I would suggest that the appeal to greatness is one of our strongest passions and a powerful force in human emotions. This appeal may be common to all charismatic nationalistic leaders and is, in my opinion, unfortunately common even in the political discourse of democracies.

The appeal to greatness, or the pursuit of greatness, also takes benign, nondestructive, forms. I was a revising an earlier version of this essay in the late summer of 1998, caught up, with most of America, in the excitement of Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa's pursuit of baseball's greatest record. But even in this case, we need to recall the passionate hatred directed towards Roger Maris in 1961, considered by many an unworthy challenger to Ruth's greatness. In sports, of course, we often find the icons of greatness we seem, as individuals and as a society, to need.

If idealization is an essential element of passionate states, then it should not be surprising that disillusionment - the loss of an idealized relationship - is so destructive of passion. Clinically, we recognize disillusionment in various forms, in adolescence, for example, often as cynicism or perhaps as contempt or apathy. The fate of Willy Loman's sons in *Death of a Salesman* offers a compelling literary example of the impact of disillusionment, prototypes, perhaps, of a clinically prevalent "disillusionment syndrome".

As a second generalization regarding the experience of passion, I would suggest that we are particularly passionate in *defense* of loved objects and ideals. In this context, we could locate parents' protectiveness toward their children as well as our passionate loyalty to family and country and to political or moral causes, or symbols of these causes. We might also invoke here a more general principle, that we passionately - and stubbornly - defend our established identities. Our sense of identity, of course, is a complex construction, or set of constructions, that serves many functions; but once established, it is felt to be essential to our psychological survival.

A third group of deeply experienced passions are passions generated by injuries to our narcissism, that is, the

spectrum of narcissistic rage reactions; passions dominated by a need, either elaborated in fantasy or acted out in overt behavior, for revenge, to undo a humiliation or to return an insult or offense.

In our passions we seek to re-capture a feeling of aliveness and vitality. Sheldon Bach (1994) has recently written about what he calls the state of "psychobiological aliveness" or "psychobiological omnipotence", which he defines as "an acute joyful sense of self-as-being," a state of being D. W. Winnicott referred to as the feeling of "I AM". Our effort to re-experience some measure of aliveness may be particularly important in our pursuit of everyday passions, for example, our passion for music, dance or sports. Bach suggests, however, that the effort to recapture a feeling of aliveness may also play a role in perverse passions, for example, in sadism.

Finally, the characteristic cognitive component of passion is certainty, or conviction (and in moral passions, self-righteousness). Certainty simplifies experience and intensifies passion; ambiguity and doubt temper passion.

This description of various passionate states is obviously incomplete and each of these relationships requires detailed study in his own right. It seems worth noting, however, that idealization, the defense or preservation of one's identity, narcissistic rage and the experience of psychobiological aliveness have all been described as aspects, or vicissitudes, of narcissism, particularly when narcissism (i.e. self-love) is understood not only as a form of character pathology, but as a fundamental motivational construct, the sense in which the concept of narcissism was originally presented by Freud and elaborated by Kohut.

To return to the "Passion Papers": How can we account for the sustained passionate interests and commitments represented in the papers? I cannot, in this brief essay, attempt an answer to this complex question. Generative passions, however, may be uncommon achievements, requiring some access to the idealizations, the competitiveness and the aliveness of childhood, tempered and made lasting by the psychological benefits of maturity, particularly our tolerance for ambiguity, for gratitude and a recognition of the legitimate needs and demands of others.

I hope that these informal observations have been of some interest to psychologists involved in the study of human passions and to readers of the "Passion Papers".

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Psychological Pursuit

Frank Wesley
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Who is the psychologist who:

- 1) was blinded for almost eight years while trying to establish the upper limit of brightness?
- 2) was the first to observe his own two children to assess their cognitive styles?
- 3) had the first psychological "law" named after him?
- 4) said: "psychology is a nasty little science?"
- 5) went into the catacomb of a basilica to communicate with the dead?
- 6) maintained that his discovery of "imageless thought" discredited Wundt's method of introspection?
- 7) supervised the dissertation of Hugo Eckener who became the commander the Zeppelin piloting it on the first around-the-world flight?
- 8) was called by Pavlov an "American philosopher" because he had contradicted Pavlov's ideas on reward and punishment?
- 9) became Prime Minister of a country about the size of Texas?
- 10) was the first and only psychologist commemorated on a US postage stamp?
- 11) was accepted by a famous graduate department of psychology without having had a single psychology course in his undergraduate studies?
- 12) was the only woman among Wundt's 186 doctoral candidates?

(Answers on Page 24)

General Response

Letter to the Editor

Robert Perloff's erudite article, July 1999, Letter to the Editor, "Three Cheers for Coherence (aka 'Giving (General Psychology Away)'" caught my eye just as I was about to put down my copy of *The General Psychologist* (Fall, 1999, Volume 34, Number 3). In general I liked what he had to say. However, since he espouses Coherence, why not go all the way and include other than General Psychologists who he feels should be in the forefront in this quest. I'd even risk being called a turncoat and ask that we invite a few interested Psychiatrists for their thoughts and suggestions.

I feel that Bob's proposed list of Illustrative Social Problems should be expanded and have indicated some 38 additional ones. I feel certain that there are many more yet to be added and welcome them.

- 1) Assassinations
- 2) Acceptance/rejection of disabled persons.
- 3) The myth of "The Golden Years"
- 4) Abortion
- 5) Prostitution/ infidelity, adultery, promiscuity
- 6) Illiteracy/genius/mental retardation.
- 7) Greedy Pharmaceutical Companies
- 8) The Stock Exchange/Traders, gamblers.
- 9) The Glass Ceiling
- 10) Empowering all minorities.
- 11) Road Rage
- 12) Government Cover-Ups. (Agent Orange, etc.)
- 13) White fear of some Afro-Americans
- 14) Public School Funding/ School Board Power.
- 15) The Death Penalty
- 16) War, genocide, Peace.
- 17) Rape, incest, divorce, marriage
- 18) The MD-as-God Myth.
- 19) Acceptance/rejection of Alternative Care
- 20) Humane care in animal research.
- 21) Destruction of the Rain Forests
- 22) Depletion of Ozone, pollutions (air, water, earth).
- 23) Banning of all land mines, nuclear arms
- 24) Psychological aspects of disease/health.
- 25) Hunting animals to extinction, fur coats
- 26) Tattooing, body piercing.
- 27) Boxing, wrestling, no holds barred events
- 28) Mental illness/Health.
- 29) Pornography, Pedophilia, Voyeurs
- 30) Liars, truth seekers, scam artists.
- 31) Riots, public demonstrations
- 32) Boycotts, sabotage, whistle blowers.
- 33) So-called Inner Cities
- 34) The criminal justice system, prisons.
- 35) Parenting, fatherhood, single families
- 36) God as being a male figure.
- 37) Belief systems affecting one's life
- 38) Prayer, Intercessory Prayer In Healing Practices.

Respectfully submitted,

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For APA President --

Phil Zimbardo

Philip Zimbardo, a distinguished member of The Society for General Psychology and the APA is on the ballot for the APA presidency. Phil, Professor of Psychology at Stanford University, is internationally recognized as an innovative researcher in many areas of social psychology, as well as an award-winning distinguished teacher, writer, and media personality. Born (3/23/33) in New York City's South Bronx ghetto, of poor Sicilian, uneducated parents, Zimbardo was the first in the history of his family to go to college (Brooklyn College, graduated Summa Cum Laude, with honors in Psychology and Sociology/ Anthropology, 1954), and got an MS. (1955), and Ph.D. from Yale University (1959). He has taught at Yale, Barnard College, Co-

lumbia, N.Y.U. (From 1960-67), and, since 1968 has been a professor at Stanford University. Zimbardo has given invited lectures in major universities throughout the U.S. and the world.

His textbook, *Psychology and Life*, 15th edition (Longman), is the oldest, continuously selling text in all of psychology. His bestselling popular book, *Shyness: What it is, What to do about it* (Addison-Wesley), is currently in its 7th printing, and translated into 10 languages. He has published more than 200 professional and technical articles and over 40 trade books, texts, workbooks and student manuals. Zimbardo has become the voice and image of psychology through the 26 episodes of the PBS TV series, *Discovering Psychology*, which he created, wrote and narrated, and which is now a staple in most college and high school courses across the United States and in ten countries world wide. He will revise and update the series his fall. His infamous Stanford Prison Experiment (1971) is a classic in the demonstration of the power of situational forces to overwhelm ordinary, good people. His video of that study, "Quiet Rage," is a powerful, prize-winning documentary of this unique experiment in which students played the roles of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison that became all too real and had to be terminated a week earlier than planned. His article on the Social Disease of Shyness in *Psychology Today*, 1975, started many researchers investigating shyness in adults, which previously had been studied only in children. This research enterprise, known as the Stanford Shyness Project, was honored with a special symposium on Shyness research and therapy at the 1995 convention of the American Psychological Association in NYC. Zimbardo's pioneering treatment for shyness in adolescents and adults continues in a community shyness clinic near Stanford, (co-directed with Dr. Lynne Henderson). His current research interests continue to be broad: cults, hypnosis, violence, shyness and technology, the social and cognitive basis of madness, and the psychology of time perspective. Zimbardo continues to teach popular large undergraduate courses (Introduction to Psychology, Social Psychology, and the Psychology of Mind Control) and seminars, along with graduate courses and practicums in teaching. He is the 1999 winner of Division 1's Hilgard Award for his lifetime contributions to General Psychology, and has won numerous awards for his teaching, research, and writing.

Executive Committee Meeting August Meeting

Executive Committee Minutes

The Division One Executive Committee (EC) meeting was held August 19, 1999 at the Sheraton Boston Hotel. This review is to provide the members of Division One with an overview of our activities, at the EC meeting. The Divisional activities during the convention were excellent this year, and we hope to see all of you at the annual Business Meeting next year.

In the absence of our President, Dr. Kurt Salzinger (due to his wife's illness), the meeting was chaired by Dr. Lewis Lipsitt, President-Elect. The minutes of the previous EC meeting, as amended, were approved.

Two representatives of the Science Directorate, Dr. Heather Roberts Fox, Senior Testing and Assessment Officer and Dr. Nancy Dess, the new Senior Scientist (she started 2 weeks ago) gave a update of current Directorate activities, future plans, and ideas under consideration. The Science Directorate is close to full staffing for the first time in many years. The recent approval of the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* is an example of the cooperative work being done in the Directorate. The years 2000-2010 are being considered as the "Decade of Behavior" within APA and other organizations. An initiative is being considered in Congress to have this designation made as a general public education promotion.

Dr. Don Bersoff as Program Chair for 1999 reviewed the excellent programming for the upcoming week. One added feature was the inclusion of a Conversation

(Continued on Page 32)

Answers to Psychological Pursuit

- 1) **Gustav Fechner** became visually impaired by staring into the sun in the winter of 1840.
- 2) **Alfred Binet**, observing Madelaine (4 yrs) and Alice (2yrs) during the 1890's.
- 3) **Adolf Jost**. Jost's Law: Of two learning events practiced with equal strength, the older one will be remembered better.
- 4) **William James**. James, H. (1920) The letters of William James. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 2, p.2
- 5) **Carl Gustav Jung**, into the catacomb of the Basilica of Basel.
- 6) **Oswald Külpe**, Imageless thought: the mind can handle ideas/concepts which have no physical existence.
- 7) **Wilhelm Wundt**. Tinker, M. A. (1932). Wundt's doctorate students and their theses (1875-1920), *American Journal of Psychology*, XLIV, 630-637.
- 8) **Edwin R. Guthrie** in a rebuttal article in the *Psychological Bulletin* in 1936. From Pavlov's 500+ articles it was his only American publication.
- 9) **Hendrick Verwoerd**, Prof. of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch Univ., Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966.
- 10) **Lillian Gailbreth**. Stamp issued in Feb. 1984. Doctorates in psychology (Brown), in engineering (Rutgers).
- 11) **B. F. Skinner** entered Harvard in 1928. B.F. Skinner (1979) *The shaping of a behaviorist*, Knopf, p.14
- 12) **Anna Berliner**, PhD in 1913. Fled Germany in 1938. Taught Japanese in the US in the 40's. Chairperson at Pacific University in the 1960's.



Candidates for Society Offices

Ballots will be sent to members by APA the middle of April for the election of officers for APA itself and for its various divisions and state associations. This year, the members of Division One will be electing a President-Elect, a Representative to the APA Council of Representatives, and two Members-at-Large of the Executive Committee. To help you decide on your choices for these offices, the candidates have submitted biographical information and a platform statement, all of which follows. The candidates for President-Elect are Linda Bartoshuk, Don Dewsbury, and Morton Ann Gernsbacher. For Executive Committee, the candidates are paired this year Alan Boneau versus Wendy Williams and Frank Farley versus Susan Mineka. The Council Rep candidates are Lew Lipsitt and Greg Kimble, a third candidate having dropped out of the race at a late date. Bios and statements are presented alphabetically by office.

Candidates for Division President

Linda Bartoshuk is a Professor of Surgery (Section of Otolaryngology) at the Yale University School of Medicine. In spite of that title, she is an experimental psychologist who got her PhD with Carl Pfaffmann at Brown in 1965. She works in the human psychophysics of taste and has taught courses on sensory processes and food behavior in the Psychology Department. Her early work included the study of plants that modify taste. One study on the artichoke (it makes water taste sweet to some lucky people) led to a brief period during which she was known as Linda Bartichoke. Fortunately the era ended when one of her friends who is vegetably challenged introduced her at a lecture as Linda Bavocado to the puzzlement of those in the audience. She subsequently discovered supertasters, individuals born with an unusually large number of taste buds and is currently interested in the health implications of food preferences influenced by genetic variation in taste. The niche she has found for herself in medicine (she thinks there is room for a lot more psychologists there) has allowed her to use experiments of nature to learn about taste. On lucky occasions, her work leads to treatments. An anatomical link between taste and pain has led her to use capsaicin (the hot material in chili peppers) to desensitize pain receptors in the mouths of cancer patients and she is currently interested in the treatment of taste as well as oral pain phantoms (e.g., burning mouth syndrome). Although active in specialized associations (Chair, 1978 Gordon Conference on Taste and Olfaction; President, Association of Chemoreception Sciences, 1980-81; recipient, first award for Outstanding Achievement in the Chemical Senses, 1998) she sees herself as a generalist in psychology. She is a member of Divisions 1, 3, 6, 25, and 35 and was President of Division 6 in 1988-89 (and of EPA in 1990-91). She

was elected to the Society of Experimental Psychology and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995.

Bartoshuk's Statement I love being a psychologist. I don't think there is a better way to be trained in science. The difficulties of studying behavior have made us sophisticated about experimental design and statistical analysis. We study the real world but we know how to look beneath the surface to explore mechanism. The results of our work have impact on the lives of real people. We have low tolerance for nonsense in science. As far as I am concerned, it doesn't get any better than this. I think as a generalist. I care very much about making what I do accessible to people in both directions on the intellectual food chain. I like being around psychologists who make their work accessible to me. If I were elected president of Division 1, my first task would be to work with the Executive Committee and Program Chair to help insure that the annual meeting continues to be a source of professional pleasure to us generalists. Beyond this, I am especially interested in disseminating the work of psychologists not only to colleagues in other disciplines but also to the public. About a year ago I evaluated a patient with burning mouth syndrome (this oral pain disorder turns out to be linked to taste damage). He was a newspaper editor who wrote about his own case. His paper is on the web and to my amazement I was suddenly hearing from more patients with this disorder than I could have found in a lifetime with conventional methods. Thus, I am especially interested in the development of our web page as a resource with which to communicate with our colleagues and with the world at large. My own work may seem very specialized to some. However, one of the unifying principles in psychology is common methodology. Psychophysicists are world travelers in psychology. We can cross discipline boundaries because our tools are useful in so many specialties. Among

those tools are scales used to compare the perceived intensities of both sensory and emotional experiences across various groups of subjects. These scales are used throughout psychology as well as a variety of other disciplines (think of category scales, Likert scales, visual analogue scales, Stevens's magnitude estimation). I have become particularly interested in the logic underlying the inferences to be drawn from such scales, particularly the logical errors that can lead to false conclusions (e.g., one such error can make differences across groups actually appear to go in the wrong direction). I cannot hope to master the subject matter in enough diverse specialties to determine just how widespread these errors are. If I am to continue this investigation, I must depend on colleagues to show me how psychophysics is used in their specialties. Division 1 is a place to meet such colleagues. Thus I have a very personal motive to seek involvement with Division 1. The interactions fostered there contribute to the pleasure I take in being generalist as well as enrich the science I do as a specialist. I am glad so many others are as interested in what joins us as in what separates us as psychologists.

Donald A. Dewsbury After growing up on Long Island, I received an A. B. in psychology from Bucknell University in 1961 and a PhD in psychology from the University of Michigan in 1965. This was followed by a post-doctoral year with Frank Beach at the University of California, Berkeley. I have been on the faculty in psychology at the University of Florida since 1966.

During most of my career in psychology I functioned as a comparative psychologist specializing in reproductive and social behavior. In about 1990 I decided to switch emphases to work in the History of Psychology, my current area. I have published over 300 assorted articles and chapters, written two books, and edited another 11 books. I teach courses in both the History of Psychology and Comparative Psychology.

My current projects include a 5-volume edited series of histories of APA divisions, a Year 2000 project in which a set of articles examining psychology 100 years ago is being published throughout the year 2000 in the American Psychologist, a set of projects related to Robert Yerkes, Karl Lashley, and Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology, and an assortment of other projects.

Within the APA, I have served as President of Division 6 (Behavioral Neuroscience and Comparative Psychology) and Division 26 (History of Psychology). I currently represent Division 26 on the APA Council of Representatives. I have served as the Historian, and an ex-officio member of the Executive Committee of Division 1 since 1995. I am also the historian for Divisions 6 and 26. I have served in various other capacities, including as Program Chair for two divisions, and as a member of the Committee on Animal Research and Ethics.

Outside of the APA, I have served as President and in various other offices of the Animal Behavior Society (ABS). I am presently the historian for the ABS, the

Cheiron Society, and the Psychonomic Society.

I am a fellow of Divisions 1, 2, 6, and 26, the ABS, the AAAS, and the APS. I have received the Clifford T. Morgan Award for Distinguished Service from Division 6 and the Exemplar Award from the ABS.

Dewsbury's Statement As I have just recently been asked to run for office and this statement has been requested on short notice, I must be honest that I do not yet have a concrete plan for Division 1. I do have an approach, however. When finishing my term as Division 6 President, I realized how short a one-year term really is. I felt that I had done a good job of keeping the division running, but that I had not really made an impact on the division. To do that, one needed to target a few items on which one could concentrate in the space of a year. This priority system had to be in place at the time of assuming office. During my year as President-elect of Division 26 I evaluated the division to set some priorities. The division had only a very minimal awards program; such programs are present in most divisions and seem to be a service to the members. I made that a target and was able to initiate the program during my year. Having served for several years on the executive committee, I saw that it often "reinvented the wheel," discussing the same issue repeatedly because of the lack of an institutional memory. With frequent changes of officers, results of past discussions were lost. I therefore developed a policy manual, summarizing both the by-laws and other actions of the executive committee. It is easy to change policies of the committee by majority vote, but at least it is easy to determine what they are. In addition, I was able to follow through on projects initiated by others: a substantial revision of Division 26 bylaws and the publication of the new division journal, *History of Psychology*.

Should I be elected Division 1 President, I would expect to take a similar approach: study the division with a goal of finding one or two priority items that might be accomplished. I am well aware of what it takes to keep a division going but I would hope to develop some program to make a lasting impact. I have served on the Division 1 executive committee for several years and thus I am broadly familiar with the issues confronting Division 1. Some, such as membership and the aging of membership, are common throughout the APA. I can view these Division 1 problems in the context of a rather broad knowledge gained in editing published histories of 41 of the APA divisions and of my current service on Council.

Frankly, Division 1 is a rather unusual division and much more difficult to grasp than are other divisions that are targeted at specific subfields. I am a strong supporter of general psychology- even if I have not quite figured out what it is. A reading of Wertheimer and King's history of division 1, in volume 1 of the Unification Through Division series I am editing, reveals that I am not alone in this regard. The issue has been much debated and even the topic of some Presidential addresses. I am a strong believer in the unifica-

tion of all fields of psychology and of a respect for all approaches, in science, practice, and other applied and academic endeavors. I would very much like to see some means of increased communication across fields of psychology. How much a division or a division President can do to facilitate this is not yet clear to me.

I am not sure that I am capable of following in the footsteps of such Past-Presidents of Division 1 as Karl Dallenbach, Edward Tolman, Anne Anastasi, Gardner Lindzey, and Sigmund Koch. I would be willing to do my best.

Morton Ann Gernsbacher received her Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin in 1983, was an assistant, associate, and full professor at the University of Oregon, from 1983 to 1992, and then joined the faculty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she is the Sir Frederic C. Bartlett Professor of Psychology. She is a fellow of the APA (Division 1 and 3), a fellow of the APS, and a fellow of the AAAS. She has received a NIH Research Career Development Award, a Fulbright Research Scholar Award, a James McKeen Cattell Foundation Fellowship, and a Professional Opportunities for Women Award from the National Science Foundation. She is President of the International Society for Text and Discourse, a member of the Governing Board of the Psychonomic Society, and was the co-organizer of CogSci98. She has served as Member-at-Large on the executive committees of Division 1 (General) and Division 3 (Experimental Psychology). She is an award winning teacher, and recently received the University of Wisconsin's highest award bestowed by its own faculty, the Hilldale Award for Distinguished Professional Accomplishment. She edits the journal, *Memory & Cognition*, and serves on five editorial boards. She wrote *Language Comprehension as Structure Building* (Erlbaum, 1990); edited *The Handbook of Psycholinguistics* (Academic Press, 1994); co-edited *Coherence in Spontaneous Text* (Benjamins, 1995), has two books in press, and has published over 90 journal articles and invited chapters. She is also the proud mother of a three-year old son. Her research investigates the general cognitive processes and mechanisms underlying language comprehension.

Gernsbacher's Statement I view General Psychology as a goal for all psychologists. I believe that we should all strive to be general psychologists. By that I mean making our research accessible to those outside of our own interest areas, capitalizing on (learning and borrowing freely from) the literature and methodologies used by our neighboring colleagues, and carrying our message beyond academic psychology into the public forum, or as many have said, "giving psychology away."

For over two decades, my research has been characterized by a generalist approach. In the mid-1980s I first began touting my message that we could best understand language comprehension by exploring the general cognitive processes and mechanisms that

underlie it. In those days I was influenced strongly by the contemporary theories and discoveries in the fields of attention, perception, and memory. For example, I explained how it is that we (as skilled language users) understand the correct referent for an anaphor (such as a pronoun) by drawing on theories of selective attention (including inhibitory processing); I predicted that the information presented first in a sentence (which is typically the syntactic subject and semantic agent) would be more accessible than the information presented later in a sentence because traditional models of memory predicted this; I explained when listeners would perceive the topic (or importance) of a discourse by referring to gestalt principles of perception.

Although this message was not initially met with open arms (if I had a dollar for every reviewer who responded with the opposition, "But this is not psycholinguistics" I could pay for my university parking spot), the position is now becoming vogue (my small contribution to encouraging the often myopic field of psycholinguistics to become more integrated among the broader field of psychology).

In the 90s, I extended beyond the traditional boundaries of experimental psychology to embrace the theories, literature, and methodologies of social psychology (for example, to predict when readers will adopt the viewpoint of the narrator); personality psychology (for example, to identify the personality correlates of language users that allow the attenuation of interfering information during comprehension); and developmental psychology (for example, to explain why adults have acquired more facility with active, affirmative, declarative sentences than sentences with syntactic forms with which they have had considerably less experience and exposure).

Perhaps my most adventurous foray into interdisciplinary neighborhoods last century was my relatively successful attempt to learn the methodologies of behavioral neuroscientists. After acquiring the skill of functional brain imaging I felt that I had truly earned the label of general psychologist; I could then think, speak, and conceptualize across the brain-behavior divide.

However, it was right before the turn of the century when I most strikingly felt the need for the commonality, rather than just the diversity, of general psychology. For reasons unrelated to my professional life I have been compelled to understand the developmental, though lifelong, "disability" we label autism. This quest for knowledge has been an intellectual awakening of proportions I cannot quantify. I have felt like a first-year graduate student scouring the literature, only this time rather than countless hours pouring over a tattered copy of Psych Lit in a university library, I can surf the psychological literature in the wee hours of the morning from my home computer. And rather than feeling awestruck at how little I know, I feel awestruck at how little we know. And humbled by the insularity of our knowledge.

Reading the literature about this phenomenon is akin to hearing the folkloric descriptions of an elephant by various men who encounter only one part of the elephant. Thus, we have our social cognition experts who describe autism as one thing; our psychoanalysts who describe autism as something else; our neuroscientists who render but yet a different description; our behaviorists whose description differs from any of the others; and even our cognitive and perceptual scientists who call it as they see it. (Missing, oddly enough, is any account of autism from my native psycholinguistics perspective, despite the fact that approximately half the persons with that diagnostic label do not use language functionally and one of the three diagnostic criteria for autism is grounded completely in the psychology of language.) If there is another so utterly human phenomenon that cries out for a unified and integrated psychological approach, I have not encountered it.

Five years ago when I authored a blurb for this newsletter about my views on general psychology (in the service of my election to member at large), I wrote that "I believe that the best psychology is general psychology — psychology that bridges traditional boundaries and values integration over specialization." My recent foray into developmental disabilities has convinced me that general psychology (and by that I mean integrative psychology) is not only "the best psychology," it is our only hope for answering fundamental but enigmatic psychological questions.

For Council Representative

Gregory A. Kimble was born in Iowa and grew up in Minnesota. His undergraduate education was at Carleton College. After receiving his Ph.D. degree at the University of Iowa, he went to Brown University, where he remained for 5 years. From Brown, Kimble moved to Yale, to Duke, to the University of Colorado, and back to Duke again. At Duke and the University of Colorado, he served as Professor and Chair of the Department of Psychology. At Duke he also served as Director of Undergraduate and of Graduate Studies.

Kimble's contributions to APA include service as President of the Divisions of General Psychology and Experimental Psychology, the editorships of *Psychological Monographs* and *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* (two terms), membership on the Policy and Planning Board (twice, once as Chair), Chair of the Task Force on Privacy and Confidentiality, membership on the Council of Representatives and The Board of Directors. Outside APA, he has served as a member and sometimes as Chair of several NIMH study sections, Secretary/Treasurer of the James McKeen Cattell Fund, Chair of COGDOP, and member of the ETS Committee that prepared the Advanced Placement Test in Psychology. Kimble has been the author and/or editor of about 100 articles and book chapters and 20 books, including six editions of an introductory textbook, 5 volumes of the Division 1 publication *Portraits of Pioneers in Psychol-*

ogy, Hilgard and Marquis' Conditioning and Learning, How to Use (and misuse) Statistics, Psychology: The Hope of a Science, and A Chairperson's Survival Manual.

Kimble's Statement Currently the Council Representative for the Society for General Psychology, I am standing for re-election. In that role, my mission has always been to work for unity in psychology, a goal that is important to our division but difficult to harmonize with the competing needs and values of the several special interests in the discipline.

For many years, my publications have aimed at promoting oneness on psychology, based on the unifying power of the concept of psychology as a science. The first of these was "Psychology as a Science" (*Scientific Monthly*, 1953). The six editions of my introductory textbook, *Principles of General Psychology* published between 1956 and 1984 (editions 2 and 3 with Norman Garnezy and editions 4-6 with Garnezy and Edward Zigler), offered that conception to thousands of undergraduate students. Several of them, who later rose to prominence in APA have told me that that book had a significant impact on their lives. An article ("The Problem of Volition," *Psychological Review*, 1970, with Larry Perlmutter) provided scientific credentials for a topic that, in those days, was scorned as subjective and therefore anti-scientific. My very most influential article, "Psychology's Two Cultures" (*American Psychologist*, 1984) describes the attitudinal dimensions along which psychologists are divided. A series of later publications outlines a science-based theory that carries the potential for erasing those antagonisms: "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Generalist" (*American Psychologist*, 1989), "A Frame of Reference in Psychology" (*American Psychologist*, 1994), *Psychology: The Hope of a Science* (MIT Press, 1996), "Functional Behaviorism: A Plan for Unity In Psychology" (*American Psychologist*, 1999), and "Behaviorism and Unity in Psychology" *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 2000, in press).

Many of my other scholarly contributions have also been of the kind that one expects from a generalist. I was the final editor of *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied* and the first editor of *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* (two terms). Currently, I am on the Editorial Board of the Division 1 publication, *General Psychology Review*.

Elsewhere, my experience has provided me with experience that helps me understand the outlooks of psychologists with a diverse variety of perspectives. When I was on the APA Board of Directors I was a member of the Board's subcommittee on the Future of Professional Education in Psychology and liaison to Board of Scientific Affairs and the Public Information Committee. At other times, I served as a member of the Policy and Planning Board (twice, once as chair), the APA Task Force on Privacy and Confidentiality (chair), the Publications and Communications Board, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards in Research (the "Cook Committee"). I also participated in the 1990

National Conference on Enhancing the Quality of Undergraduate Education in Psychology.

Looking to the future, I see emerging unity in APA, largely as a result of Council's creating a new companion organization to promote the interests of professional psychology. This development offers great hope for harmony in psychology, a development that I hope to be able to continue to contribute to.

Lewis P. Lipsitt is Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Medical Science, and Human Development at Brown University. He continues to be actively involved, as a Research Professor, in a longitudinal study, with the Harvard School of Public Health and the UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute, of children who were studied intensively at Brown University from birth to seven years of age. Those individuals are now 36 to 42 years old. At Brown for 43 years, with sabbatical and leave time away for work at the Tavistock Institute in London, the National Institute of Mental Health, and APA, Lipsitt was the founder and director for 25 years of Brown's Child Study Center. He received his Ph.D. in experimental child psychology. With a BA from the University of Chicago (from which institution he recently received a lifetime achievement award), and master's degree from the university of Massachusetts (Amherst). he was a clinical psychologist in the US Air Force 1952-54, before returning to school for his doctorate. He has mentored dozens of students, both undergraduate and graduate, and received the lifetime Mentor Award from the American Association for the Advancement of Science, especially for promoting the scientific careers of women and minority persons. Lipsitt has been president of the Division on Developmental Psychology and the Society of General Psychology (Division 1), and has been science director of APA. He was selected as the Psi Chi Lecturer for the 1997 meetings of the New England Psychological Association, and is one of this year's Distinguished Scientific Lecturers for APA. He is currently the president of Division 1. Lipsitt has been a Guggenheim Fellow, and in 1979-80 was the James McKean Cattell Fellow at Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. A Nicholas Hobbs Awardee for "science in the service of children" from APA's Division of Child, Youth, and Family Services, he also served as president of Brown University's chapter of the Society of the Sigma Xi. He was president of the Eastern Psychological Association in 1992-93, and has served on the executive board of the Rhode Island Psychological Association, from which he received the Musiker-Merenda Award for mental health service to Rhode Island. He has authored articles on infant learning and perception, perinatal risk, crib death, and adolescent suicide, and was founder and co-editor, beginning in 1963, of the series *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*. He was also founding editor of the journal *Infant Behavior and Development*, as well as the *Brown University Child and Adolescent Behavior Letter*.

Lipsitt's Statement You could vote for either of

your two Division 1 candidates for Council Representative and get an "old hand" in matters of APA governance. I approve of having many more young folks joining the the Council of APA, and indeed of joining Division 1, the Society for General Psychology. However, we have to get the young folk to join the Division first! Indeed, it appears from reports of the APA Central Office that young psychologists are not joining APA itself at a rate sufficient to counter the rapid decline in membership at the other end of the age continuum. We need to fix that, and this can be done only by working on the quality and relevance of our offerings.

Division 1 takes its special missions very seriously, and needs to exert more influence on the conduct of the overarching affairs of the APA. We are the division of **general psychology** and as such are responsible for promoting integration of psychological subdisciplines. Division 1 seeks to cross boundaries, and our diversified membership indicates that we have been and continue to be successful in this work. We sponsor awards for integrative research, and for attempts to "unify" psychology.

We are in the midst of an era of tension in Psychology. This is due in part to the special problems that our clinical members are having in meeting the stringent and often unreasonable requirements of third-party payers. Practitioners quite rightly feel that the scientist/academician "wing" (see the APA logo) of APA should be more understanding and helpful with the problems that applied psychologists are facing. Often, when the scientists seek to offer help (for example, by proposing to study the differential efficacies of diverse clinical interventions), their clinical colleagues interpret this kind of aid as a hindrance to, and even destructive of, the practice of their clinical skills. Yet, the profession of Psychology is, among all the guilds offering services to those who are in crisis, whether with behavioral interventions or other mental health measures, the most qualified to deploy appropriate outcome and other empirically defensible evaluative techniques. In Division 1, our Society of General Psychology, we seek to lessen the suspicion on both sides and help, proactively, to put before the Association a position of greater friendliness. This needs to be implemented, promoted, reinforced, and applauded especially in Council, which is "the people's emissary" brought to convene on command of the division and state membership.

As your Council Rep from Division 1, I would seek to promote greater visibility of your Society for General Psychology, and would continue with tasks that I have undertaken to sponsor this year as president of the division, with my colleagues on your executive committee. Foremost among these would be inter-divisional initiatives designed to explore the usefulness of Psychology in understanding and ameliorating problems of social injustice, poverty, and the awesomely large number of children in this country who cannot read. Society needs our science, and our science needs the talent of individuals who are trained well in all facets of the fascinating discipline called Psychology.

For Executive Committee at Large

Frank Farley Ph.D. University of London, England. BA, MA, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon. L.H. Carnell Professor, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1995 to present, Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1966-1995. President, American Psychological Association 1993-1994. President, APA Division of General Psychology, 1998; Division of Media Psychology, 1999; Division of International Psychology, 2000. President, International Council of Psychologists 1999-2000. Fellow of APA, American Psychological Society, American Association for the Advancement of Science, British Psychological Society, Canadian Psychological Association. Member, National Academy of Sciences National Committee for the International Union of Psychological Sciences. Member, Council of the Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences. Editorial Board Member of several journals. Research interests: general psychology, motivation, personality.

Farley's Statement My major contribution as a member-at-large of the Executive Committee of the Society for General Psychology would be to help ensure the stability and financial solvency of the Society and to help advance the concepts of a general psychology. These concepts embrace an integrated psychology, a psychology that seeks the common ground, the general conceptions, that will aid in understanding all of human behavior in some connected way. Thus there are the practical duties of the member-at-large to support and sustain the functions of the Society on the one hand, and on the other hand help provide some leadership in articulating and advancing the concepts of general psychology. To these tasks I bring considerable experience in the Society as one of its former presidents. I also bring substantial APA experience to the Society as a former APA president, Board of Directors member, and longtime Council of Representatives member. I would enjoy applying this experience to the tasks confronting the Society.

The Society for General Psychology has a most unique and important position in the world of psychology. It is the only organization of psychologists concerned with the integration of psychological concepts and perspectives and the seeking of common ground in the face of psychology's continuing balkanization. Its a society and APA division with a grand mission. I subscribe to that mission.

Susan Mineka is a Professor of Psychology at Northwestern University where she has been since 1987, having previously taught for 13 years at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Texas at Austin. She received her undergraduate education at Cornell University, her PhD in experimental psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, and APA-approved clinical retraining at the University of Wisconsin. She is a Fellow of both APA (Divisions 1, 3, and

12) and APS. She served as Editor of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* (1990-1994) and Associate Editor of *Learning and Motivation* (1981-1988), and currently serves on the editorial boards of three journals—the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *Psychological Review*, and *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*. She has also served on the APA's Board of Scientific Affairs (1992-1994, Chair, 1994), on the Executive Board of the Society for Research in Psychopathology (1992-1994, 1999-), on the Council of the MPA (1988-1991), as President of the Society for the Science of Clinical Psychology (1995), and as President of the Midwestern Psychological Association (1996-1997). During 1997-1998 she was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, CA.

Her research interests have focused in two different areas. In the past she did a great deal of work with rats and monkeys on animal models of human fears, anxiety, and depression. Currently she still does a good deal of theoretical work in this area. Her current research interests with humans focus on understanding cognitive and behavioral factors that contribute to the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of anxiety and depressive disorders.

Mineka's Statement I have long viewed myself as a general psychologist and am proud to be a Fellow of Division 1. I would be honored to serve as a member-at-large for this Division where I would hope to contribute to an agenda of furthering the goals of the Division. In my own teaching and writing I spend a good deal of time encouraging students and colleagues of the importance of crossing interdisciplinary boundaries in their thinking and their empirical work. I have also tried to convey the excitement of this kind of interdisciplinary thinking to more general audiences who far too often still tend to think of experimental psychologists as studying dogs that drool in response to a bell, or pigeons that peck a key for food, and of clinical psychologists as professionals who psychoanalyze their clients and their friends (or even strangers). But in this era of ever-increasing specialization the task of conveying such ideas to students, colleagues, and the general public is a daunting one that can best be accomplished by a group of like-minded psychologists functioning together. The idea of being part of such a group working together on this general agenda is very exciting for me.

A considerable amount of my own theoretical and empirical work over the years has had as a common theme integrating findings and insights from more than one discipline of psychology. Reflecting my own background, first in animal learning and motivation, and later in clinical psychology, much of this work has focused on the relevance of basic findings in experimental psychology to understanding human emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression, particularly in the form of animal models of human psychopathology. Some of my work on these topics has also incorporated theories and findings from evolutionary theory,

psychobiology, ethology, developmental theory, and personality and social psychology. In the past decade much of my work has also focused on the emotion-cognition interface (and hence the fields of cognition and emotion), with particular attention to its relevance for understanding anxiety and depression. Given the wide range of interrelated topics that interest me, it is perhaps not surprising that over the years I have published this work in nine different APA journals, as well as in many other journals in related fields. Through my experience in various capacities for APA, such as serving on the Board of Scientific Affairs and on the editorial boards for three generalist journals (*Psychological Review*, *Psychological Science*, and *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*), as well as my experience in various similar capacities for more specialized societies and more specialized journals, I have become acquainted with a broad range of colleagues in various areas of psychology. Moreover, this has also led me to understand some of the broad issues that confront different disciplines within psychology. I think this generalist background would serve me well on the executive board of Division 1.

Wendy M. Williams is an Associate Professor in the Department of Human Development at Cornell University, where she studies the development, assessment, training, and societal implications of cognitive abilities. She holds Ph.D. and Master's degrees in psychology from Yale, a Master's in physical anthropology from Yale, and a B.A. in English and biology from Columbia University, awarded cum laude with special distinction. Williams was Co-Principal Investigator for a six-year, \$1.4 million Army Research Institute grant to study practical intelligence and success at leadership. She also directed the joint Harvard-Yale Practical and Creative Intelligence for School Project. In addition to dozens of articles and chapters on her research, Williams has authored seven books and edited three volumes, including *The Reluctant Reader*, *Success-Acts for Managers* (with Robert Sternberg), and *Escaping the Advice Trap* (with Stephen Ceci). Her research has been featured in *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, *Science Magazine*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *USA Today*, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, and *Child Magazine*, among other media outlets. She also writes regular invited editorials for *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Williams is series editor for The Lawrence Erlbaum *Educational Psychology Series*, and she served on the Editorial Review Board of *Psychological Bulletin*. In both 1995 and 1996 her research won first-place awards from the American Educational Research Association. She is a Fellow of two APA divisions (1 and 46), and she is currently Member-at-Large of division 1. She was also program chair and dissertation award committee chair for both divisions 1 and 15 (educational psychology). Williams received the 1996 Early Career Contribution Award from Division 15 of APA, and both the 1997 and 1999 Mensa Awards for Excellence in Research to a Senior Investigator.

Williams' Statement Why elect me as Member-at-Large of Division 1? First, I am firmly rooted in the "generalist" philosophy of psychology, and I am devoted to Division 1, as should be clear from my biographical statement. Second, I am committed to the goal of exporting to the broader society the results and lessons learned from sound psychological research. And finally, I deserve to be elected because I made it into the professorial ranks of scientific psychology following the profound rejection, as a college freshman, of receiving a C+ in Intro Psych ... and never taking an additional psychology course until graduate school!

With the growth of the importance of broad collaborations across scientific disciplines, and with funding priorities from major agencies increasingly emphasizing integration and collaboration, the goals and mission of Division 1 become more salient. Through Division 1's program at the annual convention and through its many awards and activities, Division 1 spans academic disciplines and highlights the best and brightest of current research. My foremost goal if elected would be to locate and bring to the spotlight talented researchers and scholars from diverse arenas, so that these individuals can share their wealth with the broader psychological community and with society at large.

I place strong emphasis on effective communication with representatives of the media, who are equipped to disseminate broadly our work. Often, brilliant work does not reach the audience it deserves. Division 1 can help to improve this situation by providing a podium for deserving research and by working to export important findings beyond the walls of the American Psychological Association and the academy in general. Too often, it is the not the best of our science that is portrayed to the public, and this unfortunate fact should concern every one of us.

Finally, back to that heinous C+ during my freshman year in college. (When one runs for office during a stinging political season such as this, such historical incidents are inevitably made public; hence, I have opted to preempt the press.) Perhaps you think that I am merely making a bad joke, but my point is a serious one. A good course in Intro Psych does precisely what Division 1 aims to do—integrate and explicate the content and context of all of the subfields within the broader discipline of psychology. Had my Intro Psych course fulfilled this goal, I would not have almost flunked it, and I would not have ended up terrified of registering for another psychology course. The moral of this story is simple: When potentially talented newcomers to our discipline are shown the forest in addition to a few clumps of trees, we are likely to succeed in retaining these individuals and in maximizing their contribution. However, when we fail at this primary level—in other words, when the goals of Division 1 are not met—we risk losing the people we most need to continue to expand and bring excitement to our discipline and our science.

Alan Boneau is retired from teaching in the formal sense and now spends time writing, editing, reading, traveling, and other enjoyable activities. A Duke PhD he is a Fellow of Divisions 1, 2, 24, 25, and 26, and of AAAS and APS. He taught at Duke for 9 years after his degree and for a number of years was in the APA Central Office in Washington as a bureaucrat. After a stint at George Mason University he stopped working for money. He is a Past-President of Division One and is now on the Division One Executive Committee and is the Editor of *The General Psychologist*.

Boneau's Statement Psychology, suffers from the same kind of blight that troubles our major cities: unplanned development. Individual scientific entrepreneurs are generating new research avenues and theoretical structures, that extend into undeveloped territory and even into the suburbs of neighboring intellectual communities. Whatever the direction, there is little or no concern demonstrated for the health and well-being of the forgotten downtown, our common intellectual heritage. One concern of *General Psychology* should be the care and nurture of that neglected downtown, the hub from which psychology's creative energy flows, and has flown from to a significant extent. It is up to us in The Society for General Psychology to take a big picture view of the megalopolis of which we are a part and to attempt to make intellectual sense out of the whole thing. What are the common problems, the common goals, if any? How does the whole thing fit together, or does it? How do we define our essence, and is this essence sufficiently attractive to make a fuss about? Are we in any sense a separate quasi-political entity or only to be a minor suburb of Biology, Computer Science, or Medicine?

Someone in Psychology has got to be concerned with these issues, and Division One alone has the mission. It is the bully pulpit to preach this message and raise the questions. I have editorialized in *The General Psychologist* and have given many talks at APA about these issues and I will continue to do so. I view the Executive Committee as a mechanism for getting to work on the problems I have outlined and I will do my best to push the Division to live up to its mission and its promise (and get to work on the potholes).

Minutes: Continued from Page 24

Hour-Social Hour for all Awardees and Division 1 members to meet the presentors after the Business Meeting. Dr. Lipsitt thanked Dr. Bersoff for his hard work, and noted that he would be calling on him for support for next year's convention.

Dr. Lee Matthews thanked Larita Minns and her staff in the Accounting Department at the APA Central Office for their assistance with the 1998 IRS Statement, as well as, suggestions for organization of the Budget. The Dues Assessment Rate Structure for next year was reviewed and is in the new Divisional Brochure. The fees are different from those listed on the Website. The issue was resolved by the time of the Business meeting, and the rates are correct in the Brochure, and will be changed on the Website (By the way, you have seen our Website at APA.ORG haven't you?).

Royalty checks were received and deposited in the Divisional account in June for 1998 sales of *Pioneers in Psychology* series in the amount of \$1,464.46 and for \$5,464.51 for sales of *Career Paths in Psychology* for 1998.

Dr. Peter Salovey reported on the progress of the Society Journal, *Review of General Psychology*. It was "Good News, Bad News". While there was an increase in revenue of approximately \$10,000 over last year, the journal is still running at a net loss of \$39,256. As previously discussed at other EC meetings, this initial start up cost loss was expected for the first several years, and the expenses will be repayed to APA as subscriptions increase.

There were 150 new member subscriptions. There are currently 72 student members of APA, who are not members of any division, and with the current dues structure, recruiting these students may be one way of increasing interest in both the division and in the journal.

Institutional subscriptions have increased, with almost twice the number (29 to 15) over last year. EC members were encouraged to have their facilities and their colleagues at other facilities to put in a library request. The NEWSLETTER will have a form (1/4 TO 1/2 PAGE) in an upcoming issue, which can be used as a library request card, to facilitate members asking these libraries to adopt the journal.

Dr. Wertheimer reported on some information he had obtained concerning other divisions' institutional subscriptions. Most divisions have about 20 to 30 such subscriptions, but some divisions have large numbers (60 to 100) usually for the older, more well established journals.

Two of the 1999 journals have been sent out to members and the table of contents for the other two are in the final stages of completion. A chart in the report noted that on-going submissions had a drop-off to 25 in 1998, but there are 34 so far this year, with 55 to 60 as the ongoing yearly goal. About 1/3 will be accepted. Current review process was up to about 11 weeks, but now is back to single digits. Dr. Salovey urged the EC to encourage members to submit articles on general psychology, especially those which integrate or draw ties to several sub-fields.

Dr. Salovey has a meeting scheduled with APA Journal Committee for Sunday, August 22 at 10:00-11:00 AM in the APA Publication Suite. Other EC members are invited. Dr. Lipsitt on behalf of the entire EC thanked Dr. Salovey for his hard work and the short editorial lag time.

Dr. Morton Ann Gernsbacher sent a request by e-mail to appoint a new Chair of the Fellows Committee, as she will be stepping down from that position at the end of December. She indicated that she would willing to remain as a member of the committee, but not the Chair. Several names for the chair position were discussed and will be given to Dr. Salzinger.

There were 7 nominations for Fellow which were previously reviewed by the Fellows committee. The committee recommended at the meeting and the EC approved the applications of 2 Current Fellows and 5 New Fellows. The deadline for next year's applications is February 1, 2000.

Dr. Lipsitt, in Dr. Salzinger's absence, gave the President's report. The election returns for next year indicated that our new President-Elect will be Dr. Lyle E. Bourne, with Drs. Lynn A. Hasher and R. Duncan Luce as our Members-at-Large.

Dr. Gregory Kimble, our Council Representative, noted a few items of critical importance to the Division. Of major interest was that next year's budget was passed with a deficit. Reports from all of the Directorates were also given. Among other

noteworthy items were the passage of standards for high school psychology and test user's standards. Upcoming agenda items for the second Council meeting later in the week included a proposal to buy another building and an editorial policy about the publishing of research findings. Dr. Kimble was thanked by Dr. Lipsitt for his work on behalf of the Division.

Dr. Gregory Kimble and Dr. Michael Wertheimer continue their excellent work on the *Portraits of Pioneers* series. They presented a handout with the Table of Contents for all 4 volumes in the series. They also included an updated version of a page prepared for the Division 1 website. Volume IV is almost completed, with editing finished on 10 of the chapters, with most of the work completed on 9 more. The manuscripts to be delivered to the publishers in the Fall of 1999. Dr. Kimble also noted that the new printer, whose purchase was approved at the last EC meeting has been "well used". Plans are still under consideration for future volumes of Pioneers.

The Awards report was given by Dr. Alan Boneau. The Year 2000 Awardees are:

Arthur W Staats Award: Dr. Martin Seligmann

Ernest R. Hilgard Award: Dr. Phil Zimbardo

George A. Miller Award: Drs. K. Geoffrey White and John T. Wixted

Williams James Book Award: (Co-winners) Dr. Dean Simonton; Drs. Steven Ceci and Maggie Bruck

Issues regarding the number of winners for awards and what should happen when there is a tie for an award, such as splitting the set amount of money for the award or giving two checks, each for the full amount was discussed. Dr. Boneau suggested that consideration be given to a second award (to be named) in place of the Roger Brown award. The criteria for all of the awards and the written procedures for the awards also needs to be reviewed. Following some comments from other EC members of these topics, it was decided to have all of these issues deferred to the January 2000 meeting of the EC for further discussion. The deadline for all awards, now that the Staats Award has been integrated into the other awards process is now March 15.

Dr. Boneau also gave the TGP (Newsletter) report. Two issues have been completed so far this year. Dr. Boneau thanked the members of the EC for their support and input. The Fall issue will have the call for Nominations for Officers.

Dr. Frank Farley, as Past President noted that the Division's official name change to Society for General Psychology has been completed. Dr. Farley noted that Dr. Mary Ann Lyons took primary responsibility for publishing *The General Psychologist* in 1998 (Volume 33). Dr. Lipsitt and the EC unanimously thanked Dr. Mary Ann Lyon for her outstanding service during that time. She will be reimbursed for her duties as the position included an honorarium and office expenses.

Dr. Lewis Lipsitt, as President-Elect, noted that he is the Program Chair for the 2000 convention, but that Dr. Bersoff had offered to help out with the arrangements. As a divisional members, you are encouraged to volunteer as part of these preparations.

Dr. Nora Newcombe noted that the Division needs to continue to work on the recruitment of students and women members. The issue of trying to recruit student members of APA, who do not have any divisional affiliation was raised. A letter was sent to APAG, suggesting that students consider joining the division.

Dr. Donald Dewsbury sent in the Historian's report by e-mail. Dr. Dewsbury noted that he has continued to request materials from past officers to ensure their deposition in a proper archive. In recent years, it has not been clear as to the best place for such records, with some materials being sent to the APA Archive in Washington and some to the Archives of the History of American Psychology in Akron, the latter usually being sent materials related to more general psychology. Dr. Dewsbury noted that Dr. Wade E. Pickren has been appointed as the Director of Archives and Library Services at APA and that space has been allocated for storage of materials. Dr. Dewsbury has visited that site. He recommended that a decision be made to place all of our divisional materials in the APA archives. A motion was placed as a New Business item on the agenda (and subsequently approved later in the meeting).

The Nominations and Elections report by Drs. Farley and Kimble noted that the Call for Nominations for next year is in the TGP with January 1, 2000 as the deadline. Other New Business items included submission of the Division description for the 1999 Apportionment Ballot which was due September 1. Changes to reflect the divisional name change and other language changes were discussed. Drs. Salzinger and Matthews finalized the revision. A letter was received from Division 22 (Rehabilitation) about "socially responsible investing" of Divisional funds through APA services. This was also not an issue which other members of the EC had encountered in their capacity in this or other APA divisions. No action was taken on this item.

Thanks to the hard work of Dennis Ba Nguyen and Marc Carter, our Webmasters, the Division 1 Website has been updated. All members are encouraged to log on to APA.ORG, go to Division One and view it. If you have any ideas for further updates, please send them in as there are still "empty" pages.

Dr. Lipsitt announced that the next EC meeting will be in Providence, some time in late January of 2000. Remember, if you have any items you wish your officers to consider, please contact any member of the EC.

Dr. Lipsitt then adjourned the EC meeting.

Lee Matthews, Secretary/Treasurer

The **GENERAL** *Psychologist*

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